Abstract
We test how fast and slow thought processes affect cooperation for sustainability by manipulating time pressure in a dynamic common-pool resource experiment. Sustainable management of shared resources critically depends on decisions in the current period to leave enough stock so that future generations are able to draw on the remaining limited natural resources. An intertemporal common-pool resource game represents a typical dynamic for social dilemmas involving natural resources. Using one such game, we analyse decisions throughout time. We find that people in this context deplete the common resource to a greater extent under time pressure, which leads to greater likelihood of stock collapse. Preventing resource collapse while managing natural resources requires actively creating decision environments that facilitate the cognitive capacity needed to support sustainable cooperation.
Publication Date
4-18-2018
Publisher
Springer Nature
Journal Title
Nature Sustainability
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
Document Type
Article
Recommended Citation
Brozyna, C., Guilfoos, T. & Atlas, S. Slow and deliberate cooperation in the commons. Nat Sustain 1, 184–189 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0050-z
Comments
This is an Author Manuscript of an article published by Springer Nature in Nature Sustainability in 2018 posted to DigitalCommons@URI, Version of Record available online: https://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0050-z