Access Pricing for App Stores Under the DMA
Abstract
This article addresses the fees that Apple and Google might charge business users in their respective mobile ecosystems that would be compliant under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) with a focus on third-party app store access fees. The paper analyses the economic principles behind the DMA’s goals of contestability and fairness, particularly in relation to Apple's App Store. It argues that while Apple may charge a fixed fee to review third-party app stores or apps (‘Review Fee’), the Access Fee for third-party app stores on iOS should be zero to comply with the DMA. This is because non-zero Access Fees hinder competition from alternative app stores. The paper also explains the strategic impact of fees on app developers when they are conditioned on using rival distribution channels; these can block entry and harm market fairness. We recommend a fee structure for Apple’s App Store that includes a zero Access Fee and a reasonable Review Fee. Other aspects of Apple’s ecosystem would continue to be monetizable. The article concludes that opening the app store market under these guidelines would promote innovation and competition, consistent with the DMA’s objectives.
Department
Law
Publication Date
12-2025
Journal Title
Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaf015
Document Type
Article
Recommended Citation
Jacques Crémer, David Dinielli, Paul Heidhues, Gene Kimmelman, Giorgio Monti, Margaret O’Grady, Rupprecht Podszun, Monika Schnitzer, Fiona Scott Morton, Alexandre de Streel, Access Pricing for App Stores Under the DMA, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2025, Pages 565–594, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaf015