Social Capital in a Diversifying City: A Multi-Neighborhood Ethnographic Case Study

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Abstract
Despite major demographic shifts in the nation’s racial/ethnic composition, we know little about how residents of integrating cities and neighborhoods are connected to one another. Research regarding the relationship between neighborhood diversity and ‘social capital’ (ties between individuals) is mixed, often suggesting that diversity reduces trust, close ties, and participation in local civic life. Yet, the extant literature fails to account for ground-level urban social processes underlying social capital formation in diverse neighborhoods. In this dissertation, I reframe the diversity/social capital debate by using ethnographic methods to answer three interrelated questions: How do residents of diverse neighborhoods (compared to less diverse ones) develop ties with one another? What forms do these ties take? (For example, are these ties strong or weak? Do they cross racial and ethnic lines or are they homogeneous?). Finally, what outcomes do these connections result in for residents and their neighborhoods? Several neighborhoods of varying diversity in Manchester, New Hampshire (the states most racially and ethnically diverse city) are the sites for this research. Findings illustrate the role of culture in social capital processes—that is, the cultural frames residents use to make sense of diversity and demographic change have implications for the formation of neighborhood social ties and reciprocity. Some espoused a ‘social justice’ frame, seeing diversity and multiculturalism as enriching life experiences and offering structural explanations for inequality. These residents were from a wider range of racial/ethnic backgrounds, lived in more racially and economically diverse places, and had more racially/ethnically diverse social networks. They were also more attached to their neighbors and engaged more often in reciprocity and helping behaviors across racial/ethnic lines. Other residents used a ‘self-reliance’ frame, arguing that newcomers must assimilate, that Manchester’s diversity reduces quality of life, and that individual failures/behaviors explain inequality. This research also highlights the role of civic organizations. While these groups were sometimes successful in connecting residents to one another (including those of different racial/ethnic backgrounds) this varied by the type, structure, and recruitment strategies of organizations. These same organizational features also helped to reproduce inequality within and between neighborhoods, giving white residents and those of higher socioeconomic status better connections to resources that improve quality of life.

Keywords
diversity, neighborhoods, race/ethnic relations, social capital, Sociology

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SOCIAL CAPITAL IN A DIVERSIFYING CITY: A MULTI-NEIGHBORHOOD
ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDY

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Sociology

September, 2015
This dissertation has been examined and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology by:

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On July 29, 2015

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of New Hampshire Graduate School.
DEDICATION

For my parents. Your love and support made this dissertation possible.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No project of this scale could be accomplished alone, and this dissertation developed with the help of many individuals. I owe much thanks to my committee members, without whom this dissertation likely would have taken a very different shape. This includes my dissertation chair, Michele Dillon, whose guidance and mentorship sparked my interest in social capital. Your devotion to my professional development and career in sociology will be with me for many years to come. My thanks also go out to Ken Johnson. Ken, during my proposal defense, you iterated the importance of digging into these neighborhoods as deeply as possible, and that has made all the difference. Thank you also to Sally Ward for introducing me to the urban/community literature that substantially informed the research design I undertook here. I am also indebted to Semra Aytur for helping me realize the depth of Manchester’s rich organizational and civic structure. Thank you as well to Robert Macieski, whose knowledge of Manchester’s past was critical in helping me understand its present.

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ABSTRACT

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by

Justin R. Young

University of New Hampshire, September, 2015

Despite major demographic shifts in the nation’s racial/ethnic composition, we know little about how residents of integrating cities and neighborhoods are connected to one another. Research regarding the relationship between neighborhood diversity and ‘social capital’ (ties between individuals) is mixed, often suggesting that diversity reduces trust, close ties, and participation in local civic life. Yet, the extant literature fails to account for ground-level urban social processes underlying social capital formation in diverse neighborhoods. In this dissertation, I reframe the diversity/social capital debate by using ethnographic methods to answer three interrelated questions: How do residents of diverse neighborhoods (compared to less diverse ones) develop ties with one another? What forms do these ties take? (For example, are these ties strong or weak? Do they cross racial and ethnic lines or are they homogeneous?). Finally, what outcomes do these connections result in for residents and their neighborhoods? Several neighborhoods of varying diversity in Manchester, New Hampshire (the states most racially and ethnically diverse city) are the sites for this research. Findings illustrate the role of culture in social capital processes—that is, the cultural frames residents use to make sense of diversity and demographic change have implications for the formation of neighborhood social ties and reciprocity. Some espoused a ‘social justice’ frame, seeing diversity and
multiculturalism as enriching life experiences and offering structural explanations for inequality. These residents were from a wider range of racial/ethnic backgrounds, lived in more racially and economically diverse places, and had more racially/ethnically diverse social networks. They were also more attached to their neighbors and engaged more often in reciprocity and helping behaviors across racial/ethnic lines. Other residents used a ‘self-reliance’ frame, arguing that newcomers must assimilate, that Manchester’s diversity reduces quality of life, and that individual failures/behaviors explain inequality. This research also highlights the role of civic organizations. While these groups were sometimes successful in connecting residents to one another (including those of different racial/ethnic backgrounds) this varied by the type, structure, and recruitment strategies of organizations. These same organizational features also helped to reproduce inequality within and between neighborhoods, giving white residents and those of higher socioeconomic status better connections to resources that improve quality of life.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL RATIONALE

A growing number of Americans find themselves living in increasingly racially and ethnically diverse cities and neighborhoods. Although segregation persists and same-race neighborhoods, particularly all white neighborhoods, remain the norm (Logan and Zhang 2011), people across the US are more likely to live in multiracial neighborhoods, driven largely by a rising tide of immigration. In 1980, a quarter of American neighborhoods could be categorized as racially heterogeneous, compared to more than a third twenty years later (Ellen 2000). According to Census Bureau projections, non-Hispanic whites will make up less than half of the US population by the early 2040s. The growing diversity of individuals’ social networks reflects this new demographic reality (De Souza Briggs 2007; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears 2006).

Sociologists know little, however, about how these changes are affecting social ties in diversifying cities and their neighborhoods. How, for example, is social capital formed in more versus less diverse neighborhoods, and what role do civic organizations play in these ties?

Traditionally, America’s largest cities have played host to the nation’s most diverse communities, with immigrants flocking to gateway cities like New York City, San Francisco and Chicago (Singer 2004). More recently, however, smaller metros have experienced an influx of immigrants and a rise in their nonwhite populations. Manchester, New Hampshire—a predominantly non-Hispanic white city in an even more homogeneous state—is one city undergoing a rapid change in its racial/ethnic composition. In 1990, less than 5 percent of the city’s residents were nonwhite. By 2010, their presence had nearly quadrupled, with nonwhites comprising almost a fifth of the city’s 110,000 residents, according to the most recent census
figures from the US Census Bureau. Manchester’s population growth between 2000 and 2010 was due entirely to immigration, without which the city would have experienced a net decline (Ward, Young, and Grimm 2014)—a demographic narrative also true of the US as a whole (US Census Bureau 2014).

These demographic forces shape the everyday lived experiences of Manchester’s residents. Walter, for example—a non-Hispanic white retiree—spoke of his surprise at how diverse his hometown had become during the decade he spent living out of state: “The [neighborhood] is multicultural now,” he said. Indeed, one is much more likely to encounter residents from a range of racial and ethnic groups in Walter’s neighborhood today than just a few years ago, despite the fact that his neighborhood is less diverse than the city as a whole—and much less diverse than the most heterogeneous neighborhood (where nearly half of all residents are nonwhite).

“My neighbors are African,” Walter continued, “and I love ‘em to death.” Another resident, Edna—a white woman with a lively personality who grew up and continues to live in the same neighborhood as Walter—described a somewhat different experience. “I barely even know they’re here,” she chimed; “I’m in my own little bubble.” As this brief exchange illustrates, although Manchester residents are more likely to live in more diverse neighborhoods today than they were a decade ago—oftentimes living right alongside those of other races and ethnicities—they do not always have close ties to their other-racial neighbors. Unlike Walter, who knows his African neighbor well, Edna appears to possess no close ties to those of other racial and ethnic groups in the neighborhood, despite their geographic proximity. For both Edna and Walter, like many (especially white) Americans, their social capital—that is, their stock of ties to other individuals—remains racially and ethnically homogeneous.
This observation raises a number of important questions about the changing nature of social life in our diversifying society. First, how do residents of diverse and less diverse neighborhoods develop ties with one another? Second, what forms do these ties take? For example, are these ties strong or weak? Do they cross racial and ethnic lines or are they homogeneous? Finally, what outcomes do these connections result in for residents and their neighborhoods? Answers to these questions will add to a growing body of literature on racially diverse communities and to our understanding of the concepts of community and social capital more broadly.

In his classic essay on the American city, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” Louis Wirth (1938) observed that urbanites come into frequent contact with individuals from walks of life quite disparate from their own (including differences across racial and ethnic lines). This reality, he contended, would result in “increased mobility, instability, and insecurity, and the affiliation of the individuals with a variety of intersecting and tangential social groups with a high rate of membership turnover” (p. 1). While Wirth himself did not speak of “social capital,” his writings nevertheless imply a concern that ties among urban residents would be few and fragmented, resulting in a populace in which different groups were highly isolated from one another. Whether this is the case has implications for Manchester residents, white and nonwhite alike, and those living in other diversifying places.

We know little about the ground-level consequences of increased racial diversity and, just as importantly, of the urban social processes that might help to foster connections between residents. Are residents of such places continuing to form strong ties to one another? Does such social capital allow them to work together to solve local problems? Or does the diversity of their neighborhood fragment social networks, decrease participation and prevent local collective
action? Embedded in such questions are concerns that community is in decline—a matter of sociological contention and broader public concern (e.g., Putnam 2000; Riesman, Glazer and Denney 2001). Rising rates of immigration in the US—while well below their historic levels—illustrate the extent to which society is highly mobile and ever-changing. Increasingly, social scientists continue to debate the extent to which “place” matters. As Edna and Walter’s accounts illustrate, demographic change is experienced at the level of community.

Research regarding the effects of neighborhood diversity on social capital has been mixed. Some scholarship suggests that as racial diversity increases, social capital declines significantly (Gesthuizen, van der Meer, and Scheepers 2008; Laurence 2009; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, and Scheepers 2011). Robert Putnam argues that residents of racially diverse neighborhoods “hunker down,” participating less in community life and even voting less. They also report less trust in their fellow neighbors, a lower quality of life and fewer close friends (Putnam 2007). Much of this literature often fails to account for issues of endogeneity, and has a tendency to not separate social capital from its consequences, instead defining the term broadly (see Portes and Vickstrom 2011). Other researchers suggest that the negative relationship between diversity and social capital holds up only in limited circumstances (Gijsberts, van der Meer, and Dagevos 2012; Lolle and Torpe 2011; Rothwell 2012; Uslaner 2010). Abascal and Baldassarri (2013) are particularly critical of Putnam’s conclusions and, subsequently, their implications for policy and community life. Putnam’s findings, they argue, are driven primarily by non-Hispanic whites’ aversion to their diverse neighborhoods and not, as Putnam claims, to the hunkering down of all locals. According to Abascal and Baldassarri, if diversity does have a negative effect on participation and trust, its influence appears to be limited to whites. Similarly, in his work on Chicago—a diverse city with a long history of segregation and racial inequality—
Robert Sampson (2011) found no negative effects of neighborhood heterogeneity on civic life and other important indicators of social ties. Moreover, he observed that nonprofit organizations—which have the potential to offer numerous benefits to their members (Small 2009)—actually thrive in the face of racial and ethnic diversity.

Given this mixed body of findings and little qualitative research on the subject, I explore whether—and how—social capital works in Manchester using a combination of ethnographic observations, historical/archival data, focus groups and in-depth interviews with residents, community leaders, and other important stakeholders, including developers, school administrators, and social service providers. This approach can shed light on consequences of demographic change while tending to multiple levels of analysis (in this case, individuals, organizations, and neighborhoods).

**Social Capital Theory**

Among the first sociologists to elaborate upon the concept, Bourdieu defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relations of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (1986: 49). An individual’s social capital, in other words, is the accumulation of his/her ties with other individuals that can lead to important resources. At its earliest stages of theoretical and empirical development, social capital theory could be summarized as follows: who you know matters. Using their social capital, individuals are able to accrue numerous benefits and resources (Lin 2002). Our social ties can also foster new identities and even lead to better outcomes for neighborhoods and cities.

When the concept gained notoriety outside the realm of social science, it took on a broader meaning, encapsulating everything from friendship and trust to civic engagement and
political mobilization (Portes 1998; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). Such an expansion of the term has added to the confusion and debate about the concept and its usefulness. In this dissertation, I do not set out to enter the debate about what social capital is or is not. Here, I focus on social capital as the accumulation of social ties—ties that can affect outcomes at the individual, organization or neighborhood level. Rather than define social capital based on normative assumptions about characteristics of good communities (including trust and civic engagement) as some researchers have done, I understand it as a variable that has the potential to affect or be affected by these neighborhood and community dimensions.

Small (2004) notes that the term social capital also encapsulates “the responsibilities [our social ties] demand of us...the norms they enforce...the ties themselves, and...the presence of a high number of such ties among communities and neighborhoods” (p. 1). Thus, just as a person with many social ties and membership in numerous groups might be said to have more social capital than those with fewer ties, the same is true of communities where residents trust one another, work together to solve local issues and play an active role in community life (see, for instance, Duncan 1999 or Small 2004).

It is not merely the quantity of one’s ties and the number of networks to which one has access that affects the outcomes of our social capital, though. As Small’s (2009) analysis of mothers with children in daycare illustrates, some organizations and institutions offer greater opportunities for fostering social ties and garnering resources from such connections than others do. Relationships between social capital and other factors are largely context dependent. For instance, while impoverished communities are said to evoke much lower levels of social capital and increased isolation (e.g., Wilson 1987, 1996), ground level factors complicate this relationship (Duncan 1999; Patillo-McCoy1999; Small 2004). Place culture also varies from one
community to the next, and community belief systems (Hummon 1990) influence the structure within which social ties are formed and the means by which residents seek to maintain control over their communities. Like Hummon (ibid.), Suttles (1972) demonstrates that residents draw on beliefs about their communities in problematizing some issues rather than others (e.g., crime; see, for instance, Leverentz 2011). These differences also result in residents of different communities responding differently to similar phenomena (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen 2000).

While many researchers have analyzed social capital as a dependent variable, it is also regarded as an independent variable that affects numerous outcomes at a variety of levels, including the individual, the neighborhood, and even the city. Small (2009), for example, demonstrates how daycare centers connect mothers to social networks and how mothers utilize these networks to their advantage. Daycare centers often connected mothers to other networks that, in turn, provided mothers useful information regarding factors like housing, employment, and childcare. According to Small, mothers whose children are in daycare have lower levels of depression that those whose children are not in daycare, which Small hypothesized to be an outcome of their participation in these centers and the ties they formed in these organizations. Importantly, Small also found that those with children in daycare report more close friends than those whose children are not enrolled. Thus, the connections provided by daycare centers lead to increased psychological wellbeing as well as improved economic outcomes.

Individuals need not be closely connected to one another in order to utilize their connections to their advantage. Among a sample of job seekers, Granovetter (1973) found that individuals were willing to use information about employment prospects even when they were not strongly connected to the individuals from whom they gained this information. Granovetter
concluded that, “From the individual’s point of view, then, weak ties are an important resource in making possible mobility opportunity” (p. 1373). We need not trust our ties in order to make use of them (ibid.), a point that suggests “social capital” and “trust” are better construed as separate empirical concepts. It remains to be seen whether weak ties are more or less abundant in diverse settings and whether racial diversity has any bearing on the “strength of weak ties.”

Whether ties are useful, and to what ends, also depends on the relation between the interconnected actors. Putnam (2000), for example, distinguishes between bonding social capital (ties between similar actors) and bridging social capital (ties rooted in dissimilarities between actors). While the former are “good for undergirding reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity,” the latter are similar to Granovetter’s concept of weak ties in that they “are better for linkage to external assets (those things we require but that those similar to us also lack access) and for information diffusion” (Putnam 2000: 22). Moreover, bridging social capital also has the capacity, according to Putnam, to produce new identities.

Social ties (in some cases) also lead to better neighborhood outcomes. Small (2004) argues that residents of one poor Boston neighborhood were able to work together to protect their community from developers and economic forces that would have disenfranchised and scattered residents. Although the barrio’s participation declined over time and did not lead to decreased levels of poverty in the long-term, it nevertheless allowed residents to protect and strengthen their own neighborhood. The strengthening of their own neighborhood and the availability of local resources had negative consequences for some local residents, leading to fewer networking attempts with middle- and upper-class residents of other neighborhoods, in turn isolating the most disadvantaged residents of the barrio. The eschewing opportunities for
bridging social capital outside the Villa in favor of local ties with similar others illustrates the very contradictory nature of bridging and bonding social capital suggested by Putnam.

Social isolation from important networks is rampant in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods according to much of the classic neighborhood effects research. The lack of access to such resources is readily apparent in inner-city America where, as Wilson (1987) argues, “social isolation makes it much more difficult for those who are looking for work to be tied into the job network” (p. 60). Social networks are thus one of many important dimensions of social life by which neighborhoods are stratified. Further reproducing inequality, economically disadvantaged blacks often have poorer social and economic outcomes than poor whites because of their isolation (Sampson and Morenoff 2006), including isolation from networks that grant access to useful resources.

According to Small (2004), whether residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods are isolated depends in part on their ties to other neighborhood residents: “strong local ties may impede the generation of many strong external ones if the local ties are embedded in active sentiments (that is, if residents espouse a great deal of intra-local loyalty and strong neighborhood attachment)” (p. 165). Moreover, when residents of the Villa (the Puerto Rican barrio that was the subject of Small’s ethnography) framed their neighborhood in a negative light, they were more likely to seek out extra-local ties. Even close ties among neighbors can have unintended, negative consequences. In the case of some Chicago neighborhoods facing high crime rates, Browning, Feinberg and Dietz (2004) found that strong ties and high levels of reciprocity can actually perpetuate—rather than stave off—homicides. Patillo-McCoy’s (1999) ethnographic research on the black middle class found that many living in such neighborhoods not only knew each other well, but also had a strong distrust of law enforcement. This facilitated
an overuse of informal channels that were ill-equipped to deal with crime (including reporting youth delinquency directly to parents). In this case, residents of these neighborhoods were not necessarily socially isolated from one another (e.g., Wilson 1987), but from the larger white society (due in part to historical discrimination and segregation). The capacity of networks to facilitate positive outcomes in these neighborhoods was therefore limited.

Social capital’s accumulation among whites at the micro-level can thus compound racial inequality at the macro-level. In her sample of white and black men from the same vocational school, Royster (2003) found that despite similarities in their human capital (e.g., education and GPAs) and their social networks (having graduated from the same school in the same vocational programs), whites reported far more success in both the number and quality of jobs they found. During the course of her in-depth interviews, whites had access to ‘inside tracks’ that were largely unavailable to her black interviewees. Parks-yancy (2010) also finds differences in whites and blacks’ earnings and career trajectories related in large part to disparities in their social networks. Among a diverse sample of youth volunteers, Hampton (2010) found that racial identity played a powerful role in network formation, with white males reporting higher rates of social capital and, subsequently, more productive outcomes from their ties than their black peers. In other words, who you are significantly shapes who you know (and how you know them), in turn perpetuating various forms of inequality, including those across racial/ethnic and class lines.

At the broader neighborhood and city level, social capital’s potential outcomes are also shaped by how such capital is structured. When important civic and economic network ties are overlapping, as Safford (2009) found was the case in Youngstown, Ohio, economic growth can stagnate. This was not the case in Allentown, Pennsylvania, though, where strong ties between leaders, as well as civic and business organizations, enabled the city to take a more innovative
approach to the decline of the steel industry. In doing so, Allentown weathered the storm of deindustrialization more successfully than Youngstown, as evidenced by lower rates of unemployment and poverty. In another case, Duncan (1999) argued that residents of Gray Mountain—a rural New England community—were able to draw on the region’s rich civic history to stave off poverty, despite a decline of its pulp-and-paper industry that economic stability for over a century. While participation does not always result in the preservation of important industries, much of this depends on how organizations are connected. In other communities Duncan studied, strong ties among privileged residents—coupled with highly monopolized local economies—allowed the most advantaged to exclude the poor from numerous opportunities, including employment and civic life, thus reproducing inequality and maintaining community power structures.

According to Sampson (2011), one dimension along which neighborhoods are stratified that helps them to realize and reach collective goals is organizational and civic capacity. Neighborhoods high in organizational capacity (the presence of various civic, nonprofit, and voluntaristic organizations), such as Chicago’s Hyde Park, are better able to mobilize their citizenry and resources such that they can, at least to some extent, ensure a high(er) quality of life for their residents. Places high in organizational capacity are better able to achieve a variety of outcomes, such as lower crime (see also Sampson et al. 2005). Organizations thus matter not merely for individual wellbeing (as in the case of Small’s 2009 study), but more broadly for neighborhoods as well.

Organizational density is another important community-level characteristic that can foster increased ties and allow residents to maintain informal social control of their neighborhoods. Such density is often moderated by the types of organization in question, though, as the
overabundance of particular institutions can lead to fragmented networks. In the Four Corners—a Boston neighborhood with a vibrant religious life—churches of various denominations were plentiful, yet their prevalence did not foster strong ties among residents (McRoberts 2003). Social ties in the Four Corners were fragmented and trust low, despite the presence of an otherwise tie- and trust-generating institution. Sampson (2011) found a similar relationship between churches and trust among residents in Chicago: that too many churches leads to lower trust, in part because the organizations that generate trust are fragmented, competing with one another for participants and other resources.

If in fact diversity does negatively influence social capital, as Putnam and others argue, then these lower levels of social capital could result in fewer positive outcomes at a number of levels. The exact relationship between diversity and social capital remains unclear, however. I now turn to a discussion of the empirical relationship between these variables.

Racial Diversity and Social Capital

Putnam first alluded to the relationship between racial diversity and social capital in Bowling Alone (see Putnam 2000: Ch. 22), noting that the decline in social capital across the U.S. was associated with an increasingly tolerant American citizenry. Such a correlation does not indicate a mutually exclusive relationship between racial tolerance and social capital, however. In fact, states with residents who evince greater social capital are also the highest ranked in terms of racial acceptance, though they also tend to be the least racially diverse (ibid.). Residents of diverse metropolitan areas, however, are typically less accepting of other racial groups. An exception to this are those who live specifically in diverse neighborhoods, although selection-effects may be at play here, with racially tolerant individuals moving to their areas because of
their already high levels of acceptance; the causal direction remains unclear (see discussion in Oliver 2009).

What this correlation does suggest is that ground-level factors in diverse communities play a major role in the civic and community lives of residents in these areas. Putnam (2007) contends that, “Many Americans remain uncomfortable with diversity” (p. 158). Indeed, some research illustrates the degree to which race remains a salient cause of discomfort, particularly among white Americans, even those who evince racially inclusive, egalitarian attitudes (Shelton et al. 2005). Again, while “The most tolerant communities in America are precisely the places with the greatest civic involvement” (Putnam 2000: 356), these also tend to be the places with lower levels of racial-ethnic diversity.

Employing a multi-level analysis of the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, Putnam (2007) found that, net of other economic and demographic factors (including income, community inequality, gender, race, age, etc.), residents of racially heterogeneous communities demonstrate markedly lower levels of trust in their neighbors (no matter their race), volunteering, and memberships in associations/organizations. They are also less optimistic about their local governments, have much less faith in their own ability to enact change, are less likely to have recently voted, report less charitable giving and a lower perception of quality of life. Differences between residents of diverse communities and those in homogenous neighborhoods persist at the individual, Census tract, county and state levels. Moreover, the source of diversification—whether a natural increase in the nonwhite population, a decrease in the white population, or immigration—has little bearing on this relationship. While other research suggests that social ties are diluted when an influx of new residents (no matter the racial composition) occurs (Matarrita-Cascante and Luloff 2008; Smith and Krannich 2000), Putnam controlled for various types of
diversification (such as immigration, natural increase or white outmigration) and found that the
effects of diversity remained significant and negative.

Oliver (2009), also analyzing the Social Capital Community Benchmark survey, found
results on par with Putnam’s, though he uncovered several additional nuances. For instance,
respondents were more likely to say that they felt close to other members of their race/ethnicity
as their own group’s share of the local population increased. Moreover, the sense of belonging
provided by one’s neighborhood increases substantially for whites and Asians as the percent
white in the neighborhood increases, whereas the percent white accompanies a decline in
belonging and place-based attachment among blacks and Hispanics. Trust in neighbors, however
(which, as the concept of collective efficacy suggests, is necessary for residents to work together
to maintain control of their neighborhoods), increases among members of all races as the percent
white in a neighborhood increases (though the positive correlation is stronger for whites and
Asians than for blacks and Hispanics). Reasons for this are not entirely clear, though Oliver
attributes the association between Asian participation in civic life and whites’ representation in
their neighborhood to the former’s lower levels of segregation from the latter.

Despite this large body of literature—including Putnam (2007) and Oliver (2009)—
relating diversity to participation and trust, much less attention has been paid to whether and how
neighborhood civic networks exclude minority residents. Rodney Hero (2007), for instance,
contends that social capital indicators are lower in racially diverse states because of the
marginalized history/status of nonwhites. Unlike whites, for whom social institutions more often
offer space for engagement and gains from social capital, nonwhites not only lack access to such
institutions due to economic inequality, but they are also less likely to experience returns on
social capital when they do have access, given their marginalized racial status. According to
Hero, Putnam’s (2000) conceptualization of social capital fails to account for the extent to which social ties, the resources individuals gain from them, and community participation and civic engagement are ‘white-centric,’ privileging whites, marginalizing nonwhites and, in effect, reproducing racial inequality. Network inequality and differential racial outcomes from job searches appear to back up Hero’s thesis that gains from networks are weaker among nonwhites (discrimination might play a part).

The persistence of racial segregation in the US (Logan 2011; Logan and Stults 2011; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilkes and Iceland 2004) likely plays a contradictory role in social capital and community life more broadly (Uslaner 2010). While segregation increases residential concentration and racial homogeneity, it also decreases access to employment and other economic institutions necessary for civic life and collective efficacy (Duncan 1999; Glaser, Laibson and Sacerdote 2002; Putnam 2000, 2007; Wilson 1987, 1996)—institutions that increase community social control and quality of life (McLaren 2012; Rosenfield, Messner and Baumer 2001; Videras 2012). Still, our knowledge about the formation of social capital in more residentially integrated places is limited.

Qualitative analyses of the relationship between social capital and diversity are few, though Wilson and Taub’s (2006) study of community life and race relations in several Chicago neighborhoods is one exception. Wilson and Taub’s (2006) qualitative investigation of four Chicago neighborhoods demonstrates that factors such as racism (real and perceived), lack of trust, competition for resources, language barriers and symbolic racial boundaries undermine civic participation in diverse areas. Such factors help to explain why, in racially diverse areas, civic institutions that increase participation in community life are likely to be much more dispersed, resulting in lower levels of political engagement (see, for instance, Alesina and La
In particular, boundary work among members of various races significantly affected social ties, strengthening intra-racial connections while simultaneously reducing cross-racial ties. White residents often lamented that they felt they were being driven out of their once predominantly white neighborhoods by Hispanics and other nonwhites, while Hispanics made it a point to separate themselves from the black population, both physically and symbolically. While the latter process (regarding symbolic boundary work between Hispanics and blacks) helped to strengthen ties between the Hispanic population and whites, it continued to ensure that blacks would find themselves at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Lamont (2002) and others have expounded on the role that symbolic boundary work plays in the perpetuation of racial inequality (and different race-ethnic cultures), although, aside from Wilson and Taub’s study, little is known about how this boundary work affects tie formation in diverse neighborhoods.

The effects of diversity on social capital might vary widely from one community to the next. Claims that social capital is consistently lower in racially and ethnically diverse neighborhoods—if true—may be too broad sweeping. Indeed, place effects in general are often moderated by other social structural factors. Such is the case with respect to the relationship between poverty and social capital, which is typically regarded as being negatively correlated. Small’s (2004) case study of Villa Victoria—an impoverished neighborhood in inner-city Boston—demonstrated that social capital is not always negatively influenced by poverty in the way large-scale, quantitative studies suggest. The same is likely true of its relationship to diversity. Indeed, Oliver’s (2009) results at times contradicted those of Putnam’s (2007). Williamson (2008), like Putnam and Oliver, drew on the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey to conduct a “natural” experiment on the relationship between diversity and social
capital. Using both the 2000 and 2006 waves of the survey collected in Lewiston, Maine (Androscoggin County), Williamson was able to track changing levels of social capital before and after the community experienced an influx of more than 2,000 African refugees beginning in 2001, substantially increasing the diversity of the area. Rather than a decline in various measures of social capital, she found that reported levels of trust, neighborliness, cooperation and voluntarism actually increased (why this happened is unclear, however). The same measures of social capital declined in Chesire County—a racially homogeneous, predominantly white county in nearby New Hampshire oversampled for the Benchmark Survey that Williamson utilized as a control group.

Williamson’s analysis suggests that the association between racial diversity and social capital may be dependent on a variety of place-specific determinants. For example, Gesthuizen, van der Meer and Scheepers’ (2008) research found no link between diversity and social capital in various European nations. Rather, they suggest that America’s racial history plays a critical role in the relationship between diversity and social ties. In European societies, low community income, rather than diversity, accounts for most of the variation in social capital (Letki 2007; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011). America’s racial history might make it more difficult for various racial groups to come together to discuss and solve local issues.

Putnam’s analysis of social capital and racial tolerance by state reflects the previously cited body of literature that suggests a great deal of cross-racial distrust in diverse communities. States scoring highest on Putnam’s Social Capital and Tolerance for Equality/Civil Liberties indexes (see Putnam 2000: Figure 91)—including Vermont, the Dakotas, Montana, Minnesota and Iowa—are among the least racially diverse according to Census figures from the same year (Census 2000). At the same time, whites in racially diverse areas typically espouse more
negative attitudes toward nonwhites than do their counterparts in more predominantly white places (Grillo, Teixeira and Wilson 2010; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Quillian 1995, 1996; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Taylor 1998). This relation is reversed at lower levels of geography, however, with whites who live in the same neighborhoods having more positive attitudes toward nonwhites (Welch et al. 2001); the same is true of blacks, who are most likely to report acceptance of whites should they live in neighborhoods with a high concentration of whites (ibid.; Oliver 2009).

Here again, though, local factors that vary from one community to the next might play an important role. Diversity is not associated with a lack of organizational capacity, for instance. Sampson (2012) in fact finds the opposite in Chicago, noting that:

It is intriguing that communities like Hyde Park and the Near West and South sides are high in collective action, for the contradict stereotypes that racially and ethnically diverse communities depress civic life…it appears that nonprofits may be serving as a sort of counterweight to the challenges of diversity, perhaps even thriving in their diverse contexts‖ (2012: 197-198).

Whether the abundance of organizations—nonprofits especially—in racially diverse neighborhoods leads to more numerous (and more productive) ties among residents remains an unanswered question, though. Part of this dissertation research will thus be to determine how nonprofits and other organizations foster local networks and facilitate social capital, and to what ends. While organizations certainly have the power to broker ties between their participants (e.g., Small 2009), a more nuanced empirical portrayal of how they do so in the context of in- and out-group relations can better inform social capital theory.
Another local factor, residential segregation, can worsen the negative effects of city-level diversity, according to Uslaner (2010). Many of the nation’s most diverse cities are also among its most segregated. Whites, as Uslaner points out, are far less likely than nonwhites, particularly African Americans, to state that living in a diverse neighborhood is important to them, culminating in more self-segregation, fewer diverse social networks and decreased opportunities for “bridging” social capital. As Massey and Denton’s (1993) analysis of the Detroit Neighborhood Study demonstrated, whites most prefer to live in areas no more than a fifth nonwhite, whereas blacks tended to report preference for areas where their own racial group makes up only half the population. Thus, to the extent that Americans most prefer to associate with members of their own racial group, one’s race/ethnicity strongly moderates this relationship. Friendship networks illustrate this moderating effect, with whites reporting fewer friends of other racial/ethnic groups than nonwhites (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears 2006).

Whether or not diversity breaks down engagement in voluntary associations is also uncertain. On the one hand, the presence of various racial groups increases the likelihood that there will be a diverse set of values—whether real or perceived—and differing definitions of the public good. These differences might help to explain why “mobilizing forces” work differently for different racial/ethnic groups. Just as some forces, such as the presence of racial/ethnic specific newsletters, organizations, or radio stations, might spur higher levels of civic engagement among particular racial/ethnic groups (Hein 2014; Hill and Leighly 1999; Jang 2009; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2001, 2009), so too might they better connect some individuals (e.g., those of a particular racial/ethnic group or social class) and not others.
The types of local institutions that can mobilize certain groups are wide-ranging; such is the case of churches, which play a particularly powerful role in the black community in terms of increasing social ties and encouraging community solidarity and, in some cases, voter turnout (McRoberts 2003). Such forces mobilize individuals to action based on the extent to which they validate the values, cultures and everyday lived experiences of those they target. Wilson and Taub (2006) found cultural differences and disparate everyday lived experiences between racial groups made it more difficult for residents to work together, and that different groups had different channels and experiences that mobilized them to action. Additionally, Patillo-McCoy’s (1999) study of the black-middle class suggests that there are also intra-racial differences with respect to these values and experiences. Anderson’s conceptualizations of “decent” and “street” families (2000), and “ethnos” and “cosmos” (2010) also illustrate these differences. In his analysis of civic events (rather than individual-level participation) across Chicago neighborhoods, though, Sampson found no effects of diversity. Rather, inequality and disadvantage were the primary culprits that resulted in lower levels of civic capacity, such as the ability to organize and hold civic events or generate social ties among residents (2011). If diversity does in fact lead to less civic engagement, then the social capital that sometimes arises from such participation (e.g., Small 2009) might also be dampened and fragmented. Moreover, just because residents live in the same neighborhood does not necessarily mean they participate in similar civic organizations or share in its social networks. Indeed, Mayorga-Gallo (2014) found that many Hispanic residents living in one small North Carolina town were often excluded from civic life due to the practices of local organizations, which often did not reach out to nonwhite residents.
If bonding social capital (ties based on similarities) is necessary for collective action and social movements more broadly, it may be similarly essential for social cohesion and civic engagement at the local level. Residents might find it difficult to feel that they can contribute to the betterment of their communities if the solutions they envision are quite distinct from one another. Indeed, there is no singular definition of “public good” that persists in American culture (Hunter 1991), and solutions to various community problems are likely increasingly divergent in racially diverse neighborhoods, particularly in a nation where race continues to play a pivotal role in life chances. Given their disparate everyday lived experiences with race, whites and nonwhites might be less likely to share similar perceptions of local problems and potential solutions. Emerson and Smith (2000), for instance, observed that, whereas whites tend to assert that racial inequality is derived from problems at the individual level, blacks typically state the opposite, seeing structural constraints at the heart of racial inequality. Such disparate beliefs have significant consequences even for members of the same religious denomination to effectively come together to solve pressing issues (in the case of Emerson and Smith, racial inequality). Moreover, white privilege and colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2009), along with the institutionalization of the Protestant Ethic (Weber 1905), help to solidify the perception that matters in need of community-level solutions are matters of individual choice.

Even when whites evince egalitarian attitudes toward racial inequality, however, they may be less likely to work with their nonwhite counterparts to solve it. Field experiments by Shelton et al. (2005) found that whites might avoid cross-racial interaction, often fearing they could inadvertently offend their nonwhite counterparts. At the same time, black participants often preferred interacting with whites who espoused higher levels of racial bias, given that their white egalitarian peers were more likely to come off as aloof during interaction. Less racially
biased whites “may have held back during the interaction compared with whites with higher levels of automatic racial bias, who might have been more willing to engage in a debate about racial issues” (p. 401). Thus, even whites in diverse areas who demonstrate acceptance of racial minorities might be less likely to place themselves in settings requiring cross-racial interaction, further eroding opportunities for fostering “bridging” social capital. Shelton et al.’s experiments provide further evidence for Putnam’s (2007) claim that diversity is a major source of discomfort for many (though especially for white) Americans. Additionally, race remains a contentious and politically divisive issue in America (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000).

The notion that individuals with higher levels of racial bias “are more likely to engage in a debate about racial issues” plays out in the context of political voluntarism as well. In some communities characterized by both a rich civic history and relatively new, unprecedented levels of immigration, community responses to racial change are strong and often hostile (Deufel 2006). Evidence regarding the participation of less racially tolerant individuals in diverse communities is mixed, however, with Deufel suggesting they evince high levels of participation (at least in areas with a rich civic life), and others (Alesina and La Ferrera 2000) suggesting they withdraw from voluntarism. Withdrawal from voluntary associations also suggests a withdrawal from the important networks they might have to offer. Ironically, if the field experiments conducted by Shelton and her colleagues is any indication, individuals who are most likely to advocate on behalf of minorities might be the least likely to get involved in matters of diversity and community change.

Current Study and Research Questions

Three particular theoretical and methodological gaps stand out in the above literature that relates diversity to social capital. First, the extant literature analyzing the association between
social capital and diversity tend to conflate social capital with other phenomenon like trust and civic engagement. In this research, I conceptualize social capital instead as social ties. Trust and civic engagement are separate phenomena better conceptualized as factors that might affect or be affected by social capital, rather than as dimensions of the concept (see Paxton 1999). Small (2009), for example, demonstrates that participation sometimes results in the formation of ties that—under certain conditions—leads to particular outcomes (e.g., better mental health outcomes). Second, if diversity does, in fact, dampen social capital, the mechanisms by which it does so are not well understood. This second gap can be partially accounted for by a third limitation of the literature: its methodological reliance on quantitative analyses of survey data. Few qualitative studies have been conducted that examine the effects of neighborhood integration at the ground level. Although there are some notable exceptions, including Mayorga-Gallo (2014), Voyer (2013), and Wilson and Taub (2006), these researchers do not focus explicitly on social ties between residents and the outcomes of these ties.

The scope of the extant literature is also conceptually limited, as it considers only the quantity of social ties (e.g., the number of close friends one has), leaving us with little knowledge about the processes that lead to such connections and their outcomes (the very reasons our connections to one another matter). I seek to reframe the diversity debate by using qualitative methods that allow me to focus on social processes (including neighborhood structure, the presence of civic organizations, and culture) that influence the formation of networks in more and less diverse neighborhoods and the outcomes that arise from these connections (including whether they lead to more tolerant, stable and racially equitable communities).

Given the limitations of the present literature, I ask three interrelated but unanswered research questions. First, how do residents of diverse neighborhoods (compared to less diverse
ones) develop ties with one another? Second, what forms do these ties take? Finally, what outcomes do these connections result in for residents and their neighborhoods? To answer these questions, I rely on a comparative, qualitative research design that combines ethnographic observations and in-depth interviews. I discuss my methodological framework and process of data collection in more detail in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I explore Manchester’s history as a white-ethnic immigrant destination that has transitioned into one of the most racially and ethnically diverse cities in northern New England. I then examine the role of residents’ cultural frames, highlighting the role that culture plays in social capital. Specifically, in Chapter 4, I discuss how these frames influence the formation of social capital. In Chapter 5, I elaborate on the consequences of these cultural frames for the outcomes of one’s social ties. Finally, in Chapter 6, I examine the role of civic organizations in Manchester, including the circumstances under which they help to foster lasting ties between residents, as well as how they build civic capacity within neighborhoods.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

The body of literature outlined in the previous chapter suggests that findings regarding the relationship between diversity and social capital are mixed. More research is needed to explain whether social ties are indeed more fragmented in diverse communities. The claim that diversity and social capital are, on average, negatively associated, while empirically validated by Putnam (2007) and others, is contradicted by other studies and may be too broad a generalization, particularly because it ignores the neighborhood contexts that shapes social capital. Dilworth (2009), for example, contends that a working knowledge of social capital is best (if not only) at the ground level, where networks and the resources that arise from them transpire. In addition, quantitative analyses also cannot account for local-level factors such as the culture of place (Hummon 1990; Suttles 1972), the built environment (e.g., Jacobs 1961), or even organizational differences between places (Safford 2009). Moreover, as Sampson notes, “the character of a community” also matters for local civic action (2011: 193). Small (2004) makes a similar case with respect to the relationship between neighborhood poverty and social capital, noting that large-scale studies cannot explain the complex relationship between these concepts or help us understand the mechanisms by which poverty is argued to dilute social ties and participation.

For these reasons, I argue that an ethnographic approach can contribute to our understanding of the relation between these concepts. Despite a substantial body of quantitative research exploring the relationship between racial diversity and social ties, qualitative studies of the social, cultural, and political processes underlying the relationship between these concepts
are few. Given these empirical gaps, my dissertation research seeks to uncover how community diversity influences the volume, nature, and use of social capital. In addition to the three main research questions I posed at the end of Chapter 1, other questions I also address (in the process of answering my primary research questions) include:

- If in fact diversity does reduce social ties, by what mechanisms does it do so?
- How has the civic infrastructure of Manchester changed in recent years and to what extent are such changes related to its recent (nonwhite) diversification?

Any research question involving social capital necessitates operationalization of both social capital (the ties) and its outcomes. Following Paxton (1999), I define social capital as being comprised of 1) “Objective associations between individuals” (that is, some network must be in place binding them together) and 2) “A subjective type of tie” (in other words, there must be some shared sense of mutuality, no matter how limited, between individuals) (Paxton 1999: 93). I also expand Paxton’s definition to include not only individuals, but also organizations and the neighborhoods in which they are embedded. At the neighborhood level, I also include what Sampson and his colleagues refer to as “civic capacity” and “organizational capacity,” or the presence of organizations and collective events in a given neighborhood. These include not only civic organizations such as parent teacher groups and neighborhood watch organizations, but also collective events like protests and local festivals. Organizations are also an important component of social capital at the individual level, as individuals make connections in part by their participation in certain organizations (Small 2009).

Like ties between individuals and organizations, it is theorized that neighborhood social capital results in particular outcomes. At the individual level, social capital can be tapped to find employment or housing or even achieve more day-to-day goals, like finding temporary childcare. Organizations also attempt to achieve certain outcomes via their connections. A parent teacher
group, for example, might wish to renovate a school library, and to do so its members might draw on their ties with others (individuals or organizations) to achieve this goal. A neighborhood watch group might seek to increase the vigilance of neighborhood residents or even organize volunteer efforts, such as a park cleanup.

I investigated my research questions using a combination of 1) Ethnographic Observation, 2) In-Depth Interviews, 3, Focus Groups, and 4) Archival and Historical Data. Before elaborating on each of these data sources and their collection, I first discuss my selection of Manchester, New Hampshire—and three of its neighborhoods—as the sites for my research.

**Site Selection: Manchester, New Hampshire**

In July 2012, I began conducting ethnographic observations in Manchester, New Hampshire. As New Hampshire’s most populous city (with approximately 110,000 residents in 2010, in a metro area of over 400,000), it is also the state’s most diverse city, on a par with Nashua, being close to one-fifth nonwhite according to the most recent census figures. The city is undergoing a great deal of racial diversification. Indeed, although the largest metropolitan areas are the most diverse, medium-sized cities like Manchester are becoming more diverse at rates faster than these large urban centers (Johnson and Lichter 2010). Most of Manchester’s diversification has taken place during the last two decades. Table 2-1 displays the racial-ethnic composition of Manchester in 1990, 2000, and 2010 and each group’s change between 1990 and 2010 (these trends are described in more detail in Chapter 3).
Table 2-1. Racial-Ethnic Composition of Manchester, New Hampshire (1990, 2000, and 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Percent Change 1990-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong> (% of Total)</td>
<td>95,230 (95.6%)</td>
<td>95,581 (89.3%)</td>
<td>89,893 (82.0%)</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African American</td>
<td>901 (1.0%)</td>
<td>2,246 (2.1%)</td>
<td>4,063 (3.7%)</td>
<td>350.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2,121 (2.1%)</td>
<td>4,944 (4.6%)</td>
<td>8,883 (8.1%)</td>
<td>318.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1,066 (1.1%)</td>
<td>2,487 (2.3%)</td>
<td>3,993 (3.6%)</td>
<td>274.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>249 (.3%)</td>
<td>4,095 (3.8%)</td>
<td>2,170 (2.0%)</td>
<td>771.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>99,567</td>
<td>109,565</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. All racial groups are non-Hispanic; Hispanic may be of any race.
2. Other includes Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, Pacific Islanders, Two or more races and Other (undefined).
3. Prior to 2010, only whites were asked to respond to the Hispanic origin question. Thus, the figures for Black, Asian, and Other in earlier census data might include those of Hispanic origin, although most Hispanics do in fact identify their race as white.

Source: US Census Bureau, Decennial Census 1990, 2000, 2010

In 2000, Manchester was just under 90 percent non-Hispanic white, with their share of Manchester’s population dropping by nearly 6 percentage points since the beginning of the twentieth century (Johnson and Macieski 2009). By 2010, however, nearly twenty percent of the city’s 110,000 residents were nonwhite or Hispanic. Those of Hispanic origin made up 8 percent of its residents, having tripled their presence in the county since 1990; an additional 4 percent are non-Hispanic black, another 4 percent non-Hispanic Asian, and 2 percent “Other” (non-Hispanic). In the last decade, the city’s population increase has been driven by a natural increase in and the immigration of the nonwhite population (ibid.). Manchester thus provides a natural laboratory to assess the relationship between diversity and social capital at the early stages of America’s new racial diversification, driven mainly by increases in its Hispanic and Asian populations.
The city itself is also historically an immigrant destination. Figure 2-1 below illustrates changes in Manchester’s foreign born population over time (see also Johnson and Macieski 2009). In addition, the city has the largest refugee population in New Hampshire (Glick Schiller et al. 2009). Its racial diversity is particularly noticeable among its under-18 population, with its school district’s student body being more than a third minority (NH Department of Education 2012). A moratorium on incoming refugees proposed by the city’s mayor in 2011 due in part to economic constraints—a move met with some criticism (Coughlin and Mucciarone 2011)—demonstrates that tension with respect to race, diversity and immigration are coming to play a part in community relations and local political deliberations. Another move by the city, in which it added electronic language translation to its website—with nearly sixty options—illustrates the extent to which the city is already beginning to engage with issues of diversity (Tuohy 2011). Residents are also seeking ways to better incorporate a student body whose native language is often not English (LaMontagne Hall 2011a) and foster positive relations between immigrants and law enforcement (LaMontagne Hall 2011b).
The city’s diversity is also widely mentioned on its website. For example, a page regarding the city’s efforts to “weed out” crime and foster residential engagement notes that its healthy neighborhoods initiative is designed to foster “stronger neighborhoods which embrace our diversity” (City of Manchester 2012). Manchester thus provides a natural laboratory to assess the relationship between diversity and social capital at the early stages of America’s new racial diversification, driven mainly by Hispanic immigration and refugee resettlement.

**Neighborhood Selection**

I selected three neighborhoods in which to conduct ethnographic observations and in-depth interviews. Although I initially began conducting observations in four neighborhoods, it became apparent that conducting observations in only three would allow me to gain more depth, and thus a fourth (less diverse) neighborhood was dropped. I selected these neighborhoods based on several criteria. The first is how racially diverse each neighborhood is according recent US decennial Census data (see Figure 2-2). To demarcate neighborhood boundaries, I use official
markers, including census tracts (Figure 2-2), ward lines and neighborhood boundaries from the city’s 2009 master plan.

**Figure 2-2. Percent Minority in Manchester, NH by Census Tract (2010)**

Unlike those in larger cities, such as Chicago, Manchester residents might not readily identify with the neighborhoods outlined by the city government; they may be more likely to identify with their communities based on the presence of particular institutions. Therefore, I also used the presence of community institutions as a criterion for neighborhood selection. These institutions include schools, churches, neighborhood watch groups and other formal organizations and voluntary associations. Manchester’s status as a medium-sized city (typically
defined as a population between 100,000 and 250,000) also means that social life (including individuals’ networks and the organizations they participate in) is much less contained in the neighborhoods under study, though even in larger cities social networks and the resources garnered from them often transcend neighborhood boundaries (Sampson 2011). Indeed, I often encountered many of my interviewees various organization meetings and civic events taking place outside their neighborhood.

**Figure 2-3. Locations of Elementary Schools in Manchester, NH**

- City Border
- Surrounding Towns
- Elementary Schools
- Railroads
- Lake/Pond
- River

**Elementary School Districts**
- Bakersville
- Beech
- Gossler Park
- Green Acres
- Hallsville
- Henry Wilson
- Highland-Gotts Falls
- Jewett
- McDonough
- Northwest
- Parker-Varney
- Smyth
- Webster
- Weston
- Water Bodies (Outside Manchester)
- City Border
Each neighborhood I selected contained an elementary or middle school (elementary schools in Manchester are shown in Figure 2-3). I use official neighborhood boundaries as a starting point in identifying the locations of these institutions. I also matched these neighborhoods to census block and tract data in order to decide which might be best to compare. In terms of selecting neighborhoods for inclusion in this study, demographic data allowed me to control for other factors like poverty and median income, such that the neighborhoods selected for observation differ primarily on racial diversity.

I then used boundaries determined by census tracts, blocks, elementary schools and other civic institutions, and boundaries identified by the city’s master plan, to calculate levels of diversity and poverty in these areas. I used the percent nonwhite as well as the Diversity Index in the final selection of neighborhoods in which to conduct the bulk of my observations. The Diversity Index, which ranges from zero to .83, is a measure that indicates the probability of randomly selecting two individuals from different racial/ethnic groups (in this case, randomly selecting them from a neighborhood in Manchester). Data used for this calculation are based on Census block data (2010). Using ArcGIS 10.1, blocks that overlapped with neighborhood boundaries outlined in the city’s 2009 master plan were placed in the neighborhood in which the larger portion of the block was found. For this research, I calculate the Diversity Index as follows:

$$1-(W^2+B^2+H^2+A^2+O^2)$$

$W^2$ is the proportion (of the county) non-Hispanic White squared, $B^2$ the proportion black (no matter their Hispanic origin) squared, $H^2$ the proportion of Hispanics squared and $O^2$ the proportion of others (including Native Americans, those of two-or-three or more races and those who designated their racial status as “other”) squared. (While other researchers might break this
Diversity Index down further by not merging Native Americans and other racial groups into one, though I do not do so here, given that the rarity of these racial groups in the city means that breaking this index down further has little, if any, effect on the final indexes.) The city of Manchester as a whole has a Diversity Index (DI) of about .30; at the neighborhood level, *Neighborhood 1* was the most diverse area (DI=.58) in which I conducted observations, followed by *Neighborhood 3* (DI=.50). *Neighborhood 2* (with a DI of .29) was the least diverse of the three neighborhoods I observed. (While I did conduct some observations in *Neighborhood 4*—which has a DI of .15—I stopped these observations in June of 2013, and did not conduct any interviews with residents here, as the response rate for interviews was low).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher Poverty/Lower Income</th>
<th>More Diverse</th>
<th>Less Diverse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood 1</strong></td>
<td>Diversity Index: .58</td>
<td>Diversity Index: .29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonwhite: 42%</td>
<td>Nonwhite: 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty: 30%</td>
<td>Poverty: 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income: $30,210</td>
<td>Income: $42,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Poverty/Higher Income</th>
<th>More Diverse</th>
<th>Less Diverse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood 3</strong></td>
<td>Diversity Index: .50</td>
<td>Diversity Index: .15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonwhite: 32%</td>
<td>Nonwhite: 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty: 14%</td>
<td>Poverty: 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income: $45,921</td>
<td>Income: $46,131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**  *Neighborhood defined here as a combination of census tracts and blocks (thus comprising numerous parts of different tracts). Poverty rates are approximate, as various Census tracts overlap within some neighborhoods and exact poverty rates cannot be estimated. Both the Diversity Index and Percent Nonwhite are based on block-level data from the US Census (2010). **Income** refers to the median Household Income (2010 dollars, inflation adjusted). **I ceased conducting observations and interviews in Neighborhood 4 in June 2013.
Diversity Indexes for the neighborhoods (broadly defined) selected for analysis appear in Table 2-2. One confounding issue is the interrelation between diversity and poverty, which is readily apparent in Manchester, with the poorest neighborhoods also being the most diverse, and the least diverse having lower rates of poverty and higher incomes. However, as is true across many other cities in the US, Manchester’s most diverse neighborhoods are also its poorest. In addition, as I discovered throughout the course of my fieldwork and confirmed via census data (discussed in the next chapter), even in the areas in which I conducted observations, there were both pockets of poverty and pockets of relative affluence (which often coincided with being more or less diverse). Thus, socioeconomic inequality was an inescapable part of this research, and it quickly became clear to me that to “control” for poverty would result in an unrealistic portrayal of the relationship between social capital and diversity. Analyzing social life in these three neighborhoods allowed me to examine diversity along a continuum (e.g., 14 percent nonwhite and 30 percent nonwhite, and 42 percent nonwhite), though in these neighborhoods some streets and blocks were more diverse than others.

There are a number of institutions embedded in each of these neighborhoods. Each has an elementary school that serves the neighborhood; both share middle and high schools with surrounding neighborhoods. All local elementary and middle schools in these areas have parent teacher groups. These neighborhoods also have formal or informal neighborhood watch groups (some that meet regularly, and others only when issues arise), according to the city’s police department. Each neighborhood also had an assigned “community patrolman,” whose job it is to “work on building strong relationships with the community and...always maintain citywide coverage and accessibility of officers to respond to the communities’ needs,” according to the city’s website. Where neighborhood civic organizations stopped meeting or parent teacher
groups disbanded, I explored the dissolution of such groups using in-depth interviews with school administrators, community officials, and residents/participants. I also used in-depth interviews to gain an understanding of when and how civic organizations were founded, how they work with other organizations, and the struggles and successes current leaders have in recruiting and maintaining members. My observations and interviews were not relegated to these neighborhoods or local organizations alone, however. Sometimes, I learned of events outside of these neighborhoods that I later attended (such as citywide public forums) or was given the name of potential interviewee who no longer lived locally. Thus, while the bulk of my observations and interviews took place within these neighborhoods, this was not always the case.

**Ethnographic Observations**

Researchers use ethnography to answer how and why questions (including, for example, “How are social ties formed in integrating neighborhoods?”). Ethnographic methods also allow us to observe structure and culture in action, deepening our understanding of the social processes and mechanisms that underlie the relationship between different variables (e.g., diversity and social capital). As a qualitative methodological tool, ethnographic research uses systematic, participant observation to assess the processes underlying the relationship between numerous variables.

Small (2004), for instance, conducted an ethnography to explore the relationship between poverty and social capital, as well as to demonstrate how organizational structures and the practices that vary from one organization to another can affect social capital and reproduce inequality (2009). Also using participant observation and in-depth interviews, Wilson and Taub (2006) demonstrated that symbolic boundary work and perceived (and real) cultural differences between whites and nonwhites significantly affected residents’ ability to work together to
maintain control of their community. Many residents in their study had competing notions of the common good and divergent visions about how to achieve order. In addition, others felt threatened by the influx of newcomers. While some ethnographic accounts have examined the relationship between diversity, urban life and cross-racial interaction (chiefly Wilson and Taub 2006 and Anderson 2010, but also Patillo 2011), no ethnographic research to date has specifically addressed the relationship between social capital and racial diversity.

To address this gap and answer my research questions, I conducted ethnographic observation at various sites in each of the neighborhoods selected for study. First, I explored the neighborhoods themselves. I took regular walks in each neighborhood, sat in city parks, shopped at local establishments like convenience stores, and ate at local restaurants. I took extensive field notes during all of these observations, and residents would occasionally stop to ask what I was writing about (especially on park benches) or audio recording (as I sometimes carried a digital recorder to help me recall details during transcription of field notes).

In deciding which types of organizations to observe, I selected those that were neighborhood specific (that is, their efforts were local in scope and they served those living in the neighborhood or school catchment area). Given that schools are central to neighborhood life and serve as an anchor for many community activities, I attended a Parent Teacher Group throughout the course of the 2012/2013 school year in each neighborhood under analysis. I also selected a second organization within each neighborhood to observe regularly. In two neighborhoods, this included a residential group; in a third neighborhood, this organization took the form of a parent support group. Although I did not conduct regular observations in churches to the extent that I did PTGs and residential groups, I did observe some civic events and groups that met in church spaces (including potlucks or watch groups). I did, however, ask interviewees
whether they participated in various forms of civic life, which included church (several interviewees discussed doing so).

I observed each group that I regularly attended between 4 and 7 times (see Table 2-3), gathering all meeting minutes and other documents that were distributed. The diversity among participants varied from one organization to the next, but typically reflected that of the neighborhood in which the organization was embedded (Table 2-3). Average attendance at the organizations I regularly observed ranged from 100% non-Hispanic white (including at an organization in one of my somewhat more diverse neighborhoods) to as low as 40% non-Hispanic white. In another case, Hispanics comprised more than 40% of regular participants. Note that I include only percentages in this table, as number of participants might be used to identify the particular group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Diversity</th>
<th>Group Type (N of Times Observed)</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Diverse</td>
<td>PTG #1 (6)</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTG #2 (4)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident Group (7)</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Diverse</td>
<td>PTG (4)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident Group (4)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Diverse</td>
<td>PTG (6)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent Support Group (4)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all cases, I was direct about revealing my status as a doctoral student conducting research on neighborhoods. For all groups whose meetings I regularly attended, I emailed all organizers beforehand, noting my interest in neighborhood participation and asking whether I could attend. In only one case was my request to attend turned down (in that case, out of concern that the presence of a researcher might decrease attendance, which was already small). My level
of involvement varied depending from one organization to the next. In most cases, I was strictly an observer. On occasion, I volunteered to help set up for and clean up after an organization event, such as a potluck, sit at an organization table during a block party, or attended neighborhood walks with a residential group handing out fliers. Between July 2012 and December 2014, I accumulated 254 (double-spaced) pages of field notes, observing organization meetings, civic and organization events, public forums, and neighborhoods (via walks, sitting in parks, etc.) a total of 41 times throughout this period of observation. Although I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork between July 2012 and December 2013, I continued to attend the occasional block party and other events, such as potlucks or parent evenings hosted by schools, until December 2014.

These observations allowed me to witness social capital in action—that is, the formation of social ties, how well individuals knew one another, what types of relationships they had with each other and the organization, and the types of outcomes that arose from these bonds. I also gained a sense of how organizations were interconnected with other associations and nonprofits (as well as local government) and how they went about getting access to needed resources (like volunteers or donations). My observations and participatory involvement in particular helped me to become more embedded in the organization, getting a better understanding of its practices and building rapport with organizers and volunteers.

**In-Depth Interviews**

I conducted formal and informal in-depth interviews with 39 Manchester residents, civic organizers, and political leaders (in some cases, these categorizations overlapped). I used purposive sampling to decide which individuals to interview, based on their role in the neighborhood or organization and also based on recommendations from other participants,
leaders, and residents. While some of my interviewees could also be described as constituting a snowball sample, even when I asked interviewees whether there was anyone in particular in their neighborhood or organization they thought I should interview, I still made it a point to determine whether those recommended to me should be interviewed, based on their role in the neighborhood or organization. I asked all interviewees to complete a structured questionnaire (included in the Appendix of this dissertation). Table 2-4 displays the demographic breakdown of my interviewees based on the questionnaire. To protect my respondents’ confidentiality, I do not disaggregate interviewee demographic by neighborhood.

As data from my questionnaire suggest, most of my interviewees were non-Hispanic white (62%). An additional 10% (3 interviewees) identified as black/African, another 10% as Hispanic, and the remaining 17% (or 5 interviewees) as other/multiracial (including one Middle Eastern, two Arabic, and one Nepalese). Nearly three-quarters were born in the US. At the time of the interview, 38% were living in the less diverse neighborhood under analysis, 21% in the somewhat diverse neighborhood, and 42% from the most diverse neighborhood. The modal age category was 40-49, and women were outnumbered men in my sample by nearly a 2:1 margin—both these factors are related to sampling many participants from PTGs, which were disproportionately attended by women and those in their forties. (Among my 9 interviewees sampled from PTGs, 5 were women, and 6 were between the ages of 40-49). Interviewees lived in Manchester for an average of 22.5 years, and in their current neighborhood for 17.8 years, though this varied considerably by race/ethnicity and nativity (with minorities and the foreign-born having lived in Manchester and their neighborhoods for shorter periods of time). All reported participating in some form of civic or neighborhood life, most often a PTG (48%) followed by a civic/volunteer group, broadly defined (35%). I do not list those who were not
residents in Table 2-4, as only residents completed this questionnaire (though four of the individuals I interviewed solely as political leaders, organizers, and social service providers, and school administrators were non-Hispanic white, and one was Hispanic).

Table 2-4. Characteristics of Interviewed Manchester Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Diverse</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Diverse</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Diverse</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Multiracial³</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Born</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Owners</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For how many years have you lived in…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…Manchester</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…your current neighborhood</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the past year, have you participated in any of the following?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic/Volunteer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church/Church Group</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Teacher Group</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Watch Group</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Interviewees who did not live in Manchester (e.g., educational administrators, interns, public service workers) are excluded from this table (n=5), as are informal interviewees (n=6).
2. Asian was included on the demographic survey, no respondent selected this category.
3. Among those who identified as Other/Multiracial, one identified as Middle Eastern, two as Arabic, and one as Nepalese.
Most of my interviewees were sampled from the different organizations I observed, though some (who were recommended to me by others) did not participate in these organizations (and a handful participated in no civic organizations). I exclude my informal interviewees from this table, as they did not complete this survey. I define these informal interviews as conversations that arose during field work (typically in places like city streets or public parks); as these were informal, I did not audio record these, but still took extensive notes. Note that only six of my in-depth interviews met the criteria for “informal,” however, including (on one occasion) a conversation between me, a Spanish translator, and a group of four Hispanic parents (and the remaining two in-depth interviewees were white).

I used data gained from these interviews to examine further the relationship and social capital at the individual level. These interviews also shed light on race/ethnic relations and social capital, including on whether various how and why individuals perceived (and responded to) diversity and related demographic trends as they did. I talked to residents about their neighborhoods, and on occasion interviewees showed me around their neighborhood and introduced me to neighbors. This helped to give me a better sense of what (geographically) they considered to be their “neighborhood” (though I also asked about this during the interview). Guiding questions that I used during the interview appear in the Appendix of this dissertation. I used questions such as the following will to encourage interviewees to elaborate on matters of community life while allowing me to probe for matters related to social capital and neighborhood diversity:

- What got you involved in this organization?
- Why did you decide to move to this neighborhood?
- Are there any organizations you have stopped attending? If so, why?
- Do you consider yourself close to the people in your group or neighborhood? What kinds of things do you do for one another?

- Have you worked with members of your neighborhood to fix a local problem? What was this problem? Did these efforts ever fail?

- Do you think people in your neighborhood generally trust one another?

Formal (audio recorded) interviews lasted an average of 48 minutes (lasting anywhere between 20 minutes to 1 hour and 47 minutes), and resulted in 318 pages of interview transcripts. I conducted interviews in a variety of settings, including residents’ homes, local restaurants, cafés, public parks, and schools. I asked each of my interviewees to name a place that would be most convenient to meet for this interview. This helped to give me a sense of where they spent their time, and I made it a point during each interview to ask them about our meeting place, including how often they frequented the establishment or area (in the case of parks) and how they became familiar with it.

**Focus Groups**

As a research assistant for the Roadmaps to Health Initiative (a partnership between the Carsey School of Public Policy and the Manchester Health Department), I and two members of the Manchester Health Department conducted 6 focus groups with 37 participants between March and May of 2013. With IRB approval and permission from focus group participants, I analyzed data from these discussions in addition to my in-depth interviews. To differentiate focus group participants from interviewees in my findings chapters, I state explicitly whether a respondent was a participant in these focus groups. Where not stated, readers should assume an individual I discuss was an interviewee and not a focus group participant. As all of my formal in-depth interviews were with individuals who spoke English well or as their native language, these focus groups help to fill this substantial gap within my sample, ensuring that I captured a
substantial portion of the Manchester population (according to five-year estimates from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey, 52% of foreign-born persons in Manchester speak English “less than very well”).

Although the goal of these focus groups was to examine access to services and barriers to wellbeing (see Young 2015), topics of interest to my dissertation research also arose during the course of these discussions. This includes whom participants can go to when they need help (both individuals and organizations), the types of groups they participate in (both civic and social service associations), how they feel about their neighborhoods (e.g., whether they know their neighbors well and feel safe in their neighborhood). Each focus group represented a population of interest to the Manchester Health Department. Two were conducted in a language other than English with the aid of a translator (one in Spanish, the other in Arabic). Another two groups were comprised of individuals 50 and older living in public housing, and another two were conducted with young adults (ages 18-24) participating in social service programs. Health Department workers distributed fliers and contacted service providers and school employees in order to recruit participants. As per IRB approval, all participants were compensated for their time with gift cards to local grocery stores. Consent forms (for translators), recruitment fliers, and a letter of approval of IRB are located in the Appendix of this dissertation.

Participants in these groups completed a demographic survey similar to the one I distributed to my interviewees. Table 2-5 displays the demographic breakdown of the focus group participants based on these surveys. Note that in a handful of cases, respondents did not answer certain questions (including 8 participants who did not answer questions regarding language spoken at home, and 2 who did not answer the question about gender). Participants were recruited based less on neighborhood and more on school district, though these districts
overlapped to a large extent with the neighborhoods I was studying. Participants either lived in these school districts or participated in social service agencies and programs located in the area. About 30\% of respondents were drawn from a part of the city that overlaps with my least diverse neighborhood, another 22\% from my more diverse neighborhood, and 49\% from the most diverse neighborhood I selected for analysis. Nearly three-quarters identified as white, and 78\% said they were born in the US.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-5. Demographic Characteristics of Focus Group Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (any race)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Multiracial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-Born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoken at Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other than English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. While Asian was included as a category on the demographic survey, no respondents selected this category.
Archival, Survey and Historical Data

I gathered archival data to understand the distribution of civic groups and nonprofits throughout the city. This data also gave a sense of the extent to which a rich civic life exists within Manchester, the types of associations and organizations in which residents typically find membership. Sources included local newspapers, online public message boards on newspapers’ websites, brochures, newsletters, fliers, and meeting minutes.

I used archival data to understand the proliferation and goals of various neighborhood associations, organizations, and civic events. This included newspapers, meeting minutes, and fliers. I also subscribed to and regularly read the Union Leader, the city’s largest newspaper (though in the course of my research the publication eventually took a more statewide focus in its reporting). It is also important to understand how Manchester city bureaucracies responded to the recent diversity. As such, I collected and examined government documents, including the city’s master development plan and school improvement proposals, to examine how the city and its various institutions are responding to increasing diversity. These helped to lead me to various events to observe (such as redistricting meetings) and persons to interview. These documents suggest that much of Manchester’s response directly cites its recent demographic change, particularly with respect to the city’s civic infrastructure. Indeed, efforts to “weed out crime and seed in participation” call for approaches that “embrace (the city’s) diversity” (Manchester Weed and Seed Strategy 2012).

Coding and Analysis

Where necessary, I checked statements of interviewees against these more objective sources of archival data (e.g., crime or poverty rates) and ethnographic observations. This allows me to assess whether responses are not merely an artifact of the interview process and determine
the extent to which subjective perceptions of their communities are objectively true (e.g., the notion that incoming refugees are a significant drain on local resources). Objectively true or not, though, residents’ perceptions still matter. Whether or not objectively true, residents’ subjective perceptions and constructions bring much to bear on the structure of their neighborhoods, their own participation, and social networks. With respect to matters of race in particular, there is a tendency for Americans to exaggerate trends or to attribute certain characteristics to a particular group of individuals when in fact such generalizations lack empirical support (Crowley and Lichter 2009; Hopkins 2011; Reid et al. 2005), especially in an era where colorblind racism abounds (Bonilla-Silva 2009).

Once transcribed, I coded in-depth interviews and ethnographic field notes based on the various dimensions of social capital and related concepts (e.g., tie formation, bridging/bonding, trust, voluntarism) and other theoretical concepts (including civic capacity, resource mobilization, etc.), along with racial attitudes and related practices (e.g., colorblind racism, symbolic boundary work).

I also employed a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), which calls for allowing patterns to arise out of the data rather than enforcing a strict coding scheme that might overlook relevant patterns not originally considered. Thus, various definitions of social capital, collective efficacy, and civic capacity did not strictly guide my analysis. It was this grounded theory approach that allowed me to identify the importance of cultural frames (which are the subject of Chapters 4 and 5) and civic organization practices (discussed in Chapter 6). I coded my field notes and interviews by hand using tools available in Microsoft Office Suite, rather than using software such as NVivo or Atlas.ti. I provide more detailed descriptions of the methods I
used for coding various topics (including the criteria used to determine interviewees’ cultural frames) in each respective findings chapter.

Limitations

Causality is difficult to demonstrate in both qualitative and quantitative studies. As the proposed research is cross-sectional in nature, causal inferences may be beyond the scope of this project, though I show how processes and mechanisms work cross-sectionally within and between these neighborhoods as well as neighborhood residents. As with any geographically circumscribed research, findings also are not necessarily generalizable beyond Manchester, though the processes illuminated and how they operate in neighborhood social capital might be.

As past research suggests, social capital is often difficult to measure. Paxton (1999), for instance, argues that social capital (as with any construct) must be conceptualized separately from its consequences. For example, participation may be a result of one’s social capital, rather than a form of social capital in itself. This may be particularly true in qualitative research, where these concepts will be explored largely via in-depth interviews and systematic field observations. Another difficulty arises with respect to race, which is often a difficult topic to broach. Some interviewees—especially those who identified as white—seemed apprehensive to discuss matters of diversity and race relations, giving short answers to questions revolving around these topics. I noticed that apprehension was uncommon during interviews in which I shared a strong rapport with the interviewee, though (gained by attending and interacting with them at various civic and neighborhood functions). I also made it clear when anyone asked about my research that I was interested in Manchester primarily due to its diversity.
Human Subject Considerations

In order to preserve the anonymity of respondents and the neighborhoods, I use pseudonyms for people and places. Where necessary, I altered my descriptions of interviewees slightly, including defining their community roles, length of residency, and association memberships broadly. I other cases, I omitted descriptions of some of these factors altogether, and some identities combined or bifurcated. I made such changes or omissions only when it did not change the interpretation of the results (for instance, describing a principal or teacher as a “school employee,” or changing the gender of a parent’s child). I also describe broadly describe the organizations I observed and in which my interviewees participated (e.g., PTG, residential group, social service organization). Because these groups varied in size, I do not reveal the total number of participants at a given meeting or event, though participation at the meetings I attended ranged anywhere from only 2 attendees to more than 30 (though these numbers do not describe block parties or school-wide events, which easily had over a hundred participants).

Finally, rather than alter descriptions of residents’ neighborhoods, which could betray critical qualitative distinctions between such places (differences that could be critical to the formation of social capital), I instead described residents’ neighborhoods as “more” or “less” diverse (meaning more or less diverse than the city as a whole). Note that these broad descriptions do not necessarily pertain to the broad neighborhood I was studying, but also the part of the neighborhood (such as the street) in which a given interviewee lived. At times, I also note whether an interviewee or focus group participant lived in the city’s East or West Side at the time of our interview/focus group.

The appendix at the end of this dissertation contains all IRB documentation (including informed consent forms, demographic surveys, as well as approval and modification letters).
Respondents retained the option of ending interviews at any time or simply to stop audio recording of the interview (though in no cases did this occur), which I noted at the start of each interview. All in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were audio recorded with consent of participants (I gained written consent in the case of in-depth interviews; in keeping with IRB-approved protocol for this research, focus group participants did not sign consent forms, though these were read aloud by me or a translator at the start of each group discussion). I transcribed all interviews and focus group discussions myself, after which I immediately destroyed all audio recordings.
CHAPTER 3

A CITY IN TRANSITION: MANCHESTER DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

How exactly did Manchester’s racial/ethnic composition change in recent years, and what do these changes mean for the city’s demographic future? These are the sorts of questions I set out to answer in this chapter. I also place these trends in a historic perspective. As I discovered throughout the course of my ethnographic work, many Manchester residents use the city’s immigrant history to make sense of its current wave of newcomers. Having observed a parent-teacher group, I became acquainted with Stewart—a regular participant in the (relatively small) organization and a non-Hispanic white resident of Manchester’s west side. Living just a few blocks from the school where he volunteered much of his time, Stewart described the many changes he witnessed over the last few decades:

Well, the ethnic culture has changed a lot. This particular side of town was like the French Canadian side of town. Even when I was growing up in the school system, you didn’t have the ethnic diversity. It was more, um, you know, white middle class families for the most part. When you got into the center city you had more Spanish and French. But now, looking at the city now, we have so many different cultures, refugees are moving into the city, and the different cultures, you know, Bhutanese, Indian, Latino, different variations of those.

As Stewart’s experiences suggest, the city’s demographic makeup underwent many changes in a short period of time. Manchester residents like Stewart sometimes draw on the city’s white-ethnic immigrant history to make sense of current demographic shifts. While Manchester might seem an odd site in which to study matters of diversity, being less diverse than many of the nation’s largest cities, it is these rapid changes in its racial/ethnic composition (along with a unique immigrant history) that make the city an appropriate site in which to examine integration, cross-racial ties, social connectedness, and neighborhood change.
In this chapter, I explore in-depth Manchester’s demographic trends, tracing the sources of its population change, including the growth of the minority population and the decline of the non-Hispanic white population. Second, I examine changing diversity at the tract and block level, exploring the extent to which Manchester’s diversity is spatially concentrated, with varying rates of residential segregation. Third, I use a combination of city and tract-level data to demonstrate that, while some neighborhoods are integrating they remain economically disadvantaged—and even when those of different racial/ethnic groups “share” a neighborhood, there remains a great deal of micro (i.e., block)-level segregation, often a reflection of socioeconomic inequality. I also demonstrate the growing concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage, chiefly the increase of poverty in some (more often than not, more diverse) neighborhoods and its decline in others. Finally, I examine differences in the age structure of Manchester’s non-Hispanic white residents (for brevity, referred to from this point onward simply as “white”), compared to the city’s black, Asian, and Hispanic residents. Where appropriate, I complement demographic data with observations from fieldwork, in addition to in-depth interviews, focus groups, and archival data.

**Manchester, New Hampshire: A Diverse History of Immigration**

By most measures, the city is less diverse than the nation as a whole (see Figure 3-1; population breakdowns of Manchester’s 2000 and 2010 populations by race/ethnicity appear in Table 3-1), and also less diverse than many larger cities throughout New England, including Boston, Providence, and Hartford. For example, in 2010, nonwhites made up only a fifth of Manchester’s population, compared to more than a third of the population of the US. While Manchester might not stand out immediately in terms of its racial/ethnic diversity, one dimension
of its demography that does make it unique (one that I alluded to when describing my site selection in Chapter 2) is the rapid growth in its minority population.

Table 3-1. Race/Ethnicity in Manchester, New Hampshire, 2000 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE/ETHNICITY</th>
<th>2000 Total</th>
<th>2000 %</th>
<th>2010 Total</th>
<th>2010 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total population</strong></td>
<td>107,006</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>109,565</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RACE/ETHNICITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (not Hispanic)</td>
<td>95,581</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>89,893</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (of any race)¹</td>
<td>4,944</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African American</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4,476</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2,487</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4,014</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander/American Indian²</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Other Race</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3,440</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Races</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RACE, NOT HISPANIC (2010 Only)³</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African American alone</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,063</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian alone</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3,993</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander/American Indian</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Other Race alone</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Races alone</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
1. According to figures from the US Census Bureau (2000, 2010), 53% of Manchester’s Hispanic population identified as white in 2000 and 50% did so in 2010. Another 36% identified as “Some other race” in 2010 as well.
2. Pacific Islander/American Indian includes Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian; for consistency with the 2000 census, races other than white contain Hispanics and non-Hispanics.
3. Because the 2000 census does not provide a breakdown of racial groups who are not Hispanic (aside from whites), I provide this second set of 2010 figures that exclude Hispanics from these other racial groups.
As previously noted, the city has experienced a substantial increase in nonwhite residents and, at the same time, a decline in its non-Hispanic white population. Moreover, despite its population size of just over 110,000, and a metropolitan population of 400,000 (in the Manchester-Nashua metropolitan area, which comprises all of Hillsborough County), Manchester possesses a rich history of immigration—driven by influxes of white-ethnic workers (predominantly Irish and French Canadian) seeking employment in the city’s many mills and textile factories (see Ward, Young, and Grimm 2014). The current and historical trends apparent in Manchester are closely aligned with what Singer (2004) calls *re-emerging immigrant gateway destinations*, where “the foreign-born percentage exceeds the national average (in) 1900-1930, lags it after 1930, then increases rapidly after 1980” (p. 5). While Singer’s work is concerned primarily with the nation’s largest metropolitan areas, smaller cities like Manchester must be considered. Manchester’s foreign-born composition exceeds the nations throughout the 1900s through the 1930s. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 3-2, the rate of foreign-born persons was
substantially greater in Manchester than the nation as a whole from the late 1800s until about 1990, and far surpassing levels of foreign-born in the state of New Hampshire. Second, like other re-emerging gateways, including Portland (Oregon) and Seattle, there is a substantial dip in immigration post-1930 and, finally, a re-emergence of immigration following the 1930s. Despite being a small-to-medium sized city, Manchester is certainly experiencing a rise in its foreign-born population (and, as I elaborate on shortly, diversification) on par with (and often surpassing) those of many of the nation’s largest cities.

By the turn of the twentieth century, entry of foreign-born persons to Manchester was at its peak, with the foreign-born comprising nearly half of the city’s population in 1890, and many of the mills and textile factories that attracted so many French-Canadian, German, and Irish to the region were working at capacity. This white-ethnic diversity was reflected across the city’s neighborhoods, many of which were ethnic-specific. The city’s West Side, for instance, was composed primarily of Franco-Americans who emigrated from Quebec seeking work in many of
the city’s mills (see Perreault 2010). As one interviewee and Manchester native told me, it was not uncommon for her to hear French being spoken throughout her West Side neighborhood, even as late as the 1960s.

The rate at which the foreign-born came to Manchester slowed significantly after a series of strikes plagued the city’s mills in the 1920s (ibid.). Then, just a few years later, the city’s economic and population growth suffered yet another blow during the Great Depression with the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company (one of the largest attractors of white ethnic immigrants) in the mid-1930s. Its closure was representative of a broader deindustrialization that was slowly spreading throughout the region (Johnson and Macieski 2009). The portion of the population comprised of foreign-born persons steadily declined during this period. It was not until 1990 that increasing rates of foreign-born would return to Manchester and the surrounding region, though in the form of nonwhite diversity (as opposed to white ethnic immigration from places like Canada, Ireland, and Germany).

At the twentieth century’s end, the percentage of the population comprised of foreign-born persons in Manchester was again on the rise, with an increase that was on par with a national trend (Figure 3-2). Nationwide, the increasing prevalence of foreign-born persons was driven primarily by a rise in the Hispanic population and, to a lesser extent, those emigrating from Asia (Schmidley 2001). According to Schmidley (2001), at the turn of the twenty-first century, those from Latin America accounted for 51% of the foreign-born in the United States, while individuals from Asian counties made up another 25%. Where Manchester departs from these nationwide demographic trends, however, is the rate at which its minority population is growing and its white population shrinking.
As illustrated in Figure 3-3, Manchester’s population grew at a slower rate than the nation (2.4% compared to 9.7% nationwide), and its white population actually declined by 6.0%, whereas the white population in the US as a whole increased slightly (by about 1.2%). Moreover, Manchester is diversifying at a rate faster than the US population more broadly, as witnessed by the proportionately larger increases in its minority residents. Indeed, were it not for a rise in the foreign-born population and the growth of its minority population in the last decade, Manchester’s total population actually would have experienced a net loss, due largely to out-migration (see Johnson and Macieski 2009). Between 2000 and 2010, the city’s Hispanic residents, for instance, grew at a rate nearly double that of the nation’s (79.7%, compared to 43%). Manchester’s black/African population grew even faster than that of Hispanics, virtually doubling between 2000 and 2010; across the U.S., though, the black population increased only by 12.3%. Much of the growth in this subpopulation likely reflects refugee resettlement, with 55.7% of Manchester’s black/African residents being foreign-born in 2010, compared to 8.7% of this racial group nationwide. According to 5-Year estimates from the most recent American Community Survey (2009-2013), 17.8% of Manchester’s 14,012 foreign-born residents (or 2,494) identified as black/African (note that I divided this 2,494 by the total population in Manchester of this same racial group, or 4,476, to arrive at this 55.7% figure). What is more, just over 40% Manchester’s foreign-born black residents entered in 2000 or later, and about half of the refugees resettled in Manchester since the 1980s arrived at this time (see discussion in Ward, Young, and Grimm, 2014). Refugee resettlement in Manchester has been among the most controversial dimensions of the city’s demographic change. While the International Institute has been helping refugees resettle in Manchester since the 1980s, more than half of the city’s refugee
population arrived in Manchester in 2000 or later, contributing substantially to rising diversity during this period (ibid.).

As diversity has increased in Manchester since the turn of the twenty-first century, there have also been dramatic changes in the composition of the city’s foreign-born with respect to their origins (see Figure 3-4). In 1990, more than two-thirds (or 68.8%) of Manchester’s foreign-born originated either from Europe (32.2% of the foreign-born) or Canada (36.6%), reflecting the importance of white-ethnic immigration that was the backbone of the city’s economy throughout much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The portion of the foreign-born who originated from these regions has been on a steady decline, however. In 2000, those from Europe and Canada made up just over half of Manchester’s foreign-born residents. At present (according to the most recent estimates from the American Community Survey’s 5-Year estimates), these groups comprise only 29.8% of the city’s foreign-born. Those from Latin America (29.1% of the foreign-born in 2010) and Asia (26.2%) now account for some 55% of Manchester’s foreign-
born, up from 28% just two decades ago, although those born in Latin American countries saw their numbers rise at a rate faster than their Asian counterparts. Finally, about 15% of the city’s foreign-born arrived from Africa, up from less than 1% in 1990 and just below 6% in 2000.

![Diversity within the Hispanic Population](image)

**Diversity within the Hispanic Population**

The changing Hispanic population, being the largest (and, second to black residents, the fastest growing) minority group in Manchester, warrants further attention. Although those of different origins are typically lumped together into one larger “Hispanic” subgroup, several individuals I interviewed throughout the course of my ethnographic work elaborated on their identities, not referring to themselves simply as Hispanic or Latino, but also as “Mexican,” “Chicano,” or by country of birth, including one woman born in Honduras. In some cases, interviewees eschewed the labels of Hispanic and Latino all together. My interview with Selena—who moved to Manchester from the southern US where she was born—also points to distinct boundaries between those of various Hispanic origins.
There’s a lot of, um, there’s a lot of Hispanics here. And, I don’t like being called Hispanic, I mean, not by you, but when I got here to the state, being labeled as a Hispanic really bothered me. It still does, because Hispanics are people who are from Spain or descendants of Spain. That is what we were taught in Texas. I know my father’s ancestors are from Spain, but my mother’s are from Mexico. I don’t see myself as Hispanic. And Latino—I am not from Latin America, so don’t call me Latino. Some people call me Mexican, and I can accept that, but I am American by birth. So where do you throw me? I don’t like being clustered. So here [she places different-colored paperclips on the table to illustrate different groups] we have Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Hondurans, people from El Salvador, Costa Rica—you have this huge mix of people and we are all thrown together. Puerto Ricans can use one word, I am trying to think of it—let me skip to Dominicans. Dominicans will say that same thing, and when I heard that terminology I had no idea what the hell they were talking about… I didn’t know what it was until they told me. Our Spanish is different. Our foods are different even though we are all Hispanic. Our foods, the days that we celebrate are different. Our religious beliefs are somewhat different. So, people who are here illegally, undocumented is the correct word—then you also have the people who were born here, and they were fortunate to be born here and got an English education. Some of us see us as we have achieved what we were told we needed to achieve. Some of us extend a hand and try to help those who weren’t born here. Others could care less. So yes, you do have not really a split, I don’t know what to call it—but kind of almost a holier-than-thou attitude among Hispanics in general. Uh, they keep—I don’t know if it’s—they really keep to themselves. Puerto Ricans have their own thing. Dominicans have their own thing. And Mexicans, too. So it’s pretty much a lot of separate groups.

Selena’s point—one that many sociologists of race and immigration have observed—demonstrates the importance of examining differences within the Hispanic population, a population which is far more diverse in terms of origin/nationality in Manchester than at the national level (see Table 3-2). Differences between the ethnic makeup of the Hispanic population in the US and Manchester is most apparent with respect to those from Mexico, who comprised only about a fifth of Manchester’s Hispanic population but made up 63% of all Hispanics in the US in 2010. Also unique to Manchester is the much larger share of Puerto Ricans among its Hispanic residents—37.3% of all Hispanics in Manchester, compared to less than 10% nationwide. Puerto Ricans, as well as those from “Other” Hispanic/Latino origins, also grew at a
faster rate than any other background between 2000 and 2010. These groups are also more highly represented among Manchester’s Hispanics; only among those from Cuba is their representation in Manchester (as a share of Hispanics) somewhat on par with the national level (1.2% in Manchester vs. 3.5% nationwide, and the Cuban population grew at about the same rate in the last decade in both these places (at approximately 40%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Total, 2010</th>
<th>% of Hispanics</th>
<th>Change Since 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MANCHESTER, NH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>50,477,594</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>31,798,258</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>4,623,716</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,785,547</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12,270,073</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From ‘Global Neighborhoods’ to Micro-Segregation

The demographic trends discussed above have made for a more diverse Manchester, but how are the city’s different racial/ethnic groups distributed at the neighborhood level? Many demographers have elaborated on the extent to which growing diversity across the US has resulted (to some extent) in more heterogeneous neighborhoods. While segregation and ethnic enclaves remain the norm in many cities and towns (Logan 2013), some are witnessing a growth in what Logan and Zhang call “global neighborhoods”: those in which numerous racial/ethnic groups are well-represented and “where the simple place categories of predominantly white, predominantly black, or racially mixed are no longer adequate” (2010: p. 1070).
The map in Figure 3-5 illustrates the spatial concentration of Manchester’s racial/ethnic minorities in 2010. Ten of Manchester's 29 census tracts were more diverse than the city as a whole in 2010. In these tracts, whites make up a much smaller portion of the neighborhood, and at least one minority group is over-represented. Overwhelmingly, Hispanics (of any race) constitute the over-represented group. Indeed, in about half of these "more diverse" tracts, Hispanics comprise at least a fifth of the tract's population, and in these tracts the Hispanic population increased substantially—in some cases more than doubling—between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 3-2). On the surface, these changes seem to signify increased exposure to diversity. Yet, as Table 3-2 suggests, many of these tracts became more diverse not only because of the growing presence of minority groups. This is due to a concurrent loss of the white population, reflecting white migration to other neighborhoods and out-migration to the city's suburbs and beyond. Manchester’s suburbs, including places like Goffstown and Bedford are much less diverse than the city itself (being 95.3% and 93.3% non-Hispanic white, respectively, in 2010). According to data from the 2000 and 2010 censuses, Goffstown’s white (non-Hispanic) population increased by 1.7% (and its minority population by 53%), and Bedford’s white population by almost 11% (and its minority population by 57%); in both these suburbs, though, while minority residents representation grew at a faster rate, in sheer numbers white growth outpaced minority growth. Thus, while the white population has grown throughout the Manchester-Nashua MSA in recent years, its growth has been uneven, increasing in small suburban towns throughout the metropolitan area, but declining in the city of Manchester itself (see Johnson and Macieski 2009).

In only a handful of tracts did the city of Manchester’s white population actually increase, and growth was relatively small (ranging from 1.8% to 28.2%), especially in
comparison to changes in the nonwhite population. Tract 2004 (which runs along the Merrimack River on the city’s East Side) represents a unique case; here, the white population grew by nearly 20%, and the black and Asian populations witnessed even stronger growth (of 55% and 61%, respectively). There was some decline in the tract’s Hispanic population, though. What is more, many of Manchester’s most diverse neighborhoods—including this tract—are also among its most economically disadvantaged, a point I elaborate on shortly. Moreover, as Figure 3-5 suggests, the concentration of Manchester’s minority population suggests substantial spatial concentration by race/ethnicity.
Table 3-3. Racial-Ethnic Composition (2010) and Change (2000-2010), and Poverty Rate (2010) for Manchester, NH Census Tracts (sorted by percent white)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tract</th>
<th>White 2010</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Hispanic 2010</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Black 2010</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Asian 2010</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tract 15</td>
<td>51.80%</td>
<td>-30.90%</td>
<td>28.40%</td>
<td>76.50%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>140.70%</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>-8.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 19</td>
<td>62.50%</td>
<td>-11.40%</td>
<td>22.30%</td>
<td>46.00%</td>
<td>9.60%</td>
<td>64.30%</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 16</td>
<td>63.50%</td>
<td>-22.30%</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
<td>128.10%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>140.70%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>32.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 14</td>
<td>65.10%</td>
<td>-18.60%</td>
<td>21.40%</td>
<td>74.40%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>-13.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 20</td>
<td>70.50%</td>
<td>-23.60%</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
<td>48.90%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
<td>35.00%</td>
<td>3.30%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 13</td>
<td>73.20%</td>
<td>-14.60%</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>73.60%</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>97.60%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
<td>66.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 17</td>
<td>77.20%</td>
<td>-12.60%</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
<td>68.30%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>124.50%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
<td>-5.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 2004</td>
<td>77.90%</td>
<td>28.20%</td>
<td>10.60%</td>
<td>-16.90%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>55.40%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>61.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 18</td>
<td>79.60%</td>
<td>-11.80%</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>73.10%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>128.70%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>206.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 21</td>
<td>79.90%</td>
<td>-14.40%</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
<td>188.10%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>91.00%</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>211.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 24</td>
<td>80.20%</td>
<td>-6.00%</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
<td>139.30%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>154.60%</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
<td>120.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tract 2.04</td>
<td>81.40%</td>
<td>19.10%</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
<td>88.30%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>153.10%</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
<td>58.20%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.40%</td>
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<td>1.60%</td>
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Data for Other/Multiracial are not included with crosswalks.
Segregation is an important dimension of stratification to consider where issues of diversity are concerned, and is typically measured using the Dissimilarity Index (which refers to how evenly or unevenly one racial/ethnic group’s population is distributed in a given area, such as the city of Manchester, in comparison to another group, most often whites). Figure 3-6 illustrates the segregation of different racial/ethnic groups from whites in Manchester (based on 2010 decennial census data) using these dissimilarity indexes. Dissimilarity Indices are calculated as $D = 100 \times 0.5 \times \sum \left| \frac{P_{xi}}{P_x} - \frac{P_{yi}}{P_y} \right|$, where $D$ is the index for two groups, $P_{xi}$ is the total number of group X in the tract, $P_x$ the total number of this group in the city, $P_{yi}$ the total number of group Y in the tract, and $P_y$ the total number of this group in the city; $\Sigma$ (or Sigma) indicates the summation of these calculations.

The index is interpreted as the percent of the reference group (in this case, whites) who would have to move in order for the dissimilarity index to be zero—the point at which a city’s
population is evenly distributed across racial/ethnic lines. For example, if a city with a population comprised half of whites and half of blacks, then a dissimilarity index of zero would indicate that each Census tract is fifty percent black and fifty percent white (assuming the tract is the unit of analysis).

Although the city’s diversity is spatially concentrated, mostly in the center of the city, Manchester is actually much less segregated than many other US cities. For example, out of the 100 largest metro areas in the US, Springfield, Massachusetts is among the highest in terms of Hispanic segregation, with a white/Hispanic index of 64; the Milwaukee, Wisconsin area is the most segregated in terms of its white/black populations, with an index of 81 (Frey 2010). Manchester’s dissimilarity indices are considerably lower than these figures. With a white/nonwhite Dissimilarity Index of 23.9, nearly a quarter of whites would have to move in order for the white/nonwhite composition of the city’s census tracts to match that of the city as a whole (82 percent white, 18 percent nonwhite). Hispanic residents (who are also the city’s largest and fastest growing minority group) are the most segregated from non-Hispanic whites, followed by Manchester’s black/African residents. Among the least segregated are those who identify as multi-racial, Asian, and “Other/Multiracial.”

Despite some integration at the census tract level, there remains a great deal of variation within these tracts when it comes to growing racial/ethnic diversity. Even just a short walk through many portions of the city reveals that racial/ethnic demographics, neighborhood composition, and housing quality and other physical features of a neighborhood’s landscape change rapidly, often from one street or block to the next. I even spot the occasional sign that reads “If you can read this, you’re in range” (a sign meant to deter passersby from trespassing, warning them that they are in range of a homeowner’s gun). Signs such as these suggest that
these are not necessarily “shared” neighborhoods, but to some extent represent ‘protected’
communities (see Suttles 1972).

Block-level data help reveal the micro-segregation of Manchester’s racial/ethnic
minorities (based on data from the 2010 decennial census). While blocks might seem like a small
unit of analysis and overly restrictive when it comes to measuring a neighborhood, conceptions
of “neighborhood” in geographic terms varied considerably among the many residents I
interviewed, and were often reduced to levels even smaller than blocks. Tom, a life-long white
resident whose home rests along a cul-de-sac, for instance, defined his neighborhood as his
house and the four others which along the tiny street. Others had somewhat broader definitions,
including Selena, a Chicana resident of a more diverse neighborhood on the East Side, who
described all the homes on her block as her neighborhood. Thus, even within areas as broad as
census tracts, there are areas that some consider outside or separate from their neighborhood, and
most people do not think of their world in terms of official boundaries such as tracts. This is
consistent with Hwang (2015), who illustrates that non-Hispanic whites typically have much
more restrictive (and exclusive) spatial conceptions of “neighborhood” (ones that often
circumvent more diverse portions of the areas in which they live). When Hwang asked residents
of Philadelphia to draw boundaries (on city maps) of what they considered to be their
“neighborhood,” she found that whites tended to have less inclusive boundaries, ones that often
bypassed or excluded areas where fewer whites lived. Black residents, on the other hand, drew
maps that were more racially and ethnically inclusive, being less likely to exclude predominantly
white parts of the area. The white residents I interviewed had more restrictive, geographically
limited definitions of what they considered to be their neighborhood, in ways that were largely
consistent with Hwang’s findings. This includes Tom who, as I described in the previous
paragraph, considered only his home and surrounding houses along the street to be his “neighborhood.” However, when I talked to those who lived in parts of the city that had clearer historic boundaries, they were more likely to describe larger areas as their neighborhood (a pattern that transcended the race and ethnicity of my interviewees)—these larger conceptions of “neighborhood” did not necessarily translate into having more cross-racial ties or stronger relationships with neighbors, however. Moreover, Jones and Pebley (2014) also observed “whites are constrained to a narrower socio-spatial context than are other groups” (p. 746-747).

Not surprisingly—as I discuss in Chapter 4—close ties with neighbors were fewer among my non-Hispanic white interviewees (as were helping behaviors and reciprocity). In only a handful of cases did residents define their neighborhoods broadly in terms of local institutions like schools, and while some I encountered in the field told me they lived on the East or West side (when I asked about their neighborhoods), it did not seem that they intended this to mean they considered either half of the city their “neighborhood.” For most Manchester residents, “neighborhood” was constructed in terms of where they lived and whom they knew (typically, those living nearest them). When interviewees did discuss city life in terms of East and West side (something West Side residents and service providers were more apt to do than East Side residents), it was often in terms of an historic sense of isolation from Manchester that those on the West Side said residents have perceived for decades, given the natural divide of the Merrimack River, as well as the West Side’s history as the predominantly French Canadian part of town.

While it is not surprising that large swaths of Manchester are predominantly white (as they make up 80% of its residents), what is surprising—and illustrated in Figure 3-7—is how segregated Manchester’s racial/ethnic minorities are from their white counterparts at the block
level (census tracts are outlined in bold). Note that gray areas represent physical features such as schools and city parks (which are not large enough to appear on maps of census tracts). Blocks where minorities comprise more than a quarter (but less than half) of all residents are concentrated in the city center, though there are some cases (such as in the north-eastern portion of the East Side and the center of the West Side) where minorities make up 25% of residents. In a handful of cases, blocks are more than half nonwhite. Being over-represented among Manchester’s socioeconomically disadvantaged populations, many of these blocks contain public housing—a feature which helps to explain their over-representation in some of these cases. The takeaway here, though, is that even when it appears different racial/ethnic groups “share” a census tract, these geographic units themselves are highly segregated.
Figure 3-7. Percent Minority by Census Block in Manchester, NH (2010)
Growing Diversity, Growing Inequality

With this new diversity has come numerous controversies and challenges for the city. However, many of Manchester’s long-time (predominantly white) residents are divided over what this new wave of immigration means for the city’s future. A refugee moratorium that the city’s mayor and alderman attempted to institute in 2011 (due to what they described as the city’s lack of resources for the refugee population) made national news, for example, even being reported in the New York Times (e.g., Goodnough 2011). As I discuss in the next chapter, many of the city’s residents are divided in how they perceive immigration, with some arguing that this new multiculturalism enriches social life, and others that the city’s newcomers are a drain on local resources.

In addition to shifts in diversity, the spatial concentration of Manchester’s poorest residents has also changed. In 2000, 14 of Manchester’s 29 census tracts had poverty levels of at least 10%, and only one (the city’s most central tract) had a poverty rate greater than 30% (see Figure 3-8a). Note that this 29 is the count of all tracts within Manchester’s city limits available from US2010 Project crosswalk data, and excludes tract 9801.01 (the entirety of which is the Manchester/Boston Regional Airport). Ten years later, however, poverty rates became considerably more concentrated in some tracts and declined in others, as per Figure 3-8b.
Figure 3-8a. Poverty Rate by Census Tract in Manchester, NH (2000)

Legend
Percent Below Poverty, 2000
- 0.0% to 5.0%
- 5.1% to 10.0%
- 10.1% to 15.0%
- 15.1% to 20.0%
- 20.1% to 30.0%
- Greater than 30.0%

Source: US Decennial Census, 2000
Figure 3-8b. Poverty Rate by Census Tract in Manchester, NH (2010)

Legend
Percent Below Poverty, 2010
- 0.0% to 5.0%
- 5.1% to 10.0%
- 10.1% to 15.0%
- 15.1% to 20.0%
- 20.1% to 30.0%
- Greater than 30.0%

Source: ACS, 2006-2010
Tracts on the outskirts of the city lines—especially on the East Side—tended to see their poverty rates drop between 2000 and 2010, while many areas of the center city experienced increases. Many of these changes occurred in tracts adjacent to one another (with one tract becoming poorer while poverty in one or more surrounding tracts declined). Notice also that many of the tracts that experienced substantial increases in poverty (that is, 5%-10% or higher) were adjacent to those that became slightly more affluent (affluent, at least, by virtue of a declining poverty rate). The extent to which these rates declined due to in-migration of more affluent residents, out-migration of poorer residents, or an increase in the economic standing of current residents is not clear from these data. These changes in poverty are also felt at the school level, with some schools seeing a growth in the socioeconomic composition of the student body. Free and Reduce Lunch enrollment, for example, was 55.2% in the Manchester School District during the 2014/2015 school year (versus a third in 2006/2007). In 2014/2015, rates of enrollment in this free lunch program ranged from between 28.3% in one school to 94.3% in another, compared to a statewide average of 29% (according to the NH Department of Education). What is certain, though, is that poverty in Manchester is more heavily concentrated today than it was in 2000, especially in places where racial/ethnic minorities are over-represented—a trend that has occurred nationwide, in part due to the influence of the Great Recession (Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2012).

Areas of Manchester that are the most diverse tend to have higher rates of poverty than less diverse neighborhoods. The relationship between diversity and poverty is quite strong. This is illustrated in Figure 3-9. In census tracts with diversity indices above .30 (being more diverse than the city), 50% have poverty rates above 20% and an additional fifth have intermediate levels of poverty. Only 27% of these more diverse tracts have poverty rates below 10%. In contrast,
among Manchester’s less diverse neighborhoods (with indices below .20) none have high poverty rates and only 1 has an intermediate level of poverty. Among the city’s moderately diverse tracts (between .20 and .30) two-thirds have low poverty and 22% have intermediate levels of poverty. Only one tract (11 percent) has a poverty rate above 20%. Thus, the data clearly demonstrate that poverty levels are significantly higher among the most diverse tracts in the city of Manchester and significantly lower in the city’s least diverse tracts.

The shifting spatial concentration of Manchester’s most disadvantaged residents has not gone unnoticed by city officials. Recently, several city agencies (spurred by the Public Health Department) began partnering with local and state organizations in order to improve outcomes in three of Manchester’s least affluent neighborhoods. These efforts include, but are not limited to, allowing schools to serve as community centers that can provide access to social service providers and also house a variety of civic events (Young 2015). The outcomes of the project are
not yet clear, given its recency, but illustrate how links between a wide range of actors have the potential to enact change (see Safford 2009).

**The Future of Diversity in Manchester**

What do these trends suggest for Manchester’s demographic future, and what, if anything, do they mean for local policy? First, as Johnson and Macieski (2009) have already noted, many of the city’s older residents (ages 50+)—who are predominantly white—will “age in place.” The age pyramid in Figure 3-10a illustrates the aging of Manchester’s white population. The bulges throughout the center of the distribution suggest in the coming years that the white population will become much older as these groups move up the age pyramid or, in the case of those in their mid-to-late 20s, leave the city to raise families in the suburbs (as is often the dynamic). In contrast to these older groups, there are also fewer younger persons distributed nearer the bottom of the age structure that would otherwise help to keep this population relatively young overall.

![Figure 3-10a. Age Structure of the Non-Hispanic White Population in Manchester, NH (2010)](image)

Population: 89,893
Source: US Census, 2010
By comparison, the city’s minority population has a considerably younger age structure (see Figure 3-10b). The bulk of the minority population is concentrated at the bottom of the age structure, with even fewer at the top compared to the white population—resulting in a triangular structure indicative of a much younger population. There is some variation in these age structures, with some racial/ethnic minority groups being much younger than the white population compared to others, however. Younger age structures are most apparent for Manchester’s Hispanic (Figure 3-10c) and Other/Multiracial (Figure 3-10e) residents. The age structure of the Asian population (Figure 3-10d), meanwhile, more closely resembles the white population and the age pyramid of black residents is somewhat more evenly distributed by comparison (though it remains substantially younger).
A younger population moving up these pyramids, as well as proportionately more women of childbearing age, suggests that Manchester’s population will only become even more diverse—especially as the white population continues to age. Manchester’s child (that is, under 18) population is also far more diverse than the adult population as a whole, another demographic reality indicative of an even more racially and ethnically diverse future (Ward, Young, and Grimm 2014). Thus, even if minority in-migration to Manchester were to come to a halt (or, in the case of the attempted moratorium, refugee resettlement ceased), the city would continue to become more diverse, both by virtue of differences in age structure across these racial/ethnic groups, as well as the out-migration and decline of the white population. But how do Manchester residents perceive these demographic changes, and how are these changes altering the fabric of neighborhood life across the city? I set out to answer these, and related questions, throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
CULTURAL FRAMES, PART I: DIVERSITY AND THE FORMATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SOCIAL CAPITAL

We need to take care of our new citizens... There are so many things we need to do to accept those folks and address their needs. You can say ‘they don’t look like me, they didn’t come on the same boat as my ancestors,’ but they’re here. Stop talking that trash. (Phil, African American, 20-year Manchester resident).

~

...So I have a few issues, there’s a lot of people here that I’m not sure should be. I think they’re allowing too many people into Manchester, and I think they are handing them way too much. (Melissa, White, 20-year Manchester resident).

These quotes from two long-time Manchester residents illustrate the contentiousness that accompanies diversity, immigration, and neighborhood integration. Some, like Phil, openly embrace Manchester’s increasing racial/ethnic diversity, though they readily admit that this demographic change is not without its challenges—a cultural lens I refer to here as the social justice frame. Others share Melissa’s sentiment that immigration detracts from the quality of life, particularly when newcomers do not take steps to become economically self-sufficient. For those like Melissa, who espouse this self-reliance frame, immigration and diversification are viewed dubiously; overall, they see Manchester’s demographic change as detracting from quality of life, draining the city of important resources that could be better used elsewhere. It is not necessarily these different cultural frames themselves that are important, but how they inform different modes of action in responding to demographic change, social capital formation, and participation in neighborhood life.

These frames—and their relationship with social capital formation and neighborhood diversity—are the subject of this chapter. I illustrate how Manchester residents’ cultural frames
inform their perceptions of demographic change and whether residents form ties with newcomers and those of different racial/ethnic backgrounds.

In his frequently cited work on diversity and social capital, Putnam (2007) writes that residents of heterogeneous neighborhoods “hunker down,” withdrawing from community life. He goes on to state that residents of all racial/ethnic groups living in diverse neighborhoods tend to participate less often in local civic life, trust one another less, and have fewer close ties to one another—a phenomenon he describes as “constrict” theory (in contrast to conflict or contact theory). His research in this regard is not without its detractors, however. Sampson in particular has been a major critic of Putnam’s conclusions regarding the decline of social capital (Sampson et al. 2005) and the effects of neighborhood diversity on civic life (Sampson 2011).

In this chapter, I explore why some residents appear more withdrawn from neighborhood life than others. Depending on the cultural lens through which residents perceive diversity, demographic forces like immigration and integration actually lead some to become more involved in Manchester’s neighborhood life, forming more (and often stronger) ties with their neighbors and other city residents. By focusing on culture, I also illustrate the importance of reframing the diversity/social capital debate away from individual-level correlates (popularized by survey data) and focusing instead on urban social processes (the purpose of this dissertation). Importantly, individuals are the unit of analysis in this chapter and the next. In this chapter, I explore the role of culture in the formation of ties between residents. I continue this discussion of cultural frames in Chapter 5, where I discuss how these frames also shape the outcomes of Manchester residents’ social capital. Civic organizations (specifically, the role they play in building neighborhood civic capacity, and how their formation can reproduce racial/ethnic inequality) are the subject of Chapter 6.
Culture in a Neighborhood Context

A brief discussion of culture is warranted, as its place in the current neighborhood effects literature is limited (despite a number of sociologists having illustrated culture’s implications). Culture plays a major role in driving individuals to action—a role first highlighted by Weber (1905). According to Weber [1905], culture (e.g., Calvinists beliefs in salvation) shapes a given groups’ ultimate goals and also provides a course of action to achieve such goals (for example, working in a calling in order to prove that one is among the “chosen”). Swidler (1986), however, contends that Weber’s notion of culture is contradictory in numerous respects. Individuals, she argues, do not attempt to achieve certain ends because of culture; rather, culture is part of a ‘toolkit’ that individuals draw upon to inform action. In this chapter, I draw upon Swidler’s conceptualization of “how culture works.” In more recent years, contemporary sociologists have come to view ‘culture’ as a framework of understanding that individuals use in numerous ways. Swidler (1986), for instance, argues that culture is best understood as a ‘toolkit’ that individuals draw upon to inform their actions. According to Swidler, “Culture provides the materials from which individuals and groups construct strategies of action. Such cultural resources are diverse, however, and normally groups and individuals call upon these resources selectively, bringing to bear different styles and habits of action in different situations” (1986: 280). Thus, culture makes some behaviors or strategies possible while limiting others (see also Lizardo and Strand 2010).

The role of culture is more explicit in some instances than others. For example, “Members of a religion wear orange, or share their property, or dissolve their marriages because their beliefs tell them to” (Swidler 1986: 279). In other cases, the role of cultural is much less direct and less apparent. Evangelicals, for instance, have a strict sense of personal accountability and individual free will (like many Americans; Fischer 2010). Among this religious group, racial
inequality is therefore framed as a matter to be overcome by encouraging repentance and converting non-believers (Emerson and Smith 2000). Those adhering to this perspective therefore have little motivation to make direct efforts to lower poverty or inequality, given that these circumstances are understood as the consequences of individual failures (rather than structural barriers). Others who eschew this “self-reliance” attitude and instead favor structural explanations might be more likely to engage in “helping behaviors” (such as volunteering at a local food pantry or working with a civil rights organization).

While many urban scholars have examined the role of culture (e.g., Anderson 2010; Small and Newman 2001; Wilson 2009), researchers interested specifically in social capital have paid culture little empirical attention. One important exception is Small’s (2002, 2004) ethnographic study of public housing in Boston. Opening what he describes as the “black box” of neighborhood effects, Small demonstrates that the relationship between neighborhood-level poverty and participation in civic organizations is not necessarily a negative one, but is conditioned by how residents view the neighborhood. Some “neighborhood frames” (as Small calls them) led residents to participate more in local civic life. When residents perceived the neighborhood as a place they should be proud to live in, they wanted to work to improve the quality of life. Residents who frame their neighborhood as a “ghetto,” however, were more likely to withdraw from local civic life. These frames therefore facilitated two types of action—for those proud to call The Villa home, it was only logical that they should take direct steps to maintain a vibrant community. It made no logical sense for those pessimistic about The Villa to participate, for in their minds there was nothing to be improved upon (and the community’s quality of life, they felt, was out of their hands). I make a similar claim with respect to the
relationship between diversity and social capital—that is, how residents frame diversity and demographic change has implications for the formation of neighborhood social ties.

Residents’ Cultural Frames: Social Justice and Self Reliance

Using grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), I open coded the transcripts from in-depth interviews with Manchester residents, as well as field notes based on observations at neighborhood events and meetings at various civic organizations. I uncovered two distinct frames that residents used to make sense of Manchester’s demographic change, diversity, and the city’s newcomers: the Social Justice frame and the Self Reliance frame. Table 4-1 summarizes the key elements of these two cultural frames. These cultural frames constitute what Weber referred to as “ideal types”—that is, these frames “are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct” (1905: 90). While some interviewees typically espoused beliefs and actions exclusive to only one frame, most (62%) demonstrated characteristics of both (see Table 4-2). Thus, like any “ideal type,” adherence to these frames lies on a spectrum.

Adherents to the social justice frame value multiculturalism and perceive diversity (including immigration) as enriching one’s life experiences. I derive this frame’s name not only from the importance its adherents place on racial/ethnic diversity, but also their emphasis on structural causes of poverty and inequality (particularly when it comes to issues of diversity). Residents who espoused the self-reliance frame, on the other hand, perceived diversity and immigration as leading to a decline in quality of life. They also stressed that poverty and inequality were largely the result of individual-level failures (including, but certainly not limited to, an over-reliance on public resources and an unwillingness among immigrants to assimilate or learn English).
Table 4-1. Key Features of the Social Justice and Self-Reliance Cultural Frames

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<th>Social Justice</th>
<th>Self-Reliance</th>
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<td>Quality of Life</td>
<td>Immigration and diversity enrich life experiences</td>
<td>Immigration and diversity drain resources and reduce quality of life</td>
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<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Diversity and differences should be celebrated</td>
<td>Newcomers should assimilate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty/Inequality</td>
<td>Emphasize structural causes of poverty</td>
<td>Emphasize individual-level causes of poverty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aid should be provided to those in need, citizens or not</td>
<td>Newcomers need to be self-sufficient, often too reliant on public aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4-2, I break down these frames by respondents’ demographic characteristics. In placing interviewees within the Social Justice or Self-Reliance categories, I followed a strict classification scheme based on the different features of these frames displayed in Table 4-1. To be classified within the social justice frame, an interviewee must have evinced the following three dimensions of this frame during their discussion of diversity: 1) Diversity enriches social life, 2) Diversity and multiculturalism should be celebrated, 3) Structural issues explain poverty/inequality that accompanies diversity. Conversely, interviewees who espoused three of the following were classified under the Self-Reliance category: 1) Manchester’s diversity reduces quality of life, 2) Newcomers should assimilate, and 3) Poverty/inequality are a consequence of individual deficits. I categorized as intermediate those who espoused only one or two (or a combination of both) of these cultural frame elements.

Though the association between these cultural frames and demographic characteristics cannot be generalized beyond this group of purposively selected interviewees, there is
nevertheless some interesting variation between these dichotomies. First, those who adhered to
the social justice frame were less likely to identify as non-Hispanic white. In addition, nearly half
of those classified under the social justice frame were foreign born (though all espousing the
self-reliance frame were native, US born residents). Self-reliance proponents also tended to
report having lived in Manchester and their respective neighborhoods longer than those
espousing the social justice frame. This wide variation between these two frames with respect to
length of time living in Manchester is partly driven by many social justice adherents being
foreign-born. Social justice adherents also tended to live in more racially/ethnically diverse
neighborhoods (which were also, on average, poorer and less residentially stable places),
whereas self-reliance proponents lived in more homogeneous, white neighborhoods. (Data on
Neighborhood Characteristics are not provided for interviewees classified as “Intermediate,” as I
do not have Census Tract identifiers for these respondents.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristics of Resident Interviewees by Cultural Frame (n=29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **TOTAL**  
| **Social Justice**  
| **Intermediate**  
| **Self Reliance** |
| White  | 3 | 12 | 4 |
| Black/African  | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Hispanic  | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Other/Multiracial  | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Race/Ethnicity  |
| White  | 3 | 12 | 4 |
| Black/African  | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Hispanic  | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Other/Multiracial  | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Nativity  |
| U.S. Born  | 5 | 12 | 4 |
| Foreign Born  | 3 | 5 | 0 |
| Neighborhood Characteristics  |
| % Minority  | 26.4% | -- | 15.7% |
| Poverty Rate  | 21.1% | -- | 13.0% |
| Residential Stability  | 69.3% | -- | 75.5% |
| Home Ownership  |
| Home Owners  | 4 | 7 | 3 |
| Age  |
| 18-29  | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| 30-39  | 0 | 4 | 1 |
| 40-49  | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| 50-59  | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| 60+  | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| Gender  |
| Male  | 4 | 6 | 1 |
| Female  | 4 | 11 | 3 |
| For how many years have you lived in…  
| Manchester  | 15.5 | 5.4 | 33.8 |
| …your current neighborhood  | 11.8 | 4.1 | 14.3 |
| In the past year, have you participated in any of the following?  |
| Civic/Volunteer  | 1 | 8 | 1 |
| Church/Church Group  | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| Parent Teacher Group  | 1 | 11 | 2 |
| Neighborhood Watch  | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Other  | 4 | 0 | 1 |

Notes:  
1. Interviewees who did not live in Manchester (e.g., educational administrators, interns, public service workers, etc.) are excluded from this table (n=5).  
2. Asian was included on the demographic survey, no respondents selected this category.  
3. Figures are based on census tract data from the U.S. 2010 Decennial Census (for Percent Minority) and the American Community Survey’s 2008-2012 estimates.  
4. Measured as Percent of Residents Living in Same House One Year Ago.
Among interviewees, there was a great deal of homogeneity with regards to civic participation (as the bulk of my interviewees were recruited from voluntary organizations). The range of behaviors I observed among interviewees was more heterogeneous, though, and varied by which of the two cultural frames they used to inform their action. For example, most residents I talked to expressed that they wanted their neighborhoods to be better places to live, and worked toward this end in some fashion. Residents took different types of action to attain this goal, however, and also had different conceptualizations of what makes for a “good” neighborhood. Adherents to the social justice frame (which emphasizes structural explanations and values diversity) had more diverse social networks, stronger ties to their neighbors and (as I explain in the next chapter) also engaged in more helping behaviors (which often crossed racial/ethnic boundaries). Being less likely to value diversity and more likely to adhere to individual-level explanations for poverty, self-reliance proponents formed few (if any) close cross-racial ties, described more tangential relationships with their neighbors, and engaged in relatively few helping behaviors. In what follows, I discuss the differences in these frames and how they informed respondents’ social capital formation. First, I elaborate on how residents used these frames to make sense of Manchester’s demographic change.

**Perspectives on Diversity**

A key dimension along which adherents to these two cultural frames differed was their perspectives on demographic change—diversification, immigration, and refugee resettlement in particular. What is most important in this respect is how residents’ views were informed by these two frames. Those espousing the social justice frame (which emphasizes structural explanations for poverty and other individual circumstances) did not perceive demographic changes like diversity or refugee resettlement as detracting from the quality of life in Manchester or one’s
neighborhood. Rather, refusing to become involved, not engaging in helping behaviors, or leaving one’s neighborhood to escape the challenges of diversity and inequality are what diminishes community wellbeing. Adherents to this frame also saw opportunities to befriend and engage with those from different racial/ethnic and cultural backgrounds as enriching life experiences.

Those exhibiting the self-reliance frame, on the other hand, were much more circumspect when it came to Manchester’s demographic changes. They viewed diversity as lessening the quality of life in the city and its neighborhoods. Proponents of this frame also did not emphasize that it was important that they make (and maintain) cross-racial social ties. (As I discuss in the next chapter, these attitudes also informed very different strategies of action when it came to the outcomes of their social ties—namely, engaging in helping behaviors.)

Phil, an African American resident of Manchester’s east side, epitomized the social justice frame in numerous respects. This includes his attitude toward diversity in general as well as Manchester’s immigrants. Phil’s neighborhood is relatively affluent in comparison to many that border it. Unlike many other parts of the city, where housing is more mixed in character (e.g., a variety of both single- and multi-family homes), Phil’s is relatively homogeneous in this respect. Two-story, single-family houses line the streets, most with relatively new paint jobs and freshly mowed lawns. Phil had just finished putting new siding on his house the day before we sat down for our interview. Many streets are recently repaved. Pedestrians, including joggers and dog walkers, frequent the sidewalks, exemplifying the area’s walkability. Economically, most of the residents are middle-class homeowners, based on my discussion with Phil as well as the most available census data. (Note that, to prevent identifying the neighborhood and protect respondents’ confidentiality, I do not cite explicit percentages regarding factors like racial/ethnic.
composition, poverty rates, homeownership, and other demographics. Rather, I rely on more
general statements (e.g., “more diverse than the city as a whole,” “most residents are
homeowners”) as well as descriptions from field notes to provide a sense of the neighborhood’s
economic and demographic character.)

Unlike other residents I talked to (most of whom were non-Hispanic white and lived in
relatively homogeneous neighborhoods), Phil does not perceive diversity as deterring from
quality of life. Rather, inaction or (worse) moving out of one’s neighborhood to escape it are, in
Phil’s mind, what detracts from community wellbeing in Manchester and other integrating
places:

**Phil**: I think (some people) don’t wanna be a potential associate of someone who
doesn’t have the type of job or education you have, their kids don’t look like your
kids. You know. They might come from a broken home. You don’t have the same
language. And I’ll tell you, there is some validity to that—who wants to bring up
a kid in a bad neighborhood? Who would? That’s ridiculous. The other extreme is
to alienate yourself from everyone who looks like they might belong in a ‘bad’
neighborhood, but they are just good people. That whole white flight, I saw that
when I was a kid, people moving out and saying ‘I’m not staying here.’ I think
that detracts from the neighborhood.

Being just a short walk from more disadvantaged portions of the city, his own
neighborhood is not without the occasional break-in, including an incident where a man
attempted to steal his neighbor’s truck. According to Phil, he and his neighbors take such
occurrences in stride. These incidences are not enough to force him or his neighbors to leave the
area, he said. In the two decades that Phil has lived in this neighborhood, he recalls only a
handful of households changing occupants, either because renters (a rarity on his block) moved
or a homeowner passed away. Phil also said he has not seen the physical environment decline or
quality of life deteriorate. He has, however, witnessed Manchester’s demographics changing
throughout the city, including in nearby neighborhoods:
Phil: There’s an influx. Immigration of poor people, many of them brown people, different languages coming in, who are wonderful and loving people, but they have their percentage of people who are gonna be trouble makers, who are gonna need services. We as a municipality have to plan around that. You can’t just sit back and say “Well they’re not like me.” No… And some people don’t want to live in a Manchester neighborhood at all…but that also detracts from the neighborhood…How we are dealing with the city’s growth is not going to work. We didn’t plan on the fact that they were coming. Manchester looks attractive to many poor people. Look at the demographics—it’s coming. We need to take care of our new citizens. Is it gonna cost money? Of course. You can’t get toilet paper for free. There are so many things we need to do to accept those folks and address their needs—the needs come with them. You can say ‘they don’t look like me, they didn’t come on the same boat as my ancestors,’ but they’re here. Stop talking that trash. And when a kid walks by my house, I don’t want him to say “That’s the guy who didn’t give a shit about me.” Cause then what, he’s gonna throw a brick through my window. I’m not just gonna say I love all people, because I do, but it’s about good civic recognition of what’s going on in our municipality. I don’t want to say ‘accommodate them,’ because I’m anti welfare, but it’s about good planning—just good, effective planning.

As Phil states in this quote (part of which opened this chapter), demographic change presents a number of challenges, and it is up to residents and city leaders to meet those challenges (in line with the social justice frame), rather than shirk from them or place the responsibility on the city’s newcomers. Moreover, diversity does not detract from quality of life, according to Phil, but enriches it. He spoke warmly of his neighbors, pointing in the direction of each of their respective homes as he named and described them:

Phil: The guy who lives over here is another African American guy, like myself; this neighbor’s Caucasian, and that one is too, but, I mean, at any given point in time there is any mix of cultural backgrounds—you know, my one friend, he’s Greek, he comes over and visits sometimes…But we’re not conscious of it—we’re just neighborhood people. This particular neighborhood is good that way.

Phil strongly values this diversity (both racial/ethnic and cultural) within his group of neighborhood friends, noting that they “represent totally different spectrums of thought…and that’s what helps make the neighborhood.” Selena (a woman of Mexican descent who described herself as ‘Chicana’) expressed sentiments about diversity similar to those Phil described. She
regularly attends (and volunteers at) a large, Catholic church on the city’s east side, which she values in part for its celebration of multiculturalism:

Selena: At church we have a lot of refugees. We have people from Sudan, people from Rwanda, we have Vietnamese—they aren’t refugees I don’t think. The Congo—we have people from a lot of places in African. We have an African mass, a Vietnamese mass. We have masses in French, Spanish and English. Once in a while they do a multi-cultural service, and it’s beautiful.

A homeowner like Phil, Selena has lived in Manchester for more than two decades. Unlike Phil, though, her neighborhood is much more racially/ethnically diverse and also more economically mixed. It has also undergone many demographic changes in recent years. Selena said she “makes no qualms” about her neighborhood:

Selena: I have no problems telling people where I live. People say that it’s the shady part of town. To me, it doesn’t mean anything…When I first moved there it was considered the good part of (the neighborhood). And it was fairly quiet. Now, like, during the summer and the last few years, we’ve seen street walkers come into the area. Now they are out again. We’ve had brawls in the street at one or two in the morning. People drink and then get into fights. There are a couple of houses that we suspect drugs are sold from—you see all kinds of people coming and going all the time. So yeah, it has changed, definitely. Those aren’t things we used to see.

Nevertheless, Selena enjoys living in her neighborhood. Even after finding out that a man was dealing drugs from a nearby house, she said she still felt that the neighborhood was a safe place to live. While she plans to return to her home state after retirement, leaving New Hampshire for her is driven by the cost of living and wanting to retire near family, rather than anything to do with Manchester specifically. She does feel, however, that there are a number of factors contributing to declining quality of life in her neighborhood and the city, including a lack of services available to those in need, discrimination, a rising cost of living, and apathy toward keeping the city clean:

Selena: There’s a lot of old homes that need to be fixed. The city does have money for lead, but they have so many stipulations people don’t want to apply. And also, people need to have more pride in where they live…Um, and taking
more pride in who they are and what they have, making the city look nicer and more appealing. It’s lost—the appearance of the city is not what it could be. And then there are a lot of things that are for sale that are so expensive, like food and gas. And that affects people the wrong way…But there is still a lot of prejudice in New Hampshire. If you aren’t white, there is discrimination. And I’ve experienced that, it can be subtle, but it’s there. And everyone knows it—everyone of color knows it. But the white people, the white skinned individuals don’t see it because it doesn’t affect them. There are a lot of stereotypes, and I have them myself, but they are out there….Also, what about people having the desire to live in a nicer, cleaner city? I think the city is beautiful, but it could be cleaner, if people could just pick up trash when they see it. And if we could provide more services for people like street walkers. Yeah, it’s a crime, but don’t just penalize them, but give them information to get tested or give them condoms. Same thing with drug use, they find needles all over. Why not set up a needle exchange program?

As per the social justice frame, Selena sees the issues facing many Manchester residents as consequences of larger structural barriers, rather than individual-level deficits. The solutions she proposes, including providing more services, reflect her understanding of these problems as structural in nature. Others, like Joe and Sophia (a white married couple and residents of the city’s most diverse neighborhood), value diversity because they see it enriching their children’s lives as well as their own:

Joe: Yeah, it was weird how it changed a lot. It’s a great learning experience for the kids to get to know people of different races and from different places. It is what it is, you can’t hide behind facts, crime rates and stuff. You gotta balance the two. All our children interact…There are gazillions of different languages, cultures, people. I mean, it’s a good experience. Most places are very redneck, very white—a lot of kids don’t get those interactions. You see it when the kids come play football when they come to Manchester. We pick on ‘em and say stuff like, you know, you hear people make racist jokes, then they come to Manchester and have to come out of their shell. It’s a culture shock. I think it’s awesome—our kids are gonna be more well-adjusted and understanding in that sense, because they interact with people from so many cultures. They are experiencing it, not just watching it on the news, which, to me is more important. You are actually talking to people, not watching movies or sports or something. It’s all about what the kids get from it. It’s only gonna help them. The reality is that it’s a multicultural country.

Their perspectives stand in stark contrast to those who espouse the self-reliance frame. As I described in Chapter 3, Manchester’s foreign-born population tends to be much more
socioeconomically disadvantaged (as do its native-born minority residents) than the city’s native-born white residents. Given the self-reliance frame’s emphasis on individual-level explanations for one’s life circumstances, diversity is therefore perceived as leading to a decline in Manchester’s quality of life. The quote by Melissa, which opened this chapter, illustrates this point:

*Melissa:* …So I have a few issues, there’s a lot of people here that I’m not sure should be. I think they’re allowing too many people into Manchester, and I think they are handing them way too much.

A white resident who has been living on the city’s west side for almost 20 years, Melissa found herself struggling economically, but not to the point where she was eligible for government assistance. “The system didn’t help at all. I went to my parents. That’s all I had,” she told me. For Melissa, part of her frustration was seeing many of the city’s nonwhite residents receive benefits for which she herself was not eligible:

*Melissa:* The system wouldn’t help me. And it’s just really sad because I know a lot of people who are not necessarily citizens yet, but they are raking in the food stamps and everything else from the state. I know people whose kids are. A lady I work with, her daughter is living off the state—they give her everything, housing, food, and she doesn’t work. She had a part time job and she quit. But yet she lives off the state.

Unlike the social justice frame espoused by residents like Phil and Selena, Melissa sees diversity and immigration as reducing quality of life in Manchester, in part because it drains the city of important resources (including those for which she herself was not eligible). Her perspective is also tinged with elements of what Bonilla-Silva (2010) calls ‘colorblind racism’: “a new way of justifying the racial status quo distinct from the ‘in your face’ prejudice of the past” (p. 210). Melissa’s sentiments were shared by a number of other residents as well, most (but not all) of whom were white, long-time residents living in more homogeneous (predominantly white) neighborhoods (see Table 4-2).
Another interviewee who typified the self-reliance framework was Tom, a lifelong white resident living in a less-diverse neighborhood. We discussed the city’s recent demographic change and his life in Manchester at a restaurant just a short drive from his home. Tom’s job takes him all over the city, driving from one neighborhood to another, working in both public establishments and individuals’ homes.

**Tom**: So, uh, you know, I can see all, you know, ‘Oh, Mrs. Jones used to live there. Now someone does who I can’t pronounce the name.’ Then you see all the different changes. Some blocks used to be fairly decent and they’ve gone downhill. Other ones have gone the opposite way. You know, a lot of changes in the city…My old neighborhood, I wouldn’t hang around there anymore…The place is a dive. You know. Everything is in Spanish or Swahili or whatever language. And, um, junk cars all over. It’s just rotten. You don’t wanna go there at night or even during the day time.

Like Phil and Selena, Tom sees a number of challenges that coincide with demographic change. Neighborhoods that were once (in Tom’s eyes) ‘good’ places to live have deteriorated. One way to escape these worsening conditions is not to work for change in these neighborhoods, but rather, avoid such areas in general. Tom is certainly not wrong that more economically disadvantaged neighborhoods are also among the Manchester’s most diverse (a reality that proponents of the social justice frame also acknowledge). What is important, though, is the extent to which residents feel that diversity has contributed to this decline (and what is to be done). From the self-reliance perspective, the only logical action is to avoid poor, diverse neighborhoods altogether. If individuals themselves are to blame for this decline, then there is no working together to reverse it. My encounter with Rebecca—a white resident living on the city’s west side, helps to illustrate this point. Like Tom, Rebecca was born and raised in Manchester. She, too, views the city’s newcomers with some apprehension:

**JY**: So, you’ve probably seen it (diversity), the school district, I don’t know if you’ve seen it in your neighborhood, too, but is it more diverse?
Rebecca: Mm-hmm. It is—which is fine. Um, but you know they want the same education but then they should, if you are gonna live here, learn the language. If I moved to France I would learn French. I think that they just need to, it’s not the kids fault, that they can’t maybe score well or that they don’t do well. It’s not just them, it’s the other kids that are staying back because their parents just don’t push them.

In contrast to parents like Joe and Sophia (who view diversity as helping improve their children’s lives), other parents I talked to were more apprehensive that Manchester’s public schools would be able to provide their children with a strong education, giving shrinking resources (like recent budget cuts) or because teachers increasingly need to focus their energies on ELL (English Language Learners) and other students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Several parents, including Rebecca, described plans to pull their children out of public schools or, in other cases, move to school districts like Goffstown and Hooksett. This includes parents who espoused the self-reliance frame, as well as some who fell in between these two extremes. For example, Sarah (a white, lifelong Manchester resident) planned on sending her son to one of the city’s most diverse public schools, until a close friend and teacher suggested against it:

Sarah: She said to me, ‘he’s too smart, you can’t send him there, unfortunately we see it every day.’ The kids who are troublemakers or have learning disabilities get all the attention and the ones who have more, I don’t want to say potential, but more needs to go higher in where they should be—because he is very smart in math and he needed upper-level math, but those kids don’t get additional help for that. So that’s when my family and I discussed it and my parents both agreed to help me send him to a Catholic school.

Importantly, no parents who adhered to the social justice frame described plans to leave the city or send their children to private schools (despite the fact that many of them had the resources to do so). In all cases illustrating the self-reliance frame, structural explanations for individual circumstances are eschewed for those that emphasize individual autonomy. Because these two frames emphasize different explanations for various circumstances, they also facilitate distinct types of action (or, in some cases, inaction). As per the self-reliance frame, for example,
Rebecca places the burden of (in this case) learning English on the city’s foreign-born newcomers. This represents an important finding with respect to diversity and neighborhood social capital: who one forms ties with is partly contingent upon a given individual’s cultural frame. More specifically, many Manchester residents I interviewed described different types of action when it came to 1) forming ties (i.e., social capital) with some individuals (rather than others), and 2) whether they engaged in informal helping behaviors (thereby granting individuals within their network access important resources). I turn my attention now to the first of these—social tie formation—and how tie formation is facilitated by the “tools” that cultural frames make available.

**Tie Formation and Network Heterogeneity**

Just as residents have an array of ideas about the influence of diversity in Manchester, they also have varying perceptions about the centrality of diversity to their social networks. Through open coding, I uncovered two distinct attitudes and behaviors regarding residents’ social ties: 1) how heterogeneous their social networks are, and 2) how close they were to their neighbors. Residents network diversity and ties to their neighbors aligned closely with the cultural frames that residents held. Those espousing the social justice frame emphasized that diversity enriched their life experiences. Not surprisingly, they valued (and often had) cross-racial social ties (with varying degrees of connectedness). These residents also described being better connected to their neighbors, knowing them by name and spending time with them regularly. Those adhering to the self-reliance frame described fewer cross-racial ties and weaker relationships with neighbors. As I will demonstrate, these differences are partly a result of the cultural frames residents held.
Earlier, I noted Phil mentioned that diversity (including not only racial/ethnic, but also cultural and political) is what he values most about his neighborhood: “I mean, at any given point in time there is any mix of cultural backgrounds…and that’s what helps make the neighborhood.” It is not enough for Phil simply to live in a diverse neighborhood, however—he also engages with many of its residents. He knows most of his surrounding neighbors by name and converses with them regularly. For Phil (who adheres to the social justice frame), his relationships with his neighbors extend well beyond the mere “hi-and-bye” associations that those adhering to the self-reliance frame often described. For example, those on Phil’s block regularly lend one another various possessions (as illustrated by a set of wrenches sitting in the corner of Phil’s kitchen, which he said he’s been meaning to return to a neighbor across the street). He and others on the block gather regularly in one neighbor’s garage, which Phil described as a “place where we can frequent, we can drink our spirits, and we can drink a lot of our spirits and just walk home, and have our world problem solving discussions or arguments. Frequently people talk about how great the neighborhood is because we have that gathering place.” Close ties to one’s neighbors—including those of different racial/ethnic backgrounds—were common among interviewees who viewed diversity through the social justice lens. Like Phil, Selena also knew many of her neighbors by name, and described living in a diverse neighborhood with much enthusiasm:

 Selena: In this neighborhood—and when I say neighborhood I mean my block of people. On that block, there are only like 2 houses with Hispanics, the rest are all white. And then three African Americans.

 JY: So that’s pretty diverse.

 Selena: Very. And then we have the Greek couple.

 JY: And so the ones you are closest to, your next-door neighbors—

JY: And, are they white?

Selena: Rebecca is white. Ed is from (the Caribbean). He wears the dew rag. And Nicki is African American. So yeah, those are my three neighbors. Now, Rebecca is maybe mixed. But yeah, there’s white, and Ed does not consider himself African American, but an islander.

JY: So your block is really representative of Manchester.

Selena: Oh yeah, it’s different. And I think the other thing that contributes to saying the block is not so bad is that I am hardly ever there. I am here most of the day. My three neighbors work. Then I go home at night, Ed is mowing his lawn. So during the weekend we get to see each other. If I am pulling out weeds and Ed is out there, he will come over and ask why I don’t just buy some machine. He doesn’t see that it relaxes me. And Nicki will see us talking and be like, “Are you having a party without me?” Now, if Nicki is going out Ed and I will keep an eye on the house, and vice versa. Ed is like the grown-up guy—he will keep an eye on my house, he is right smack in the middle of me and Nicki. I told him, just don’t send me a bill. But we do have a good relationship. We can run into each other of the store and accuse each other of stalking each other. Or I’ll joke to Nicki that I am making a move on Ed (chuckles). Again, we are comfortable that way.

Other aspects of individuals and their neighborhoods, including homeownership and other dimensions of social class, must not be discounted. Home ownership in particular has ramifications that interact with cultural frames in producing various outcomes related to social capital. Another proponent of the social justice lens was Kelly, a white New Hampshire native who moved to Manchester over a decade ago with her husband, Sam. One impetus for moving to Manchester was that Kelly wanted to live nearer the minority populations she served through her job. For her husband, the move to Manchester meant selling their old farmhouse, which would translate to a newer home that required fewer repairs. Since moving to the city, the couple has changed residences twice, renting for several years in a more diverse community on the east side before buying a house in the same neighborhood. “Sam still didn’t want a project. We didn’t want to have to rebuild the kitchen or whatever;” Kelly told me. While renting, Kelly and Sam got to know some of their neighbors quite well.
Sam: We had a close relationship with the lady upstairs. We knew her kids, you know, could do things for them and them for us. But outside that house we really didn’t have much of a connection. The people across the street was a friendly young couple, we would talk to them.

The couple also sparked a close friendship with an African refugee family who lived nearby. According to Kelly, they simply “started talking one day. She was a nurse and he was a doctor. So, and I’m a retired nurse, so we talked about a lot of medical stuff.” Sam added that what also helped was that this family “tended to be more outgoing than a lot of people. They were willing to say hi and talk to you for a bit, you know.” The friendship ballooned from there. Although Kelly noted that they did not necessarily do favors for one another, the couple did attend a prayer gathering at her and Sam’s house, when the latter was combating a life-threatening illness. The relationship between Sam, Kelly, and this couple lasted for several years, until the latter moved out of the neighborhood after finding a larger apartment. “We sort of lost contact, although once in a while one of their girls would see us downtown and we’d chat,” Kelly said.

Thus, unlike the close ties to other-racial neighbors that Phil and Selena have forged with their neighbors, residential instability helps to explain why this particular cross-racial friendship was much more difficult to maintain. This frame alone is not enough to promote long-lasting connections, however. Rather, lasting connections appear to be sustained by residential stability. Phil, for example, knows his neighbors by name and congregates with them regularly. For Kelly and Sam, they know many of the area’s Hispanic and Asian only as passersby. Diverse neighborhoods are less residentially stable, a demographic pattern to which Manchester neighborhoods are no exception (cf. Chapter 3). Thus, if cultural frames help to foster initial interactions across racial/ethnic lines, it is a combination of home ownership and residential
stability that maintains these ties and shapes the forms they can take (including whether they are weak or strong).

Being homeowners also gives residents the wherewithal to create spaces in which cross-racial ties can be fostered. This includes spaces like the one Phil described—a neighbor’s garage (which the homeowner recently renovated to include a bathroom) where Phil and other neighbors gather regularly. Kelly and Sam eventually became homeowners in Manchester, buying a home a couple blocks away from where they rented. Similar to other proponents of the social justice lens, the couple noted that having strong ties with their neighbors was an important aspect of community life. After purchasing their house, the two made plans to become involved in the neighborhood, volunteering their time at a local Habitat for Humanity project. A central source for cross-racial interaction between the couple and other residents was Kelly’s garden, which she planted with the hopes of interacting more with passersby:

**Kelly:** In the summer, one of the things that I did about four years ago was built these raised beds out front. In the process of building them, people would stop by and talk to me about what was going on. Once I plant them, people stop me all the time if I’m out there. It feels much more friendly and more like a neighborhood. There are several people I know by sight just from being out there gardening, they will stop and chat. I remember one woman, she was from a Latin American country, and I gave her some tomatoes one day when she stopped by—you know, just that kind of thing. But it’s a little harder to recall that when you’ve been shut in all winter. Our neighbor next door is really the only one—I call him or he calls me a couple times a week.

**Sam:** The garden was really, she was trying to instigate interaction a lot of times—that was the point of that.

**JY:** So it seems like it was successful.

**Kelly:** Yeah. Once it got started I realized how much it was impacting the neighborhood interaction.

**Sam:** And people would walk by, and their kids would want to touch the plants.

**Kelly:** There was one little boy who came by, walking home from school one day. He picked a flower down the street to put in my garden, he didn’t think I had
enough flowers in there—it was mostly vegetables. So we planted this flower. You (Sam) were out there talking to him, you remember that?

Sam: Was he the (neighbor’s last name) kid?”

Kelly: Yeah, I think it was his son. I don’t think they live there anymore.

JY: So that’s a thing that was pretty common, even with the example of the woman from Latin America?

Kelly: Yeah. I don’t remember what country, but she and I chatted in Spanish for a little while... I asked if she’d like some tomatoes, and she did... And then there was another Spanish speaking woman who walks by a lot in the summer, and we chat, too.

Though it was the garden that sparked many of these interactions, it was the social justice lens that provided Kelly a reason to interact with many passersby. That Kelly noted after planting her garden the area feels “more friendly and more like a neighborhood” also illustrates another dividing line between proponents of the social justice frame compared to the self-reliance lens: while both expressed a wish to live in “friendly” neighborhoods, those adhering to the social justice frame actively created and maintained spaces (including Kelly’s garden, as well as Leo’s garage, which he even upgraded to include a bathroom), with the explicit intent of bonding with other residents. Kelly, for instance, also talked to several of her neighbors about transforming a vacant lot at the end of the street into either a community garden or dog park. “I want to see places where people gather,” she told me.

Importantly, Phil, Selena, and Sam and Kelly are all homeowners, who also have the economic (e.g., income) and cultural capital (such as knowledge of how to build and maintain a garden) which allows them to create spaces to build stronger ties with their neighbors (many of whom are also homeowners) and other residents. Not all proponents of the social justice frame were homeowners, however, and those who were renters often described weaker ties to neighbors. Yet, home ownership alone does not explain differences in neighborhood ties and
cross-racial interaction. Indeed, while all but one of the residents I talked to who espoused the
self-reliance frame were also homeowners (Table 4-2), they tended to describe their neighbors as
acquaintances, with whom they only occasionally interacted and for whom they rarely (if ever)
did favors. Self-reliance adherents neither describe spaces in which they can convene regularly
with other residents, nor did they lament a lack of such places (though all of these interviewees
were recruited at various civic events and associations).

During our interview, Tom (a white homeowner and a proponent of the self-reliance
frame) described himself as outgoing, willing to strike up conversation with anyone—something
he often does in his own neighborhood, waving hello to strangers while walking his dog:

**Tom:** My daughter cringes all the time—‘you always talk to strangers!,’ Big deal,
they’re just people you haven’t met yet. See an old couple sitting on the porch,
you walk by, wave, ‘how you doing?’ And they like the dog, too, it’s a big
attention-getter.

While Tom described having many pleasant encounters with individuals of different
racial/ethnic backgrounds throughout the years—many of which occurred through his job—these
encounters did not result in the lasting ties or cross-racial friendships described proponents of the
social justice lens. One reason for this might be not only the demographic makeup in Tom’s
predominantly (non-Hispanic) white neighborhood, but also his utilization of the self-reliance
frame, which (unlike the social justice frame) does not help to facilitate cross-racial ties or
connections to those of different backgrounds. Like other self-reliance proponents, Tom also did
not describe having strong ties with neighbors: “We don’t eat dinner every Thursday night or
anything like that, but we see each other, say hi. And if somebody needs something they will call
or come over, and I can give them a hand.” For those whose understanding of diversity,
newcomers and nonwhites is informed by this self-reliance lens, there was also little incentive to
reach out to those of other racial/ethnic groups, particularly when it comes to forming ties.
This cultural frame also helps explain why another one of its proponents—Rebecca—is somewhat averse to forming a close tie with the parents’ of one of her son’s close friends. Rebecca described one recent incident, in which her son’s friend arrived at her home, not alone but (much to Rebecca’s dismay) accompanied by his siblings:

**Rebecca:** This is, I don’t know if they are Muslim. They’re, something like Muslim, Arabic, Middle Eastern. And, even the dad, but they don’t, and I don’t want to be rude and say, my little guy’s friend can come over, but his older brother, (chuckling) that’s not part of the deal. And I don’t know if they culturally think that is rude, you know? I don’t know. So, it’s hard. There is a language thing. And I try to say ‘just play with somebody else’ (chuckles). He’s a sweet kid, but, I don’t know.

In the absence of the social justice frame, Rebecca’s cultural ‘toolkit’ does not provide her a means to form a closer bond with the parents of her son’s friend. In fact, the self-reliance frame encourages the opposite—placing the burden of ‘integration’ on the parents (in this case). Rebecca was not enticed to form a close friendship with the parents of her son’s friend. Since that incident, Rebecca said she is often relieved when her son’s play-dates do not include this particular friend. Further, she sometimes encourages that to be the case, given the frustration she said these encounters entail. In this way, the self-reliance frame actually discourages such connections; at the very least, this framework leaves its adherents with a dearth of “tools” they might draw upon to inform their interactions and relations with racial and ethnic others.

Like Tom, Rebecca’s social network is relatively homogenous. Unlike Tom, though, Rebecca reported that she was close with one of her neighbors: “It’s nice having her there because we are good friends, too. Our kids play together.” She added that she “would call on (her neighbor) in a second” if she needed help. Rebecca was the only proponent of the self-reliance frame I talked to who described such a close friendship with a neighbor. Another proponent of this frame, Melissa (introduced in the previous section), said she and those living in her building might do the occasional favor for one another (such as feeding a cat when a neighbor is out of
At the same time, however, she was apprehensive when it came to forming ties with those in nearby buildings and apartment complexes, recognizing them only by sight:

**Melissa:** The people next door, we wave, say hi and talk. We know the owner of the building on one side of us. The other side we stay away from them, unfortunately it’s a lot of—I’ve talked to some of them but it’s more the drug type who are people that end up there, or not so nice people. So we tend to, when we do see them, we just wave hello and goodbye. We’ve made friends with them in the past and then, you know, they are just constantly coming over, asking ‘Can I borrow this, can I borrow that? Do you have any money?’ And that’s—you can only go so far. You can only give so much. And then it becomes, you are being taken advantage of, so you have to draw a line. There are certain neighbors that we, you know, unfortunately it’s like that, but it is.

Although Melissa’s willingness to form ties with other residents appears to be tainted by bad experiences (e.g., “being taken advantage of”), her perspective is informed by an attitude of self-reliance (which emphasizes that individuals should help themselves) through which she understands these encounters. Unlike proponents of the social justice frame (including Phil and Selena) who often do favors for each other, Melissa’s willingness to do so is much more calculated. Thus, the frame that informs her tie formation (including who it is she is willing to form ties with and how strong those relationships will become) also has consequences for the outcomes of her social ties. The outcomes of Manchester residents’ social capital—and how they are shaped by cultural frames—are the subject of the next chapter.
On a rainy October morning, I sat in on a meeting of a local, newly formed organization whose goal was to unite Manchester residents across racial and ethnic lines. At this point, members were still working to determine what exactly their mission was. Diversity was certainly not lacking in the room, with four black attendees (including several who arrived in Manchester as refugees) and five (non-Hispanic) whites (myself included). The group was also diverse in terms of age. With more than half of us in our late 20s and early 30s, we erupted in laughter when Winni (an older African woman) pointed out that the room resembled “a dating service.”

Certainly, this was the most varied group (in terms of age) that I observed throughout my fieldwork. As we went around the room introducing ourselves, the prevalence of the social justice frame among participants became apparent. “We have a lot of wounds, and we need to come together to heal them,” one participant said. In her own introduction, Winni described a recent incident where she discovered a neighbor (whom she did not know well) was seriously ill and had no money for treatment. She came to his aid, she says, helping him get on Medicaid as well as food stamps. We have to talk to our neighbors, she tells us, “That’s what’s important.”

This social justice frame, then, adhered as much in the organization itself as it did its participants.

In Winni’s case, the cultural frame she used to understand her neighbor’s predicament had important consequences for her actions. As per the social justice frame, Winni emphasized that it is important to know your neighbors—in case this, because they may be in need of help.
Winni was also willing to come to the aid of her neighbor, despite having been only recently acquainted with him. Per social capital theory, Winni’s story illustrates that who you know matters. Beyond this classic tenant of social capital theory, we may deduce an important (and rarely discussed) modification to this school of thought—whether or not who one knows matters is partly contingent upon the cultural frames individuals employ. The social justice frame made a certain strategy of action—engaging in helping behavior—possible for Winni. The outcomes of social capital (the very reason our social ties matter) are partly contingent upon cultural frames. In this section, I focus on the outcomes of Manchester residents’ ties to their neighbors—in particular, their willingness to engage in helping behaviors.

**Outcomes: Why Social Capital Matters**

With its over-reliance on survey and other quantitative data, the extant diversity/social capital literature has not focused on *outcomes* of social ties in diverse (compared to less diverse) neighborhoods, though outcomes are at the core of social capital theory. According to social capital theorists, social ties have the potential to produce a variety of outcomes. By focusing on these outcomes, as I do in this chapter, a new understanding emerges with respect to how individuals come to make use of their social ties, and why exactly diversity and demographic change matter in this respect. That is, who you know matters, but *how* it matters (i.e., what outcomes emerge from one’s connections) is partly contingent upon the cultural frames we use to understand our ties to others.

Outcomes can take a variety of forms, including a job-hunting tip that leads to a sustainable income or help finding housing. In other cases, social ties can help to foster new identities and enhance (or inhibit) community economic wellbeing. Social capital outcomes such as these accumulate at the macro-level. For instance, the networks that can result in job gains are
often closed off to many minorities, reproducing racial/ethnic inequality in income and unemployment (Royster 2003).

In this chapter, I focus on the outcomes of social ties that emerge via helping behaviors. Such behaviors were one theme that I observed often in the field, and that many of my interviewees (particularly those espousing the social justice frame) discussed in depth. Though I also had discussions about helping neighbors and strangers with self-reliance adherents, these residents were less likely to report engaging in such behaviors or, in some cases, withdrawing from opportunities and relationships where they might have done so. Social capital outcomes, as I demonstrate in this chapter, were fostered by cultural frames, which encouraged (or discouraged) helping behaviors. These behaviors were also cultivated by strong ties between neighbors—ties that were developed partly as a result of residents’ cultural frames (as illustrated in Chapter 4).

In a neighborhood context, reciprocity between neighbors is often conceptualized as an “exchange relationship” (Blau 1964; Gouldner 1960). Many of these studies lack a comparative lens, however, focusing on demographic differences between residents of a single neighborhood, rather than differences across neighborhoods (e.g., Ignatow et al. 2013). I circumvented this limitation by using a multi-neighborhood design. Relying on survey research, much of the literature on neighborhood social ties also focuses on what neighborhood residents say about their relationships with their neighbors and racial/ethnic others (e.g., “How well do you know your neighbors?”) rather than what they do (and the outcomes of these behaviors). Moreover, studies of reciprocity and exchange between residents of integrated neighborhoods are few, and tend to focus on social-capital generating processes, rather than outcomes. I am limited, however, when it comes to the scope of these outcomes (including their lasting effects on
individual wellbeing and whether they accumulate at the neighborhood level). Thus, while this chapter represents an improvement on the extant literature, it is obviously not without its own shortcomings (using ethnographic methods to examine processes and outcomes, for example, limits my ability to quantify social ties and exchange relationships, though much literature has already done the latter).

**Ties Are Not Enough**

Cultural frames and the strategies of action they make possible have important implications for one’s social ties. These frames—more specifically, how they inform action—are part of the process by which individuals engage in reciprocity and helping behaviors. Phil, an African American resident introduced in Chapter 4, illustrates how cultural frames (in his case, the social justice frame) inform relationship-oriented action. Not only does Phil know his neighbors well, he also noted that he and his neighbors are not shy about helping one another with home or auto repairs, as happened recently before our interview:

*Phil:* Ethan (who lives next door) was on his way back from Boston and he heard a sound in his car. He asked me if Leo (another neighbor) would look at it. Leo said ‘OK,’ gets in the car, and he said to me, ‘hey, let’s go for a ride!’ It was either the left or right wheel bearing. We get back here, jacked it up, Leo ran a test on it, it was the right one. Then he goes to the place to buy a wheel bearing. He saved money because he knew what was wrong. Leo helped for a half hour, and the bottom line was Ethan stopped by Leo’s place and dropped off a 30-pack of Miller Lite—that’s Leo’s currency.

This incident exemplifies how close Phil and his surrounding neighbors are, but also the outcomes that result from these ties—outcomes made possible by the cultural frame Phil uses to define what makes for a good neighborhood (and what it means to be a good neighbor). It also illustrates a form of “generalized reciprocity”—a type of exchange in which, according to Sahlins (2004) one might expect something in return, though not necessarily in the exact form or value of good originally provided (in this case, Leo’s “currency,” a 30-pack). For Phil, the
meaning behind being a “good neighbor” also results in helping behaviors—those for which residents do not necessarily expect something in return, and are provided when residents deem a neighbor to be “in need.” This includes Phil’s elderly, next-door neighbor, whom Phil and others watch out for:

*Phil:* Well, the (neighbor) over there, was having a hard time with his lawn mower, and because we are close we know there is not a lot of money, so (another neighbor) and I and a friend from work decided we could take one of my old mowers that was in good shape and customize it. He took it into the shop and had a custom paint job, made this super new lawn mower and gave it to him, free. Because we just sat down and talked about a plan. I haven’t seen that type of thing before. People will sell you or let you borrow one. And often times with raking, we have a couple beers and go over there and rake for a half hour and it’s done. And you’re proud of that because it’s purely charity—there’s no exchange of funds, no reciprocity needed, it’s just to help someone. It’s the neighborly thing to do.

In this case, Phil and his neighbors expect nothing in return. It is, as Phil described, “purely charity…no reciprocity needed, it’s just to help someone.” Just as important, he calls it “the neighborhood thing to do,” suggesting that helping behaviors are one of the important norms underlying interaction between Phil and his neighbors. As I will discuss shortly, norms of reciprocity between those evincing the self-reliance frame are less clear, and such individuals engage in fewer helping behaviors or exchange relationships (and neither are behaviors that their cultural frames call on them to partake in).

More recently, Phil came across a young acquaintance named Mario—an encounter that illustrates how individuals put the social justice frame into action. “I was leaning out that kitchen window and two young men walked by and look up at me. I put my, ‘What the fuck is your problem’ face on…the kid gets closer, and I see it’s Mario.” After a short conversation, Phil learned that Mario, a young Hispanic man, was homeless since his father went to prison. He also discovered that Mario was addicted to heroin and had been charged with assault (for which he had a pending court date). There was no question in Phil’s mind what to do next. Being well-
connected to many nonprofits and other city agencies, he spent the next several days taking
Mario throughout the city to get the necessary documents for his court date (including a
photograph ID), and helping to find a rehabilitation program for which Mario would be eligible.

**Phil:** His lawyer goes to the judge and presented the situation. The judge said
‘okay, but get me verification that he’s actually out of the city and we’ll drop the
charges.’ And they did, they dropped them.

That Phil and Mario knew one another certainly helped Mario divulge that he was in need
of help—but this tie between himself and Phil alone was not necessarily enough to spur action on
Phil’s part. The concept of neighborhood, according to Phil, is not only neighbors helping
neighbors, but residents also helping individuals most in need of help—people like Mario: “It’s
building up relationships—that’s neighborhood.” In this way, the social justice frame facilitated
Phil’s pro-social behavior. Importantly, this frame was not the “cause” of Phil’s pro-social
behavior—rather, it was part of a toolkit of understanding that Phil used to construct a “strategy
of action” (Swidler 1986). In Phil’s case, this “strategy” eventually resulted in Mario moving to a
rehabilitation facility on the other side of the country, rather than skipping out on his court date
and potentially going to prison. In Phil, Mario had a series of “weak ties” (Granovetter)
accessible via Phil, through which he was able to access a variety of resources (including an
attorney and help from the worker at the ID center) to improve his wellbeing.

Phil’s encounter and the subsequent actions he took to improve Mario’s circumstances
illustrates the importance of cultural frames, particularly with respect to social networks. This
cultural lens shaped the outcome of Phil and Mario’s tie to one another, as it informed the actions
Phil used in deciding whether to help Mario (and how). This incident suggests and important
finding with respect to social capital: that the resources accessible to any given individual vary
not only by whom one knows, but also by the cultural frames of actors’ within an individual’s
social network. Accessing the resources to which Phil was connected was not just contingent
upon Mario’s tie to Phil, or Phil’s knowledge of nonprofits and other social services. Rather, the outcome of Mario’s connection to Phil was contingent upon the latter’s understanding of diversity as inevitable, but also with challenges (like those facing Mario) that calls on residents to do their part and help those in need whenever possible. Without this framework, the resources to which Phil connected Mario might otherwise have been inaccessible. After all, what reason would Phil have to engage in these helping behaviors were it not for the social justice lens that he used to make sense of Mario’s circumstances? Cultural frames, therefore, help to explain why actors in a given social network (and, in this case, a neighborhood) do not necessarily share in all the resources that the network and its members have to offer.

Mario was certainly not the only individual to benefit from a given individual’s helping behavior. This above narrative only allows a glimpse of being on the receiving end of this social-justice oriented action, however. Although I was unable to interview Mario (who as out of state receiving rehabilitation), several refugees described the importance of receiving this type of help from their social ties. In some cases, this help came from (formal organization). In other cases (similar to Mario’s), help comes from more informal connections, such as neighbors. The importance of social ties—especially with those who are willing to come to the aid of others—was the subject of discussion among several refugees I interviewed.

Another proponent of the social justice frame—Selena (introduced in Chapter 4)—also engaged in helping behaviors. One dimension of the frame that helped to foster these behaviors were her close ties with many of her neighbors—ties that were more common among those espousing the social justice lens. Selena not only knows some of her neighbors well, but they are also willing to help each other when needed. This includes watching over each other’s homes
when anyone is away, telling them the goings-on in the neighborhood or, in one instance, helping to see a neighbor through an injury:

Selena: She was out fixing a roof and she fell off, broke her leg and something with her jaw, she had it wired. So Ed told me this happened, and both of us would check in on her, take her food, make sure she was OK. One time I offered to take her dog out. So we do help each other out. Of course Ed is next door to me and we talk a lot. He’ll let me know what is going on in the neighborhood because I am not there during the day. He told me the other day, the police, there were like eight cruisers on the street at a house where we suspected they were selling drugs. It’s an empty house but people go there to do their thing, and the police officers showed up. I heard no one was there but they placed a red X (on the door)—Ed was giving me the scoop. And the neighbor across the street, I don’t know her name, but she came out and started clapping because she was so happy. It was time this got done, Ed said. So he keeps me appraised. But he also says let me know if you ever need anything and I can do that. Now, Nicki is the only one I’ve looked out after. During the winter now, if Ed hasn’t been able to shovel, the boys will do his sidewalk and he’ll do ours too if it hasn’t been done. It’s nothing we expect of each other, we just do it, so yeah, I say yes we do help each other.

As per the social justice frame, Selena engages in numerous helping behaviors, and also has close ties with many of her neighbors. Given the demographic composition of her neighborhood—among the most diverse in the city—this is certainly not what we would expect from the literature in the diversity/social capital debate. Growing diversity in Manchester—coupled with her use of the social justice frame—helps drive her to action. The helping behaviors that Selena engages in also extend to strangers, including some of the homeless and unemployed persons she sees in surrounding neighborhoods, as well as clients from her job whom she sometimes encounters outside of her office:

Selena: I do like helping people. I am a firm believer that, how does the saying go, what does around comes around. And my mother always raised me to help those who are less fortunate than you when you can. You might not see the results, but someone down the line might repay you or your offspring when they need it…I am having a hard time, you know those guys that sit on the street corners with their signs, homeless signs—I am having a hard time because my instinct is to give them money. But people tell me they just want it for drugs. My philosophy on that is that I really don’t know. But even if I give them just 5 dollars, I did my thing and it’s up to them what to do with it. I don’t help them as often as I would like to, but I do. I have even gone out and given them gift cards
to stores once in a while. I just think that perhaps they are not really that needy, but I try not to be judgmental. I don’t like to be taken advantage of, either. So yeah, I do help them, but not as much as I think I should.

_JY:_ Because you get the sense they could be doing more for themselves?

_Selena:_ Yes. Sometimes I see them on South Willow where Stop and Shop used to be. Like, every weekend there would be a different guy there with a sign. And those were the ones I would usually give money to—my kids don’t do that though, they tell me they are just gonna go buy drugs. And there is another one I see near Bridge Street, a guy with a sign, and one of them looks more deserving than the other. I know that’s judgmental, but he looks dirty, like he hasn’t been able to bathe. His appearance is really one of humbleness or shame. The others, something about him just makes me feel very sorry for him. The others I can say, “Oh, God forgive me, but I am not gonna help them out.” But this guy, there is something like a sadness, maybe it’s an addiction or maybe he is just down on his luck, and that’s why he is so sad. But there is a sadness about him—to me that makes him more credible than the others. There is something about him. His hair doesn’t look very clean and he doesn’t look at you when he’s standing with the sign, his eyes are down. It’s just the whole package. He doesn’t look at you like the other guys do. So I think, how does he know if someone is trying to give him something? And he looks very thin.

Whether it is giving money to those on the street or helping see her neighbor through an injury, the same attitude toward aiding those in need underlies both of these behaviors. Even though Selena described various social cues that indicate whether a given individual is “in need” (and deserving of help), her actions suggest that these cues are overshadowed by the social justice framework. While she often gives money and gift cards to one homeless man in particular (whom she described as “humble,” “dirty,” and “thin,” with “a sadness about him”), she also gives similar aid to other persons who do not evince these physical and emotional signals. Despite her children’s concerns that “they are just going to buy drugs” (an anxiety more consistent with the self-reliance frame) she continues to offer these individuals help whenever possible. Here again, as with Phil, neighborhood proximity comes into play. Being adjacent to more disadvantaged portions of the city (coupled with carrying out her day to day routines in such places) increases the odds of contact between Selena and those she deems worthy of her
help (including, but certainly not limited to, the homeless and unemployed persons seeking donations from passersby).

Selena’s actions represent the many forms that helping behaviors can take. She gave money to strangers on the streets, helped see her neighbor through a serious injury. In other cases, residents I talked to described wanting to “help others” as a motivation for moving to Manchester (and certain, less affluent—and more diverse—neighborhoods). Kelly and her husband, Sam (introduced in Chapter 4), were one such couple. Working in the nonprofit sector, Kelly (a white New Hampshire native) wanted to move to Manchester to be closer to the Hispanic population she served while working in the health field. As her husband told me over coffee, “she (Kelly) wanted to be closer to the people that she was really focused on with her work here in Manchester.” That met selling their house in a relatively rural Manchester suburb and finding a new home in the city. Once their children were out of the house, they did exactly that, settling in a relatively diverse neighborhood of the east side (though, in their search, they looked at homes in numerous neighbors, some more diverse than others, on both the city’s east and west sides).

But what do these outcomes look like from the perspective of those on the receiving end of these helping behaviors? I also interviewed a number of residents—many of them having arrived in Manchester as refugees—whose stories help to answer this question. Jamin, a refugee who came to Manchester from Nepal several years ago, also described the importance of having access to individuals who engage in various helping behaviors. When Jamin arrived in Manchester with his parents nearly five years ago, his shift to life in the US was a jarring one:

**Jamin:** First few days were very hard for us, the only people we knew were family. And I would get lost outside instantly because I never lived in a place like this, you know, advanced technology. I came from a place where there was no
electricity, no clean drinking water, no facilities. And moving to this country was overwhelming. It was completely different.

What helped him and his family adjust to a new city, however, was being surrounded by Manchester residents who reached out to them, including one neighbor and social worker in particular (and whom I refer to here as “Claire”). Jamin and his family did not meet or form a relationship with Claire via her professional capacity in the social work field, but through a local church.

**Jamin:** She actually volunteered to help our family, to help us get adjusted here. She would come to our place, take us places, shopping, show us places, you know. It made it feel comfortable, like a home for us, and it was good to know someone was watching our back. Her help was good, because my dad was worried we made the wrong choice. He was starting to figure out how to get a job and raise a family. So she was really helpful and helped us to get on our feet and be able to work, to be stable enough to live here.

Jamin’s story provides insight into the outcomes of the social justice frame, and of having ties to individuals who espouse this lens (including the woman he described). Not only did she help Jamin and his family feel at ease, she also engaged in numerous helping behaviors that substantially aided them in various dimensions of their lives, including their emotional (e.g., “It made me feel comfortable”), physical (Claire also provided transportation to and from doctor/dental appointments), and economic wellbeing (helping his parents find employment).

The tie between Claire and Jamin also constitutes what social capital theorists refer to as a “bridging tie”—that is, a connection between two or more actors based on differences between them. By connecting to individuals different from ourselves, we also gain access to resources that would otherwise be closed off to us. In this case, these resources included transportation, ties to social welfare resources, and knowledge of the local labor market. Differences between these actors (that is, Jamin and Claire) were also demographic, including not only race/ethnicity, nativity, and education, but socioeconomic status. What is lacking in the present literature on
bridging social ties (and the diversity/social capital research) is a discussion of the process by which resources become accessible. When it comes to Jamin’s relationship with Claire, a tie between them was not enough. As I will continue to illustrate throughout this chapter, it was Claire’s cultural frame that facilitated their relationship and drove her to engage in the helping behavior Jamin described.

An Iraqi couple (who, like Jamin, arrived in Manchester as refugees) communicated a similar experience. Although Mahmod and Zainab received help from school social workers and the International Institute (a nonprofit that helps resettle refugees in Manchester), they also received assistance informally through their neighborhood ties. In this case, it was their landlord, his wife, and their Iraqi neighbors who came to their aid. Mahmod, “We didn’t have a car, and the Iraqi neighbor living on the first floor helped us with shopping. Sometimes the wife of the landlord took the kids to parks, to buy things.” With help from their neighbor and landlords, Mahmod and Zainab managed to become better acquainted with their neighborhood and gain access to a number of important resources.

In other cases, residents gained access to resources by participating in civic organizations, which introduced them to networks in which helping behaviors proliferate. This includes churches, which often (but not always, e.g. Smith and Emerson 2000) encourage helping and other pro-social behaviors (McClure 2013; Merino 2014; Saroglu et al. 2005). Doug, for example, was able to find employment (among other resources) via a network of individuals at a neighborhood church in which he participated.

DOUG: I just felt as if I belonged there, because, you know, people don’t know me but they came up to me and were like, “Where are you from?” They were just interested to know who I was. That made me feel like I belong there. Since then I’ve been with that church.

JY: And do they also have like social gatherings after services? Anything like that?
DOUG: Yes, they do. Actually, the funny part is that my first job in New Hampshire I worked for that church, believe it or not. I just got here, it was tough to get a job. I didn’t have work to start, I didn’t know where to go to ask for a job. I got a couple interviews but they were unsuccessful. My language was so broke that no one could actually understand what I was saying. But they have been a welcoming place for me.

JY: And you did end up getting your first job there?

DOUG: Yes. They help me out. And then I could actually get other jobs.

JY: And how did you find out about the job there?

DOUG: Well, I actually, they asked me questions about where I was from, trying to learn more about me. I mentioned I don’t have a job. They were like, we can offer you one, and meanwhile you can look for other jobs.

JY: So they offered you the job with the understanding that you were still looking?

DOUG: Yes. And it helped me out to pay for my apartment. It started from there.

What this helping behavior and exchange experienced by Doug shared in common with Phil, Selena, and other residents I interviewed, was a cultural framework (i.e., the social justice lens) that individuals drew upon in acting on behalf of their social ties. Those using the self-reliance frame, however, did not reach out to or engage in helping behaviors or exchange relationships. The actions they took resulted in different outcomes for their neighbors and racial/ethnic others within their social networks.

**Helping Behaviors and the Self-Reliance Frame**

Those espousing the self-reliance frame had much different attitudes toward those in need (particularly minorities and immigrants, and especially those below poverty). As I discussed in the previous chapter, these residents also reported fewer close ties to their neighbors (though they lived in neighborhoods that were much more homogeneous in terms of race/ethnicity and income, and thus shared their neighborhoods with somewhat more affluent residents). For those whose understanding of diversity, newcomers and nonwhites is informed by this self-reliance
frame, there is little incentive to reach out to those of other racial/ethnic groups, particularly when it comes to forming ties, participating in certain civic groups, and engaging in pro-social behaviors like those evinced by Phil. After all, if individual’s circumstances were a result of their own failures or lack of motivation (as per the self-reliance frame), helping such individuals made little sense. Importantly, but not surprisingly, reciprocity and helping behaviors were less common among this group of interviewees in comparison to those using the social justice frame.

In the case of the ‘self-reliance’ framework, the onus is on the disadvantaged individual to take the steps that would facilitate increased integration and improve their own wellbeing. There is also the notion—as illustrated by Melissa—that some claiming to be in need of help might instead be “trying to take advantage.” Unlike Selena, who also fears she may be taken advantage of (though, in her case, by the homeless persons to whom she gives money), Melissa’s concern is also associated with a lack of helping behaviors on her part (Selena continues to offer help and aid, despite a similar concern). Thus, while they share a similar concern that those claiming to be “in need” might not be, the extent to which they engage in helping behaviors (and in what venues) is split along the lines of their cultural frames.

While proponents of the self-reliance frame did engage in some helping behaviors, such actions were not central to the beliefs they espoused about what makes for a “good neighbor” or a “good community.” Tom, for example, whom I introduced in Chapter 4, did not describe having close ties with his neighbors, even though they did the occasional favor for one another: “We don’t eat dinner every Thursday night or anything like that, but we see each other, say hi. And if somebody needs something they will call or come over, and I can give them a hand.” His definition of a “good neighborhood” appeared to rest on cordial, hi-and-bye associations with neighbors, not strong ties that made possible the levels of reciprocity that social justice adherents
described. While Tom and other proponents of the self-reliance frame certainly do not avoid engaging in exchange relationships with neighbors, they also did not describe these exchanges occurring as frequently as those who used the social justice lens. Tom occasionally will pick up his daughter’s friend from school, having gotten to know her mother through a local PTG. He also does occasional favors for a neighbor:

One guy across the street, probably a little bit older than you. He has a dog. I’ll be walking mine and be like, ‘Hey, want me to walk your dog, or go for a walk?’ But, we don’t have a whole lot in common. He’s 20 years my junior, and I don’t play beer pong any more (laughs).

Thus, even though Tom has lived in his neighborhood (indeed, in the same house) for just as long as many of the social justice proponents I talked to (and is a lifelong Manchester resident), he did not describe having particularly strong ties with neighbors. Although it is clear weaker ties are useful in producing certain outcomes (e.g., Granovetter 1973), exchange and reciprocity between neighbors appear more common among those who described stronger connections to their neighbors, for whom a “good neighborhood” rests upon cultivating (and maintaining) these relationships. These stronger ties are made possible by certain cultural frames (like the social justice lens) and constrained by others (such as the self-reliance frame).

With the self-reliance frame also comes a more restricted sense of who is worthy of help. Melissa, for instance, was a regular participant in a local residential organization (where we first met), a group that occasionally raises food and money for local families in need. This activity was not at the center of the organization’s efforts, however, and was one of many annual undertakings (most of which did not emphasize helping behaviors). This is not to suggest that those using the social justice frame see those in need of help as lacking agency or bearing no self-responsibility (Phil, for example, made Mario responsible for meeting him at various locations for different meetings, to ensure Mario was serious about his recovery; he also
described himself as “anti-welfare”). For individuals proclaiming an ethos of self-reliance, the entirety of the burden is placed on those in need of help, encouraging individuals to help themselves, and to do so with their own resources. It is from this ethos that their actions follow.

Engagement in helping behaviors was also noticeably absent in my discussion with Rebecca—another proponent of the self-reliance frame (also introduced in the previous chapter). Though we discussed her cross-racial/ethnic relationships and ties with neighbors (most of whom are white) at length, Rebecca did not report having close enough ties to most of her neighbors that would result in reciprocity (such as that described by Phil), and the volunteerism she engaged in mostly took the form of working with the parent teacher group at her son’s school. Moreover, when Rebecca did encounter individuals whom she identified as being “in need,” the result was not increasing exchange or lending a helping hand, but (in one case she described) withdrawing from the relationship. The following excerpt from our interview (also discussed in Chapter 4) illustrates this dynamic:

Rebecca: This is, I don’t know if they are Muslim. They’re, something like Muslim, Arabic, Middle Eastern. And, even the dad, but they don’t, and I don’t want to be rude and say, my little guy’s friend can come over, but his older brother, (chuckling) that’s not part of the deal. And I don’t know if they culturally think that is rude, you know? I don’t know. So, it’s hard. There is a language thing. And I try to say ‘just play with somebody else’ (chuckles). He’s a sweet kid, but, I don’t know.

Despite similarities across class (e.g., homeownership, education, and occupations) and race between Rebecca and (for example) Sam and Kelly, a lack of reciprocity between Rebecca and those she deemed “in need” appears to be driven largely by her adherence to the ethos of self-reliance. Discussions of the processes underlying social capital and exchange (particularly with respect to neighborhoods, integration, and diversity) must account for the cultural frames social actors use to understand their ties to one another.
An alternative explanation for variations in social capital outcomes and tie formation, based on developments in social exchange theory (Buchan, Croson, and Dawes 2002), is that these cultural frames moderate social distance—a component of relationships upon which exchange is contingent (ibid.). In the above example, Rebecca clearly draws boundaries between herself and those she engages in only limited reciprocity with the parents of her son’s friend. While there are certainly cultural barriers at play here—ones that Rebecca herself acknowledges—Rebecca uses these barriers as a means to create further distance between herself and these parents. Proponents of the social justice frame, on the other hand, appear to draw fewer boundaries between themselves and the city’s newcomers. Social justice proponents, therefore, maybe more likely to engage in reciprocity and helping behaviors because their cultural frames lessen the ‘social distance’ between themselves and those of different racial/ethnic, nativity, cultural, and socioeconomic backgrounds. Although this cultural frame certainly allows its proponents to emphasize differences between themselves and other individuals (such as whether others are more “in need” compared to their own circumstances), this lens also helps to generate a collective “we”—that above all else, individuals are “Manchester residents.” As such, those who emphasize the social justice lens may perceive less social distance between themselves and others—thereby increasingly the likelihood of exchange and reciprocity (including, but certainly not limited to, helping behaviors).

**Conclusions and Implications**

In Chapters 4 and 5, I have illustrated the importance of reframing the social capital/diversity debate to focus on micro-level social processes, where tie formation takes place and the outcomes of these ties are more easily recognized. Differentiating the “processes” underlying tie formation from the ties themselves (as per Portes 1998), particularly with respect
to racial/ethnic diversity, helps to illuminate an important dimension of social capital and its outcomes: that is, the resources that one actor stands to gain from his/her ties to another are contingent upon the cultural frames of the actor.

Figure 5-1 illustrates the empirical relationship between culture, neighborhood characteristics, social capital, and the outcomes of social capital, suggested by ethnographic data discussed in this and the previous chapter. First, cultural frames shape social capital, with the Social Justice being more likely than the Self-Reliance frame to result in: 1) more racial/ethnic diversity in one’s social capital (network heterogeneity) and 2) stronger bonds between neighbors. These frames lead to these differences in social ties by providing proponents with strategies of action for achieving their definition of a “good neighborhood,” including neighborhood selection (such as willingness to move to or spend time in a more diverse neighborhood) or finding ways to increase neighborhood participation (such as building and maintaining spaces within one’s neighborhood for such interaction to take place). The Social Justice frame in particular encourages residents to construct more inclusive spatial boundaries (across racial/ethnic and class lines).

Neighborhood social structure also matters. For example, living in a neighborhood that is more diverse and/or economically disadvantaged (or adjacent to such places) increases the likelihood of cross-racial/ethnic and cross-class interaction, as previous literature on tie formation has demonstrated (e.g., De Souza Briggs 2007, Small 2004). Yet residency in a diverse neighborhood alone does not mean residents will form ties across racial/ethnic or even class lines (as per the relationship between Phil and Mario), or that these ties will result in particular outcomes. Rather, neighborhood structures interact with cultural frames. Some residents (especially those who espouse the social justice frame) are more likely to live in diverse
neighborhoods. They are also more likely to engage in helping behaviors or to form have stronger ties with neighbors (ties that are more likely to result in reciprocity, like those described by Phil and Selena).

Neighborhood characteristics above and beyond racial/ethnic and socioeconomic diversity also matter, however. As illustrated by relationship between Kelly and her former neighbors (who arrived in Manchester as refugees from Africa), residential instability (coupled with a lack of homeownership) makes the formation of strong, lasting ties more difficult (and reciprocity therefore less likely, as these types of exchanges are more likely to emerge when residents form lasting ties). Homeownership also gave residents (particularly those using the social justice frame) the wherewithal to create spaces that encourage interaction and tie formation (such as a garden, in the case of Kelly and Sam, or a neighbor’s garage, as per Phil and his neighbors). Importantly, policy (including federal, state, and local) plays a critical role in these neighborhood social structures. For example, housing policies of the mid-twentieth century
played an important role in shaping the racial/ethnic and spatial inequalities in homeownership and other forms of socioeconomic disadvantage (like poverty and residential instability) that persist to this day (Massey and Denton 1993). Policies also have the potential to foster the growth (or in some cases, the decline) of local voluntary organizations and other institutions.

The red arrows in Figure 5-1 signify that the relationships between cultural frames, neighborhood social structure, and social capital are also emergent. In other words, as per Swidler’s conceptualization of culture, although individuals use cultural frames, these frames come from outside the individual (though they are then used in ways that reproduce objective realities). Some of these frames (and how individuals draw upon them) are more accessible than others for structural reasons. For example, exposure to those of other racial and ethnic backgrounds has been shown to increase racial/ethnic tolerance—a factor that the social justice frame necessitates. In addition, some voluntary organizations (churches, for example) readily promote some ways of thinking (such as social justice) and not others.

Cultural frames like the social justice lens often help to improve outcomes with respect to racial/ethnic inequality within neighborhoods, at least in the short-term (as per, for example, the exchange between Phil and Mario or Jamin and Claire). But what do the ties between these residents and their short-term outcomes mean for the long-term wellbeing of those like Mario and Jamin? Will they translate into residential stability and reduced inequality? Longitudinal studies that focus on reciprocity in integrating neighborhoods might be useful in determining whether this is the case. As more researchers turn their attention to inequality in integrating neighborhoods, we must focus not only on social structural differences in these neighborhoods, but cultural ones as well—including the cultural frames that individuals draw on to make sense of integration, inequality, and demographic change.
In this and the preceding chapter, I have focused predominantly on individuals and their neighborhoods. But civic organizations, including parent-teacher and residential groups, are also an important component of neighborhood life—one whose role in shaping social life in diverse neighborhoods has not been considered in the diversity/social capital debate. Regardless of whether individuals espoused the social justice or self-reliance frame, I found that participation in civic organizations often resulted in residents forming ties with one another (Tom, for instance, met several parents in a local PTG). These ties sometimes resulted in reciprocity and helping behaviors. Participation in such organizations also gave residents access to important resources (such as the job that Doug found via a network formed at a local church). Several questions about the role of organizations remain unanswered in the urban sociology/social capital literature, though. Among the most pressing is: how do civic organizations actually go about connecting residents to one another, and how do they help to produce certain outcomes, both for individual participants and the neighborhoods in which they are embedded? In addition, what characteristics of neighborhoods (including diversity, poverty, and residential instability) and place more broadly (such as inequality between neighborhoods) help organizations foster civic engagement and mobilize resources? I provide answers to these questions in the next chapter, where I examine the role organizations play in neighborhood life.
CHAPTER 6
NEIGHBORHOOD SOCIAL CAPITAL IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

In Chapters 4 and 5, I have illustrated how reframing the diversity/social capital debate in order to focus on urban social processes illuminates our understanding of social ties (and their outcomes) in more and less heterogeneous neighborhoods. As such, I have focused explicitly on individuals (in particular, the cultural frames individuals use to inform social capital formation, as well as how outcomes are partly contingent upon the cultural frames of one’s social ties). In this chapter, I explore neighborhood social capital at a different unit of analysis: civic and nonprofit organizations.

Like poverty (Wilson 1987) or diversity (Putnam 2007), the presence (or absence) of civic organizations constitutes a neighborhood effect that influences local outcomes and the lives of residents (Safford 2009; Sampson 2011). Moreover, civic organizations and events also represent what Sampson calls “community-level” properties—dimensions of a neighborhood that are measured directly at the neighborhood level and are not merely derived from properties measured at the individual level (such as the poverty rate, for example, which is derived from the number of persons living below the poverty level). The number and types of civic organizations within a neighborhood (or even the number and types of certain civic events) have implications for neighborhood wellbeing. For instance, Sampson (2011) found that “the density of local organizations as reported by residents and their involvement in voluntary associations predicts higher levels of collective effective, controlling for poverty, social composition, and prior crime rates” (p. 158). Thus, voluntary organizations help to make possible certain neighborhood
outcomes (including, but certainly not limited to, levels of trust among residents, as Sampson and his colleagues have demonstrated).

In this chapter, I answer several an important questions about the role of civic organizations when it comes to social capital in diversifying places. The first of these questions is: Under what circumstances do civic organizations help to foster social ties between participants? Although I found that some organizations were successful in bringing together those of different races and ethnicities, such ties were often not long-lasting and rarely extended outside the context of the voluntary associations in which those of different backgrounds interacted. Success in connecting residents to each other varied depending on organizational structure and recruitment practices. Boundary work (which I define below) among participants of these groups, in addition to neighborhood social and physical structure (such as the proliferation of home ownership and walkability), also mattered in this regard.

I also ask: how do civic organizations and nonprofits help to build civic capacity (that is, the propensity for civic engagement and participation) in various neighborhoods? In answering this question, I demonstrate the importance of organizational practices, neighborhood physical structure, and civic organization history when it comes to bringing together neighborhood residents of disparate backgrounds. I also illustrate an important point regarding neighborhood diversity: that local integration alone is not a panacea for racial/ethnic inequality. Indeed, even when those of different racial/ethnic groups share a neighborhood, they do not always share in its civic resources (including access to political leaders, police officers, and other limited public goods that can improve neighborhood life). Moreover, at any given time, organizations within a given city are competing for limited resources, including not only funding, but also a sustainable police presence in their neighborhood and participation of local leaders in their organizations and...
events. I also illustrate how neighborhood demographic trends linked to diversity (including residential instability and population shifts from one neighborhood to the next) and federal policy (chiefly, enforcement of illegal immigration policies) can prevent voluntary organizations from building civic capacity.

**Organization Site Selection and Observations**

While I observed several different voluntary organizations and events throughout Manchester, I made it a point to select two in each neighborhood to attend regularly (typically, once per month). As noted in my methods and data discussion (Chapter 2), this included a Parent Teacher Group in each neighborhood, in addition to another organization, which varied from one neighborhood to the next (see Table 6-1). In two neighborhoods (including my least diverse and somewhat more diverse neighborhoods), this included a residential group. In my most diverse neighborhood, I observed a parent support group. Although all organizations that I observed typically met at least once per month, these were occasionally canceled for a multitude of reasons (such as expected low turnout or a holiday), and PTGs only met during the school year.

I attended and observed two PTGs on the city’s West Side, and an additional two on the East Side, during the 2012/2013 (and the first half of the 2013/2014) school year, attending each group between four and seven times. (Note that, at the start of my research, I set out to examine four neighborhoods and hence conducting observations at four PTGs, though when it became clear that focusing on only three neighborhoods would allow for more in-depth data collection, I dropped this fourth neighborhood, hence the inclusion of PTG #1 in Table 6-1). In addition to organizational meetings, I also included events sponsored by these groups or those in which they were participating with numerous organizations. These events included holiday gatherings, block
parties, potlucks, neighborhood walks, and attending public (local government) meetings regarding events like school redistricting or general public forums.

Symbolic Boundaries and Interaction in Neighborhood-based Organizations

As I briefly noted in Chapter 2, levels of diversity in the organizations I observed varied from one group to the next, typically (but not always) reflecting diversity throughout the neighborhood. In two cases (one in a less diverse neighborhood, and the other in a neighborhood slightly more diverse than the city as a whole), 100% of participants were white during all meetings I observed, and in the case of two other groups more than 90% were white (though one of these—PTG #1—was in a neighborhood I eventually dropped from analysis). Note that I do not reveal the number of participants, as they could make it easier to identify these groups. The participants of three groups I observed were far more racially and ethnically heterogeneous, including two of those in the most diverse neighborhood and another in a more diverse neighborhood in which I conducted my ethnographic work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Diversity</th>
<th>Group Type</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTG #1 (6)</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTG #2 (4)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident Group (7)</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Diverse</td>
<td>PTG (4)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident Group (4)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Diverse</td>
<td>PTG (6)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent Support Group (4)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just because some of these groups had a diverse membership does not necessarily mean that those participating formed strong ties with those of other racial/ethnic groups, however. In one diverse group I observed, for instance, turnout was high. This high turnout is due to a
combination of factors, including the neighborhood’s physical structure, with the school being within walking distance from many parents’ homes. School employees also experimented with meeting times, rearranging the group’s schedule until finding a time when attendance was highest. Nevertheless, language and cultural barriers abounded, but many employees were hopeful that given enough time and attendance they could find ways to break down such barriers. One school employee, for instance, told me one of her goal’s for her school’s PTG was to have parents of different racial/ethnic and cultural backgrounds sitting together and talking to one another. By the end of that year, though, I continued to observe highly segregated interactions among participants. This was partly due to boundary work among participants, but also the demographics of the neighborhoods in which organizations operated, as well as organizational practices (particularly those surrounding gaining new members). I discuss each of these factors separately in the context of several organizations I observed during my ethnographic work, beginning with boundary work.

In many cases, while cross-racial interaction often took place, these interactions typically did not result in lasting ties or those that stretched beyond the context of the organization. When participants did form strong ties with other members of PTG or other group, these ties typically did not cross racial/ethnic lines. This is partly an outcome of how individuals use race/ethnicity as markers of in-group status, denoting that they share common experiences and beliefs, what sociologists of culture call symbolic boundary work. As Lamont and Molnar (2002) defined it in their review of the concept, “Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space…Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership” (p. 168). (Note that symbolic boundary work, as understood within the field of cultural sociology, is
distinct from the conceptualization of boundary work in the literature on organizational change; for a discussion of the latter, see Quick and Feldman 2014). A Hispanic woman named Carla described an interaction during our interview that illustrates precisely how race and ethnicity are made meaningful when it comes to tie formation. Shortly after relocating to Manchester with her family, Carla’s husband died several months later. Finding herself isolated, she did not know where to turn.

And I saw a guy there (at a center where she worked) with my skin color, and I thought, “Oh my God, another Hispanic! Finally, someone who can understand what I am feeling.” I approached him and started talking to him in Spanish. And he looked at me and in this thick accent he said, “What is your problem? What is this gibberish you are talking to me?” And it turns out, he’s from Egypt (laughs). His skin color was very misleading.

In this case, Carla and this man remained close friends, but her anecdote illustrates how individuals use race and ethnicity when determining with whom to interact and/or form ties. There are other cases in which long-lasting ties did not result from cross-racial interaction as a result of this “boundary work,” however. Anita, another Hispanic woman I interviewed, formed a close friendship with a parent she met while participating in a PTG at her children’s school. Having emigrated from Central America as a teenager, Anita was eager to get involved with her local PTG after moving to Manchester several years ago:

**Anita:** I started to talk to one woman and she said she lived right in front of my house, but I didn’t know. So she asked me to go to her house for breakfast. I told her I couldn’t that day, but then I decided to go later. That’s how we started to get close. Then, um, she told me to babysit her daughter for like an hour or two because she was going to work and then her husband would be home soon. So I used to do that. And then sometimes when I had something to do I used to ask her to watch my kids and we got even closer. Then, I think it was last year, yeah, she put her son in a summer program, and I put my son and nieces in it. They (the program) changed at the last minute to another school. She said it was too far away to let her son walk alone though. Well, my kids were going, so I said why don’t you just let him come with me. She wanted to know how much I would charge for that, she wanted to pay me, but I told her no. I have to go anyways and he’s already nine. I don’t have any issues with taking her son for free. So I took
them to school and she brought them home. So that way we could both help each other.

_JY_: So that worked out well?

_Anita_: Yeah. In the morning it was easy for me but she was working. And in the evening it gets so hot and that’s when I get sleepy, because I wake up at 3:30 in the morning to cook because my husband works construction so he takes lunch. I cook for my uncle and his brother too. Around 3:00 I get so sleepy. So it was good for me that they could pick them up in the evening, because around that time her husband comes with his car and can drive from work and get them to my parking lot. So, I was like, OK (chuckles). Yeah, it was easy.

_JY_: Did you see each other at the PTG a couple times before you started talking?

_Anita_: Yeah. And we still talk and sometimes she asks if I can take my kids to her place. She has ice cream and things like that.

_JY_: Have either of you moved since then or do you still live next door?

_Anita_: Still next door. Sometimes she calls me from the store and tells me about specials she finds (chuckles). We are in touch most of the time.

Like many parents, Anita was wary when it came to which children her own kids should play with, and in which types of settings. Anita described how she used cues from other parents based on whether their parenting practices aligned with her own. This included (but was not limited too) whether she was invited to accompany her children on their first play-date at the other parent’s home. She an Anita became somewhat close—in terms of exchanging resources—but there was not much trust between her and Anita when it came to the latter allowing her children to play at the woman’s house:

_Anita_: There is another mother that I know and I met her at the meeting. But then her daughter and my niece were in the same classroom and they were very close. Yeah, she moved, I think she moved closer to the school. And she did talk to me over here and when she got pregnant and I had some clothes from my son I gave them to her. I even told her about the places that I knew where they give clothes away, like a church that has a program where they give maternity clothes, baby clothes too, and things that women might need. So I told her about that and she did go over there, she told me. But her daughter and my niece got very close, but she never invited me to her house and I never invited her to mine. But she invited my daughter to go to her house, but I didn’t know her except from school, so I
wanted to do something else. Then one day she asked if her daughter could come to my house. I was like, “I don’t know, we have to clean today. “ I only knew her from school and I am always careful with where I let my kids go. I don’t like them to be alone in the neighborhood. Like, right now, one of them is 11 and I still walk them to school and things. I don’t like them to be by themselves because I don’t know what they are doing.

**JY:** So was it that you didn’t know her well enough?

**Anita:** No, it was that she didn’t invite me to her house, so I didn’t know who else was there. On the other hand, the other woman she invited me to her house first. She didn’t just invite my kids, she invited me too, or sometimes she asked me to come with my kids to watch hers. So then I could see where she lived and what was going on. The other lady was just asking for my niece, but I didn’t want her to go to another house where I don’t know who else is there. That’s why I always had an excuse to not let her go.

Anita explained that wanting to know where her children would be playing was often perceived as overprotective, but that for her, this is something she learned from her own parents.

It was also a parenting principle she said was an important part of her culture. After living in the US for several years, she said she found the difference between US-born Hispanics and those who emigrated here to be especially visible in this regard:

Well, Hispanic people, yeah, we do that. Because some people call it overprotective but we always want to know what our kids are doing. And I’m talking about the Hispanic people that were raised in other countries, not the ones raised here. They have more like, American life. They let their kids go without them to other houses. But not for us that were raised—I came here when I was (a teenager), but I still remember how my grandma used to say that we don’t go alone to someone else’s house. They were always watching what we were doing and don’t let us go alone. Like cousins, brothers and sisters is OK. And over here I see a lot of kids alone, walking alone doing bad things, and their parents don’t even know what they are doing.

This same type of vigilance regarding one’s children also helps to explain lower levels of criminal involvement among children of first-generation immigrants compared to those of native-born US residents (see, for example, Bui 2009). Regardless of whether or not this parenting style is unique to certain immigrant groups (other native-born parents of different races whom I talked to described similar sentiments regarding their children), what mattered in Anita’s
case was the *perception* that such vigilance was uniquely a Hispanic practice. Thus, one reason that Anita formed a close bond with one parent (whom she confirmed was also Hispanic) and not another (who was white and US-born) was her use of socially constructed boundaries (such as nativity). This “boundary work” is certainly not unique to immigrants or parenting styles, spanning the boundaries of race/ethnicity, gender, social class, and even occupations. What Anita demonstrated, however, is that even when individuals of different backgrounds participate in the same voluntary associations, they do not always form close bonds with one another.

I witnessed these boundaries play themselves out during organization meetings and events, when parents were clearly seated with those of similar racial/ethnic backgrounds. Examining the demographic composition of a packed gymnasium one evening at one school’s annual event, it was quite obvious that Hispanics were seated and talking to Hispanics, those of black/African descent were seated with other black/African parents, white parents with white parents, etc. Thus, even when individuals live in the same neighborhood and participate in similar civic organizations, they do not necessarily form ties with one another. When ties do form, they are not always strong.

In cases where participants of civic groups did have ties with one another that cross racial and ethnic lines, these individuals typically knew one another outside the context of the group, and were often neighbors. Such was the case with Norma, a white resident, and Baako, a resident of the East Side who arrived in Manchester as a refugee from African several years ago. Norma credits a local residential group (started with the help of a nonprofit agency) with helping her break out of her shell after moving to Manchester. It was in that group that she became close friends with Baako, who lives just down the street from her: “She always stops by here, and (another woman in the group) gives me a ride to work sometimes. Yeah. But I think if I didn’t go
to that I probably still wouldn’t be talking to anyone. Just because I don’t go (into the neighborhood).” Norma, Baako, and other members of the resident group sometimes offer each other rides to work or the grocery store, pick up one another’s children from school and babysit for each other on occasion. Although organizations can connect residents to each other (allowing them to share resources and engage in reciprocity), their ability to do so is impacted not just by boundary work, but also their organization’s structures and practices.

**Organizational Practices and Network Exclusion**

Organizational practices, especially those regarding recruitment strategies, also influenced whether participants formed ties with one another (though not necessarily across racial and ethnic lines). For one group I observed, this met talking to parents and handing out fliers as parents dropped their children off at school. “We call it sidewalk social work,” an organizer told me:

> We are out there morning and afternoon talking to parents and thinking of how to bring them in. A clothing giveaway is a good way to do that. There were faces at (their most recent) meeting that you don’t typically see, but they came because they could get something. And I’m OK with that, because it is useful and getting them to feel comfortable and realize that they do have a voice. And it helps them to find that voice.

Most participants I talked to learned of the group from the visibility of these recruiters, who handed out fliers on the sidewalks in front of a local elementary school. Because their outreach efforts targeted all parents broadly, their efforts resulted in a diverse not only racially, ethnically, and culturally, but also linguistically, meaning that many attendants did not speak one another’s language (and many did not speak English well). Recruitment practices in other groups I observed relied more on “word of mouth”—a phrase that came up often during my interviews with other civic organizers, PTG leaders and school administrators. At one (predominantly white) residential group in a less diverse part of the city, I often observed greeting one another by
name, exchanging handshakes and hugs. On some occasions, the room would erupt in excitement when a resident who had missed the last several meetings returned. Although organizers of this residential group initially relied on handing out fliers to strangers and going door to door in their early efforts, they soon found that having their friends spread the word to their neighbors and encouraging them to attend resulted in better turnout. As one organizer told me:

One woman I know, she just moved here alone, she didn’t know anyone. This group was a life saver for her because she met a lot of people. She was thrilled. She talked to a new member—this new member, I keep forgetting his name, but he started bringing all of his neighbors. All of the sudden he is bringing new people. He brought her in. She moved into the neighborhood and he ran into her and invited her.

Organizers did make some efforts to reach out to the neighborhood’s minority residents. This was typically in the form of handing out fliers, which were in English—another practice that helps to produce a predominantly white group of participants among civic groups, even in integrating neighborhood (see Mayorga-Gallo 2014). When I asked one recruiter about a lack of diversity within the group, she shrugged disappointingly. She told me she would often approach some of the neighborhood’s black and Hispanic residents, in addition to white passersby (many of whom she recognized as tenants living in properties owned by absentee landlords) but often to no avail—a trend that she partly blamed on landlords who live out of state. Their absenteeism, she said, often discourages their tenants from caring about the neighborhood. “Unfortunately, we have a lot of non-resident landlords, which is a bad thing. You are better off having landlords who live there because they are more careful,” she told me. From whom residents rent also appears to be a marker along which individuals draw boundaries. When approaching those living in such housing, she told me that “you can tell right off the bat that they want nothing to do with you. I say, ‘Hi,’ and I get no response. They turn around and walk away. I try to say hi to
everyone, because if I can bring them into the group, that’s what I want.” She and other recruiters therefore relied overwhelmingly on their own networks to find members.

Thus, on one hand, efforts that broadly target neighborhood residents to spur participation can result in large turnouts, though participants (being of quite disparate backgrounds and joining for a variety of purposes) appear less likely to form lasting ties with one another. On the other hand, outreach efforts that rely on word of mouth and neighborhood networks can also result in high levels of turnout and sustained participation. These network-reliant recruitment methods worked less well for PTGs and better for residential groups that targeted smaller (and also more demographically and economically homogeneous) geographic areas. But by relying on pre-existing (predominantly white) networks, these recruitment strategies inadvertently ensured that meetings and events were attended by mostly white residents.

Whether participants interact and form ties with one another might also depend on the type of civic organization. Parent support groups, for example, have quite different goals compared to organizations like residential groups. By encouraging parents to join to help improve their child’s wellbeing by helping them connections to social service providers and school personnel, participants in such a support group have less wherewithal to form ties with one another (though they sometimes did so, as in Anita’s case). Individuals were better connected in the residential groups I observed (where turnout was often smaller), as the relationship between Norma and Baako illustrates. In considering whether individuals for ties with one another via civic organizations (cross-racial ties in particular), we must therefore consider the type of organization under analysis.

Of course, an organization’s goals will also influence its structure, another characteristic that had ramifications for social connectedness among participants. One organizer for a parent
support group, for example, told me that the group does not have a president and is used to keep parents informed about their role in the school and curriculum developments. This met that volunteers and participants (even those who attended regularly) did not have to stay in touch with each other outside the context of the group for it to be successful. In other groups I observed, participants (especially those who held positions or sat on subcommittees) would meet regularly, often at each other’s homes, planning for events like fundraisers or potlucks. These differences were partly a reflection of socioeconomic differences between neighborhoods. For organizations in less affluent areas, participants often did not own their homes or have access to transportation, and therefore little wherewithal to meet independently outside monthly meetings.

Having a parent-body with more economic resources also met that schools could hold fundraisers selling more expensive items (and could be relatively assured that these sales would be successful). In one case, for example, a school (not one I observed, however) was able to raise nearly $30,000 via one of their fundraisers (a feat that many participants in other PTGs discussed, and one that I asked some parents and school personnel about during the course of in-depth interviews). Some groups I observed attempted to replicate this fundraising model, with far less success. There was less certainty and success with similar sales and fundraisers at schools that served a more socioeconomically disadvantaged student population, though. In this way, resources begot resources, and seemingly benign mechanisms of fundraising like Yankee Candle sales or collecting BoxTops (sold with select, brand-name grocery items like cereal) served to reproduce inequality between neighborhoods and local institutions like schools.

**Resource Mobilization and the Reproduction of Neighborhood Inequality**

Little empirical attention has been paid to the role that civic organizations play in the contemporary urban landscape when it comes to stratifying resources between different
neighborhoods, as well as between residents of the same neighborhood. In some cases, organizations I observed sought to gain access to resources that existed within the confines of the neighborhood they served (such as parents to volunteer at or donate for an event). As I illustrate in this section, however, organizations were often competing with each other for limited resources and for those that were not neighborhood specific. This includes access to time and participation from civic leaders and government agencies, and inevitably means that some civic organizations and their neighborhoods get access to more resources than others. Organizations also had to compete for the same resources even as they were trying to work together to bring residents together and hold civic events (what is often referred to as “building civic capacity”). Whether or not they were aware of it, organizations competed with organization, and neighborhood competed with neighborhood, to gain access to a number of resources that improved quality of life. This finding is on par with research that extends beyond urban places to small, rural areas, where research on community civic leaders suggest similar types of competition between organizations (see Dillon 2012).

Organizations often had to work together to pool their resources, especially in the early stages of starting a civic group or social service program. Making use of ties to other organizations was especially important for gaining members, particularly among newer groups. For instance, one group of social workers, in starting a parent support group, worked with local PTGs in order to identify parents who might participate and take on leadership roles within the group. As one social worker told me:

We used a PTG, so we already knew. And the social worker has had ties with the African, because that is split into different groups, too. So she knew who could speak English, but maybe their work schedule wouldn’t permit them, but she knew who was home. We brainstormed a list of people that we knew. And with the Hispanics, too, we had to make sure who was bilingual. We started brainstorming a bunch of people that we knew and who would be able to come to
this meeting once a month. You know, you can invite them to one meeting, anyone can show up to just one meeting, but we needed someone who can attend all and get involved and really share some ideas. We took our list and we started figuring out who couldn’t because of work, childcare, other things. And we cut the list down like that and then sent out reminders. And everyone showed up to the first meeting.

This social worker went on to note that this parent support group was relatively successful. Most parents who said they would attend the first meeting were able to do so, and attendance other meetings has been relatively steady. What might have also helped to make this group a success, though, was its relatively unique mission (one that I do not describe in detail here, so as not to reveal the identity of the group or its participants). While there were numerous support groups for parents throughout the city, there was not one specific to ensuring parents had a larger say in organizational practices and goals—one of the key purposes of this new group.

In Manchester, one is likely to encounter many voluntary organizations with quite similar goals. As one principal lamented, “There are just too many people trying to do the same thing.” Several sociologists, including Sampson (2011) and McRoberts (2003) have identified homogeneity among civic organizations (in the case of their research, churches) as a factor that reduces trust and fragments social ties among residents.

When it comes to civic groups and social service organizations, however, another outcome that can reduce organizations’ ability to work together is competition for resources. This is especially true among organizations whose goals (and, subsequently, the resources needed to achieve them) are quite similar. When starting new efforts, organizers learned that they had to tread carefully, walking a fine line between closing gaps in civic participation or social service needs while not replicating the efforts of another group too closely. One woman volunteering with a local nonprofit described an instance where she inadvertently butted heads with an organizer from another nonprofit.
Marianne: We said we were looking for a speaker for our event, and she recommended this lady. And all in one day several people told me I should reach out to her. I found out they were like 2 blocks away from our office—but no one had heard of them. I think they were originally a little bit put off by the fact that we were doing the same thing that they were doing, they felt we were stepping on their toes. I met with them, the woman was very nice. She said we can just work together—but I could tell at first they were like, “we have to do something about this.” But they came to our event. Another man who is involved came to one of our meetings—I think they really do want to work together, but was first it was like, uh oh. Someone asked us to tell them how we are different than their group—someone from their organization asked us, like, “there are already a lot of things going on here, what is your purpose?” But now they seem to be involved with us. They send people to our events and to our meetings, so everything is good now (chuckles).

JY: And, do they do similar things to (your group) or is it a different mission?

Marianne: It is different. It’s also statewide, they’re office just happens to be in Manchester. And we are focused on Manchester specifically—and the mission is much wider. We tried to tell them that. And also the fact that we are a coalition—we aren’t an organization ourselves, we are a group that brings together all these people. We said we would be happy to have them come and send a representative to our meetings. So it worked out when we told them that and explained that we are different from what they do.

In this case, Marianne and her organization were successful in working with this other group, who regularly sent representatives to their monthly meetings. Competition for resources—especially grants—was one source of angst for many organizers I encountered during my field work. In addition to monetary resources like grant funding, though, groups also competed (often unknowingly) for access to civic resources. This includes a police presence in the neighborhood and at local civic events, such as those organized by PTGs. Members of one PTG were shocked to learn that they were unable to have a police officer guide traffic one morning, as police were busy in another neighborhood. In the case of one residential group, one white participant noted that she that police officers hired via a grant would be young and, therefore, unable to work as effectively as more senior officers. “I prefer my cops more experienced,” she said.
“Experienced” police officers were just one resource for which civic organizations and residents competed. In some instances, group leaders and participants requested certain officers be assigned to their neighborhood, illustrating how these organizations give residents a say in the distribution of public goods. Because their meetings were heavily attended by community police and local political leaders, residents were able to form close ties with them, learning how to gain access to them when necessary.

The highway department takes care of not only the streets but also the rubbish, recycling, they do all of that. if you need a sign in front of your house, they will put a sign in, like a 15-minute parking sign like if you want to prevent people from parking there, like if you have an elderly person living there who might need that space for an ambulance. And then the community police are at our beck and call—when I send emails I get responses in like a half hour.

Those living in more disadvantaged neighborhoods, where participation in residential organizations was less active, also told me they knew who their community police were, though they were not always away of how to get into contact with them (or which circumstances were appropriate for doing so). While Manchester uses “community policing” (wherein each neighborhood is assigned two regular patrolman, who can get to know residents and can be reached by residents if needed), police and even representatives like alderman at large were unequally represented among the different residential groups I observed. Both police and at least one local politician were present at most meetings of a residential group in more affluent and homogeneous neighborhood. In meetings at similar organizations that I observed in more diverse neighborhoods, though, this was less likely to be the case. Even residents who participated in these local groups told me they knew local officers from seeing them patrolling the neighborhood, rather than via attendance at meetings. One organizer told me that police will attend their meetings if requested, and that their local alderman occasionally attended, these
differences in attendance suggest that these civic resources are not as accessible in some neighborhoods and for some civic groups as they are for others.

Residents were aware of these disparities in access to public goods. At one public forum I attended, a man from a less affluent neighborhood described the city as being “two Manchesters,” divided by residents socioeconomic status and (from his perspective) city officials lack of responses to the needs of residents in poor neighborhoods. Yet, city officials described stumbling blocks of their own when trying to improve outcomes in more disadvantaged neighborhoods. One public official described an encounter with a resident of the center city, where she was conducting outreach, when a passerby told her, “Here comes the city to feed the ghetto.” She also said that her department wanted to organize an event at one of the local schools (in a more disadvantaged neighborhood) that partly involved handing out healthy food, but noted that someone helping to organize the event stated that the kids “would simply throw the food” (as happened at another school during a similar event). These reactions, she said, were linked to a sense of hopelessness felt by many residents of these neighborhoods. Given that efforts to improve outcomes (including the city’s Neighborhood Health Improvement Strategy) are relatively new (started just a couple years ago), it is possible that residents might not be aware of the scope of these efforts or doubtful that they will be successful.

Local organizations also had to compete to gain access to translators, especially for large events like Parent/Teacher conferences, but also for having documents translated into other languages. While these were often provided by different nonprofits at no cost, translators are few in number, as one social service provider told me, and another said that need for them often spikes throughout the year (especially when schools Parent/Teacher conferences overlap, though coordination between schools helped to alleviate). A need for translators was especially difficult
for participants in the smaller organizations that I observed to find those willing and able to translate recruitment fliers and other information. After attending a community walk with one organizer (passing out fliers in English), I sat down for a formal interview with her. She acknowledged that many parents could likely not read the fliers, and that a woman who used to regularly translate for them recently moved out of the neighborhood.

We can’t really translate because there are so many languages. We’d have to put out a million of them. And if people are gonna come to the meetings, though, we can get a resident translator. I know they’ve had to do it before. We used to have someone there to watch the kids if they needed to bring their kids. We are more than willing to accommodate, but we just don’t know the needs if they are not there.

Diversity—including along linguistic lines—presents a number of challenges to organizations when it comes to fostering civic engagement among participants. A dearth of translators is one such problem, and their time is one resource organizations must compete. Yet, other population characteristics beyond linguistic diversity—including residential instability, also make it difficult for organizations in less affluent neighborhoods to cultivate civic participation.

**The Social Isolation of Manchester’s Hispanic Residents**

Residential instability is particularly high among the city’s Hispanic population, particularly among Mexican parents, according to school officials I talked to. Such instability was another factor that prohibited efforts to improve civic outcomes and foster ties between residents and local institutions like schools. As one school employee told me that: “One of the biggest challenges is that we have a very transient population. You know, you get your core group but we have so many who come in and then they move on. It’s hard to have that same group of parents whose kids start in K and go here all the way through grade 5.” Such transiency made it difficult for teachers and staff to form close ties to parents, but also hard to maintain
stable participation and volunteerism among certain groups, including Hispanic parents. She often found herself having conversations with teachers, learning the day of (or sometimes after the fact) that a child left the school or the district. The loss of critical staff, like translators (due to budget cuts) also hurt schools and other organizations’ ability to get Hispanic parents involved.

The enforcement of immigration policy also dampened efforts to organize parents and build ties between them. The constant threat of detainment (much like that faced by wanted black men in the inner city, as Goffman documented) often prevented organizations from maintaining membership and also discouraged parents to form close ties with schools and other institutions. One translator told me, “I have at least 3 or 4 cases a week where either the mother or dad is being deported. I’m living it. I cry every week because it’s so sad, they get them outside of Sam’s Club now. They stop them everywhere.”

When parents learned that immigration officials might stop those of undocumented status near the local schools, some stopped walking their children to school themselves, instead relying on close friends and family members to do this for them. One Spanish-speaking parent noted via a translator during our focus group: “I don’t know what is going on. There are people calling me speaking quietly because they are afraid of getting sent back.” Families often moved from one apartment to another in order to avoid detection or when neighbors discovered their undocumented status, according to focus group participants.

With residents of undocumented status being taken during routine trips to schools or grocery stores, Hispanic parents said they were concerned that other Hispanics were reporting those without legal residency, including their own neighbors. One Spanish-speaking parent said that, “certain people have a routine; they might go to the store every Sunday or whatever. But Immigration would only know that if someone who knows you calls Immigration and tells them
that.” All three Spanish-speaking parents present said they felt certain that “it was a Latino reporting a Latino.” One woman added that, “the ones who have papers feel like they have the right to humiliate the others; they feel empowered, even though we are all in the same boat as Latinos.”

A combination of immigration policy, stratification along the lines of documented status/citizenship, residential instability (influenced to some extent by policy enforcement) contributed to the social isolation of Manchester’s Hispanic population—the largest minority group in the city and among its fastest growing. Still, schools and civic organizations served important functions for immigrant parents, helping to get them involved in local civic life, including attending local political meetings to ensure their school got needed resources for critical updates to its building structure (as I learned through long, informal discussion between myself, a Spanish translator, and several Hispanic parents). Yet, the Hispanic population appeared more isolated than other minority groups. The enforcement of immigration policy was only one reason for this, however. Another was the loss of Manchester’s Latino Center, which closed about a decade ago. The loss of this organization represents a broader trend of deinstitutionalization that I encountered.

**When the Doors Close: Deinstitutionalization and Civic Organizations**

Some neighborhoods experienced varying levels of “deinstitutionalization”—or the loss of important institutions like civic organizations. According to Wilson (1987, 1996), deinstitutionalization is especially prevalent in disadvantaged urban areas and poor neighborhoods, where economic restructuring and white flight significantly eroded tax bases and moved many well-paying jobs to the suburbs (Wilson 1996). Testing Wilson’s theory, Small and McDermott (2006) concluded that “whether high poverty neighborhoods are deprived of
organizations or not depends greatly from city to city” (p. 1713). In the case of Manchester, deinstitutionalization varies from one neighborhood to the next. The loss of civic organizations, I found, was more common in racially/ethnically diverse neighborhoods, which were also more socioeconomically disadvantaged, and further weakened efforts to unite residents and sustain civic participation.

Presently, Manchester hosts numerous organizations that serve specific minority immigrant groups, including a Somali association and another organization for those of Nepalese descent. Many of these organizations have close ties with the International Institute, which serves (and helps to resettle) refugee residents. Throughout the late 1980s and into the mid-2000s, long-time Hispanic residents I talked to told me they used to attend a similar organization, the city’s two Latin American centers. One center eventually was absorbed by a larger organization (that does not serve Hispanics or immigrants specifically), while another closed due to lack of funding. A Hispanic social service provider I talked to said that the loss of these centers made it difficult for Hispanics to find many of the services they need. She noted that she and others throughout the city easily become overwhelmed with requests for help from Hispanics, for legal services and other types of assistance:

The Latin American Center is completely gone. So, they don’t have a resource center. This is a population that really needs a go-to, because the Center was the go to place if you had any questions. A lot of people assume that because there are so many Latinos in this area that they all know what they’re doing, but they don’t, it’s by word of mouth, they help each other out. But then a lot of them come to me for help with legal services, all that kind of stuff, because they don’t know where to go.

One Hispanic health care worker also said that “Hispanics, we kind of rely on each other. ‘Oh, I know so and so, go to them, they can help you.”’ She often found herself overwhelmed with requests from other Hispanic residents for help:
I had Spanish-speaking people ask me at my church services about immunizations for their kids. And that happens at grocery stores, too. So I try, if I see someone that I know, I try to discretely go the other way (laughs)... It’s hard being Hispanic, because if they know you, you will get stopped and asked for favors.

In these cases, the loss of programs and centers serving Hispanic residents represents deinstitutionalization that affects formal organizations. In other cases, deinstitutionalization also took the form of failed informal efforts to maintain participation in local watch groups. I encountered two cases—both in more diverse neighborhoods—where efforts to form neighborhood watch groups were short-lived. Selena told me about a group in her neighborhood that was organized informally by one resident (whom she did not know as well as her other, next door neighbors).

**Selena:** We had one next door to the neighbor across the street. And she was the neighborhood watch person, but she moved out, and nobody picked it up. I didn’t even know there was a neighborhood watch thing going on—wait, no, I take that back. They had a meeting to get something going, I don’t know why, but I didn’t go. Then Edward told me the lady across the street was the official neighborhood watch person, and I thought, OK. But then she moved. And now we have the community police.

**JY:** Do you know who your neighborhood police are?

**Selena:** No...I have no idea. I don’t see them much in the neighborhood. They are either parked at their building or in the alley—which is good because that is where the drug stuff happens.

**JY:** With the neighborhood watch, do you wish that was still going on?

**Selena:** I have no feeling one way or the other, really.

Stephanie, a white woman who lives in a similarly diverse neighborhood on the East Side, described local efforts to start a watch group that were not met with much success.

**Stephanie:** What I found out about that was that she set a date for the meeting but she didn’t advertise it at all. No fliers went out. And then she was mad because no one showed up, but how was anyone supposed to know? She did no outreach. And as far as I know she didn’t do it again.

**JY:** And this isn’t someone you know very well?
Stephanie: No, I only met her a few times.

JY: Did she ever come to your residential meetings?

Stephanie: No, because she works during the day.

Civic engagement seemed especially difficult to maintain in Stephanie’s neighborhood. Trying to organize a resident council, deinstitutionalization played a role in her community as well, particularly with respect to the loss of public community space—one reason that she was working to organize residents:

They (a local government agency) are supposed to have programs here, but they don’t do it. They rented out the community space and make money off it. So, the biggest issue is getting housing to cooperate with residents. There’s probably grants that they are getting that are supposed to be focused on the residents, but aren’t. The council is the big thing in getting housing to do and provide what they are supposed to. So that’s our biggest issue and that’s why we need the council to get up and running.

The loss of a local community facilitator, whose position was eliminated due to budget constraints, also negatively impacted the neighborhood, according to Stephanie: “Since (he) has been gone, there’s nothing for the kids. There used to be a neighborhood school at the community center all summer with games and what not. I think that has caused a lot of people, well, they just aren’t happy. It seems that way.”

One West Side resident named Amani (who arrived in Manchester several years ago as a refugee, and identified as Middle Eastern) told me that she had a similar experience with the loss of community space that residents used for numerous events.

Amani: We used to have a community center, and that was a good thing. We would have all these activities. But now, after 2008, I think the economy and what happened affected everything, including even relationships in the community. People are very busy and concerned with their lives that they don’t have time to just socialize that much. Even, I feel like more and more people are very depressed and have anxiety.

JY: And with the community center, it closed?
Amani: It did. They didn’t have enough money to keep it open. And they laid off the workers, too. There were like 2 or 3 workers there, but no one anymore. They shut it down. It was a part of the community where I live.

JY: And it sounds like a lot of people used it, too.

Amani: Right. If you were celebrating something, you could just book the room. It was really good, like for birthdays or anything. But not anymore. It’s sad.

JY: And what do people do—is there someone else people go now since that closed? Or is it just sort of—

Amani: I mean I am sure they try to find a place, but it was a solution for many people. The room is there. If you want a meeting—say I have a meeting with my friends, I used to do that. I could go and book the room. I could say, “Let’s have breakfast today,” and everyone could bring their own dish if it’s like a family gathering, and we meet there. We eat and we chat, socialize. You can do that with family. I did it with family members. I did this with neighbors, with friends. Even workers, like, “let’s meet,” and I would book the room. But now it’s gone.

Along with these larger trends underlying the loss of local institutions (including fewer public funds for such institutions), changes in neighborhood population size also complicated matters for residents and civic organizers. With neighborhood population sizes being directly linked with school district boundaries, local changes in population have spurred redistricting efforts in the city. With fewer elementary schools (and even fewer middle schools and just one high school), redrawing these boundaries is a far simpler feat on the city’s less diverse West Side. On the East Side, though, officials at a redistricting meeting pointed out that determining which elementary schools would send students to which middle schools was more problematic. Many parents expressed outrage that they bought houses in one school district even though these lines might now change. As one stated, “You buy a house near the school you want your kids to go to and then they don’t get to go anyway.”

During the year I conducted observations in schools, administrators and PTG leaders directly experienced the fallout from concerns regarding redistricting, with noticeably fewer parents attending their end-of-year and transitioning-to-school events. When one PTG was
attempting to schedule an annual event for incoming parents and students, they found parents unable to commit to attending. The event was canceled the previous year, and was finally canceled this year as well, as a PTG leader informed me, due to confusion among parents that made the event difficult to coordinate, volunteers hard to find, and attendance hard to estimate. In another case, a parent night was pushed back by a month, also due to redistricting concerns among parents, who did not know which schools their children might be attending. These events were a critical source of replacing outgoing parents in PTGs, and made it especially difficult for these groups to recruit new members. As one volunteer told me with a sigh, “the school district is just so messed up.”

**Conclusion**

As in Stephanie’s and Amani’s neighborhoods, the loss of public community space (which limits residents to gather together and hold a variety of events) represents a form of deinstitutionalization that has occurred in numerous neighborhoods I observed, but predominantly those that were more racially/ethnically diverse and evinced higher levels of poverty (among other forms of socioeconomic disadvantage, such as fewer homeowners). Deinstitutionalization also affected some citywide organizations, including Latino centers (one that closed, and another that merged with a larger organization). The loss of such groups and public spaces made it difficult for residents to work together to solve local problems. They also presented problems for formal civic groups and institutions such as schools.

Such deinstitutionalization also contributed to the isolation of Hispanic residents. Residential instability, along with federal immigration policy, also adds to the isolation of Manchester’s largest minority group. Other changes linked to residential instability (including shifts in neighborhood populations) make it difficult for institutions like schools to encourage
parental involvement. In this way, like PTGs must adapt their practices differently compared to those even a few blocks away or across the Merrimack River dividing the city. Organizational practices themselves can result in numerous outcomes for participants and neighborhood residents. Practices like incorporating a formal organizational structure or using friendship and neighborhood networks to recruit participants can foster engagement, but also inadvertently exclude minority residents and those in poverty. These practices can thus stratify access to important public resources (such as police officers or public officials), both between neighborhoods and within them. I discuss the ramifications of these findings for sociology, social capital theory, and stakeholders of diversifying places like Manchester in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: RETHINKING DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

In this dissertation, I have illustrated the importance of reframing the diversity/social capital debate, focusing on urban social processes at the ground level, in order to demonstrate how social capital is formed, the forms these ties take, and what outcomes they result in, across more and less diverse neighborhoods. In doing so, I have shown the role that cultural frames play in the tie formation process. Whether or not residents of integrating neighborhoods form ties, particularly cross-racial ties, depends on the cultural frames they use to understand demographic change, diversity, and racial/ethnic inequality. To a certain extent, these ties are also contingent on the types of organizations in which they participate, and the structure of these organizations, as well as class-based neighborhood differences (like home ownership).

Implications for Social Capital Theory

Contributing to social capital theory more broadly, my ethnographic research also demonstrates that the outcomes of one’s social ties are partly contingent upon the cultural frames of those to whom an actor is connected. Residents with ties to those who adhere a social justice lens may be more likely to find themselves in social networks where helping behaviors are common, particularly across racial/ethnic lines. This lens also helps to facilitate neighborhood ties in general. Those who espoused a self-reliance frame reported fewer close ties to neighbors, even though they lived in more homogeneous communities (both in terms of racial/ethnicity and socioeconomic status). One question moving forward is whether these helping behaviors and exchange relationships found in networks where the social justice lens proliferates actually result
in improved outcomes in the long-term, such as higher quality of life (for individuals and their neighborhoods), upward socioeconomic mobility, or even improved mental and physical health.

The notion that some individuals are more welcoming than others or perceive diversity and immigration as detracting from quality of life (as per my discussion of cultural frames) is certainly not a novel one. Indeed, residents are often wary of various types of population change, even when newcomers are of similar racial/ethnic backgrounds or social classes. What I have shown, though, is how the cultural frames that inform residents’ understandings of demographic change shape their ties to these newcomers and their (often long-time) neighbors, as well as how these attitudes help to produce (or in some cases, constrains) certain outcomes of one’s social capital. One step for future research in this respect is to use quantitative data to test whether cultural frames (measured by attitudes toward diversity, immigration, and structural explanations for inequality) moderate the relationship between neighborhood diversity and social ties (as well as trust and civic participation). Indeed, a number of hypotheses emerge from this dissertation that could be tested quantitatively. In this way, qualitative and quantitative methods are complementary, with the former illuminating social processes that can then be tested via the latter using nationally representative, generalizable data.

**Directions for Future Research**

One testable hypothesis regards the role of cultural frames. Specifically, do cultural frames moderate the relationship between neighborhood diversity and factors like the following: close ties/friendships (and diversity among these ties), civic participation (including what types of associations in which residents participate), trust, and reciprocity (including, but not limited to, helping behaviors and exchange relationships between neighbors). Analyses should also consider whether the moderating role of these frames varies by race/ethnicity, SES, and
neighborhood characteristics (like the prevalence of homeownership). White flight to the suburbs (in Manchester and other places) remains an important, ongoing demographic trend (particularly in diversifying urban areas), yet culture’s role in neighborhood selection remains uncertain, though my findings suggest those espousing certain cultural frames are more attached to some neighborhoods than others.

This could be done with data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark survey, among the most widely used datasets researchers draw on when studying civic participation, trust, and social ties. This dataset includes numerous measures of attitudes toward immigration and diversity, which could be used to construct measures of the cultural frames I identified. Researchers should also consider the role of homeownership, as those who own homes have the wherewithal to create spaces in which ties can be formed and exchange relationships can emerge (as I illustrated in Chapter 4). It might be difficult to account for the sociological significance of place as a specific context, even in more complex analyses like mixed-effects models that include residuals reflecting the role of place. Mixed-effects modeling, which includes residuals for unmeasured place-based characteristics, could prove useful in this regard.

A second set of hypotheses pertains to the role of civic organizations. I have also shed light on the role that civic and nonprofit organizations play in neighborhood life, including the circumstances that help organizations facilitate ties between individuals of different backgrounds. My findings suggest that important demographic trends that play out at the local level can impede participation and efforts by civic organizations to enhance civic life and improve neighborhood outcomes. School redistricting, for instance (due to change in population size) made it difficult for parents to determine where their children would be going to school and, therefore, reduced their ability to commit to volunteering in local parent teacher groups and
school related events (some of which were canceled or rescheduled numerous times). Thus, local population shifts or even deinstitutionalization prevent these associations from building civic capacity.

Chief among the questions I raise here (that can be tested quantitatively) is whether social connectedness and civic participation are lower in more diverse, disadvantaged neighborhoods due to the closure of such organizations and public spaces (a pattern of deinstitutionalization apparent in Manchester). Research on civic organizations should consider not merely the number of organizations per neighborhood, but also those in other nearby places, as many residents’ day to day activities and civic participation are not relegated to the neighborhoods in which they live. The types of organizations (e.g., PTG, residential group, church, etc.) should also be examined. Which types of organizations, for example, are better predictors of cross-racial ties, lasting relationships, participation, and civic events? Importantly, while I did not undertake regular observations at local churches (instead focusing on PTGs and residential groups), the proliferation of churches has been shown to fragment trust and social ties (i.e., McRoberts 2003); whether their impact is exacerbated in diverse places should also be considered.

Another question raised my ethnographic findings is whether civic organizations reproduce neighborhood inequality. To date, most of the research on organizations tends to focus on what these groups do for residents of particular neighborhoods, such as how they shape the lives of the poor (Marwell 2007), fragment social ties (McRoberts 2003), or increase civic participation (Sampson 2011). Whether these groups stratify resources and quality of life between neighborhoods is a missing component of the literature on urban inequality. I found that some of these groups in Manchester—especially those in more affluent neighborhoods—are better at mobilizing resources and giving participants access to public goods (e.g., local political
leaders) than others. This is yet another hypothesis that can be tested quantitatively. For instance, are civic organizations stronger predictors of quality of life in middle-class (compared to more disadvantaged) neighborhoods? Does the emergence of such associations worsen inequality between neighborhoods, or is the proliferation of these organizations merely endogenous to local disadvantage? Network analyses of civic organizations could also prove useful in determining the extent to which some residents (especially minorities) are excluded (inadvertently or not) from this aspect of neighborhood life (and, subsequently, from the resources available to those in these networks).

Researchers might also test whether diversity among Hispanics (by origin) impedes collective action and tie formation among this group. Diversity among Hispanics will only become an increasingly important topic among researchers as this group becomes more stratified by ethnic origin (Tienda and Fuentes 2014). In addition, citizenship and legal documentation serve to stratify Manchester’s Hispanic residents in important ways (including how connected they are to important institutions like schools and local government). The privileges of citizenship and documentation shape a number of outcomes in important ways (including labor market outcomes)—but what role do they play in stratifying access to public goods like local political leaders, civic groups, and social service programs?

In this dissertation, individuals, organizations, and neighborhoods were the unit of analysis, all nested within a single diversifying city. In future research, sociologists and others interested in the effects of diversity and integration should consider comparing numerous cities, making the city the unit of analysis. Due to Manchester’s status as a small city, far smaller than many of the nation’s largest urban centers and MSAs, it is possible that social tie formation or even the distribution of civic organizations differ based on place size; social and physical
structures also differ between smaller and larger places. Cross-city comparisons could help highlight place differences while bringing smaller and medium sized cities more fully into the urban sociological literature (which, to date, predominantly focuses on large cities and MSAs).

**Ramifications for Policy, Organizations, and Community Stakeholders**

While some contend that the nation’s civic institutions have weakened over previous decades, findings here paint a more nuanced portrait of civic life. In Manchester, some civic organizations and local associations (such as the city’s Latino centers) closed while new organizations (like those serving specific refugee populations) were formed. Additionally, in some neighborhoods, residential groups and PTGs thrived, while in others they struggled to gain membership. Leaders of some groups reported to me that membership was steadily growing, others that it was in decline, and others that it ebbed and flowed throughout the year or every several years (akin to Small’s 2004 findings regarding civic participation in the Villa). What is more, as disadvantage has become increasingly concentrated and the wealth distribution more unequal, the role of civic organizations may be more salient than ever, helping local residents gain access to important resources that might not exist otherwise. Residents I talked to reported being connected to important resources and forming exchange relationships with others via their participation in voluntary associations like PTGs, residential groups, churches, and other organizations. Residential groups in particular connect residents to political leaders and public resources (though some are better connected than others).

Organizations like PTGs or residential groups might find ways to work collectively, such as linking leaders and volunteers together in ways that allow them to coordinate efforts and mobilize resources in tandem. Local civic organizers, residents, school administrators, government officials, and political leaders alike should consider ways to work with a variety of
organizations to better connect underrepresented groups and minority residents to the same organizations in which many white residents are already participating. In this regard, reaching out to minority churches and similar organizations might prove useful. These steps should not be approached from the top-down, however, but be done in partnership with local residents and various civic organizations. Manchester’s Community Schools Project, which seeks to expand the role of neighborhood schools, such that they house a variety of social service programs and civic organizations, is one step toward this end. Being in the early stages, it is too soon to what extent the project will lessen inequality between neighborhoods, but it nevertheless is illustrative of the types of efforts that have the potential to improve neighborhood outcomes and quality of life for all residents.

In some ways, the neighborhood-based inequality I observed in Manchester is part of a larger trend of stratification occurring across the nation. For example, with less funding for public schools since the Great Recession (Leachman and Mai 2014) and an increasing reliance on property taxes to fund these institutions (Baker and Corcoran 2012), local residents turn inward to resources within their neighborhoods to improve outcomes for their children. Raising funds via silent auctions and other efforts certainly can be a boon to local schools, though these endeavors also reproduce inequality between schools. While some schools I observed were holding events such as raffles and auctions, others in Manchester were struggling to keep their classrooms up to code or cope with issues like population transiency. In this way, federal and state policies regarding school funding trickle down to the local level, perpetuating inequality between students and increasing the opportunity gap.

Federal policy in the form of immigration enforcement also dampens local institutional efforts (most prominently schools, as I found in my research) to engage residents in civic life and
help them build lasting ties with teachers, administrators, other local leaders, and other residents. The local consequences of federal policy must therefore become a larger part of the immigration debate as efforts to reform existing laws and practices take shape. Encouraging residents to form lasting ties with one another is an uneven process. Recognizing how social ties and participation in civic life have the potential to reproduce or narrow existing inequalities is the first step in ensuring that diversifying places—and all residents—have the opportunity to prosper.
References


LaMontagne Hall, Beth. 2011b. “Manchester police seek to build trust and bridge cultures.” *Manchester Union Leader* <http://www.unionleader.com/article/20110903/NEWS15/709039999>


Appendix

University of New Hampshire
Research Integrity Services, Service Building
61 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-2086
Fax: 603-862-3564

09-May-2012

Young, Justin Robert
Sociology, Horton Hall
1 High Ridge Drive, Apt. #1
Dover, NH 03820

IRB #: 5471
Study: Racial-Ethnic Diversification and Social Capital: A Mixed-Methods Community Case Study
Approval Date: 08-May-2012

The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval is granted to conduct your study as described in your protocol.

Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in the attached document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects. (This document is also available at http://unh.edu/research/irb-application-resources.) Please read this document carefully before commencing your work involving human subjects.

Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed Exempt Study Final Report form and return it to this office along with a report of your findings.

If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact me at 603-862-2003 or julie.simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # above in all correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your research.

For the IRB,

Julie F. Simpson
Director

cc: File
    Dillon, Michele
University of New Hampshire
Research Integrity Services, Service Building
51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585
Fax: 603-862-3564

01-Oct-2012

Young, Justin Robert
Sociology, Horton Hall
1 High Ridge Drive, Apt. #1
Duxbury, NH 03820

IRB #: 5471
Study: Social Capital in a Neighborhood Context: A Comparative Community Case Study
Study Approval Date: 08-May-2012
Modification Approval Date: 10-Oct-2012
Modification: Change in Title

The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has reviewed and approved your modification to this study, as indicated above. Further changes in your study must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to implementation.

Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in the document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects. This document is available at http://unh.edu/research/irb-application-resources or from me.

If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact me at 603-862-2013 or Julie.simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # above in all correspondence related to this study.

For the IRB,

[Signature]
Julie F. Simpson
Director

cc: File
Dillon, Michele
05-Feb-2013

Young, Justin Robert
Sociology, Horton Hall
1 High Ridge Drive, Apt. #1
Dover, NH 03820

IRB #: 5171
Study: Social Capital in a Neighborhood Context: A Comparative Community Case Study
Approval Expiration Date: 01-Feb-2014
Modification Approval Date: 05-Feb-2013
Modification: Addition of focus groups

The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has reviewed and approved your modification to this study, as indicated above. Further changes in your study must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to implementation.

Approval for this protocol expires on the date indicated above. At the end of the approval period you will be asked to submit a report with regard to the involvement of human subjects in this study. If your study is still active, you may request an extension of IRB approval.

Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in the document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects. This document is available at [http://www.unh.edu/research/irb/applications/resources](http://www.unh.edu/research/irb/applications/resources). For further information or if you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact me at 603-862-3053 or julie.f.simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # above in all correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your research.

For the IRB,

[Signature]
Julie F. Simpson
Director

cc: Tice
    Dilbon, Michele
University of New Hampshire
Research Integrity Services, Service Building
51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585
Fax: 603-862-3564

18-Nov-2013

Young, Justin Habert
Sociology, Burton Hall
1 High Ridge Drive, Apt. #1
Dover, NH 03820

IRB #: 5471
Study: Social Capital in a Neighborhood Context: A Comparative Community Case Study
Approval Expiration Date: 01-Feb-2014
Modification Approval Date: 12-Nov-2013
Modification: Addition of survey

The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has reviewed and approved your modification to this study, as indicated above. Further changes in your study must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to implementation.

Approval for this protocol expires on the date indicated above. At the end of the approval period you will be asked to submit a report with regard to the involvement of human subjects in this study. If your study is still active, you may request an extension of IRB approval.

Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in the document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects. This document is available at http://unh.edu/research/irb-application-resources or from me.

If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact me at 603-862-2003 or Julie.Simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # above in all correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your research.

For the IRB,

Julie F. Simpson
Director

cc: File
Dillon, Michele
University of New Hampshire
Research Integrity Services, Service Building
51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585
Fax: 603-862-3564

19-Nov-2014

Young, Justin Robert
Sociology, McConnell Hall
1 High Ridge Drive, Act. #1
Dover, NH 03820

IRB #: 5471
Study: Social Capital In a Neighborhood Context: A Comparative Community Case Study
Approval Expiration Date: 01-Feb-2015
Modification Approval Date: 19-Nov-2014
Modification: Addition of data from: #5941

The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has
reviewed and approved your modification to this study, as indicated above. Further changes in
your study must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to implementation.

Approval for this protocol expires on the date indicated above. At the end of the approval
period you will be asked to submit a report with regard to the involvement of human subjects in
this study. If your study is still active, you may request an extension of IRB approval.

Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in the
document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects. This
document is available at http://unh.edu/research/irb-application-resources or from me.

If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact me
at 603-862-2003 or Julie.Simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB # above in all correspondence
related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your research.

For the IRB,
Julie F. Simpson
Director

cc: File
    Dillon, Michele
    Grimm, Curt
Dear interviewee:

I am conducting a research project to add to our understanding of community life and civic participation in Manchester, New Hampshire. I am seeking to uncover more about social ties and community life, specifically the extent to which residents of your community trust one another, work together to solve local issues, and reasons why residents do or not do participate in their communities. I am writing to invite you to participate in this project. I plan to work with approximately 50 to 75 individuals in this study.

If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview that will last about one hour. In this interview, I will ask you about your perceptions of your community, the organizations and community activities you take part in, and how you feel about life in your neighborhood. I will, with your consent, audio-record our interview to ensure accuracy in transcribing, after which the recording will be destroyed. You will not receive any compensation to participate in this project.

I am also asking that you complete a short questionnaire at the start of our interview. This questionnaire does not contain any identifying information such as name or address, but a series of demographic questions that I want to ensure I report accurately. Your answers to some of these questions will also help facilitate our interview. Just like your participation in this interview, completion of this questionnaire is voluntary, and you may skip any question you do not wish to answer.

Participation is strictly voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. If you agree to participate and then change your mind, you may withdraw at any time during the study without penalty. Although you are not to receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, I hope that your participation will be helpful by giving you an opportunity to review your role in the community. You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this interview.

Risk is minimal, and stems mainly from a potential breach of confidentiality. I will provide you a pseudonym by which you will be identified throughout the interview, in my field notes, and in later publications. I will also assign a pseudonym to your neighborhood. As a respondent, you also might feel some embarrassment or discomfort during the course of our interview, should you share an experience you might have wished to remain private. This is unlikely, however, given that our discussions pertain to your involvement in public, community activities and your experiences within this community.

I also will not identify the specific neighborhood in which you live or the organization(s) you belong to, though I will specify Manchester as the area under analysis. Also, only I will have
access to your name and contact info. These steps will help further ensure your confidentiality and help to minimize potential risks.

I seek to maintain the confidentiality of all data and records associated with your participation in this research. You should understand, however, there are rare instances when I am required to share personally identifiable information (e.g., according to policy, contract, and regulation). For example, in response to a complaint about the research, officials at the University of New Hampshire, designees of the sponsor(s), and/or regulatory and oversight government agencies may access research data. You also should understand that I am required by law to report certain information to government and/or law enforcement officials (such as child abuse or threats of violence).

I will store your interview answers (transcribed from audio tapes and notes) under lock and key at my place of residence, as well as on a password-protected computer. The audiotape of each interview will be destroyed as soon as the interview is transcribed and checked for accuracy.

The work will be conducted by me—a PhD student in the sociology department at UNH—and supervised by my dissertation committee, chaired by Michele Dillon (Sociology Department Chair), who will also be allowed access to these interview transcripts. Only I, however, have access to audio recordings, your real name and contact information. Also, I will be the only person who has access to the completed surveys, which will be stored separately from transcripts and consent forms.

If you have any questions about this research project or would like more information before, during, or after the study, you may contact me via email at jrobertyoung@gmail.com. My dissertation chair, Michele Dillon, can also be reached at Michele.Dillon@unh.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Julie Simpson in the UNH Research Integrity Services at 603-862-2003 or Julie.Simpson@unh.edu to discuss them.

I have enclosed two copies of this letter. Please sign one indicating your choice and return in the enclosed envelope. The other copy is for your records. Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully,

Justin R. Young
Graduate Student, Sociology (UNH)

Please check one of the following and sign/date below:

☐ Yes, I, ___________________________________________ consent/agree to participate in this research project.

__________________________________________
(print name)

☐ No, I, ___________________________________________ do not consent/agree to participate in this research.

__________________________________________
(print name)

__________________________________________  ________________
Signature                        Date

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Demographic Survey for In-Depth Interviewees (IRB #5471)

Dear Interviewee,

In order to better facilitate this interview and ensure accuracy in reporting findings for this dissertation research, I, Justin Young, a doctoral student in sociology at the University of New Hampshire, ask that you complete the following survey at the start of our interview. You may skip any questions with which you are uncomfortable answering and can ask me any questions you would like about this survey or our interview. At your request, I can provide you a blank copy of this survey for your records. Thank you for your assistance.

Respectfully,

Justin R. Young

Interviewee Survey

Race/Ethnicity (Check all that apply):

- [ ] Asian
- [ ] Hispanic origin (any race)
- [ ] Black/African Descent
- [ ] White
- [ ] Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
- [ ] Other (please specify below):
  ________________________________

- [ ] American Indian/Alaska Native

Age:

- [ ] 18-29
- [ ] 30-39
- [ ] 40-49
- [ ] 50-59
- [ ] 60-69
- [ ] 70+

Gender: _______________________

For how long have you lived…

...in Manchester? ______ years ______ months
...in your current neighborhood? ______ years ______ months

In the past year, have you participated in any civic, neighborhood, or other local organization/s? (Check all that apply).

- [ ] Civic/Volunteer Group
- [ ] Church/Church Group
- [ ] Parent Teacher Group
- [ ] Neighborhood Watch Group
- [ ] Other (please describe): ________________________________

For Researcher Purposes Only

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180
Community Leaders (non-government): Guiding Questions (IRB #5471)

- For how long has your organization existed?
- What kinds of activities does your organization undertake?
- How many members does your organization have?
- What is the biggest problem facing your organization?
- What is the biggest problem facing the community in which your organization works?
- Do you have trouble gaining/retaining members? What difficulties does your organization experience when reaching out to the community?
- In your experience, what is the greatest roadblock to getting and/or keeping people involved in your organization? What steps has your organization take to increase participation?
- Are you a member of other organizations?
- With what organizations does yours work to achieve its goals?
Residents and Organization Members: Guiding Questions (IRB #5471)

- How long have you lived in your current neighborhood? If you recently moved there from another, why did you?
  
  o Do you see yourself staying in this community for a long time, and why or why not?

- Are you a member of any local organizations?
  
  o How long have you been a member?
  
  o What got you involved?
  
  o What does your organization(s) do?
  
  o Are they successful in retaining their members?

- Are there any local organizations/events in which you no longer participate? If there are, why did you stop attending?

- Do you think there needs to be more local participation?

- Are you aware of any efforts that have tried, but failed, to get residents involved?

- Do you think residents of your community trust one another?

- Do members of your community have trouble working together? If so, why do you think this is the case?

- What is the biggest problem facing your community? What do you think needs to happen to address it?
Dear participant,

To help guide our conversation and be sure that we know more information about you, please complete this short survey. You may skip any questions that you do not want to answer and can ask us any questions about this survey or our focus group. Thank you for your assistance and participation.

**Race/Ethnicity (You can check more than one):**

- [ ] Asian
- [ ] Black/African Descent
- [ ] Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
- [ ] American Indian/Alaska Native
- [ ] Hispanic origin (any race)
- [ ] White
- [ ] Other (please specify below):

**What language do you and those living with you primarily speak at home? (Print below):**

_________________________________________________

**Age:**

- [ ] 18-29
- [ ] 30-39
- [ ] 40-49
- [ ] 50-59
- [ ] 60-69
- [ ] 70+

**Gender:**

- [ ] Male
- [ ] Female

**How long have you lived...**

- [ ] in Manchester? ______ years ______ months
- [ ] in your current neighborhood? ______ years ______ months

**How many children (under 18) live in your household? ____________**

**How many adults over 65 live in your household? ____________**

For Researcher Purposes Only

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Focus Group Guiding Questions (IRB #5481)

MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS PROJECT: ROADMAPS TO HEALTH

- We wanted to begin by talking about services and programs you currently utilize in Manchester and your neighborhood. Are there any services that you use on a regular basis?
- How did you go about finding the services/providers you currently use?
- When you are in need of a particular service but are unsure of where to get it, is there anyone in particular—such as a friend or a representative from another agency or group—that you reach out to for help finding services?
  - If there was a particular person who worked at a school whose job it was to help connect you to services, do you think you would go to them for help?
- What kinds of services and programs do you think your neighborhood needs but is currently lacking?
- Have any of you experienced any barriers or problems when accessing particular services? What are your experiences?
- The Manchester Health Department is thinking of starting a program related to (insert field, depending on areas of interest/barriers identified by the group) in your neighborhood—what do you think about this idea? What would be most useful to you?
  - These will include questions about GED programs, employment services, and resident leadership training.
- Would you attend a resource fair where you could learn about different types of services available? What types of resources would be most useful for you to gain access to?
- For parent group/s: School staff often state that students and their parents sometimes struggle transitioning from elementary school to middle school. Have any of you experienced issues like this? If so, what did you do?
Focus Group Participant Consent Form (IRB #5481)

MANCHESTER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS PROJECT: ROADMAPS TO HEALTH

Dear participant,

As part of the Manchester Community Schools Project, the Carsey Institute at the University of New Hampshire needs input from residents like you. We want to know about services you and residents of your neighborhood need. If you agree to participate in this study, you will participate in a focus group that will last around one hour. Information from these focus groups will be used to help improve access to services in your neighborhood. It may also be used for other research on Manchester neighborhoods.

Your participation will provide valuable information on Manchester and its residents. Hopefully, this will help to improve services in your neighborhood. The Manchester Health Department will provide you a $20 gift card for participating. You can refuse to participate at any time. You do not have to answer any question that makes you uncomfortable.

We will audio-record our discussion and then destroy this recording after we transcribe it. We will keep the copies on password-protected computers. Hard copies will be kept under lock and key. Only employees of the Manchester Health Department and Carsey Institute employees involved in the project will have access to copies.

To protect your identity, we will not record your name in any notes or reports. If you ever feel uncomfortable, you can stop participating. You do not have to answer any question that makes you don’t want to. We ask that you do not tell anyone the names of participants or what was said during this talk. This will help to protect everyone’s confidentiality. Before the discussion starts, we will ask everyone whether they still wish to participate. We also ask that you answer some questions on a short survey we will distribute. Please do not put your name or any contact information on the survey.

It is unlikely that we will need to share copies of transcripts and surveys. However, there are some things we may need to report. For example, the law says that we have to report child abuse or threats of violence to government or law enforcement. However, these topics will probably not come up in our discussion.

This focus group is being led by Justin Young. He is a research assistant at the Carsey Institute. The second leader is a member of the Manchester Community Schools Project team. If you have any questions, you may ask us them at any time. You can also contact Curt Grimm at the Carsey Institute (Curt.Grimm@unh.edu) and/or Jaime Hoebeke at the Manchester Health Department (jhoebeke@manchesternh.gov).

If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Julie Simpson in the UNH Research Integrity Services at 603–862-2003 or Julie.Simpson@unh.edu to discuss them. We will ask everyone whether they wish to participate before we begin audio-recording. You can keep this form for your records if you wish. Thank you.

If you have any questions about this focus group or the survey, you may ask us at any time.
Dear translator:

Thank you for offering your services in regards to this research. As part of the Manchester Community Schools Project (MCSP), the purpose of this focus group is to help uncover more about service needs and barriers to wellbeing in three school catchment areas, as well as residents’ perceptions of services, programming needs, and everyday experiences in their neighborhoods.

As a translator for this group, you should know that we are asking participants, as well as yourself, not to disclose the names of participants or what in particular was said by participants. This will help protect the identities of those who participated in the group. By acting as the translator for this focus group, we ask that you agree to help maintain this confidentiality, as indicated by your signature below.

____________________________________  __________________________
Signature                                      Date

If you have any questions about this research project or would like more information before, during, or after the study, you may contact one of the following individuals:

- Justin R. Young (research assistant at the Carsey Institute): jrobertyoung@gmail.com
- Curt Grimm (Deputy Director of the Carsey Institute): Curt.Grimm@unh.edu
- Jaime Hoebke (Public Health Specialist at the Manchester Health Department): jhoebke@manchesternh.gov

If you have questions about the rights of those participating in this research, you may contact Julie Simpson in the UNH Research Integrity Services at 603-862-2003 or Julie.Simpson@unh.edu to discuss them. Thank you again for your assistance in this research.
Community Members Needed!
FOCUS GROUP
“Services in your Community”

$20 Gift Card to Market Basket for Participants

The Manchester Health Department & The Carsey Institute are holding a focus group to discover what services and programs are available in your community. If you are over the age of 55 we would like to invite you share your opinion in a small group setting.

When: ________________
Where: ________________
Time: __________

To sign up, please contact ____________ at (XXX) XXX-XXXX xxxx or ________________