Burgeoning skepticism
Abstract
This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.
Department
Philosophy
Publication Date
9-1990
Journal Title
Erkenntnis
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.1007/BF00166330
Document Type
Article
Recommended Citation
"Burgeoning Skepticism," Erkenntnis, Vol. 33 (1990), pp. 141-164
Rights
© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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