Author ORCID Identifier
Abstract
In his Tales of the Mighty Dead, Robert Brandom discusses at some length Wilfrid Sellars’s two-ply account of observation. Much of Brandom’s discussion is pithy and revealing, but we would like to draw attention to two problems with his treatment of ‘looks’-statements that make it a less than faithful representation of Sellars’s analysis. Furthermore, to the extent that Brandom falls short of a truly Sellarsian account of ‘looks’-statements, he also prevents his readers from appreciating fully Sellars’s critique of Cartesianism.
Department
Philosophy
Publication Date
2009
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Recommended Citation
“Brandom’s Two-Ply Error” (Jointly authored with Paul Coates) in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity and Realism: Essays on the Anniversary of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” W. A. deVries, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 131-145.
Comments
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a chapter published by Oxford University Press in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity and Realism: Essays on the Anniversary of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” in 2009.