Date of Award
Spring 2025
Project Type
Thesis
Program or Major
History
Degree Name
Master of Arts
First Advisor
David S Bachrach
Second Advisor
Marion Dorsey
Third Advisor
Kurk Dorsey
Abstract
This paper examines military strategy during the mid twelfth century civil war in England, the so-called “Anarchy.” It demonstrates that King Stephen and his Angevin opponents both employed what would be recognized today as strategy in their conduct of the war. It posits that the two largest factors influencing their respective strategies was the permeability of the English countryside, allowing the easy movement of military forces, and the expensive and time-consuming necessity of besieging castles to gain control of territory, the latter a reality of contemporary technology. Using concepts from the field of strategic studies, it demonstrates that, rather than being a period of anarchy and chaos, the conduct of the war was logical and rational given the limitations imposed on both sides, and that it was fought using “best practices” of the period. It supports the historiographical position that warfare in the Middle Ages was far more sophisticated than it is often given credit for and that this is demonstrated by the systematic analysis of the actions of both sides of the conflict rather than a piecemeal approach of examining individual activities and engagements. It concludes that historiographical views of King Stephen as a weak leader are inaccurate and his failure to decisively conclude the war were due to exogenous factors, not innate character flaws. Ultimately, the dearth of contemporary sources means that a full accounting of the war will never be possible.
Recommended Citation
Sloan, Keith, "King Stephen's War: Military Strategy in a Time of Anarchy" (2025). Master's Theses and Capstones. 1999.
https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/1999