Abstract
Justice Scalia is an outspoken conservative acclaimed for his remarkable intellect and scholarship, and is noted for his adherence to the principle of judicial restraint. He pursues what he insists is an "originalist" path that relies on the Constitution's actual text in decision-making. He works hard to try to maintain constitutional interpretation that does not change from case to case.
So what happens when an "originalist"--concerned that Congress writes imprecise legislation and then leaves its interpretation and application in the hands of administrative agencies or, worse yet, the courts-is forced to deal with tax issues? This article takes a look at whether Scalia has been successful in trying to construct a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation that does not change from case to case, when those cases involve tax issues.
Publication Date
4-27-2003
Journal Title
University of Toledo Law Review
Document Type
Article
Recommended Citation
Black, Stephen T. and Black, Katherine D., "Justice Scalia's Tax Jurisprudence" (2003). University of Toledo Law Review. 394.
https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub/394
Rights
Copyright 2003 University of Toledo, Stephen T. Black, and Katherine D. Black
Included in
Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Tax Law Commons
Additional Information
This manuscript was made available as Paper 2 of the Pierce Law Faculty Scholarship Series by NELLCO (nellco.org). The final version was published in Volume 34 of the University of Toledo Law Review (2003).