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Ethnicity and nationality: Towards a class-based theoretical framework (Volumes I and II)

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Ethnicity and nationality: Towards a class-based theoretical framework. (Volumes I and II)

Doane, Ashley Wood, Jr., Ph.D.
University of New Hampshire, 1989

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ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY:
TOWARDS A CLASS-BASED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

VOLUME I
(CHAPTEARS I-V)

BY

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B.A., New England College, 1977
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DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Sociology

December, 1989
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Date
Dedicated to the memory of my father, Ashley W. Doane, Sr., who always encouraged me to ask questions, seek answers, and strive towards the completion of this undertaking.
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When an endeavor represents years of labor and the culmination of an educational career, there are many whose contributions need to be acknowledged. I would like to thank the legion of persons—family, friends, fellow travelers, teachers, students, and colleagues—who served as "teachers" at some point in my life. Several persons in particular contributed to my development as a sociologist and deserve special thanks: my parents, who encouraged my intellectual explorations from the very beginning; Dick Ingersoll, who first kindled a flame of interest in sociology; Ken Smith, who showed me how to be a sociologist during a memorable internship on the Maine coast; Madeleine Giguere, who took the time to aid a fledgling researcher; my graduate colleagues—Steve Cosgrove, Sue Kingsland, and Dan Santoro—whose comradeship encouraged me to persevere; the members of my dissertation committee, whose comments improved the quality of this work; Professor Walter Buckley, whose stratification seminar helped focus my sociological interests; Professor Richard England, who inspired me to explore Marxian political economy; and Professor Bud B. Khleif, my advisor and mentor, without whose efforts this moment would not have been possible. On a personal level, I would like to thank my family and friends, whose presence has made my life immeasurably richer. Finally, to Hannibal,
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## VOLUME I

**DEDICATION** ................................................................. iv

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** ....................................................... v

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** ...................................................... vii

**ABSTRACT** ................................................................. x

### CHAPTER PAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale ........................................................................... 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview ............................................................................ 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization ....................................................................... 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Notes ...................................................................... 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY AND CLASS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES .................. 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity ............................................................................ 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality ......................................................................... 49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class .................................................................................. 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary .................................................................... 64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Notes ...................................................................... 67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY AND CLASS: EXISTING THEORIES ............... 71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Theories of Ethnicity and Nationality ....................... 73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Ethnicity and Nationality: Recent Trends ....................... 83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary .................................................................... 104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Notes ...................................................................... 108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. THEORETICAL MODEL ................................... 112
   Underlying Assumptions: Social Groups and Society .......... 113
   Eth-Class: A Tool for Understanding Group Action ............ 117
   Structural Context: Capitalist Development ................... 123
   Working Hypotheses ....................................... 136
   Chapter Summary ......................................... 151
   Chapter Notes ............................................ 155

V. ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE CORE:
   THE UNITED STATES ........................................ 160
   The Colonial Era: 1609-1800 ................................ 164
   Expansion and Industrialization:
      1800-1890 .............................................. 177
   Core Status and Monopoly Capitalism:
      1890-1945 .............................................. 206
   The Modern Era: 1945-Present ................................ 231
   Eth-Class Struggles and the State ............................. 261
   Chapter Summary ......................................... 266
   Chapter Notes ............................................ 279

VOLUME II

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... 294

CHAPTER PAGE

VI. ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE PERIPHERY:
   SOUTH AFRICA ............................................ 295

   Dutch Conquest and Settlement:
      1652-1800 ............................................. 298
This work is an attempt to develop a theoretical model useful for explaining the historical evolution of ethnic and national identities. Central to this framework are the following assertions: (1) that ethnic and national identities are dynamic affiliations which undergo change through intergroup resource competition; (2) that given their material base, a complete theory of ethnicity and nationality must consider these ties in relation to class; (3) that the evolution of group identities can ultimately only be understood in the context of global capitalist development; and (4) that the uneven nature of capitalist development (i.e., the core-periphery division) can be employed to explain intersocietal variations in the evolution of ethnic and national identities. Drawing upon these assumptions, we propose a global, historical and material approach to the study of intergroup relations and ethnic change.

In the analysis of intergroup relations in historically specific circumstances, our model employs the notion of eth-class (defined as social location in terms of both ethnicity and class) in order to explore the material interests which
underlie group action. We maintain that eth-class captures both the interrelationship between ethnicity and class and the reality that ethnic groups contain internal class divisions. Thus, ethnic and national mobilization are analyzed as "alliances" of eth-class fractions; assimilation and ethnic merger reflect strategic decisions to alter group identity.

In addition to a conceptual discussion of ethnicity and nationality and a critical review of both classical and contemporary theories of ethnic change, this work contains two case studies in which our model is employed to explain the evolution of ethnic identities after 1800 in both the United States and South Africa. We find that the global, historical, and material approach presented in our framework facilitates analysis of the development of intergroup relations and group identities in these two societies.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work is to develop a theoretical model, that is, an inventory of the elements necessary for understanding (Mills 1962, p. 36), useful for explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities in the context of capitalist development in the post-1800 world-economy.¹ We will attempt to provide a framework in which to answer the question: What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear? To use the argot of the social sciences, we are employing ethnicity and nationality as dependent variables, seeking to explain variations in their form and nature across time and space. Such an approach stands in contrast to the main current of ethnic studies, which is to take ethnicity and nationality as givens (i.e., as independent variables) and instead focus upon their ability to explain other phenomena. As we will make clear below, we believe that a fuller understanding of ethnicity and nationality as social processes is necessary if we are to realize their full potential in explaining human behavior.

At the same time, however, we must emphasize both the exploratory and the theoretical nature of this work. Our objective is not to propose a "grand theory" of ethnicity and nationality--a task which we believe is beyond the
current level of development of the field—but instead to construct a framework containing those processes which in our opinion most strongly shape the evolution of ethnic and national identities. Thus, this endeavor should be viewed as an attempt to specify parameters and establish a program for future study. The theoretical orientation of this undertaking will be manifest in our concentration upon broad, general trends in ethnic relations rather than the explanation of specific phenomena. Although case studies of two specific societies are provided, their inclusion is more for the purpose of exploring and illustrating our theoretical framework than to stand as substantial analytical efforts in their own right.

Rationale

Our rationale for this undertaking has both theoretical and substantive roots. We believe that ethnicity and nationality are fundamental concepts in the attempt to understand and to explain human social behavior. They provide an important context for individual and group identity and action. How we define situations and act on the world around us is shaped by our ethnic and national affiliations. On a broader scale, ethnicity and nationality are a major source of local and global conflict. One need only peruse the daily newspaper for examples of struggle and violence rooted in ethnic and national cleavages. Of equal significance is the role of ethnicity and nationality in serving as
a basis or socially constructed pretext for the unequal
distribution of scarce or valued resources—i.e., for deter-
mining social stratification—thus affecting both indi-
vidual and group life chances and group interaction and
conflict. Few societies exist without at least some degree
of ethnically-based inequality, while the unequal distribu-
tion of wealth among nations is a major global issue (for-
merly First vs. Third World, now popularly phrased as the
"North-South" conflict). Clearly, issues involving the
forms and evolution of ethnicity and nationality may hold
the key to understanding a diverse range of social issues.

On a substantive level, this work has its genesis in an
earlier study (Doane unpublished) exploring issues of ethnic
identity and stratification in the case of the Franco-
Americans of New Hampshire. During the course of this
research, we became convinced of the necessity of a histor-
ical and structural approach to the study of ethnicity. At
that time, it seemed fruitless—and it still does—to
attempt to explain the current status of Franco-Americans
without reference to the past, which in turn was only under-
standable through the consideration of such factors as the
industrialization of New England and the need for cheap
labor in the textile industry; American immigration and the
ebb and flow of nativism and Americanization; and the oppor-
tunities for mobility produced by the expanding American
economy. In the context of these issues, it was possible to
begin to explain both the assimilation and the persistence of Franco-American ethnicity.

At the same time, however, we became interested in the issue of variations in identity within an ethnic group. For some Franco-Americans "le fait français" remains a vital aspect of existence, while for others ethnic identification has been reduced to a descent category in the course of assimilation into the White American "mega-group." In addition, we also became aware of historical and anecdotal evidence of class divisions within the group (e.g., a traditional working class, a petty bourgeois elite which provided both group leadership and a liaison with the larger society, and a professional and academic intelligentsia which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s), each with different implications for the persistence or disappearance of Franco-American ethnicity, which led us to question the interrelationship between ethnicity and class. A final puzzle was presented by the assertion of French-Canadian/Quebecois identity in Canada, a development which stood in sharp contrast to the experiences of Franco-Americans in the United States. This led us to question why an identity which flourished in one milieu disappeared or experienced a major transformation in another. Each of these considerations is subsumed in the central question of this work: What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear?
As we began to search for answers to this question, we became increasingly dissatisfied with the corpus of existing works on ethnicity and nationality. Traditionally, social science has tended to treat ethnicity and nationality as undesirable preindustrial relics destined to fade away under the relentless homogenizing pressures of modernization. As a result, the primary contribution of the social sciences has been a plethora of excellent descriptive studies of the role and nature of ethnic identity for individual groups, with a much more limited literature on what we view as the essential issue of intergroup relations and the evolution of ethnic and national identities. Moreover, the bulk of such work suffers from tendencies towards ahistorical, so-called "empirical" research; that is, the use of data torn from their social contexts. In our opinion, studies of this nature do more to obfuscate than to clarify the nature of ethnicity and nationality.

A particularly harmful development in our view has been the tendency to generalize from case studies of individual groups to develop "universal" understandings of ethnicity and nationality. Given the prevalence of sociological "ethnocentrism"—the tendency of social scientists to explain general social phenomena on the basis of their understanding of their own society—and the intellectual hegemony of Western social science, the study of ethnicity and nationality has disproportionately reflected the experience
of Europe and the United States (cf. Amin's 1980, p. 4, discussion of "West-centered reductionism"). This is manifest in such practices as the emphasis on assimilation, the view of ethnicity as minority culture, and the use of race as a master concept. When non-western ethnicity as been taken into account, it has generally been via an "anthropological" emphasis on the "tribal" identities of preindustrial cultures. From our vantage point, a global theory of ethnicity requires a comparative approach derived from concrete group experiences in a diverse array of settings.

The development of our approach to the study of ethnicity and nationality has been shaped by two major influences. First and foremost has been general Marxian political economy. Marx's observation (1970, pp. 20-21) that as humans interact to produce their subsistence, they enter into social relations which in turn condition more general social and political processes underscores the primacy of class (i.e., material) interests in analyzing social behavior. This does not mean—as is often mistakenly assumed by those working both inside and outside the Marxian framework—that all actions are reducible to class (a position often referred to as "vulgar Marxism"). The relationship between the material and the ideal is a dialectical one: ideas such as ethnicity and nationality may assume an independent existence and may in turn affect relations of production—or, in Weberian terms, non-economic elements may have economic
consequences. Thus, ideas emerge from human productive activities, which means that class (i.e., relations of production) must be taken into account as a key variable. Following this approach, our search for a theoretical framework for ethnic and national relations will emphasize the material basis of ethnicity and nationality, assuming that the ultimate utility of group affiliations lies in the realm of intergroup resource (i.e., productive and distributive) competition. Such an approach will necessarily focus upon the structural (as opposed to cultural, psychological, or even socio-biological) roots of ethnic and national identities (cf. Yancey, Erikson and Juliani 1976, p. 392). In essence, our quest is for what Bonacich (1980, p. 12) has termed a "class" theory of ethnicity and nationality; that is, an explanation of the impact of class and the interplay of class and ethnic interests on the emergence, persistence, and evolution of group (i.e., ethnicity/nationality and class) affiliations.

A second influence has been the super-macro or world-system perspective and its emphasis upon the world-system as a unit of analysis in the study of social behavior. Wallerstein's (1972, p. 222) insistence that national cases (and the study of ethnicity therein) cannot be understood apart from the world-system convinced us of the necessity of a global approach to the study of ethnicity and nationality. One cannot study the current ethnic conflict in South
Africa, for example, without taking into consideration the effects of European conquest and colonialism, the influence of foreign investment, and the evolution of the capitalist world-economy during the post-1945 age of decolonization and the *Pax Americana*. From a global or world-system perspective, Wallerstein's (1974a, 1974b) conceptualization of a core-periphery division of labor suggests that experiences of ethnicity and nationality may differ between the First World and the Third World; however, it simultaneously reminds us that these experiences are inexorably bound together—and therefore can only be understood in terms of each other. This encourages us to view the evolution of ethnicity and nationality in industrial and developing societies not as separate phenomena, but as different yet related outcomes of the process of global capitalist development.

**Overview**

As we stated at the outset, the objective of this work is to develop a theoretical framework with which we can begin to explain the evolution of ethnic and national identities. Yet the process of theory-building is complex indeed. Before we can present our model, we must first set conceptual parameters and evaluate the contributions of previous efforts. In this overview, our purpose is to introduce the reader to the core of our theoretical argument in the hope that such exposure will enhance appreciation of
the necessary intermediate steps. This synopsis will necessarily be truncated, as elaboration will be forthcoming in the following chapters.

In approaching the study of ethnicity and nationality, we maintain that these phenomena are not unique, but serve as one type of group affiliation, one means through which humans mobilize to produce and to compete for the means of material existence. As a basis for group formation, ethnicity and nationality belong to the order of communal affiliations; that is, they are rooted in real or presumed common origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint destiny (cf. Weber 1946, pp. 171-79; 1968, pp. 385-98; Schermerhorn 1970, p. 12). At the same time, these communal affiliations take on social significance in the context of intergroup material relations—relations which emerge from the specific conditions of economic and political life. This suggests that ethnic and national identities and the structure of intergroup relations emerge and change as a consequence of the exigencies of material existence. Accordingly, if we are to unlock the secret of how ethnic and national identities evolve, then we must develop some conception of how the social organization of human productive activities shapes the process of communal group formation.

One central argument of this work is that as group phenomena, ethnicity and nationality can ultimately only be
understood in the context of the process of global capitalist development—the evolution of the capitalist world-economy. This is not to attribute mystical explanatory powers to capitalism, but to recognize that the dominant means through which humans produce their subsistence will have a significant effect upon other dimensions of social existence (cf. Marx 1970, pp. 20-21). We contend that the expansion of capitalism into a global system transformed the nature of group affiliations through such processes as colonization, labor migration, proletarianization of independent producers, and the emergence of the modern state. Thus, the process of capitalist development constitutes the most general basis for explaining ethnicity and nationality, the current context in which communal affiliations are expressed. Our choice of the post-1800 world-economy as the focus for analysis permits us to concentrate upon an era in which capitalist production relations were unquestionably dominant in much of the world, while maintaining sufficient historical scope to enable us to analyze the evolution of group identities.

Although we maintain that global capitalist development constitutes the overarching context for the study of ethnicity and nationality, further exploration should take place at lower levels of analysis—in particular, the nation-state. Social behavior occurs across a range of interrelated levels, from world-system to dyad; our task is to
move between levels and to specify interrelationships. At the societal level, we believe that one dynamic of capitalism—*uneven development*—has had a particularly profound influence upon the evolution of ethnicity and nationality. The core-periphery relationship (cf. Wallerstein 1974a, 1974b) describes two vastly different yet intertwined trajectories of national social and economic development; that is, the economically and politically dominant core vs. the underdeveloped and dependent periphery. In our view, this core-periphery division can be linked to different evolutionary paths for ethnicity and nationality (e.g., "symbolic" ethnicity in the core vs. stronger ethnic ties and ethno-nationalism in the periphery). Accordingly, one major thrust of this work will be to generate hypotheses about the nature of ethnicity in the core and in the periphery. As we move to even lower levels of analysis, we recognize that these processes may also be observed *within* a nation-state, as uneven development—e.g., the domination of peripheral areas within a country by a more developed metropolis—which may again give rise to different forms of ethnicity (e.g., Wales, Quebec). In this work, however, the bulk of our analysis will be concentrated at the level of the nation-state.

The third component of our theoretical framework is an emphasis upon the *eth-class* as a basic unit for the analysis of group action. The term eth-class (borrowed—but with
a different usage— from Gordon 1964) captures the notion of social location in terms of what we believe are the two most important social dimensions: ethnicity/nationality and class.\textsuperscript{5} From our perspective, this concept incorporates two significant (and interrelated) social facts: (1) that ethnic groups themselves internally contain class divisions; and (2) that social classes may be segmented on the basis of "communal" affiliations such as ethnicity and nationality.\textsuperscript{6}

When groups mobilize for action, mobilization will occur along ethnic/national lines (e.g., Black working class and Black middle class) or class lines (e.g., Black, Hispanic, and White working classes) within the context created by the exigencies of capitalist accumulation. As these eth-class "alliances" struggle with other such entities, group identities and intergroup relations are continually created and recreated. Consequently, another of our theoretical tasks will be to outline the types of eth-class "alliances" and to begin to specify conditions under which these different forms will actually emerge.

In sum, what we are proposing is a class-based framework for the study of ethnicity and nationality, a model which will be embedded in the dynamics of global capitalist development (e.g., capitalist accumulation—the search for markets and cheap labor, exploitation, proletarianization) and the consequences (e.g., core-periphery relations, tendencies towards crisis) of the uneven nature of this
development. While material activities serve in our view as the most general basis for social action, we will place particular emphasis upon competition and conflict between eth-classes (and constellations of eth-classes) as a key explanatory factor in understanding the evolution of group identities. It is our hope that what emerges from our effort at theory-building will be a useful means for addressing what we have posed as a core question: What causes ethnic identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear? If we are successful in this endeavor, we hope that this work will make a contribution to both the sociology of ethnic relations and the more general areas of stratification and political economy.

Organization

Our attempt to develop a theoretical model useful for explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities will be organized around the following tasks: exploration of conceptual issues; critical review of existing theories; development of a class-based theoretical framework; and application of the framework to two case studies. Each of these tasks is essential to the development of our theoretical position and will constitute one or more chapters in this work.

In Chapter II we will explore conceptual issues related to our central notions of ethnicity and nationality. This task is made necessary by the conceptual confusion and broad
range of variation which currently exist in definitions of ethnicity and nationality (cf. Isajiw 1974; Burgess 1978; Connor 1972, 1978). Moreover, how we conceptualize a variable is closely linked to its theoretical usage (e.g., ethnic group qua culture group); therefore, a conceptual discussion is an essential first step in the construction of a theoretical framework. We will consider a variety of conceptual issues relevant to our study including: the nature of ethnicity; "race"; ethnicity as a variable; ethnicity and nationality; and rationality and ethno-nationalism. One key (and somewhat novel) component of our conceptual base will be a distinction between ethnicity and nationality based upon level of inclusiveness: ethnicity will be defined as a communal affiliation expressed within a society (i.e., a nation-state); nationality as a more inclusive identity asserted on a global level. Secondly, we will adopt a strategic perspective on ethnicity; that is, we will assert that ethnic and national identities are linked to the pursuit of material interests and are thus inexorably linked to issues of class, domination, and stratification.

The final preliminary step in the development of our theoretical model will be a critical review, presented in Chapter III, of past and present theories of the evolution of ethnicity and nationality. Although classical social science seems to have unequivocally assumed that ethnic identities would wither away as a result of the homogenizing
effects of industrialization and modernization, many contemporary theorists have sought to evaluate ethnicity and nationality in the context of the changes wrought by industrialization and modernization. We will classify and evaluate five types of theories which attempt to explain the persistence of ethnicity in modern society: primordialism, the plural society approach, modernization/competition theories, reactive ethnicity, and class theories. Our critique of these approaches will emphasize their oversimplification of the relationship between ethnicity and class, as well as their lack of a macro-level dynamic which adequately explains the diversity of ethnic and national phenomena. Thus, we set the stage for the introduction of our model, a class-based framework grounded in the dynamics of uneven global capitalist development.

In Chapter IV, we will present our framework for understanding the evolution of ethnic and national identities in the post-1800 world-economy. As outlined above, we attempt to resolve the "dilemma" of the relationship between ethnicity and class by focusing upon the eth-class as a basic unit for the analysis of group action. At the same time, we assert that the formation of eth-class alliances (i.e., mobilization for action) can only be fully understood in the context of global capitalist development, including the uneven nature of this development reflected in the division between core and peripheral areas of the world-system.
Drawing upon this base, we will present a series of "working hypotheses" which address the evolution of ethnicity and nationality in both the core and the periphery. In addition, we will seek to specify factors which we believe play an integral role in the evolution of ethnic and national identities in specific circumstances.

Chapters V and VI constitute the first application of our framework, where we will seek to assess the analytical utility of our model by employing our working hypotheses to study the evolution of ethnic and national identities in two case studies: the United States and South Africa. Our goal in each instance will not be to produce an exhaustive case study—indeed, we will rely upon the secondary analysis of existing data—but rather to elaborate our abstract theoretical model by applying it to specific historical circumstances. Following the emphasis we have placed upon the core-periphery distinction, we will devote one chapter to a core nation (the United States) and one to a peripheral society (South Africa). Our choice of the United States reflects both its location within the core and its role as a "data source" for many theories of ethnicity (e.g., assimilation). Similarly, South Africa stands as perhaps the most acute (and most analyzed) example of ethnic conflict in the contemporary world. We are confident that the opportunity to reanalyze these cases while employing our framework will allow for a particularly rigorous test of its utility.
In Chapter VII, the final chapter, we will conclude our presentation and evaluate our theoretical framework in light of the data provided by our case studies. This should enable us to highlight both the strengths of our model and the areas requiring further elaboration. Given the exploratory or developmental nature of this undertaking, we will devote particular attention to the task of specifying issues to be addressed by subsequent studies. Indeed, this work is as much a beginning as it is an end product. Perhaps the true measure of success will be the degree to which we establish a useful foundation for future research.
CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Both of our central concepts—ethnicity and nationality—will be discussed at length in Chapter II. At this stage, the reader should be cognizant of the fact that we are employing a somewhat unique conceptualization of nationality as a communal (i.e., ethnic-like) affiliation linked to asserted claims of political and territorial autonomy. Stated simply, nationality is ethnicity on a more inclusive level.

2. The reference here is to Marx's famous statement in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:

   In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

3. While key aspects of this work were inspired by the writings of Immanuel Wallerstein, we would like to emphasize that this does not constitute an unqualified endorsement of world-system theory. On the one hand, we believe that the world-system paradigm has made a significant contribution to sociology by reintroducing detailed historical analysis to the study of social change (reflected in the detailed historical analyses in Chapters V and VI of this work) and by encouraging us to consider the effect of global forces in the study of individual societies (a core component of our theoretical framework). On the other hand, we believe that much more needs to be done with respect to elaborating the dynamics of the world-economy. Moreover, we would agree with those critics of Wallerstein (e.g., Brenner—1977) who complain that world-system theory downplays
the role of internal class (not to mention ethnic) factors in shaping the evolutionary course of individual societies. In this context, we would consider the eth-class based analysis presented herein to be an implicit critique of the world-system approach. For an excellent summary and critical analysis of the world-system perspective, see Shannon (1989).

4. Clearly, communal identities existed prior to the emergence of the capitalist mode of production and would be likely to exist in future social forms. Our analysis is limited to communal affiliations under capitalism. One complicating factor in such an analysis is the slow emergence of capitalism from feudalism (cf. Sweezy, Dobb, Takahashi, Hilton, Hill, Lefebvre, Proacci, Hobsbawn and Harrington 1978) and the length of time before capitalism penetrated the entire globe. This muddied the analytical waters by giving rise to intermediate, contradictory forms of communal affiliation containing components of precapitalist affiliations.

5. While Gordon (1964) should be credited with inventing the term eth-class, it should be noted that our usage will differ dramatically from his (e.g., our use of Marxian class categories vs. Gordon's conception of class in status terms). Other writers (e.g., Leon 1970; Geschwender 1978; Bonacich 1980; Barrera 1987) have also sought to integrate ethnicity and class as bases for social action.

6. Indeed, in the extreme circumstances of a "caste-like" society, ethnic groups, as overall units, may constitute class divisions within a society. See Leon (1970) on the role of European Jews during feudalism and in the early stages of industrial capitalism.

7. We recognize that the choice of South Africa as an example of a peripheral society may be somewhat controversial. From the vantage point of the world-system perspective, South Africa would be classified as semiperipheral; that is, as exhibiting a mixture of core and peripheral activities in the international division of labor (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Martin 1986; Wallerstein 1979, p. 100; Milkman 1979). Inasmuch as (1) we view the semiperiphery-periphery distinction as representing gradations within the periphery (indeed, some--e.g., Chirot 1977--would argue that all peripheral societies are now semiperipheral) and (2) South Africa was unarguably peripheral at the beginning of the twentieth century, the South African case is suitable for the purposes of our study.
CHAPTER II

ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY AND CLASS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

In this chapter, we propose to explore conceptual issues of ethnicity and nationality—and, more briefly, of social class—in order to provide a firm definitional foundation for the theoretical discussion in the following chapters. As we do so, however, we acknowledge the limitations of static, abstract definitions. From our vantage point, sociology is the study of social change; "social structure is process in slow motion" (as Robert E. Park used to say); and definitions are, in essence, metaphors for process. In other words, the theoretical concepts necessary to comprehend society evolve with society itself; that is, present-day "ethnicity" does not necessarily have the same sociological content as ethnic-like identities in ancient societies. Therefore, we remind the reader that our conceptual discussion is set in the specific context of the post-1800 world-economy—the analysis of other times is left to other works (see, for example, Armstrong 1982). Moreover, the definitions offered in this chapter represent but a first approximation of ongoing social processes; further elaboration will occur when we link ethnicity and nationality to class and to specific historical circumstances.

Our reservations regarding definitions notwithstanding, the discussion which is presented in this chapter is made
necessary by conceptual problems which beset the field of ethnic studies and stand as an obstacle to analysis. Indeed, to pose a question such as: What do we mean by ethnicity and nationality? is equivalent to battling the many-headed Hydra. In surveying the field, we find a basic lack of consensus as to what is meant by ethnicity and nationality, a problem compounded by the presence of a host of related terms such as race, tribe, status group, culture group, and the like. Any review of social science literature will yield broad variations in definitions of ethnicity and nationality (cf. the excellent summaries provided by Isajiw 1974; Burgess 1978; Obidinski 1978; and Connor 1978), differences which often reflect the specific research context or ideological environment of the author. Moreover, as Isajiw (1974) observes, definitions of ethnicity are often taken for granted and omitted entirely. We will address this issue in more detail as we consider each individual concept.

A second and in our view equally grave problem is posed by the analytical separation of ethnicity and nationality, the artificial sundering of these fundamentally interrelated concepts. From a "sociology of knowledge" perspective, this unfortunate state of affairs reflects the compartmentalization of subject matter and units of analysis among the social sciences. In approaching ethnicity and nationality, sociologists have traditionally concentrated upon "race
relations" and minority groups within a society, a focus which has been conducive to the study of ethnicity but not (except in the case of anti-colonialism) to the study of nationality—which requires a larger unit of analysis. Likewise, anthropologists have tended to engage in ethnographic studies of individual groups, only more recently turning to the study of intergroup relations (R. Cohen 1978, pp. 380-83; Wolf 1982). On the other hand, political scientists, with their emphasis on political institutions, have explored issues of nationality and "nation-building" but have devoted less attention to aspects of ethnicity. Moreover, as Connor (1978, p. 387) found after comparing references from articles in the journals Ethnicity and Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, little cross-pollination has transpired. This academic "division of labor" has perpetuated the separation of ethnicity and nationality, leading to conceptual confusion of the two terms (e.g., treating them as synonyms) and limitations upon the development of an integrated framework.

Our major conceptual position, to be elaborated in this chapter, is that ethnicity and nationality are analytically separate yet related affiliations, both belonging to the larger order of communal affiliations based upon real or fictive common ancestry and a shared sense of joint historical experience and destiny. The distinction we draw is that ethnicity (e.g., Franco-American, Walloon) is expressed
within a society or social system, while nationality (e.g., American, Belgian) represents a claim as a people to be a politically autonomous society (i.e., a nation-state). In other words, nationality is a more inclusive identity, a sense of citizenship in a nation-state which is expressed on a global level, while ethnicity is asserted within the confines of the nation-state (we will deal with ethno-nationalism—the unattained claim of nationhood by an ethnic group—in the discussion of nationality). Indeed, ethnicity and nationality represent but part of a continuum of affiliations ranging from kinship to pan-nationalism. From the perspective of the individual, these affiliations or potential affiliations exist as levels within levels (e.g., pan-national--national--ethnic--subethnic--kin), each identity employed in its particular social context (e.g., nationality in international relations; ethnicity within the nation-state; sub-ethnicity within the ethnic group—cf. Keyes 1976; van den Berghe 1971).

The other major component of the conceptual position which we will develop is a strategic characterization of ethnicity and nationality; that is, the position that ethnic and national identities are grounded in material interests—the production and distribution of valued resources—in the context of intergroup relations. As we noted in Chapter I, this is not to assert that ideas such as ethnicity and nationality cannot in turn influence material conditions,
but only to observe that they are ultimately grounded in material life. From the standpoint of individual group members, assertion of ethnic and national identities reflects individual perception of interests, which in turn may be shaped by the group—and, as we will see shortly—by other groups. This linkage yet differentiation of individual and group interests leads us to another major point, one which is often overlooked in the literature: ethnic and national groups are not monolithic entities, they can subsume considerable differences of interest, especially with regard to class interests (cf. Thompson 1979). What this means is that ethnic and national identities and group actions are shaped (negotiated, imposed) on the basis of interests and power relations within group boundaries (e.g., longstanding political tensions within the Parti Quebecois). This point will be developed further in this and subsequent chapters.

The organization of this chapter will be along the lines of a topical discussion of the concepts of ethnicity, nationality, and class. In each case, our purpose is not to engage in an encyclopedic discussion, but rather to highlight key issues and to elaborate our position. During our discussion of ethnicity we will also consider briefly a related concept—race—which we believe has been the source of much confusion in the study of ethnicity and nationality. We should also alert the reader to the fact that our consid-
eration of class will necessarily be brief. Although class is inexorably intertwined with issues of ethnicity and nationality, and its conceptual ambiguity requires some clarification, a complete exposition of conceptual issues relevant to class would involve a separate work with a focus considerably different from that of this undertaking. Finally, at the conclusion of the chapter, a summary will emphasize this conceptual presentation to the material to follow.

Ethnicity

Although it is by no means a new term, ethnicity has only recently enjoyed widespread usage among social scientists (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, pp. 1-4; R. Cohen 1978, pp. 379-80). Moreover, as we noted at the beginning of the chapter, there is as of yet no consensus regarding a definition of ethnicity or its corporate manifestation, ethnic group (Isajiw 1974; Burgess 1978; Obidinski 1978).² The reasons for this state of affairs serve as both an overview of the conceptual problems in the field of ethnic studies and a case study in the sociology of knowledge. As is evident in the development of ethnic studies, definitions reflect the "frame of reference" and the research objectives of the user, much to the detriment of any attempts to develop a lingua franca for scholarly discussion.

The ideological and geographical frame of reference of the researcher has had a particularly profound influence on
how ethnicity has been conceptualized. Sociologists in the United States have for years viewed ethnicity as race, religion, or national origin (e.g., Gordon 1964) or as "minority culture" (e.g., Wirth 1938; Warner and Srole 1945, p. 28), thus reflecting the ideological emphasis of hegemonic groups upon resolving social problems through the assimilation of ethnic minorities. From this perspective, the dominant Anglo-Americans were not viewed as an ethnic group, thereby creating what Banton (1983, p. 64) has described as "minus-one" ethnicity; that is, a conceptualization of ethnicity as an attribute of minorities. More recently, on the other hand, "primordial" definitions of ethnicity have been promoted by academic supporters of the recent ethnic "resurgence" in the United States (e.g., Greeley 1974; Novak 1973). Other examples further illustrate the sensitivity of definitions of ethnicity to the research context. The notion of ethnic group was often discarded by European social scientists in favor of nation, a reflection of European historical experiences with the national aspirations of ethnic groups (Isajiw 1974, pp. 113-14). Western scholars studying Africa have tended to use "tribe" to describe ethnic groups—in what we interpret as an ethnocentric, pejorative application (cf. R. Cohen 1978, p. 384) which serves to legitimate core domination (Connor 1978, p. 392; van den Berghe 1983, p. 221). Definitions,
then, must be evaluated with respect to their social setting and to the ideology of their promoters.

As is the case with geographical or ideological context, academic environments have also shaped conceptualizations of ethnicity. Anthropologists have tended to emphasize ethnic groups as culture groups (Barth 1969, p. 9; R. Cohen 1978, pp. 379-80), while sociologists outside of the field of ethnic studies have focused upon ethnicity as an explanation for other social processes. In this latter context, ethnicity is employed as a social category, an independent variable shaping such dependent variables as achievement orientation, mate selection, voting behavior, and occupational prestige (Obidinski 1978, p. 213; Yancey et al. 1976, p. 399). Unfortunately, such a methodological approach has resulted in ethnicity becoming "a matter of research design" (Obidinski 1978, p. 219), a function of the availability of data and the nature of operational definitions employed by large scale survey operations such as the United States Bureau of the Census and the National Opinion Research Center. Such "abstracted empiricism," to use Mills' (1959) term, has made ethnicity a term employed by all and defined by few (cf. Isajiw 1974, p. 111), a practice all too prevalent in current empirical works.

Rather than offer an abstract definition of what we view as a social process, our preference is to address the question: **What is important, sociologically speaking, about**
ethnicity? To begin with, ethnicity is an identity which reflects a group affiliation; thus, it is endowed with all the characteristics of social groups—e.g., collective representations shaping the behavior of members; existence in contrast to other groups; persistence through the ability to satisfy the needs and goals of members, particularly material needs and goals. Although similar in form to other types of social groups (e.g., occupational groups, subcultures—cf. A. Cohen 1974b, pp. ix-x), ethnicity belongs to the order of communal identities; that is, it is grounded in presumed common origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint destiny (Weber 1968, p. 389). This affiliation is not an "objective" social category, it requires some measure of collective solidarity on the part of group members (A. Smith 1981, p. 66). Ethnic groups differentiate themselves from other such entities on the basis of a configuration of socially defined (i.e., negotiated, imposed) symbolic markers such as language, religion, customs, and physical characteristics (Schermerhorn 1970, p. 12) which define the "boundary" (Barth 1969) of a group. In the contemporary world, ethnic identities exist in relation to other such identities within a sociopolitical system (i.e., a nation-state); that is, they are employed to make demands upon or resist incursions by other groups in what becomes a political struggle (cf. A. Cohen 1981, pp. 317-18). To summarize, we have tentatively described
ethnicity as a social identity with four central characteristics: presumed commonality, collective solidarity, differentiation via symbolic markers, and expression through intergroup interaction within a social system. Yet this formulation only begins to capture the conceptual richness of ethnicity; thus, we must continue our exploration.

The Nature of Ethnicity

A central focus of conceptual discussions of ethnicity has involved attempts to describe the sociologically significant qualities or the "nature" of ethnicity. In our view, this debate is best organized around three subtopics: "primordial" ethnicity vs. ethnicity as a variable; ethnicity as culture vs. ethnic boundaries; and "strategic" ethnicity.

"Primordial" ethnicity vs. ethnicity as a variable. To speak of ethnicity as "primordial" (e.g., Geertz 1963; Greeley 1974; Isaacs 1975) is to view it as an irreducible, basic group identity, one which is rooted in the "givens" of social existence. Such an identity is ascriptive and involuntary; group solidarity is based in mysterious, emotional sentiments linked to historical experience. The attraction of a primordial view of ethnicity is its seeming ability to explain the emotional intensity of ethnicity, the "non-rational" emphasis upon symbols, and the adoption of ethnocentric attitudes (cf. Weber's--1968, pp. 390-91--notion of "ethnic honor") towards other groups. Indeed, it
is this "primordial" aspect of ethnic groups which has led many observers to view them as unique among social groupings.

Although primordiality may at times be a useful description of the apparent nature of ethnicity, its unidimensionality tends to obscure as much as it explains. Humans may exhibit a propensity for group membership and for basing groups on presumed descent; however, these groups may vary with regard to scope or permeability of their boundaries, change, or even disappear—phenomena which contradict the notion of primordiality. In our view, primordialism is best viewed as an ideological claim of ethnic groups, a means of maintaining group solidarity. This point is tacitly recognized even by writers sympathetic to the primordialist position, as exemplified by Nagata's (1981, p. 94) discussion of "primordialized" cultural traits and of primordiality as "a matter of usage." Ultimately, we believe that the affective intensity, the seeminglyascriptive nature, and the symbolic demands of ethnicity are not primordial—they stem from human material activities (although ideas, once established, can assume a seemingly independent existence—hence, "primordiality").

In contrast to the primordialist conceptualization of ethnicity, many recent works have emphasized the variable nature of ethnicity. As Abner Cohen (1974b, p. xiv) has observed, "ethnicity is a matter of degree. There is
ethnicity and ethnicity." The notion of ethnicity as a variable subsumes a broad range of considerations. First, the assertion of ethnicity may exhibit considerable within-group variation in meaning and intensity (Obidinski 1978; Banks and Gay 1978, p. 245), even leading to the formation of sub-groups emphasizing different cultural markers (Barth 1969; Lyman and Douglass 1973; Hannan 1979). Moreover, individual and group identities can be observed to vary across time and space (A. Cohen 1981) and in specific circumstances (Lyman and Douglass 1973, p. 358; Okamura 1981). For example, Italian-American affiliation may have held one subjective meaning for a Brooklyn laborer in the 1930s, as opposed to a Connecticut grocer during the same era, or a Portland, Maine, stockbroker in the 1980s. Finally, inter-marriage between groups may produce "multiethnic" individuals who may choose to accentuate one identity (T. Smith 1980) or create their own "ethnicity package" from the alternatives available to them (Lopata 1976, p. 117).

A second aspect of ethnicity as a variable pertains to our earlier observation that ethnic-like affiliations exist as levels within levels. Accordingly, each individual may have at his or her disposal several identities (e.g., American, White-American, Franco-American, Cajun), each of which may be activated in different circumstances (Light 1981, pp. 70-71; Nielsen 1985). Perhaps the most significant aspect of ethnicity as a variable, however, involves
the ability of individuals and groups to change this seemingly most basic of all identities. Individuals may "pass" from one identity to another, usually higher-status affiliation (De Vos 1975, pp. 26-29), while entire groups may assimilate into and be absorbed by more dominant groups (a phenomenon observed among White protestant immigrants to the United States). Indeed, new identities may emerge from new circumstances (e.g., Creoles in Sierra Leone—A. Cohen 1981) or from the "pan-ethnic" fusion of smaller groups (e.g., American Indians, Asian Americans—Trottier 1981; Italian-Americans—Hannerz 1974; Slavic-Americans—Barton 1975; Jewish-Americans—Teller 1970; Arab-Americans—Abraham and Abraham 1983, Naff 1985).

Although the dimensions of ethnicity as a variable discussed above tend to refute the primordialist perspective, overemphasis of the mutability of ethnicity may be equally problematic. To reduce ethnicity to a purely "subjective belief" (as Weber—1968, p. 389—is generally interpreted as having done; cf. Isajiw 1974, pp. 116-17; Burgess 1978, p. 269) is to remove its social and cultural anchors and to downplay the persistence of ethnicity. While they are not primordial, neither are ethnic identities donned and shed like a suit of clothes. This indicates for us the need to explore further, to uncover the reasons for both the persistence and the variability of ethnicity.
Ethnicity as culture vs. ethnic "boundaries". The perspective of ethnicity as culture includes an emphasis upon ethnic groups as culture groups; that is, as bearers of a distinctive culture or symbolic system which is employed by group members to guide and interpret behavior (Naroll 1964; Isajiw 1974; A. Cohen 1974b). This formulation has the attraction of seemingly capturing the unique essence of ethnicity, the often striking cultural differences between groups and the emphasis ethnic groups often place upon symbolic issues. While ethnic groups, like many other social collectivities (e.g., occupational groups), share in common elements of culture, the notion of a direct correlation between ethnicity and culture has been criticized for promoting an overly static conceptualization of ethnic group and for reducing ethnic groups to "trait inventories" (Barth 1969, p. 12). Moreover, culture is not a unitary phenomenon (Lal 1983, p. 163); that is, it is subject to intergroup variation (Horowitz 1985, p. 69; A.P. Cohen 1985, pp. 15-19) and intergroup similarity through contact and diffusion. The "cultural diversity" between ethnic groups is an artifact of their past geographical separation (i.e., different material conditions and social contexts giving rise to different cultures), an isolation which is broken through intergroup interaction. We believe that the erroneous tendency to equate ethnicity with culture is due to over-emphasizing the use of relatively persistent cultural sym-
bols (which gives ethnicity both its seeming primordiality and the appearance of being culture) as "markers" of group membership, thus overlooking the possibility of changing markers (e.g., the French language no longer being shared by all Franco-Americans) or the existence of markers which are shared by several groups (e.g., Catholicism as a common element for many ethnic groups in the United States). Culture may be an important element of ethnic identity; however, ethnicity is not culture!

From the standpoint of intergroup relations, what is important about culture, more than its content per se, is the use of cultural elements as markers or boundaries which define and differentiate between groups. As noted in the seminal work of Barth (1969), an ethnic group is an organizational type, a key feature of which is the maintenance of a boundary allowing classification into in-group and out-group, "us" and "them." Inasmuch as culture is constantly created and re-created as a consequence of material activities and intergroup contact, the persistence of boundaries implies the conscious structuring of interaction so as to maintain intergroup differences (cf. Barth 1969, pp. 15-16). Accordingly, we can view the seemingly "non-rational" (from an economic standpoint) emphasis of ethnic groups on cultural symbols as attempts to maintain the organizational basis of the group and to assert collective solidarity (e.g., the attempts by ethnic groups in the United States to
use bilingual education to preserve group distinctiveness). Ultimately, culture follows boundaries (Horowitz 1985, p. 69).

For our purposes, the above discussion leads to several important points. First, we see that ethnicity is only meaningful in the context of interaction with other groups. Without an "out-group" for contrast (i.e., boundary maintenance), "in-group" identity becomes irrelevant. Secondly, the process of boundary formation and maintenance reflects the results of self and other ascription—the change and persistence of ethnicity occurs in the course of intergroup interaction. Thus, ethnicity becomes a negotiated identity (Lyman and Douglass 1973, p. 360) or, to the extent that power relations between groups are unequal (a fact with important historical significance), even an imposed identity (cf. Banton's--1983, p. 31--discussion of "pariah groups"). It is in this context that "cultural markers" become significant in limiting the variability of ethnicity, for unless key markers (e.g., language, physical traits) are part of one's make up or behavioral repertoire, ethnic boundaries become impermeable (i.e., unless one looks or acts the part—and is perceived in such a manner by others—one cannot pass or assimilate; for example, a Franco-American with a "French" accent cannot present him or her self as an old stock Yankee). Consequently, to the extent that intergroup relations (and boundaries) are linked to elements of culture
which are not easily manipulated, ethnicity *appears* to be primordial and ascriptive. What remains for us, then, is to investigate why processes of ethnic change and persistence—of boundary maintenance and manipulation—occur.

"Strategic" ethnicity. Thus far, we have emphasized the variable nature of ethnicity, suggesting that group boundaries and identities change as a consequence of intergroup contact. As we have just observed, however, we are still faced with the question: Why do ethnic identities vary? In response to this question, we can stress the importance of ethnicity as strategy; that is, the view that ethnic identities are linked to material interests—the production and appropriation of valued resources—expressed in an intergroup context (cf. Worsley 1984, pp. 248-50). This position is a logical extension of our emphasis on the role of material factors in human social existence outlined in Chapter I; however, we should note that the notion of ethnicity as strategy has been given wide use by many non-Marxian scholars (e.g., A. Cohen 1974b; Bell 1975; Keyes 1981; Light 1981).

To consider ethnicity as strategy is to underscore the situational, voluntary nature of ethnicity, to assert that individuals and groups assert, mask, and alter ethnic identities in the pursuit of economic and political goals.* Individuals manipulate identities and seek to restrict the range of identities available to others (Lyman and Douglass
1973); while groups mobilize along ethnic lines in order to demand greater inclusion into social institutions, to seek or maintain the exclusion of other groups, or to struggle for survival as a group. The implications of this are far-reaching: the notion of ethnicity as strategy suggests that ethnic identities will ultimately not be retained across generations if they fail to provide material advantages (Barth 1969, p. 25; Glazer and Moynihan 1975, p. 9; Despres 1975, p. 199). In other words, we can begin to explain ethnic persistence and change in terms of strategic utility in intergroup competition. As Keyes (1981, pp. 14-16) observes, individuals continually reassess social identities in light of past social action and changing social contexts; identities are shed, reformulated, or retained and the process begins anew.10

How do ethnic identities serve as strategies? On an individual level, the cultural markers which comprise group boundaries can be displayed or masked according to the perceived exigencies of the situation. Surnames can be emphasized or altered, descent asserted or kept hidden, language employed or discarded. Individuals may also vary the level (e.g., nation, group, sub-group) at which they express their identity, choosing the identity which they believe will be most advantageous (Bell 1975, pp. 158-59; Light 1981, p. 73). Group mobilization and ethnic assertion can be employed to make political demands (e.g., "language rights,"
increased representation), to create economic monopolies (Light 1972), or to establish an institutional infrastructure (Breton 1964) and informal social networks (Yancey et al. 1976, pp. 392-93). What is important in each instance is that ethnic boundaries are manipulated in order to obtain advantages in political and economic competition with other groups.

Despite the attractiveness of a strategic conceptualization of ethnicity, we must recognize that at this juncture the notion of ethnicity as strategy remains problematic. First, there are limits to the ability to manipulate ethnic boundaries due to the fact that ethnic identities must be negotiated (i.e., accepted by both outsiders and other members of one's own group) and the cultural markers which comprise group boundaries are not necessarily easily adopted or shed (Horowitz 1985, p. 66). In instances of unequal power and the domination of one group by another, self-definition may even become secondary (De Vos 1975, p. 30) or identities may even by forcibly altered (cf. Magubane's—1979, pp. 55-70—description of the deliberate transformation of native identities by the European colonizers in South Africa). Secondly, to consider ethnicity as an isolated strategy at one point in time reduces ethnic groups to interest groups and begs the larger issue of the emergence and evolution of ethnic identities. The simple assertion that identities persist or disappear in accordance with
their strategic efficacy becomes teleological unless it is grounded in larger social dynamics. To consider ethnicity as personal strategy (e.g., Patterson 1975; Banton 1983) is unjustified reductionism which downplays group dynamics. Accordingly, while we find the notion of ethnicity as strategy to be useful, our fuller exposition must include issues of power and domination and attempt to explain the evolution of ethnic identities in the larger socio-historical context of social and economic development.

**Ethnicity and Race: A Conceptual Comment**

In our consideration of conceptual issues of ethnicity, it is necessary to discuss briefly the related concept of race. We will argue that race is a confusing notion best omitted from the lexicon of the social sciences. From a scientific standpoint, race has little utility; it represents an arbitrary system of classification (e.g., Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid) based on phenotypical differences. Underlying the notion of race was the fallacious belief that humans could be divided into separate species or subspecies based upon the assumed intergenerational transmission of complexes of traits—and that these differences could be employed to "explain" a vast array of human differences. Current scientific theory, on the other hand, holds that all humans belong to the same species and share the same original ancestry, exhibiting only minor variations due to isolation and adaptation (Montagu 1974). Nevertheless, these
pseudoscientific explanations have exerted a disproportionate—and, one might add, tragic—influence on human affairs.

Sociologically speaking, we can describe race as a *folk concept* or social "myth" (Redfield 1958, p. 67; Montagu 1974, p. 3) which is employed *socially* to distinguish between human groups (i.e., to mark *ethnic* boundaries) and to emphasize intergroup differences by inferring separate origins. The social and arbitrary nature of this categorization is reflected in the varying treatments accorded persons of "mixed" ancestry (e.g., Black/White persons as Black in the United States, as a separate group—Colored—in South Africa, and distributed along a continuum in Brazil—Harris 1964), the legal definitions of racial membership (e.g., the *Phipps* case in Louisiana, Racial Classification Boards in South Africa), and the legislative alteration of the race of an individual (Henriques 1953, pp. 49-50).12 "Racial" categorization has its origins in interethnic contact between diverse groups (usually due to long distance migration) and a desire to "explain" intergroup physical, cultural, and technological differences. A seemingly inevitable corollary of this process was the deliberate creation of racist ideologies (i.e., of "superior" vs. "inferior" human types) to legitimate the brutality of conquest, colonization, and enslavement (Montagu 1974, p. 39). Indeed, as Hannah Arendt
has observed (1973, pp. 183-84; cited in Montagu 1974, p. 31):

It is highly probable that the thinking in terms of race would have disappeared in due time together with other irresponsible opinions of the nineteenth century, if the "scramble for Africa," and the new era of imperialism had not exposed Western humanity to new and shocking experiences. Imperialism would have necessitated the invention of racism as the "explanation" and excuse for its deeds even if no race-thinking had ever existed in the civilized world.

Thus, from a social scientific standpoint, race is properly studied as an ideology of domination, as the reification of relations of dispossession (Chang 1985).

In our view, what remains problematic is that despite its recognized scientific shortcomings, race is still widely used by social scientists (e.g., the large number of articles and monographs containing "race" in the title; the use of race to describe fields of study—ethnic and racial studies; race relations). Those who distinguish "racial" groups from ethnic groups assume that race engenders unique emotions and serves as a particularly visible and immutable marker of group identity, thereby producing qualitatively different intergroup relations. If we transcend the experiences of former slaves in the Americas and the European colonization of Africa, which seemingly provide the bulk of the data for the sociological study of "race relations," we find that neither of the above assumptions is valid. Differences of color have not always been stigmatized, there exist instances of race-like divisions which do not rely
upon skin color (e.g., Tutsi vs. Hutu in Burundi), and the ability of individuals to "pass" as members of another race belies any unique reliability of race as an incontrovertible marker of group membership (Horowitz 1985, pp. 42-43; Banton 1983, p. 27). Even the perspective that race is a "special case of ethnicity" (e.g., van den Berghe 1983, p. 222) where group boundaries are more rigid is flawed in that any distinction is not qualitative but at best a matter of degree. Skin color is simply one means of marking ethnic boundaries; "race" is a supporting ideology. Inasmuch as we believe that the notion of race has limited analytical utility and that its use perpetuates its pseudoscientific standing, we will henceforth subsume race under the aegis of ethnicity.

Ethnicity as a Dependent Variable

Thus far, we have conceptualized ethnicity as a communally based group identity which varies in conjunction with its strategic utility in intergroup material competition. We emphasized the point that ethnicity is a variable, that it persists, evolves, or disappears as a consequence of intergroup interaction. While explication of the causes of this variation will be pursued in following chapters, we believe that it is useful to expand our conceptual discussion to include dimensions of ethnicity as a dependent variable; that is, how ethnicity and ethnic relations are outcomes of intergroup competition. In this respect, we will highlight conceptual aspects of two interrelated
issues: changing individual and group identities and changes in the structure of intergroup relations.

Changing identities: assimilation and dissimilation.

Within the field of ethnic relations, the analysis of the persistence or evolution of individual and group identities is generally phrased in terms of assimilation and dissimilation (Yinger 1981). In a general sense, assimilation describes a process of boundary reduction, the whole or partial absorption of one group into another or the merger of two or more groups into a more inclusive identity. Traditional sociological perspectives on assimilation (e.g., Warner and Srole 1945; Park 1950), based upon the experience of European immigrants to the United States and the "Anglo-conformity" ideology of the dominant group, viewed it as a unilinear process which would lead to the inevitable absorption of ethnic minorities into the dominant group and the subsequent loss of the distinctive cultural markers which defined the group and its boundary. More recently, however, with the proliferation of comparative studies and the so-called "resurgence" of ethnicity in the United States, sociologists have come to recognize that the ethnic experience in the United States constituted a unique historical moment and that assimilation is a multidimensional process which is neither inevitable nor irreversible.13

Gordon (1964) has demonstrated that assimilation may occur at varying paces in different spheres of social life (e.g.,
cultural vs. structural assimilation). Others (e.g., Banton 1981; Yinger 1981) have observed that assimilation need not be total, that it may be reversible, and that it may involve changes in the identities of both groups. Furthermore, assimilation may vary among members of a group, as different material and political interests produce different ethnic "strategies." What is clear is that assimilation as absorption is a complex phenomenon shaped by such factors as the time and nature of intergroup contact, differential levels of power, the generational progression of intermarriage, and the competing goals of different groups (Scherrhorn 1970; Banton 1981).

In addition to the notion of absorption and "loss of identity," assimilation has also been used to describe a second process of boundary reduction, the temporary or permanent amalgamation or fusion of several groups into a larger, more inclusive identity (Horowitz 1985, p. 65; Sarna 1978). Here, intergroup competition has the effect of expanding the "scope of identity" (Light 1981, p. 73), as previously separate groups blend their boundaries by employing more inclusive criteria (cf. Coser—1956—on conflict functioning to reduce intragroup conflict). For example, ethnic competition and out-group hostility in the United States encouraged Neapolitans, Sicilians, and other regional groups to view themselves as Italian-Americans (Hannerz 1974), much as it facilitated the formation of such
"pan-ethnic" groups as Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanic Americans (Trottier 1981). Such unification often reflects an awareness of the strategic disadvantages of relatively small, fragmented groupings in an expanding socio-political arena. Indeed, some writers (e.g., Hannan 1979; van den Berghe 1983) maintain that the organizational requirements of modern societies produce more inclusive ethnic groupings.

The other side of the coin of changing ethnic identities is dissimilation or differentiation. We can describe dissimilation as the maintenance or strengthening of ethnic boundaries or the creation of new, more exclusive boundaries (cf. Yinger 1981, p. 257). Ethnic groups can persist despite strong assimilative pressures and increasing cultural convergence (e.g., Franco-Americans in Northern New England—Doane unpublished, pp. 46-79) and can even experience ethnic "revivals"—the increased assertion of group distinctiveness—under certain conditions (cf. Khleif's—1978b—description of the post-1945 revival of Welsh identity; other examples would be Quebecois in Canada, Basques in Spain, and Sikhs in India). While the general trend may be towards more inclusive identities, groups may still be divided into more exclusive subgroups—Muslim solidarity created Pakistan, subsequent Bengali dissimilation in East Pakistan led to the secession of Bangladesh. Indeed, neither dissimilation nor assimilation are unilinear
processes; groups may experience cycles of unification and differentiation (cf. Nagata's—1981—enlightening description of the expansion and contraction of Malay ethnic boundaries).

The structure of intergroup relations: ethnic stratification. The structure of intergroup relations describes issues of group access to economic resources and political power; that is, of systems of ethnic stratification. In our view, the structure of intergroup relations is a key intervening variable in the evolution of ethnic identities. Individuals and groups reassess and reformulate identities and goals in light of group location in the ethnic structure of society. Group position conditions both available alternatives and the probability of success of given strategies. At the same time, group location is constantly changing as a result of the collective actions of group members, the responses of other groups, and changes in the larger social system (e.g., colonization, immigration, economic and demographic changes). Types of changes in group location include: increased egalitarianism, subordinate group ascendency, increased dominant group power, and rearrangement of the subordinate hierarchy (i.e., gains for one minority group relative to others). What we are describing is a dynamic process: group position shapes identities and action which in turn affect group position; identities and
goals are reassessed in light of changes and the process continues.

Systems of ethnic stratification can be depicted in a variety of ways. Conceptually, such systems can be viewed as distributed along a continuum between two ideal types: (1) a hierarchical, "caste-like" ordering of all groups (i.e., all members of group A rank above group B, which in turn ranks above group C, etc.); and (2) an unranked system in which all groups are proportionately distributed across all levels of society. Clearly, neither of these ideal typical forms reflect empirical reality. Instead, societies exist between these polar opposites; that is, they vary with regard to degree of inequality, and each group within the society exhibits its own "status pyramid" (Horowitz 1985, p. 24) or internal stratification. Moreover, we must emphasize the dynamic nature of such structures; systems of ethnic stratification are constantly changing--becoming more or less equal, or rearranging the relative position of groups (cf. Light 1981)--as a result of intergroup competition.

While we believe that the notion of the structure of intergroup relations constitutes an excellent conceptual basis for describing outcomes of ethnic interaction in specific historical circumstances, two additional comments are necessary. First, we reject the position, found frequently in the literature (e.g., Horowitz 1985, pp. 22-
that societies can be classified categorically as either stratified or plural, ranked or unranked. Each society varies in terms of degree of ethnic stratification; however, as long as ethnicity is a factor in determining access to resources, a society is not unranked (cf. Vallee, Schwartz and Darknell 1957; Lenski and Lenski 1982, p. 330). To insist that the internal stratification of groups—the existence of an elite within each group (Horowitz 1985, p. 25)—constitutes an unranked system is to remove ethnic stratification from consideration as a factor in human affairs. The internal stratification of groups does not preclude the existence of stratification between groups (e.g., the existence of some Black members of the capitalist class would not make the United States an ethnically "unranked" society). Indeed, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, a minority elite may often play a key role in the maintenance of systems of ethnic stratification.

A second observation pertaining to our position is that any attempt to depict a system of ethnic stratification is an extremely general characterization of very complex relationships. To describe ethnic stratification at the societal level is to smooth over regional variations (e.g., Croatians in Croatia vs. Croatians in other parts of Yugoslavia) which can be vital in determining social action. Moreover, social stratification is in itself a complex phenomenon. As we will note later in this chapter, social
class constitutes a matrix of relationships, it is not merely described by economic position or any other univariate measure (Poulantzas 1975). Accordingly, the totality of the relationship between ethnicity and class (i.e., systems of ethnic stratification) transcends any simple characterization (cf. Marger 1985, pp. 42-43).

Nationality

As a focus of study, nationality poses perhaps even more of a dilemma than ethnicity. Indeed, it is easy to agree with Tilly (1975, p. 6), that nation is "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon." For some social scientists (e.g., De Vos 1975, p. 11; Newman 1973; Said and Simmons 1975), nationality is viewed as identical with ethnicity, as another means of describing the same phenomenon. In contrast, a second perspective defines nationality as simply a category--citizenship within a particular political state--with little or no social content. From this vantage point, Obidinski (1978, pp. 215-16), after properly criticizing the tendency of many social scientists to equate ethnicity with nationality, continues on to describe nationality as having attribute qualities--a formally designated "either-or" classification. Both perspectives effectively eliminate consideration of nationality as a key social process, with the result that it has been underutilized by sociologists.
In our opinion, the conceptual ambiguity involving nationality is rooted in an academic division of labor which has tended to discourage sociologists from using the nation-state as a unit of analysis (cf. Mills' 1959 critique of sociology for a lack of societal vision) and has prevented proper specification of the link between ethnicity and nationality. Such a shortcoming is all the more puzzling inasmuch as the basic notion of nationality—an ethnic-like identity linked to political autonomy (i.e., state power)—was presented by Weber (1946, pp. 171-79). In any event, the limitations of contemporary approaches are clear. On one hand, if national and ethnic groupings are viewed as identical, then virtually all existing geo-political entities are not nations but multi-national states (Connor 1972, p. 320). The effect of this position would be to define the nation (or the ethnic group) out of existence. On the other hand, if nationality is equated with citizenship, then the richness of group identification is lost or diminished. What is needed, therefore, is a new conceptualization of nationality, one which considers the underlying similarity of ethnicity and nationality while at the same time retaining a distinction (and specifying the linkage) between the two identities.

In contrast to the above approaches, we propose a somewhat unique formulation of nationality as a group affiliation, a communal identity linked to asserted political and
territorial autonomy (i.e., to state power). A nation, then, becomes a politically autonomous social group sharing the same nationality (cf. Finer 1975, p. 88). Nationality is akin to ethnicity in that it, too, is grounded in presumed common origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint destiny. Given the more inclusive nature of nationality, the putative aspect of common origins and experience comes to the fore. Indeed, one of the tasks of nation-building has been to create national "myths"—a history of the past capable of promoting solidarity in the present (Worsley 1984, pp. 273-75; Khleif 1985). Like ethnicity, nationality also relies upon cultural markers to define group boundaries and upon cultural symbols and rituals to promote group solidarity. As Gellner (1964, p. 168) has observed, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist— but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on." In this most basic sense, nationality and ethnicity are similar.

Yet ethnicity and nationality are not the same. The difference is that nationality is linked to geo-political autonomy, to state power (yet, as Connor—1978, p. 379—reminds us, the nation—a social grouping—is not the same as the state—a political relationship). While ethnicity is expressed within a socio-political system (i.e., a nation-state), nationality constitutes a political claim vis-a-vis
other such entities in an interstate system. This distinc-
tion is crucial, for as Abner Cohen (1974b, p. xi, emphasis
added) observed in distinguishing between ethnicity and
nationality:

The term ethnicity will be of little use if it is
extended to denote cultural differences between
isolated societies, autonomous regions, or inde-
pendent stocks of populations such as nations
within their own national boundaries. The differ-
ences between the Chinese and the Indians, con-
sidered within their own respective countries,
are national not ethnic differences.

Thus, we view nationality as an ethnic-like identity on a
more inclusive level, as a special form of ethnicity
attached to the state (cf. Worsley 1984, p. 247). It is
more than a formal category such as citizenship; it is an
internalized identity which, like ethnicity, is employed in
intergroup material interaction.

Nationality: A Modern Phenomenon

If we are to understand fully the significance of
nationality in the modern world-system, then we must realize
that it is a modern phenomenon, one which is linked to
global capitalist development and which fully emerged in the
post-1800 era (cf. Ehrenreich 1983, p. 9; Rejai and Enloe
previous loyalties (e.g., religion, estate, feudal lords,
even absolute monarchs), modern nationality is a political
identity (Weber 1946, p. 172) grounded in mass allegiance to
the idea of the nation—a people sharing a common heritage,
interests, and destiny—with the belief that ultimate
sovereignty resides in the people as a whole (cf. the Declaration of Independence; the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen). In Western Europe, the rise of nations (and nationality) was concurrent with the emergence of capitalism and the capitalist state. If it was to prosper as a social system, capitalism required a political structure capable of social and economic integration (e.g., public education, common language, common standards), a potential which was made possible by urbanization and the improvements in transportation and communication which were concomitants of capitalist development. The political "cement" (i.e., legitimation) for this process was provided by the ideology of nationalism demanding loyalty to a nation-state in which (according to the tenets of bourgeois liberalism) the people were sovereign—although some would be more sovereign than others. Such loyalty was not "natural" (Gellner 1964, p. 149), but was often created through coercive homogenization or "nation-building"; that is, cultural conformity imposed on ethnic minorities (Khleif 1978b; Tilly 1975, p. 43).

Nevertheless, nationalist ideology—the "right" of national self-determination—spread rapidly, fueled by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and late nineteenth century European global domination.

In this context, the issue of how nationalism emerged in different historical circumstances becomes important. According to the "nation-building" school (e.g., Deutsch
1953; Deutsch and Foltz 1963), all nations would evolve along the same path as modernization led to increasing social and political mobilization and the development of supraethnic "national" identities. Yet even a cursory examination of twentieth century history is enough to assure us that this "nation-building" did not universally come to pass (cf. Connor 1972; Horowitz 1985, pp. 566-68). The failure of the nation-building school, like the failure of the developmentalist/modernization school in sociology, is grounded in mistaken generalization from the experience of Western societies. Nation-building may describe the slow evolution of nations (concurrent with capitalist development) in core societies; however, it is much less applicable to the periphery in that the very existence of the core changes the international context (Tilly 1975, p. 81), not to mention the effects of colonialism and uneven development (Amin 1980). Nationality assumes different forms in different historical circumstances.

What begins to emerge is a picture of two very different types of nationalism. In the developed nations of the core, we find that some sense of national identity generally preceded the emergence of a state structure, while in the periphery the existence of a politically independent state generally preceded any meaningful national integration and solidarity. Thus, following Rejai and Enloe (1969, p. 140), on one hand we have "nation-states;" on the other hand,
"state-nations." This distinction is crucial, for it foreshadows differences between nations in degree of national integration (and ethnic conflict) and it begins to explain the subsequent "fragility" of peripheral societies. Amin (1980, p. 20), in drawing a parallel distinction between more complete (core) and less complete (peripheral) societies, reminds us that this division is inexorably linked to the uneven development of the capitalist world-economy (i.e., to core-periphery relations). We will explore the fuller implications of this issue in subsequent chapters.

**Nationality and Nations: Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity**

A major source of confusion in the study of nationalism is the issue of homogeneity, the insistence by many writers (e.g., A. Smith 1981; Connor 1978; van den Berghe 1983) that "nations" must exhibit substantial ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Connor (1972, p. 320) correctly observes that few contemporary states can be described as ethnically homogeneous (i.e., one group accounting for more than 90% of the population—e.g., Germany, Japan); however, this fact often leads analysts to the position that "nation-state is a misnomer" (A. Smith 1981, p. 10), that existing states are multi-nations. We believe that this misses the point: a nation need not be a monolithic entity, it may subsume considerable ethnic variation. As we noted earlier, ethnicity and nationality exist as levels within levels (cf.
Keyes'—1976—notion of "nested segments") and are employed in relation to specific others. Ethnic identities are asserted in opposition to other ethnic identities within a nation-state; national identities are employed vis-a-vis other nations in an interstate system. Thus, a nation may contain considerable ethnic heterogeneity and conflict as long as it possesses some measure of similarity and solidarity in its dealings with other nations—a matter of within-group vs. between-group variance. Indeed, following Khleif (1978a) and Park and Burgess (1921, p. 665), we believe that most nations in the contemporary world can be viewed as coalitions of competing ethnic groups whose balance is continually subject to change.

This internal heterogeneity of nations has an important implication. If a national identity is negotiated or imposed through intergroup interaction, then we must take into consideration issues of power and domination. Hegemonic ethnic groups (i.e., a Staatsvolk—Glazer and Moynihan 1975, p. 4) and classes control the means of cultural reproduction (e.g., schools, media) and may construct or shape the national identity in their own image and interest (e.g., the confluence of "American" national identity with the dominant Anglo-American ethnic identity). Nationality, then, may largely reflect the culture of dominant ethnic groups.

Consequently, as Weber (1946, pp. 172-74) noted, individual and group attachments to a nation may vary, generally being
strongest in more powerful groups and weaker (i.e., indifferent or even opposed) in less powerful groups. Like ethnicity, nationality is a variable!

To illustrate the heterogeneous nature of nationality, let us briefly consider a question which has prompted much debate: Is there an "American" national identity? Our answer to this question is that there is indeed an "American" national identity. "Americans" possess a shared sense of a common past (more recent arrivals seemingly adopt the past) and joint destiny; identify themselves as "Americans" (vis-a-vis Iranians, Soviets, or other nationalities); and employ cultural symbols and rituals to define the group boundary and maintain solidarity. For immigrants, part of the process of assimilation (which is neither irreversible nor inevitable) involves assuming an American national identity. For example, a Cambodian migrating to the United States would at first (in terms of orientation) be a Cambodian residing in the United States; however, over time (the duration of which is determined by a variety of factors) we might expect adoption of "American" nationality, with Cambodian (or Asian-American) becoming an ethnic identity asserted in competition with other "American" ethnic groups. At the same time, "American" national identity exhibits considerable variation, due to both the continuous influx of immigrants and the reaction of other groups to the attempts of the dominant Anglo-Americans
(joined, after 1960, by some "White Ethnics") to define "American" national identity in their own image.**

**Ethno-Nationalism: Ethnicity or Nationality?**

While we believe that the distinction specified above resolves much of the conceptual confusion surrounding ethnicity and nationality, it remains problematic in that there is no clear line of demarcation separating ethnicity and nationality. Individual ethnic groups within a nation-state can aspire to separate nationhood, an event which has happened so often as to appear commonplace in the post-1945 era (e.g., Quebec, Basque Provinces, Wales, Brittany, Corsica, Biafra, Katanga, Eritrea, Sikhs in the Punjab, Tamils in Sri Lanka—to name a few). Although the existence of these would-be nations seemingly represents an anomaly in our conceptual schema, we believe that this phenomenon can be accounted for. Ethnicity and nationality are not rigid, mutually exclusive identities but dynamic affiliations capable of movement along a continuum of inclusiveness.²⁴ National identities are socially constructed and may experience moments of waxing and waning—cycles of national solidarity—in response to specific circumstances. Strictly speaking, these separatist movements are neither ethnic groups nor nations, but contradictory social groups which contain elements of both forms (and will probably eventually become one or the other). Consequently, although many observers use the word "nation" to describe these social
groupings, we will reserve the word nation for politically autonomous entities (cf. Worsley 1984, p. 252) and denote as "ethno-national" those movements for national autonomy on the part of ethnic groupings within existing nation-states.29

Also problematic is the treatment of ethno-national movements in the study of ethnicity and nationality. For some (e.g., Said and Simmons 1975; Connor 1972; A. Smith 1981), ethno-nationalism represents the decline of nation-states amid competing loyalties and the proliferation of nationalist movements. We believe that this overstates the situation; that ethno-nationalism is better understood as a response of ethnic groupings (some with memories of past autonomy or "failed" nationhood) to such phenomena as domination by other groups (perceived "second-class" status and feared loss of autonomy) and the increasing emphasis on national self-determination amidst the break-up of colonial empires. While some ethno-national movements may succeed in establishing separate nations (although Bangladesh is the only recent example) and others may persist or periodically resurface for generations, they must overcome substantial obstacles such as state resistance and lack of external support for altering the interstate system.29 Moreover, ethno-national groups may not possess unanimity of purpose; some may be willing to accept improved social, political, and economic position within existing states rather than
undergo a protracted struggle for national liberation (e.g., the divisions among French-Canadians in Quebec). While ethno-nationalism will remain a significant social force for the foreseeable future, we suspect that many ethno-national movements will eventually become movements of ethnic assertion within existing states, with national aspirations held in reserve in the event of "intolerable" conditions at some future time.

Class

The final conceptual topic to be considered in this chapter is class. For our approach to the study of ethnicity and nationality, class is an important concept inasmuch as it describes human relations in the production of material life, a process which in turn conditions social existence. Analytically, the changing conditions of the production of material life constitute the basic context in which social relations (e.g., ethnicity and nationality) occur. Moreover, we adopt the perspective that class struggle is a basic motor force of history; that is, that the tension between conflicting groups in the production of material life is a fundamental social change dynamic. Thus, any attempt to understand the evolution of ethnicity and nationality must be linked to issues of class.

While a detailed exposition of issues of class is beyond the scope of this endeavor, we believe that some consideration is necessary in light of the varying (and, in
our view, often misleading) uses of class by mainstream social scientists. We refer here to the attempts to create social order by defining class out of existence; that is, removing class from the realm of social action by reducing it to an attribute of individuals (cf. Page 1969, p. 128). From this perspective, class becomes part of a seamless web of social relations, but one (and declining in influence) of many possible bases for ad hoc group formation and social action (Bell 1975). As a result of this ideological position and the "abstracted empiricism" (cf. Mills 1959) which is prevalent in American sociology, class is too often operationalized as occupation, income, prestige, or "lifestyle" (none of which measure class!) and turned into a smoothly graded "status hierarchy" (e.g., Warner, Meeker and Ells 1949; Hollingshead and Redlich 1958; Blau and Duncan 1967; Sewell, Haller and Portes 1969). Accordingly, much contemporary research which purports to treat social class instead measures non-class economic variables which may be loosely correlated with class (Wright, Costello, Hachen and Sprague 1982).

Although long neglected by mainstream social science, a useful basis for the study of class existed in the work of Marx. Unfortunately, the incomplete nature of Marx's formulation (e.g., the unfinished Chapter 52--"Classes"--in Volume III of Capital--Marx 1981) and the existence of mechanistic applications of Marxian class categories have
contributed to the persisting ambiguity in conceptualizations of class. More recently, many excellent attempts have been made to construct more refined definitions of class (e.g., Poulantzas 1973, 1975; Anderson 1974; Wright and Perrone 1977; Wright et al. 1982; Resnick and Wolff 1981); however, a complete conceptualization remains an elusive goal. It is not our purpose here to attempt such a task; instead, we will briefly consider those issues most relevant to our subsequent analysis.

Our approach to class is essentially Marxian; that is, we emphasize relations of production and distribution as the definitional basis of class. Thus, a class can be distinguished in general on the basis of common economic position (i.e., in the production process) and interests. Yet a class is not an economic category, it exists only in relation to other classes. Like ethnicity, class stands as a potential basis for group formation and action, which in turn provides an orientation for individual behavior. Although any potential basis for group membership is problematic in that it may come into conflict with other affiliations (Nielsen 1985), we can attribute a certain primacy to class inasmuch as material interests are fundamental human interests. Nevertheless, class-based action requires a certain level of consciousness (Marx's Klasse an sich--Klasse fur sich distinction)—perhaps ranging along a continuum (cf. Giddens 1973, pp. 111-13)—thereby rendering
class action a variable, not a given. Consequently, an important issue for class analysis involves the degree to which class shapes human behavior in historically specific circumstances.

A central concern of class analysis is the nature of specific class structures. Marx's general analysis of the capitalist mode of production employed a two-class model (bourgeoisie-proletariat); however, the analysis of historically specific social formations requires more complex schema (e.g., Anderson 1974; Wright et al. 1982) with more than two classes. Moreover, classes may contain internal divisions (cf. Poulantzas 1973 on fractions, strata, and social categories) which may function as effective social forces (e.g., intelligentsia, highly skilled labor, fractions of the bourgeoisie) in specific circumstances. Thus, we must conceptualize class structures as dynamic relationships which vary over time and from nation-state to nation-state, as processes which reflect historical forces and material conditions. Each society has a unique class structure which must be analyzed as such.

Finally, the analysis of specific class structures must ultimately be conducted on a global level. This is not to assert that global classes exist—although they potentially could (Connell 1984, pp. 430-35). What we mean is that given the international nature of capitalist accumulation, and the linking of economies effected by core imperialism,
the analysis of historically specific class structures must include classes external to the national economic arena—e.g., U.S. capital in the Third World (Bonacich 1980, pp. 17-21; Bonacich and Cheng 1984). In addition, external ties may in turn transform indigenous classes or fractions—e.g., the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie linked to foreign capital (Poulantzas 1973, p. 38). Thus, class relations within nation-states must be linked to global processes.

**Chapter Summary**

Our purpose in this chapter has been to present an outline of our conceptualization of ethnicity, nationality, and class in the modern world-system. This undertaking had its roots in what we perceived to be the shortcomings of approaches to the study of ethnic relations which focus upon individual groups and nation-states torn from their social context rather than intergroup relations, social change and global dynamics. In our view, such formulations contain several major flaws: they place an incorrect emphasis upon such notions as primordiality, culture, and race; they confuse ethnicity and nationality; and they constitute an incomplete basis for explaining the evolution of group identities. Consequently, we found it necessary to create our own conceptual base before we could embark upon our exercise in theory-building.

Towards the end of this chapter, we briefly considered conceptual issues pertaining to class. The importance of
class to our analysis lies in the fact that there exists a critical interface between ethnicity/nationality and class. Like class, ethnicity and nationality emerge as humans mobilize in opposition to other groups to produce and to compete for the resources necessary for existence. Individuals and groups possess potential affiliations with others in the same productive circumstances (class) and the same communal order (ethnic group or nation). Yet these potential ties represent different and possibly contradictory social realities (e.g., ethnic groups and nations contain internal class divisions, while classes may be riven by communal ties). Accordingly, a key issue for any attempt to explain the evolution of ethnic and national identities, becomes explication of the relationship between the ethnic or national structure and the class structure of a social system.

As we frame this question, however, we must recognize that the relationship between ethnicity/nationality and class is neither static nor abstract. Ethnicity, nationality, and class describe dynamic relationships (i.e., social processes) in historically specific circumstances. History describes the evolution of ethnic and national identities and class relations. As humans interact with one another, they alter conditions of the production of material life and, hence, change society. Thus, any class-based theory of ethnic and national identities must necessarily be
a theory of social change; that is, of changes in social
groupings effected by the changing patterns of relative
power and access to resources. Moreover, if we are to
analyze the evolution of ethnic and national identities,
then we must consider them in the context of the current
form of the production of material life—the capitalist mode
of production. This process will begin in the following
chapter, as we review the literature on the relationship
between ethnicity, nationality, and class in the context of
capitalist development.
CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Indeed, a review of recent literature in the field of ethnic studies finds researchers offering substitutions for the somewhat unwieldy "ethnic group" (e.g., ethne--De Vos 1975, p. 9; ethny--van den Berghe 1983, p. 222; ethnie--A. Smith 1981, p. 66). The process of terminological evolution may yet be unfinished.

2. For a discussion of methodological issues and the conceptualization of ethnicity, see Doane (unpublished, pp. 88-103).

3. Weber's definition of ethnic group (1968, p. 389) merits quotation in its entirety:

We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the custom, physical type, or, above all, language exist among its members.

4. To assert that behavior occurs within a social system or society is somewhat problematic inasmuch as we agree with Wallerstein (1974b, pp. 347-48) that the only real (i.e., self-contained) social system in contemporary society is the world-system. Nevertheless, it is also true, at least from the perspective of social actors, that political boundaries tend to provide the context in which intergroup relations occur (Horowitz 1975, p. 121).
5. For summaries of this debate, see Isajiw (1974); Burgess (1978); Yinger (1985).

6. The concept of primordiality is generally credited to Edward Shils (1957), although he did not directly apply it to ethnic groups.

7. For a discussion of methodological issues involving the variability of ethnicity, see Plax (1972); Obidinski (1978); T. Smith (1980); Darroch and Marston (1969). For applications of measures to specific groups, see Segalman (1967); Simirenko (1964); Masuda, Matsumo and Merideth (1970); Sandberg (1974); Driedger (1975); and Montero (1981).

8. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it would seem that the confusion of ethnicity with culture is at least in part attributable to the historical tendency of sociologists and anthropologists to study individual, culturally distinctive groups. To view ethnicity as culture may seem appropriate when studying isolated peoples or newly arrived immigrant groups; however, it is clearly much less useful in understanding modern societies or third-generation immigrants.

9. Our emphasis upon the political as well as the economic is intentional. Following Poulantzas (1975, pp. 64-66), we seek to avoid overly economistic conceptualizations of social relations and to recognize that political relations (i.e., relations of domination) are an integral aspect of material life.

10. At this point, it is appropriate to enter a caveat with regard to rationality as an explanation of human behavior. Individuals may pursue a course of action even if it has significant economic costs (Billig 1976), while affective, "non-rational" motives undoubtedly shape human behavior (cf. Nielsen 1985, p. 140ff.). Furthermore, perceptions of situations may vary and actions may have "unintended consequences." While resolution of this issue is beyond the confines of this endeavor, for our purposes it is sufficient to suggest that material rationality exerts a strong influence on human behavior.

11. For detailed accounts of the evolution of the concept of race, see Banton (1977); Montagu (1964; 1974); Gossett (1963).

12. In the Phipps case, a Louisiana woman in 1982 failed in her attempt to overturn a Louisiana law which defined as Black anyone with 1/32 "Negro blood."
13. By "so-called resurgence of ethnicity," we are suggesting that in many instances ethnic identity never disappeared, that the "resurgence" of ethnicity was the rediscovery and glorification of diversity by a school of American social scientists (e.g., Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Novak 1973; Greeley 1974). See commentaries on this phenomenon by Steinberg (1981) and Yinger (1985, pp. 152-53).

14. Thus, as Chang (1985, p. 42) observes, ethnic stratification becomes "a case of statistical correlation rather than a categorical certainty."

15. Indeed, Weber's entire discussion (1946, pp. 171-79) of "nation" is in our opinion well worth reading inasmuch as it considers several key aspects of nationality: the link to the state; the existence of internal heterogeneity; and varying degrees of national solidarity.

16. Nationality was used with this meaning both in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and in its more recent interpretations (cf. Norton 1952).

17. This can even be applied to the subsequent incorporation of immigrant groups into a national identity. See Steinberg (1981, p. 86) for a description of attempts by ethnic "insiders" to link newcomers to national experiences by intertwining the history of the group with that of the host nation.

18. Similar formulations have been suggested by other writers (e.g., Francis—1976, p. 387—demotic vs. ethnic nations; A. Smith—1981, p. 18—territorial vs. ethnic nationalism); however, we prefer the political (as opposed to cultural) emphasis of Rejai and Enloe (1969).

19. For example, Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium think of themselves as Belgian—as opposed to Nederlandic or Dutch—in nationality. The existence of ethnic divisions (e.g., Fleming vs. Walloon) in Belgium does not, in our view, make Belgian any less a national identity.

20. As many writers have noted (e.g., Weber, Simmel, Coser), external conflict (in this case, war with another nation) can lead to increased internal solidarity (in this case, reduced ethnic conflict and increased national solidarity).

21. For example, Connor (1978, p. 381) maintains that Americans are not a nation, while Amin (1980, p. 129) asserts that they are.
22. Thus, a national identity in one setting (e.g., Italian in Italy) can become an ethnic identity in another setting (e.g., the United States) and could even be reactivated upon return to the original context.

23. Many members of the dominant Anglo-American (i.e., WASP) group simply identify themselves as "American" (cf. T. Smith 1980).

24. This continuum of inclusiveness need not stop at state boundaries but can also encompass supranational identities (e.g., Pan-Slavism, Pan-Arabism). While the history of pan-nationalism to date is a history of failed attempts (see the excellent summary provided by Snyder--1984), it is conceivable that changing structural conditions could facilitate some form of supranational political organization at some future time.

25. In this sense, then, we follow the French sociologist Alain Touraine (1981) in asserting that sociologically speaking there is no such thing as society as an entity, only social movements!

26. For a discussion of the factors shaping the outcome of separatist movements, see Horowitz (1985, pp. 265-81).

27. In this respect, we find ourselves generally in agreement with Poulantzas (1973, p. 27, emphasis in the original) who asserts that classes are "defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the production process;" that ideological and political factors are also significant.

28. The development of class consciousness within the core working class has not reached the revolutionary level anticipated by many Marxists (moreover, I would question whether this or any process is a historical inevitability--as opposed to a historical potentiality). Indeed, a higher degree of class consciousness seemingly exists among the bourgeoisie. This can be attributed to a variety of factors: the cultural and ideological reproduction of capitalism; the limitation of the relative deprivation or impoverishment of the core working classes due to their privileged position vis-a-vis other working classes in the world-economy; reform (vs. revolution) resulting from non-revolutionary class struggle (i.e., conflict not oriented towards overturning the system); and the at times confounding influence of ethnic and national ties (Ehrenreich 1983; Amin 1980, pp. 28-30).
CHAPTER III

ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY, AND CLASS: EXISTING THEORIES

At the conclusion of the preceding chapter, we posited a fundamental interrelationship—grounded in the production of material life—between ethnicity/nationality and class. This led us to assert that a complete understanding of ethnicity and nationality requires that they be considered with respect to class; that is, that a complete theory of ethnicity and nationality must be a class-based theory. In this chapter, we will review existing theories of the relationship between ethnicity/nationality and class. Such a review should serve as a useful preliminary to presentation of our own model, thus enabling us to highlight key issues as well as to benefit from the corpus of existing works on ethnicity, nationality, and class.

In our consideration of existing formulations, we adopt the position that all theories of ethnicity and nationality either explicitly or implicitly contain a theory of social change and assumptions regarding the relationship of ethnicity, nationality, and class. What we mean by this is that every attempt to understand ethnic-like phenomena has sought to explain the emergence, persistence, or disappearance of ethnicity and nationality in the context of the changes wrought by industrialization, modernization, urbanization, and bureaucratization. Moreover, each
approach considers ethnicity/nationality in relation to class, whether as an epiphenomenon of class or as a competing or even more basic source of group affiliation. Consequently, issues of social change and of class will serve as a focus for our evaluation of past and present theories of ethnicity and nationality.

Our review of theories of ethnicity and nationality will necessarily be critical, for in many respects the study of ethnicity and nationality constitutes one of the weak areas of social science. From classical theorists who viewed ethnicity as a remnant of primitive society to modern observers who have chronicled the ethnic "revival," social scientists have been unable to explain in a satisfactory manner why ethnic identities emerge, persist, change, or disappear. One cause of this problem has been a tendency to view social change as technological change or "modernization" rather than as an integrated process grounded in the dynamics of global capitalist development. In addition, theorizing has been limited by the ethnocentrism of Western social science (i.e., a tendency to generalize from the experiences of Europe and the United States—cf. Amin 1980, p. 12); by ideology (the incompatibility of ethnicity with Western liberal thought); and by methodology (the division of labor in the social sciences; the sociological emphasis on community studies). These themes will be developed throughout the chapter.
This chapter will be organized in a manner consonant with our purpose, which is a critical evaluation of attempts to explain the persistence of ethnic and national identities in contemporary society. Accordingly, we will not provide a detailed description of each perspective, but rather will attempt to highlight the contributions and shortcomings of each approach. We will begin with an overview of the development of theories of ethnicity and nationality, for many of the strengths and weaknesses of present approaches are grounded in past formulations. Following this, we will evaluate existing theories of ethnicity and nationality, which we have organized into the following rough typology: (1) primordialism; (2) pluralism; (3) competition/modernization; (4) reactive ethnicity; and (5) class theories.

**Development of Theories of Ethnicity and Nationality**

The tendency of social scientists to downplay ethnicity has deep roots which reach back into the nineteenth century. In general, mainstream classical sociologists (e.g., Durkheim, Toennies, Simmel, Weber) accorded little relevance to the role of communal identities in modern society. For these theorists, industrialization, modernization, and urbanization would lead to the weakening and eventual destruction of preindustrial forms of social organization and the emergence of rational social bonds—a transition captured in such dichotomies as mechanical vs. organic solidarity (Durkheim), *Gemeinschaft* vs. *Gesellschaft*. 
(Toennies), and status vs. contract (Maine). This transformation of society would be brought about by such processes as the increasingly differentiated and interconnected division of labor (Durkheim), the emphasis on bureaucratic and market rationality (Weber), and the homogenizing influence of urbanism (Wirth 1938). Given the grounding of sociology in the conservative reaction to the perceived loss of order stemming from urbanization and modernization (cf. Zeitlin 1968; Nisbet 1978; Wolf 1982, pp. 7-13), the classical social theorists did not necessarily approve of these changes; instead, they sought to uncover new sources of social solidarity which would counteract the loss of traditional communal ties. As we shall see, the emphasis of mainstream classical sociology on order and new "rational" social ties was to have a profound influence on subsequent social thought—to the detriment of the study of ethnicity and nationality.

The legacy of the classical social theorists can be clearly seen among the functionalists who later came to dominate mainstream sociology. From the functionalist perspective, the search for order would be resolved by universalistic goals and values stemming from the functional prerequisites of modern society. Indeed, even inequality was viewed as contributing to the maintenance of society (e.g., Davis and Moore 1945). Thus, the outcome of modernization was a functionally integrated society possessing
common goals and a common culture, a society where social position was based upon universalistic achieved criteria rather than particularistic ascribed statuses such as ethnicity (Parsons 1966, pp. 22-23; Benedict 1962; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Smelser 1969).

By this juncture, the misgivings towards modern society of the classical theorists had disappeared and mainstream sociology became a glorification of modernity. Traditional society was no longer lamented but viewed as rigid and inflexible, while modern society was extolled as efficient and liberating of human potential. Consequently, ethnicity was viewed as an artifact of preindustrial society, dysfunctional in that it was incompatible with modernization and bureaucratization, and doomed to disappear as individuals made "rational" social decisions. Furthermore, with the emergence of the modernization/developmentalist perspective—that is, the (ethnocentric) assertion that all societies would evolve along the model of the "most advanced" Western societies (Rostow 1960)—it was assumed that ethnicity would disappear even in peripheral nations once sufficient and inevitable levels of modernization had been attained. Later, the persistence of ethnicity even became an "explanation" of the "backwardness" of peripheral societies.

Closely paralleling the functionalist approach was the "nation-building" school in political science (e.g., Deutsch
1953; Deutsch and Foltz 1963; Almond and Coleman 1960; Jacob and Toscano 1964; Hoselitz 1960). This perspective expanded upon the effects of modernization to include the observation that social mobilization, facilitated by modern communication and transportation, led to political integration and the assimilation of ethnic groups into an interethnic "national" identity. Such a process, it was assumed, had already occurred in the core nations, where democratic institutions and common interests had created new "national" loyalties. Furthermore, like the functionalist/developmentalist approach, adherents of the nation-building perspective also held that national integration would be a necessary concomitant of modernization in less-developed nations (e.g., Coleman and Rosberg 1964). Thus, drawing upon its classical foundations, a dominant theme of mainstream social science was that industrialization and modernization inevitably led to the disappearance of ethnicity in favor of more "rational" ties.

The effects of this theoretical monophony were reflected in early attempts to study the relationship between race and class. For Robert E. Park and others who studied "race relations" in the United States at the time of the "great migration" (1880-1924), emphasis was placed upon the issue of integrating immigrants and minorities into the common culture of the larger society. Following the classical social theorists, Park viewed modernization and European
expansion as resulting in the "emancipation" of individuals, the formation of more inclusive groups, and the reduction of social distance through new economic and political ties (Park 1974a, p. 205; 1974b, p. 149); however, he also maintained that modernization created "race relations" by increasing intergroup contact (Park 1974c, p. 116). This seeming anomaly was resolved in Park's (1974b, p. 150) famous "race relations cycle" of "contact, competition, accommodation, and assimilation," a cycle characterized as "progressive and irreversible." Thus, while a short term effect of modernization might be to increase intergroup conflict, inevitably such ties as ethnicity and race would be superseded by class conflict (Park 1974c, p. 116).

Following the lead of Park, sociologists in the United States during the middle decades of the twentieth century continued to emphasize the assimilation of minorities. Although subsequent writers suggested that assimilation might occur at varying rates for different groups (Warner and Srole 1945), at different levels in various dimensions of social life (Gordon 1964), or even into a "triple melting pot" along religious lines (Kennedy 1952; Herberg 1960), the underlying assumption of inevitable assimilation remained unchallenged. Even the "caste-like" position of Black-Americans was viewed as amenable to assimilation once "dysfunctional" White prejudice and discrimination were eliminated (Myrdal 1944; Dollard 1937; Gordon 1964, p. 114).
This overemphasis upon assimilation led mainstream U.S. sociologists to view any relationship between ethnicity and class as a reflection of "entry status" in the United States, a temporary phenomenon awaiting the homogenizing influence of individual mobility and assimilation.

Even more than the influence of classical social theorists, the assimilationist bias of U.S. and European sociology reflected the prevailing ideological climate of dominant groups in Western society. During this period, social thought was dominated by what some (e.g., Greeley 1974; Gordon 1975, p. 88; A. Smith 1981, pp. 2-3) have termed the "liberal expectancy"--the belief that the homogenizing influences of mass education, the media, and the marketplace would eliminate social cleavages and conflict based upon "irrational" communal ties. Indeed, the most optimistic thinkers envisioned that the culmination of this process would be the disappearance of nationalities in the face of social integration on a global level (cf. A. Smith 1981, p. 3; Said and Simmons 1976, p. 9)." Thus, the decline of ethnicity was viewed as not only inevitable but also socially desirable, even, it was assumed, by minorities themselves. Their protestations of "value-free" science notwithstanding, most social scientists uncritically accepted assimilation not only as a prediction, but also as a prescription (cf. critiques by Metzger 1971; Greeley 1974) for social integration (to be achieved through a reduction
of prejudice and increased mass education). What was
unsaid, however, was that the nature of this ideal" assimila-
tion was not the more inclusive identity postulated by
theory (i.e., the melting pot), but rather the adoption of
the culture and values of the dominant ethnic group (cf.
Gordon--1964--and Greeley--1974--on assimilation in the
United States as "Anglo-conformity"). In essence, main-
stream sociological thought was a reflection of (and legiti-
mation for) dominant group ideology.

A second development in the study of ethnicity and
class by mainstream sociology in the United States involved
the above-mentioned (cf. the discussion of class in Chapter
II) extension of the emphasis on social integration and
achieved status to the "individualization" of class and
stratification (i.e., class as a description of individual
position). As applied to ethnicity, this reduction of
social processes to individual careers lowers ethnicity to a
characteristic of individuals (i.e., a descent category
affecting social status), thus totally removing it from the
realm of action or from accounting for action. Given the
all-too-prevalent practice of "abstracted empiricism" (Mills
1959, pp. 50-75) by U.S. sociologists, this "individualiza-
tion" of ethnicity permeated the field, its influence re-
flected in such notions as the "culture of poverty" (Lewis
1966; Banfield 1970), "status attainment" (Duncan and Duncan
1968; Featherman 1971), and the "human capital" perspective
(Becker 1971; Sowell 1975; 1978; 1981). These reductionist approaches towards ethnic stratification subsume dominant ideological assumptions concerning the free market and the blessings of individual competitiveness, while ignoring such factors as the structural "reproduction" of inequality (cf. Bordieu 1977), power differentials, and group influences. Unfortunately, this tendency to view ethnicity and class as individual attributes remains influential, particularly in directing so-called "empirical" research on stratification.

The study of the relationship between ethnicity and class has fared little better outside the mainstream of sociological thought. Interestingly, the Marxian/conflict perspective, which usually stood in opposition to the classical theorists, contained a strikingly similar view of the fate of ethnicity in modern society. For Marx (1964, pp. 68-69; 1973, p. 163), ethnic ties were only significant in precapitalist societies and would wither away under the force of capitalist production relations and the emergence of class-based conflict. Likewise, Lenin (1968, pp. 20-21, emphasis in the original) viewed nationalism as a phenomenon of early capitalism, doomed in the face of "capitalism's world historical tendency to break down national barriers, obliterate national distinctions, and to assimilate nations." Although remaining vestiges of nationalism (i.e., "false consciousness" from the Marxian perspective) could serve as an obstacle to working class solidarity (cf.
Marx and Engels—1972—on "the Irish Question"), they would be swept away during the class struggle in which the proletariat would emerge victorious. To the extent that Marxian theory contained a sense of evolutionary inevitability, issues of ethnicity and nationality were generally de-emphasized.

Where ethnicity and nationality did figure in Leninist thought, however, was with respect to political strategy. In this case, the focus was upon the "national question"—the issue of the socialist position on the right of self-determination of nations (e.g., the famous debate between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg). For our more limited theoretical purposes, what is most interesting about this issue was the inclusion of the notion of the different class bases of nationalism (Lenin 1968, p. 65; Luxemburg 1976, pp. 136-38), the recognition that different classes may possess different "national" interests. Unfortunately (for our purposes), the development of this theoretical point was lost in the larger tactical issues. Later, the nuances of this debate were overshadowed by such concerns as the national unification of post-revolutionary societies and the construction of grand alliances to capitalist nations.

The Crisis of Classical Theories

By the middle of the twentieth century, however, the major theoretical schools had reached a paradigmatic "crisis" (cf. Kuhn 1970) with respect to ethnicity and
nationality. Within the most developed core societies, the proposition that ethnicity was no longer a relevant factor was belied by the persistence of supposedly assimilated groups, the emergence of ethno-national movements seeking political autonomy, and the intensification of existing "racial" cleavages (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; McRoberts and Postgate 1976; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). Similarly, the post-colonial nations which emerged in the periphery after 1945 found that ethnic divisions and conflict inhibited attempts at "nation-building" (Connor 1972; Horowitz 1985). From a Marxian perspective, the ideal of proletarian internationalism failed to overcome nationalist sentiments during world wars and in the foreign policies of socialist states (Davis 1978, pp. 17-22), while much anti-imperialist resistance emerged on a national basis (Ehrenreich 1983). Clearly, theories of modern society which fail to account for ethnicity and nationality as bases for social action have become rather obsolete.

From the vantage point of the present, it is evident that the classical assumption of progressive and uniform effects of modernization and the disappearance of ethnicity is empirically untenable. Indeed, most contemporary works begin with a critique of these earlier theories. On a global scale, the belief that all societies would follow the path of the most developed societies can be viewed as an unjustified generalization (a case of "West-centered reduc-
tionism"—Amin 1980, p. 12) which ignores the impact of
developed core societies upon the evolution of less-
developed peripheral societies. At the societal level, we
have found that the increased contact (and increasing homo­
geneity via diffusion) is as likely to lead to increased
conflict as it is to assimilation (Blumer 1965; Greeley
1974; Khleif 1978b), thus undercutting the underlying
assimilationist assumptions of most sociological studies.
As a consequence of the crisis of classical theory and its
successors, much recent literature has been devoted to
rethinking issues of ethnicity and nationality. What is
emerging are formulations which explicitly seek to explain
the persistence of ethnicity and nationality in modern
society.

Theories of Ethnicity and Nationality: Recent Trends

The final step in our survey of existing perspectives
on ethnicity and nationality is an assessment of the corpus
of "new" theories of ethnicity and nationality; that is,
formulations which have their genesis in the abovementioned
"crisis" of classical theories. We believe that the great
majority of these new perspectives are best viewed as
attempts to revise or modify earlier theories in light of
new realities—and can only be fully understood in this
context. Indeed, these new formulations share as a common
point of departure the rejection of the classical assumption
that communal identities would wither away in modern socie­
ties. Accordingly, each perspective seeks to address the same basic question: How can we account for the persistence of ethnicity and nationality in modern society? In order to analyze the diverse attempts to answer this question, we have organized existing approaches into the following rough taxonomy: (1) primordialism; (2) plural society theories; (3) the modernization/competition perspective; (4) reactive ethnicity; and (5) class theories. This taxonomy is not intended to provide a definitive system of classification, but is instead employed as a heuristic device for the analysis and criticism of existing theories prior to the presentation of our own framework.

**Primordialism**

This perspective seeks to address the problems of classical and functionalist theories by changing the properties of ethnicity. For primordialists, the persistence of ethnicity is due to the strength (i.e., the *primordial* nature) of communal ties which are grounded in precapitalist society but are able to resist the effects of modernization. As a primordial identity, ethnicity is a non-rational, affective, ascriptive tie rooted in the presumed "givens" of social existence (Geertz 1963)—such factors as descent, biological features, place of birth, name, language, and religion. Thus, ethnicity becomes a "basic group identity . . . a ready-made set of endowments and identifications which every individual shares with
others from the moment of birth by chance of the family into which he is born" (Isaacs 1975, p. 31). As a primordial bond which exists prior to action, ethnicity is, from the primordialist perspective, an immutable phenomenon which must be considered *sui generis* as a fundamental explanation for human behavior.

In its role as a corrective to traditional theory, primordialism assumes several different forms. For Edward Shils, who is credited with coining the term "primordial" (1957), such ties could assume a functional role in integrating modern society; however, Shils assumed (1975, pp. 45-46) that ethnic identities would diminish in favor of the more inclusive primordial tie of nationality. Similarly, Geertz (1963) sought to account for the persistence of ethnicity in post-colonial societies, thus leaving unchallenged the hypothesis that modernization resulted in the diminution of ethnic ties. On the other hand, more recent writers (e.g., Novak 1973; Greeley 1974; Isaacs 1974, 1975; Keyes 1976), particularly those examining the persistence of ethnicity in core nations, have extended the primordialist position to encompass the existence of ethnicity as a significant tie in modern societies. In this latter approach, the traditional thesis regarding the effects of modernization upon ethnicity is explicitly rejected and ethnicity is considered as basic to social action—or, one
might add, as a "permanent artifact" of preindustrial society.

As an explanation of ethnicity, primordialism has been widely criticized (e.g., Bonacich 1980; McKay 1982) for the unidimensional nature of its characterization of ethnicity as a primary motor for social action as well as for its de-emphasis of structural factors. The attribution of primordiality does little to explain variations in the existence and intensity of intergroup conflict or times when ethnicity is sublimated to other group ties. Moreover, the existence of *intragroup* conflict (e.g., Breton's—1972—description of intergroup differences among Quebecois/French-Canadians in Canada) constitutes a phenomenon totally outside the bounds of the primordialist perspective. Furthermore, an emphasis on primordiality is an emphasis on the psychological as opposed to the structural, thereby placing intergroup conflict in a "political and economic vacuum" (McKay 1982, p. 399).

Perhaps the most fundamental failing of primordialism, as noted in Chapter II, is that it provides a static and deterministic picture of ethnicity which ignores the variability of ethnic ties (e.g., assimilation vs. assertion; changing group boundaries). The "presumed givens" of primordialism are in fact variable (e.g., religion, language) or socially defined (e.g., biological features, descent, birthplace). This shortcoming has been recognized by some
primordialists (e.g., Geertz 1963, p. 109; Isaacs 1975, pp. 33-34; Keyes 1981); however, if identities vary according to circumstance, then primordiality is reduced to a description—a metaphor for the emotional intensity of ethnic affiliation. This is captured by Nagata's (1981, pp. 92-94) observation that primordiality is a matter of usage, that traits undergo "primordialization" in opposition to specific groups in a particular context. Thus, primordialism constitutes an ide­ological claim, not a social fact.

The major contributions of the primordialist perspective are its critique of traditional approaches and its role in calling attention to the affective aspects of ethnicity. Ironically, the primordialist approach may be viewed as a form of propaganda for pluralism and dissimilation; that is, it has a tendency to overstate ethnic persistence and to extol the virtues of diversity in the same manner that traditional sociology emphasized and glorified assimilation. It is as extreme—and as erroneous—a position as the view that ethnicity would disappear in modern societies. Ethnicity and nationality may be primordial to the extent that humans are social animals and tend to form groups on the basis of perceived similarities (whether cultural or territorial); however, primordiality is ultimately no more than a somewhat useful metaphor. More complex perspectives are necessary if we are to understand the variable and material nature of ethnic and national identities.
Plural Society Theories

This heading is employed to describe two dramatically different—and, one could say, diametrically opposed—perspectives on ethnic phenomena in modern societies. While both perspectives emphasize the "plural" nature of society, analytic distinctions have been drawn between equilibrium and conflict pluralism (van den Berghe 1969, p. 72; Kuper 1969a, pp. 8-16) and "pluralistic" vs. plural societies (Kuper and Smith 1969, pp. 3-4). The equilibrium or pluralistic society approach is more compatible with mainstream social science; however, it does attempt to address the issue of ethnic persistence. On the other hand, the conflict or plural society perspective constitutes a more radical break with the assimilationist assumptions of classical sociology and, hence, a more serious attempt to come to grips with issues of ethnicity in modern society.

The "pluralistic society" approach to ethnicity is an offshoot of the pluralist model of power employed by many political scientists and sociologists. Grounded in de Tocquevillean political theory (cf. van den Berghe 1965, p. 270; Burawoy 1974, p. 521), this perspective views modern society as an entity in which power is dispersed among interest groups based on multiple or overlapping ties, with competitive balance achieved via compromise or shifting coalitions (see, for example, Kornhauser 1960; Dahl 1961; Polsby 1980). Societal integration is achieved, in a manner
similar to the functionalist perspective, by adherence to a shared set of common values and political principles. Although the traditional pluralistic society approach emulated classical social theorists in postulating "rational" economic interests as the basis for interest group formation, it has more recently been extended to include ethnicity—perhaps as a reawakened primordial tie—as a basis for political mobilization (Bell 1975; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). In this scenario, social order is maintained through mutual toleration of ethnic differences (i.e., "cultural pluralism"), along with shared national identity and political institutions.

From our vantage point, the "pluralistic society" approach towards ethnicity is not a theory, but a description. It requires an additional mechanism (e.g., primordialism or modernization) to account for the persistence of emergence of ethnic ties. Moreover, we believe that the notion of a pluralistic society is flawed even as a description. Like functionalism, the pluralist approach to power has been criticized (e.g., Parenti 1978, pp. 27-37; Esping-Andersen, Friedland and Wright 1976; Whitt 1982) for ignoring or obfuscating the realities of the distribution of power and for overemphasizing the degree of consensus in modern society. With respect to ethnicity, the pluralistic perspective constitutes an ideal-typical description of a culturally plural society (e.g., the "melting pot" as it was
meant to be—cf. Zangwill 1906—in contrast to assimilation or "Anglo-conformity"), one which recognizes ethnic diversity but retains an emphasis on social equilibrium—in essence an ideological statement, not an empirical description. Although in some respects the pluralistic approach represents an advance over classical formulations, it ultimately offers no solution to the problem of explaining ethnicity in modern society.

In contrast, the plural society approach represents a more dramatic departure from the classical tradition. It is essentially a response to the failure of functionalism, grounded in the observation—first made by J. S. Furnivall (1948)—that there existed societies which were not integrated by a consensus on common values, but were instead divided by sharp cleavages (e.g., ethnicity) and held together through coercion (Kuper and Smith 1969, p. 3). For Furnivall, a plural society was a "tropical" society under colonial domination, a diverse "medley" of peoples forced into a common political unit by a colonial power. The causal factor in this case is economic, for economic forces (i.e., colonial exploitation) both created and maintained social pluralism. In such a society, according to Furnivall (1948, p. 304, cited in Kuper 1969a, pp. 10-11),

mix but do not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the marketplace, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community
living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit.

With respect to functionalism, this "plural society" constitutes a pathological social form, with more or less functionally integrated subsocieties bound together in an involuntary and unhappy relationship.

This formulation was later expanded by M. G. Smith (1965; 1969a; 1969b) to encompass societies outside of the colonial situation and bases for differentiation beyond ethnicity (cf. M. Smith 1969b, p. 436). In addition Smith viewed plural societies as emerging not from economic exploitation, as did Furnivall, but from cultural differences manifest in different institutional practices (e.g., kinship, religion). This institutional separation was a necessary, but not sufficient basis for Smith's plural society; what was also required was the differential (i.e., unequal) incorporation of these distinct culture groups into a common political structure under the domination of a cultural minority (Kuper 1969a, p. 12). Other writers in this tradition (e.g., van den Berghe 1965, p. 270; Kuper 1969a, pp. 15-19) embrace less rigid conceptualizations of "plural society" by introducing the notion of pluralism as a variable (i.e., societies exhibiting varying levels of pluralism) and by seeking to elaborate factors which affect this variation. Used in this sense, a plural society is a society containing substantial ethnic cleavage and conflict (Thompson 1983, p. 127).
In our view, the major contribution of the plural society approach is the recognition of the structural basis of ethnic persistence (and the reproduction of this basis), particularly Furnivall's recognition of the role of colonialism in expanding ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the development of the notion of plural society has been rather limited. The insistence by Smith upon institutional separation reduces plural society to an ideal type or a description of an empirically rare extreme form of an ethnically divided society. Yet if Smith's assumptions are relaxed to incorporate pluralism as a variable (e.g., van den Berghe, Kuper), then "plural society" becomes essentially a descriptive term for an ethnically divided society. Moreover, given the multiethnic nature of modern societies, virtually every society would be a plural society in this broader sense, thus removing any descriptive or analytical utility (cf. R. Cohen 1978, pp. 398-99). Consequently, the plural society perspective is best viewed as a set of "sensitizing concepts" (van den Berghe 1973, p. 970), a framework for study which employs ethnicity as a basic explanatory variable, one which is analytically coequal with class (Thompson 1983, p. 128).

Even as a framework for research, however, we believe that the plural society approach contains several serious deficiencies. First, little attention is devoted to the nature of ethnicity; instead, it is viewed as extrinsic--but
not in a primordial sense—in that group cultural differences precede any particular social setting (cf. Banton 1983, p. 93). As a consequence, intergroup commonalities are downplayed and intragroup variation is neglected. Secondly, other than Furnivall's emphasis upon colonial domination, the plural society perspective lacks a motor force for conflict and change, especially in that primacy is given to political domination and economic issues are seen as derivative (Greenberg 1980, p. 18). It is difficult to envision "differences in institutional practice" (M. Smith 1969a, p. 27) as being the root cause of ethnic conflict in such "plural societies" as South Africa and Sri Lanka. In sum, while the plural society approach recognizes the shortcomings of classical sociology and properly views ethnicity as linked to social structure, it offers little beyond extended description as an explanation for ethnic phenomena.

Modernization/Competition Approaches

This is less an organized paradigm than a convenient heading for a group of approaches which we believe share the same underlying assumptions. The crux of the modernization/competition thesis addresses the "crisis" of classical theories of ethnicity by asserting—in direct contrast to earlier theories—that modernization results in increased ethnic conflict and, hence, the persistence or even resurgence of ethnic identities. Like the earlier classical and functionalist theories, the modernization/competition
model views modernization or industrialization as leading to urbanization, bureaucratization, and the ascension of "market" criteria. What is different about the modernization/competition perspective, however, is the view that modernization, by bringing groups into closer contact with each other (e.g., via expanded markets and improvements in transportation and communication) and by destabilizing existing interrelationships (e.g., productive activities, demographic balances), creates competition between groups, competition which heightens ethnic solidarity and sharpens group boundaries (Barth 1969; Blumer 1965; Despres 1975; Deutsch 1966, pp. 125-26; Banton 1983; Nielsen 1985).

Moreover, these effects of modernization are felt not only in peripheral societies undergoing rapid change, but also in the most modern societies (Khleif 1978b; Nielsen 1980; Olzak 1982).

Unlike the primordialist and plural society approaches which emphasize the persistence of cultural differences between groups, the modernization/competition perspective maintains that ethnic identities can flourish despite the reduction of intergroup cultural differences (Barth 1969, pp. 32-33). What is essential for the persistence of ethnic identities is resource competition between groups (Despres 1975, p. 199; Barth 1969, p. 25; A. Cohen 1974a, 1974b), competition stemming from modernization. Given the seemingly inevitable acculturation which results from intergroup
contact, the continuation of ethnic boundaries implies the conscious structuring of interaction and rearranging of identities to maintain distinctions between groups (Barth 1969, p. 16). Thus, ethnic identities may persist in a "we-they" sense, regardless of diminished cultural differences between groups, as long as there exists a conscious reason for doing so. Indeed, in instances of ethnic resurgence, the symbolic content may be revived or invented from the past in order to facilitate mobilization for competition (Gellner 1964; Khleif 1985).

In light of the postulated connection between modernization and ethnic persistence or resurgence, many of those who follow the modernization/competition approach have sought to elaborate mechanisms through which modernization increases ethnic mobilization and conflict. Examples of such mechanisms include the following:

**Transformation of social structure.** As modernization changes traditional economic activities (i.e., production, markets) and relations of domination, the process of establishing new arrangements may lead to increased intergroup competition and ethnic assertion (Despres 1975, p. 202; Khleif 1978b; Gellner 1964, p. 171). With the disintegration of empires and the post-1945 wave of decolonization, the ensuing power vacuums led to increased intergroup conflict (cf. Banton 1983, pp. 193-95; this is also a basic premise of the "plural society" model). Furthermore, this
wave of anti-colonialism and nationalism spread from the periphery to the core, triggering a rise in ethnonationalism among historically subjugated groups (i.e., the "Third World within the First World"--Khleif 1985; that is, groups such as the Welsh and the Quebecois who were previously assumed to have assimilated; see also A. Smith 1981, pp. 19-25). Ethnic mobilization within the core was also stimulated by the relative gains of minorities vis-a-vis previously hegemonic groups (e.g., "White Ethnics" vs. WASPs in the United States--Burgess 1978, p. 277; Khleif 1978b) and by the emergence of an ethnic intelligentsia or middle class (i.e., cultural entrepreneurs) who saw further gains as tied to the assertion (as opposed to masking, which had been the previous route to mobility) of ethnic identity (Gellner 1964, pp. 168-70; A. Smith 1981, pp. 108-33; Khleif 1984b; Doane unpublished, p. 73).

Migration. One significant phenomenon of the modern era has been large scale migration in response to changing labor markets (Hechter 1976; Castles and Kosack 1973; Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982; di Leonardo 1984). Although often underemphasized by earlier students of ethnic relations (cf. Burgess 1978, p. 279), one effect of migration has been to bring together--often within a short time span--previously separated groups under conditions of economic competition or domination of one group by another. Moreover, the process of international migration continues (al-
though the identity of the participants may change), thus constantly changing (and often sharpening) the nature of ethnic relations within societies (e.g., the recent influx of Hispanics and Asians into the United States).

**Changing role of the state.** With modernization, the state has assumed an increasingly important role as an economic actor, both in terms of social capital expenditures (e.g., education, infrastructure) and the social need programs of the "welfare state" (cf. O'Connor 1973). In addition, the state serves as a source of valued resources (e.g., public sector employment and expenditure--Khleif 1984b; Horowitz 1985, pp. 224-25) and an arbiter of political claims (e.g., civil rights, affirmative action). Indeed, if groups occupy separate territories within a nation-state, the geographical "patchiness" of the effects of political decisions may give virtually any state action an ethnic flavor (Nielsen 1985, p. 144). Consequently, ethnicity may be activated as a means of mobilizing to press group claims for inclusion or preference and for a share of social resources (Bell 1975; Khleif 1978b).

**Mass society.** Another outgrowth of modernization has been the expansion of the scope of markets, organizations, institutions, and media—the emergence of an increasingly interconnected "mass society." While the classical and functionalist perspectives held that these processes would lead to assimilation and more inclusive (e.g., national,
global) identities, modernization/competition theorists emphasize ways in which mass society may facilitate ethnic mobilization. For example, increased intragroup homogeneity (i.e., the merging of subgroups) and improved communication may increase the effective size and scope of ethnic mobilization, while expanded labor markets and the enhanced role of education increase the potential value of large scale organizations (Nielsen 1985; Burgess 1978, p. 279). At the same time, pressures for societal homogenization may spur ethnic assertion as a reaction to perceived external dominance (Khleif 1985; A. Smith 1981). Finally, a sense of alienation or rootlessness due to a loss of traditional ways may spark an ethnic resurgence as a "quest for community," a search for Gemeinschaft in the midst of Gesellschaft (Khleif 1984b; 1985). In each instance the claimed effect of modernization is an increase in the assertion of ethnic ties.

**Competition theories: a critical comment.** In our view, modernization/competition approaches constitute a significant improvement over classical theories of ethnicity. They address the reality of the persistence of ethnicity by locating it squarely in the dynamics of contemporary society. Moreover, competition serves as a plausible context for ethnic persistence; even the "non-rational" affective elements of ethnicity can be explained in terms of perceived interests or group solidarity. At the same time,
however, the modernization/competition perspective has some serious shortcomings. It does not easily explain *intragroup* differences in ethnic assertion or why some groups might assimilate while others persist. Furthermore, competition theory is circular to the extent that it claims that while competition is ethnically based, it is in turn essential for the maintenance of ethnic affiliations (e.g., Despres 1975, p. 199). Without an additional mechanism (e.g., primordialism, modernization following pre-existing cleavages), ethnicity and competition would appear inexplicably as both cause and effect of each other.

**Reactive Ethnicity**

According to this approach, ethnically based action is actually a *reaction* to structural discrimination; that is, a "cultural division of labor" where individuals are assigned to specific occupations on the basis of ethnic affiliation (Hechter 1974, p. 1154). Inasmuch as ethnic assertion is a reaction to migration or to the differential effects of modernization (i.e., unequal benefits) upon ethnic groups, the reactive ethnicity perspective could seemingly be viewed as a variant of the modernization/competition approach, except that it emphasizes *separation* of groups as opposed to contact (Nielsen 1980; 1985). On the other hand, unless an additional mechanism, such as internal colonialism (Hechter 1975), which creates and perpetuates ethnic divisions is specified, there is little to distinguish reactive ethnicity...
from the functionalist assertion that ethnic persistence is merely the result of the "accidental" coincidence of ethnic and functional cleavages and should disappear with complete modernization (Nielsen 1980, p. 78). Accordingly, the reactive ethnicity model per se is of rather limited utility in explaining ethnic phenomena.

**Class Theories.**

Given that Marx provided no systematic writings on ethnicity and nationality and that the orthodox Marxian position has always maintained that ethnic ties would fade away in the face of capitalist relations of production, many attempts have been made to "revise" Marx in light of the obvious persistence and salience of ethnicity. While there is no integrated body of theory, we will divide existing formulations into the following rough taxonomy: (1) ethnicity as class strategy; (2) ethnicity as class; and (3) ethnicity as colonized nation.

**Ethnicity as class strategy.** In this variant of class theory, it is claimed that the capitalist class employs ethnicity (i.e., "precapitalist divisions") to create an underclass which can be paid artificially low wages (thus increasing the rate of surplus value--i.e., "superexploitation") and to create political divisions within the working class (Reich 1970, 1981; Baran and Sweezy 1966). Consequently, ethnicity is not a meaningful social reality per se, but rather a deliberate creation (albeit based on pre-
existing categories) of the bourgeoisie. An alternative—but in our opinion related—perspective is split or segmented labor market theory (Bonacich 1972; 1979), a class theory which emphasizes ethnic competition within the working class, but which also retains a key role for capital. According to the split labor market perspective, ethnic conflict results from the efforts of relatively advantaged dominant group labor to defend its position (via discrimination, immigration restriction, etc.) in the face of attempts by capital to replace highly paid labor with "cheaper" (i.e., superexploited) labor from subordinate groups. In this schema, ethnicity is once again relegated to a secondary role—by "historical accident" it happens to be correlated with labor market status (Bonacich 1980, p. 14). Indeed, if ethnic antagonism is a result of "accidental" cleavages, then there is little to separate split labor market theory from the reactive ethnicity approach.

**Ethnicity as class.** In this context, ethnicity is more than a capitalist device, ethnic groups are essentially "blurred collective representations of classes" (Wallerstein 1972, p. 222). This formulation is most often applied when class and ethnic boundaries coincide, as in the case of "middleman minorities" (Bonacich 1973) or "caste-like" situations (South Africa, American Blacks in the Jim Crow era), to produce a "people-class" (Leon 1970) which contributes to the persistence of ethnicity, yet is in essence a
class. From the world-system perspective (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1983; Wallerstein 1972), class and "status" (i.e., ethnicity) are two manifestations of the same phenomenon of group formation, except that class takes logical precedence in that if underlying class differences disappear, then the status-group conflicts would also eventually disappear (Wallerstein 1972, p. 221).

Ethnicity as "colonized nation". This perspective is closely linked to the debate on the "national question"--the self determination of nations as an intermediate revolutionary step--mentioned earlier in the chapter. For some students of the world-economy (e.g., Cox 1959; Magubane 1979) racial/ethnic/national domination is an effect of the superexploitation manifest in Western colonialism and imperialism. Likewise, Third World revolutionary theorists (e.g., Fanon, Cabral) emphasized the national basis of resistance to capitalist colonial rule.22 By extension (or by analogy), this analysis was applied to ethnic groups within nations so that ethnic stratification became colonialism and ethnic assertion became national liberation (cf. Blauner--1972; and Omi and Winant--1986, pp. 38-47--on Black nationalism in the United States and the use of internal colonialism to facilitate ethnic mobilization).23 As a consequence, many analysts spoke of internal colonialism; that is, the political and cultural domination and economic exploitation of a geographically discrete ethnic enclave
within the boundaries of the nation-state. The notion of internal colony has been employed to study South Africa (Wolpe 1972); Blacks and Hispanics in the United States (Blauner 1972; Barrera 1979); Quebec (McRoberts 1979); the Celtic Fringe of Great Britain (Hechter 1975; Khleif 1978b); Frisians in the Netherlands (Khleif 1985); and various South American nations (Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1970)--to name a few. In each case, internal colonialism was employed as a tool to facilitate the analysis of ethnic interaction in the appropriate historical, comparative, and structural contexts.

Class theories: a critical comment. Like the modernization/competition perspective, contemporary class theories represent a significant advance over classical and mainstream approaches to the study of ethnicity. Class theories emphasize the importance of understanding the link between ethnicity and class and the role of class interests in motivating "ethnic" behavior, while encouraging a perspective which is both macroscopic and comparative. Nevertheless, existing class approaches contain many limitations. While both the superexploitation and the split labor market approaches pinpoint key group interests, neither "bourgeois machinations" nor labor market competition provide a satisfactory explanation of the complexity of ethnic identities and intergroup conflict. Similarly, the notion of ethnicity as latent class might be applicable in special cases where
class and ethnic boundaries coincide; however, it has little utility in other situations where the proliferation of "people-classes" would dilute the explanatory value of "ethnicity as class." Internal colonialism, while perhaps a useful metaphor in sensitizing analysts to historical and structural forces, lacks an explanation of change, minimizes interconnections between sectors, and leads to an overemphasis on political domination, nationalism and in-group homogeneity (Burawoy 1974, pp. 523-27; Khleif 1985; Frank 1969; Omi and Winant 1986, pp. 49-50). Carried to an extreme, internal colonialism mystifies social relationships by confounding ethnicity and nationality and by ignoring intragroup class divisions—it becomes a class theory from which class has been jettisoned. Ultimately, the class approaches seemingly provide little explanation for why ethnic identities persist or evolve; indeed, ethnicity is either viewed (by the superexploitation, split labor market, and ethnicity as class approaches) as epiphenomenal to class (with the ultimate goal being the attenuation of ethnic affiliations in the name of class unity) or (by internal colonialism) as a replacement for class. Thus, we believe that current class theories of ethnicity grossly oversimplify the reality of intergroup relations.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we have conducted a critical review of existing theories of ethnic change in an attempt to assess
their utility for our own endeavor. From the outset, we characterized theories of ethnic change as one of the "failures" of social science, a state of affairs which we traced back to pre-1960 social theories which posited the diminution of ethnic ties in modern industrial society. As we described above, however, the basis of these theories (i.e., the decline of ethnicity) was contradicted by the persistence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which became particularly evident during the post-1945 era. In response to this "crisis" of classical theory, the modern (i.e., post-1960) study of ethnicity has been dominated by the emergence of new theories which attempt to explain the continuing significance of ethnicity in contemporary society. Given this progression of theories of ethnicity, our central task in this chapter was to evaluate five current perspectives on ethnicity and nationality—(1) primordialism, (2) plural society theories, (3) modernization/competition approaches, (4) reactive ethnicity, and (5) class theories—in terms of how they addressed our basic question: What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear?

Despite the contributions of these contemporary paradigms in addressing the persistence of ethnicity, our conclusion was that they contained several significant limitations. All of the perspectives analyzed above treat ethnicity as unidimensional, thereby failing to explain the
phenomenon of within-group variation discussed in Chapter II. Moreover, several approaches—e.g., primordialism, plural society theory, reactive ethnicity, and internal colonialism—lack any dynamic for social conflict or change. As a result, they are reduced to little more than descriptions of ethnically divided societies. Even those perspectives which we viewed as most promising—competition and class theories—remain flawed. The competition perspective seemingly lacks any grounding in larger structural and historical dynamics, thereby leaving it susceptible to reduction to an individual phenomenon. Class theories, meanwhile, suffer from a failure to take ethnicity seriously, a belief that in the final analysis ethnicity remains an epiphenomenon of class. Consequently, we feel the need to look elsewhere for a theory of ethnic change.

In our view, what is needed is a perspective which can accomplish the following tasks. First, ethnicity must be taken seriously as an explanatory concept in its own right, rather than viewed as a given or as an epiphenomenon. Secondly, any perspective on ethnicity and nationality must be able to address the issues of within-group variation; that is, it must provide a theory of assimilation as well as persistence, and it should be able to account for different actions by members of the same ethnic group. Thirdly, it is necessary to develop a more explicit link between ethnicity and class; to explain the interrelationship between these
two affiliations, rather than to declare one as conceptual terra firma having analytical precedence. Finally, any theory of ethnicity and nationality must have a macrostructural dynamic; that is, it must be grounded in global processes capable of explaining both the evolution and the broad variation of ethnic and national phenomena. It is to the development of a framework for such a theory that we will turn in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER III

1. We view these phenomena as integrated components of the larger process of global capitalist development.

2. The reader may observe that relatively little mention is made of nationality in this chapter. This reflects the reality—described in Chapter II—that nationality has for the most part been overlooked by students of race and ethnic relations. The few exceptions to this (the nation-building school, the national liberation variant of Marxian thought) will be addressed briefly below.

3. For summaries and critiques of this perspective, see Barringer, Blanksten and Mack (1965); Moore (1960); Parsons (1964); Eisenstadt (1970); Bendix (1967); Weinberg (1969); and A. Smith (1973).

4. For Park (1974d, p. 354), even slavery was a case of temporary accommodation prior to assimilation. On the other hand, Park's race relations cycle was not as unilinear as has often been portrayed, as he observed (1974b, p. 150) that various social processes (e.g., racial barriers, immigration restriction) could slacken or even temporarily halt the process of assimilation.

5. Interestingly, this viewpoint was presaged by Park (1974c, p. 116) who observed that:

Looking at race relations in the long historical perspective, this modern world which seems destined to bring presently all the diverse and distant peoples of the earth together within the limits of a common culture and a common social order, strikes one as something not merely unique but millennial! Nevertheless, this new civilization is the product of essentially the same historical processes as those which proceeded it. The same forces which brought about the diversity of races will inevitably bring about, in the long run, a diversity of peoples in the modern world corresponding to that which we have seen in the old. It is likely, however, that these diversities will be based in the future less on inheritance and race and rather more on culture and occupation. That means that race conflicts in the modern world, which is already or presently
will be a single great society, will be more and more in the future confused with, and eventually superseded by, the conflicts of classes.

6. For an excellent discussion of this point and a critique of the mainstream ethnicity paradigm, see Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 15-24).

7. Lenin did adopt the position that nationalism could be a progressive force to the extent that it enabled "backwards" nations to resist core imperialism (i.e., "reactionary" nationalism) and commence the process of capitalist development necessary for the emergence of class struggle (cf. Davis 1978, p. 73).

8. For original positions in this debate, see Lenin (1968) and Luxemburg (1976). An interesting summary is provided by Davis (1978).

9. For a brief discussion of this point, see Bonacich (1980, p. 16).

10. The literature on dependency theory (e.g., Frank 1967; 1969) served as a first major critique of the modernization/developmentalist perspective. For critical evaluations of dependency theory, see Palma (1978); Brenner (1977).

11. While Hechter (1974, p. 1153) places Shils squarely within the traditional functionalist camp, I believe that Shils' efforts constitute an attempt to "update" functionalism to explain the persistence of ethnicity. His writings on the "crisis of national integration" (Shils 1975, pp. 50-63) exhibit an awareness of the persistence and resurgence of ethnicity.

12. See the critiques of primordialism by Patterson (1975); Steinberg (1981); and Yinger (1985).

13. Furnivall's observation was anticipated by Robert E. Park (1974d, pp. 353-54) who wrote in 1928 that:

Under such circumstances peoples of different racial stocks may live side by side in a relation of symbiosis, each playing a role in a common economy, but not interbreeding to any great extent; each maintaining, like the gypsy or the pariah peoples of India, a more or less complete tribal organization or society of their own.

14. Thus, for Smith, the United States would not be a plural society.
15. In a most general sense, intergroup resource competition could be viewed as underlying most theories of ethnicity (cf. Nielsen 1985, p. 134ff.).

16. Indeed, some theorists (e.g., Bell 1975) go so far as to maintain that ethnicity, with its affective intensity, now supersedes class as a basis for organization.

17. While some authors would include the discrimination theories of Becker (1971) or the human capital theories of Sowell (1975; 1978; 1981) under the aegis of class theories, we hold that Becker provides a theory of discrimination, not of ethnicity, while the work of Sowell is too reductionistic to merit serious consideration.

18. Indeed, Marx is seemingly contradictory on this issue. On one hand, in The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels (1964, pp. 5-8) describe the dissolution of nations amidst the revolutionization of production and the expansion of the world market. On the other hand, their analysis in Ireland and the Irish Question (Marx and Engels 1972) shows an inclination to take ethnicity into account as a factor in class struggle.

19. Superexploitation theories have also been applied on a global level; for example, the assertion that racist ideologies emerge as a result of (and as legitimation for) core imperialism and colonial domination (cf. Cox 1959).

20. Bonacich (1980, p. 14) would disagree with our linking the superexploitation and split labor market approaches; however, we believe that the superexploitation and split labor market theories describe the responses of two different eth-classes (dominant group capital, dominant group working class) to the same circumstances. We will develop this argument in subsequent chapters. For an insightful critique of labor market segmentation approaches, see Hodson and Kaufman (1982).

21. For those working within this paradigm, a major issue of contention is the role of dominant-group industrial workers: whether they are manipulated "victims" who suffer due to working class fragmentation or willing participants who benefit from the exploitation of the ethnic underclass (cf. Lenin's "labor aristocracy").

22. For a discussion of Fanon and Cabral on this issue, see David (1978, pp. 212-228). This "anti-imperialist" model was often linked to a two-stage theory of revolution in which national liberation is viewed as a

23. For example, Blauner (1972, p. viii) explicitly grounds his analysis in the social movements of oppressed groups.

24. For example, in the United States, with its myriad of ethnic groups, potential "people-classes" could number in the dozens—an unwieldy basis for a "class" system.

25. As a guiding metaphor, internal colonialism overlooks one essential fact; that is, that "a colony can become independent, while an internal colony is integrated into a larger society" (Burawoy 1974, p. 523). In a particularly trenchant critique of internal colonialism, Southall (1983, pp. 10-17) notes that the colonial analogy has been used by the South African state to support "separate development" and the "independence" of Black homelands. Similarly, in an analysis of the U.S. case, Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 48-51) note that the nationalist analogy and demands for "community control" were used by dominant groups to resist minority demands.
CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL MODEL

In this chapter, we will present our theoretical model for understanding ethnicity and nationality in the post-1800 world-economy. As we noted in Chapter I, a model can be defined as a list of interrelated elements—and some statements of relations among them—useful in understanding a given phenomenon. In actuality, we intend to proceed beyond this, introducing notions or "working hypotheses" which we believe are helpful to the development of a global theory of ethnicity and nationality. Nevertheless, our use of the word model is intentional, for it underscores the preliminary nature of this work; that is, the fact that we view this undertaking as an initial attempt to indicate a new direction in response to what we have described as the shortcomings of existing works. In this context, our goal is to establish a general theoretical framework for the study of ethnicity and nationality, one which stresses both the importance of analyzing the relationship between ethnicity and class and the necessity of grounding theories in global dynamics. If we are successful in this effort, we will, we hope, have established a "base camp" for future explorations.

The presentation of our model will begin with a brief consideration of our basic sociological assumptions regard-
ing the nature of groups and the issue of levels of analysis. We believe that exposition of our position on these issues will provide the reader with a broader context within which our framework can be more easily understood. Following this, we will embark upon a discussion of the relationship between ethnicity and class, introducing the "eth-class" as a key analytical concept. In the third section of the chapter, we will explore the significance of the process of global capitalist development and the uneven nature of that development (especially the core-periphery distinction) for the evolution of ethnic and national identities. From this general discussion, we will then turn to a series of "working hypotheses"; that is, notions regarding the differential evolution of ethnic relations in core and periphery which will guide our subsequent analysis. In addition, we will also "flesh out" our framework (and facilitate our subsequent case studies) by listing aspects of nation-states (e.g., nature of the political system) which we believe exert a particular influence upon the nature of ethnic relations and national identities in historically specific circumstances. Finally, at the conclusion of the chapter, we will provide a brief summary of our model.

**Underlying Assumptions: Social Groups and Society**

Underlying our approach to issues of ethnicity and nationality are some fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of social groups and society. We believe that humans
create social groups and, hence, society as they interact in order to pursue goals and produce the necessities of material existence. Affiliation with such groups is a basic source of human identity (i.e., the "reference group"), while group participation shapes how humans perceive and act upon the world around them. Human social groupings are not static entities but ongoing processes; moreover, they only assume significance in relation to other groups (i.e., "ingroups" vs. "outgroups"—Sumner 1906). In this intergroup setting, group membership operates through processes of inclusion and exclusion (i.e., maintenance of a boundary via some diacritical characteristic) and the group itself persists through its utility to at least some of the actors involved. Groups compete with each other for valued resources as they seek to improve their relative position or to maintain the status quo.

Ethnicity and nationality are not unique phenomena, they represent one type of possible group affiliation which may or may not be asserted (Nielsen 1985). In other words, ethnicity and nationality may be potent, even central bases for group formation, yet they nevertheless remain a basis for group formation along with class, occupation, religion, sex, and other potential affiliations. Such a formulation is somewhat at variance with the prevailing tendency to ascribe "special status" to ethnicity and nationality; however, we believe that it is necessary to remove the
mystifying veil of "uniqueness" in order to ask the proper questions concerning the nature of ethnicity and nationality. As organizational forms, ethnicity and nationality are communal affiliations grounded in real or putative common origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint destiny (nationality is distinguished from ethnicity by its link to political and territorial autonomy; i.e., to a nation-state). Yet we also hold that ethnicity and nationality are more than communal ties. As a basis for social groupings, ethnicity and nationality are ideological/cultural constructs stemming from the conditions of material life. While other services to members (e.g., psychological) may become significant, the ultimate relevance (and, hence, survival) of groups is linked to their material utility; that is, their role vis-a-vis challenging or maintaining the system of ethnic stratification. In other words, ethnicity and nationality are communal identities with a material base. Thus, during intergroup resource competition, ethnic and national identities continually evolve; that is, the assertion, masking, or change of identities occurs—whether voluntarily, via negotiation, or through ascription—in response to the changing exigencies of intergroup competition and conflict. A key question then, is: What effects do different types of intergroup interaction have on ethnic and national identities?
In the study of the role of ethnicity and nationality in human affairs, one important consideration is that of level of analysis; that is, determination of the level at which the evolution of ethnic and national identities is most fruitfully explained. This is a difficult question, inasmuch as society is best viewed as a series of concentric contexts (Khleif 1985) and ethnicity and nationality are asserted in a variety of milieus ranging from super-macro (global) and macro (nation-state) to meso (institutional) and micro (local or household). As we stated in Chapter I, we begin from the premise that the ultimate level of analysis for the study of ethnicity and nationality is the world-system; however, we will tend to emphasize the nation-state as a focal unit for analysis. Our rationale for this is simple: in the contemporary world-system, the nation-state is the primary arena for intergroup competition, while the state itself plays a key role in shaping ethnic relations and national identities. In other words, the nation-state, while a "subunit of the world-system" (Khleif 1985), becomes the practical context for the analysis of ethnic and national phenomena. At the same time, we will retain our global emphasis by anchoring our analysis in processes of the world-system, thereby employing these processes as key contextual variables in the study of ethnicity and nationality. Furthermore, we will seek to remain sensitive to what we might term "lower-level" processes occurring within the
nation-state; for example, the impact of uneven regional
development on intergroup relations. Given the model-
building nature of this work, our efforts will necessarily
be preliminary; however, one component of a complete theory
of ethnicity would be the ability to articulate intergroup
interaction at the global, national, regional, and local
levels.

Eth-Class: A Tool for Understanding Group Action

In the macro-level analysis of human affairs, eth­
nicity/nationality and class, both of which are rooted in
material relations, are perhaps the most salient bases of
group affiliation. As we observed in Chapter II, individ­
uals possess potential affiliations with other individuals
in the same productive circumstances (class) and the same
communal order (ethnic group or nation). Most contemporary
perspectives on ethnicity have attempted to specify the
nature of the relationship between ethnicity and class, the
conditions under which intergroup relations emphasize
communal ties as opposed to class distinctions (cf. Mast
1974; Lewis 1974). For some theorists (e.g., primordialists
and plural society theorists), ethnicity and class have been
viewed as competitive, mutually exclusive affiliations, with
one asserted at the expense of the other. In contrast,
other perspectives (e.g., competition, reactive ethnicity,
and class theories) have depicted ethnicity and class as
largely coincidental; that is, as drawing upon the same
membership, with one affiliation considered an epiphenomenon of the other, more basic tie. Thus, to accord analytical primacy to either ethnicity or class is to take, either explicitly or implicitly, a theoretical position in the above debate.

From our perspective, the competitive-coincidental dichotomy is a misleading oversimplification. Ethnicity and class are neither competing nor coincidental forms of group affiliation; such conceptualizations are ideal types rather than empirical realities. Each individual has both an ethnic and a class position; each class/ethnic group contains ethnic/class differences. Thus, we will assert that ethnicity and class are interrelated (via their common grounding in material practice) in a manner much more complex than is suggested by the ideal types of competition and coincidence. In other words, we cannot study ethnicity and class independently of one another, but as integrated affiliations (cf. Marger 1978, p. 21). What is needed, therefore, is an analytical device which will enable us to explore the intricacies of the interrelationship between ethnicity and class.

Accordingly, we believe that a basic unit of analysis for group action is the "eth-class" (adapted from Gordon 1964, p. 51); that is, social location in terms of both ethnicity and class (e.g., British capitalist class, Italian-American working class, Black middle class). In
our view, the major advantage of the notion of eth-class is that it allows us to analyze both class interests within ethnic groups and ethnic divisions within classes—the different material bases for action for different eth-class segments. At the same time, it is essential to emphasize that we are employing eth-class in a sense which is dramatically different from that of Gordon—or Abram Leon's (1970) similar notion of "people class". For us, eth-class is an analytical tool, more valuable as an objective category than as a concrete basis for action or the subjective identity which ipso facto accompanies such a category. Indeed, it is rare that an individual or group would develop an "eth-class consciousness" along the lines of class or ethnic consciousness. For example, working class Blacks are more likely to view themselves (and to mobilize for action) as Black or working class rather than as Black working class.

If we assert that eth-class is primarily an objective category, how do we make the transition from eth-class to group action along ethnic or class lines? In general, we accept the proposition that individuals and groups act to pursue material interests and to ensure survival (cf. Patterson 1975). Each eth-class segment has unique material interests which reflect a blend of ethnic and class interests. Depending upon whether interests are defined in class or ethnic terms (see Thompson—1983, pp. 129-30—on class vs. ethnic economic interests), mobilization for group
action (and the assertion of identity) can occur along either ethnic/national or class lines, involving ad hoc combinations or "alliances" of eth-classes (e.g., the alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and working classes). Furthermore, the differing constellations of ethnic and class interests may impel various eth-classes to adopt different strategies, even though the ultimate action may be cloaked in similar ethnic or class terms with regard to other groups (cf. See--1986--on different material interests of Protestant capitalist and working classes in Northern Ireland, yet the similarity of their ethnic assertion vs. Catholics). In modern society, the general goal of eth-class alliances is to advance interests by seeking to attain or to influence state power (i.e., to realize greater inclusion or exclusion of subordinate groups); that is, mobilization will occur within a national context (cf. Marx and Engels 1964, p. 22).

On a general level, a rough typology of potential eth-class alliances might be as follows:

1. **Ethnic mobilization.** This would involve group mobilization along ethnic lines, a cross-class alliance (elite, working class, etc.) of the eth-class units of a particular ethnic group. Such an alliance could occur in the face of real or perceived oppression or ethnic-based challenges to the status quo. To some extent, it may also reflect the ability of the ethnic elite to manipulate the
symbolic content of group identity (or, from a Marxian standpoint, "false consciousness" on the part of the ethnic working class). One concomitant of ethnic mobilization is increased assertion (i.e., strengthening) of ethnic identity.

2. **National mobilization.** This is ethnic mobilization at the level of the nation-state; that is, a "cross-class, cross-ethnic" alliance. Like its ethnic counterpart, national mobilization may reflect real or perceived material and political interests and/or manipulation by hegemonic eth-classes (i.e., the bourgeoisie of the dominant ethnic group). One outcome of national mobilization may be the at least temporary muting of ethnic identities (i.e., assimilation); however, attempts by dominant ethnic groups to cast national identity in their image may trigger ethnic mobilization on the part of subordinate groups (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement by Black Americans during the 1960s and the ethnic resurgence among White Ethnics as responses to the hegemony of WASPs in shaping "American" national identity).

3. **Ethnic merger.** A third type of mobilization entails the superimposition of eth-class matrices upon one another, either via the absorption of one group by another, or through the merger of two or more groups into a new "pan-ethnic" group.* Mergers would generally occur as groups band together (or are forced together) to assert interests
vis-a-vis other entities. In this case, the outcome is the change of one or more ethnic identities.

4. **Class mobilization.** This is a "cross-ethnic" alliance—the unifying of eth-classes and the assertion of interests along class lines. For our purposes, the key outcome here is a diminution (although not necessarily irreversible) of ethnic ties.

At this abstract level, we have little more to add to our conceptual discussion of eth-class. The eth-class alliances we have described above should be viewed as temporary arrangements, as social movements which seek to alter the institutional and ideological contexts of group relations, including the redefinition of ethnic understandings (cf. Omi and Winant—1986—on racial formation). Moreover, these alliances are not necessarily mutually exclusive, more than one may occur simultaneously within a society (the United States is a prime example of this).

With respect to the conditions under which eth-class alliances emerge (i.e., why mobilization occurs along class vs. ethnic lines, or vice-versa, or along both lines), much remains unaddressed at this juncture. In addition, we have yet to assess the impact of such factors as the number and relative size of eth-class units and the duration of eth-class alliances. These issues will be developed when we analyze intergroup relations in historically specific circumstances.
Structural Context: Capitalist Development

Our attempt to address issues of ethnicity and nationality begins with our central thesis:

The evolution of ethnic and national identities (i.e., the formation of eth-class alliances) can only be understood in the context of the process of global capitalist development.

This is not to assert that capitalist development per se "explains" the evolution of ethnic and national identities, but that capitalist development constitutes the structural context, the most general basis for explanation. In our opinion, current theories of ethnicity and nationality (which we criticized in Chapter III) either lack a basic motor force or employ processes (e.g., modernization, industrialization) which we believe are corollaries of capitalist development. Thus, if ethnicity and nationality are to be better comprehended, then they must be deliberately linked to the dynamics of global capitalist development.

Why are we emphasizing capitalist development as the most general explanation for the evolution of ethnicity and nationality? As we noted earlier, the dominant means through which humans produce their subsistence (in the post-1800 world, this is the capitalist mode of production) will have significant effect upon social existence (cf. Marx 1970, pp. 20-21). In the case of capitalism, this influence has been particularly pervasive. Over the past half-millennium, capitalism has revolutionized the production of
material life, which in turn has transformed social life through such processes as proletarianization; the domination of market relations; the emergence of mass institutions, mass society, and even mass communication on a world scale; and the production and dissemination of new technologies and ideologies. Unlike other social formations (e.g., precapitalist empires), capitalism transformed entire societies, destroying previous systems of production (either deliberately or by dint of superior productivity) and increasing the sway of market relations. Furthermore, the ceaseless process of capitalist expansion (i.e., accumulation—cf. Marx 1906) and the advances in technology (e.g., transportation, arms) facilitated the internationalization of capitalism to the extent that by the end of the nineteenth century, the effects of capitalism had occurred, in varying forms, on a global level.

For the purposes of this analysis, the most important effect of capitalist development was its effect upon the nature of the human penchant for communally-based group formation. The revolutionization of relations of production and the development of a generalized system of domination via the market and civil society led to the intensification and extension of socio-economic systems, the erosion of traditional social bonds, and the creation of new forms of group affiliation. What is important to understand is that the impact of the emergence of capitalism was not a
simple matter of the disappearance of "non-rational" communal identities in the face of the logic of market criteria. Instead, it involved a complex interaction between the dynamics of capitalist development and the human propensity for group formation. In other words, what transpired was the transformation of communal identities: pre-existing "ethnic" affiliations (relatively autonomous Gemeinschaft-like social relations, with a Durkheimian "collective conscience") became means of domination and exploitation; of competition; and of mobilization and mutual aid—in each case reflecting material and political claims vis-a-vis other groups. Thus, the symbolic and cultural content of ethnicity became a means for group mobilization and boundary maintenance in the course of intergroup competition in a social system shaped by capitalist production, market relations, and the capitalist state.

Yet perhaps the greatest impact of capitalist development on communal identities involved its effects on the global level. The internationalization of capitalism—the expansion of the Western European economy into a world-economy (cf. Wallerstein 1974a; 1974b; 1980)—brought together previously separate groups through such processes as colonization and voluntary and involuntary labor migration. This intergroup contact occurred between continents and across oceans, a quantitative change in the number of meetings between people on a scale thereto unseen.
(Stavrianos 1982, p. 140). Even more significant, however, was the qualitative change in the nature of intergroup relations brought about by the exigencies of capitalist accumulation on a global scale. Historical examples abound: see Hughes (1971, pp. 73-86) on the mixing of Protestant and Catholic Germans in the Ruhr valley; Koebner (1961) on the deliberate importation of Indians into Uganda and other African possessions by the British; Williams (1944) on the African slave trade; and Magubane (1979, pp. 55-70) on the forcible alteration of native culture by the British in South Africa. Furthermore, with the ascendance of the modern capitalist state, interstate competition, core imperialism, and anti-colonial resistance, national identities emerged, thereby adding yet another level of complexity to intergroup relations. Clearly, capitalist development has radically altered both the context and the nature of communally based group formation.

Inasmuch as we have asserted that capitalist development constitutes the main context for the evolution of ethnic and national identities, it is essential that we specify those processes inherent in capitalist development which shape this evolution. The main dynamic propelling capitalist development (i.e., expansion, intensification of productive activities) is accumulation—the expanded reproduction of capital. As Marx (1906) observed, accumulation is motivated not by acquisitiveness, but by survival—the
need to increase size or productivity in order to withstand competition from other capitalist entities. Yet the process of capitalist accumulation is not smooth, it is rife with contradictions (e.g., falling rate of profit; underconsumption; profit squeeze; state expenditure) which become manifest during periods of crisis—the disruption of accumulation (cf. Wright 1977; Shaikh 1978; Alcaly 1978). Thus, we can understand the seemingly ceaseless quest for markets, resources, investment opportunities, and cheap labor power—the internationalization of capital and the formation of the global economy—as the virtually inevitable outcome of the basic motor force of capitalism.

Uneven Development and Ethnic/National Identities

For our purposes, what is particularly important about capitalist development is the nature of its expansion into a world-system. In this context, our next key proposition is:

A major factor in the evolution of ethnic and national identities has been the uneven nature of capitalist development as characterized by the core-periphery division.

Uneven development (i.e., periods of relative advantage for different regions) is endemic to capitalism (Frank 1967, p. 9); that is, it is grounded in the competitive, privatized nature of commodity production. This is not to assert that uneven development is unique to capitalism; indeed, the technological advances linked to capitalism enabled Western Europe to "leapfrog" past more developed Middle Eastern and Oriental societies and to create a European-dominated world-
economy (Stavrianos 1982, p. 35; Wolf 1982). Nevertheless, uneven capitalist development is a qualitatively different phenomenon due to the internationalization of capitalism and the degree to which capitalist production relations altered the nature of social life. Moreover, to speak of uneven capitalist development is not to describe inequality between isolated empires, but between societies integrated into a world-economy. As a consequence, the experiences of peoples in developed and less-developed areas are inexorably intertwined.

How is uneven development linked to the evolution of ethnic and national identities? Historically, uneven development—and the domination of less-developed countries by more powerful ones—has followed existing social cleavages, particularly geographic and cultural boundaries (Wallerstein 1974b, pp. 86-87), both within nation-states and at the societal level. Thus, ethnic and national identities became relations of domination and exploitation—and of resistance. Through social and ideological reproduction (cf. Bourdieu 1977), these ethnic and national divisions became an aspect of material life; indeed, intergroup differences were often reified as an "explanation" for inequality (Chang 1985; Genovese 1968, p. 32). As we will argue below, these different material experiences produced different trajectories of ethnic and national relations. In essence, then, one could assert that ethnicity and national-
ity in the current world-system are a reflection of the interaction of uneven development and previous socio-cultural cleavages.¹²

The notions of core and periphery (cf. Amin 1974, 1980; Wallerstein 1974b) are useful for describing two fundamentally different paths of capitalist development—and the resulting differential evolution of ethnic and national identities.¹³ Core describes those nation-states (e.g., United States, Western Europe, Japan) characterized by a high level of economic development, a complex and diversified economy, and a relatively high level of national integration in terms of political and social institutions. In contradistinction, periphery describes areas (e.g., Latin America, Africa, Asia) which exhibit relatively low levels of economic development and diversification (i.e., concentration on relatively few products) and relatively low levels of national integration. Yet core-periphery is more than a description, it is a relationship in which one presupposes the other. Core-periphery relations are those of economic and political domination and subjugation, relations which are reproduced through such mechanisms as colonization, dependent development, capital repatriation, and unequal exchange. What we are confronting are two different paths of capitalist development: the core, where the process of capitalist development was relatively slow and autonomous and fueled by the exploitation of the resources
and labor power of the periphery; and the periphery, whose process of capitalist development was introduced by the core and subsequently distorted to conform to the needs of the core (e.g., the destruction of the Indian textile industry by the British concurrent with the construction of an infrastructure to facilitate the export of raw materials--Stavrianos 1982, p. 277). What remains to be explored is how this core-periphery division was manifest in the evolution of ethnicity and nationality.

Communal Identities and Post-1800 Capitalist Development

At this juncture, we have discussed in general terms the revolutionary impact of capitalism on pre-existing social relations and the expansive forces propelling the internationalization of capitalist production relations. In addition, we have observed uneven nature of the process of capitalist development which in turn resulted in an integrated world-economy structured for the benefit of the powerful core nations. As we enter the post-1800 era, we find this uneven internationalization proceeding apace, as the capitalist world-economy expands rapidly from its European base. By the nineteenth century, the age of "plunder" (i.e., the overseas exploration, slaving, and looting--Marx's "primitive accumulation"--which served as a source of capital for European expansion) and mercantilism had largely passed, and the industrializing core powers were embarking upon an era of colonization of the periphery (i.e., Asia, Africa, the
Caribbean) which met the need for new markets, sources of raw materials, and outlets for investment. Driven by the need to overcome domestic obstacles (i.e., contradictions) to continued capitalist accumulation and by interstate competition among colonial powers, core imperialism resulted in a world-economy which by 1900 was virtually completely dominated by Western Europe and the United States. Again, what must be emphasized is both the scope of nineteenth century European expansion and the unprecedented nature of its effects—i.e., the transformation of peripheral social structures to serve the needs of core capitalist accumulation.

One noteworthy aspect of the expansion of the capitalist world-economy was that it was neither a uniform nor a unitary process. Instead, core imperialism (i.e., core-periphery relations) and global capitalist accumulation involved the articulation of a variety of subprocesses, each with different implications for intergroup contact and the evolution of ethnic and national identities. For our purposes, we will consider briefly two issues most closely linked to intergroup relations: colonization and labor migration.

**Colonization.** Political and economic domination of the periphery by the core took several forms, each with—as we will discuss later in the chapter—different effects on ethnic and national identities.
1. **Settler colonies.** These were societies (e.g., United States, Canada, Palestine-Israel, New Zealand, and Australia) created by core conquest and the replacement of the indigenous population (often eliminated via genocide) through large scale migration from Europe. This served several purposes for the core: a safety valve for excess or unwanted population (thereby reducing domestic conflict); a locus for investment; a new market for core commodities; and a source of raw materials and agricultural goods. Variations on this pattern include societies where settlers constituted a small but dominant minority (e.g., South Africa) or a smaller majority partially amalgamated with native peoples (e.g., Latin America). Given cultural and institutional similarity to the colonial power, settler colonies tended to achieve political independence at an earlier stage. Following independence, indigenous peoples were often subject to domination by settler groups.

2. **Traditional colonies.** These were peripheral societies conquered by the core and governed directly by a colonial administration for the economic and strategic benefit of the core. Overall migration from the core was on a much smaller scale, consisting of administrators and support personnel, military, representatives of core capital, and independent entrepreneurs and adventurers. From the vantage point of the colonized nation, the impacts of colonization included: distorted or inhibited development
(i.e., economic development consonant with the needs of the core—e.g., export of selected raw materials or agricultural products); partial proletarianization (i.e., creation of a wage labor force through disruption of traditional activities, enclosure, taxation, etc.—yet with wages often below subsistence levels); and inhibition of the development of indigenous economic and political institutions. The bulk of these "traditional colonies" only became independent in the post-1945 era, most remain on the periphery of the world-economy.

3. **Autonomous but dominated societies.** These were semiperipherial or peripheral societies which escaped conquest and colonization (often due to intra-core rivalries), yet were economically (and occasionally politically) dominated by the core (e.g., China, Ottoman Empire, Eastern Europe, post-independence Latin America). One result of this core economic domination was underdevelopment (i.e., distorted capitalist development); however, these effects were mitigated somewhat by political autonomy. To some extent, there exist parallels between these societies and the post-colonial experience of the traditional colonies (i.e., political independence but economic domination by core-based transnational corporations).

**Labor migration.** Core colonization and the evolution of the world-economy also provided the context for mass movements of peoples from one area of the globe to an-
As mentioned above, settler colonies provided an outlet for economically displaced persons, adventurers, and political and religious refugees from both the colonial power and other core nations (e.g., German and Scandinavian immigrants to the United States). Within "traditional colonies," migration from the core was more limited; however, the labor force was often supplemented by the importation of workers from other colonies (e.g., Indians and Asians as contract laborers within the British empire). The plantation economies of the Southern United States, the Caribbean, and South America were buttressed by the involuntary importation of African labor—i.e., the slave trade.

A subsequent but analytically related phenomenon involved "reverse" migration from the periphery to the core. Incomplete proletarianization in the periphery and semi-periphery disrupted traditional economic pursuits (e.g., agriculture); however, development (distorted by core domination) was not sufficient to absorb this surplus population. Given the lower historical levels of wages in peripheral societies and the need of core capital for cheap labor, a frequent result was mass migration from the periphery to the core, thus creating a new setting for inter-group relations. Whatever the direction of movement, each of these processes is grounded in core capitalist expansion, each can be linked to different experiences of
intergroup relations and both class-based and ethnically-based identities.

**Capitalist Development: A Summary**

Thus far, we have presented a brief outline of those aspects of capitalist development which we deem most relevant to understanding the evolution of ethnic and national identities. We have emphasized the need to view the global evolution of capitalism as a constellation of integrated processes—capitalist accumulation, uneven development, and core-periphery relations. Indeed, one problematic aspect of many works is the artificial sundering of such fundamentally interrelated processes. For example, colonization, dependent development, and labor migration are not isolated events, but threads in a larger historical tapestry. In the post-1800 world-economy, what transpired was the expansion of Western European capitalism, an event which effected an unprecedented transformation of social relations on a worldwide scale.

With respect to ethnicity and nationality, our argument is that the emergency and evolution of capitalism has transformed the nature of communal relations. Given the uneven nature of global capitalist development and the broad and diverse contacts between peoples, ethnicity and nationality became an aspect of material relations, a tool for domination, competition, and resistance. In other words, we have intimated that the specific nature of intergroup
contact, along with position in the world-economy, shaped the nature of subsequent intergroup relations; that is, the evolution of ethnic and national identities. Accordingly, in the next section we will seek to link specific outcomes to the world-system processes described above.

**Working Hypotheses**

Although we have asserted that the evolution of ethnic and national identities has been shaped by the dynamics of global capitalist development, our discussion to this point has been rather general. Consequently, in this section we will present a series of "working hypotheses" in which we will attempt to link different historical experiences of ethnicity and nationality to processes of the world-system. The term "working hypotheses" has been selected intentionally so as to underscore the exploratory nature of this work. By working hypotheses we do not mean specific, empirically testable propositions, but rather more general statements which represent a first attempt to describe relationships between our key concepts. In other words, these working hypotheses will serve as guideposts for the application of our framework to specific cases. Further development of our framework will of course necessitate elaboration of these notions.

As will soon become evident, a major basis for organization of these hypotheses is the core-periphery division. Within the context of global capitalist development in the
post-1800 world-economy, the radically different experiences of core and periphery led to different historical patterns of ethnic and national relations. We are in essence describing two different types of ethnicity and nationality (core and peripheral) which are linked together by the dynamics of the capitalist world-system. This is not to assert that the core-periphery distinction explains all variations in ethnic and national identities, but rather that it constitutes a first cut with our analytical scalpel. Indeed, these hypotheses are grounded in the conceptual issues raised in Chapter II, as well as the subprocesses of the world-system (e.g., types of colonization, labor migration) described above. Additional detail will be provided at the end of the section, when we discuss the evolution of ethnicity and nationality in historically specific circumstances.

Ethnicity and Nationality in the Core

Nationality.

1. In the core, the emergence of nations was roughly concurrent with capitalist development and the formation of the modern state—an entity which would facilitate (as opposed to control) market relations and maintain the basis of bourgeois domination. This process of national emergence included the evolution of nationalism (the ideological assertion of national
self-determination, mass sovereignty, and loyalty to the nation-state) and nationality.

2. Given their relatively slower and more autonomous process of nation-building, core societies tend to be more complete (Amin 1980, p. 20); that is, they exhibit higher levels of national integration and national affiliation (Horowitz 1985; Tilly 1975).

3. The process of nation-building facilitated core capitalist development by homogenizing and unifying societies, by providing mass support for imperialism, and by reducing class conflict (by providing an alternative—national mobilization—to mobilization along class lines). Capitalist development in turn facilitated nation-building by increasing the role of the state, by allowing subordinate eth-classes to enjoy some of the benefits of colonial exploitation via increased standards of living, and by stimulating nationalism through rivalries with other core nations (cf. Ehrenreich 1983).

4. National identities do not emerge de novo, but rather through intergroup interaction (i.e., national mobilization or nation-building). Thus, national identities are negotiated and/or imposed; they reflect relations of power between eth-classes. The homogenization inherent in national mobilization often means the creation of a national identity in the image of the
dominant ethnic group, with consequent variation in intensity of affiliation among subordinate groups (e.g., the attempt to base "American" identity on Anglo-American ethnicity—and the responses this engendered from other groups).

5. At the same time, uneven development within core nations (or annexation of a contiguous area, followed by uneven development), the ideology of the right of self determination of peoples, and the attempt (often through coercion) to create homogeneous national identities gave rise to ethno-national movements on the part of subordinate but not assimilated peoples within the core (e.g., peripheral areas within core nations such as Wales, Quebec, and Corsica). Thus, core nationalism contains a contradictory element in terms of facilitating capitalist development.

Ethnicity.

1. In general, ethnicity in core societies has undergone a transformation from a Gemeinschaft-like culture group to a Gesellschaft-like interest group (cf. Steinberg 1981, pp. 52-57). Modernization and proletarianization did not lead to the disappearance of ethnicity, neither did increased cultural similarity necessarily result in assimilation (both of which had been assumed by pre-1960 sociologists). Instead, ethnic groups have increasingly become symbolic organi-
zational types, the role of which is to assert material and political claims (cf. Gans--1979--on "symbolic ethnicity").

2. Within this overall pattern, one subtrend involves "submerged nations"; that is, historically autonomous regions within the core which were annexed or conquered by more powerful groups, but not totally assimilated into the larger nation-state (e.g., Wales, Corsica, Quebec, Native Americans). In these cases, ethnic identity has persisted--although considerable acculturation may have occurred--due to uneven economic development and economic and cultural domination (i.e., what some would term "internal colonialism") and may even give rise to ethno-national movements seeking autonomy.

3. A second subtrend has occurred within "settler societies" (i.e., Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and pre-1967 Palestine-Israel) where the indigenous population was virtually eliminated and replaced by European migrant groups. In these cases, successive waves of voluntary migrants (i.e., labor migration from periphery to core; the involuntary importation of labor to the core--i.e., African slaves to the United States--is a special case and will be treated later) underwent either full assimilation and absorption into the dominant group or partial assimila-
tion and evolution into a "symbolic" identity. This trend was the result of the effects of class and national mobilization; the economic, political, and cultural hegemony of the dominant settler group and a period of internal settlement and economic expansion (i.e., movement into the core) which facilitated (and relied upon) the absorption of large numbers of immigrants.

4. A new phase of intergroup contact and ethnic relations has resulted from the (largely) post-1945 labor migration from the periphery to the core. In these cases (e.g., "guestworkers" in Western Europe; Commonwealth immigrants in Great Britain; Hispanics and Asians in the United States), assimilation may be more problematic due to changing conditions of accumulation (e.g., emergence of the service economy and labor market segmentation).

Ethnicity and Nationality in the Periphery

1. With regard to nationality in the periphery, a key factor appears to be the specific nature of contact with the core (e.g., colonialism vs. relative autonomy under the suzerainty of a core power). Indeed, the very nature of peripheral capitalist development (and subsequent ethnic and national relations) is different if for no other reason than the existence of the core (e.g., dependent development; increased ethnic contact-
-due to infrastructural development--prior to any significant national mobilization). In general, societies experiencing higher levels of core penetration (i.e., depth, duration) tend to be less "complete" nation-states with lower levels of integration and national mobilization.

2. The effect of core colonial domination of the periphery upon the evolution of ethnic and national identities was shaped by such forces as:

   a. the nature and level of development of pre-colonial society (cf. Rex 1981).
   b. the identity of the colonial power and the time and duration of colonial occupation (for example, the earlier independence of Latin America due to its colonization by weaker powers such as Spain and Portugal).
   c. specific colonial policies (e.g., importation of foreign laborers, reliance upon specific groups for soldiers or state officials--cf. Horowitz 1985; political boundaries which reflected the interests of the colonial power rather than the ethnic divisions of subjugated peoples).
   d. the exigencies of capitalist accumulation (e.g., labor requirements of specific enterprises, specific forms of labor control--plantations, wage labor, etc.).
e. the structuring of post-colonial society
(e.g., the deliberate institutionalization of
ethnic interests in Lebanon and Malaysia; the
existence of colonial "settlers" in Latin America
and South Africa).

3. Nationalism in the periphery emerged largely as a
response to core domination and in part to the dissemi-
nation of the core ideology of "national self-determi-
nation." Thus, nationalism is a contradiction of
capitalism: on the one hand, it facilitated (via the
rise of powerful states based upon the nationality of
the majority) core domination of the world-economy; on
the other hand, it has served as a means of resisting
and ultimately limiting core hegemony (via "anticolo-
nial" nationalism).

4. In peripheral areas which experienced core domi-
nation, attempts at nation-building often followed the
establishment of a politically autonomous state (cf.
Rejai and Enloe's--1969--notion of "state-nation").
Thus, the cultural and institutional basis for national
integration tends to be more fragile, with nationality
based upon resistance to core imperialism. To the
extent that nation-building occurs, national identities
are created through intergroup interaction (and con-
flict) in a manner similar to the core.
5. Peripheral ethnic identities tend to be stronger and more salient, almost in inverse proportion to the strength of national identity (e.g., Guyanese primary identification with the ethnic group—Creole or East Indian—as opposed to the nation). In contrast with the core, ethnic identities tend to have a stronger Gemeinschaft-like component and to be less "symbolic". Given lower levels of national integration, interethnic conflict is often "national" in character as groups strive for self-determination (e.g., current conflicts between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; between Sikhs and Hindus in India).

Ethnicity and Nationality in Specific Circumstances

Although the above working hypotheses provide a general framework for explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities, they cannot account for all variation. While we have suggested that the core-periphery distinction reflects two different trajectories of ethnic and national relations, each of which contains considerable similarity of experience, each category nevertheless subsumes considerable differentiation. Clearly, the evolution of ethnic and national identities in the United States has been different from that of Great Britain; the experience of South Africa is different from that of India or of Peru. From our perspective, explanation of such differences can only come from an analysis of the historically specific circumstances sur-
rounding each case or constellation of interrelationships. Accordingly, the development of our theoretical framework must include a consideration of those aspects of social systems which we believe are important in understanding the evolution of ethnic and national identities at the level of the nation-state. In our examination of particular cases, we will emphasize the following factors: the nature of the eth-class system; the nature of the political system; and the nature of the intergroup "arena."

**The nature of the eth-class system.** Each society has a unique eth-class system; that is, ethnic composition, class structure, and the distribution of ethnic groups across the class structure (i.e., eth-classes). In the analysis of concrete situations, a key consideration involves the material and political interests of eth-class units and the strategies selected to advance these interests (e.g., inclusion vs. autonomy; exclusion vs. incorporation; class vs. ethnic mobilization). Two factors seem crucial here. First, the number and relative size of groups and classes (and eth-class units) affects strategic perceptions and possibilities (e.g., polarized relations in Northern Ireland vs. the multiethnic nature of the United States; the small proportion of Native Americans in the United States vs. the proportion of indigenous Blacks in South Africa). The second factor is the existence of certain eth-class units (e.g., minority intelligentsia, elites, and working class)
which have historically assumed a key role in ethnic mobiliz-
iation (cf. See--1986--on the role of the French-Canadian
clergy in supporting English-Canadian rule in nineteenth
century Quebec). For our purposes, the crux of the matter
is whether or not interests are perceived and articulated in
ethnic terms.

With respect to the evolution of eth-class structure,
it is essential to examine the reproduction of such systems.
Inasmuch as the institutional superstructure of a society
tends to reflect existing relations of power and domination,
these relations tend to be reproduced intergenerationally
through differential access to key resources (e.g., educa-
tion, networks). In this context, such factors as degree of
economic mobility, permeability of ethnic boundaries, and
the degree of mobility possible while maintaining minority
group affiliation influence the selection of assimilative
vs. assertive strategies. Rigid boundaries, for example,
would increase the likelihood and intensity of intergroup
conflict. Thus, strategic options (e.g., the formation of
eth-class alliances and the manipulation of group ties) are
constrained by structural realities.

The nature of the political system. Given our asser-
tion that eth-class alliances occur within a national con-
text, that is, within a nation-state, then a theory of the
state is essential to understanding intergroup relations
(cf. Khleif 1985). To speak of the state in modern capital-
ist society is to speak of concentrated social and economic power (e.g., military and police powers, state expenditures) in an institution which affects virtually every sphere of social life. Without undue elaboration, our view of the state is as a temporary accommodation which represents relations of power between social groups. State actions reflect the interests of dominant classes and groups, constrained (to varying degrees) by the oppositional power of subordinate groups. Moreover, the state is not a monolithic entity but consists of subinstitutions which reflect different constellations of interests.

In essence, the state is both an actor in and an object of ethnic and class struggle. On one hand, socially defined ethnic meanings are embedded in political processes, while state decisions have varying impacts on different eth-class segments. On the other hand, group claims are political claims made towards the state; group mobilization is a social movement aimed at altering the political balance of power. Thus, in an ethnically divided society the state is shaped by current ethnic ideologies; however, these ideologies may change in response to challenges to the established order (cf. Omi and Winant-1986—on the response of the U.S. state to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s and to the "White backlash" of the 1970s and 1980s). In short, the "balance" between groups, as both mediated by and reflected in the state, is constantly changing.
Accordingly, the nature of the political system is a key factor in intergroup relations. The relative power of groups and the perceived legitimacy of the dominant group will shape both demands on the state (e.g., relatively absolute power might inhibit subordinate group mobilization by lowering the perceived chances of success) and state responses.\textsuperscript{21} Similarly, the balance between group claims and the claims of others (e.g., White supremacy vs. Black equality in South Africa) will condition both the incidence and the intensity of group conflict.\textsuperscript{22} Finally, the nature of the formal political structure itself is important, for if ethnic cleavages are institutionalized in the formal state structure—e.g., ethnic political parties, proportional representation, ethnic "niches", legitimacy of ethnic based claims—then group identities will remain a salient basis for action (cf. Marger's—1985, pp. 81-81—notion of corporate pluralism).

The nature of the intergroup arena. If we are to attempt to explain the evolution of ethnic and national identities in historically specific circumstances, then it is useful to take inventory of factors which vary from milieu to milieu and which affect intergroup interaction. Historically, aspects of the physical environment have shaped material activities and group relations. For example, location along trade routes or the existence of valued resources were reflected in patterns of exploration,
colonization, and subsequent social relations (e.g., the
discovery of gold in South Africa). Likewise, environmental
changes which have a significant impact upon productive
activities may dramatically alter the nature of intergroup
relations (e.g., the Irish potato famine and subsequent
Irish emigration to the United States). Even a factor such
as close proximity of immigrant groups to the "homeland" may
effect the evolution of group identity (cf. Barkan--1977--on
the "commuter migration" of Mexicans and French-Canadians to
the United States).

Of equal or greater importance for the evolution of
ethnic and national identities is the social context in
which intergroup interaction occurs. What we are referring
to here is the specific social structural setting in which
groups meet, as well as the particular qualities of groups
involved. Such factors as demography (e.g., the changes in
the relative sizes of ethnic groups in Lebanon--Khleif
1984a); economy (e.g., the ability of expanding American
industry to absorb relatively unskilled immigrant labor at
the beginning of the twentieth century); economic cycles
(Weber 1968, p. 938; Cross 1978, p. 40; Khleif 1984b); group structure (e.g., the institutional supports which
contributed to the persistence of French-Canadian identity
in Quebec--Breton 1964): and external actors (e.g., the
impact of India on the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri
Lanka) all influence the nature and outcome of intergroup
conflict. In each case, it is essential to examine particular historical circumstances in order to discern which factors have shaped the trajectory of intergroup relations.

Our purpose in discussing aspects of the physical and social environment which affect intergroup relations is not to provide an exhaustive listing, but rather to make an important theoretical point: that specific intergroup relations must be explained in the context of a specific social and spatial environment— that the evolution of ethnic and national identities takes place in a specific "intergroup arena" (Doane unpublished, p. 17). This is not to suggest that the study of ethnicity requires idiographic explanations; indeed, our framework remains grounded in processes of the world-system, for many of the variables which operate at the level of the nation-state are shaped by global forces. Instead, we maintain that global processes are mediated by the forms which they assume in particular circumstances and by the nature and actions of specific social entities. In other words, if we want to understand the evolution of ethnic and national identities in, for example, the United States, then it is necessary to study the specific course of capitalist development and the nature of the particular groups involved in the American intergroup arena— whether forcibly imported in chains or peacefully recruited by steamship companies. Thus, to paraphrase Marx (1978, p. 595), ethnic groups and national-
ities may make their own history; however, they do not make it as they please, but under specific historical circum-
stances conditioned by the dynamics of global capitalist accumulation. Yet the evolution of ethnic and national
identities is a dynamic, recursive process, for the outcomes of intergroup "struggle" will in turn shape the nature of
the "intergroup arenas" of the future.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter, we have presented our theoretical model for the study of the evolution of ethnic and national
identities, our framework for answering the question: **What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist,
change, or disappear?** As we asserted at the outset, this model is preliminary in nature; it is an attempt to recast
the study of ethnicity and nationality in the macrosociological context of global capitalist development. Rather than
the last word on the subject, we view what we have just presented as a preamble. Necessary elaboration must come
through the rigors of the process of theory construction, and by employing data from case studies and from comparative
research.

To summarize briefly, our model rests upon the following core assumptions:

1. Ethnicity and nationality are one basis for group affiliation, ideologies of community which may be
asserted in intergroup resource competition. Thus, ethnicity and nationality have a material basis.

2. Ethnicity/nationality and class are intertwined inasmuch as every individual potentially possesses both affiliations and every ethnic group/nation or class contains divisions based upon the other affiliation. Rather than to attempt to separate these two identities, both of which are grounded in material life, we suggested that the eth-class--social location in terms of both ethnicity and class--provides an objective basis for understanding the material interests underlying group mobilization. Depending upon how material interests are perceived, group formation may be along either class or ethnic lines, resulting in ad hoc alliances of eth-classes and the assertion or masking of ethnic and national identities.

3. The ultimate context for explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities is the process of global capitalist development. We suggested that capitalism has brought about the transformation of social life, increased the level of interaction between diverse peoples, and effected the metamorphosis of pre-capitalist communal identities into group affiliations imbued with material content which serve as a basis for domination, competition, and resistance. Furthermore, the expansionist dynamic of capitalist accumulation and
the need to overcome contradictions inherent in the process of accumulation led to the internationalization of capitalism and the transformation of social identities on a global scale.

4. The uneven development of the capitalist world-economy is an important factor in explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities. Manifest in the core-periphery relationship of domination and exploitation, uneven development emerged and was reproduced on a global scale. Inasmuch as uneven capitalist development tended to follow existing geographical and socio-cultural cleavages, these divisions became aspects of material life. Thus, different levels of capitalist development are reflected in different historical patterns of ethnic and national relations.

Building upon these central notions, we then sought to anchor our framework in the dynamics of the post-1800 world-economy—the era of industrial capitalism and an increasingly integrated world-system. In particular, we focused upon two processes, colonization and labor migration, which we deemed most salient to the evolution of ethnic and national identities. At this juncture, we introduced our "working hypotheses"—a series of rough propositions describing the different historical paths of ethnicity and nationality in core and peripheral societies. These notions will serve as organizing assumptions for the study of specific social
settings. As a further elaboration of our framework, we recognized that other aspects of social systems (i.e., for our purposes, nation-states) also affect the evolution of ethnic and national identities and must be taken into consideration in explaining variations in ethnic experience between similar societies (e.g., core-core). Consequently, we attempted to provide an initial inventory of those aspects of nation-states which we believe are most likely to affect the course of intergroup interaction and group identities.

In sum, what we have presented in this chapter is a first outline of what we perceive to be the key factors in explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities. We have sought to redirect the study of ethnicity and nationality along lines which we believe will yield more fruitful results. At the same time, we recognize that our framework requires considerable elaboration and development. As a first step in this process, we will attempt in the next two chapters to employ our framework to explore the nature of ethnicity and nationality in two case studies: the United States and South Africa.
1. Although we have maintained that ethnicity and nationality are group phenomena, we recognize the problem of the link between group affiliations and individual behavior, the level at which sociological abstractions become human experience. This issue—the so-called macro-micro problem (Collins 1981; Blalock and Wilken 1979; Hechter 1983)—involves specifying the relationship between individual action and social determination. While the nature of this linkage remains unclear, we embrace the Durkheimian notion that the social whole is more than the sum of its parts (i.e., the actions of individual actors); that society and social groups have a reality sui generis; that the group itself provides a context (i.e., shared rules and understandings) for individual rationality and action (Khleif 1985). Indeed, following Berger (1963) we posit that the relationship between individuals and society is interactive, perhaps dialectical in nature; that is, individual actions shape society, which in turn conditions individual behavior. With respect to the study of ethnicity and nationality, this implies that while individual actions are shaped by group membership, the combined (in a manner more complex than mere addition) impact of individual experiences and actions in turn changes the nature of group membership (e.g., if enough individuals see no utility in group membership and act accordingly, then the group may disappear). Although our investigation will focus upon group relations at the macro level, we recognize that a complete theory must include linkage to micro level phenomena (e.g., linkage via informal social networks which may affect opportunities for education, employment, etc.).

2. For a more detailed exposition of our conceptual position, see Chapter II.

3. See our earlier discussion of ethnic stratification in Chapter II.

4. Gordon (1964) uses eth-class in the tradition of mainstream U.S. sociology; that is, as a combination of two individual attributes. In contrast, Leon (1970) employs "people-class" to describe the fusion of ethnicity and class among American Jews. Our formulation differs from both: we use "eth-class" as a configura-
tion of both relations of production (class) and communal/political groupings in the context of the nation-state. The concept of eth-class enables us to look within both ethnic groups and classes and to take into account the division of one by the other.

5. I am indebted to Professor Richard England for directing my attention to this issue.

6. For an exception to this, see our description in Chapter VI of the actions of the South African white working class during the Rand Revolt of 1922. See also Cruse (1967; 1968) on abortive attempts by the Black working class in the United States to mobilize themselves during the Depression.

7. For purposes of this analysis, there is little to be gained by attempting to assign analytical primacy to ethnicity (e.g., primordiality) or class (e.g., ethnicity as an epiphenomenon of class). The "ethnic" and "class" material interests of an eth-class segment are fused together, although they are expressed politically in ethnic or class terms. Indeed, even if we assign analytical primacy to class (via its grounding in the economic base of society) as opposed to ethnicity (an ideology located in the social superstructure), their interrelationship confounds the causal chain in the analysis of historically specific circumstances (i.e., the superstructure--ethnic relations--in turn influences the base--class). If class has any determining influence over ethnicity, it is across longer time spans (e.g., the impact of the transition from feudal to capitalist class relations on ethnic and national identities). For a discussion of this issue as it pertains to ethnic relations, see Burawoy (1974).

8. This is not to overlook the possibility of class or pan-national mobilization on a level broader than that of the nation-state (e.g., Trilateral Commission, Second International, Pan-Arabism, "the West"); however, such processes are not, in our judgement, a major determinant of ethnic/national identities at the current historical moment. With the increasing interconnectedness of the global economy, it is likely that such identities will become more salient in the future.

9. See our discussion of this point in Chapter II.

10. Such contact effected a decrease in the cultural differences between groups (via diffusion), while often increasing the social distance between groups (due to economic and political competition).
11. For example, in the Near East, such factors as (1) the incursion of the British into Egypt in the 1880s to control, among other things, its cotton production and the Suez Canal; (2) the incursion of both the British and the French in the post-WWI era into the countries of the Fertile Crescent in order to control the oil resources of the region; and (3) the U.S. presence in the region as successor to British hegemony in the post-WWII era all contributed to the downplaying of the "Millet System," the decline of the religious community as the mainspring of identity, and the evolution of a new community based on language and culture. In other words, "Christian" and Muslim" as distinct identities were fused into something new--"Arab" nationalism--especially during the 1880-1960 era. More recently, the destabilization of Lebanon in the 1970s was a reversal of the usual sort of nationalism, a boost to "confessional" divisions and the Balkanization of the Arab countries into religious Bantustans. Here ethnicity, class, nationality, and pan-nationality become ingredients in an imperial and sub-imperial "melting pot" (Khleif unpublished; Rodinson 1973a, 1973b; Locke and Stewart 1985; Semyonov and Lewis-Epstein 1987).

12. This is not to imply, in the manner of the functionalist perspective, that ethnicity and nationality are historical artifacts reflecting different levels of development. On the contrary, we view ethnicity and nationality as key aspects--both process and outcome--of uneven capitalist development.

13. While world-system theory (e.g., Wallerstein 1974a; 1974b) also describes a *semiperiphery* (i.e., an intermediate position wherein a state has core-like relations with the periphery and peripheral relations with the core), we view the semiperiphery-periphery distinction as one of gradations within the periphery. For us, the key distinction is the one between core and periphery.

14. This is not to suggest that all colonization was directly economic in nature; for example, colonization was also an attempt to establish spheres of influence in opposition to other core nations (see Chirot 1977, pp. 49-54; Sweezy 1942, pp. 302-03).

15. As Magdoff (1978, p. 29) observes, effective European control (including former colonies in the Americas) increased from thirty-five to sixty-seven percent of the land surface of the earth during the period 1800-1878.
16. For an excellent discussion of international labor migration, see Bonacich and Cheng (1984).

17. Perhaps the first instance of this "reverse migration" involved Irish workers in England (Bonacich and Cheng 1984, p. 29); other examples include Irish, Southern and Eastern European, Hispanic, and Asian migration to the United States; "guestworkers" in Western Europe; and Commonwealth migrants to Great Britain.

18. For an example of this point, see our discussion of race in Chapter II.

19. Thus, we are describing objective interests, subjective perceptions, and concrete actions.

20. In brief, our view of the state is neither pluralist nor elitist/instrumentalist. While we believe that state power is in general wielded by the dominant segments of a society (e.g., in modern capitalist society, this would be the capitalist class of the dominant ethnic group) for their own benefit, we recognize that the power of subordinate segments (e.g., working class, ethnic minorities) acts as a constraint on dominant group hegemony. Thus, state power and actions are shaped by class/ethnic struggle, which, in modern society, is increasingly directed towards the state. For an in-depth exploration of this point, see Esping-Andersen et al.--1977; Whitt--1979.

21. See Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 72-82) on variations in subordinate group strategies (i.e., war of maneuver vs. war of position) and state responses (e.g., repression vs. absorption or insulation) in relation to differing levels of power.

22. See Schermerhorn's (1970, p. 78) notion of "reciprocal goal definition."

23. Interestingly, these writers disagree on the nature of the effects of economic cycles. Weber (1968, p. 938) and Cross (1978, p. 40) posit that ethnic identity will become more salient during periods of slow economic growth, while Khleif (1984b) describes the reawakening of Welsh nationalism in the midst of the post-1945 expansion of the world-economy. This suggests for us both the importance of social structural effects and the need to examine these effects in relation to a specific context.

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted by the past.
CHAPTER V

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE CORE: THE UNITED STATES

In this chapter we will employ our theoretical framework to analyze the course of intergroup relations in the United States. Our purposes in doing so are twofold. First, we believe that the framework outlined in the preceding chapter will enable us to attain a fuller, more comprehensive understanding of American ethnic history. Such an endeavor should be the ultimate objective of any attempt at theory development. Secondly, we hope that application of our hitherto abstract framework to a concrete historical case will provide us with an opportunity to "flesh out" our model in the face of the demands of actual usage. Thus, this chapter represents both case study and laboratory, as we seek to demonstrate the utility of our framework while at the same time subjecting it to test and elaboration or modification.

Our selection of the United States as our core nation case study reflects a variety of considerations. As we noted in Chapter I, the United States has served as "data" for many theories of ethnicity, theories which we criticized in Chapter III. Moreover, these data have been subjected to diverse if not diametrically opposing interpretations, from the view of the United States as an open society or "nation of nations" (Glazer 1987) to its
characterization as a country marked by fundamental racial inequality (Takaki 1987a). Accordingly, we find it particularly challenging to "reanalyze" this case using our own theoretical model. In addition, American ethnic history contains a wide variety of interethnic experience, both in terms of type of interaction (e.g., colonization, migration, involuntary migration and slavery) and number of groups involved, thereby providing us with the greatest possible breadth of material for analysis. If our model can address the diversity of the American case, then it should be able to contend with the analytical problems posed by ethnic relations in other perhaps less complex core nations.

In our examination of American ethnic history, our objective is not to produce a history per se, but rather to undertake a theoretical interpretation of the development of ethnic relations in the United States. Consequently, we will employ our model for the secondary analysis of existing sociohistorical studies, providing a distillation and interpretation of these "data." Given the scope of this undertaking, our analysis will necessarily be painted with broad strokes on a macro (in this case, national) level, emphasizing major themes and dynamics rather than specific groups, facts, or figures. In keeping with the focus of the model outlined in the previous chapter, we will anchor our discussion in the following assumptions:
1. The development of ethnic relations in the United States was ultimately shaped by the nature of American capitalist development (set, of course, in the context of global capitalist development), particularly the exigencies of capitalist accumulation and the uneven nature of development. This is especially true of the post-1840 era.

2. The major factor shaping the evolution of ethnic identities was not culture, ideology, or values, but rather the strategic demands of intergroup resource competition. Thus, the emergence, metamorphosis, persistence, or disappearance of ethnic identities in the United States is best interpreted as an outcome of eth-class alliances and struggles. For example, we would attribute the initial persistence of Irish-American identity to eth-class struggle (in which various Irish-American eth-classes banded together) vs. the dominant Anglo-American group. The more recent attenuation of Irish-American ethnicity could be interpreted as the result of an alliance (of the type which we termed "ethnic merger" in Chapter IV) with Anglos and other "old stock" groups to defend their position in the face of challenges from newer arrivals. These eth-class alliances and struggles led to the creation of specific ethnic systems (i.e., a system of stratification and a related set of understandings governing the rela-
tions between specific groups)--a temporary "balance of imbalance"--which in turn provided a context for subsequent struggles (as well as those forces which tended to reproduce the system) and the further evolution of ethnic identities.

Additionally, as we develop our analysis of the American case, we will also seek to highlight those variable aspects of societies (i.e., nature of the eth-class system; nature of the political system; nature of the intergroup "arena") which appear significant to an explanation of the evolution of ethnic and national identities.

Our examination of the course of intergroup relations in the United States will be divided into four historical segments: the colonial era (prior to 1800); the nineteenth century (1800-1890); the early twentieth century (1900-1945); and the modern era (1945-present). We believe that this format will best enable us to take into account the evolving nature of both the American economy and American ethnic relations, as these historical divisions roughly correspond to major economic epochs (colonial; expansion and early industrialization; industrialization and movement into the core; and the modern era), as well as eras of intergroup relations (settlement, old immigration, new immigration, modern). For each chronological period, we will attempt to link the dynamics of capitalist development (e.g., accumulation, uneven development) to specific forms of contact (e.g.
conquest, migration) and the appearance of particular groups. We believe that an understanding of these initial patterns of migration and intergroup contact is essential, for the events of each era shaped the context for subsequent intergroup interaction. Following this initial discussion, we will then retrace our steps, this time focusing upon relations between groups. In keeping with the model proposed in the previous chapter, we will seek to interpret the American ethnic experience in the context of eth-class struggles, with particular attention devoted to the assimilation, persistence, or evolution of ethnic identities. At the conclusion of our chronological discussion, we will briefly examine the role of an important actor in eth-class struggles--the state. Because the role of the state has expanded exponentially (especially after 1945), we elected to present consideration of the impact of the state upon intergroup relations as a separate discussion, as opposed to incorporating it into the historical narrative. Finally, in the chapter summary, we will review our key findings and draw some preliminary conclusions.

The Colonial Era: 1609-1800

Capitalist Development and Intergroup Contact

The origins of the American ethnic experience are grounded in the emergence and expansion of a capitalist world-economy centered in Western Europe (Wallerstein 1974a, 1974b, 1980). Beginning in the fifteenth century, Western
European nations began a process of conquest, plunder, mercantilism, and colonization which brought about dramatic social change on a global scale. Driven by the expansionary nature of capitalist accumulation and fueled by competition between core powers, the quest for raw materials, markets, and cheap labor resulted in a world which by 1900 was virtually completely under the sway of Western capitalism. This expansion was physical as well as political and economic, as the impact of capitalist agriculture (e.g., enclosure, increased rents, decreased prices), increased manufacture and trade, and a population boom led to the displacement (i.e., proletarianization) of vast sectors of the European peasantry. Acting in concert with one another, the expansion of market relations and the creation of a European "surplus population" (relative to resources) resulted in an historically unprecedented movement of peoples and transformation of societies.

Within these larger global processes, the fate of the area which was to become the United States was determined by several factors related to English colonization. First, the victorious colonists were English, a fact which would leave an indelible imprint on the future shape of the United States. The eventual emergence of British hegemony within the capitalist world-system led to the absorption or removal of competing (e.g., Dutch, French, Spanish) European claims to North America and ensured Anglo-American dominance. Of
equal significance were the absence of instant wealth (unlike South America) and the particular economic needs of Great Britain. These forces combined to create an English colonial policy which emphasized self-sustaining settlements which would provide markets, raw materials, and an outlet for Britain's "surplus" population—a sharp contrast to the French and Spanish policies of plunder and limited settlement. Finally, the indigenous Native American population was not economically exploitable (Archdeacon 1983, p. 4), a situation which when combined with their military vulnerability would lead to displacement via conquest. Thus, the American colonies emerged as a quintessential race supremacist "settler society," a colonial outpost in which the indigenous peoples were outnumbered, decimated, and replaced by European peoples (cf. Stavrianos--1982, p. 319--notion of "Europeanization").

As a British colony, the future United States developed a dualistic nature which in turn would shape the course of subsequent intergroup contact. On one hand, the Northern colonies (New England and the mid-Atlantic states) were of relatively limited economic value to Britain and experienced a relatively low degree of economic and political control by the colonial power (Frank 1979). As a result, the North became a region of small farmers and independent artisans, "refugees" from the process of British capitalist development who hoped to return to an essentially precapitalist
mode of production (Bonacich 1984, pp. 81-82). Alongside these "independent" classes emerged an increasingly prosperous merchant class (fostered, at least initially, by British colonial trade policies and economic power) and the beginnings of an urban working class (Dowd 1974, p. 203; Zinn 1980, pp. 47-51). In addition, liberal British immigration policies--stimulated by needs for labor, settlement, and defense and the desire, after 1661, to limit British emigration--encouraged the migration of non-English peoples such as Scotch-Irish, Germans, and (in smaller numbers) French Huguenots to the American colonies (Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 30-32; Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 1-2). Thus, the Northern colonies became an outlet for the excess population of not only England, but also the prospective core nations of Western Europe--the beginning of a pattern of immigration which would persist throughout the nineteenth century and become a dominant theme in American history.

The South, on the other hand, possessed greater agricultural potential and rapidly evolved into a predominantly plantation society producing tobacco (and, later, cotton) for the world market. Success of this economy was based upon the availability of cheap labor; however, the constraints upon wages exerted by relatively low world market prices for such commodities as cotton and the existence of competing opportunities (i.e., "independent" agriculture) inhibited the emergence of a wage-labor workforce (Bonacich
168

1984, p. 80). Initially, this gap was filled by indentured servants, but this source proved unstable in the face of competing opportunities (e.g., farming) and post-1660 English restraints on immigration (Dinnerstein, Nichols and Reimers 1979, pp. 12-15). Given the seeming unsuitability of the Native American population as a labor force (Marger 1985, p. 136), Southern plantation owners turned to the importation of African slaves as a source of cheap and controllable labor, a step which would have dramatic implications for the course of subsequent ethnic relations in the United States (Quarles 1969, pp. 34-35; Williams 1944).

Establishment of a system of plantation slavery left the South with a radically different economic base (the consequences of which will be discussed below) while discouraging European immigration by limiting opportunities for independent small farming or wage labor employment (Nevins and Commager 1966, p. 239).²

Such was the colonial pattern at the time of the American revolution and the establishment of the United States as a sovereign nation. At this juncture, the United States already exhibited several components of its subsequent ethnic structure. Nearly two centuries of British colonialism had left an Anglo imprint upon American culture and institutions; however, Anglo-Americans existed alongside other European groups, as well as Blacks and Native Americans.² At the conclusion of the eighteenth century, the
United States stood as a relatively weak peripheral society engaged in a process of nation-building amidst a debate (North vs. South, English vs. non-English) over its eventual shape. Nevertheless, the United States also stood at the threshold of a series of processes which would result in the total transformation of American society.

**Intergroup Interaction and Ethnic Identities**

Although the period prior to 1800 is beyond the stated purview of this work, it was during this time that a foundation was established for subsequent ethnic and class interaction. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to examine briefly the central ethnic/class issues of this era. In this analysis, one key consideration is the fact that the United States was established as an English colony, which meant that its political economy, ethnic composition, and class structure were shaped by the exigencies of English economic and political interests. The importance of this English influence cannot be overstated: the bulk of the initial colonizers were English, the colonies adopted English institutions and culture, and subsequent events (e.g., immigration, slavery, revolution) were results of English colonial policy.

With respect to ethnic relations, the first intergroup conflicts can best be described as national in nature, as the English vied with the French, Dutch, Spanish, and Native Americans for control of the New World. These interactions
would set the stage for future ethnic interaction. For example, when England absorbed Dutch New Netherland in the 1660s (a national conflict), the residents of New Netherland were required to accept English law and language and to swear allegiance to the British Crown (Archdeacon 1983, p. 12), thus establishing the basis for Anglo-conformity—the expectation that non-English settlers would conform to English practices. Perhaps the most significant "national" conflict, however, was between English colonizers and Native Americans. From the beginning, this was a case of resource competition between peoples, as existing Native American settlements were incompatible with English colonial expansionism. Facilitating this process of conquest and dispossession was a "national" ideology in which Native Americans were characterized as heathen savages with no legitimate claim to land (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 7-13). Given the perceived limited economic utility of Native Americans (e.g., as trading partners or as a labor force) to White settlers and the emergence of increasing conflict over land, massacres and dispossession became standard practice. Any resistance on the part of Native Americans only led to harsh retaliation and the creation of new stereotypes (e.g., "treacherous Indians," the "Indian threat") to justify further conquest. While coastal Native American peoples soon succumbed—in a genocidal reduction of population—to warfare, disease, and economic displacement and marginaliza-
tion, this experience established a pattern of ethnic or national interaction which would be repeated for two centuries (cf. Zinn 1980, pp. 12-16). It is, in concert with anti-Black sentiments, at the core of White racism.

Initially, ethnic conflict (i.e., conflict between groups within a society) in the English colonies was limited by the homogeneity of the first settlers. This changed, however, with the post-1660 decline of English emigration and the adoption of liberal policies with regard to immigration from other European nations.7 According to historical accounts (e.g., Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 2-6; Archdeacon 1983, p. 20), early non-English immigrants such as the Scotch-Irish and Germans did experience some ethnic hostility as a result of ethnocentrism and a fear of "foreign" domination on the part of the English settlers. Nevertheless, the level of intergroup conflict was low, reflecting the fact that English hegemony within the colonies was never seriously challenged and, more importantly, the existence of a preindustrial, precapitalist class system which was not conducive to interethnic conflict. What we mean by this is that the system did not foster resource competition—labor was regulated via indenture or slavery rather than a competitive market, while land (for independent agriculture) was plentiful. Furthermore, the relative isolation of communities (as opposed to the integration of industrial society) enabled groups to avoid conflict and to
maintain a distinctive identity and customs. Indeed, the most virulent intergroup conflicts among European immigrants during the colonial era involved religious differences (Protestants vs. Catholics, Quakers, and other Protestant sects), reflecting the historical intolerance which had characterized the European experience of many groups (cf. Archdeacon 1983, pp. 20-21).

At the same time, assimilation did occur among non-English groups, reflecting the operation of the contradictory forces of assimilation and pluralism which characterize much of American ethnic history. The aforementioned low level of resource competition, the economic utility of acculturation to English customs, and dominant group pressures to conform were certainly key factors in the "blending" of groups. In addition, the lack of institutional support for non-English culture made it more difficult to retain group identities (cf. Dinnerstein et al.--1979, pp. 66-67--on religion, language and the decline of Dutch and German identity; Dinnerstein and Reimers--1982, pp. 7-8--on the lack of trained Presbyterian clergy and the diminution of Scotch-Irish ethnicity). Also significant were characteristics of the intergroup arena--the proliferation of groups, the small size of individual groups, and the geographical mobility encouraged by colonial expansion--each of which served to inhibit the persistence of ethnic communities. What is important for our purposes is the
existence of a complex interplay of forces promoting both ethnic persistence and change.

Given the preindustrial class structure and the proliferation of the independent class (i.e., small-scale farmers, many with limited market ties; artisans engaged in petty production) in the pre-1800 United States, class conflict was relatively absent (as opposed to industrial capitalist society) and eth-class divisions were therefore of lesser importance (i.e., the relative isolation of independent farmers tended to inhibit group mobilization—the Shay's and Whiskey Rebellions standing as notable exceptions). Nevertheless, increased contact, competition, and unrest, particularly among workers, servants, and a lumpen-proletariat in urban areas, resulted in a growing concern (on the part of the elite) with the lower class "threat" and a tendency to equate "poor" with "foreign" (Zinn 1980, pp. 50-53; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 28)—the beginning of a tendency to blur together notions of ethnicity and class (Takaki 1987b, p. 105). In response, immigrant groups established self-help societies, thus employing ethnicity as a strategy for economic survival and advancement. Also evident during this period was the relationship between class position and ease of assimilation. For example, upper middle class French aristocrats and planters who fled to the United States during the French Revolution or as a result of Caribbean slave revolts found that their higher status
enabled them to blend in much more quickly with the dominant Anglo-American group (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 9). These various patterns would become increasingly evident in ethnic relations in the post-1800 United States.

A final piece in the early American eth-class mosaic was the introduction of Blacks into the colonies. As we noted earlier, the political economy of the South (plantation agriculture, scarce labor) provided the context for the emergence of slavery. While initially Southern labor needs were met by indentured servants, the tendency of such laborers to enter into farming or the labor market upon expiration of their term of service left the South with a perpetual shortage of agricultural labor. By the late seventeenth century, social unrest (e.g., Bacon's Rebellion) and the fear of a landless lower class of former indentured servants created an opening which was filled by the coincidental English entry into the African slave trade (Breen 1987; Zinn 1980, pp. 37-47). Interestingly, the first Blacks in the colonies were term servants; however, the economic benefits to plantation owners and the social stability stemming from lifetime servitude (one concern of the planter elite was that Black free labor would ally itself with the White lower class) facilitated the spread of the institution of slavery (Quarles 1969, pp. 35-36). The restriction of manumission (for economic reasons) and the absence of a large Black free class in turn gave rise to
caste-like distinctions between Blacks and Whites and the emergence of a social order held together by racist ideology (Fredrickson 1981, p. 87).

A key event in the course of intergroup relations was the American Revolution. On the most general level, the American Revolution can be viewed as a case of national mobilization—a cross-class, cross-ethnic alliance between most segments of the merchant, planter, independent and working classes (cemented by appeals to an ideology of individual rights and freedom) which emerged in response to English colonial practices (e.g., taxation, trade restriction, limitation of settlement—cf. Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 66-80). The success of the American Revolution changed the nature of the United States as an ethnic arena. Perhaps the major outcome was the shedding of "English" affiliation and the emergence of an "American" national identity (cf. the discussions by Boorstein—1965, pp. 325-90—and Nevins and Commager—1966, pp. 168-81). At the same time, while the revolution removed the basis of English-American group dominance, the hegemonic Anglo-American elite was successful in casting national identity in its own image (i.e., American=Anglo-American) and in retaining Anglo-based institutions. This determination was reflected in such early legislation as the Naturalization Act, the constitutional restrictions on foreigners holding office, and the Alien and Sedition Acts. Thus, while the new bourgeois
national ideology promoted individual sovereignty and allegiance to the nation as a set of ideals, both individuals and the nation were expected to assume a certain form—one which assured the dominant position of the Anglo-American elite (Zinn 1980, pp. 88-101).

The process of national mobilization which began in the late eighteenth century had a significant effect upon non-Anglo ethnic groups. First, national mobilization entailed a muting of ethnic identity and the adoption, at some level, of the Anglo-defined "American" national identity. Moreover, the economic and political institutionalization of Anglo dominance ensured the absence of some of the institutional supports (e.g., a somewhat separate legal system— as was permitted to French-Canadians in Quebec) which would facilitate the persistence of minority ethnic identity. These forces, along with dominant group pressures for Anglo-conformity (at least for Whites), provided a strong impetus towards assimilation for non-Anglo European immigrants. On the other hand, Anglo hegemony (i.e., the effort to define American identity in Anglo terms) often triggered a countervailing ethnic mobilization as immigrants sought to improve their economic position and preserve their traditional way of life (cf. Dinnerstein et al.—1979, p. 23—on German resistance to Anglo attempts to establish free schools to "Americanize" German students). Throughout American history, these two contradictory forces—assimilation and
resistance—were influential in shaping the course of intergroup relations.

**Expansion and Industrialization: 1800-1890**

**Uneven Development and Ethnic Contact**

The nineteenth century was a period of rapid change for the United States. As the processes of capitalist development and nation-building continued, the United States began its emergence as a world economic and political power, moving from the periphery to the core of the world-system. This era brought with it the upheaval of industrialization and the proletarianization of independent producers, the Civil War and the destruction of the slavery-based plantation economy, and massive immigration and population increase. During the century from 1790 to 1890, the population of the United States increased from 3.9 million to 62.9 million, including more than fifteen million new immigrants and their descendants (Archdeacon 1983, p. 27). The United States also expanded territorially, as the conquest and annexation of North America continued inexorably across the continent from the original states on the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast. Each of these processes had a significant impact upon the development of the American ethnic structure and the subsequent course of ethnic relations in the United States. In this discussion, we will seek to link these macro level components of capitalist development to specific patterns of migration and intergroup contact.
As we examine the emerging ethnic structure of the United States in the nineteenth century, we find that a central causal mechanism for such structure is the uneven nature of American capitalist development. One legacy of the colonial era was the dual nature of the new nation, the different and contradictory political economies of the North and South, the conflict between which would dominate the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. Initially, the South was the more advanced area due to the slave-generated wealth of its plantation economy; however, this economic base contained tendencies which led to stagnation. The absence of a large independent sector (small farmers, artisans) and the non-wage nature of coerced slave labor limited the development of a local market and discouraged non-export production beyond plantation needs and luxury items. In addition, the nature of the slave labor system inhibited specialization, diversification, and mechanization and kept productivity at low levels (Boorstein 1965, pp. 171-79; Genovese 1966).

Thus, pressure for expansion was not as much qualitative (intensification of the forces of production) as it was quantitative (expansion of the slave labor force and of agricultural land) and investment opportunities were limited.

In contrast, the North benefitted from forces which would, over several decades, allow it to "leapfrog" past the South and dominate American society. The dispersed nature
of the economic base of the North facilitated the slow development of an indigenous market, while the high relative cost and general scarcity of labor encouraged technological innovation and the emergence of manufacturing. A second source of advantage for the North was its greater participation in international trade, which enabled the accumulation of wealth (capital) through mercantilism and transportation (Frank 1979, p. 61). In addition, the North derived several advantages from its economic ties with the South: it profited from its role as intermediary in the export of Southern raw materials; it was able to use cheap Southern cotton to develop its textile manufacturing capacity; and it dominated Southern markets with lower priced (but more profitable) goods (Genovese 1966, pp. 158-65; Bonacich 1984, p. 91). Nevertheless, the pace of development was relatively slow even in the North as the United States remained dependent upon European (especially British) investment, imports, and markets. Eventually, however, the ultimate effect of these processes—the Southern tendency towards stagnation and the economic dynamism of the North—was the ascendancy of the North and North-South political conflict (centered upon such issues as tariffs, slavery, and the nature of territorial expansion), the denouement of which was Northern victory in the Civil War and the dismantling of the Southern slave economy.
With respect to ethnic contact and intergroup relations, the dual nature of the United States was reflected in two dramatically different historical patterns. The nature of the Southern plantation economy continued, with the exception of a few port cities, to discourage large scale European immigration (Nevins and Commager 1966, p. 239). Consequently, the ethnic structure of the South was dominated by the Black-White division with its caste-like social relations embedded in the slave labor base of the plantation economy. As the institution of slavery came under increasing attack in the nineteenth century, racist ideology emerged as a moral justification for this system of domination (Marger 1985, pp. 137-38). In the North, on the other hand, immigration from Europe was the significant factor in shaping ethnic relations. Although the pace of immigration was slow prior to 1820 and modest prior to 1840--due to the slow economic and territorial expansion of the United States and to the difficulties of the transatlantic passage--the United States (primarily the North) attracted a steady flow of newcomers, the bulk of whom were from Great Britain, Germany, and Ireland, but whose ranks also included smaller numbers of immigrants from other areas of Europe and from French Canada. As the United States became more industrialized and began to expand territorially, the pace of this immigration began to increase--from 143,000 in 1821-30 to
600,000 in 1831-40 to 1.7 million in 1841-50 (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 156).

Both the scope and the nature of European immigration to the United States were intimately connected to economic processes. On the "push" side, European capitalist development resulted in the displacement of small farmers and artisans in numbers far beyond the absorptive capacity of the expanding industrial labor market. For some, the United States offered an opportunity (although it would prove temporary) to attempt to escape the sway of capitalist production relations by re-establishing themselves in agriculture or crafts, while for others the labor needs of American industry provided employment opportunities superior to those at home. Interestingly, the source of immigrants often shifted within sending nations, as the processes of capitalist development and proletarianization touched more peripheral areas within the core (Archdeacon 1983, p. 49). On the "pull" side, the economic nature of European immigration was reflected in the sensitivity of migration to economic cycles in the United States—increased immigration during periods of prosperity and lower levels during recessions (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 11-13). In addition, migration patterns tended to follow existing trade routes and economic opportunities, thereby creating concentrations of immigrants and of specific groups in particular areas (e.g., Irish in Boston and New York, Germans in the
As the industrialization of the United States continued, immigration was encouraged by the recruiting activities of employers and the promotional activities of states and shipping companies (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 34-37). Once established, immigration generated its own momentum and created its own patterns as kin networks and ethnic agencies aided the flow of newcomers.

In addition to the uneven development and dualistic ethnic patterns of the North and South, a third component was added to the picture by the westward territorial expansion of the United States. From our perspective, the history of the American West is best viewed in terms of "core-periphery" relations—the Northern states (first in competition with the South, then on a hegemonic basis after the Civil War) dominated the West in the same manner and for the same reasons that European core nations colonized much of the rest of the world. Whether territory was acquired by purchase, treaty, or conquest, United States westward expansion served two purposes: (1) to provide raw materials, markets, and new outlets for investment; and (2) to serve as a haven for members of the independent class who were displaced by capitalist development and who sought such opportunities as homesteading or mining—the latter driven by the Gold Rush of 1849 (Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 201-21; Barrera 1979; Bonacich 1984, pp. 95-96). Thus, the West emerged as a peripheral area within the United States in
which major economic activities—ranching, railroads, agriculture, and mining—were dominated by external (Northern) capital.

Given the different nature of development in the United States West, it is not surprising that it exhibited its own pattern of ethnic contact and interaction. Territorial expansion and colonization involved the conquest and dispossession of Native Americans through war, treaty, and the destruction of the economic base of Native American societies. By the time their last resistance was crushed in 1890, Native Americans would experience a genocidal decrease in numbers and would find themselves confined to a marginal existence on reservations in the most desolate areas of the West (Brown 1971; Zinn 1980, pp. 124-46). These processes of genocide and peripheralization (i.e., relegation to such fringe activities as subsistence farming—cf. Barrera 1979, pp. 56-57) can thus be viewed as an outcome of capitalist development and expansionism, Native-American resistance and increased White racism, and the perceived disutility (due to their resistance to settler incursions) of Native Americans as a source of labor. This experience was to a degree paralleled by that of Mexican-Americans. The southwestward expansion of the United States in 1848 resulted in the absorption of some 75,000 Mexicans who became American citizens (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 89). Despite guarantees of property rights, Mexican-Americans were slowly
but steadily dispossessed by a combination of Anglo purchase, taxation, legal and political decisions, and violence and intimidation (Barrera 1979, pp. 24-31). While the lack of Mexican-American military resistance enabled them to avoid the extreme fate which befell Native Americans, the end product of United States annexation of the Southwest was relegation of Mexican-Americans to subsistence farming or to serve as a source of cheap labor in mining and agriculture. As would become evident over the following decades, these events had a determining effect upon the subsequent experiences of Native and Mexican-Americans.

Immigration also played an important role in shaping the ethnic structure of the Western United States. While the initial "settlers" may have been "Americans" from the Eastern states, they were soon joined by many other groups. The slow pace of development, the danger posed by Native American resistance, the greater distance from Eastern seaports, and competition from superexploited labor combined to make the West less attractive to European immigrants; however, small numbers of many groups did migrate to isolated settlements (e.g., Germans, Scandinavians--Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 90). At the same time, the Pacific seaports of the West facilitated immigration from China, which after 1850 became a significant source of cheap labor for railroads, mining, and agriculture. While Chinese immigration was numerically less significant than that of other groups
during the mid-nineteenth century (e.g., Germans, Irish, Scandinavians) and was largely confined to a peripheral region within the United States, it assumes an important historical role as a harbinger of a new phase of immigration—the movement of peoples from periphery to core (e.g., the United States by 1900) as the scope of global capitalist development expanded—which would become the dominant pattern by the end of the century.

1865-1890. The Civil War serves as a useful checkpoint in the discussion of American capitalist development and intergroup contact. The conclusion of the war cemented the ascendancy of the emerging industrial capitalist order in the North over the plantation economy of the South and effected the dismantling of the slave labor system. Nevertheless, the South was slow to change. The pace of Southern economic development and industrialization continued to lag behind the North, while the imposition of the "Jim Crow" laws in the post-Reconstruction era kept Blacks in the position of superexploited labor. In general, however, the post-Civil War era saw the continuation and intensification of processes of capitalist development which were already underway. Immigration kept pace with industrialization and territorial expansion: the flow of immigrants resumed after the Civil War and increased markedly after 1880 (cf. Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 156-59). Likewise, conquest and settlement of the West proceeded such
that by 1890, little room remained for territorial expansion--at least on the North American continent itself (as opposed to the 1898-1900 expansion which resulted in a U.S. "empire of islands"--Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Samoa).

The post Civil War era also saw the rapid transformation of capitalist development in the United States and, hence, a period of rapid social change. Although the seeds of industrial development has already been planted, the confluence of cheap labor, technological innovation, abundant natural resources, and investment capital contributed to the rise of the United States as a major industrial power. Concomitant with this process was the emergence of monopoly capitalism--the rise of corporations, the concentration of economic power, and the increased organic composition of capital (Bonacich 1984, pp. 98-99; Commager and Nevins 1966, pp. 291-310). One outcome of these processes was the transformation of American society: the proletarization of the population (i.e., an increasing proportion of wage laborers and a declining proportion of agricultural workers), the increased sway of market relations, and increased class struggle and the rise of the union movement (Zinn 1980, pp. 247-75). These changes in turn provided further impetus for the expansion of the American economy, creating a need for cheap labor which could only be satisfied through further immigration. This demand for labor
would combine with processes of the world-system (e.g., uneven development) to trigger a new phase in American ethnic relations.

**Intergroup Relations and Ethnic Identity**

With respect to intergroup relations, a key factor during the nineteenth century was the changing nature of the eth-class arena, a process which was shaped by the course of global capitalist development. Processes such as industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, mass immigration, and territorial expansion dramatically altered both the ethnic and class structures of the United States and the context in which intergroup interaction occurred. Also significant was the continued uneven development of the United States, a process which in effect created three separate intergroup arenas: North, South, and West. Within this rapidly changing setting, our task is to explore the implications of intergroup relations for the evolution of group identities. For reasons which will soon become obvious--namely, the dramatic differences in their experiences during the nineteenth century—we will consider issues involving European immigrants separate from those of non-White ethnic groups.

**European immigrants: assimilation and persistence.**

During the first part of the nineteenth century, several factors operated to reduce conflict between Anglo-Americans and European immigrants and to facilitate the slow assimila-
tion of the latter. The slow rate of immigration prior to 1820 reduced both the physical and cultural reinforcement of non-Anglo ethnic groups as well as any perceived threat which they posed to Anglo hegemony (Archdeacon 1983, p. 61). More significantly, the preindustrial (albeit slowly changing) social structure of the United States with its large independent agricultural class provided a context which, in concert with opportunities afforded by territorial expansion, served to limit class conflict and, hence, the salience of group identity. At the same time, the low level of urbanization and the absence of the high level of interconnectedness characteristic of later mass society also contributed to reduce potential conflict by allowing groups to exist (and identities to persist) in relative isolation. With continued dominant group pressure for conformity, the result was assimilation, particularly among immigrants from England, thus creating an ideological model of assimilation which would be applied to subsequent immigrant groups. At this juncture, what we are describing is still largely a precapitalist, preindustrial type of ethnicity; that is, one in which ethnicity is a way of life as opposed to a competitive strategy. This would soon change, however, as the push/pull factors described earlier led to a rapid increase in immigration, particularly the post-1840 influx of Germans and Irish. With the alteration of the class structure (i.e., the expansion of the urban proletariat) as a result
of industrialization in the North, the stage was set for increased intergroup interaction and the emergence of "modern" ethnic identities.

In the context of rapid immigration and increased intergroup contact, a key factor in determining subsequent interaction was the relative position of newcomers within the working class (cf. Poulantzas--1973, p. 38--on class "fractions"). Furthermore, given that skilled immigrants were often initially forced to occupy unskilled positions, we must take into consideration not only current occupational position, but also the potential for occupational or even class mobility. To the extent that social groups were homogeneous in terms of class, lifestyle, and culture, differences between them and the dominant group were often defined in ethnic terms—that is, ethnicity served as "shorthand" for describing ethnic and class differences—a practice fostered by dominant group association of immigrants with urban blight, poverty, and other social problems. This was particularly noticeable in the case of Irish Catholics, whose colonial experience under British rule in Ireland and urban location channeled them towards work as unskilled labor or in domestic service. In addition, Irish immigrants encountered particularly virulent dominant group resistance which was grounded both in religious differences (the historical Anglo fear of Catholicism) and, later, in political conflict (i.e., the real or per-
ceived political threat posed by the urban concentration of the Irish). This in turn fostered ethnic mobilization on the part of the Irish as the best means for realizing group material interests. It also meant survival—albeit in changed form due to the power of Anglo-American institutions—of Irish ethnic identity.

Standing in contrast to the Irish was the experience of German-Americans. Unlike the Irish, German immigrants tended to locate in the rural agricultural areas of the Midwestern United States, thereby avoiding the intensified ethnic/class conflict of the Eastern urban network. More importantly, German-Americans exhibited both a higher overall class position and more class diversity than the Irish, which enabled them to avoid ethnic labeling based upon class position, but which also provided less basis for ethnic mobilization. Our point here is that despite some cultural persistence, intragroup class divisions opened the door to the influence of assimilative forces.22 This assimilation was neither unitary nor irreversible as dominant group resistance could trigger ethnic mobilization (e.g., the reaction of German Catholics to legislative attacks on German language parochial schools—Archdeacon 1983, p. 109); however, the general trend was towards assimilation.

Also relevant to our analysis is the generally nativist reaction of the dominant Anglo group (now including assimilated non-Anglos). While undoubtedly ethnocentric reactions
to cultural and religious (especially Catholic) differences were a contributing factor, we believe that the key issues were political and economic. As we observed during our discussion of the colonial era, fear of political domination by non-Anglos gave rise to fear of foreigners and insistence on Anglo-conformity. This dynamic persisted during the nineteenth century, as acceptance of European immigrants was tied to acculturation to American (i.e., Anglo-American) ways (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 111). Increased urbanization and economic competition also fostered nativism, as reflected in the Know-Nothing movement of the 1840s and 1850s. This mobilization also underscored the divergent class interests within the dominant group: workers, artisans, and the independent class—those who felt the brunt of foreign competition or economic dislocation—provided the basis for the movement, while capitalists (industrialists, railroad magnates)—who benefited from the influx of cheap labor—tended to support immigration (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 81-82; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 117-118). Indeed, the Know-Nothing phenomenon is nicely explained by split labor market theory (Bonacich 1972) with its emphasis on labor competition—in this case, the real or threatened displacement of "native" labor by "new arrivals"—leading to antagonism and exclusion.

Closely linked to processes of ethnic mobilization or assimilation were the strategic decisions of individual
group members, decisions which were made in a group context, but which transformed both individuals and groups. Moreover, individual and group action took place within a general institutional framework which emphasized (and transmitted) dominant group culture while devaluing the cultural practices of non-Anglos. As we suggested in earlier chapters, strategic decision making was a complex undertaking in that non-material (e.g., historical, cultural, political) factors could affect the process; however, such decisions were strongly conditioned by economic forces. For the few wealthy newcomers (or those who attained wealth) assimilation seemed the best strategy (e.g., as in the case of French aristocrats or planters), for there was little to be gained by retaining a non-Anglo ethnic identity, while the assimilative route offered increased status and opportunity. In contrast, strategic options for the middle class were less clear-cut: one path involved using class position to assimilate and thereby enjoy (as permitted) the advantages of dominant group membership; however, a countervailing and often easier alternative was to retain ethnic identity and pursue material goals by attaining status and wealth through exploiting communal ties (e.g., professionals, merchants working within the enclave) or by serving as a broker or emissary between the group and the larger society. The final segment, the working classes, had the most limited strategic options. Opportunities for mobility were circum-
scribed by both ethnicity and class (essentially a "double-barrelled" process of social reproduction). With few exceptions, the optimum working class strategy was to group together and use ethnic ties for adjustment and survival (e.g., informational networks, mutual aid).

As suggested in Chapter IV, a significant factor determining the persistence or disappearance of group identity is the nature of the intergroup arena. In examining the mid-nineteenth century United States as an arena, key variables affecting ethnic identity are urban vs. rural, enclave vs. isolated, and nature of minority status (large vs. small, only vs. one among many groups). These factors shaped individual and group strategies both directly—e.g., the feasibility of ethnic institutions (more possible in enclaves)—and indirectly—e.g., increased competition in urban areas triggering ethnic mobilization; increased nativism directed towards the only significant minority in a particular area. The interaction between these factors could often be complex. For example, while the settlement of Scandinavians in isolated rural communities made it possible for them to retain their ethnic identities without significant conflict, this same lack of conflict also inhibited ethnic mobilization and facilitated eventual assimilation. In another case, the urban location and dominant minority status of Franco-Americans in the mill towns of northern New England provided both demographic
support for ethnic institutions and a basis for ethnic mobilization (because of the triggering of dominant group hostility). As a final example, the Irish of Minneapolis-St. Paul, who constituted a relatively small proportion of the population and who were outnumbered by Germans and Scandinavians, found it best to pursue a more assimilative strategy (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 102-03).

What appears to be unique about the U.S. eth-class system is the interplay between ethnicity and class. As Frederickson (1981, p. 200), among others, has observed, ethnic divisions impeded class consciousness among American lower classes. At the same time, the number of ethnic groups (and the relative weakness of any one) and the existence of class and other (e.g., demographic) differences within groups tended in many cases to discourage ethnic mobilization. Indeed, due to labor market competition and to Anglo policies of divide and rule, minorities were often as likely to compete with other minorities (e.g., Irish vs. Northern Blacks for service jobs, Irish vs. German Catholics or French-Canadians for control of the Catholic church in the United States) as with the dominant group, thus themselves diffusing the focus of conflict. Accordingly, while nineteenth-century European immigrant groups were able to preserve some aspects of ethnic distinctiveness, cross-cutting influences and Anglo institutional hegemony encour-
aged acculturation and, in some cases, eventual absorption into a dominant "White American" group.

Non-White groups: superexploitation and exclusion. As we consider nineteenth century intergroup interaction in the United States, it is essential to realize that the pattern described above--immigration, varying degrees of conflict, mobilization, persistence, or assimilation--is only part of the picture. In sharp contrast to this process was the experience of non-White immigrants (e.g., Chinese-Americans) and those groups involuntarily incorporated into U.S. society through conquest or forced immigration (e.g., Native, Black, and Mexican-Americans). What is different about non-White groups is not merely their means of "entry" into American society, but the nature of their subsequent experience. In each case, these groups were not fully integrated (i.e., proletarianized) into the economic mainstream--whether as wage labor or as independent agriculturalists--but were restricted to the margins of the economy as "superexploited" eth-classes whose labor power was appropriated via ethnically-based slavery, debt peonage, or labor market segmentation (cf. current practices in South Africa and in Israel). Thus, the interface between ethnicity and class for superexploited groups was dramatically different from that of European immigrants--indeed, ethnicity and class were virtually isomorphic in a caste-like manner where "race" served as the basis for the
organization of social relationships (cf. Omi and Winant's--1986, pp. 66-67--notion of "racial formation"). This in turn led to a different pattern for the evolution of ethnic identity, one in which subordinate group identities were maintained by "racial" exclusion on the part of the dominant group.

For Native Americans, interaction with Whites followed the pattern established during the colonial era of conquest and removal in the face of settler expansionism. As we noted before, this was a "national" conflict (the United States viewed Native Americans as separate nations to be dealt with via treaty or warfare--Schaefer 1988, p. 177); one in which Native American resistance was weakened by "ethnic" divisions. From the White perspective, whether capitalist or settler, the ultimate objective--displacement of Native Americans--was clear. What was less clear, however, was the means by which this was to be accomplished.

In terms of policy objectives, White attitudes varied from the paternalism or assimilationism of Jefferson--who foresaw eventual acculturation and assimilation--to the implacable racism and advocacy of violent removal epitomized by Jackson and western settlers (Fredrickson 1981, p. 44; Takaki 1987c). These differing views were manifest in a variety of policies ranging from the incorporation (proletarianization) of Native Americans via mission schools (cf. Archdeacon 1983, pp. 67-68) and the development of individual property
rights (often followed by systematic defrauding by Whites—cf. Takaki 1987c, p. 64) to denial of citizenship and open aggression (Fredrickson 1981, p. 45; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 227-28). Given strong Native American resistance (and continued expansionary pressures), these various policies coalesced in military subjugation and removal which progressed inexorably from the Indian Removal Act (from east of the Mississippi River) in 1830 to total conquest and marginalization on reservations by 1890 (Zinn 1980, pp. 124-46). After conquest and creation of the reservation system, Native Americans remained largely outside of the American class structure (or, if one prefers, a lumpenproletariat), struggling in isolation to eke out a marginal existence.

A second superexploited minority, Mexican-Americans, were absorbed through the conquest of the territory which would become the Southwestern United States. Despite being granted American citizenship, Mexican-Americans were driven off the land via a variety of devices (laws, taxes, government grants to railroads, institutional practices, non-recognition of land tenure—cf. Barrera 1979) each of which favored Anglo corporations and settlers in what could be described as a form of "primitive accumulation" in which individual producers were separated from the means of production (cf. Marx 1906, pp. 784-87). Dispossessed Mexican-Americans were then available to serve as a source of "superexploited" labor for mines, railroads, and large
agriculture. At the same time, their status as low wage superexploited labor earned Mexican-Americans the enmity of Anglo workers (who resented perceived economic competition and downward pressure on wages) and small farmers (who had to compete with large farms using superexploited labor), both of whom sought to exclude Mexicans from the labor market (Barrera 1979, pp. 50-55). Given the weakness of Anglo workers, this situation does not in our judgement fit the split labor market interpretation of a caste system created by the working class of the dominant group (cf. Bonacich 1972); however, economic competition undoubtedly fostered Anglo racism and attempts at exclusion. These social arrangements tended to reproduce themselves from generation to generation, as Mexican-American mobility was inhibited by both their superexploited status (and ensuing economic disadvantage) and the effects of institutionalized Anglo racism.

An experience somewhat similar to Mexican-Americans was that of Chinese immigrants. The preponderance of Chinese-Americans entered as indentured servants or as contract labor on the railroads (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 193) and experienced ethnically-based restrictive circumstances closer to the superexploited end of the continuum. Like Mexican-Americans, Chinese-Americans served as a low wage pool for the benefit of Anglo capital, while incurring the wrath of the White working class (Barrera 1979, p. 52).
Similarly, anti-Chinese antagonism can be attributed to competition (e.g., downward pressure on wages, the use of Chinese-Americans as strikebreakers) and to the spreading ideology of racial inferiority of non-Whites. The eventual legal exclusion of Chinese immigrants after 1882 reflected a range of eth-class concerns. Clearly, the White working class agitated for exclusion; however, passage of restrictive legislation was as much a strategy of capital in the course of eth-class struggle--discarding a weapon (Chinese-American labor) which was serving as an organizing issue for the labor movement (Takaki 1987b, pp. 107-08). For our purposes, the essential point is that outcomes of intergroup interaction--conflict, exclusion, denigration--reflect constellations of eth-class interests.

For the other superexploited minority, Black-Americans, the nineteenth century was a tumultuous one as they were caught up in the class/regional conflict between the North and the South. The expansion of cotton production cemented the role of slavery in the Southern political economy and increased the isolation of Black-Americans from the American mainstream (Quarles 1969, p. 63). Within the confines of slavery, forced acculturation, and social isolation, Black-Americans forged a new ethnic identity which reflected both their historical heritage and their economic status (Boorstein 1965, pp. 190-99; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 57-59; Schaefer 1988, pp. 218-19). Following
the termination of the slave trade in 1808, heightened Northern criticism of the institution of slavery, and an ever-growing Southern fear of slave revolts, Black-Americans suffered increased restrictions (e.g., slave codes) as plantation owners sought to secure their position in the social order (Zinn 1980, pp. 168-76; Archdeacon 1983, p. 66). The effects of this expanding racist ideology—a philosophical justification for the institution of slavery—were also felt in the form of increased restrictions upon free Blacks, who were viewed by Southern Whites as a threat to the maintenance of the slave system (Quarles 1969, pp. 86-88).

The situation of the Northern Black-American population also deteriorated during this time. Confronted by a smaller (and therefore less threatening) population which did not play a significant economic role, Northern Whites exhibited what Fredrickson (1981, p. 151) has termed an "aversive" racial order—one which sought to exclude Black-Americans, which encouraged their "repatriation" to Africa, and which envisioned the eventual extinction of Blacks through an inability to compete on an equal basis with Whites. Thus, Northern Black-Americans experienced legal attempts to prohibit their entry and to restrict their civil rights (Archdeacon 1983, p. 66). With respect to the labor market, most Northern Blacks served as superexploited labor in a manner similar to Mexican and Chinese-Americans in the
Western United States; that is, they were excluded from desirable jobs and labor unions and limited to the most unskilled positions—from which they were in turn often displaced by immigrants (Quarles 1969, pp. 92-93). In this context, the Northern attack on slavery was not grounded in an ideological belief in equality, but instead in economic (class) competition between North and South, as the North was fearful that any westward expansion of slavery would both limit capitalist development and undermine the position of free White labor (Fredrickson 1981, p. 156; Zinn 1980, p. 182).

The triumph of the North in the Civil War shattered the slave-based Southern social order. Post-war "Reconstruction" saw the extension of some civil rights to Black-Americans; however, racism, the lack of land reform, and the class disadvantages instilled by slavery (e.g., lack of education and vocational skills) limited their economic opportunities. While the first decade after the Civil War contained considerable class struggle over the shape of the new post-slavery social order, the White rural elite (essentially the former plantation class) was able to re-establish first its economic power and then—after the Hayes deal and the collapse of Reconstruction—its political hegemony (Bloom 1987, p. 33; Zinn 1980, pp. 198-200).

Even then, the planter class feared the potential threat posed by free Blacks in alliance with working class Whites
(particularly given the popularity of the populist movement among lower class Whites--Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 91-92) and sought to preserve its control over Black agricultural labor. Consequently, following the collapse of the populist movement, the Southern elite engineered the disenfranchisement of Black-Americans and instituted the "Jim Crow" system of legal segregation. For Black-Americans, this meant subjugation in a system of superexploited labor (e.g., debt peonage and exclusion) which was maintained through both legal and extralegal coercion.

What emerges from this picture is the notion that the hegemony of the Southern White rural elite and emergence of the post-bellum racial order were not inevitable, but rather that they evolved via eth-class struggle in an arena shaped by the legacy of slavery and the existence of a polarized ethnic structure (i.e., containing two major groups, as opposed to the North). The "Jim Crow" system was the result of White ethnic mobilization, as the rural elite employed racial ideology to build a cross-class alliance--one which enabled them to retain power. As Bloom (1987, p. 18) observes, "racism did not overwhelm class; racism became an organizing principle for social strata fearful of class-based political action." In our view, this outcome is not compatible with the split labor market interpretation of a caste system (i.e., the exclusion of minority labor from high-paying jobs and the emergence of racially-based wage
differentials) created by a labor "aristocracy" (as would be maintained by Bonacich--1972), inasmuch as the Southern White working class did not have the power (although they might have had the interest) to force such changes. While the White working class may have benefitted from reduced economic competition (as well as the psychological benefits of higher social status), the major beneficiary was the rural planter class which both assured a supply of cheap labor and eliminated any potential cross-ethnic working class alliance. Thus, the interests of the White elite were cast as "ethnic" interests in order to mobilize all Whites and to maintain the subjugation of Blacks. Our intention in making this statement is not to depict ethnicity as an epiphenomenon of class--certainly racist ideology had become a social fact and was well institutionalized in the South--but instead to assert that without the underlying class interests, the Southern racial order would not have emerged.

Also relevant to this analysis is the link between the Southern racial order and the national eth-class structure. As long as its political hegemony was unchallenged, the North was unwilling to employ costly control measures (e.g., using the full power of the federal government to push the South) to protect Blacks (Fredrickson 1981, p. 183). Inasmuch as Northern capital did not need Black labor (European immigrants provided an alternative source of cheap labor for industrial expansion--Bonacich 1984, pp. 112-13), it was
thus more interested in maintaining social harmony and continuing the flow of profit from the Southern "periphery" to Northern industrial and financial interests than in improving the welfare of Black-Americans (Bloom 1987, p. 25; Zinn 1980, pp. 201-03; Quarles 1969, p. 141). As a beneficiary, the North had no interest in overturning the Southern racial order. In addition, the social climate in the North was evolving in ways which made it more sympathetic to Southern practices--e.g., the late-nineteenth century spread of Social Darwinism, the increased racism directed towards new immigrants, the use of racism to rationalize imperialism, and the view that segregation was a necessary "apprenticeship" before Black-Americans could attain full citizenship (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 188-91). Closely linked to this was the increased class conflict (i.e., strikes, unions, populism) of the late nineteenth century, which in turn fostered increased capitalist class consciousness (including viewing the Southern elite as allies in the struggle against the working class) and a general retreat from ideologies of equality (Zinn 1980, pp. 235-46; Fredrickson 1981, p. 189). In this context, it could be argued that Northern capital feared the fusion of the newly-formed Black-American underclass with the burgeoning union movement and was therefore quite willing to accept the Southern racial order (Steinberg 1981). Thus, the post-Reconstruction rapprochement between Northern
capital and the Southern agricultural elite can be viewed as both class (capitalist) and national (White American) mobilization which occurred at the expense of Black-Americans. In this manner, the Southern racial order was integrated into the national social system—a "peripheral" and coercive form of labor control linked to core (Northern) capital through commercial and financial ties.

**Summary: 1800-90.** Before continuing with our analysis of the evolution of intergroup relations in the United States, let us briefly summarize the trends of the years between 1800 and 1890. This was an era of rapid social change: immigration and territorial expansion had increased the size and population of the United States; capitalist development, industrialization, and proletarianization had altered the nature of production; and the Civil War and the emergence of monopoly capitalism had restructured the political economy. These developments in turn transformed the nature of intergroup relations, an outcome which we sought to describe in terms of two processes. In the *first* of these—the European immigrant experience—increased intergroup contact and competition in the context of industrialization led to a complex set of outcomes. On the one hand, competition and conflict (as "natives" sought to defend their position against immigrants) encouraged ethnic mobilization and the persistence of group identity as a strategy for survival in unfamiliar settings. On the other hand,
several factors—the link between acculturation and social mobility, overall economic expansion, and the relative permeability of boundaries (among White groups)—produced strong pressures towards assimilation, albeit at different rates for different eth-classes. Meanwhile, the second trend—the non-White experience—resulted in a different set of outcomes. These groups were relegated to a subordinate, "superexploited" social and economic position which was reinforced by rigid, almost caste-like "racial" boundaries imposed by the dominant group (including newly-arrived European immigrants). While specific group experiences differed—Native Americans were decimated and marginalized on reservations; Black-Americans suffered under slavery prior to 1865 and from the Jim Crow system of segregation thereafter; and Mexican-Americans were faced with debt peonage and extreme labor market segmentation—the result of this overlapping of ethnicity and class (in the context of dominant group exclusion) was to concretize group boundaries and thereby effectively preclude any assimilation. The effects of these patterns would continue into the next century.

**Core Status and Monopoly Capitalism: 1890-1945**

The first half of the twentieth century saw the continuing evolution of the process of U.S. capitalist development. Industrialization and proletarianization proceeded apace, as evidenced by rapid economic expansion and the
reshaping of the class structure. On a global level, this era also marked the movement of the United States into the core of the capitalist world-economy, a dramatic change from the weak, newly emergent nation which existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Closely linked to this transformation was the emergence of the United States as an imperialist power, a development attributable to the expansionary nature of capitalism (e.g., the quest for new markets, sources of raw materials, and outlets for investment) and its inherent tendencies towards crisis (i.e., disruptions of accumulation, such as the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s).² For the United States, imperialist activities included the Asia trade and the Open Door policy, the Spanish-American War and territorial acquisitions in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the political and economic domination of Latin America.³ In addition to serving as a sign of the increased power and influence of the United States, many of these ventures would later provide sources of immigrants to the United States (e.g., Puerto Rico, Central America), particularly during the post-1945 era.

With respect to intergroup relations, the years between 1890 and 1945 stand as a period of transition between the patterns of the nineteenth century (immigration and competition, domination and superexploitation) and those of the modern era (migration from periphery to core, ethnic assertion vs. the state). The already complex ethnic structure
which was the legacy of the nineteenth century would become even more varied, which in turn would lead to a sharp upsurge in intergroup conflict as new groups sought to establish a niche in American society. Underneath the surface, increasing class differentiation would intersect ethnic boundaries (leading to a proliferation of eth-classes) and trigger intergroup processes ranging from assimilation to mobilization, although in many cases these effects would not be evident until the post-1945 era. Yet here we are beginning to anticipate events. The story of intergroup relations in the first half of the twentieth century begins with variations on a traditional theme: immigration.

**Ethnic Contact**

For the first half of this era--i.e., from 1890 until 1924--immigration continued to serve as a source of cheap labor for rapid economic growth. After 1880, the number of immigrants per decade roughly doubled from two and one-half million to five million (with the exception of only 3.7 million during the depression-ridden 1890s), reaching a peak of 8.8 million in the first decade of the twentieth century (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 158). While the "old immigrants"--English, Irish, Germans, and Scandinavians--continued to come, they were surpassed in both numbers and impact by a flood (often referred to as the "Great Migration") of "new" immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe--primarily Italians, Jews, and Slavs, but also including
smaller numbers of Greeks, Finns, Magyars, Lithuanians, and many other groups (Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 333-35). In contrast with the original American settlement pattern which persisted through the nineteenth century, this migration reflected a new pattern—movement from the periphery (or the semiperiphery) to the core. Underlying this phenomenon was the increasingly global impact of capitalist development, as new areas experienced the same upheavals (e.g., rapid population growth, decline of small agriculture, political conflict—the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires) which had previously stimulated emigration from Western Europe. Indeed, this "new" immigration is best viewed as part of a worldwide pattern (migrants also moved to other "settler" societies—e.g., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) in which the United States was the primary destination (Archdeacon 1983, p. 113). For our purposes, what is most significant about this "new" immigration was that by introducing many new groups into American society, it effected a dramatic change in the ethnic composition of the United States.

As was the case in the nineteenth century, immigrant and labor patterns were shaped by the uneven development of the United States. Bonacich (1984, p. 108) observes that the United States at the turn of the century contained aspects of both peripheral formations and advanced capital (e.g., exporting both raw materials and manufactured goods;
investing overseas while remaining an outlet for European capital). In the Northeast—the advanced capitalist "core" of the United States—immigration followed the "modern" pattern of peripheral (Southern and Eastern European) peasantry becoming a core urban industrial proletariat. The United States "periphery", on the other hand, exhibited different patterns: core-periphery migration in the West (i.e., "settlers" emigrating from the Northeast in search of opportunities—e.g., agriculture, mining—to join the independent class) and limited migration to the more established agrarian society of the South. Both areas were dominated by "core" (Northeastern United States) capital and possessed an economy based on superexploited labor (Black-Americans in the South, Mexican-Americans in the West), hence, both were less attractive to immigrants. This core-periphery metaphor has its limits, as some immigrants did settle in the "periphery" (especially the West, with its opportunities for economic independence); however, it provides a useful basis for understanding the different immigration and ethnic labor patterns of the early twentieth century.

This "new" immigration, however, would persist for only a few decades. While (despite their larger absolute numbers) smaller relative to the existing resident population, the new immigrants had a significant social impact, probably due to the increased economic and cultural distance between the United States and the sending societies. One effect of
this increased "social distance" was an upsurge in nativism, ethnic conflict, racism, and pressure for immigration restriction. By the 1920s, American nativist sentiment was sufficiently strong to bring about legislation which strictly limited immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe and continued the exclusion of Asians (which began in 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act and was extended by the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907 which limited Japanese immigration). The roots of this exclusionary process were many and varied, including racism, general xenophobia, and political and economic competition; however, we would emphasize the economic factors, particularly the declining need for unskilled labor (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 152) and the absorption of new immigrants into domestic workers' movements (Bonacich 1984, p. 116). What is significant about the immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s is that it was deliberately (in a racist manner) designed to reverse the trend of the previous thirty years by restoring Northern and Western Europeans to the pre-eminent position among immigrant groups. Moreover, the restrictive system of national quotas, in concert with the Depression and World War II, served to limit drastically all immigration to the United States (e.g., from 4.1 million in the 1920s to 500,000 in the 1930s--Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 158).

Yet the story of ethnic contact in the first half of the twentieth century does not end with immigration restric-
tion, the Depression, and the decline of European immigration. Mexicans were not affected by the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act (neither were French-Canadians, for that matter) and began to migrate in greater numbers, filling the labor void created by restrictions on Asian and European immigration. Emigration from Mexico was encouraged by rapid population growth and the displacement of the peasantry (the latter due in part to the effects of United States investment), while continued development of agriculture, mining, and railroads in the American Southwest created a demand for cheap labor to the extent that companies actively recruited in Mexico (Barrera 1979, pp. 69-71). Moreover, the proximity of Mexico (via improved railroad links) and the seasonal nature of agricultural work created a pattern of temporary or "commuter" migration (cf. Barkan 1977) which was compatible with both Mexican economic patterns and the needs of American capital (Archdeacon 1983, p. 129).

Indeed, the economy of the United States Southwest was so dependent upon Mexican labor that agricultural and mining interests successfully resisted any attempts to restrict Mexican immigration.

Also significant during this era was the internal migration of American Blacks from the "peripheral" Southern United States to the urban areas of the North. Like other immigrants during this period, Black-Americans forsook an economically less developed area for the wage labor market
and expanding economy (particularly during wartime) of the Northern "core." Giving further impetus to the Black-American exodus from the South was the decline of cotton production and the mechanization of agriculture (the same disruption of small producers which propelled so many Europeans across the Atlantic), as well as the onerous nature of the Southern system of racial segregation (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 130-32). From the perspective of Northern capital, Southern Blacks provided a ready source of cheap labor after the restriction of European immigration and during the labor shortages of the First and Second World Wars. Although the migration of Blacks from South to North was not in itself international in scope, it continued the restructuring of the ethnic composition of the North and expanded Black-White intergroup contact beyond the confines of the South.

Thus, the half-century preceding World War II saw the continued evolution of United States capitalist development and the American ethnic structure. With respect to the former, this era witnessed the emergence of the United States as a full fledged core power, which in the context of the early twentieth century entailed industrial monopoly capitalism (i.e., increased rationalization of production, the expansion of market relations, the concentration of capital, the formation of trusts and cartels, and the systematic recurrence of economic crises) and imperialist
activities. Ethnic contact was shaped by the demands of economic expansion which encouraged continued labor migration. Indeed, European immigration reached its zenith during the first half of this period. This pattern of labor migration was qualitatively different: it dramatically broadened the ethnic structure of the United States by introducing a diverse array of new groups which were non-Protestant and non-Western European. Even when the flow of immigrants from overseas was curtailed by the immigration restriction legislation of 1924, the migrations of Mexican and Black Americans continued the reshaping of the American ethnic mosaic. By the onset of the Second World War, the ethnic composition of the United States had begun to assume many of the characteristics of its present configuration—a mixture of Native Americans, the descendants of the British "original settlers" and of the "old immigrants" from Northern and Western Europe, the "new immigrants" from Southern and Eastern Europe, Asians, the "superexploited" Mexicans and Blacks, and an assortment of "micro-groups" from virtually every corner of the globe (indeed, U.S. ethnic groups are estimated to number more than 200).

Eth-Class Struggles and Group Identity

European immigrants. As we have just described, the addition of the new immigrants greatly increased the diversity of the American eth-class structure. For the old immigrants and newcomers from Northern and Western Europe,
the arrival of groups from Southern and Eastern Europe triggered a process of "ethnic succession" (cf. Light 1981); that is, the displacement of earlier immigrants from the bottom of the (White) ethnic hierarchy. This occurred in several different ways. First, the new immigrants tended to deflect the nativist sentiments of Anglo-Americans (except perhaps towards Irish-Americans) from older immigrant groups, thereby enabling the latter (now seen as less objectionable) to move into a "middle" position in the ethnic structure—a benefit realized even by newcomers from these groups (e.g., Protestant immigrants from Germany, Scandinavia, etc.). In addition, intergroup competition with "new" immigrants often induced older immigrant groups to accentuate their "American" (i.e., Anglo) affiliation as a strategy to exclude newcomers or otherwise gain competitive advantages (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 151-52). On the other hand, old immigrants occasionally found it easier to develop ties with newcomers, which in turn allowed them to improve their status by serving as "brokers" (e.g., increased Irish political power through incorporating Southern and Eastern Europeans into the Democratic Party and urban political "machines"—Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 176-77; Archdeacon 1983, p. 157). This movement into the middle of the White ethnic structure, coupled with economic mobility (and subsequent intragroup class variation and divergent eth-class interests) in the midst of the expanding American economy,
continued the assimilation of the old, pre-1880 immigrant groups.

For immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, the situation was markedly different from that of earlier ethnic groups. First, their migration was from periphery (or semi-periphery) to core, as opposed to the core-periphery (or semiperiphery) pattern of the old immigrants. This meant that rather than entering American society with occupational and literacy skills that could be directly utilized (as was the case with the old immigrants, whose skills were roughly equal to that of the resident population), the new immigrants tended to be relatively disadvantaged (cf. Nevins and Commager 1966, p. 297; Archdeacon 1983, p. 152). Secondly, post-1890 new immigrants encountered a different class structure, one which was increasingly industrial as opposed to independent agriculture and petty commodity production, and one in which the modal labor form was urban and semi or unskilled as opposed to agricultural. As a result, new immigrants assumed a relatively low class position upon entry into an intergroup arena marked by increasing interaction, competition, and differentiation.

Another characteristic of the American intergroup arena during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an upsurge in eth-class struggles. This was the era of union assertion, socialist movements, and the mobilization of anti-capitalist small producers (e.g., the Grange, rural
populism), all **class-based** forms of group organization (cf. Zinn 1980, pp. 237-46, 314-49; Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 369-75). Given the increasingly complex ethnic structure of the United States, **ethnicity both cut across and was intersected by class divisions**, a factor which tended to limit the utility of both affiliations. Moreover, new immigrants were simultaneously interacting and competing with Anglos, old immigrants, and other new immigrants, which meant that intergroup conflict was not bipolar but multi-headed and more diffuse in nature (and, therefore, less salient). Thus, the new immigrants were confronted by contradictory forces which encouraged both accentuating and attenuating ethnic identity.

In this context, new immigrants faced a wide range of strategic alternatives with respect to ethnic identity. For the many sojourners who viewed their stay in the United States as temporary (see note 33 above), there was little incentive for acculturation. Urban location and clustering in enclaves facilitated the emergence of ethnic institutions and informal networks, thereby increasing the value of group affiliation as a means of survival for both sojourners and permanent immigrants. For some group members, enclave survival entailed partial withdrawal from the larger society or specialization in an economic "niche" (i.e., occupational concentration or ethnic enterprise) as an ethnic-based strategy for improving class position. Competition with
other groups often encouraged ethnic mobilization, manifest in new immigrant affiliation with the Democratic Party and with urban political machines (Handlin 1951, pp. 209-24; Archdeacon, 1983, pp. 189-92). Given the initial economic homogeneity of the new immigrant groups, the broad use of ethnic strategies resulted in the initial persistence of group identities.

Another factor in the equation was the reaction of the dominant classes and ethnic group to the new immigrants. Monopoly capital (which was predominantly Anglo) was seemingly the greatest beneficiary of continued immigration, as the continued influx of cheap labor both increased profits (by reducing labor costs) and undercut working class solidarity. On the other hand, the Anglo/old immigrant working class tended to be antagonistic, fearing competition via lower wages and the deskilling of jobs and resenting the use of newcomers as strikebreakers. Similarly, the class of independent producers, still fighting a losing battle against capitalist development and proletarianization, viewed new immigrants with suspicion as tools of monopoly capital (Bonacich 1984, pp. 121-22). Fanning the flames of economically rooted intergroup conflict was existing racial ideology (e.g., Social Darwinism, the eugenics movement) employed to explain the social problems stemming from industrialization and the economic and cultural gap between residents and new immigrants from the periphery.
(Handlin 1951, pp. 279-80). This was manifest in works describing Southern and Eastern Europeans as racially inferior (e.g., Grant 1916) and by a Congressional Commission report (i.e., the Dillingham Commission) which described them as an "undesirable addition" to American society (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 163-64; Gossett 1963; Nevins and Commager 1966, p. 336). Thus, material conflict was exacerbated by existing ideology, which in turn had emerged from earlier intergroup resource competition.

As a result of these divergent interests and attitudes, there was considerable variation in dominant group strategies towards new immigrants. Pressures for exclusion began in the nineteenth century; however, initial efforts met with only limited success (e.g., exclusion of contract laborers and Chinese) as restrictive legislation was vetoed by Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson (Higham 1955). Once immigrants had entered the United States, dominant group strategies for maintaining supremacy included exploitation, discrimination, and intimidation (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 145-56). One alternative strategy involved attempts to "Americanize" (i.e., Anglicize) immigrants, as manifest in social work (e.g., settlement houses), the workplace, and--most significantly--the public schools (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 184-85). This movement gained momentum with the onset of World War I and charges of divided loyalty among "hyphe-nated Americans" (charges promulgated by no less than
President Wilson himself); however, the limited success of Americanization increased pressures for exclusion. Given the lessened opposition of the capitalist class to immigration restriction—due to the declining need for unskilled labor, the absorption of new immigrants into the union movement, and the perceived link between newcomers and radicalism (Bonacich 1984, p. 115; Archdeacon 1983, p. 152)—Anglo cross-class ethnic mobilization (under the guise of Americanism) gave rise to the restrictive immigration legislation of 1924. Nevertheless, differing eth-class interests were visible in the lobbying for immigration restriction legislation—the National Association of Manufacturers opposed quotas, while the American Federation of Labor strongly supported them (Handlin 1951, pp. 289–90; Archdeacon 1983, p. 174).

The 1924 restriction (in the case of new immigrants, the virtual cutoff) of immigration changed the strategic context for intergroup interaction. While the enclave or ethnic niche strategy which had provided an initial foothold remained feasible for some, the absence of the physical and cultural reinforcement previously provided by sojourners and new arrivals limited the effectiveness of ethnic mobilization and encouraged acculturation. One strategy—which became increasingly appealing given the intolerance of the dominant group for cultural diversity, the large number of groups in the American ethnic structure, and the existence
of conflict *between* ethnic minorities—was *ethnic merger*; that is, the enhancement of group strength by blurring ethnic identities from the country of origin and creating a new supra-ethnic identity based on previous *national* identity (e.g., Italian-Americans—Hannerz 1974; Slavic-Americans—Barton 1975). Given declining dominant group hostility (new immigrants were perceived as less of a threat after immigration restriction), access to rights of citizenship (the 1790 Naturalization Act extended citizenship status to all "free Whites"—Bonacich 1984, p. 116), and continued Anglo institutional hegemony, assimilation became an increasingly viable individual strategy. At the same time, the individual psychological "costs" of assimilation—separation from community and family (cf. Child 1943; Handlin 1951)—made it a process more likely to occur over generations. Thus, while acculturation and decreased intergroup conflict paved the way for assimilation, ethnic identity persisted for the new immigrants.

*Non-White Groups.* The problems and conflicts experienced by the "new immigrants" paled by comparison with those superexploited groups not of European origin. Black, Asian, Native, and Mexican-Americans were forced to confront both the extreme racism of American society in the early twentieth century and the disadvantage of location at the bottom of the class structure. With the exception of Native Americans, who for the most part were kept on the margins of the
economy, these groups served, with varying degrees of severity, as superexploited labor generally located (with the exception of Northern Blacks) in the peripheral regions (i.e., the South and the West) of the United States. Inasmuch as colonial labor systems are grounded in the maintenance of rigid ethnic boundaries, non-White groups were not permitted to assimilate; that is, intergroup boundaries and status differentials were strictly enforced by the dominant Anglo-American group. This did not preclude the emergence of intragroup class divisions, for while the bulk of non-White group members remained in the superexploited segment of the working class, the limited permeability of the American "caste" system allowed for some mobility and the emergence of a small middle class (e.g., professionals or small business owners serving the minority community). Yet ethnicity remained a determining factor, for although the minority "middle" class enjoyed a higher economic position, it shared the pariah social and political status of its fellow group members.

For non-White groups, exclusion did not inhibit acculturation (i.e., the adoption of aspects of Anglo-American culture), it merely assured—given the rarity of "passing" as a dominant group member and the impossibility of class-based strategies—the persistence of ethnic stratification and group identity. In essence, minority ethnic identity in the early twentieth century evolved as an adaptation to
White domination (e.g. Black accommodation to Southern White racism/paternalism--Bloom 1987, pp. 122-28) within parameters set by the dominant group. From the other side of the fence, dominant group exclusionary practices reflected the eth-class interests of both the elite (e.g., Southern and Western agricultural interests), who benefitted from the superexploitation and general labor control inherent in colonial labor systems, and the White working class, who sought to exclude competition. These economic interests were buttressed by the now-entrenched racial ideology of White superiority.

Within the general context of superexploited labor, the experiences of different groups varied. Black-Americans in the post-Reconstruction South experienced relegation to agricultural debtpeonage (i.e., sharecropping) or to the lowest ranks of the working class. This caste-like social status was maintained by the "Jim Crow" system of legal segregation (which was given national sanction by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Plessy v. Ferguson decision), by informal exclusion, and by extralegal coercion such as lynchings (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 268-74). What emerged was a social order in which Blacks were economically, politically, and psychologically dominated by Whites, a social order in which the White rural elite were the prime beneficiaries. Although "caste-like", this social system was not as rigid as slavery, as evidenced by the emergence of a small
enclave-based Black middle class and of a range of ethnic institutions (e.g., churches). Although the Southern economy was rocked by crises (e.g., the boll weevil infestation and the decline of cotton agriculture), the emigration of Blacks to the North provided a safety valve which allowed the racial order to persist.

Black-Americans in the Northern "core" of the United States experienced a different form of superexploitation during the early twentieth century. While some Blacks had always lived in the North, their numbers were swelled by the immigration of Southern Blacks during World War I and after the restriction of European immigration (Quarles 1969, pp. 193-95). In some respects, Black northward migration can be viewed as a case of "ethnic succession" in that they replaced the "new immigrants" at the bottom of the class structure; however, the position of Black-Americans was qualitatively different from that of Southern and Eastern Europeans due to racial exclusion—which seemingly increased in response to the influx of Southern Blacks (Lieberson 1980, p. 375). At the same time, the Northern racial order was different from that of the South: there was less state-sanctioned segregation; Blacks were more integrated into the mainstream urban industrial sector; the system of ethnic stratification was relatively more permeable; and the local political economy did not depend on racial segregation (Bloom 1987, p. 187). Nevertheless, the position of Black-
Americans was superexploited in that they constituted a separate segment of the working class (different wages, ethnic occupational stratification, exclusion from unions) amidst an "aversive" (cf. Frederickson 1981, p. 151) racial order characterized by segregation in employment, housing, and education (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 171-72; Bloom 1987, p. 188; Blauner 1987, pp. 149-60). In response, Northern Blacks developed their own social and cultural networks and institutions, utilizing group ties as a means of survival.

Given our assertion that no one dominant eth-class segment benefitted from the exclusion of Blacks to the same degree as in the South, it becomes necessary to examine the basis of the Northern racial order. In essence, we are asking the question: Why were Northern Blacks treated differently from European immigrants? According to neo-classical economic thought (e.g., Friedman 1962, p. 108), status discrimination is economically irrational in the context of advanced capitalism; however, it has not been market forces which have reduced discrimination. Given the power of the capitalist class, it is also not feasible to accept the split labor market suggestion that a White working class fearful of competition was unilaterally able to establish a restrictive racial order. We would argue that racial discrimination is not incompatible with industrial capitalism, and that the capitalist mode of production...
can adapt itself to pre-existing ideologies. This suggests that there is little incentive for capital to change a racial order due to both the influence of racial ideologies and the economic advantages of discrimination (e.g., profits from superexploitation, increased labor control through working class divisions—cf. Reich 1981). Indeed, if a racial ideology is widespread, individual actors cannot afford not to discriminate (e.g., the economic loss, or perceived danger thereof, experienced by the first employer to hire racial minorities as professionals, managers, sales staff, etc.).

In the Western United States, Mexican-Americans experienced yet another superexploited labor pattern. As a consequence of agricultural expansion, World War I labor shortages, and the restriction of European immigration, the existing Mexican-American population was augmented by an influx of immigrants from Mexico.32 Within the political economy of the Southwest, Mexican-Americans served as cheap labor (with varying degrees of superexploitation) in several economic niches: extreme superexploitation via debt peonage or wage discrimination in agriculture; wage discrimination in mining or as railroad labor; and occupational stratification in the industrial labor force (Barrera 1979, pp. 78-90). Despite increasing White ethnic antagonism stemming from economic competition (e.g., White labor, White farmers competing with employers of Mexican-American labor), the
economic role of Mexican-American labor was central to the extent that Southwestern capitalist interests prevented the inclusion of Mexicans in the immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 217; Barrera 1979, pp. 73-74.). Nevertheless, the tenuous economic position of Mexican-Americans was reflected in their reserve role (which was enhanced by the proximity of Mexico)—Mexican-Americans were deported during the Depression or were replaced by White labor (Barrera 1979, pp. 105-07). Although some internal differentiation existed within the Mexican-American community (e.g., an enclave-based middle class), their ethnically-based marginality—and the later emergence of the contract-labor bracero program—stood as a barrier to mobility.

A somewhat similar experience was encountered by Asian-American immigrants (i.e., Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos) in the Western states. Each group was welcomed by employers as a source of cheap labor, yet experienced hostility, discrimination (e.g., housing, jobs, citizenship rights), and eventual exclusion as a result of the interaction of economic competition and racist ideology. After Chinese immigration was prohibited in 1882, Chinese-Americans retreated into enclaves, using group solidarity as protection against White hostility. Both the Japanese, who followed the Chinese, and the Filipinos, who succeeded the Japanese, experienced similar receptions (Japanese immigra-
tion was first limited by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907, then explicitly halted in 1924; Filipino immigration was halted by the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924). Japanese-Americans prospered in agriculture and in small businesses (e.g., Japanese-Americans operated one-half of the truck farms in California by 1940); however, this success further fanned the flames of White racial antagonism. This hostility came to a head with the internment of Japanese-Americans in the Western United States during World War II, which, although rationalized as a military necessity in the context of national conflict with Japan, was grounded in racist ideology and economic competition. For example, White farmers supported internment as a means of removing Japanese competitors, while Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, although closer to the war zone, were not interned due to the centrality of their position in the local economy (Schaefer 1988, p. 393).

The final non-White group, Native Americans, were placed in a unique social and economic position. Following the end of the White-Native American national conflict in 1890, surviving Native-Americans were placed on reservations and remained largely on the outside of the White capitalist economy (indeed, the economic marginality of reservation land reduced most residents to economic dependence on the federal government). At this juncture, the White objective for Native Americans entailed socio-cultural incorporation
into the larger society and proletarianization into the labor force. This was attempted via two vehicles. The first, the Dawes Act of 1887, established individual private property rights (vs. communal landholding) within reservations, with the expectation that Native Americans would fail at farming and be forced to sell their land enter the labor market, and assimilate into "American" society (Zinn 1980, p. 514; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 228; Schaefer 1988, pp. 180-81). In addition, many Native American youth underwent removal and forced acculturation through the notorious boarding schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 228-29). Neither of these methods completely achieved its goal (due in no small part to Native American resistance); however, Native American culture was weakened as a result of this economic and cultural onslaught. One side effect of the White attack on Native American culture was the beginning of Native American ethnic merger—the creation of a pan-ethnic "American Indian" identity (Trottier 1981)—although sub-ethnic identities continued to persist. Although White tactics changed to a more paternalistic approach (Native Americans were given citizenship and some political rights in the 1920s and 1930s), Native Americans remained an economically marginal and politically subjugated ethnic group controlled by Whites through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Schaefer 1988, pp. 181-82).
Summary: 1890-1945. As we suggested at start of this section, this period was a time of transition between the nineteenth century and the modern (i.e., post-1945) era. The "Great Migration" of the new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe was the culmination of the immigration which defined U.S. society as a settler society; however, intergroup conflict (and the perceived threat to Anglo hegemony) led to stringent restrictions on immigration. Nevertheless, ethnic relations did not end with the exclusionary legislation of 1924. As was the case with their predecessors, new immigrant identities both persisted, in response to intergroup conflict and the demands of a new environment (including merger into pan-ethnic identities), and slowly diminished, in response to increasing intragroup differentiation and the link between acculturation, assimilation, and mobility. In contrast, the position of the superexploited non-White groups remained relatively static: Black-Americans were subject to Jim Crow and other forms of segregation; Native-Americans remained marginalized on isolated reservations; and the position of Mexican-Americans was undermined by deportations and contract labor. Nevertheless, chinks were beginning to appear in the "caste-like" status of these groups in the form of limited mobility (especially during the World Wars) which, by altering the eth-class composition of superexploited groups, would
provide a base for subsequent mobilization. These trends would become dominant themes in the post-1945 era.

**The Modern Era: 1945-Present**

The conclusion of World War II marked the beginning of a new stage of global capitalist development. This included the establishment of the United States as the hegemonic core power; that is, as the political and economic center of the world-system. On a global level, key processes included nationalist movements and decolonization in the periphery, the emergence of U.S.-Soviet conflict as a central issue in international politics, and the proliferation of transnational corporations (TNCs) as a vehicle for global capitalist accumulation (Borrego 1981; Hymer 1978). Within the United States, the nature of capitalist development became increasingly post-industrial, marked by an expansion of education and the service and information sectors of the economy and a decline of traditional industrial manufacturing. Each of these processes in turn contributed to reshaping patterns of American immigration and intergroup contact.

In contrast to the first half of the twentieth century, which we have cast as a transitional period, the post-1945 era (especially post-1960) constituted a dramatic departure from previous patterns of ethnic relations. Intergroup interaction during this period can be described in the context of several subtrends: (1) the post-1965 removal of
immigration quotas and the subsequent influx of immigrants from the periphery (the cause of which was often linked to U.S. imperial ventures)—a development with particular for "ethnic merger" and the emergence of Hispanic-American and Asian-American pan-ethnic identities; (2) the increasing assimilation of White Ethnics (despite the much-ballyhooed "resurgence" of the 1970s) and the corresponding challenge to Anglo hegemony—the result of which is movement towards the creation of a "White American" (i.e., a partnership of Anglo-Americans, old immigrants, and White Ethnics) pan-ethnic identity; and (3) the mobilization of Black-Americans (and, to a lesser degree, Native Americans and Hispanics) to challenge their subordinate status—and the subsequent White "countermobilization" of the late 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, the increasing interpenetration of ethnicity and class would further compound the complexity of intergroup interaction. What is clear, however, is that ethnic relations have continued to play a significant role in U.S. society. In the following pages, we will explore the evolution of both group identities and intergroup interaction during the modern era.

**Intergroup Contact**

In the years after 1945, the rate of immigration and labor migration began to increase, reflecting both the post-war prosperity and the new global position of the United States. One trend was the continuation of patterns which
were established prior to and during the Second World War: Blacks continued to leave the South for the urban areas of the North, while Mexicans migrated across the border in greater numbers—as "braceros" (contract laborers), as traditional immigrants, and as undocumented or "illegal" immigrants." Another source of immigrants was Europeans uprooted by World War II. Although the quota system established in 1924 remained in effect until 1965, legislative action (e.g., Displaced Persons Act, War Brides Act) permitted increased immigration following the war (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 72-73). In addition, beginning in the 1950s, the United States also accepted refugees from "communist" nations whose policies it opposed (e.g., Hungary, Cuba), an extension of "Cold War" politics in the context of U.S.-Soviet conflict. A final source of immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s was Puerto Rico, an American colony whose citizens possessed United States citizenship and were thus not subject to immigration restriction laws. Driven by economic underdevelopment and rapid population growth and attracted by the need for cheap labor, Puerto Rican immigration fit the periphery to core migration pattern which had emerged in the late nineteenth century but which had been largely curtailed by the immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s. This pattern would be re-established during the 1960s and 1970s.
American immigration reached a watershed of sorts with the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965. This legislation, which went into effect in 1968, reflected several policy objectives. First, it abolished the system of national quotas, a system which appeared increasingly illegitimate in the context of the Pax Americana, decolonization, and U.S.-Soviet political conflict (Archdeacon 1983, p. 207). Secondly, it for the first time placed limits on migration from other Western Hemisphere nations by establishing a hemispheric quota (120,000) within the yearly global quota. This portion of the legislation was clearly in the tradition of earlier immigration restriction in that it addressed a perceived new threat (i.e., the unrestricted influx of Latin Americans) by placing a limit on the number of newcomers (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 75). Finally, the 1965 act established a new system of preferences, this time based upon family ties (i.e., close relatives of United States citizens) and job skills.

The impact of this law upon immigration patterns was dramatic and far reaching. Almost immediately, the number of immigrants increased by one-third, while within ten years the volume had doubled to more than 600,000 per year (Massey 1981, p. 58). Of even greater significance was the shift in the origins of these "new" immigrants. While 77% of immigrants between 1921 and 1960 were from Europe and North
America, 83% of immigrants between 1981 and 1985 were from Asia (e.g., Vietnam, Philippines, Korea, Taiwan) and Latin America (Schaefer 1988, p. 128). At the same time, geographical proximity and changes in the American economy (i.e., the decline of traditional manufacturing centers, the rise of the service sector, and the economic expansion of the "Sun Belt" during the 1970s) effected a shift in the destination of immigrants from the Northeast to the South­west and Florida, with Los Angeles now supplanting New York as the most popular point of entry. Thus, the ethnic compos­ition of the United States appears to be undergoing yet another transformation.

Yet the explanation for this shift transcends the change in immigration laws. During the half-century the United States had closed its doors the world-system had undergone a profound transformation. The ongoing process of global capitalist development (i.e., the expansion of the area under the sway of capitalist relations and the evolu­tion of an increasingly integrated world-economy bound together by financial, transportation, communication, and corporate networks) had altered the nature of the periphery, which now included Latin America, Africa and much of Asia (cf. Chirot 1977, pp. 179-81). Continued capitalist pene­tration of the periphery had resulted in partial proletari­anization (including a decline in the viability of small agriculture) and rapid population growth, while the changing
nature of core-periphery relations (i.e., post-1945 decol­
nization and the emergence of neocolonialism—Hunt and
Sherman 1986, p. 609) fostered continued underdevelop­
ment and political instability. The result was an ever-widening
gap between core and periphery (i.e., the "North-South"
division) and an intensification of the "push" factors
encouraging emigration from the periphery. At the same
time, there was less economic incentive for Europeans to
emigrate after 1965, with the exception of some movement
from the poorer, semiperipheral nations (e.g., Ireland,
Portugal, Greece). Within these shifting patterns of global
migration, the identity of specific countries sending immi­
grants to the United States seemingly reflects past and
current patterns of military involvement (Korea, Southeast
Asia), colonization (Philippines), and political and
economic domination (Latin America).

On the other side of the equation, however, the "pull"
factors encouraging immigration to the core had also under­
gone changes. First, transnational corporations found it
increasingly feasible to relocate production to the peri­
phery in order to take advantage of lower labor costs
(Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1977, pp. 83-85; Barnet and
Muller 1974). Secondly, as a "post-industrial" society, the
United States (and other core nations) have different needs
for unskilled labor. What is available are often low paying
jobs in the service sector (with little prospect for upward
mobility) or temporary work corresponding to agricultural needs or economic fluctuations (hence, the proliferation of guestworkers or migrant agricultural workers). One additional consequence of the changes in the United States labor market has been an increase in the occupational heterogeneity of immigrants, reflected in the influx of professional and technical workers (e.g., doctors, engineers, scientists) from the periphery who are attracted to the core by the higher wages available to skilled labor (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 82-84; Archdeacon 1983, p. 212; Fortney 1972). Encouraged by the preferences for skilled workers in the 1965 Immigration Act, this "brain drain"—the transfer of skilled labor from periphery to core, to the detriment of the former—has been augmented by the disproportionate representation of highly educated workers among refugees from Cuba and Southeast Asia (Massey 1981, pp. 59-60).

One outcome of this imbalance between push and pull factors, as well as the limitation on immigration from Western Hemisphere nations, was an increase in undocumented or "illegal" immigration, a phenomenon which became the most controversial immigration issue of the 1970s and 1980s. While the exact number of undocumented immigrants during this period could not be determined, the estimated annual influx was between 200,000 and 1,000,000, and the estimated resident "undocumented" population was between three and six
The primary source of undocumented immigrants is Mexico; however, significant numbers have come from other Latin American nations and citizens of nearly one hundred countries have been apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Schaefer 1988, p. 131). While the "push" factors encouraging migration are the same as for legal immigrants, undocumented labor serves as an exploitable "reserve army" working for the lowest wages in the least desirable jobs (i.e., as a form of "superexploited" labor. During the 1980s, undocumented labor became increasingly controversial for a variety of reasons, including fear of labor competition, concern regarding the economic impact of undocumented immigrants, and an ethnocentric fear of the "Hispanicization" of the Southwestern U.S. Following several failed attempts, the United States Congress responded to pressures for exclusion (pressures remarkably similar to those of the 1920s) by enacting the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, a measure which sought to limit undocumented immigration through sanctions against employers, while at the same time extending amnesty and eventual citizenship to undocumented immigrants who entered the United States before 1982 (Pear 1986). Despite this attempt to limit immigration, the persistence of the "push" factors encouraging undocumented immigration—high Mexican
unemployment and economic stagnation, rapid population growth, and the strength of the dollar relative to the peso—suggests that recent patterns will continue into the foreseeable future.7

Eth-Class Interaction and Group Identity

The rapid changes in post-war American society had a profound impact on the nature of the "intergroup arena"; that is, the context in which intergroup interaction occurred. Ethnic relations in the post-1945 United States were shaped by several forces: the post-war expansion of the United States and world economies (what some would describe as the "A-phase" of Kondratieff cycle); the emergence of "post-industrial society", with its emphasis upon education and the service and information sector; the increased international role of the United States in the context of the Pax Americana; and by the expanding role of the state in social and economic life. These forces were bound together by increasingly interconnected national and global mass communication networks (cf. Richmond's—1969, pp. 278-80—notation of Verbindungsnetzschaft) which both expanded the scope of intergroup interaction and the potential for ethnic mobilization (e.g., the nationwide impact—via television—of the Civil Rights Movement) and increased acculturation by bombarding ethnic enclaves with the dominant culture.8 For our purposes, what is important is to recognize that these changes altered both the eth-class structure (by changing
both the class structure and the means by which this structure was reproduced—e.g., increased emphasis upon education, credentials, etc.) and the nature of intergroup interaction (e.g., the emergence of mass movements). Our task, therefore, is to trace the influence of these processes upon the evolution of specific group identities.

**Ethnic mobilization: Black-Americans.** Perhaps the most significant development in ethnic relations in the post-1945 era was the ethnic mobilization of Black Americans. This social movement—the "Civil Rights Movement"—involved several important dynamics. First, Blacks challenged and overthrew the existing racial order (i.e., the norms, laws, and assumptions governing intergroup relations), particularly in the South, and as a group sought to improve their position in the American eth-class structure. Secondly, as a corollary to this movement, Black-Americans redefined their ethnic identity (Bloom 1987, pp. 6-7)—including the perceptions of other groups. This entailed a process of psychological decolonization (cf. Fanon's—1963—discussion of similar processes in nationalist movements in the periphery); that is, the shedding of White-imposed definitions and the promotion of a Black-American consciousness (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967, pp. 34-39). Finally, Black-American ethnic mobilization altered the social role of ethnicity in the United States by establishing the
legitimacy of group-based political mobilization (Omi and Winant 1986).

The roots of this Black-American ethnic mobilization are best analyzed in terms of both ethnicity and class (i.e., eth-class). At the most fundamental level, ethnic mobilization was a response to the historical ethnic encapsulation of Blacks (maintained via racial ideology), which for the most part restricted them to a superexploited fraction of the working or lower classes, or to an ethnically separate segment of the middle class. Yet this subordinate status is not sufficient as an explanation for ethnic mobilization. What must also be taken into consideration are a series of structural changes: the slight but significant changes in the position of Blacks (e.g., cf. Quarles—1969, pp. 227-28—on opportunities for mobility provided by World War II, the 1949 desegregation of the U.S. military, and the emergence of a small Black middle class); the declining basis of the Southern racial order (e.g., decreased role of agriculture, the industrial development of the South and a lessening of its "peripheral" status with regard to the rest of the nation); and the declining stake of Northern capital in the Southern racial order (due to such developments as the encapsulation of class struggle through the legitimation of unions, and the international stigma of segregation in the context of decolonization, U.S.-Soviet conflict, and the Pax Americana). These subtle but significant changes in the
intergroup arena created an opening for Black-American ethnic mobilization.

The Civil Rights Movement originated as a limited Black challenge to the Southern system of segregation which was nevertheless a challenge to the basis of the class hegemony of the White rural elite (Bloom 1987). Resistance by the elite took the form of an ethnic countermobilization, one which invoked the ideology of White supremacy—via appeals to "states' rights" and "preserving our Southern heritage"—in an attempt to gain the alliance of other White eth-classes. The ferocity of White resistance (as well as such early successes as the Brown decision and the Montgomery bus boycott) in turn facilitated the formation of an eth-class alliance between the Black middle and lower classes and resulted in the emergence of a mass social movement (Zinn 1980, pp. 441-46). As part of the movement strategy, Blacks sought to enlist (or force) the involvement of the federal government as an ally in overthrowing the Southern racial order, an objective which was feasible in light of the increased political influence of Blacks (especially on the Democratic Party in the North) and the declining stake of Northern capital in supporting a Southern rural elite which had become an economic and political anachronism. Also targeted by the movement was the emerging Southern business class, which did not benefit from segregation as did the rural elite (although they also had no stake in
challenging the racial order), but which was vulnerable to Black economic pressure (e.g., boycotts, disruption of the "business climate") and could thus be induced to negotiate (Bloom 1987, pp. 115-17). Ultimately, after a prolonged struggle, the Civil Rights Movement was successful in overthrowing legal segregation and transforming the Southern racial order. 71

As Black-American ethnic mobilization evolved, it underwent a change in its class basis. Initially, the Civil Rights Movement was led by the "new" Black middle class (primarily lawyers, writers, and ministers) and took the form of legal challenges, limited protest, and a focus on "rights." As the base of the movement expanded amidst mass action, the increased involvement of the lower classes gave rise to class based demands. While the Black middle class stood to benefit the most from the removal of barriers to equal access (a demand which could be couched and realized in ethnic terms), fulfillment of lower class demands would involve more fundamental social and economic changes. 72

This was particularly evident when the focus of Black mobilization shifted to the North and its de facto system of segregation (cf. Quarles 1969, pp. 255-59). In this context, the economic (class-based) demands of Blacks constituted a direct challenge to the basic interests of the American capitalist system (as opposed to the Southern campaign, which merely challenged the peripheral rural
elite). These demands shattered the civil rights "coalition" by triggering the defection of middle class Whites and Blacks (neither of whom had any class interest in economic restructuring) and, when pressed in the form of increased militancy and ghetto revolts, brought on government co-optation and repression (Zinn 1980, pp. 449-50; Omi and Winant 1986, p. 89).

For Black Americans, the ethnic mobilization of the 1950s and 1960s did bring important social, economic, and political gains—the shedding of their superexploited position; however, Blacks remain far behind Whites in the late 1980s on virtually every measure of social or economic well-being. Given the continuing relationship between ethnicity and class (i.e., Blacks are overrepresented at the lower levels of the working class and among the underclass while they remain conspicuously absent from the upper classes), there remains a strong material basis for the persistence of group identity. Furthermore, continued exclusion (e.g., residential segregation) and ethnic antagonism by Whites provides additional impetus for group solidarity even in the face of intragroup class divisions. Consequently, we anticipate that Black-White interaction and conflict will remain a focal issue in American society for the foreseeable future.

With respect to ethnic relations in the United States, the social impact of the Civil Rights Movement far transcen-
ded its significance for Black-Americans. The success of Black ethnic mobilization altered the social meaning of American ethnicity by conferring increased legitimacy upon group demands (i.e., the "right" of non-dominant groups to make demands as a group) and by installing the federal government as "arbiter" of such demands. In addition, the movement changed the nature of intergroup relations by establishing a socio-cultural framework in which segregation, prejudice, and discrimination are unacceptable (Omi and Winant 1986, p. 141). Finally, now that the legitimacy of group demands had been established, Black-American mobilization was followed by similar movements on the part of other ethnic minorities: Hispanic-Americans (e.g., La Raza Unida), Native Americans (e.g., the American Indian Movement, land claims—cf. Zinn 1980, pp. 513-26), and, to a lesser degree, the "new" immigrants (e.g., the Italian-American Civil Rights League). These movements can be viewed as actual or attempted eth-class alliances (e.g., cross-class ethnic mobilization) pursued as a means of attaining material or political objectives. For the groups involved, the process of mobilization with its emphasis upon ethnic ties, group pride, and past or present grievances had the effect of increasing the salience of ethnic identity.

Assimilation vs. persistence: White Ethnics. For the non-Protestant and non-Western European "new" immigrants, now referred to as "White Ethnics," the post-1945 era was
one of both significant assimilation and surprising persistence. Indeed, this contradiction is captured by the label "White Ethnic"—which on one hand implies the persistence of group identity by distinguishing White Ethnics from "non-ethnics" (i.e., Anglo-Americans and assimilated old immigrants), while on the other hand suggests (through the omission of specific group labels) at least partial assimilation along the lines of the "triple melting pot" (Protestant, Catholic, Jew) model popularized during the 1950s.

Many forces encouraged acculturation and assimilation. The restriction of immigration in the 1920s reduced the perceived "threat" which the new immigrants posed to the dominant Anglo-Americans and led to a decline in ethnic antagonism (e.g., no longer were new immigrants referred to as "racially different"). New immigrants were also subject to the assimilative forces which had affected the "old" immigrants: Anglo dominance of institutions; the increasing number of ethnic groups (which tended to diffuse intergroup conflict); and the process of ethnic succession (Blacks replaced the new immigrants in much the same manner that the new immigrants replaced the old immigrants). A third set of factors were more historically unique: the national mobilization which occurred during World War II and the increasing influence of mass society, both of which promoted absorption into the larger Anglo-dominated society. The most important factor, however, was mobility, the oppor-
tunity for which was increased by the union movement (which improved the economic position of the working class) and by structural changes and expansion in the United States economy (which facilitated the economic advancement of the new immigrants without displacing other groups—Hechter, 1979, p. 124). One significant milestone in this process was the 1960 election of the first Catholic president, John F. Kennedy—an event which legitimized the inclusion of White Ethnics into the federal government and academic "means of administration." Mobility in turn led to increased intra-group class divisions (subjecting the upwardly mobile to the homogenizing tendencies of the middle class) which functioned to reduce ethnic solidarity. Opportunities for mobility made it more likely that individual group members would choose an "assimilative" strategy (i.e., increase opportunities by blending into the dominant group) as opposed to an "ethnic" strategy (i.e., advance interests within the context of the enclave).

At the same time, the new immigrant groups exhibited considerable persistence with respect to ethnic identity. The assimilative strategy, which worked so well for the middle class, was often eschewed by the working class, for whom ethnic ties and networks remained more salient (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Gans 1962). Thus, ethnic identity was increasingly linked to class position—"White Ethnic" was often equated with upper working class and with ties to the
Democratic Party. A significant event for White Ethnics was the "ethnic revival" of the late 1960s and the 1970s—the assertion of identities thought to have been assimilated into the Anglo-American group, or at least into the triple melting pot (Novak 1973; Greeley 1974; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). Occurring in the context of the post-Civil Rights Movement "legitimation" of ethnic politics, this "revival" was rooted in ethnic competition. The working class White Ethnics felt threatened by the demands of the groups below them (i.e., Blacks); that is, they believed that their neighborhoods and schools would be integrated, that their jobs and opportunities for advancement would be taken away (Vecoli 1978, p. 142; Novak 1973, p. 15). While their resistance was often racial (anti-Black) in form—reflecting both the virulence and the resilience of racist ideology in the United States—the White Ethnic "backlash" is probably best understood in class terms as a defense of their intermediate position in the class structure (Steinberg 1981, pp. 218-19). This "revival" was further fueled by resentment towards (i.e., competition with) Anglo-Americans which stemmed from both memories of past injuries and a sense of exclusion from the upper echelon of American society (cf. Lieberson and Carter 1979; Vecoli 1978; Schrag 1970). The White Ethnic attempt at ethnic mobilization did exhibit some cross-class tendencies—e.g., attracting segments of the ethnic intelligentsia and upper middle class (i.e., cultural
entrepreneurs) who stood to benefit from the upgrading of group status (cf. Doane unpublished, p. 73); however, its main effect seemed to be to slow temporarily the process of assimilation. 7

By the 1980s the new immigrants/White Ethnics seem largely to have "made it" in American society in terms of achieving overall parity with the dominant Anglo group with respect to key economic indicators. On the other hand, they remain underrepresented among the economic and political elite—although significant inroads appear to be being made as the U.S. "power elite" is moving towards becoming an Anglo-White Ethnic partnership (Alba and Moore 1982; Lieberson and Carter 1979). Continued blurring of the relationship between ethnicity and class among Anglo-Americans and White Ethnics would be a strong force towards the assimilation of the latter. Given the likely absence of significant reinforcement or intergroup conflict, we expect that White Ethnic identities will become increasingly symbolic—that is, an affiliation with little salience for behavior (Gans 1979; Alba 1985). 7 Moreover, the combination of an increasing influx of non-White immigrants and continuing challenges from more disadvantaged groups will facilitate ethnic merger and the emergence of a "White American" supra-ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the "vestiges" of new immigrant identity remain sufficiently
strong that the completion of any such merger will perhaps require at least another generation.®

Immigration and ethnic merger: Hispanic and Asian-Americans. For Hispanic and Asian-American groups, the post-1945 era brought a dramatic change in group composition and the meaning of ethnic identity. The key dynamic here is immigration, as the dominant pattern of the modern era (especially following the 1965 Immigration Act) has been the influx of immigrants from Latin America and Asia (Massey 1981; Sassen-Koob 1983). Consequently, both groups contain a higher proportion of first generation residents who would tend to have a lower "entry level" status and stronger cultural ties to their country of origin (both of which would be more likely to trigger dominant group ethnocentrism). A second theme is the expanding locus of immigration and the resulting ethnic diversity. Mexican-Americans, the original Spanish-speaking group, have been joined since 1945 by Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and smaller numbers of immigrants from virtually every Caribbean and Central and South American nation. Likewise, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino-Americans have been joined since 1965 by Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and smaller numbers of migrants from other Asian countries. In addition, newcomers have exhibited a range of class (or potential class) positions—e.g., the high relative class positions of middle-class "refugees" from Cuba and Vietnam (Massey 1981; Portes and
Stepick 1985, p. 494)—which in turn has resulted in increased intragroup economic heterogeneity. This diversity (and the small relative size of individual groups) has seemingly served to hinder ethnic mobilization.

As opposed to ethnic mobilization, what can be observed are the early phases of ethnic merger—the combining of two or more groups into a "pan-ethnic" group. This is manifest in the increasing use of "Hispanic-American" or "Asian-American" in place of individual national identities such as Mexican or Cambodian—although these lower-level ethnic identities still persist. While these mergers for the most part reflect an awareness of common interests, they are also a product (much in the same manner that new immigrant "national" identities were created by the American experience—cf. Glazer 1954, p. 167) of being classified and treated similarly by dominant groups and by the state (Enloe 1981, pp. 133-34). Interestingly, these new pan-ethnic identities are not "national" in foundation but regional (Asian-American) or regional/linguistic (Hispanic-American), a factor which would seemingly offer less in the way of an historical or cultural basis for ethnic merger. Nevertheless, given the broad base necessary for effective ethnic mobilization in the contemporary United States (for example, Native American mobilization is inhibited by smallness of numbers) there is a strong incentive for these mergers to continue. This is particularly true in the case of His-
panics, who by the twenty-first century could surpass Blacks as the largest American ethnic minority (Bouvier and Davis 1982).

Given the newness of most Hispanic and Asian groups, it is difficult to analyze intergroup contact and the evolution of identity. To some extent, the pattern of the past appears to be being repeated—entry at the bottom of the eth-class structure, competition and antagonism on the part of resident ethnic groups (e.g., conflict between Vietnamese and White fisherfolk in Texas; violent attacks on Asian-Americans), and attempts at exclusion (e.g., interdiction of Haitian refugees, imprisonment of Marielitos, the anti-Hispanic tenor of the 1986 Immigration Act). Not surprisingly, these newest immigrants have responded by mobilizing along ethnic lines; that is, by using group identity for self-defense and survival in the face of dominant group resistance (Portes 1984). What is different for the most recent immigrants, as opposed to earlier groups, is the abovementioned change in the nature of the intergroup arena as a result of the Civil Rights Movement. From the perspective of new arrivals, the most important of these differences would appear to be the existence of some protection from extreme racism (e.g., the response of authorities to violent attacks on minorities). While this represents a change in the context of intergroup relations, the long term effects remain unknown.
For Asian and Hispanic groups with a longer tenure in the United States, it is possible to trace a more developed pattern of intergroup relations and evolution of ethnic identity. Mexican-Americans experienced a slow diminution of their superexploited status; however, group mobility was inhibited by new and commuter (given the proximity of Mexico) immigration. At the same time, Mexican-Americans exhibited increased internal differentiation reflected in the emergence of an enclave-based middle class (Barrera 1979, pg. 92). Nevertheless, a substantial superexploited sector remained, first through the temporary labor of the "bracero" program which was terminated in 1964 (Craig 1971), and later through the exploitation of undocumented workers (Barrera 1979). Conflicts regarding the status of braceros and undocumented immigrants followed the traditional eth-class pattern: agricultural capital, who benefitted from the exploitation of "superexploited" Mexican labor, institutionalized and tried to protect the process; White labor, fearing wage competition, sought to exclude Mexicans and displayed increased ethnic antagonism (especially in the context of the Reagan-Meese attack on minorities); and Mexican-Americans in general suffered from the equating of "illegal immigrant" with "Mexican" (Craig 1971). Consequently, Mexican-American ethnic mobilization occurred in response to economic and political issues—e.g., civil rights for undocumented workers, opposition to the tactics
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and opposition to the inclusion of employer sanctions (for hiring "illegal aliens") in the 1986 Immigration Act for fear of increased discrimination against Hispanics. Given the likely persistence of Mexican immigration (and of White resistance), the basis for group identity will continue; however, strategic considerations should encourage the continuation of the process of ethnic merger into a Hispanic-American pan-ethnic group (in which Mexican-Americans will play a significant role).

The experience of the oldest Asian-American groups, Japanese-Americans and Chinese Americans, has been shaped by a complex array of factors. Both groups had already faced virulent racism (although less than that faced by Blacks—cf. Lieberson 1980, p. 366; Frederickson 1981, pp. 116-17 on White hierarchies of racial preference) and complete exclusion after the 1920s, and the Japanese further endured internment during World War II. Ironically, the cut-off of immigration in 1924 may have had a "positive" effect over time on the status of Japanese and Chinese-Americans.

Termination of immigration had several effects: it undoubtedly reduced intergroup competition and the perceived threat felt by the dominant group (and probably eased subsequent intergroup conflict, although prejudice and discrimination persisted); it enhanced acculturation (by eliminating reinforcement); and it transformed Japanese and
Chinese-Americans into less visible micro-groups (by keeping group numbers small). Since the 1920s, Japanese and Chinese-Americans have followed separate paths (Schaefer 1988, pp. 399-400). Chinese-Americans have tended to follow an enclave-based strategy which, reinforced by post-1965 immigration, resulted in a slower rate of acculturation and assimilation. In contrast, the Japanese-American group has been more dispersed (due in part to the destruction of communities during the World War II internment), which, in turn, has led to higher rates of both assimilation and economic mobility (Petersen 1971; Montero 1981; Woodrum 1981).

What this comparison suggests to us is that for micro-groups, ethnicity and economic position are shaped by the effects of both demography and eth-class.

Hegemony and competition: Anglo-Americans. Our assessment of the evolution of ethnic identities in the United States is not complete without some consideration of Anglo-Americans and those (e.g., "old" immigrants) who have assimilated into this group. This is a topic which is often overlooked in the literature on American ethnic relations (e.g., the assumption that Anglos are not ethnic--cf. Banton's--1983, pp. 64-66--critique of "minus-one" ethnicity), perhaps reflecting a less specific sense of identity which gives the appearance of non-existence. We contend that to mistake low visibility for non-existence is a grave analytical error, that Anglo-American (WASP) ethnicity has
played a key role in intergroup relations in the United States. There exist several explanations for the "invisibility" of WASP ethnicity: dominant group status (cf. Banton--1983, pp. 165-66--on majority vs. minority ethnicity); intragroup class divisions (which have existed from the beginning); and the institutionalization of group culture on a societal level leading to a "taken for granted-ness" in which the ethnicity of the majority is the societal standard. The bottom line is access to power and the resultant blurring of the lines between ethnic and national identity--the appropriation of "American" as the functional equivalent of "Anglo" (Enloe, 1981, p. 130; T. Smith 1980). Accordingly, prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants and ethnic minorities is most fruitfully interpreted as ethnic-based action by Anglo-Americans (i.e., boundary maintenance) as a means of establishing and maintaining the dominant position of the group. Indeed, the basis of Anglo-American hegemony has been the ability to impose definitions and set parameters for intergroup action, while masking (i.e. institutionalizing) this process amidst larger dynamics of cultural reproduction (e.g., via an educational system which transmits an "Anglicized" version of U.S. ethnic history and guidelines for acceptable group action).

For Anglo-Americans, ethnic competition and antagonism towards minorities has been an ongoing process as the group has sought to fortify its position (even though it has never
been seriously challenged). This conflict has been exacerbated by the persistence of racial ideology, which contributes to increased intergroup tension." In the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of factors have contributed to increased intergroup competition: the economic downturn (the so-called Kondratieff "B-phase"); the "fiscal crisis of the state" (cf. O'Connor 1973); resistance to the demands of minorities (i.e., a "backlash" towards the Civil Rights Movement); and cracks in WASP hegemony (Schrag 1970; Novak 1973)." This sense of disquiet has been exacerbated by the decline of U.S. global hegemony and increased challenges to American interests, which in turn have spawned increased national chauvinism (e.g., national or racial conflicts, at times government-sanctioned, vs. Arabs, Iranians, Japanese) and self awareness (remembering that "American" has to a large degree been appropriated by Anglos and, more recently, by White Ethnics). While Anglo-American and White Ethnic defense of position has often taken the form of overt racism (e.g., extremist groups, violent attacks on minorities, racial conflict in colleges and universities), the declining legitimacy of racism in the post-Civil Rights era has encouraged the emergence of new forms of racial resistance couched in non-ethnic terms or (ironically) in the language of equality. Recent examples of these new forms include: attacks on bilingualism and promotion of English as an "official" language; the assertion of the existence of
equal opportunity and denial of the obstacles facing Blacks and other minorities (cf. Kluegel and Smith 1982); the Reagan-Meese doctrine (supported by such academics as Nathan Glazer--1975) with its attack on affirmative action "quotas" and emphasis upon fighting individual (vs. group) discrimination; and attacks on the "welfare state" (i.e., an attack on the state as an advocate for minorities--Omi and Winant 1986). If current trends (e.g., assimilation of White Ethnics; ethnic merger and polarization; the "shrinking middle class"; the fiscal and legitimation crises of the state) continue, we can expect continued intergroup competition and conflict in the 1990s and beyond.

American eth-class structure in the 1980s. As the eth-class structure of the United States has evolved over time, one noticeable change is its increasing complexity with respect to number of ethnic groups, classes, and fractions. This can be attributed to both continuing immigration (and the continually shifting sources of immigration) and the ongoing process of capitalist development. What is important for our purposes is that there is no simple correspondence between ethnicity and class in the contemporary United States, that ethnic groups contain class divisions and vice-versa (at times in the past, various ethnic groups exhibited a high degree of class homogeneity due to entry status or superexploitation). As a consequence, it becomes necessary to compare the eth-class "pyramids" of different groups;
that is, the proportional distribution of group members across the various classes. Different shaped "pyramids"--e.g., concentration of group members in the working class--provide an underlying basis for ethnic mobilization as groups seek to improve or to maintain their position. Moreover, ethnic segmentation within classes (e.g., concentration in entry level positions, "ghettoization" in personnel or public relations--Schaefer 1988, pp. 265-66) may also contribute to the persistence of intergroup differences.

The current eth-class structure of the United States contains a diverse array of group pyramids. Ethnic minorities--e.g., Hispanics, Blacks, Native Americans--are disproportionately concentrated in the working class and in the underclass (Wilson 1987) and conspicuously absent from the elite. In contrast, WASPs (and assimilates) while existent in all classes, have a disproportionate grip on elite membership. Yet other groups--e.g., White Ethnics, Japanese-Americans--occupy a mostly intermediate position, without publicly noticeable overrepresentation at either end of the class structure. While this does not ensure that mobilization will occur along ethnic lines (including ethnic merger), the fact that current intergroup disparities are a result of past ethnic-based action (e.g., exclusion, discrimination) suggests that attempts to remedy the situation will most probably also be ethnically based.
One key factor which will affect the potential for future ethnic mobilization is the nature of reproduction of the eth-class system. Here, we can envision two scenarios, each with different implications for ethnic mobilization and the persistence of group identities. To the extent that the economic system becomes open, with increasingly equal opportunities for mobility, we would expect an expansion of *intragroup* class divisions and a corresponding decline in the role of ethnicity as a major social force. In such a case, ethnic identity would become increasingly symbolic for individuals (Gans 1979) and social movements would be more likely to be class-based. Even so, without virtually complete intergroup equality (which is probably an "ideal typical" eth-class system), ethnicity would remain on some level as a potential basis for mobilization. Thus, the more likely outcome here would entail the diminution but not elimination of group identities.

Our second scenario is based upon a relative lack of mobility and a high level of social reproduction. According to Moore (1981), recent changes in the structure of the American economy (e.g., declining need for skilled labor and an increase in unskilled service jobs; the increasing importance of education) will provide fewer opportunities for mobility for those groups currently at the bottom of the eth-class structure than were available for European immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If
this is so, then social (class) reproduction will in large part be ethnic reproduction as intergroup disparities are transmitted from generation to generation. Moreover, if economic stagnation results in a hardening of class lines, ethnic boundaries will harden as well, particularly as mobility becomes a "zero-sum" proposition which can only be achieved at the expense of others. As a consequence, ethnic conflict and mobilization would most likely increase, particularly if the current trend towards ethnic merger results in the creation of a few, easily polarized, pan-ethnic groups--and ethnicity would remain an influential force in American society for years to come.

Eth-Class Struggles and the State

In the above discussion, we have emphasized two central themes: the relationship between capitalist development and intergroup contact, and the role of eth-class struggles in shaping the evolution of group identities. At this juncture, one element remains to be added to our discussion, that being a brief consideration of the role of the U.S. state with respect to eth-class struggles and ethnic identity. This is an important issue, for as we stated in Chapter IV, intergroup relations occur within a national context; eth-class struggles are political struggles. Our purpose here is not to present a theory of the state (see our brief discussion in Chapter IV), but rather to draw upon our analysis of intergroup relations in the United States to
develop some general propositions regarding the role of the state in ethnic relations. In our view, such a task is essential, for while much has been written with respect to the role of the state in class struggle, there is little in the way of an "ethnic" theory of the state.

What can we infer about the role of the state in intergroup relations? Our first observation is that the state is playing an ever-expanding role in ethnic affairs (i.e., the state is a major actor in intergroup interaction). This phenomenon is concomitant with the general expansion of the U.S. state amidst the process of capitalist development (i.e., the emergence of monopoly capitalism and state monopoly capitalism). The growth of state functions has included an expansion of both direct involvement in ethnic relations (e.g., the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, immigration legislation, civil rights legislation, affirmative action) and in actions of the state which have a measurable effect on the intergroup arena (e.g., growth of the welfare state; the GI Bill and expanded educational opportunities; the interstate highway system and "White flight" to the suburbs). In general, the growth of the capitalist state was closely linked to nationalism and the rise of national identities (cf. Ehrenreich 1983). This was especially true in the case of the United States, as the emergence of an "American" national identity and national culture was tied to the growth of the state and
the expansionist ideology of "manifest destiny" (Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 168-81; Boorstein 1965, pp. 325-90; Archdeacon 1983, p. 64; Dangerfield 1965).

Second, state actions tend to reflect relations of power between ethnic groups (i.e., eth-class alliances). The state is neither the "executive committee" of the dominant group, nor a neutral arbiter of intergroup affairs. Nevertheless, its policies generally serve to advance the interests of the dominant Anglo and White Ethnic partnership, thereby reflecting its disproportionate control of resources and of the staffing of state offices. The state was historically the vehicle through which Anglo-Americans (i.e., the political alliance of the various Anglo-American eth-classes) were able to conquer and dispossess Native and Mexican Americans; it played a key role in the subjugation of Blacks. In the same vein, the ability of Anglo-Americans to define "American" nationality in their own image and to use state power, especially in the post-1865 era, to institutionalize a particular set of cultural understandings established a basis for continued group hegemony.

Third, state actions reflect the interests of elite classes within the dominant ethnic group. As we review the course of ethnic relations in the United States, we find that the general course of state policy has served to benefit the dominant eth-class, basically the Anglo-American (WASP) elite/capitalist class. Indeed, one of the earliest
tasks of the American state was to establish rules for inclusion on the basis of ethnicity (e.g., the Naturalization Law of 1790) as a means of preserving the position of the Anglo elite (Omi and Winant 1986, p. 75). Likewise, major events where state policies were focused upon intergroup relations—the conquest of Native and Mexican-Americans, the termination of slavery, the long duration of unrestricted immigration, and even the end of Reconstruction (which we described earlier as a mutually beneficial treaty with the Southern rural elite)—can be interpreted in the context of facilitating capitalist accumulation and solidifying the eth-class hegemony of the Anglo-American elite. Parenthetically, we can observe that this proposition is also true at the regional level, as Southern state actions served to maintain the power of the White rural elite (Bloom 1987) and federal and state policy in the Southwest effectively maintained a supply of superexploited Mexican labor for White agricultural, mining, and railroad interests (Barrera 1979, pp. 168-72)."°

Fourth, the power of the dominant eth-class is not absolute but can be constrained by mobilization of ethnic minorities or the dominant group working class.° These countervailing forces reflect the ability of subordinate groups or classes to mobilize and to force the hegemonic eth-class to make concessions in order to maintain the legitimacy of their position within the state system. Such
legitimizing actions seem particularly necessary in the context of bourgeois democratic ideologies of citizenship rights. At the same time, concessions are particularly likely to occur when they inflict no significant damage to the interests of the hegemonic eth-class. For example, Oriental exclusion and immigration restriction were concessions to the White working class (thus maintaining the White ethnic alliance) which did not threaten the dominance of capital. Likewise, state acquiescence to the demands of the Civil Rights Movement increased its political legitimacy at minimal cost to capital (on the other hand, when Northern Blacks instituted a challenge to the basis of the economic order, it was quickly rejected).

Finally, the modern state is a major target of eth-class struggle. This particularly true in light of the expanding role of the state (e.g., the welfare state) and the post-Civil Rights casting of the state as arbiter of group demands. Consequently, groups mobilize to make demands on the state, which in turn may respond by absorbing (i.e., co-opting), insulating (i.e., confining to a limited area), or even rejecting group demands, depending upon the strategic contingencies of the situation (Omi and Winant 1976, p. 81). Ultimately, however, the relationship between the state and the ethnic system is dialectical in nature; that is, while state action shapes ethnic relations (see our first point in this discussion), the state itself--
and the ethnic understandings which it embodies—may also be transformed by intergroup conflict (e.g., as in the case of the Civil Rights Movement or some aspects of foreign policy). Thus, the state is both subject and object in eth-class struggle (cf. Esping-Andersen et al. 1976, p. 191).

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we have attempted to employ our theoretical framework to interpret the general course of ethnic relations in the United States. Our analysis stressed two main issues: (1) capitalist development and ethnic contact, and (2) eth-class struggle and the evolution of group identities. For each historical era, we first examined the role of capitalist development in shaping initial contact between groups; that is, how the evolution of the capitalist world-economy, uneven development, and the ceaseless search for cheap labor and new markets acted to create specific constellations of ethnic groups which in turn set the stage for subsequent intergroup interaction. In the case of the United States, we have argued that the initial economic dualism (i.e., North vs. South) of the United States led to separate patterns of economic development and ethnic contact (which was later augmented by a third "Western" pattern). As the United States experienced continued capitalist development, dynamics such as expansion, industrialization, and proletarianization created the context for massive immigration and an increasingly complex
ethnic structure. Later, the changing political economy of the United States (i.e., the dynamics of monopoly capitalism) led it to embark upon an era of immigration restriction which in turn encouraged internal migration and immigration from neighboring countries. Continued development has resulted in further changes in immigration patterns and the emergence of new issues (e.g., undocumented immigration).

At the same time, we noted that the role of American capitalist development in shaping interethnic contact was but one theme in a larger symphony. The United States is (and has been) part of a world-system; its development has been shaped by global trends (e.g., world markets, economic cycles, and the uneven development of the world-economy).

In its creation, the United States was a product of European capitalist expansion and English colonialism--its initial colonizers were for the most part drawn from those displaced by the capitalist development of Western Europe. Processes of global capitalist development also determined the sources of immigration to the United States, as changes in the identity of sending nations corresponded to the progression of capitalist penetration (i.e., first the core, then peripheral regions within the core, and then the periphery of the world-system). As the position of the United States within the world-economy underwent a metamorphosis (i.e., from periphery to core), so too did the nature of immigration. More recent immigration patterns (e.g., Latin Ameri-
cans, Asians) reflect bonds forged through U.S. colonialism, economic imperialism, or military intervention. Clearly, the ethnic history of the United States cannot be understood apart from the evolution of the world-system itself.

The second issue which we explored was concerned with what happened following initial intergroup contact; that is, how ethnic identities evolved in the course of intergroup resource competition. In this context, we examined processes of ethnic change—acculturation, assimilation, merger, and mobilization—in each case linking the evolution of identity to material interests and to relations of domination and subordination. We concluded that American ethnic history is best understood and explained not on the basis of ideology (e.g., melting pot, racism, ethnic identity or peoplehood), or as a series of contacts between culturally different groups leading to eventual assimilation (e.g., Park's "race relations cycle"), but as an ongoing process of intergroup interaction (e.g., conflict, domination, accommodation) between eth-classes. As we stated in Chapter IV, eth-classes—groups sharing ethnic and class affiliations—form ad hoc alliances along either ethnic/national or class lines in order to advance material interests. In the course of this struggle, ethnic identities take on a strategic role; that is, they are asserted, masked, or altered in accordance with the perceived exigencies of the situation. We believe that the notion of eth-class enables us to
capture the complexity of ethnic change—and to account for economic differences and divergent interests within groups.

What we have attempted to postulate is a dynamic process of intergroup interaction and the evolution of group identities, one which involves complex matrices of eth-class interests. For example, the post-Reconstruction Southern racial order can be interpreted as an alliance between the White rural elite and working classes (with the tacit consent of the Northern capitalist class) which employed the ideology of White supremacy in order to maintain dominance over Blacks. Ethnic mobilization (e.g., immigrant political machines, the Civil Rights Movement) involved cross-class alliances within groups in which ethnic identity was asserted in order to advance material interests. In contrast, national mobilization (e.g., cross-class, cross-ethnic alliances) or class-based strategies (e.g., capitalist search for cheap labor, working class attempts at exclusion) involved transcending some ethnic ties while accentuating others. Although we have barely scratched the surface in exploring the implications of various strategies for the evolution of ethnic identities, we find eth-class to be a useful analytical tool for explaining the persistence, change, or disappearance of ethnic identities.

In addition to these two core issues, we also emphasized the effect of the intergroup arena on the evolution of identities. As we asserted in Chapter IV, the intergroup
arena constitutes the context in which interaction occurs, the background against which strategies are formed and identities evolve. In the case of the United States, one key factor was the demography of the intergroup arena (e.g., the number, relative size, and dispersion of groups), which had a significant impact on strategic options and relations between groups. For example, the multiplicity of groups in the U.S. arena (as opposed to polar situations such as Flemish vs. Walloons in Belgium or Tamils vs. Sinhalese in Sri Lanka) has tended to diffuse ethnic conflict. A second factor was the changing nature of the intergroup arena as a consequence of capitalist development and ongoing eth-class struggle—a factor we sought to highlight in our chronological discussion of American ethnic history. Clearly, ethnic relations in the preindustrial colonial era were qualitatively different from those of the industrial era which in turn differ from those of state monopoly capitalism and verbindungnetzschaft. Changing ethnic and class structures (i.e., the relation of groups to the economy), new conditions of capitalist accumulation, and the expanding role of the state all altered the context in which intergroup interaction occurred. Thus, individual and group strategies are bounded by material and historical forces in an intergroup arena which is constantly recreated and modified.
With respect to specific groups, we can begin to address the question: What causes ethnic identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear? Although the experience of each group is unique, it is possible to identify some general patterns—the underlying structure of ethnic relations. In the American case, we can describe two basic paths—immigration and superexploitation—each of which in turn contains innumerable variations on a general theme. As we briefly summarize these two trends, we will highlight those factors which we deem essential to understanding the evolution of ethnic identities.

The first pattern, the immigrant pattern, characterizes the experience of European immigrants (both original settlers and later migrants) and is seemingly also applicable to the experience of post-1945 immigrants (with the exception of undocumented immigrants). Initially, the experience of these groups could be described by the first half of Park's (1950, p. 150) "race relations cycle"—contact and conflict—a phenomenon which reflects both a seemingly universal initial ethnocentrism and the effects of subsequent intergroup resource competition (cf. Barth and Noel 1972). An important early factor appears to be entry status (i.e., existing or potential occupational and class position) and compatibility with the then-current American class structure. For example, the higher relative position of the old immigrants and their general compatibility with the
then-preindustrial class structure of the United States facilitated their absorption into the dominant Anglo-American group. On the other hand, groups with a lower relative entry position (e.g., Irish and French-Canadians among the old immigrants) tended to retain ethnic affiliations for a longer period of time.

For most immigrant groups, there was little initial intragroup class differentiation. This "fusion" of ethnicity and class (i.e., no eth-class variation as most newcomers ranked near the bottom of the working class) meant that group identity was generally expressed in ethnic terms (especially given the presence of other immigrant groups), thereby increasing the salience of group identity. In this context, ethnicity became a strategy—groups clustered together in enclaves for mutual assistance, developed ethnic "niches" within the economy, or sought to exclude competitors—for improving group position within the eth-class system. At the same time, the "stuff" of ethnic identity underwent a transformation at the hands of the acculturative forces in American society (Anglo institutional dominance, the number and dispersion of groups, the relative permeability of boundaries). Thus, while identities persisted, they also evolved (e.g., loss of language, adoption of Anglo-American customs).

From our vantage point, the most important factor shaping the evolution of ethnic identities was the existence
of intragroup class differentiation; that is, the emergence of eth-classes within group boundaries. This occurred for both old and (albeit with more difficulty) new immigrants as an outcome of economic expansion, ethnic succession, and subsequent opportunities for mobility. The significance of intragroup differentiation was twofold. First, class divisions led to a divergence of interests within groups and increased the difficulty of ethnic mobilization (unless the entire group came under attack from another group). Secondly, middle class (or higher) status appears to facilitate acceptance by and assimilation into the dominant group (seemingly the most rational strategy for members of a minority middle class) when intergroup boundaries are not rigid. Consequently, the emergence of intragroup class divisions is necessary if assimilation is to occur.

Nevertheless, assimilation is a more complex process than was envisioned by Park and other early American sociologists. In the American case, assimilation was not uniform (traditional ethnic identities persisted longer for the working class and in enclaves), it was not unidirectional (e.g., the ethnic "resurgence" of the 1960s and 1970s), and it was not complete (e.g., the persistence of "symbolic ethnicity" among post-1880 "new" immigrants). Taking a broader perspective, we would assert that assimilation is not necessarily the rule when peoples meet—as was assumed by a generation of American sociologists—but that European
immigration to the United States was a special case conditioned by a unique set of historical circumstances particular to core settler societies. These circumstances—i.e., economic expansion and waves of immigration, which permitted upward mobility; the multiplicity of groups, which averted more focused bipolar conflict—facilitated the assimilation of many groups on a scale unlikely to be repeated.

One variation of the immigrant path was the experience of the dominant Anglo-American group. As we noted earlier, the low visibility of the "ethnic" identity of this group can be attributed to dominant group status, the institutionalization of Anglo-American culture, Anglo appropriation of "American" national identity, and access to state power. Cloaked under the guise of state action, Anglo-American ethnic action had a significant impact on other groups. Anglo-Americans were to a large degree able to shape the definition of group identities and to set the parameters of the American intergroup arena: they could foster ethnic persistence by their ability to set and enforce boundaries; they could encourage acculturation and assimilation by controlling the processes of cultural reproduction and national mobilization; and they could even reshape the intergroup arena by excluding other groups. At the same time, Anglo power was by no means absolute—it was fragmented by class divisions within the group (e.g., the often-differing interests of the Anglo elite and working classes)
and limited by the countervailing power of ethnic minorities (which often forced accommodation of non-Anglo interests). Indeed, much of American ethnic history can be described as a dialectical struggle between majority domination and minority resistance, a struggle increasingly characterized (given the expanding role of the state) by political challenges to Anglo hegemony.

The second pattern, the superexploited pattern, describes the experiences of non-Whites--Native, Black, Mexican, and (to a lesser extent) Chinese-Americans. For these groups, the common denominator of their experience was segmentation; that is, restriction to a separate class fraction on the basis of ethnicity--e.g., a lower segment of the working class, a separate and lower segment of the middle classes. As we observed earlier, a key element in maintaining this segmentation was the existence of a "racial order"--a set of beliefs of minority inferiority supporting caste-like rigid boundaries between groups. Accordingly, the ethnic identities of "superexploited" groups persisted, even in the face of considerable acculturation.

An important consideration with respect to the superexploited pattern is its variability; that is, the existence of differences in degree of segmentation and domination. Clearly, the experience of Black-Americans differed from that of Mexican-Americans, while the situations of both groups varied over time (cf. Barrera--1979--on the slow
diminution of the superexploited status of Mexican-Americans). At the same time, the presence of this variation suggests that not only is superexploitation a matter of degree, but so also is the distinction between the immigrant and the superexploited patterns. For example, Italian and Greek-Americans experienced a form of superexploited labor coercion at the hands of padrones, while the experiences of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino-Americans contained elements of both the superexploited and the immigrant patterns (Archdeacon 1983, p. 158).

Much less apparent are the long term effects of superexploited status upon ethnic identity. The initial rigidity of intergroup boundaries (which serves as a vehicle for dominant group hegemony) functions to maintain the salience of group identity. Moreover, the segmentation inherent in superexploited status, permits only a limited degree of class differentiation within the group and precludes any assimilation by the minority middle class, thus maintaining the fusion of class and ethnicity. Over time, however, the continued capitalist development of the United States (e.g., industrialization, post-industrialization) and the ethnic mobilization of the most oppressed groups (e.g., the Civil Rights Movement resulted in the gradual disappearance of superexploited or coerced labor. Consequently, the continued persistence of ethnicity among previously superexploited groups can be attributed to two factors: the use of group
identity as a basis for mobilization to challenge subordinate status; and the perseverance of racial ideologies even after superexploitation has given way to ethnic competition. Future evolution of ethnicity among formerly superexploited groups will be contingent upon the relationship between ethnicity and class (increased differentiation vs. the emergence of a permanent Black, Hispanic, or Native American underclass), the degree of ethnic mobilization, and—especially through institutional racism—the continued survival of racist ideologies.

On a more general level, we can also reach some tentative conclusions regarding the nature of ethnic identities. While ethnic identities have their origin in historical separation and uneven development, they are maintained through intergroup contact, competition, and conflict; that is, through eth-class struggle. During the course of intergroup material struggles, ethnic relations may take on an ideological life of their own and thereby set the stage for subsequent intergroup interaction.®3 In addition, the evolution of ethnic identities is more than a simple outcome of intergroup conflict: ethnicity is intersected by class and the emergence of eth-class interests may result in the confounding of "ethnic" or "class" interests (which may explain, in the case of the United States, the relative absence of both class and ethnic consciousness). These eth-class interests are in turn are manifest in temporary
alliances along either ethnic or class lines. Thus group identities assume a dynamic form—they neither disappear (a la Park) nor persist (a la the pluralist school)—but they are constantly renegotiated as groups struggle to gain (or protect) advantages or to establish niches within an ever-changing political economy. As we have seen in the American case, this can lead to a variety of outcomes.

At this juncture, our conclusions have been drawn from one case—that of the United States—which reflects but one of our postulated trajectories of intergroup relations (i.e., the "core" pattern). Moreover, the United States case, like that of any nation, undoubtedly contains idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., the lack of native, precapitalist feudal elites as in Europe). In the next chapter, we will attempt to analyze a second case, South Africa, in order to test further the utility of our theoretical framework and to provide a broader base for analyzing the evolution of ethnic identities. Then, in the final chapter, we will draw more general conclusions regarding our model.
CHAPTER NOTES

CHAPTER V

1. See Zinn (1980, pp. 47-49) on the emergence of a settler merchant elite during the colonial era.

2. This contrast between North and South, while of immense historical significance, should not be overstated. As Archdeacon (1983, pp. 9-10) observes, the South did resemble the British Caribbean colonies (and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies) in the establishment of plantation slavery; however, the South differed from the Caribbean in that it contained both a larger European population and more small farmers and artisans (although less in comparison to the North). What is significant, however, is (1) that Southern society was not conducive to European immigration, and (2) that slavery served as the origin (or "roots") of Black-White relations in the United States.

3. Archdeacon (1983, pp. 23-24) estimates that in 1790 Anglo-Americans constituted only 49.2% of the total population (excluding Native Americans) and 60.9% of the White population of the original thirteen states, Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

4. Our use of national may be somewhat problematic here inasmuch as we are applying it to a period which is at best the infancy of modern nationalism. It is employed here as the most descriptive term for a conflict between peoples, each of whom viewed themselves as autonomous and self-governing.

5. For a discussion of conflicting White class interests (e.g., merchants vs. settlers vs. English Crown) with respect to native Americans, see Fredrickson (1981, p. 6).


7. This open immigration policy can be attributed to the English desire for population growth in the colonies to provide labor power and for purposes of defense.
8. As Fredrickson (1981, p. 87) observes, slavery tended to obscure class differences within groups, as the racial privileges of poor Whites served as counterweight to the disadvantages of class.

9. This is clearly an oversimplification. As Archdeacon (1983, pp. 22-23) asserts, the Revolutionary War involved a complex mixture of ethnic and class interests, with many groups opposing independence. What is significant for our purposes was the success of this nationalist movement and its subsequent implications for intergroup relations.

10. According to Archdeacon (1983, p. 57), the continental congress initially considered including symbols of all major ethnic groups in the Great Seal of the United States; however, eventual American symbols instead reflected the new Anglo-dominated "American" identity.

11. Dinnerstein and Reimers (1982, p. 3) conceptualize American ethnic relations as containing a fundamental contradiction between the acceptance of newcomers (rooted in the need for labor) and the fear of "foreign" domination. To this, we would add a class-based contradiction between a national ideology rooted in equality and individual sovereignty and the elite fear of lower class rebellion (after the experiences of Bacon's Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Shay's Rebellion, etc.). Thus, the objective of the early American political leaders was creation of a social order which would preserve both ethnic and class hegemony.

12. The American case can be contrasted with the Canadian case, where the institutionalization of French customs facilitated the survival of French-Canadian ethnicity.


14. According to Bonacich (1984, p. 86), only 2.7% of the Southern population in 1850 consisted of foreign born Whites, as opposed to 12%-15% in the Northeast, North Central, and Western regions of the United States.

15. In this analysis, the position of Ireland is somewhat ambiguous. Although it is probably best viewed as a colony rather than a core nation, the length of its colonization, its proximity to England and relative political absorption, and the economic distortion effected by British colonization gave Ireland characteristics similar to those which facilitated emigration.
from peripheral areas within core societies.

16. Given the dominance of the North in trade, this is another factor working against immigration to the South—with the exception of New Orleans.

17. At the same time, the virtual removal of the indigenous peoples and the political absorption of the West into the United States made the outcome of conquest and settlement dramatically different from that of European overseas colonies.

18. It has been estimated that 12-15 million Native Americans lived North of the Rio Grande in 1500 and that their numbers fell to 600,000 by 1800 and 200,000 by 1900 (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 205; Schaefer 1988, p. 177).

19. Bonacich (1984, p. 97) characterizes the Civil War as a conflict between Southern dependent (plantation) capitalism and the temporary alliance of Northern industrial capital with independent small farmers. The foundation of this ultimately victorious coalition was a common interest in blocking any westward expansion of the plantation economy of the South. From the perspective of independent small farmers this was, as Aglietta (1978, p. 21, cited in Bonacich 1984, p. 97) observes, "an alliance with the devil himself"—for the expansion of industrial capitalism would ultimately envelop small agricultural production.

20. See Steinberg (1974) on initial vs. potential class position of Jewish immigrants.

21. English colonial domination of Ireland reduced most Irish to tenant farmers or laborers (as opposed to independent farmers or artisans); hence, their potential class position was different from that of other groups (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 40).

22. Another factor which may have contributed to intergroup divisions and, hence, assimilation was religious diversity—the existence of significant numbers of both Protestants and Catholics among German-Americans (cf. Archdeacon 1983, pp. 105-06).

23. Our notion of superexploited eth-classes is similar to what Blauner (1972) and Barrera (1979)—among others—would refer to as "colonized" minorities. In order to avoid the conceptual confusion which we believe is inherent in the colonial analogy (see our critique of "internal colonialism" in Chapter III), we prefer to
employ the term superexploited with its connotation of the extraction of additional surplus value by coercive, non-market measures. We would also maintain (as Blauner--1972--does for colonization) that superexploitation is a matter of degree; that is, that some groups (e.g., Blacks) experienced considerably harsher treatment than others (e.g., Mexican-Americans).

24. There were, however, some gaps in the Northern racial order which permitted a few Blacks to prosper (Quarles 1969, p. 94), although they still experienced a caste-like lower social position.

25. To the extent that Northern opposition to slavery was based on a belief in equality, it was more a matter of legal equality--the basis of the emerging bourgeois social order--than inherent equality (Fredrickson 1981, p. 153). As noted above, the popular Northern belief was that Blacks would be unable to compete under such circumstances (Archdeacon 1983, p. 66).

26. The re-establishment of the Southern rural elite was by no means inevitable, see Bloom 1987, p. 19) for a discussion of potential eth-class alliances.

27. As Bloom (1987, p. 51) points out, wages for Southern Whites remained low (as opposed to the effects of a labor aristocracy) and that the exclusion of Blacks was accomplished through local legislation.

28. For example, Northern business interests strongly opposed the Lodge voting rights bills of 1890 and 1891, claiming that the resulting social turmoil would be bad for business (Bloom 1987, pp. 43-44).

29. The Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism views such expansion as an attempt by capital to maintain or maximize profits in the face of the inherent contradictions of capitalism (e.g., underconsumption--the inability of the working class to consume the output of ever expanding production--leading to stagnation; class struggle and the increasing demands of the working class) and the need for growth. Although, as Chirot (1977, pp. 51-54) points out, this explanation is seemingly not supported by fact (e.g., colonies were not the primary source of trade and investment; core nations still possessed the potential for internal growth), what is important is that during the post-1870 era of imperialism the core powers acted as though the Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism was true. As Senator William Frye (quoted in Ehrenreich 1983, p. 21), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in 1895:
"We must have the market (of China), or we shall have a revolution."

30. For a brief but cogent analysis of U.S. imperialism, see Zinn (1980, pp. 290-313).

31. For detailed listings of "new immigrant" groups, see Archdeacon (1983, pp. 112-42) and Dinnerstein and Reimers (1982, pp. 32-48, 158). As Dinnerstein et al. observe, however, inaccurate record keeping by United States immigration officials makes an exact count impossible.

32. In contrast, previous immigrants left core nations (Germany, England) for the peripheral (or semiperipheral) United States.

33. United States immigration in the post-1890 era was qualitatively different from that of the past. New immigrant groups contained a higher proportion of single men (sojourners, commuters) and, in many cases, a high rate of remigration (Archdeacon 1983, p. 139; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 134-35). Such a pattern was facilitated by the urban-industrial locus of immigrants and the prevalence of wage labor, as liquid assets (e.g., savings vs. farms) and fluctuations in labor demand made "commuter" migration feasible. This remigration rate also varied considerably from group to group, ranging from 4.3% for Jews to 87.4% for Bulgarians/Montenegrins/Serbs (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 139).

34. One historically interesting question is why the periphery-core pattern of labor migration did not include significant Black emigration from the South until the 1920s. According to Bonacich (1984, pp. 112-13), key factors were the indifference of Northern capital to the source of its labor and the insistence of the Southern elite upon retaining the post-bellum system of superexploited labor (e.g., sharecropping).

35. This illustrates the limitations of the core-periphery (colonial) metaphor within nation states. Despite its "peripheral" status in the American economy, the Western United States was, from a global standpoint, part of a core society--its "colonial" experience is hardly comparable to that of Latin America, Asia, or Africa. Likewise, its "core" status made the United States West at least somewhat attractive to immigrants from peripheral societies, hence, it did serve as a locus for immigration, although at a much lower level than that of the Northeast.
36. For expositions of the nativist position, see Fairchild (1926) or Grant (1916). For analyses of American nativism, see Higham (1955) or Billington (1938).

37. The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 specified that annual quotas for each nation would initially be two percent of the foreign born persons from that nation according to the 1890 Census. This was changed in 1927 to a ratio (of 150,000) proportionate to the national origin of all (White) residents of the United States in 1920. In effect, this shift (actually implemented in 1929) was merely the recloaking of the original formula in more politically palatable garb. This quota system was not applied to nations of the Western Hemisphere, thus Mexicans, Canadians, etc. were not affected.

38. This seemingly reflects a new phase of core-periphery relations. Core investment (vs. the previous pattern of colonization) brings about structural distortion and social change in the periphery, whose displaced population migrates to the core as a source of cheap labor.

39. As Barrera (1979, pp. 106-09) describes, Mexican immigration functions as a reserve army of labor for Southwestern agricultural interests. Periods of increased enforcement of immigration regulations coincided with downturns in the American economy, while the Border Patrol often avoided ranch checks and concentrated enforcement efforts upon non-agricultural workers.

40. For discussions of ethnic enterprise, see Light (1972) or Light and Bonacich (1988). For lists of ethnic occupational specialization, see Dinnerstein and Reimers (1982, pp. 109-25) or Hechter (1979).

41. Obviously the situation was more complex that a direct correspondence between class and attitude towards immigration. One confounding factor was ideology. Members of the elite, who presumably should favor immigration, were affected by the nativist/racist climate of the times (e.g., the "bluebloods" who formed the Immigration Restriction League in the 1890s--Archdeacon 1983, pp. 162-63). Similarly, the American democratic ideology of inclusion and appeals to working class solidarity at times mitigated antagonism towards newcomers (e.g., attempts of the Knights of Labor to organize immigrants and Blacks--Bonacich 1984, p. 111). A second contradictory influence affecting attitudes towards new immigrants was the existence of diverse interests within dominant group eth-classes. Certainly owners and workers in different industrial sectors
varied in terms of the benefit or threat posed by newcomers. Likewise, members of the independent class who prospered through commerce with immigrants were likely to be more tolerant than those in competition. The point is that while eth-class interests shaped the overall pattern of intergroup relations, other factors could and did influence interaction in specific cases.

42. For discussions of the role of schools in the "Americanization" of immigrants, see Carlson (1975), Weiss (1982), Higham (1955), and Hartmann (1948).

43. Interestingly, pressures during World War I are credited with effecting the final assimilation of German-Americans, as attempts to preserve German culture withered in the face of United States conflict with Germany (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 167-68; Hawgood 1940).

44. Use of the term "lessened opposition" is important. The bulk of the capitalist class did not support immigration restriction, but merely failed to oppose it with the same vigor as before.

45. Given the high remigration rate, many new immigrant group members were less likely to learn English or become American citizens. Following the cutoff of immigration and the decline of sojourners, this trend was reversed (Covello 1967).

46. This is not to suggest the disappearance of all dominant group nativism. Continued competition was expressed in "WPX jobs" during the Depression, limiting quotas for Jews at Ivy League schools, and the perpetuation of unfavorable stereotypes.

47. Integration into the class structure is not incompatible with status as a superexploited minority (cf. Barrera 1979). Southern Blacks constituted a racially separate and lower segment of the working class, subject to occupational stratification and a dual wage system in which they were paid less than White workers (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 152).

48. While the nature of the Southern racial order could seemingly lend itself to the split labor market interpretation that it was imposed by the White working class (cf. Bonacich 1972; Wilson 1980), such a view is not compatible with the political economy of the early twentieth century South (Bloom 1987, p. 51). The White working class did not have the power to create such a system, nor were they the prime beneficiaries (e.g.
while a dual wage system did exist, Southern wages remained below those of the rest of the nation. Although the specter of economic competition and the existence of racist ideology created a context in which the White working class was amenable to segregation, they are better viewed as a "junior partner" to White ethnic mobilization triggered by the rural elite.

49. Some observers (e.g., Dollard 1937; Myrdal 1944; Berreman 1960) have actually described the position of Black-Americans in caste terms.

50. According to Lieberson (1980, pp. 371-74), incoming Blacks from the South occupied a lower class position than Southern and Eastern Europeans. Moreover, given the lower standard of living of Southern Blacks (reflecting the caste-like racial order of the post-Reconstruction era), lower-paying jobs represented an improvement over their pre-migration status.

51. A more recent modification of the neoclassical position (Becker 1971) suggests that discrimination will persist if those discriminating are willing to accept the cost (i.e., inefficiency and competitive disadvantage) of their "taste for discrimination."

52. As is noted by several sources (e.g., Archdeacon 1983, p. 129; Barrera 1979, p. 67), there are no accurate data on the exact number of Mexican immigrants.

53. On the other hand, nativist pressure was sufficiently strong so as to effect some restriction of Mexican immigration (e.g., contract laborers, illiterates, potential public charges) in the 1930s (Archdeacon 1983, p. 176). This was undoubtedly possible in the context of the Depression.

54. According to Schwartz (1945, p. 117, cited in Barrera 1979, p. 106), persons with Spanish/Mexican surnames were laid off from WPA jobs in the Southwest in order to maintain a reserve labor force for agriculture (under the assumption that Mexican=agricultural labor).

55. Under the then-current interpretation of the Naturalization Act of 1790, Japanese and Chinese were "non-Whites" and thus ineligible to become naturalized citizens (Archdeacon 1983, p. 164).

56. For a discussion of the role of racist ideology in the conflict between the United States and Japan during World War II, see Dower (1986).
57. While this legislation did not succeed in proletarianizing Native Americans, it did have the effect (often due to White fraud) of reducing Native American land holdings from 138 million acres to 90 million acres in 1934 (Schaefer 1988, p. 181).

58. For our purposes, the most significant effects of TNCs are dependent development/underdevelopment in the periphery and (consequently) continued pressure for labor migration from periphery to core (e.g., gastarbeiter in Western Europe, Mexicans in the United States).

59. For a description and analysis of the bracero program, see Craig (1971).

60. These acts do not reflect any significant softening of the discriminatory national origins system. The first displaced Persons Act was blatantly anti-Jewish, while the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952 continued the system of national quotas and only relaxed the Oriental Exclusion Act to allow each Asian nation a token annual quota of one hundred persons (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 72-73).

61. The limits established by the 1965 act were modified by subsequent legislation in 1976, 1978, and 1980 (cf. Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 168); however, the basic thrust of the act remained unchanged.

62. While the overall yearly quota during this period was 290,000, the total number of immigrants was much larger due to the admission of substantial numbers of refugees.

63. In addition to residents, the number of undocumented immigrants present in the United States at any one time would be supplemented by temporary or commuter migrants (cf. Bennett 1986, p. 3).

64. For a cogent analysis of the "reserve army" role of undocumented labor, see Barrera (1979, pp. 113-26).

65. For a brief survey of the debate concerning the economic impact of undocumented immigrants, see Beck, Ma, Weathers, Cooper and Pedersen (1984).

66. By the time of its expiration on May 4, 1988, the amnesty program attracted 1.5 million applicants. An emerging issue pertains to the treatment of family members of individuals who receive amnesty, which could potentially involve hundreds of thousands more individuals (Arocha 1988). At the same time, the United
States has yet to resolve the status of those who did not qualify for amnesty (cf. Bartlett 1988).

67. Many "pull" factors--i.e., the need for cheap labor, especially in the agricultural and service sectors--also remain a reality, a fact which is explicitly recognized by a provision of the 1986 act which permits entry of foreign agricultural workers.

68. This is not to suggest that the mass media cannot also be used as a vehicle for ethnic mobilization and cultural maintenance (e.g., Spanish-language programming); however, this has been a relatively recent (and thus far limited) phenomenon.

69. This was reflected symbolically and culturally through slogans ("Black Power" and "Black is beautiful"), by alteration of group labels (from "Negro" to "Black"), by a rejection of White standards (the disappearance of the higher in-group status accorded lighter-skinned Blacks) and a promotion of Black culture (emphasis on "soul", demands for inclusion of Black Studies in college curricula).

70. Formation of this alliance was not necessarily a given. Much of the traditional (accommodationist) Black leadership either benefitted from White largess or was more vulnerable to White reaction and was often initially reluctant to challenge the established racial order (cf. Bloom 1987, pp. 127-37).

71. As Bloom (1987, p. 2) observes, one outcome of the social revolution wrought by the Civil Rights Movement was the completion of the modernization of the South and the integration of the South into the national political economy (or, as we might phrase it, termination of the "peripheral" status of the South).


We could go anywhere in Greensboro that we wanted to go, but we were already raising the question, "what the hell, if people can't afford food on their table at home, it matters not that they can eat at the fancy little restaurants in Greensboro."

This point was also recognized by Martin Luther King, Jr. who in 1967 (quoted in Williams 1988, p. D1) stated that "We must recognize that we can't solve our problem until there is a radical redistribution of economic and
political power."

73. For example, recent public statements by sports figures (Al Campanis, "Jimmy the Greek" Snyder) which were viewed as racist led to their dismissal from their respective organizations.

74. For a discussion of "White Ethnics" vs. "non-ethnics" see Banton's (1983, pp. 64-66) notion of "minus one" ethnicity. The idea that Anglo-Americans were non-ethnics can be found in the work of Warner (Warner and Srole 1945, p. 295) and Hughes (Hughes and Hughes 1952, p. 137). For discussion of the notion of the "triple melting pot" see Kennedy (1952) and Herberg (1960). Interestingly, as Archdeacon (1983, p. 214) observes, the "triple melting pot" made no provision for "racial" minorities.

75. It is important to recognize that this mobility often occurred at different rates for different groups, due to the effects of actual or potential class position, as well as a myriad of historical and cultural factors. For example, the different rates of mobility experienced by Jewish-Americans and Italian-Americans can be attributed to differences in potential class position (Steinberg 1974) and to differences in economic conditions (Covello 1967).

76. Alba and Chamlin (1983) found that despite increasing intermarriage (and, hence, multiple ethnicity) most White Americans asserted an attachment to one ethnic group. The strength and salience of this attachment is entirely another matter.

77. In essence, one could say that White Ethnics felt "squeezed" between Anglo-Americans and Blacks—that Anglos expected them to make restitution for injustices for which they were not historically responsible, while Blacks were demanding that which White Ethnics felt that they had worked (and overcome Anglo prejudice and discrimination) to attain (cf. Vecoli 1978, pp. 142-43). Symbolically, this position is reflected in the belief that while anti-Black humor was defined as racist, anti-White Ethnic humor was respectable—and a means of asserting Anglo hegemony (Schaefer 1988, p. 155).

78. By 1960, three interconnected labeling processes took place: (1) the acronym "WASP" was coined by competitive upwardly mobile Catholics and Jews to put "Old-Stock"
Americans in their place, so to speak; (2) the word "minorities" was deflected from White Ethnics onto non-Whites and became a federal category for grants and entitlements; and (3) and "ghettoes" was ethnically clapped onto Black-American residential areas as an Americanization of an Eastern-European residential practice (Khleif 1978a).

79. This process is seemingly reflected in the 1988 Dukakis presidential candidacy. Dukakis, a Greek-American, drew upon ethnic ties for fund-raising and for a symbolic base for his candidacy; however, he also underwent criticism from some Greek-Americans for alleged movement away from traditional group heritage.

80. For an opposing viewpoint, see Vecoli (1978).

81. This process is also happening, albeit on a smaller scale, for Arab-Americans (Abraham and Abraham, 1983).

82. For a discussion of the negative impact of stereotypes upon ethnic groups, see Lieberson (1982).

83. We recognize that our choice here is somewhat arbitrary, that other groups (e.g., Filipinos, Koreans) were resident in the United States prior to 1965; however, the small numbers of these groups make any meaningful analysis difficult.

84. With respect to many social and economic indicators, the position of Japanese-Americans equals or surpasses that of White Americans (one notable exception is representation in the economic and political elite). At the same time, this "success" may at least in part be attributable to small group size and concentration in high wage regions of the United States (Shaefer 1988, p. 395).

85. Two exceptions to this would be the work of Baltzell (1964) and Anderson (1970).

86. This is not to assert that Anglo culture is American culture, but that it dominates American culture. Thus, we do not subscribe to either the American=Anglo model or to the "melting pot" analogy in which American culture is a composite of many ethnic cultures. Our preferred metaphor would be that of Khleif (1978a, p. 57), who describes the United States as "a salad bowl with Anglo dressing" (see also Yinger 1981, p. 251 for a theoretical discussion of this issue).
To the extent that ethnic merger has created a "White American" pan-ethnic identity, this term could be substituted for Anglo-American.

Interestingly, racial ideology has also been employed by Anglo-Americans to "explain" (i.e., denigrate as unfair competition rooted in undesirable group traits) the success of some groups (e.g., Jewish-Americans, Japanese-Americans) in intergroup competition.

For example, the WASP dominance described by Baltzell (1964) is not as apparent in more recent works (e.g., Alba and Moore 1982).

In an excellent account, Barrera (1979, pp. 168-72) catalogues a number of state and federal government actions which served to perpetuate the superexploited status of Mexican labor for the benefit of large agricultural interests (e.g., forcing persons with Mexican surnames off the relief rolls prior to harvest time, consulting with agricultural interests before institutionalizing the bracero program, non-enforcement of school attendance laws for Mexican-American children).

This is compatible with the class-dialectical model of state power discussed in Chapter IV.

To be sure, our framework can accommodate the role of ideology, cultural differences, or ethnocentrism in intergroup interaction; however, we contend that ideas, culture, or even ethnocentrism are not in themselves sufficient to explain the totality of intergroup relations--these processes derive their force from the exigencies of intergroup resource competition and eth-class struggle.

Our conception of material includes the political as well as the economic. As Bloom (1987, p. 3) observes:

the concerns of classes, while shaped by their material existence, are political as well as economic, because the political system is so important in setting the framework within which economic struggles are carried out.

Cf. Marx's (1978, p. 595) famous quote:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past.
95. Thus, one component of intergroup struggle is ideological or cultural—ethnic beliefs and "markers" are important for mobilization and for setting boundaries, while restricting the options of others can be an effective strategy. This reminds us that while ideas such as ethnicity (or race) may have a material base, they may also assume a life of their own (and in turn shape material processes).
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY:
TOWARDS A CLASS-BASED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

VOLUME II
(CHAPTERS VI-VII)

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## VOLUME II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI. ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE PERIPHERY: SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Conquest and Settlement: 1652-1800</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colonization and Territorial Expansion: 1800-1910</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union, Economic Development, and Eth-Class Struggle: 1910-48</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartheid and African Resistance: 1948-Present</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Notes</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. DISCUSSION</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Study of Intergroup Relations</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directions for Further Research</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Notes</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VI
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE PERIPHERY: SOUTH AFRICA

In this chapter, we will continue the substantive application of our framework, this time directing analytical attention towards intergroup relations in South Africa. Our goals are the same as in the previous chapter: application of our theoretical framework so as to enable us to understand a specific historical case, and use of a case study as a vehicle for elaborating our framework. Likewise, our methodology will also be similar: interpretation as opposed to description, and the secondary analysis of existing studies as "data" for analysis. Thus, what we will be presenting is not a detailed sociohistorical study of ethnic relations in South Africa, but rather an overview in which we employ our framework to highlight what in our view are major themes and issues in the evolution of ethnic identities.

Our analysis will emphasize the following assumptions, each of which was initially presented in Chapter IV. First, we will argue that the evolution of ethnic relations in South Africa was ultimately shaped by the process of South African capitalist development, which in turn is linked to global capitalist development—the ceaseless quest for markets, materials, cheap labor, and new outlets for investment. Secondly, we will assert that the major factor
shaping the evolution of ethnic identities is resource competition between groups; that is, that specific interactions (conflict, domination, alliance) between eth-classes (e.g., Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, White working class, African working class) with concrete material interests create a social order which embodies both a system of stratification and a set of ideological understandings which circumscribe relations between groups. Moreover, this process is a dynamic one: tension between the forces of social reproduction and social change creates a continually evolving context for the (strategic) assertion, evolution, or attenuation of ethnic ties. Throughout our analysis of the South African case, eth-class will serve as our main conceptual tool for the analysis of ethnic relations and group identities. Finally, we will again explore the role of aspects of the nation-state or "intergroup arena" (e.g., relative size of groups, role of the state, impact of the physical and social environment) in shaping the evolution of ethnic identities.

In addition to these general analytical themes, a specific point of emphasis in this chapter will involve the impact of the uneven nature of global capitalist development and the peripheral status of South Africa upon the course of intergroup relations. Globally, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, peripheral status entailed colonization, which was manifest as direct political and eco-
onomic domination of the periphery by the core and which resulted in social and cultural transformation (i.e., the destruction of traditional ways) and partial proletarianization (i.e., a blending of wage labor and subsistence economy). For South Africa, a major historical force was Dutch/British colonization. Indeed, we will argue that the nature of the colonial relationship (e.g., economic development shaped by the needs of the core, specific core colonial policies, and the structuring of post-colonial society) shaped the evolution of intergroup relations. At the same time, we must also acknowledge unique aspects of the South African colonial experience. As a colony, South Africa was neither an ideal-typical colony (small-scale migration from the core for purposes of political administration and economic exploitation) nor a classic settler society (one in which the indigenous population was virtually "replaced" by massive European settlement). Moreover, as we shall see below, the unique history of the Afrikaner descendants of the Dutch colonists (European settlers colonized by another European core power) was a key element in the evolution of South African ethnic relations. Thus, our analysis will consider both general aspects of colonialism and the historically specific nature of the South African case.

The organization of this chapter will be similar to that of Chapter V. Our sociohistorical analysis of the evolution of intergroup identities in South Africa will be
presented in four chronological segments which correspond to the major divisions of the South African experience:

1. Dutch settlement and initial intergroup contact (1652-1800)
2. British colonization and territorial expansion (1800-1910)
3. Union, economic development, and eth-class struggle (1910-1948)

For each historical era, we will divide our analysis into two sub-sections. First, we will seek to link specific intergroup interactions to the dynamics of capitalist development (e.g., accumulation), with the objective of understanding the context in which intergroup relations occurred. Secondly, once we have established this basic context, we will direct our focus towards specific eth-class struggles, as we seek to trace the evolution of group identities in the context of intergroup resource competition and ethnic stratification. Following our historical narrative, at the conclusion of the chapter, we will review our findings and present our conclusions.

**Dutch Conquest and Settlement: 1652-1800**

**Capitalist Development and Dutch Colonization**

The history of intergroup relations in South Africa, or any society for that matter, is intertwined with the expan-
sion of the European-based capitalist world-economy. For the purposes of this analysis, what is important is the impact of such changes as the migration of European peoples to other parts of the globe as conquerors, colonizers, and settlers (i.e., increased intergroup contact) and the transformation (or, if one prefers, destruction) of societies as a result of this globalization of European capitalism upon the evolution of intergroup relations. In the case of South Africa, this process dates from 1652, when the Dutch East India Company established a small settlement on the Cape of Good Hope as a refreshment and refueling station for its profitable East Indies spice trade.3 This development occurred at the height of Dutch core hegemony, an ascendancy grounded in financial strength and superior maritime technology (Wallerstein 1980, pp. 37-71). As we will see in the course of this chapter, Dutch colonization would forever alter the course of South African history.

What was particularly most significant for the evolution of South African society was the fact that the initial colonizer was not a European state, but the Dutch East India Company (VOC).3 While statelike in the powers which had been granted to it (Katzen 1969, p. 185; Fredrickson 1981, p. 18), the VOC was a capitalist enterprise whose ultimate goal was profit maximization (as opposed to territorial expansion or empire building).4 From the perspective of the Company, South Africa offered little in terms of eco-
nomic value; that is, there was no one staple commodity which could be profitably exploited and agriculture was not productive (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 9). Consequently, the VOC had little interest in expanding beyond its Cape beachhead (Fredrickson 1981, p. 28). In short, the exigencies of enterprise (i.e., profit) led to a different, "conservative" colonial policy (e.g., attempts to limit settlement and native contact; imposition of tight economic controls and company monopolies), one which reflected both the unwillingness of the VOC to bear the costs of empire and the desire of the Company to maximize profits (de Kiewiet, 1957, p. 8).

What VOC presence meant for the Cape Colony was that the pace of European settlement and capitalist development was slow. Given that territorial expansion was not a priority of the VOC (especially in the context of declining Dutch hegemony after 1671), any additional settlement which did occur was undertaken by former Company employees who were permitted to establish themselves as independent farmers and pastoralists. Accordingly, settlement was not followed by extensive economic development (reflecting the limited interest of the VOC), thus leaving the interior of South Africa as a frontier existing in relative isolation from the world-economy. Indeed, Company actions (e.g., fixed prices and monopolies, unwillingness to invest capital, official corruption) have generally been viewed as an obstacle to the economic development of South Africa (cf.
Katzen 1969, 202-03; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 5-7). Over time, this "underdevelopment" fed upon itself, as low levels of development inhibited investment, immigration, and the emergence of a domestic market, all of which in turn limited further development. This slow pace of development would have a significant impact upon the evolution of intergroup relations in South African society.

**Intergroup Struggles and Ethnic Identity**

From our perspective, it appears that the South African case exhibits an historical pattern of development of intergroup contact and relations which is significantly different from that of either other European settler societies (e.g., the United States) or other colonies. What appears crucial is the combined effect of slow capitalist development, limited immigration, and relative isolation from the world-economy, which created a South African society in which a relatively small proportion of Europeans existed in the midst of a larger native African population. This demographic imbalance between the dominant European colonizers and the native African population produced—in the context of South African capitalist development—a unique set of political and economic exigencies (i.e., the logistics of dominating and exploiting a numerically superior population) which in turn led to the emergence of a particular eth-class structure and specific cultural practices and ideologies. These processes played themselves out over centuries. Our
Immediate task in this section is to examine those aspects of intergroup relations during the pre-1800 era which we believe had a significant effect upon the eth-class structure and the subsequent evolution of group identities. We will focus upon three phenomena: (1) resource competition and conflict between natives and European settlers; (2) the emergence of the Boer independent class; and (3) slavery and intergroup boundaries.

1. **Resource competition: Europeans vs. Africans.** As was the case with the American colonies, a significant early intergroup conflict in South Africa was the "national" (in the context of groups viewing themselves as autonomous socio-political entities) struggle (or European war of conquest) between Dutch colonists and native African peoples for control of the land and its resources. The initial pace of European settlement was slow—having barely moved beyond Cape Town by 1700—a reflection of both VOC policy and the limited number of immigrants. Nevertheless, despite continued attempts by the Company to limit settlement, by 1803 Dutch colonists occupied much of the present-day Cape province (Fredrickson 1981, p. 32; Katzen 1969, p. 212). This territorial expansion was brought about by several social and economic factors—population pressures, the need for large tracts of land for herding and farming to be economically viable (due to the limited fertility of the soil), and the desire of the settlers to move beyond the
political and economic control of the VOC— and facilitated by the ease of access (temperate climate, no natural obstacles) to the interior (de Kleviet 1957, pp. 2-15). Indeed, only the isolation of the interior and the strength of native resistance (particularly when eastward Dutch movement brought them into contact with the numerically larger Nguni-speaking peoples in the latter part of the eighteenth century) inhibited further settlement (Katzen 1969, p. 212).9

One consequence of the expansion of Dutch settlement in the eighteenth century was increased contact and conflict, first with the Khoikhoi (who inhabited the Cape area) and later with the San (who lived inland and to the north).10 While first contact between the Dutch and the Khoikhoi was relatively benign, due to the perceived utility of the Khoikhoi as suppliers of cattle to the Cape settlement, the unwillingness of the Khoikhoi (like many pastoralists) to part with a significant proportion of their herds and the expansionary desires of the independent Dutch settlers quickly led to cattle raids and warfare (i.e., the Khoikhoi-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century).11 In these conflicts (or wars of conquest), the key dynamic was the ever-expanding European desire for land, a goal whose fulfillment required the widespread expropriation of native land and herds. What is perhaps most significant about this process was the use of negative stereotypes (e.g., "heathens" or "savages") and ideologies of superiority in order
to legitimize the conquest and dispossession of the native peoples (cf. de Kiewiet 1957, p. 20; M. Wilson 1969c, p. 242; Fredrickson 1981, p. 34). These ideologies were then readily applied to subsequent relations between European colonists and other native Africans.

For the Khoikhoi, the consequences of this conflict were disastrous. Khoikhoi society, never advanced to begin with, literally disintegrated in the face of European colonization (much in the same manner as east coast Native Americans) as loss of land and herds brought about the rapid erosion of the economic and social base of the Khoikhoi. When these changes were accompanied by the ravages of disease, the Khoikhoi soon ceased to exist as an independent people (M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 67-8). While some survivors moved northwestward into what is now Namibia and others (including Bastaards or Griquas) reestablished themselves on the northern frontier of the Cape Colony, those who remained in the Cape area were absorbed into European colonial society as casual labor (Katzen 1969, p. 184; M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 68-70; Macmillan 1963, pp. 53-72). For this latter group, absorption over time led to acculturation (i.e., the adoption of European language, religion, and other cultural practices) and— with intermarriage with persons of slave and/or Dutch ancestry— eventual amalgamation (i.e., ethnic merger) into a new "Coloured" ethnic group.
2. The rise of the Boer independent class. The second significant development during the pre-1800 period was the emergence of the Boer independent class, an eth-class, which, as the predecessors of the present-day Afrikaners, would play a key role in the evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa. Our use of the term "independent class" reflects the contradictory position of the Dutch settlers between modes of production; that is, on the one hand they existed primarily at a precapitalist subsistence level, but on the other hand they were at least somewhat (and in varying degrees depending upon time and place) subject locally to the sway of market relations and able to operate as independent or petty-bourgeois producers (market production was primarily linked to the role of the Cape as a supply station on the route to the East Indies—cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 52). This class had its origins in those ex-Company employees who became independent herders and farmers and who spread away from Cape Town into the interior of South Africa. The ranks of the settlers were expanded by an influx of Huguenot immigrants in the late seventeenth century (who were quickly and deliberately assimilated into the Dutch population—Magubane 1979, p. 31; Katzen 1969, pp. 196-99) and by the limited immigration permitted by the VOC during the period between 1700 and 1717 (Katzen 1969, pp. 196-202; Fredrickson 1981, p. 66). Given the overall low level of immigration—particularly after 1717—the major
means of Dutch settler population growth was by natural increase, thus leaving the size of the group relatively small.

In essence, what we are describing is a process in which economic and social forces combined to create a new eth-class. The lack of immigration prevented South African settler society from developing the ethnic diversity which was so significant in the case of the United States. Moreover, the slow economic development of the Cape Colony inhibited the evolution of a differentiated class structure. Thus, the European settlers as a group had a structure marked by both ethnic and class homogeneity—indeed "Boer" is Dutch for "farmer"; thereby providing the group with a name which described it in terms of both ethnicity and class (cf. Katzen 1969, p. 231). In addition, a clear demarcation of interests vis-a-vis other eth-classes (i.e., natives, the VOC) and subsequent conflict encouraged the formation of a strong sense of group identity.  

From the outset, the Boer independent class found its fortunes and interests both intertwined with and in opposition to the colonial power (in the pre-1800 era, the VOC). To the settlers, the profit-oriented economic policies of the Company (e.g., monopolies, trade restrictions, limits on contact with the natives) constituted an economic burden. This conflict of interests, coupled with the nature of the social and physical environment, encouraged settler migra-
tion into the interior both to escape the control of the VOC and to exploit new economic opportunities. For its part, while the VOC initially sought to forestall settler contact with the natives, it eventually "tolerated" expanded settlement and limited its role to providing support (e.g., arms) for the settlers when conflicts with the natives became particularly intense (Katzen 1969, p. 224). From the perspective of the Company, this represented a "trade-off"--the increased cost of control (e.g., military intervention, administrative costs) vs. increased reliability of supply from European farmers and herders (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 30-33). Given the disinterest and institutional weakness of the VOC (e.g., its unwillingness to invest financial resources to extend its influence into the "unprofitable" interior, its inability to collect taxes and rents and to enforce rules), the settlers or "trekboers" essentially existed beyond the control of the Company, thus giving rise to a Boer self-image as a free frontier society living on open land (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 10-15; Katzen 1969, p. 211).

At the same time, the economic interests of the Boer independent class brought them into sharp conflict with the native peoples. In the "national" conflict between Europeans and Africans, the Boer independent class was the chief European antagonist, for it was the settler desire for expansion which conflicted with native land tenure. This was a quintessential example of resource competition, inas-
much as the basis of the settler herder economy (a sufficiently large tract of land so as to support--despite its low carrying capacity--an economically viable herd) was also the economic base of native society. Despite their relatively small numbers, the settlers were able to vanquish the natives by virtue of their access to superior European military technology. Even in its early stages, this intergroup conflict contained a class as well as an ethnic or national dimension, for the basis of the economic well being of the Boer independent class was grounded in the dispossession of native land and the exploitation of native labor (Magubane 1979, p. 10). This intertwining of class and ethnic interests will remain a dominant theme in our interpretation of South African history.

Another salient aspect of the settler independent class experience was that it underwent a process of ethnic change—a transformation of identity from Dutch to Boer (White African). To quote de Kieviet (1957, p. 17):

In the long quietude of the eighteenth century the Boer race was formed. In the vast, unmysterious, thirsty landscape of the interior lay the true center of South African settlement. When the Trekboers entered it with their flocks and tented wagons, they left the current of European life and lost the economic habits of the nations from which they had sprung.

What made this rapid transformation possible was the social and economic isolation of the trekboers. Scattered farms, a nomadic lifestyle, economic self-sufficiency, and a lack of transportation networks all served to limit settler ties to
Cape Town and European civilization (Magubane 1979, p. 31; Fredrickson 1981, p. 34; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 11-15). Moreover, the limited nature of immigration meant that the settler population was predominantly African-born and lacked the dynamic element introduced by constant immigration.

The emergence of Boer society was manifest in changes in culture and language (e.g., the evolution from Dutch to taal, a local dialect which was the forerunner of modern Afrikaans). Historically, the emerging Boer culture was characterized—often as a result of isolation—as conservative, anti-intellectual, highly religious (the Dutch Reformed Church was at the core of Boer culture), and stamped with the individualism of the frontier (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 15-18; Katzen 1969, pp. 228-31). More ominous, however, was the fact that Boer society was seemingly grounded in two fundamental tenets (which were clearly linked to economic interests)—the principle of unlimited White access to land and the presumed—thought to be divinely sanctioned—right of settlers to deal as they pleased with natives (Katzen 1969, p. 232). These principles would provide the ideological basis for future intergroup conflict between Europeans and Africans.

3. Slavery and group boundaries. The other key aspect of intergroup relations in pre-1800 South Africa was the emergence of slavery and the importation of slaves from East Africa and from Dutch holdings in the East Indies.
From an economic standpoint, the establishment of slavery was a consequence of the need for cheap agricultural labor juxtaposed with the scarcity of local supply. Consequently, slavery became widespread in the Cape settlement, particularly after the VOC made a conscious decision in 1717 to favor slavery over European immigration (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 66-67; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 21). Economically, Cape slavery was less salient in that it was not the cornerstone of a single-crop cash export economy (as in the Americas) and, consequently, not essential to the power of a ruling class (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 89-92). Instead, although the VOC did utilize slave labor, the bulk of slave-holding occurred on a widespread basis, with a majority of settlers possessing slaves, yet most owning a relatively small number (Katzen 1969, p. 205; Fredrickson 1981, p. 69). What slavery did do, however, was facilitate continued underdevelopment (by inhibiting productivity and market expansion—much as it did in the U.S. South) and encourage territorial expansion (by eliminating opportunities for White labor, thus forcing the "excess population" to migrate in search of farmland and, hence, to come into contact with Bantu-speaking native peoples), both of which were key processes in the evolution of South African society (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 22). For these, if for no other reasons, the institution of slavery in South Africa should be viewed as historically important.
For purposes of this analysis, *South African slavery was significant inasmuch as it established an institutional and cultural basis for White domination.* Given the widespread extent of slaveholding, slavery shaped production relations in that the domination and exploitation of non-White labor was the mainstay of the economic well-being of the majority of the Boer independent class (unlike the U.S. South where slaveholding was primarily concentrated within a small elite class). Not surprisingly, these economic interests were ingrained in an ideological system which emphasized the religious and racial differences between natives and Europeans and the importance of "proper relations" between masters and servants--thereby maintaining White dominance (Macmillan 1963, p. 20). Furthermore, given the economic homogeneity of the Boer settlers and the general underdevelopment of the Cape Colony, the belief that manual labor was the province of non-Whites (which created caste-like distinctions) was the basis of the supremacy of White settlers over native labor (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 21-22; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 92-92). This superimposition of ethnicity and class provided an ongoing basis for the supremacist ideologies which maintained the group position of the Boer independent class.

The other major impact of Cape slavery was its contribution to the changing ethnic structure of the emerging South African society. Although some slaves were captured
during commando raids beyond the borders of European settlement, most slaves were not indigenous to South Africa, but came instead from East Africa or Dutch holdings in Asia (Katzen 1969, p. 204). The existence of widespread miscegenation among Dutch settlers, imported slaves, and native Khoikhoi and San—a phenomenon which reflected, among other factors, the relatively relaxed Dutch attitude (displayed in Indonesia) towards the mixing of groups, the demographic imbalance in the male-female ratio among Dutch settlers, and the status of Cape Town as a "rest station" for passing ships (M. Wilson 1969a, p. 66; Katzen 1969, p. 184; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 94-135; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 17-19)—produced a population of mixed ethnic background, which in turn continued miscegenation with the different ethnic groups. For South African society, the ultimate outcome of this process was the ethnic merger of slaves, Khoikhoi, San, and mixed-race persons into a new, "Coloured" ethnic group. This process was seemingly facilitated by external forces—the "deculturation" of slaves, Khoikhoi, and San and their rapid acculturation into Dutch culture (van den Berghe 1965, p. 19), as well as White insistence (despite attempts to retain subgroup identity) upon treating persons of mixed ancestry as a homogeneous entity. What emerged from this process was a unique social entity—the "Coloured" population; however, the small size of this group relative
to the Europeans and Africans would relegate them to a marginal role in South African history.

While the distinctions between Whites and natives, free persons and slaves, were relatively clear, the social position of this mixed group was more ambiguous. Initially, intergroup boundaries were somewhat fluid, particularly in light of the rapid acculturation of Coloureds, to the extent that third and sometimes even second generation offspring of mixed unions were generally able to "pass" into the Dutch group (van den Berghe 1965, p. 19; Fredrickson 1981, p. 118). In this process, a key variable was often social and economic position—i.e., wealth facilitating absorption into the Dutch group—reflecting the relationship between ethnicity and class and the need of the European settler community to expand its numbers. With the passage of time, however, boundaries began to harden, due to greater economic differentiation (which encouraged those of putatively "pure" European stock to use ethnic markers to enhance their status—cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 122) and expanded conflict with the Bantu-speaking population (which led to increased prejudice against non-Whites). Nevertheless, throughout South African history, the boundary between Whites and mixed (Coloured) persons has continued to be ambiguous and based on common knowledge as much as any other factor (van den Berghe 1965, p. 53; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 133-34).
British Colonization and Territorial Expansion, 1800-1910

Capitalist Development and British Colonial Rule

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Cape Colony was little more than a European beachhead on the tip of southern Africa. Despite nearly a century and one-half of occupation, the VOC had left "light footprints" in that the Cape exhibited a very low level of economic development, a paucity of political and cultural institutions, and a relatively small colonial population (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 30). Indeed, with the exception of Cape Town and its immediate environs, the remainder of what would become South Africa could be characterized as an "external area" beyond the economic and political sway of the European-based capitalist world economy. Nevertheless, the pre-1800 era left an enduring legacy in the form of an ethnically diverse society whose political economy was based upon domination and exploitation of the non-White majority by the White settler minority. Moreover, Cape society at the end of the eighteenth century was marked by an increasing divergence of interests between the European settlers (the Boer independent class) and the colonial power (the VOC). These dynamics constituted the foundation upon which South African society would be built.

The period encompassing the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century was a time of rapid change for South Africa. During this period, the forces of
global capitalist development facilitated the incorporation of South Africa into the capitalist world economy as a peripheral area (cf. Martin 1987; Magubane 1979, p. 32). Key elements of this process of incorporation were: (1) the absorption of South Africa into the British empire/sphere of influence; (2) settler/colonial territorial expansion and the conquest and absorption into settler/colonial society of the Bantu-speaking native peoples; and (3) the emergence of mining and the expansion of capitalist production and market relations. From our perspective, each of these events had an inarguable impact upon the South African ethnic structure and upon the subsequent course of intergroup relations. In this initial discussion, our purpose is to examine these macro-level processes, with our ultimate objective being the development of an analytical context for the evolution of intergroup relations.

1. British colonization. One major transition occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century (1795-1806), when the Dutch/VOC were supplanted by the British as the European colonial power in South Africa. On a global scale, the acquisition of South Africa can be viewed in the context of British consolidation of hegemonic core status (replacing the Dutch) as the dominant political and economic power within the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 1989, p. 122). For the emerging South African society, this transformation was to have two main effects. First, it
changed the political economy of the Cape Colony by substituting British colonial policy for that of the VOC and by linking the fortunes of South Africa to global British political and economic interests (South Africa was, after all, but one "jewel" in the imperial crown). Secondly, it added an ethnonational component to divergent class interests within the European colonial community; that is, economic and political conflicts were no longer between Dutch settlers and the Dutch-based VOC, but instead between the Boer independent class and the British colonial administration.

The results wrought by the transfer of the Cape Colony to British control were neither immediate nor dramatic; however, they did produce several tangible alterations in the social fabric of South African society. Perhaps the most significant of these changes was an upsurge in economic activity—the removal of VOC monopolies and the opening up of trade, the introduction of Merino sheep and the development of a wool export economy, and the general expansion and rationalization of market relations (Houghton 1969, pp. 4-5; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 30-31; Martin 1987, p. 860). Other major effects of British rule included the establishment of an expanded (and indelibly British) social and political structure; the elimination of the slave trade (1807) and of slavery (1834/38); and a change in the ethnic structure of the settler community through the introduction of British
immigrants (cf. de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 30-31; Davenport 1969, pp. 272-73; Thompson 1969a, pp. 378-79). For each of these processes, however, the overall impact was somewhat muted. The economy expanded, yet underdevelopment remained a significant feature of South African society. Political and administrative structures emerged, but were slow to expand into the hinterlands. Slaves were freed, yet non-White labor experienced other forms of coercion (e.g., laws enforcing labor "contracts"). And while British immigration led to a diversification of the ethnic structure, it did not occur in sufficient quantity to overcome the numerical superiority (within the European settler community) of the Boers.  

2. Settler expansion. The second major development during the nineteenth century was the expansion of European settlement, a process which—after decades of conflict—resulted in the subjugation of native African peoples and their eventual incorporation into South African society as the largest ethnic group. Intergroup contact between Europeans and Africans began on the Eastern Cape frontier in the eighteenth century, where the expansion of Dutch settlement was checked for some seventy years by encountering substantial settlements of Xhosa (Macmillan 1963, p. 40). What followed were decades of increased economic contact and slow European expansion along the eastern frontier, a process punctuated by mutual raids and outbreaks of open
warfare (M. Wilson 1969c, pp. 237-53). This was to be but the first act in an unfolding drama.

A second front of European territorial expansion began in 1830 with the movement of the Boer independent class across the Orange River into the interior highlands. This migration—often referred to as the "Great Trek"—was unique in that it did not consist of individuals moving in search of grazing land (trekboers) but instead was comprised of loosely organized groups (voortrekkers) who consciously sought to move beyond the borders of the Cape Colony (Thompson 1969c, pp. 405-06). The roots of the Great Trek are complex—demographic, economic, and political (cf. Martin 1987, p. 895). From the outset, European settler society possessed a strong expansionary dynamic—extensive agriculture (and the impact of herding upon the fragile grasslands) and population growth—a force which for a century and a half had induced trekboers to ignore the frontier in search of better grazing areas. Given the Xhosa "barrier" along the eastern frontier, a barrier which was also maintained by British policy (e.g., the British foreign Office order to the Cape Governor to restore African land seized after the 1835 war—de Kiewiet 1957, p. 51), and the rapid population growth of the Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century, the Great Trek can in some respects be viewed as a natural outcome of bottled up expansionary pressures (cf. Macmillan 1963, p. 199; Davenport 1969, p. 274). Moreover, there
also existed strong *economic* incentives for migration, as the expansion of market relations and British attempts to rationalize agricultural production drove up land prices and encouraged Boers to move in search of cheap land (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 55; Martin 1987, p. 895). What set the *voortrekkers* apart from the *trekboers*, for whom the above dynamics also existed, was the political and ideological—or, we might add, *ethnonational*—component of their migration; that is, Boer resentment of British rule, particularly the imposition of a new racial order (e.g., the elimination of slavery and increased legal rights for natives—which also threatened the material interests of independent farmers) and the failure to maintain "proper relations" between masters (Europeans) and non-White servants (Davenport 1969, pp. 297-311; Macmillan 1963, pp. 7-20; Moodie 1975, p. 4).

Whatever its root causes, the Great Trek had three significant effects on the evolution of South African society: (1) the absorption of African peoples into settler society; (2) the persistence of Boer identity; and (3) the widening of British involvement in South Africa. *First*, settler expansion brought the African peoples—first the Ndebele in the high veld and the Zulu in Natal, then others in the ensuing years—within the pale of European settlement, thereby setting in motion a chain of events which would result in Europeans and Africans being inextricably bound together in a single society (cf. de Kiewiet 1957, p.
Secondly, territorial expansion provided the Boers with the opportunity to preserve their group identity. As de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 52-53) observed, the Great Trek came to occupy a symbolically important role in Boer/Afrikaner history, with the voortrekkers portrayed as heroic peoples fleeing British colonial oppression. In addition, the establishment of the Boer Republics (the South African Republic and the Orange Free State) provided a political and territorial basis for group identity. Finally, the aftermath of the Great Trek forced Great Britain to expand its sphere of influence in South Africa. While Britain was generally reluctant to extend colonial control unless it could realize clear economic or strategic benefits, increased frontier unrest (in part due to the disruption caused by Boer migration into Natal) and a perceived threat to the security of the Cape Colony (a Boer outlet to the sea could serve as a foothold for an unfriendly power) moved the British to annex Natal in 1843 (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 62). Although Great Britain proceeded no further at this juncture (indeed, it recognized the autonomy of the Boer Republics), the imperial genie was nevertheless out of the bottle. Continued unrest and war on the Cape frontiers led to the annexation of British Kaffraria, Victoria East, and Basutoland—actions which were but the first steps towards British imperial domination of all of South Africa.
By the 1860s South Africa had evolved as follows. The Cape Colony and Natal, while still underdeveloped, had under British control steadily expanded both productive activities and external economic ties (Houghton 1969, pp. 1-6). At this stage, both could be viewed as peripheral areas of the world economy (Martin 1987, p. 860). In contrast, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic were weak, frontier societies whose primarily subsistence economies were only minimally integrated (via limited trade) into the capitalist world-economy (Thompson 1969c, pp. 425-27; Martin 1987 pp. 860-61; Houghton 1969, pp. 6-7). Finally, South Africa in the 1860s contained innumerable African kingdoms and chiefdoms ringing the borders of the Orange Free State, Natal, and the South African Republic. Most of these societies had felt (in varying degrees) the impact of European territorial expansion; however, they remained, for the most part, on the fringes of or external to colonial society (cf. Arrighi—1979, pp. 161-62—on "nominal incorporation"; i.e., external political domination and weak economic ties, but no wholesale introduction of market relations or proletarianization of independent producers). What none of these actors knew, however, was that South Africa stood upon the threshold of an era of revolutionary social change.

3. **Mining and capitalist development.** The transformation of the social and economic landscape of South Africa began in 1867 with the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley
in Griqualand (an area on the northern frontier of the Cape Colony). By 1871, the Kimberley mines made South Africa the largest diamond producer in the world; total exports for 1872 were valued at more than 1.6 million pounds (Innes 1984, p. 21; Houghton 1969, p. 11). Scarcely fifteen years later, gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand (in the South African Republic/Transvaal), giving birth to an industry whose value and significance would eclipse even that of the diamond industry. By 1898, the South African Republic was the largest producer of gold in the world, producing 27.55% of total global output—a proportion which rose to 40% by 1913 (van Onselen 1979, p. 289). The emergence of these two industries irrevocably altered the course of South African capitalist development; they provided the basis for economic development and incorporation into the capitalist world-economy (Martin 1987). It is not an overstatement to say that the emergence of mining, more than any other single development, transformed intergroup relations and shaped the economic, social, and political nature of modern South African society.

The impact of the mining revolution was felt in all sectors of South African society. Moreover, as opposed to the gradual industrial development of the core, the pace of growth was rapid—as was the social dislocation which resulted from development. The influx of core capital and technology (facilitated by the colonial link between South
Africa and Great Britain) and the revenues generated from mining fueled rapid economic growth—the expansion of commerce (which benefitted the ports of the Cape and Natal), infrastructural development (the extension of roads and rail links from the ports to the interior mining areas), and the growth of a domestic market. This in turn provided a basis for secondary industry (e.g., coal, brickmaking, explosives) and an expanded market for agriculture, both of which further contributed to economic expansion. Another effect of the mining economy was the creation of a basis for a significant wage-labor workforce, a recasting of the class structure which was manifest in both the immigration of skilled mining labor and the proletarianization of indigenous (African and Boer) labor. Finally, South African economic expansion initiated those processes—urbanization, industrialization, and the expanded role of the state—which are the seemingly inevitable concomitants of capitalist development. Clearly, South Africa would never be the same.

The nature of this economic expansion—and of the course of South African capitalist development—was heavily influenced by the specific conditions of capitalist accumulation in the mining industry. The marketing of diamonds (the quintessential luxury commodity) necessitated the forging of links between the South African mines, the world market, and core-based economic interests (cf. Innes 1984, p. 22). Even more significant was the nature of mining
itself: South African diamonds are located in diamondiferous "pipes" running deep into the earth, which meant that once surface deposits had been exhausted, continued mining would require modern technology—and a massive infusion of capital (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 92-93). At the same time, the scope of the diamond deposits were sufficiently extensive so as to serve as a basis for ongoing industry (rather than the brief "booms" which occurred in the western United States). Thus, while the South African diamond industry was initially marked by small holdings worked by independent diggers, the forces of centralization resulted—after economic and political struggle (e.g., the "Black Flag Rebellion")—in the dispossession of small diggers and the consolidation of holdings (e.g., from 3588 in 1871 to 71 in 1881—Innes 1984, pp. 29-31). This in turn enabled the mineowners to ensure market stability (by limiting production) and to enhance profitability (by increasing their ability to control labor). The ultimate denouement of this process of centralization occurred in the mid-1880s when Cecil Rhodes—with the backing of core finance capital in the form of the Rothschild group—bought out all competitors and consolidated the diamond fields under the aegis of De Beers Consolidated Mines (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 94-95; Innes 1984, p. 36). In short, in less than two decades the South African diamond industry evolved from domination by independent small diggers to control by
monopoly capital intimately linked to core interests. Furthermore, South African monopoly capital was to become a major force in other economic activities—agriculture, secondary industry, and finance (Innes 1984, pp. 41-42).

A similar process occurred within the gold industry, accelerated by the capital and expertise accumulated in diamond mining. Indeed, prior to the announcement of the Witwatersrand gold fields, leading South African capitalists (e.g., Rhodes) actively bought up land in the area (Innes 1984, p. 46). Given the initial participation of monopoly capital, centralization of the gold industry proceeded at a much faster pace and by the 1890s the industry was dominated by a few large groups (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 118; Innes 1984, p. 55; Houghton 1969, p. 13). As was the case with diamonds, the process of centralization was facilitated by the nature of South African gold mining—extensive veins of low grade ore which ran deep into the earth—which required extensive capital investment (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 116-19). Moreover, the unique role of gold as a global medium of exchange created an unlimited demand for gold, but at a fixed price set by Great Britain. This meant that the core concern of the mining industry was not overproduction and market saturation, but the need to control costs in order to maintain profitability (Innes 1984, pp. 48-49). Given the relatively invariant nature of capital expenditures, cost control in the gold mining industry could best be obtained
through ready access to cheap labor (Magubane 1979, pp. 115-116). Thus, cheap labor served as the basis for the economic development of South Africa (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 96). This would have a significant effect upon the evolution of the South African eth-class system.

**Intergroup Relations and the Eth-Class Structure**

Until the beginning of the twentieth century South Africa was not a unitary society in that it contained neither structured relations between groups nor a single political structure. With respect to intergroup relations, we maintain that the key process (and outcome) during the period between 1800-1910 was the molding together of diverse groups into a single society (Union of South Africa) with a unique eth-class structure. At the same time, the evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa was shaped by the changes wrought by the mining revolution and by the incorporation of South Africa into the capitalist world-economy as a peripheral society. In general, intergroup relations in South Africa during the nineteenth century were characterized by continual tripartite conflict between Africans, British, and Boers. For our purposes, this conflict—and its resolution—is crucial, for it determined the nature of the eth-class structure in the emerging South African society. Our discussion of intergroup relations during this era will focus upon four significant developments: (1) the complete conquest of the African population
and their absorption into European settler/colonial society; (2) the extension of British colonialism and subsequent bitter conflict with the Boer republics, the resolution of which established the political framework for modern South African society; (3) the processes of peasantization and proletarianization; and (4) the transformation of the South African eth-class structure. In each case, we will explore the implications of developments for the evolution of ethnic identities.


The history of nineteenth century South Africa is the history of struggle over land—a "national" conflict (in the context of a struggle between autonomous peoples) between Europeans and Africans. By any yardstick, the outcome of this conflict was dramatic: in 1800 European colonial rule was limited to Cape Town and the surrounding area; by 1900 the entire area which constitutes modern South Africa had been conquered and absorbed into a society which was dominated by Europeans. From our perspective, European-African conflict can be viewed as a case of resource competition over land and cattle, a conflict grounded in confrontation between two societies with similar expansionary dynamics—population growth and extensive agriculture. This resulted in a cycle of conquest and dispossession of Africans from the best land, which increased the pressure on the remaining land, which in turn led to further conflict (raids
and counter raids). Despite fierce African resistance, the technological superiority of European weaponry proved decisive and the process of conquest and dispossession continued such that by the end of the century, European colonial rule had been extended over all of South Africa.

One key outcome of the conquest of African societies was that the African population was not annihilated (as were natives in ideal-typical settler societies such as the U.S.) but instead was absorbed into colonial society (cf. de Kieviet 1957, p. 79). As a result, a central problem for the European settlers became how, even given their technological superiority, could they maintain control over a significantly larger indigenous population. In general, European colonial policies involved measures for ensuring both security and a supply of cheap labor, such as restricting African settlement to allotted "reserves", while at the same time limiting the number of Africans permitted to live as tenants on "European" land. Within the reserves, locations, and nominal chiefdoms, African political structures were allowed to persist; however, they were ultimately subordinate to European authority (Thompson 1969a, p. 376). According to colonial law, Africans were viewed as encroachers or foreigners—the Cape Colony Kaffir Employment Act used the convenient oxymoron "native foreigner" (Davenport 1969, p. 310)—who were required to have a pass to be in a White area (de Kieviet 1957, p. 74; Thompson 1969c, p. 436).
In reality, these policies (like their more recent "Bantustan" successors) were not workable inasmuch as they ignored the economic realities (e.g., the colonial need for labor; the fact that the land allotted for reserves was insufficient to support the African population) which bound Africans and Europeans together. Consequently, many Africans were forced to live in violation of colonial laws—as tenants or squatters on "European" land. On the other hand, what these policies did do was establish a framework for European domination of the African majority within the confines of a single society.

In addition to military conquest, African societies were transformed by economic and social forces stemming from European domination (Thompson 1969b, p. 251). Initially, when conquest entailed the extension of the colonial frontier and the expulsion of native inhabitants, it resulted in little structural change in African society (i.e., if Europeans were to leave, African society could continue relatively unchanged—cf. Arrighi 1979, p. 166). With increased contact and conquest, however, came cultural diffusion and expanded economic ties (e.g., trade, employment), both of which began to erode the economic and political base of pre-colonial African society (Macmillan 1963, p. ix; Thompson 1969a, p. 335). In this context, we might assert that the subjugation of the African peoples was effected not only by military force, but also by missionaries who intro-
duced new values, traders who induced new wants, and farmers who appropriated the best lands (Thompson 1969b, p. 251; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 86-87). Dispossessed of the best land, Africans found themselves in an increasingly untenable economic position with respect to traditional activities and were often reduced to serving Europeans as tenants or laborers. This process was facilitated by new colonial laws—e.g., hut taxes, clothing regulations—which were designed to force Africans into the colonial economy. In short, precapitalist African society withered away and African peoples were absorbed into colonial society.

The conflict between Europeans and Africans was also waged on an ideological and cultural level. Conquest, dispossession, and domination required rationalization—the debasement of subordinate peoples which was endemic to Western colonialism. This was manifest in racist ideologies which cast Africans as barbarians or even as members of a different species, thereby providing a moral basis for domination. In the context of the transformation of traditional African culture, settler racism resulted in a process of psychological colonization or "deculturation" (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 65); that is, the forced shedding of traditional culture and adoption of an externally imposed "colonial" culture. This involved some measure of acculturation (usually partial) to European culture, which increased both the exploitability of African labor and their
acquiescence to colonial rule (e.g., by socializing colonized peoples to accept European domination). To the extent that elements of traditional culture persisted, they were adapted to this new framework. From an ethnic standpoint, the outcome of this process was to create a new, subordinate "African" ethnic identity, largely imposed by Europeans, in the context of European-dominated colonial society. Thus, European domination shaped the formation of African ethnic identities.


The second major intergroup conflict in nineteenth century South Africa occurred within the European colonial community—between British imperialism and Boer settlers. This conflict, which dominated the last two decades of the nineteenth century, was significant for two reasons. First, the intensity of this conflict kindled the flames of Afrikaner nationalism, a dynamic which would become a driving force in twentieth century South Africa. Secondly, the resolution of this conflict (given the European dominance of South African society) directly shaped the political economy of modern South Africa. At the same time, however, the British-Boer conflict must be viewed as secondary to the conflict between Europeans and Africans (e.g., intra-European conflict abated during periods of frontier unrest, neither side would arm Africans or employ them as soldiers

From our vantage point, the British-Boer conflict is best understood as an eth-class conflict, albeit with national overtones. In essence, this was a conflict between British imperial interests (and their local representatives) and the Boer independent class—the concerns of empire and core capital (e.g., security, profitability, limitation of colonial expenditures) vs. the interests of the independent settlers (land, cheap native labor, low taxes)—an economic conflict with a cultural veneer. This conflict was grounded in a unique set of historical circumstances. The replacement of the VOC by the British meant that Boer settlers were ruled by a culturally different colonial power, the effects of which were felt as the British moved to superimpose their language, institutions, and values on South African society. Furthermore, British rule brought British settlers (although never in the same numbers as the Boers) into South African society, a group which was not only able to resist assimilation (by dint of the institutionalization of their culture) but also able to employ core-based educational and occupational skills to attain a superior economic position (Davenport 1969, p. 279). At the same time, British settlers tended to side with the British colonial government (as its presence served as a guarantor of their status), often clamoring for increased
imperial involvement to protect their interests (Thompson 1969b, p. 251; 1969d, p. 318).

From the outset, a key issue dividing the British and the Boers was treatment of the natives. Again, the core of the conflict was not ideological (e.g., settler racism vs. bourgeois liberalism) but economic. On one hand, the material interests of the Boer independent class were closely tied to direct exploitation (e.g., slavery, coercion) of native labor on individual farms and to the elimination of the African military threat (thereby enhancing their ability to appropriate land). As a consequence, the Boer republics employed more direct means of labor control and instituted political structures which expressly excluded non-Whites from citizenship (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 175-78; Thompson 1969c, p. 436). On the other hand, the interests of British colonialism (i.e., core capital) required less direct, less costly means of control—the more generalized exploitation obtainable through the labor market. Thus, slavery was outlawed in the British colonies and natives were accorded de jure equality. Our point here is not to deny the existence of British humanism (see Macmillan—1963—on the role of John Philip and the London Missionary Society in influencing British native policy), but instead to assert that such "liberalism" was clearly tied to economic interests (e.g., labor supply, market expansion, and the costs of administration—cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 62-
Given the divergence of economic interests between British and Boers—settler expansionism and petty bourgeois farming vs. British exigencies of empire—native policy served as an important political battleground.

Like many other aspects of South African society, the British-Boer conflict was transformed by the post-1867 mining revolution. The discovery of diamonds and gold heightened British interest in the interior of South Africa (which had previously been viewed as unprofitable), exemplified by the British move in 1871 to annex the diamond fields (Thompson 1969b, pp. 255-56). Imperial goals were seemingly clear: protect British strategic interests while maximizing economic benefit and minimizing costs of control (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 100-03). Over the long range, this meant the establishment of a self-sufficient, White settler dominated society operating within the British sphere of influence and under the tutelage of British capital—presumably for the benefit of British interests (cf. Thompson 1969d, p. 291; Magubane 1979, pp. 48-52). What remained problematic, however, was the means by which this goal could be attained. The Afrikaner republics were unlikely to join voluntarily into any union with the British colonies (particularly after the ill-fated British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 and subsequent relinquishment, after embarrassing military reverses at the hands of the Boers, in 1881), while the Cape Colony was too weak (and driven by its own interests) to
serve as a proxy (Thompson 1969d, pp. 291-92; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 122-25). Thus, Great Britain sought to attain its goals via diplomacy and pressure—the politics of imperialism.

Occurring simultaneously with increased intergroup conflict was the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism; that is, the assertion of a White South African identity linked to the Boer experience, the Afrikaans language, conservative Calvinism, and a claimed role as a "chosen people" with a divine covenant to rule South Africa (Moodie 1975, pp. 2-26; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 193-94; Thompson 1969d, pp. 301-02). While a basis for Afrikaner group assertion had been provided by prior events (e.g., the Great Trek), a full-fledged nationalism was slow to coalesce before the 1870s due to the isolation of Boer communities, divisions within Afrikanerdom (e.g., cultural and linguistic differences between Boers in the Cape Colony and the republics), and conflicts between trek communities (Thompson 1969d, p. 301; Giliomee 1979a, p. 96). What gave rise to Afrikaner nationalism in the late nineteenth century was conflict: the defense of petty bourgeois agricultural interests in the face of modernization, (British) monopoly capitalism, and economic exploitation by the British colonies (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 67-68); the defense of territory (i.e., the Boer Republics) from the mounting threat of British imperialism; and the defense of identity in response to the influx of uitlanders (non-
Afrikaner Europeans attracted by the mines) and feared assimilation into the British colonial community (de Villiers 1969, pp. 365-67; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 119-21; Giliomee 1979a, pp. 99-103). At the same time, Afrikaner resistance was limited by their economic and military weakness vis-a-vis Great Britain, by the South African Republic-Orange Free State division, and by the lack of an outlet to the sea. Nevertheless, emboldened by revenues from the gold industry and the nationalist leadership of Paul Kruger, the South African Republic increasingly adopted policies designed to remove it from the British sphere of influence.*7 While none of these measures was completely successful, the Afrikaners were playing a dangerous game by threatening the interests of both the British empire and the monopoly capital dominated gold industry.*8

By the mid-1890s, the situation evolved into a series of moves and countermoves, Machiavellian maneuverings which constitute a fascinating case study in imperial power politics.*9 On a global level, the British-Boer conflict was played out against the larger backdrop of the European race for Africa—the competition for colonies as other core powers (e.g., Germany, France) challenged British hegemony (cf. Stavrianos 1987, pp. 567-71; Magdoff 1978, pp. 54-62). This effectively raised the stakes for Great Britain in the interior of South Africa—particularly after the German
annexation of South West Africa (Namibia) in 1884—as it now faced the possibility of the loss of the Boer republics and adjoining areas to the "empires" of other core powers (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 109-13). As a result, Great Britain rapidly escalated its involvement in southern Africa, annexing Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), most of the remaining African kingdoms (e.g., Zululand), and—through Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company—much of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Tensions were heightened by the Jameson Raid of December 1895—a failed attempt by Rhodes and the British Foreign Office to stage a rebellion in the Transvaal which would serve as a pretext for military intervention. This episode only strengthened Afrikaner resolve, as it united the Orange Free State and the South African Republic in the face of British "treachery" (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 135).

In the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, Great Britain increased its pressure on the South African Republic, ultimately triggering the outbreak of war in October 1899. Despite the overwhelming military superiority of Great Britain, the South African War (Boer War to the British; Second War of Freedom to the Afrikaners—Thompson 1969e, p. 325) lasted for two and one-half years—a crushing rebuff to British imperialism. Although the particulars of the war are beyond the scope of this inquiry, its conclusion—the Treaty of Vereeniging—saw the complete defeat of the Afri-
kaners and the absorption of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State into the British empire. From our perspective, the South African War is best viewed through the prism of both class and ethnicity: independent or petty bourgeois settlers vs. monopoly capital; Afrikaner nationalism vs. the British empire. Significantly, this dual nature of the conflict would shape the peace which was to follow.

While Great Britain won the war, the more crucial issue involved the structuring of post-war South African society. On the surface, Great Britain had seemingly obtained its objective (i.e., the political consolidation of the British colonies and the Afrikaner republics); however, British policymakers quickly realized (given the minority status of British settlers) that they needed Afrikaner cooperation in order to achieve their goal of settler self-rule. In this vein, both the peace treaty and subsequent British colonial administration were marked by a tone of reconciliation, a reflection of the British interest in restoring unity within the European settler community (and creating a stable climate for core investment). Moreover, British policy was shaped by the assumption that continued modernization and British immigration would in time result in the disappearance of Afrikaner nationalism and their eventual absorption into a British-dominated settler society (Thompson
1969e, p. 330). Time heals all wounds and erodes all unwanted identities—or so the British thought.

Achieving the political unification of the European settler community turned out to be a formidable task. Conflict between the different colonies threatened to create social and economic chaos instead of unity and stability (de Kiewiet 1957, pp.148-49). Afrikaner nationalism did not fade away, but instead was strengthened by the memories of the South African War (e.g., Kitchener’s "scorched earth" policy, the death of an estimated 25,000 Afrikaners in British concentration camps) and the emergence of new heroes (Villiers 1969, p. 369; cf. Moodie--1975, pp. 2-13--on the "sacred history" of Afrikanerdom). At the same time, Britain no longer had the political will (or the domestic support) for continued imperial involvement in South Africa. Consequently, the British quickly restored self-rule to the colonies and consented in 1910 to the independence of the Union of South Africa as a member of the British Commonwealth.

Historically, the formation of the Union of South Africa constituted a compromise between British capital and Afrikaner settlers—a resolution of an intra-White conflict which served to benefit both sides. Great Britain came away having achieved its goals of settler self-rule, political unity, and stable conditions for capital accumulation, while the Afrikaners gained political autonomy and ethnic survival
(via the institutionalization of "Dutch" on an equal footing with English). Perhaps what is clearest about the resolution of the British-Boer conflict and the creation of the Union of South Africa is that the Africans were the losers. Now a conquered people, the Africans had been bystanders during both the war and the negotiations leading to union. Great Britain, despite its professed concern for native welfare, made no serious attempt to improve the status of the Africans. Indeed, the Treaty of Vereeniging postponed resolution of the issue of political rights of Africans until after independence, thus ensuring White settler hegemony within the new South African society. In essence, the British sold out the African peoples in exchange for White political unity and a stable climate for capitalist accumulation (much in the same manner that northern capital in the United States had little interest after the Reconstruction period in pressing for improved conditions for Blacks—cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 197). As Magubane (1979, pp. 52-53) has observed, Britain exchanged "the right to rule for the right to make money." From the standpoint of the present, it is no exaggeration to state that the "peace" process created the context for South African intergroup relations in the twentieth century.

3. Peasantization and proletarianization. Thus far, we have discussed the military conquest and deculturation of the African peoples; that is, the destruction of traditional
culture and the absorption of Africans into European colonial society. Equally far-reaching in its effects, however, was the economic incorporation of Africans into colonial society and, by extension, into the capitalist world-economy. As a result of this process, Africans became not only a subordinate ethnic group in a White-dominated South Africa, but also a lower class in a capitalist economy. Thus, any consideration of South African intergroup relations from this point onward is inextricably interwoven with issues of class and ethnicity. In this context, we must first consider the nature of the incorporation of Africans into the colonial economy—the specific processes which shaped the eth-class structure of the new South African society.

Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, traditional African relations of production were destroyed by European conquest, the dispossession of Africans from the best land, and—once absorbed into colonial society—by the effects of colonial domination (e.g., hut tax, induced consumption). This became particularly evident with the complete subjection of the African peoples in the years after 1870. Incorporation into the colonial economy involved two complex and interrelated processes: peasantization and proletarianization. Peasantization can be described as the dissolution of kin-based subsistence economies and the emergence of relations grounded in land
rights, family labor, and a link (via external domination) to a broader market economy (cf. Saul 1979, pp. 303-05; Freund 1988, pp. 64-65). In the South African case, peasant production took such forms as tenant farming (including "farming on the half"—cf. F. Wilson 1969, p. 128), squatting (under "semi-feudal" conditions—cf. de Kiewiet 1957, p. 84), and independent landholding (Thompson 1969a, p. 385). Proletarianization, perhaps the more familiar term, will be used here to describe the alienation of primary producers from land (Marx's "primitive accumulation") and their necessary entrance into the labor market as wage labor (cf. Arrighi 1979, p. 185). In South Africa, this meant both casual labor on White farms and, after 1870, entrance into the mining work force.

To assert that the processes of peasantization and proletarianization are interwoven is to acknowledge that, in the South African case, they both occurred during the same period (as opposed to Europe, where proletarianization involved a well-established peasantry). In other words, what transpired in South Africa during the late nineteenth century was a slow and uneven process, one which involved varying levels (depending upon time and place) of traditional subsistence farming, peasant production, and wage labor. In this context, the African peasantry is a transitional class. On the one hand, they represented a dramatic break from traditional society—"radicals" in the process of
social change (M. Wilson 1969e, pp. 53-54). On the other hand, virtually as soon as it was created, the African peasantry came under siege from the forces of capitalist development, forces which transformed the most successful peasants into capitalist farmers and the bulk of the remainder into a proletarianized working class (Saul 1979, p. 305).

Given the peripheral status (and ensuing underdevelopment) of South Africa, the transformation of the African peasantry was a slow process. Due to environmental factors (e.g., soil quality, lack of rainfall) and the absence of a market, South Africa for most of the nineteenth century experienced no "agricultural revolution"—which elsewhere had the effect of displacing peasants who could not compete with capitalist agriculture (cf. Wallerstein 1974, pp. 110-20; M. Wilson 1969e, p. 69).

What ultimately did transform South African agriculture was the mining revolution, which, by expanding both the demand for agricultural production and (by encouraging infrastructural development) the ease of access to markets, in turn greatly accelerated the peasantization of Africans (Southall, 1983, pp. 70-71; F. Wilson 1969, p. 114). In addition, this "boom" had, at least over the short run, the effect of retarding proletarianization by reducing incentives to leave the land (Fredrickson 1981, p. 205). Furthermore, retaining peasant status could, for the African peoples, be viewed as a form
of resistance to modernization and European domination—a means of retaining at least some ties to traditional culture (Innes 1984, pp. 27–28).

At the same time, peasant production was being undermined by both capitalist development and the colonial political economy. The railways which expanded the market also brought foreign (e.g., American) produce to compete with local goods (F. Wilson 1969, p. 114). Overcrowding, soil deterioration, and state policies which benefitted their White competitors (e.g., the location of railroads) further increased pressures on African peasants (Southall 1983, pp. 74–75; M. Wilson 1969e, pp. 61–64). War, drought, and pestilence completed the process (cf. F. Wilson 1969, p. 126). What emerged in many cases was partial proletarianization linked to temporary migrant labor. This left many Africans with a foot in both worlds: labor migration increased deculturation and the influence of White-dominated colonial culture; rural subsistence farming preserved many elements of traditional society.

From the perspective of the colonial economy, the above processes, while increasing the impoverishment of Africans, moved too slowly to meet the labor needs of agriculture and the mining industry. The point is that African proletarianization began in the late nineteenth century—and worked itself out through much of the twentieth. Consequently, Europeans often resorted to the importation and coercion of
labor—indentured Indian labor on the sugar cane plantations of Natal; forced apprenticeship of African children in the Afrikaner republics; labor agreements with Portuguese colonies; and imported Chinese miners after the South African War (cf. Freund 1988, p. 113; Magubane 1979, pp. 77-78; Thompson 1969a, pp. 387-90). In addition, colonial policy included the use of political and economic "levers" to hasten the decline of traditional/peasant societies and to accelerate the proletarianization of Africans.*0 For example, the Glen Grey Act (put into place by Rhodes in the Transkei during the 1890s) established a system of individual land tenure on small, economically untenable plots; thereby effectively and deliberately forcing Africans off the land and into the labor market (Magubane 1979, p. 78; M. Wilson 1969e, p. 65; Southall 1983, p. 90).*1 One outcome of this conflict—the struggle between Europeans and Africans over the control of African labor power—was the emergence of racially based ideologies asserting the right of European settlers to have access to African labor.*2 Once again, the nature of intergroup relations was shaped by resource competition.

One key to understanding the nature of the South African proletarianization process is an appreciation of the role played by the mining industry, particularly gold. Given that mining was the driving force behind South African economic development, it is not surprising that the process
of proletarianization was strongly conditioned by the exigencies of mining. This was particularly true if we consider the relationship between cheap labor and the profitability of gold mining. Not surprisingly, African labor constituted the core of the emerging South African workforce: by 1912, 325,000 African (including migrants from Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Basutoland) workers—88% of the total—were employed in mining (Houghton 1969, p. 19; Innes 1984, p. 51). Partially proletarianized migrant laborers (i.e., Africans) were particularly desirable from the standpoint of industry, because their rural base meant that their wages could be below the cost of reproduction of their labor power; that is, less than what was necessary to provide for the families of these workers. In this context, one early class struggle was between capital, which was dependent upon cheap African labor, and African labor, which reacted to low wages by withholding their labor—as long as peasant farming provided a viable alternative (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 58-59). Thus, the partial proletarianization of the African workers constituted a contradiction of late nineteenth century South African capitalism in that it was both necessary for profitability and at the same time a cause of continual labor shortages. As a consequence, monopoly capital (in the form of the Chamber of Mines and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association—cf. Johnstone 1987, p. 16) adopted a series of strategies (e.g., the
compound system, pass laws, contract labor laws) to obtain a sufficient supply of cheap labor. None of these measures was completely successful in the period prior to 1910 (due to a lack of effective state support and the existence of alternative means of subsistence for African labor) and the mining industry continued to be troubled by shortages of cheap labor (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 57-68).

Concurrent with the above processes was the emergence of a White working class, a phenomenon—hitherto absent from South African society (Fredrickson 1981, p. 205)—which increased the complexity of the eth-class structure. One component of this process was the proletarianization of the predominantly Afrikaner independent/petty bourgeois farmers, who fell victim to the same forces—population pressures, capitalist agriculture, disease, and war—which were displacing the African peasantry (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 187; F. Wilson, 1969, p. 126)." The pace of proletarianization was more rapid for Afrikaners than for Africans, to the extent that by 1911, sixty percent of the White population of the Transvaal lived in urban areas (Johnstone 1987, p. 53). In addition to displaced settlers, the ranks of the White working class were swelled by immigration, most notably an influx of skilled English-speaking mining labor from Great Britain and other British colonies. This had the effect of creating eth-class fractions within the White
working class, thereby providing a basis for the persistence of Afrikaner ethnonationalism.

4. Evolution of the eth-class structure. By the time the Union of South Africa emerged as an independent nation in 1910, the above processes—conquest, the mining revolution, peasantization and proletarianization, and the resolution of the British-Boer conflict—had combined to create an entirely new eth-class structure. There were no frontier or imperial wars: those issues had been settled. South Africa had embarked upon a new stage of capitalist development, one in which intergroup conflict would be played out against a backdrop of modernization (i.e., urbanization, proletarianization) and within the confines of a single society. Likewise, the class system was no longer comprised of African pastoralists, Afrikaner settlers, and British colonial functionaries, but instead exhibited an ethnically segmented and increasingly differentiated character. Briefly, the top of the eth-class structure was occupied by British and Afrikaners, both of whom had their own internal class "pyramids"—the British providing the preponderance of capitalists and administrators, while the Afrikaners were predominantly petty bourgeois farmers and newly established laborers. In an intermediate and much lower position were the Cape Coloureds and Indians in Natal, both of whom played an increasingly marginal role due to their small numbers. Finally, at the bottom of the eth-class structure was the
African majority, now fully incorporated into settler society as peasant farmers or as fully or partially proletarianized labor.

A key dynamic in creating this system was the differential proletarianization of Africans and Europeans; that is, their disparate incorporation into the South African economy. At this point in time, the bulk of the African population remained at best partially proletarianized peasants, while Whites tended towards total proletarianization and complete alienation from the land. In addition to this different general position in the class structure, Europeans and Africans were further differentiated occupationally in that the former were predominantly skilled or semi-skilled labor while the latter were limited to unskilled positions. These different structural positions gave rise to different material interests, which would then be articulated in ethnic/racial terms.

The focus of intergroup competition was no longer land and cattle, but labor market issues. An overriding fear for the White working class was that they would be displaced by Africans, whose "partial proletarian" status and lower levels of consumption enabled them to work for lower wages. This reflects what Johnstone (1987, pp. 57-58) has termed the "structural insecurity" of White workers. On the one hand, their complete proletarianization left them completely dependent upon wage labor as a means of survival. On the
other hand, they knew all too well that the interests of capital would be advanced by increasing the exploitation of cheap African labor in the place of more highly paid White labor (particularly in the context of gold mining and the need to limit production costs). Moreover, as Fredrickson (1981, p. 211) observes, Afrikaners were experientially no more suited to industrial work than were Africans. As a consequence, their interests would be served by erecting barriers to reduce labor market competition. What was crystallizing was a new tripartite eth-class conflict between White capital, a White working class (which also contained a British-Afrikaner division), and partially proletarianized African labor. This conflict would dominate twentieth century South African society.

Union, Economic Development, and Eth-class Struggle: 1910-48

Capitalist Development and Economic Growth

As it emerged from British colonization, South Africa in 1910 had seen a century of dramatic social change. The nineteenth century had witnessed the expansion of European settlement and the conquest and transformation of African societies. It had also contained the mining revolution which had altered the pace and direction of economic development and facilitated the incorporation of South Africa into the capitalist world-economy. In its turn, the first decade of the twentieth century had brought the South African War and the resolution of the British-Boer conflict
in the form of the Union of South Africa, thus binding all South Africans together in a single political and economic system. Nevertheless, South Africa in 1910 was not a nation but a *state*, as it remained divided along lines of race and ethnicity and showed little sign of developing a "South African" national identity.

For our purposes, the key development of the first half of the twentieth century was the continued economic transformation of South African society. On one hand, South Africa in 1910 was an underdeveloped peripheral society, with a modern, foreign-dominated mining sector counterpoised against an inefficient farming economy (which was subsidized by coerced labor and mining revenues) and a backwards native peasant sector. On the other hand, the seeds of economic development had been planted. The processes of industrialization, proletarianization, and urbanization which had taken root in the late nineteenth century operated more intensively in the decades after union. Indeed, during the period under consideration these dynamics functioned to such an extent that by the middle of the twentieth century South Africa possessed a relatively diversified industrial economy and stood poised to move into the semiperiphery of the world-economy.

What contributed to these changes were two key factors. *First*, the mining sector served as an "engine" of development. The consistency of the mineral resources of South
Africa (i.e., the consistent quality of the ore—as opposed to surface deposits which in other milieus resulted in cycles of boom and bust) provided a steady source of national income—made possible, of course, by the super-exploitation of cheap African labor.* This increased national wealth facilitated economic development in a variety of ways: it stimulated consumption, thereby expanding markets for other sectors; it created capital (i.e., mining profits) which could be invested in expanding production of manufactured goods (Innes 1984, pp. 119-20); and it provided, through disproportionate taxes and tariffs, state revenues which were used for infrastructural and industrial development (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 162).* In short, the economic development of South Africa was rooted in geological happenstance and made possible by a political economy which enabled settler society to maximize the exploitation of these fortunate circumstances.

In addition to mining-led economic growth, the second key factor in the transformation of South Africa was the restructuring of the world-economy which occurred during this period. The First World War accelerated the decline of British core hegemony and ushered in an era of heightened core conflict in concert with the contraction of the world-economy. As an independent, albeit peripheral, society well removed from the economic mainstream, South Africa was well-positioned to benefit from the maneuvering room created by
the demise of the *Pax Britannica* and took advantage of this space to increase its resistance to core domination (Martin 1986, pp. 108-09). World War I and the attendant disruption of commerce forced South Africa to substitute local products for core imports. Following the war, labor unrest reduced the competitive advantage of core manufactures in the South African market, while a general global increase in protectionism (a reflection of the declining British ability to maintain free trade) enabled South Africa to institute protective tariffs (to shelter local industry and agriculture) without incurring retaliation or provoking British intervention (Innes 1984, p. 120; Houghton 1969, pp. 28-30; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 261). Finally, the period up to and including World War II saw increased foreign investment by core-based multinational corporations (a precursor to the wholesale global expansion of monopoly capital which occurred in the post-1945 era), a process which included an upsurge in foreign investment in South African industrial production (Magubane 1979, p. 203; Innes 1984, p. 131). Thus, South African economic expansion occurred at a propitious moment with respect to processes of the capitalist world-system.

At the same time, the expansion of the South African economy was not a smooth process. The period between 1919 and 1932 contained considerable economic stagnation, a reflection of a general decline in world commodity prices
relative to manufactures which resulted in declining terms of trade (and higher prices) for South Africa (Houghton 1969, p. 22). Given the poor quality of South African gold-bearing ore and the narrow profit margins of the mining industry, rising costs triggered a "profitability crisis" in the years after World War I, especially when Great Britain lowered the world gold price by removing the price premium (Johnstone 1987, pp. 93-104; Houghton 1969, p. 26; Innes 1984, pp. 75-82). Indeed, on more than one occasion, South Africa was seemingly faced with the end of gold-based prosperity (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 172). These economic problems were exacerbated by the decline of agriculture, as the Depression combined with problems stemming from inefficient production, ecological limitations, and capitalist development to create widespread dislocation of farmers (cf. F. Wilson 1969, pp. 131-36). These economic reversals were an integral component of the context for intergroup interaction during the 1920s and 1930s.

What completed the economic transformation of South Africa was a rise in gold prices triggered by the worldwide currency devaluations of the 1930s (Houghton 1969, p. 32; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 174-76; Innes 1984, pp. 129-30). This in turn ushered in a new era of mining-led economic expansion—a long wave of prosperity in a world racked by Depression. By this juncture, a sufficient industrial and infrastructural base had been established so as to provide the condi-
tions for "take-off"— to borrow Rostow's (1960, p. 7) term—in industrial development. This expansion occurred with such rapidity that by the 1940s, industry surpassed mining in its proportional contribution to the South African Gross Domestic Product (Innes 1984, p. 167). Given the further impetus for economic development provided by World War II, the South African economy of the late 1940s exhibited a well-developed industrial base, a condition which bore scant resemblance to its position at the beginning of the century.

In sum, during the years between 1910 and 1948 South African society was transformed from an underdeveloped colony/peripheral area to an industrialized semiperipheral state. From our perspective, this period constitutes a key era in the development of South African intergroup relations—a time of transition between the colonial and modern eras. The changing nature of the forces of production altered the dimensions of the "arena" in which intergroup relations occurred; that is, intergroup relations evolved from the "national" conflicts (between separate peoples) of the colonial era to ethnic conflicts between groups bound into a common economy and polity. Moreover, this process was shaped by the specific forms of South African capitalist development (e.g., the mining-based economy) and by the ethno-class structure which emerged from the colonial era. Our task in the remainder of this section is to explore the changing nature of intergroup relations during this era,
with particular attention devoted to struggles between eth-classes and their impact upon group identities.

Eth-Class Struggles and Group Identities.

From the standpoint of intergroup relations, the period from 1910 to 1948 covered the transition from the colonial social structure to the system of apartheid characteristic of modern South Africa. On the one hand, the struggles of the early twentieth century were shaped by the eth-class structure which emerged from the colonial era and by racial ideologies and cultural practices which evolved from previous eth-class struggles (e.g., the use of notions of racial superiority to legitimate the dispossession and domination of Africans). Thus, intergroup relations were shaped by the material interests of various eth-classes and by socio-cultural understandings stemming from earlier conflicts. On the other hand, the eth-class struggles of early twentieth century South Africa took place in an intergroup arena defined by the processes of South African capitalist development, which in the period between 1910 and 1948 were the mining-led economic transformation and the emergence of a substantial industrial sector, both of which were punctuated by periodic crises in mining and agriculture. In addition, South African society experienced a continuation and intensification of the process of proletarianization which had begun in the nineteenth century, as economic changes uprooted small farmers and peasants and
forced increasing numbers of both Africans and Afrikaners into the working class. This changing economic context altered the material interests of the various eth-classes, who in turn responded by changing intergroup relations and group identities (i.e., altering past social structures and cultural understandings in an attempt to pursue strategic interests in a new set of circumstances.

Having outlined the setting for intergroup interaction, we will now examine the specific nature of eth-class struggles during the period between 1910 and 1948. Our discussion will be centered on the following issues: (1) the initial eth-class struggles after the formation of the Union of South Africa; (2) the eth-class alliance between the White working class and the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie and the subsequent expanded use of the state as a vehicle for advancing group interests; (3) the rise in Afrikaner nationalism as a result of eth-class struggles; (4) the upsurge in African nationalism spawned by their subordinate status in the South African eth-class structure; and (5) the "crisis" of the 1940s. Throughout our analysis, we will place particular emphasis upon the implications of these developments for the evolution of group identities.

1. Early struggles: 1910-1924. The South African eth-class structure at the time of Union contained four major eth-class groupings: a largely agrarian Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie; a British-dominated, mining-based capi-
talist class; a White working class; and a partially proletarianized African working class. Each of these eth-class groupings had clearly defined material interests; however, there was no one hegemonic class. Indeed, the rough "balance" existing among the White eth-classes, as well as the perceived common interest in maintaining dominance over Africans, would be important factors in shaping group strategies. Given this state of affairs, our interpretation of early twentieth century South African inter-group relations will emphasize the role of strategic struggles and alliances between these eth-classes (set, of course, in the context of South African capitalist development). As we will seek to demonstrate, it was this process of pursuing group interests which led to the shaping and reshaping of the South African eth-class structure.

One issue which remained to be determined in the years following union was the matter of who would wield power in this new "state-nation"—to use Rejai and Enloe's (1969) term. South Africa was not a nation—few, if any, of its inhabitants viewed themselves as "South African"—but rather a conglomerate of sharply defined eth-classes grounded in Afrikaner, British, and African ethnicity. Indeed, the relationship between the British and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie could best be characterized as one of "antagonistic cooperation" (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 108). The only clear outcome at the time of Union was that Africans
would be excluded from the political arena, that South Africa would continue to be controlled by European settler eth-classes.

Given the numerical domination of Afrikaners within the settler community, the agreement of Union ensured a significant role in South African politics for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. As an eth-class, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie had evolved from the Boer independent class which had conquered much of South Africa; however, it was now increasingly internally differentiated as a result of capitalist development and the mining revolution (Magubane 1979, p. 121; Thompson 1969e, p. 339). Thus, the ranks of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie ranged from a landed upper class to independent farmers (many of whom would be proletarianized in the coming decades). This in turn produced divisions within the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie with regard to relations with the British capitalist class, where the largest landowners (and the Transvaal interests most closely tied to mining) favored accommodation with Great Britain and mining capital, while smaller agricultural interests and hard-line Afrikaner nationalists feared continued British domination (de Villiers 1969, p. 368; Burawoy 1974, p. 539). Indeed, this strategic division--accommodation vs. resistance--would shape Afrikaner (and South African) politics throughout the early twentieth century. With these battle lines drawn, the first South African governments were
dominated by the accommodationist Botha-Smuts faction, a
group committed to alliance with Great Britain and mining
capital (Davies 1973, p. 43; Thompson 1969e, p. 341).\textsuperscript{109}

A major early instance of eth-class struggle and alli-
ance involved the effort by mining capital and the Afrikaner
petit bourgeoisie to secure a supply of cheap, superex-
ploited African labor.\textsuperscript{109} This was essential to the
material interests of both eth-classes: the nature of gold
mining (unlimited demand at a fixed price, cost constraints,
and low grade ore) meant that industry profitability was
based on the exploitation of African labor; while the
"backwards" (i.e., inefficient, labor intensive) status of
South African agriculture created a similar link between
cheap labor and the well-being of the agricultural petit
bourgeoisie. The quest for cheap African labor in the early
twentieth century can be viewed as two problems: (1) the
ability to insure that a sufficient number of Africans
needed to work (i.e., were forced to enter the workforce in
order to survive); and (2) the ability to control the
African workforce in order to maintain their status as
superexploited labor. Faced with this situation, mining
capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie joined forces
and used the power of the state to establish what Magubane
(1979, p. 71) has termed the "migrant labour system"--a
series of measures designed to insure a steady flow of cheap
African labor.
The cornerstone of this effort was the Natives Land Act of 1913, a piece of legislation which was originally proposed by the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and subsequently supported by mining capital (Southall 1983, p. 24). For the purposes of this analysis, the Natives Land Act contained two key elements (cf. F. Wilson 1969, pp. 127-31; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 205-06; Magubane 1979, p. 81). First, it delineated as "African land" approximately 7.3% of the total territory of South Africa (mostly the existing "native reserves"), while holding out the promise of an additional 5.7% to be released at a later date. Africans were only permitted to purchase land within these areas, while Whites were proscribed from buying land within these areas. Secondly, the act outlawed "farming on the half" and other sharecropping or tenancy arrangements which enabled Africans to pursue peasant farming on White-owned land, permitting Africans to reside on White-owned land only as wage laborers (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 205; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 127-29).

The effects of the Natives Land Act were stark and immediate, dislocating thousands of Africans who were either forced to return to the already overcrowded Native Reserves or to migrate to urban areas in search of employment (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 132; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 129-30). On a societal level, this increased the proletarianization of Africans by restricting land occupancy and peasant agriculture—approximately seventy percent of the population of
South Africa was now legally restricted to roughly seven percent of the land. The Natives Land Act served the class interests of both mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie by increasing the numbers of Africans who were forced to seek wage employment in the settler economy (Southall 1983, p. 24). In addition, the Act further benefitted the agricultural petit bourgeoisie by precluding any serious competition from African peasant farming (F. Wilson 1969, pp. 127-31; Fredrickson 1981, p. 244). Thus, while many of its supporters couched their arguments in the rhetoric of segregation (separate development) and even protection of African land tenancy (cf. de Kiewiet 1957, p. 205; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 131-32), the ultimate purposes of the Natives Land Act were not ideological but material: the provision of a steady supply of cheap African labor.110

In essence, the effect of the Natives Land Act was to codify and intensify the reserve-based migrant labor system which had begun to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century--an attempt to eliminate the then existing contradictions (i.e., labor shortages) of the South African economy. There were specific advantages for capital in the migrant labor system in that it maintained the partially proletarianized status of African labor (i.e., wage labor retaining an agricultural toehold in the reserve economy), which in turn enabled wages to remain below subsistence level.111 At the same time, successful maintenance of this...
system required that mining capital and the agricultural petit bourgeois perform a "balancing act" with respect to the peasant economy of the reserves. On the one hand, if the agricultural economy of the reserves was to prosper, then there would be a shortfall in the number of Africans forced to enter the wage-labor workforce. On the other hand, if reserve agriculture were to become too weak, then the African working class would become fully proletarianized, which in turn would increase both its wage requirements and its revolutionary potential (Wolpe 1972, pp. 437-38; Southall 1983, p. 26). This balancing act was sufficiently successful so as to enable the reserve-based migrant labor system to serve as the foundation of the South African economy throughout the first part of the twentieth century.

In addition to insuring an adequate supply of cheap African labor, a second exigency for capital was to exert effective control over labor; that is, to maintain the conditions of superexploitation. This was accomplished both through the use of state power and through the practices of the mining companies. Shortly after the formation of the Union of South Africa, existing labor control legislation (e.g., Masters & Servants laws, which made breach of a work contract a criminal offense; pass laws, which required Africans to obtain an official pass in order to seek or change employment) was consolidated and extended to mining by the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 (Johnstone 1987,
Equally important, the government acted to administer existing labor control laws more effectively (Innes 1984, p. 64). This legislation was supplemented by a range of practices of the mining industry: monopsonistic recruiting via the Native Recruiting corporation; the maintenance of prison-like compounds for mine laborers; and a series of methods for minimizing wages—e.g., wage fixation, the minimum average system, and the loafer ticket system (Johnstone 1987, pp. 34-45; Southall 1983, pp. 78-80). Considered in toto, state legislation and industry practices constituted a rationalized and institutionalized means of exploiting African labor, for the benefit of both mining capital and (via mining led growth) capitalist interests in general. Indeed, given the economic centrality of mining and the dependence of mining profitability upon cheap labor, it is no overstatement to say that the exploitation of African labor was the basis of settler prosperity.

A second major area of eth-class struggle was the conflict between mining capital and the White working class, a conflict which encompassed two areas: (1) the "traditional" (i.e., structurally inherent in capitalism) struggle over wages, benefits, and working conditions; and (2) the conflict over the role of African labor. Despite its peripheral status, South Africa by the end of the nineteenth century had begun to experience increased conflict between
labor and capital, a phenomenon attributable to the nature of mining (i.e., its domination by monopoly capital) and to the influx of skilled British (core) mining laborers who brought with them a strong union tradition. Indeed, the first mining union was established in 1892, and by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, South Africa has an increasingly militant labor movement, a labor-based political party, and even an active socialist movement (Simons and Simons 1969). In 1913, three years after the formation of the Union of South Africa, the mining industry was racked by major strikes which were settled only with direct government intervention (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 167-68; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 156-58). At the same time, the White working class was itself an amalgamation of two eth­class fractions: skilled labor, which was comprised largely of British immigrants, and unskilled labor, which increas­ingly consisted of proletarianized Afrikaner bywoners. This division at times constituted a major obstacle to working class solidarity; however, it was of considerably lesser significance than the schism between White and African labor.

The "traditional" conflict between capital and the White working class was complicated by the existence of a third party, superexploited African labor, and the fact that the interests of capital (and the profitability of the gold mines) were linked to maximizing the use of superexploited
African labor. In direct opposition to these interests were those of the White working class, which had used its initial monopoly over skilled labor to secure high relative wages (averaging three to ten times that of Africans), and which feared replacement by cheaper African labor (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 210-13; Johnstone 1987, pp. 71-72). As a consequence, the White working class pushed for adoption of "colour bar" legislation which prohibited the employment of non-Whites in particular occupations (e.g., blasters, engineers, engine drivers, etc.) where they would be in competition with Whites. While the first colour bar legislation had emerged in the late nineteenth century (a colour bar had first been instituted in the Transvaal in 1893 and was reinstated by the British in 1906), it was the Mines and Works Act of 1911 (and attendant regulations) which extended and consolidated the colour bar (also referred to as the "White labour policy") in the new settler-dominated state (Johnstone 1987, pp. 66-70; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 78-91; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 166). Thus, the material interests of the White working class were grounded in both the low wages of Africans (which enabled capital to "afford" expensive White labor) and the ability of the White working class to exclude cheap African labor from competing for the same jobs.

How can we explain the colour bar with respect to eth-class interests? From the perspective of the White working
class, colour bar legislation, as we have noted, served as a means of protecting themselves from being replaced by super-exploited African labor. Agitation for the colour bar reflected the structural insecurity of White workers: as fully proletarianized, "free" labor they could not compete with partially proletarianized and coerced African labor; moreover, they recognized that capital had a clear interest in replacing them with cheap labor. At the same time, their political rights—which Africans did not have and which were particularly important given the split between mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie—and their monopoly on skills increased the power of the White working class and enabled them to protect their "privileged" position.22

Given that Africans could not be excluded from the mining labor force—indeed, both mining profitability and the status of the White working class rested on the exploitation of African labor (Johnstone 1987, pp. 86-87)—job discrimination served as an effective means for maximizing the material interests of the White working class. The only other strategic alternative for the White working class, a cross-ethnic class alliance with African labor, held only a promise of long-term gains (i.e., the fruits of class struggle waged by a united working class). From the vantage point of the White worker, this outcome paled by comparison to the short term gains (e.g., higher wages, job security) realized through job segregation.
A point needs to be made here regarding the relationship between material interests and racist ideologies. We maintain that eth-class interest, not racism, was the force underlying White working class support for the colour bar. In other words, job discrimination was not merely a product of the racism of the White working class, but instead was a reflection of their ethnic and class interests. As members of the dominant ethnic group, the White working class had an interest in maintaining the privileged position created by colonialism; as an upper "fraction" of the working class, it had an interest in defending its position from both capital and African labor. Indeed, White miners had previously attempted to exclude competition from both unskilled European immigrants and Chinese contract labor (Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 53, 80-82). Thus, while the racial ideologies which pervaded both the British Empire and South African society undoubtedly channeled and inflamed White working class antagonism towards African labor, we do not believe that they were the determining factor in group action. Racism was used as an instrument for protecting material interests.

At this juncture, the South African situation seemingly fits the split labor market thesis of restrictions imposed upon capital (which would prefer a free labor market and wage competition) by a dominant group working class bent upon eliminating competition from cheap labor—with ethnic
antagonism resulting from the "coincidental" relationship between ethnicity and labor market status (cf. Bonacich 1972). While this gives us some useful insights regarding the interests of the South African White working class, the split labor market model does not, in our opinion, provide a satisfactory explanation of the South African case. On one hand, the colour bar undoubtedly hurt capital by limiting its ability to exploit cheap African labor (e.g., the use of African labor in semi-skilled and skilled occupations). On the other hand, capital was a clear beneficiary of the "split labor market" inasmuch as the migrant labor system and the colour bar maintained the "superexploitability" of African labor and, hence, the profitability of the mining industry (which in turn enabled it to tolerate more expensive White labor). Furthermore, the existence of the colour bar effectively divided the working class along ethnic lines, where a unified working class would in all likelihood have been able to wage an effective struggle for higher wages (thereby reducing profitability). Our conclusion, therefore, is that the existence of the colour bar benefited both capital and the White working class; the issue which divided them was the location of the colour bar—labor favoring an extensive colour bar, capital a more limited system of segregation (Johnstone 1987, p. 81). Thus, the location of the colour bar was the field upon which the battle between the mine owners and the White working class
would be fought. The outcome of these struggles would be determined by the strength of the respective eth-class alliances.

In the first years after the formation of the Union of South Africa, the balance of power between eth-classes would fluctuate rapidly. Although mining capital and their allies were successful in crushing the 1913 strikes, the White working class almost immediately gained an advantage in its struggles with the mine owners. Shortages of workers during both World War I and the brief postwar boom enabled the White working class to use its economic and political power to extract significant concessions from capital with respect to wages, benefits, and working conditions (Johnstone 1987, pp. 98-99). In addition, the White working class was able in 1918 to coerce mining companies into signing the "Status Quo Agreement", a pact which extended the colour bar and proscribed any replacement of White workers by Africans (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 278; Johnstone 1987, pp. 109-11).

The context for eth-class struggle was changed dramatically by the onset in 1921 of the post war profitability crisis in gold mining. The mining industry sought to address this crisis by attacking the colour bar through the increased use of African labor. While mine owner rhetoric stressed the rights of African workers, the overriding motivating interest was economic. Only by substituting
cheap African labor (often in conjunction with mechanization) for more highly paid White labor could the mining industry achieve the lower costs and higher productivity (i.e., output per shift) necessary to restore profitability. When the Chamber of Mines unilaterally abrogated the Status Quo Agreement, White workers struck in January of 1922—triggering the bloody confrontation known as the Rand Revolt (Johnstone 1987, pp. 125-45; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 279-97). Stripped to its barest essentials, the Rand Revolt was an all-out struggle between capital and labor over the location of the colour bar: the White working class was fighting to preserve its position; mining capital was attempting to crush the unions and restore profitability by limiting the colour bar. The ethnic and class nature of this confrontation was reflected in the slogan "Workers of the world unite and fight for a White South Africa" (Burawoy 1974, p. 540; Davies 1973, p. 43)—a rare example of "eth-class consciousness." Ultimately, the intransigence of the mining industry and the military forces of the government (Smuts' South African Party having combined with the mining-backed Unionist Party in 1920—Simons and Simons 1969, p. 249) combined to crush the rebellion and enable mining capital to restore profitability by reorganizing labor and restricting the colour bar (Johnstone 1987, pp. 136-37; Simons and Simons 1969, p. 300). This apparently consti-
tuted a complete victory for mining capital; however, as we shall see below, it was to prove a short-lived triumph.

2. *Eth-class alliance: the Pact Government.* A turning point in South African politics was the emergence of an eth-class alliance between the White working class and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, and the subsequent success of this alliance in capturing state power. Shortly after mining capital and the Smuts government had combined to crush the Rand Revolt, the Labour Party (representing British-dominated craft unions) and the Nationalist Party (established in 1914 by a faction of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie which rejected the accommodationist policies of Prime Ministers Botha and Smuts—cf. de Villiers 1969, pp. 369-70; Moodie 1975, pp. 73-82) agreed to electoral cooperation in opposition to the Smuts government. In the 1924 elections, this alliance was successful in defeating Smuts and creating a Nationalist-Labour coalition government (the "Pact Government"), dominated by the Nationalist Party under Prime Minister Hertzog. From our perspective, the surpassing significance of this development was that the White working class/Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie eth-class alliance embarked upon the use of state power to advance group interests on a scale which would transform the structure of South African intergroup relations (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 164; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 224). Indeed, as Davies (1973, p.
44) asserts, "it is this class alliance which remains the key to understanding the South African system."

The eth-class alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and the White working class was grounded in common economic and political interests vis-a-vis other eth-class groupings. First, both groups shared an interest in industrial segregation (i.e., the colour bar): the White working class for reasons of protection and privilege; the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie for the purpose of maintaining its supply of cheap agricultural labor (inasmuch as the colour bar would restrict the flow of African labor towards mining and industry). Secondly, both groups had an interest in constraining the power of mining (core) capital and its local allies. The Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie feared that the growing economic power of British-dominated mining capital (which they often referred to collectively and pejoratively as "Hoggenheimer"—an epithet derived from the surname of the Oppenheimer family which controlled the Anglo-American Mining Corporation—cf. Moodie 1975, p. 90) would channel South African economic development in a direction inimical to agricultural interests, while the White working class had just experienced the effects of unbridled capitalist power in the crushing of the Rand Revolt (cf. Johnstone 1987, pp. 152-54). Indeed, these two eth-classes had been taking tentative steps towards each other (e.g., petit bourgeoisie support for the Mines and
Works Act of 1911); however, any dynamics facilitating coalition had hitherto been offset by mutual mistrust (e.g., Afrikaner resentment of British support for the British empire; British fear of Afrikaner nationalism; the Afrikaner fear of union socialism) before any eth-class alliance could emerge (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 303).

In addition to common interests, there were compelling strategic and ideological reasons for the post-1924 eth-class alliance, reasons rooted in the unique eth-class configuration of the South African political arena. Given the exclusion of Africans and the sixty-forty Afrikaner-British split within the White population, the Afrikaner agricultural petit bourgeoisie needed White working class support in order to overcome the political dominance of mining capital, British South Africans, and their allies (e.g., Coloureds, accommodationist Afrikaners). If the eth-class alliance which led to the Pact Government was grounded in common interests and considerations of political strategy, the final bonds were ideological. Afrikaner nationalism helped fuse together the petit bourgeoisie and the expanding Afrikaner segment of the White working class; many Afrikaners feared British domination, harbored smoldering resentments from the South African War, and viewed Smuts as a collaborator ("the Handyman of the Empire"—Moodie 1975, p. 88). In the same vein, racist doctrines provided a common ideological base for the policies of segregation,
domination, and exploitation which benefitted both the petit bourgeoisie and the White working class. Thus, the ideological, while emerging from material circumstances, was in turn able to shape the direction of eth-class relations.

Once in power, the Pact Government and its Nationalist-dominated successors made effective use of the state to advance the interests of their eth-class coalition. Not surprisingly, the government expanded state involvement in the agricultural sector—the agrarian petit bourgeoisie being the power base of the Nationalist Party. During the years after 1924, the government increased the number of programs designed to stimulate production or otherwise improve the economic position of farmers (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 257-61; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 137-40). Even more critical were measures designed to improve the status of the White working class, for the persistence of the ruling eth-class alliance was contingent upon the ability of Afrikaner petty bourgeois politicians to deliver benefits to the White working class. Almost immediately, the Pact government was able to reinstate and extend the mining colour bar (which had been limited by mining capital and invalidated by a 1923 judicial decision) in the Mine and Works Amendment Act of 1926 (Johnstone 1987, p. 162; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 228; Davies 1973, p. 45; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 340-41). This action was, however, but the first in a series of
policies designed to protect the White working class and solidify the eth-class alliance.

A major concern for White South Africa during the 1920s and 1930s was what was described as the "poor White" problem—as though "poor White" was a social oxymoron. This referred to the increasing proportion of the population (one-tenth to one-sixth of the population—de Kiewiet 1957, p. 181; Magubane 1979, p. 183), largely proletarianized and displaced Afrikaners, who had no industrial skills and who could not compete in the unskilled labor market against superexploited African labor (whom, of course, employers were only too willing to exploit). From the perspective of the government and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, the poor White phenomenon was threatening for two reasons: (1) the potential for cross-ethnic class alliances between poor Whites and Africans; and (2) the potential for intermarriage and the weakening of ethnic boundaries, which in turn would threaten White political and economic hegemony (Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 516-17; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 221-22). Furthermore, it quickly became evident that the poor White problem could not be solved by increasing the utilization of Whites as unskilled mining labor (i.e., by extending the colour bar even further). Given the nature of South African gold mining, the profitability of the mines—and, by extension, the health of the South African economy and the revenue base of the government—was dependent upon the
exploitation of African labor (via the coercive migrant labor system) at wage levels at which Whites were unwilling to work.

In response to this dilemma, the government established a "civilized labour" policy; that is, a series of measures to protect the White working class and discriminate against the use of cheap labor (Davies 1973, p. 45; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 224). Foremost among these was the Wage Act (1925), which maintained the White-African wage gap by asserting different subsistence needs for the two groups and then setting "civilized" (i.e., European) wage levels for certain occupations—assuming that given equal wages, employers would prefer White labor (Johnstone 1987, p. 156; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 273-75). This wage policy was buttressed by making the awarding of government contracts and the extension of tariff protection contingent upon industries following the government wage guidelines (Davies 1973, p. 45; Burawoy 1974, p. 541). In addition, the government itself served as an employer of poor Whites at "civilized" wages through expanded public works programs and the development of state owned industries (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 229). Despite these measures, resolution of the poor White problem was a slow process, as the government was unwilling to risk economic disruption for the benefit of the White working class (e.g., limiting application of the Wage Act when business profitability was threatened—Simons and Simons
1969, p. 338). Eventually, however, these policies, along with the economic and industrial boom of the mid-1930s, produced the remarkably low White unemployment rate which became a characteristic of the South African economy (Davies 1973, pp. 46-48).

On a general level, we would maintain that the civilized labour policy did not turn the White working class into an elite (as Simons and Simons--1969, p. 325--suggest), but instead gave the White working class a vested interest in the status quo and in a continued alliance with the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. The system of job discrimination (e.g., colour bars, the civilized labour policy) enabled the White working class to enjoy artificially high wages, employment levels, and mobility (a position which was only possible due to the small relative size of the White working class). This in turn had two important consequences for South African society. First, it solidified the ethnoclass alliance between the White working class and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, as the White working class gave its allegiance to the state and in return enjoyed continued protection of its material interests. Secondly, the civilized labour policy solidified the connection between the interests of the White working class and the petit bourgeoisie and the subjection of the African population, a linkage which would lead to further measures to maintain White supremacy.
As we consider the actions of the eth-class alliance between the White working class and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, a question arises regarding the role of mining capital and British interests, now cast in the role of opposition. Although the petit bourgeoisie/White working class coalition pursued different policies, and the Afrikaners sought to increase their political and economic power, the interests of mining capital were not clearly contravened by any actions of the new government. Indeed, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie had a clear interest in maintaining the health of the mining industry, for mining remained the basis of economic prosperity and government revenues—which the petit bourgeoisie needed in order to advance its own interests (Magubane 1979, p. 174; Burawoy 1974, p. 537). Thus, government policies tended to preserve the migrant labor system and the flow of cheap labor into the mines. At the same time, mining capital found the colour bar and the civilized labour policy to be an acceptable price to pay for peace with the White working class-petit bourgeoisie alliance (Fredrickson 1981, p. 234). In short, there was no overriding conflict of interest between mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. Indeed, all White eth-classes had an interest in maintaining a political economy which assured White supremacy and continued capitalist accumulation; the differences which did
exist were more a matter of disputing the appropriate means for achieving this goal.131

3. **Eth-class alliance: Afrikaner nationalism.** A third major intergroup phenomenon in South African society during the first half of the twentieth century was the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism as a significant political force.132 Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to assert that Afrikaner nationalism was a dominating factor in South African during this era. The unique Boer/Afrikaner identity was molded by the events of the nineteenth century—especially isolation, the wars of conquest versus the Africans, and the conflict with British imperialism.133 From an "ethnic studies" standpoint, Afrikaner ethnicity had a firm basis: cultural differences (e.g., language and religion) from other groups; a strong feeling of peoplehood and a claimed "territory"; and a sense of common experience and historical injury (what Moodie—1975—has termed the "sacred history" of Afrikanerdom). Yet all of these factors existed prior to 1910. What is analytically interesting is the upsurge in Afrikaner nationalism during the first half of the twentieth century, a phenomenon which requires new explanations.

At the time of Union, the position of Afrikanerdom had both strengths and weaknesses with respect to the potential for group mobilization. Although the Union of South Africa was formed under the auspices of British imperialism, the creation of a unitary South African society brought all
Afrikaners into one intergroup arena—as opposed to pre-Union days, when group activity had been linked to the British colonies and the Boer Republics. Other strengths included the numerical domination of Afrikaners within the White community (which provided a potential electoral base for political power and a strong incentive for group mobilization) and the British acceptance of linguistic equality (which provided an institutional footing for Afrikaner culture). At the same time, the Afrikaner community contained major internal divisions—most notably the conflict between the accommodationists (i.e., the Botha-Smuts governments) and the resolute nationalists—which were reflected in Hertzog's withdrawal from the South African Party and the formation of the Nationalist Party in 1914. Thus, Afrikaner nationalism was still in its formative stages in the early twentieth century; however, it now had a vehicle for political mobilization—the Nationalist Party.

While some aspects of nationalist assertion took place on an ideological level (e.g., Afrikaner resistance and revolt against South African participation in World War I—de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 168-69; continued agitation for status as a republic outside of the British Commonwealth—de Villiers 1969, pp. 391-93), twentieth century Afrikaner nationalism was not the persistence of primordial tribalism. Afrikaner nationalism flourished because it served the class interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and intelli-
Appreciation of this point must be linked to an understanding of the eth-class interests of these two groups. The Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and intellectual eth-classes occupied an intermediate position in the overall South African eth-class structure, one which was clearly inferior in comparison to British mining and finance capital. Moreover, the agricultural power base of the petit bourgeoisie left them vulnerable to the effects of capitalist development and British economic power (Burawoy 1974, p. 539). Given these circumstances, acquisition of state power became the best and perhaps only means of advancing the material interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. The problem, however, was that the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie was neither large enough nor sufficiently united to pursue this strategy. Ethnic mobilization (i.e., obtaining the support of the Afrikaner working class by couching eth-class interests in ethnic terms and by stressing symbolic issues—e.g., language—to promote unity) would provide the solution.

During the same period (1910-1924), a second dynamic was occurring which would further strengthen the basis of Afrikaner nationalism. Forces of social change—proletarianization and urbanization—transformed Afrikaner society by turning farmers and bywoners into an urban working class. The newly urbanized and proletarianized Afrikaners found themselves in unfamiliar surroundings (the cities were
centers of British culture) and often at a disadvantage in labor market competition with the British (who dominated the ranks of skilled labor) and Africans (preferred by employers due to their "superexploited" status). These circumstances left the Afrikaner working class receptive to nationalist appeals which both appealed to their psychological needs and provided a basis for advancing their material interests (Giliomee 1979a, p. 107). Thus, in addition to a common interest in the colour bar, Afrikaner nationalism—initially promoted by the petit bourgeoisie as a means of advancing their interests vis-a-vis British capital—became the cement for a cross-class ethnic alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and working classes.

The accession to power of the Pact Government did not represent a complete triumph for Afrikaner nationalism, for the eth-class alliance which led to the Pact Government also included the British-dominated Labour party (British influence within the labor movement reflected the newly-proletarianized status of the Afrikaner working class). As a consequence, the Nationalist Party was forced to soft-pedal Afrikaner nationalism in order to avoid alienating its coalition partners (Moodie 1975, p. 91). Furthermore, the narrowness of the electoral mandate of the Pact Government and the continuing political strength of Smuts and the South African Party constituted additional constraints upon the Nationalist agenda (de Villiers 1969, p. 379; van den Berghe 1965,
p. 294). In this context, the Nationalists found appeals to White unity to be strategically more effective in establishing a political common ground. This in turn further imbued Afrikaner nationalism with an anti-African tone which was at least as powerful as pro-Afrikaner sentiment, a development which would only further heighten conflict between Africans and Whites.

Once in possession of state power, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie used the state as a vehicle for furthering its eth-class interests. The political interests of this class were advanced by protecting White labor via the colour bar and the civilized labour policy, thereby maintaining the eth-class alliance with the White working class (which, while by no means an equal partner, provided crucial electoral support). In addition, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie was able to advance its own material interests through both agricultural programs and, more importantly, through the use of the power of the state to facilitate Afrikaner entrance into the modern sector of the economy. This latter goal was accomplished through development of the state capitalist sector and Afrikaner monopolization of government employment, both of which provided an urban power base for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (cf. Davies 1973, pp. 48-49; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 60-61). What is significant about this development is that the interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie were increasingly wedded to the
exercise of state power as a means of maintaining and enhancing economic power (Magubane 1979, p. 188; Davies 1973, p. 56). Consequently, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie made increasing use of the "nationalist card"—the twin specters of British imperialism and the African threat—as an ideological prop for their political position.

Another manifestation of increasing Afrikaner nationalism was the proliferation of ethnic activity outside of the realm of politics. In addition to Afrikaner schools, social organizations and newspapers, this included the Broederbond (a secret society which played a key role in organizing the Afrikaner elite and coordinating nationalist activity), the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuuryenigings—a cultural organization), and trade unions (Moodie 1975, pp. 96-115; de Villiers 1969, pp. 395-401; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 517-25). Also significant was Afrikaner economic nationalism—exhortations to patronize ons eie mense ("our own people"), the amassing of funds for Afrikaner entrepreneurs, and the organization of Afrikaner investment companies (Magubane 1979, pp. 175-76; Moodie 1975, pp. 202-07; Simons and Simons 1969, p. 612). From our perspective, these developments can be interpreted in the context of urbanization and increasing intergroup competition; that is, as a response to the perceived threats posed by Africans and the British. On a practical level, the effect of the emergence of these
organizations was to expand the ideological and material bases of Afrikaner nationalism.

Despite the increase in nationalist sentiment and activity, the realization of Afrikaner hegemony was a long, drawn-out process. A major obstacle to unity was the existence of divisions within Afrikanerdom, particularly with regard to such issues as the definition of "Afrikaner" (i.e., whether the ethnic boundary extended to all White South Africans or would be restricted to Afrikaans speakers) and relations with the British (de Villiers 1969, p. 380; Giliomee 1969a, p. 101). Matters came to a head in 1933, when Hertzog joined with Smuts to form a government (the "Fusion" government) and subsequently merged the Nationalist and South African Parties into the United South African Nationalist Party--later the United Party (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 469). This was anathema to hardline nationalists, who in turn formed a new opposition party, the Purified Nationalist Party, under the leadership of D.F. Malan (Moodie 1975, pp. 126-45). Moreover, by returning British capital (affiliated with Smuts and the South African Party) to a position of power, "fusion" posed a threat to the material interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, all of whom depended upon access to state power to compete with British-South Africans (Giliomee 1979b, pp. 152-53). The effect of these developments--internecine struggle, the return to opposition, the return of Smuts as Prime Minister
(Hertzog resigned in 1939 when the Cabinet voted to enter World War II)—was to increase Afrikaner militancy. Indeed, it was during the late 1930s—particularly the Great Trek centennial celebration of 1938—that Afrikaner nationalism became a mass movement (Moodie 1975, pp. 177-93). This ethnic resurgence would play a significant role in the postwar restoration of Afrikaner political power.

4. African nationalism: conflict and ethnic assertion. Thus far, our discussion has treated Africans more as objects (or victims) of eth-class struggle than as active participants. While they were clearly involved in the abovementioned struggles (e.g., Africans were the "third party" in the struggle between mining capital and the White working class over the colour bar), the fragmentation and political powerlessness of Africans served to limit their ability to act. At the same time, there were also strong forces which favored the development of an African national consciousness. Incorporation into a settler-dominated society increased intergroup contact and awareness of the differences between Africans and Europeans. Entrance into the mining workforce (which began in the late nineteenth century) brought Africans from different ethnic groups together under common conditions of exploitation (Magubane 1979, p. 272). Perhaps the most important dynamic of all, however, was the fact that natives were subject to White domination as Africans (i.e., lumped together as "Kaffirs"
or "Bantu") rather than as members of a particular ethnic group (e.g., as Zulus, Xhosa, etc.). Thus, the national (racial) nature of exploitation and oppression gave rise to a national consciousness.\textsuperscript{142}

Despite the strength of these unifying forces, the development of a broad-based African nationalism was a slow process. In our view, this can be attributed to the existence of two factors. First, the partial proletarianization of African labor (a result of the migrant labor system which maintained ties to the rural reserves) slowed the formation of a permanent urban working class and encouraged the persistence of traditional group identities, both of which in turn inhibited national mobilization. Secondly, harsh state repression and rigid social and political controls (e.g., the compound system) further dampened African attempts to resist White domination. As a consequence, the period from 1910 to 1948 saw the painfully slow emergence of African nationalism, as the propelling dynamics were often outweighed by countervailing forces. Nevertheless, the events of this period were crucial to the development of African nationalism, as they created the basis for a common national consciousness which would dominate intergroup relations in the years following World War II.

The emergence of African nationalism involved a process of \textit{ethnic merger}; that is, the fusion of regional ethnic identities (e.g., Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho)—which were in
themselves still emerging from precapitalist "tribal" ties—into an "African" group identity. First steps towards this group mobilization were taken in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—as intellectuals established autonomous "Ethiopian" churches, and as Africans responded to their political exclusion by founding the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912 (Kuper 1969b, p. 435; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 132-34). One characteristic of the early stages of this ethnic merger was its petty bourgeois base, as the ANC was dominated by professionals and intellectuals (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 116). The fact that an "African" national consciousness first emerged among the petit bourgeoisie reflected their awareness of the disjunction between their class and ethnic status. What was significant about this development was that initial nationalist strategies reflected the experiences and interests of the African petit bourgeoisie (e.g., the use of "constitutional methods" such as resolutions or petitions to Great Britain), not the economic interests of the working class. During the period prior to World War II, this "petty bourgeois nationalism", as well as the slower evolution of nationalism among the working class (due to their partially proletarianized status), served to hinder the alliance of African eth-class segments.

For this analysis, a significant question pertains to whether African resistance would be expressed in class or
national terms. Given the overtly racial nature of South African society and the relative absence of class differentiation within the African group, one might expect that Africans would mobilize along national lines. At the same time, the "racial" oppression of Africans also reflected the class interests (e.g., profit, cheap labor, occupational privilege) of various White eth-classes. Moreover, the lack of significant economic differentiation within African groups (i.e., most Africans were wage laborers or peasant farmers) and the fact that African national identity (as opposed to ethnic or "tribal" ties) was still in the early stages of emergence made class-based group action a seemingly viable alternative. This potential became reality in labor actions by African workers (strikes as early as 1875, with major strikes in 1918 and 1920—Magubane 1979, pp. 280-85; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 211-12, 230-32) and in the formation and growth of the African-based Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU).

Despite this initial surge of eth-class action articulated in class terms, the African working class was unable to maintain effective mobilization during the first half of the twentieth century (indeed, the early 1920s were the high water mark for such activities). We believe that this can be attributed to three factors. First, the partially proletarianized status of African labor inhibited the emergence of class consciousness inasmuch as the migrant labor system
maintained the temporary status of wage workers. Moreover, continued ties to the reserves maintained ethnic divisions, which in turn undermined class solidarity (African labor movements were, after all, alliances of eth-class segments—e.g., Zulu workers, Xhosa workers, etc.). A second key factor limiting class-based action was the lack of cooperation and even outright hostility from the White working class (the optimal class action, of course, being an eth-class alliance of African and White workers), who sought instead to maintain their relative privileges at the expense of African labor. This precluded any broad based eth-class alliance and weakened the position of the African working class. The third obstacle confronting African workers' organizations was state repression: strikes brought immediate and harsh response, while the ability of Africans to form labor unions was restricted by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. As a result of these and other factors, the ICU withered away in the late 1920s, taking with it any prospects for class-based mobilization during this era.

Thus far, we have asserted that the major force in the weakening of both national and class based African resistance was repression. The political control of Africans—that is, the ability of Whites to use state power to restrict African group action—was a core aspect of South African eth-class struggle. Indeed, political domination of
the African population was **essential** to the interests of all White eth-classes: both the migrant labor system (and profits of the mine owners and the agrarian petit bourgeoisie) and the colour bar (and the privileged position of the White working class) were maintained by state action. But political control went far beyond economically-oriented measures. **Particularly critical were measures which reproduced the political powerlessness of the African population, for this was the cornerstone of White domination.** Given the overwhelming numerical superiority of the African population, anything remotely resembling political equality would bring an end to White political and economic hegemony (thus the immediacy of White opposition to any measures which would increase African political power). As a consequence, political control of Africans was undertaken by all White governments—differences, such as those between Smuts and the Nationalist Party—were merely a matter of degree.

While the African majority had been effectively disenfranchised from the beginning, political control meant more than maintaining the status quo. The system of White domination was subject to destabilizing forces in the form of the increasing proletarianization and urbanization of the African population. A fully proletarianized African urban working class would be a potentially formidable political force in eth-class struggle, as opposed to a fragmented and partially proletarianized work force. Accordingly, the
South African state sought to forestall this threat and maintain political control by increasing the segregation of Africans (thus, segregation was a product of increased intergroup contact). A major step in this direction was the Urban Areas Act of 1923, which restricted the right of Africans to remain in urban locations and extended the provisions of the colonial pass laws (Welsh 1969, pp. 197-98; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 229-31). As much as any single state action, the Urban Areas Act maintained the partial proletarianization of the African population and, hence, extended White political control.

A second area of political control was the political sphere itself. While Africans were effectively disenfranchised, Whites feared that urbanization would in time lead to acculturation and demands for political representation (and, ultimately, the loss of White hegemony). Accordingly, South African governments enacted a series of measures (e.g., the Native Affairs Act of 1920, the Native Administration Act of 1927, and the Representation of Natives Act of 1936) designed to remove Africans from political life by establishing separate political, legal, and social institutions in the context of the reserves (Magubane 1979, pp. 84-88; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 235). By 1936, Africans had lost even their limited franchise in the Cape, and political representation was restricted to three White representatives to Parliament (out of 150) and an "advisory" Natives Repre-
sentative Council (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 495; Kuper 1969b, p. 452). Equally significant was the ideological rationale for this legislation—the assertion that segregation reflected the natural order of things and that Whites and Africans should each develop in their own manner (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 235; Magubane 1979, pp. 84-85)—a precursor of the system of apartheid which was to come.

In addition to political exclusion, the 1927 Native Administration Act furthered the goal of segregation by attempting to revive traditional culture and by restoring the power of chiefs (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 345; Magubane 1979, p. 84). The purpose of this legislation was to use traditional African "tribal" identities as a means of separation and control—by fostering traditional practices to inhibit acculturation and by installing traditional authority figures (chiefs) as a petty bureaucrats (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 236-37; Magubane 1979, p. 84). In essence, the White South African state was employing ethnicity as a weapon; that is, it was attempting to revive aspects of traditional culture to create new subordinate African ethnic identities. There is considerable historical irony attached to this strategy, for it was nineteenth century European conquest and deliberate policies of deculturation which had resulted in the disintegration of traditional African societies. While it was probably impossible to reverse the ethnic fusion which was creating an "African"
identity, the White South African "ethnic weapon" was Nonetheless effective in retarding African mobilization by maintaining reserve-based ethnic identities (e.g., Zulu, Pedi, etc.) and by creating a comprador class (chiefs and headmen) whose interests were tied to political separation.

The eth-class struggles described above had specific outcomes—segregation, political control, migrant labor, and partial proletarianization—which produced a social system with a high level of reproduction; that is, one which maintained the correlation between ethnic affiliation (African) and class position (partially proletarianized labor).

Indeed, the material circumstances of Africans seemingly worsened over the period, given the continued decline of real wages under conditions of superexploitation (Southall 1983, p. 80; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 569-71). Such practices as the colour bar and the migrant labor system retarded both economic mobility and the emergence of a stable, self-conscious urban proletariat. Nevertheless, White South Africa was only postponing the inevitable.182

5. The "crisis" of the 1940s. The first half of the twentieth century was a time of rapid economic and social change for South African society. With respect to inter-group relations, this period was dominated by eth-class struggles between British mining capital, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, the White working class, and the African working class, as well as the emergence of an eth-class
alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and the White working class). Our analysis emphasized three major outcomes: (1) the evolution of the system of segregation—the migrant labor system, the colour bar, and the native reserves—as a reflection of the political power and economic interests of the White eth-classes vis-a-vis the African majority; (2) the Afrikaner-British conflict and the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism as a potent political force; and (3) the slow development of African resistance to White domination, a process inhibited by partial proletarianization and by White political control. Thus, in the three decades following independence, South Africa gave rise to a unique system of social relations, a system shaped by the exigencies of capitalist development (e.g., gold mining) and by the material interests of specific eth-classes.

If there is any constant in intergroup relations, however, it is that they are in a continuous state of change. South Africa in the first half of the twentieth century was no exception, for during this period dynamics were in force which would alter the nature of relations between groups. By the 1940s, the contradictions of the reserve-based migrant labor system—the bulwark of the South African political economy—had reached the crisis stage (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 67). The "balancing act" upon which the system depended (i.e., the ability of the reserve economy to subsidize superexploited African migrant labor) was eroded
by the decline of African agriculture (manifest in increasing poverty and landlessness and declining productivity) as a consequence of underdevelopment and population pressures (Wolpe 1972, pp. 440-42; Southall 1983, pp. 73-88). At the same time, the post-1933 economic expansion generated an increased demand for cheap African labor, particularly as unskilled and semi-skilled factory workers (where the "civilized labour policy" made them less expensive than White workers) in the rapidly growing industrial sector (Freund 1988, pp. 121-23; Southall 1983, p. 30). This combination of push and pull factors resulted in a dramatic influx of Africans into urban areas and into the industrial workforce—the percentage of Africans residing in urban areas rose from 18.4% in 1936 to 23.7% in 1946, the number employed in industry increased during the same period from 270,000 to 457,000 (Kuper 1969b, p. 451). Moreover, a significant proportion of this population was becoming permanently urbanized (Welsh 1969, pp. 209-10). In the words of the Fagan Commission (cited by Magubane 1979, p. 130): "The natives have come to town and they have come to stay."

For the African population, one major outcome of urbanization was a more complete proletarianization of the working class. This was manifest in the emergence of a "culturally new working class" with new "urban" concerns (e.g., transportation, housing) and supported by an array of new institutions and associations (Freund 1988, p. 124; Welsh
1969, pp. 214-19). The material interests of this urban proletariat were asserted in a variety of ways: bus boycotts in response to fare increases; squatter camps in the face of overcrowding in slums; and strikes in reaction to low wages (Magubane 1979, pp. 127-28; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 554-55). In terms of destabilization of the existing order, the upsurge in strike activity --strikes absorbed 1,684,915 African man hours in the 1940s, as opposed to 171,088 in the 1930s (Wolpe 1972, p. 445) --was particularly significant. This resistance reached its zenith with the 1946 Mine Workers' Strike, when 75,000 to 100,000 African miners paralyzed the mining industry with a week long strike which was brutally crushed by the police (O'Meara 1975; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 571-77; Magubane 1979, pp. 293-94). Clearly, the further proletarianization of the African working class was creating the basis for a challenge to the underpinnings of the entire social system.

The crisis of the 1940s and the African "challenge from below" had varying implications for the material interests of the different White eth-classes. Industrial capital (still primarily British) stood to benefit the most from a stable African work force --which would enable capital to take advantage of labor which was both cheaper and more permanent (i.e., better trained and more productive). As a consequence, industrial capital was more willing to consider the relaxation of restrictions on the urban migration of
Africans, so long as the hegemony of capital remained unchallenged (cf. Welsh--1969, pp. 200-01--on the recommendations by the Smits Committee that the pass laws be abolished). In contrast, other fractions of capital--e.g., mining, with its need for fixed costs; agriculture, predominantly Afrikaner, whose survival depended upon cheap African labor--believed that profitability would be jeopardized (due to either higher wages or loss of workers to other sectors) by the decline of the migrant labor system (Freund 1988, p. 120; Magubane 1979, p. 132). Most threatened of all, however, was the White working class, which once again faced replacement by cheaper African labor. Within this group, Afrikaner workers, who constituted the least-skilled segment of the White working class, were particularly vulnerable to any change in the existing system--thereby creating a coincidence of ethnic and class interests which would prove crucial in group mobilization (cf. Southall 1983, p. 31).

As South Africa approached the second half of the twentieth century, resolution of these conflicting interests would result in the emergence of a new set of social relations.

Apartheid and African Resistance: 1948-Present

Capitalist Development: The Post-1948 Era

As we noted in Chapter V, the period following World War II constituted a new stage in global capitalist development. From the standpoint of the world-economy, this was the era of the Pax Americana--U.S. core hegemony--which was
marked by decolonization, the Cold War, and the emergence of transnational corporations (TNCs) as the major vehicle for global capitalist accumulation. For South Africa, this was a new era as well, as the years after 1945 brought continued economic and industrial expansion and the consolidation of its semiperipheral status in the global economy. From our perspective, these events, while interesting in themselves, are significant inasmuch as they established the larger context for South African intergroup relations—the conflict between White hegemony and African resistance which has come to dominate modern South African society. Consequently, we will briefly discuss these macro-trends in order to set the stage for our discussion of intergroup relations.

Geopolitically, the world in which South Africa found itself after World War II was shaped by decolonization in the periphery and the superpower rivalry between the United States and the U.S.S.R. (cf. Beaud 1983, 186-88). The wave of decolonization and Third World nationalism which began immediately after 1945 reached Africa with the independence of Ghana in 1957 and would sweep across the continent in the following two decades (Stavrianos 1987, pp. 694-706). Decolonization came to Southern Africa (e.g., Botswana, Malawi, Zambia) in the mid-1960s and continued with the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule (and the independence of Angola and Mozambique) in the mid-1970s and the liberation of Zimbabwe from settler rule in 1979. For South Africa,
decolonization would have several major effects. First, continued White domination and racial capitalism (as well as South African colonial rule in Namibia) became increasingly anomalous in the emerging new international order. As a consequence, South Africa was subject to strong international criticism (which was led by the newly independent nations) and, especially after 1960, increasing political isolation (Spence 1969, pp. 507-24). Secondly, decolonization changed the nature of African nationalism within South Africa by expanding the ideological basis for group assertion and by increasing external support for African liberation. This served to provide further impetus for group mobilization. Finally, decolonization restructured the political environment of Southern Africa: where previously South Africa had been bordered by British and Portuguese colonies, it was now surrounded by potentially or actively hostile African states. At the same time, however, the economic and military weakness of these new states would provide South Africa with new opportunities to act as a regional power.

Although at first glance decolonization appeared to increase pressure on the White-dominated state, its overall effect was reduced by countervailing forces. For example, while decolonization transformed the interstate system and produced an array of newly independent states, it also altered the regional balance of power in Southern Africa by
eliminating direct core rule. Consequently, given the weakness of the newly independent states, South Africa was able to employ its military and economic power to mute opposition towards apartheid on the part of its neighbors. Furthermore, decolonization did not occur in a vacuum, but in concert with the global political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. One product of this "Cold War" was the freedom of maneuver it provided for nations in the periphery and semiperiphery. For the South African settler state, this meant that Western criticism of apartheid would be restrained by "strategic" interests; that is, the perceived utility of a stridently anti-communist state located adjacent to sea lanes and atop vital minerals.

From an economic standpoint, the key feature of the post-1945 capitalist world-economy was the globalization of production relations; that is, the worldwide activities of core-based transnational corporations (Martin 1986, p. 111; Magdoff 1978, pp. 171-76; Beaud 1983, pp. 216-24). For South Africa, this meant an upsurge in core investment, as transnational corporations were attracted by cheap labor, the availability of local capital, a relatively developed infrastructure, and the seeming stability of the settler regime. What was particularly significant for South Africa was the changing nature of foreign investment—from holding shares in mining companies to direct investment and active involvement in productive facilities (Saul and Gelb 1986, p.
74). This trend became increasingly evident in the 1960s, as direct foreign investment more that doubled, particularly in the manufacturing sector (Magubane 1979, pp. 205-211). The impact of this foreign investment was mixed. On one hand, the expansion of foreign investment increased the economic dependence of South African upon imported capital and technology—South Africa imported mostly capital goods and relied upon mineral exports to balance payments (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 75; Magubane 1984, pp. 204-06). Thus, South Africa was even more closely linked to and affected by processes of the capitalist world-economy. On the other hand, the growth of foreign investment increased the economic stake of the core in South Africa above and beyond any "strategic" interests. This had the effect of undermining Western opposition to apartheid and support for African liberation (Magubane 1979, pp. 213-15).

In terms of the capitalist world-economy, what we have been describing is the semiperipheral status of South Africa (i.e., its mixture of core and peripheral processes), a position which crystallized during the decades following World War II (Martin 1986, p. 111). As had been the case throughout its history, South Africa clearly assumed a peripheral role in its relationships with the core. At the same time, South Africa emerged as a regional power with respect to its newly independent neighbors; that is, it assumed a "core" position within Southern Africa. This was
manifest in the flow of labor and other commodities into South Africa, in South African dominance of the regional infrastructure (the British-built transportation network extended north from South Africa), and in increased South African investment in neighboring states (Magubane 1984, p. 205; Innes 1984, pp. 248-49; Martin 1986, pp. 110-11). Thus, South Africa was increasingly able to shape political and economic processes beyond its borders, a capacity which would become a significant force in Southern Africa during the 1970s and 1980s.19

While our discussion thus far has concentrated upon the implications of world-system processes for South African capitalist development, it is also essential for us to consider the evolution of the domestic economy, for it is at this level that productive processes most directly interact with intergroup relations. In the years following the Second World War, South Africa found itself in the midst of a long (1933-1973) period of economic expansion, which in turn resulted in continued industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization (Houghton 1969, pp. 32-36; Freund 1988, p. 121; Southall 1983, pp. 208-13; Welsh 1969, p. 173). Initially, South African economic development adhered to the prewar pattern of reliance on mining (which was buttressed in the post-war period by the discovery of new gold fields in the Orange Free State) and mining-led industrial development (Innes 1984, 175-84). As a consequence, despite
economic growth, the industrial sector of the South African economy remained small, labor intensive, and backwards (cf. Freund 1988, p. 111; Innes 1984, pp. 169-71). This pattern would change during the economic boom of the 1960s, when an influx of foreign capital, the expansion of state-owned industry, and the accelerated movement of mining capital into industry (cf. Innes--1984, pp. 191-222--on the expansion of the Anglo-American Corporation into industrial production) resulted in rapid industrial development and the increased concentration of South African capital in fewer hands (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 73; Magubane 1984, pp. 205-06; Innes 1984, pp. 188-89). In the post-1948 era, this transformation would provide the backdrop for the further alteration of both the context for intergroup interaction and the South African eth-class structure itself.

Eth-Class Struggles and Intergroup Relations

In our analysis thus far, we have described the evolution of South African intergroup relations as shaped by the dynamics of capitalist development and the outcomes of intergroup conflict. Moreover, we have demonstrated how eth-class interaction during each era reflects the legacy of previous periods; that is, the existence of specific eth-classes, ideologies, and relations of productions. South Africa after 1948 is no exception to this pattern. The main elements of its eth-class structure had emerged during the first half of the twentieth century. Likewise, key pro-
cesses which affected the eth-class structure—industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization—were evident during the years between 1910 and 1948.

At the same time, intergroup relations in the post-1948 era were more than an intensification of previous patterns. By 1948, the evolution of South African capitalist development, the changing dynamics of the world-system, and the outcomes of previous eth-class struggles combined to create an intergroup arena which was qualitatively different from conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the course of intergroup relations is continually shaped and re-shaped by the actors themselves—their interests (and perceptions thereof), their ability to mobilize, and their success (in relation to other groups) in attaining group objectives. Social groups in South Africa in 1948 faced a new array of opportunities and constraints in the form of the crisis of the 1940s—the challenge to existing relations posed by the internal contradictions of the social system.

From our perspective, intergroup relations in post-1948 South Africa can be most fruitfully analyzed in terms of three core issues. The first of these is the 1948 establishment of Afrikaner political hegemony and the creation of the apartheid system, a development which defined the context for subsequent interaction. This in turn engendered the second dynamic, the upsurge in African resistance in
response to the apartheid state. Finally, the dialectical relationship between these two forces, as well as the changing nature of South African capitalist development, gave rise to the third event: the "crisis" of the mid-1970s and 1980s and the restructuring of intergroup relations. Throughout our analysis, we will attempt to highlight eth-class interests and the implications of developments for both group identities and relations between groups.

1. Afrikaner hegemony and apartheid. The election of 1948 marked a watershed in South African intergroup relations, as it resulted in the return to power of the Nationalist Party (albeit a "recreated" party) and the establishment of an Afrikaner political hegemony which has persisted to the present. Historically, these events reflected the interaction of two dynamics: the rising tide of Afrikaner nationalism and the South African "crisis" of the 1940s. While Nationalist Party campaign slogans stressed White supremacy and Afrikaner unity, the issue was not White dominance—neither party considered changing that aspect of South African society—but rather one of tactics and the interests of specific eth-classes; that is, how best to maintain White supremacy in the face of increasing African urbanization and resistance. Here the parties differed: the United Party was prepared to tolerate some African urban presence (the interests of its capitalist constituency would be served by a more stable work force—cf. Saul and Gelb
1986, pp. 68-70), while the Nationalist Party advocated a hard line policy of total segregation. The outcome of the election was a narrow victory for the Nationalist Party and the installation of D.F. Malan as Prime Minister. As was the case with the 1924 Pact Government, the Nationalist Party was in essence an eth-class alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (still largely rural) and the White working class (without the Labour Party), with Afrikaner nationalism and White supremacy serving to cement the alliance. What was different, however, was that the Nationalist Party was controlled by a more conservative--i.e., militant Afrikaner nationalist, hard line attitude towards non-Whites--political leadership as a result of the schisms of the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, this new government would be even more adamant in pursuing eth-class interests.

Once in power, the Nationalist Party embarked upon its program of apartheid, the state-based system of racial oppression which has become the defining feature of South African society in the post World War II era. In contrast to the "race relations" approach, which views apartheid as an expression of Afrikaner racism (e.g., van den Berghe 1965, p. 267), we will assert that apartheid is best understood as a reflection of the material interests of the eth-class coalition which came to power in 1948. Thus, apartheid is not an irrational ideology divorced from economic life, but an eth-class strategy which can be analyzed
in terms of intergroup relations and South African capitalist development—i.e., interaction between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, British capital, the White working class, and the African working class in the context of the crisis of the 1940s (cf. Stone 1985, pp. 62-82). At the same time, we recognize that apartheid was not a narrow economic project, but that it was shaped by the outcomes of previous eth-class struggles, including the institutions and ideologies which emerged from them (cf. Burawoy—1974, p. 528—on the interaction between economic base and superstructure). Indeed, ideologies played a significant role, both as a means for group mobilization and in attempts to legitimize the existing system of domination. Nevertheless, in keeping with our theoretical framework, we will give analytical primacy to eth-class interests, for therein lies the key to the specific nature of apartheid.

Having staked out this theoretical ground, we will now focus upon the specific eth-class interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (and the small Afrikaner capitalist class) which dominated the 1948 Nationalist government. On the surface, these interests were similar to those of the eth-class alliance which formed the Pact Government of 1924: (1) promote the economic interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie; (2) maintain political power within the White community (i.e., control of state power); and (3) maintain White hegemony over the African population. What was
different, however, was the context. South Africa in 1948 was more urban and industrial; the African population was increasingly proletarianized (given the decline of reserve agriculture) and more likely to engage in militant resistance. Thus, the policies of the South African state after 1948 reflect the interests of the dominant eth-class as shaped by the changing nature of the intergroup arena.

What gave South African state policies their seemingly unique cast was the quantity and quality of actions which directly advanced one or more of the interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. Briefly, South African state "ethnic" policies after 1948 can be divided into three main categories: economic, segregative, and dominative. Economic policies either directly advanced the economic interests and power of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and capitalist class or aided in the consolidation of political power by benefitting the White population in general. Examples of the former include the growing Afrikaner domination of the state bureaucracy, the further expansion of state corporations, and increased state support for the Afrikaner private sector (Giliomee 1979b, pp. 162-69; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 65; van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; Magubane 1979, pp. 178-79). On a more general level, new "colour bar" legislation (e.g., the Native Building Workers Act; Section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act—cf. Davies 1973, pp. 45-46) maintained the protected position of the White working
class. Furthermore, it is probably no exaggeration to assert that the overall effect of government spending—whether on agriculture, education, infrastructure, housing, or jobs—has been to increase further the economic differences between Whites and non-Whites (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, p. 196). Thus, the Nationalist Party (and the Afrikaner elite) has been able to solidify its hold on power by maintaining the allegiance (and dependence) of broad segments of the White population.

Segregative policies, perhaps the most notorious aspect of the apartheid system, are those state actions designed to separate Whites and non-Whites. These included the Group Areas Act (which expanded and rigidified urban segregation), the Bantu Authorities Act (which extended political segregation via separate "tribal" institutions), the Bantu Education Act (which formalized a system of educational segregation), the Population Registration Act (which effectively codified ethnic divisions), and the system of "petty apartheid" (including the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, and the Separate Amenities Act). This body of legislation promoted dominant eth-class interests in that it sought to halt the urbanization, proletarianization, and acculturation of Africans, thereby reducing their ability to make demands in the context of South African society. From the standpoint of the White population, segregation provided reinforcement for ideologies of
group separation and White supremacy, thus maintaining the rigid intergroup boundaries necessary for domination.  

Finally, dominative policies refer to the use of the South African state to maintain White political and economic hegemony. These policies served two crucial interests of the dominant eth-classes. First, they enabled the continued superexploitation of migratory African labor, a dynamic which served as the cornerstone of White economic prosperity. Particularly effective in this regard were the "pass laws" (officially called—in an excellent example of Orwellian "doublespeak"—the Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952), which operated in conjunction with the Group Areas Act and other legislation to restrict African urban migration to those persons employed under labor contracts and the few who had "legal" urban rights. In addition to "influx control", the migrant labor system was supported by state labor bureaus and by the continued proscription of African labor unions. The second function of these dominative policies was to crush African resistance and mobilization through both direct and indirect means. Direct measures of domination included both an array of repressive legislation and the increased use of police and military power, the combination of which effectively created a police state with regard to the African population. Indirect measures, on the other hand, were designed to control Africans via ideology (e.g., Bantu
education) and through African intermediaries in the reserves and townships (e.g., the Bantu Authorities Act, the creation of Urban Bantu councils). From the perspective of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and capitalist classes, the maintenance of political domination over the Africans constituted the crux of intergroup relations. As Magubane (1979, p. 188) has observed, "if the Nationalist Party loses state power, it loses all else as well." Without the dominant powers of the state, White advantages would quickly wither away.

Viewed in a broader historical perspective, the apartheid system can be seen to have clear roots in the South African past (e.g., earlier pass laws, the Natives Land Act of 1913, the Urban Areas Act of 1923). Indeed, given that they were both means of political and economic domination, it is tempting to view apartheid merely as a rationalized, rigidified outgrowth of earlier South African segregation. Yet while it evolved from the past (i.e., earlier capitalist development and eth-class struggle), apartheid was also qualitatively different in that it reflected changing conditions of accumulation (i.e., the crisis of the 1940s) and the unique eth-class interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. Given the declining yield of peasant agriculture, the problem for White South Africa was no longer inducing peasants to seek wage employment but was now to maintain superexploitation and political control in the face of
increasing African urbanization (Wolpe 1972). Moreover, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (and its White working class allies) were, unlike British capital, more vulnerable to any social restructuring and were therefore more likely to favor a "hard line" reactionary solution as opposed to the reforms considered by the United Party (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 69).

In the wake of our several references to British capital and the suggestion that its eth-class interests differed from the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, it is useful for us to examine briefly the role and interests of British South African capital in the years after 1948. As had become evident during the crisis of the 1940s, British capital (mining and manufacturing) was seemingly willing to accept (and, indeed, would seemingly benefit from) a limited program of reform and a permanent African urban presence. In addition, it was not unlikely that apartheid would contain "costs" for capital as a result of its limitations on productivity and markets. Nevertheless, British capital did not strenuously object to the apartheid program because it had no intention of dismantling White domination (which had, after all, served as the basis for profitability) and found its eth-class interests threatened by African resistance. In this context, Afrikaner hardliners were viewed as playing a useful role in maintaining White supremacy (Magubane 1979, p. 190; Adam, 1979b, pp. 177-86). Furthermore, the British capitalist class stood to profit from the super-
exploitation of cheap labor which was perpetuated by the apartheid system. At the same time, the Nationalist Party was unlikely to adopt extreme policies which would endanger capitalist accumulation, for, as was true in the 1920s, state power (and the Afrikaner political program) depended upon continued economic prosperity. Thus, while the British South African capitalist class was not part of the dominant eth-class alliance, it was able to exist in a symbiotic relationship with the Afrikaner-dominated apartheid state.

In our analysis of post-1948 South Africa, we have emphasized the material base of apartheid; that is, its relationship to the interests of the dominant eth-classes. Our point is that apartheid is not only a rigid system of social relations (as might be suggested by an ideological interpretation), but also a means for maintaining White (especially Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie/capitalist) economic and political domination (supported, of course, by ideological systems). One benefit of this approach is its ability to address changes in intergroup relations by linking them to the evolution of the intergroup arena (and, hence, the need to alter group strategies). This is a significant point, for South African society did change, a process spurred by both eth-class struggle and the dynamics of capitalist development.

An excellent illustration of this point is provided by the emergence of the "Bantustan" or homelands policy--the
attempt by the South African state to transform the African reserves into self-governing territories and, ultimately, "independent" nations. At the outset, even autonomous (let alone independent) African homelands were not the objective of post-1948 Nationalist governments (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 117-18; Wolpe 1972, pp. 448-49; Southall 1983, pp. 45-46). In this context, the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act is probably best interpreted as a vehicle for achieving political segregation and the indirect control of the African population (via so-called "tribal" authorities), as opposed to the first step in a greater plan. At the same time, however, the emerging apartheid system was beset during the 1950s by contradictory pressures: the intensification of African resistance; the decolonization of Africa and the increase in international criticism of South Africa; and the growing realization that total segregation was economically unfeasible—that Whites and Africans were economically intertwined (Magubane 1979, pp. 237-41). In response, the apartheid state evolved its "Bantustan" policy, a process which began with the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act—legislation which "established" eight (later ten) "nationalities" among the African population and proclaimed an explicit goal of gradual African "self-rule" compatible with their own traditions—but which in reality meant pseudo-self rule under White domination (Southall 1983, p. 46; van den Berghe 1965, p. 145). This process was
accelerated by the government (partially in response to international pressures for change) during the 1960s and 1970s and culminated with the nominal "independence" of four Bantustans (beginning with the Transkei in 1976).

In terms of the eth-class interests outlined above, the Bantustan policy was an attempt by the dominant eth-classes to respond to changing circumstances. Stripped to its barest essentials, the Bantustan system was a strategy for maintaining the migrant labor system and the economic benefits of superexploited labor, while sustaining White political hegemony. While the economic benefits are relatively self-evident, the political objectives of the Bantustan policy were equally significant. First, creation of African homelands was an attempt to provide legitimation for the existing system of social relations. The South African government could now claim to the African population and to the outside world (in an attempt to deflect international criticism) that the political and civil rights of Africans would be attained with the "decolonization" (an interesting mutation of the anticolonialist rhetoric of the era) of the homelands--thereby excusing the denial of these rights in "White" South Africa (Spence 1969, pp. 510-11). Indeed, carried to its extreme, the Bantustan policy envisioned that every African would become a citizen of a homeland--thereby eliminating the Black-White problem within South Africa (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 101). Secondly, the
Bantustan policy was—to borrow Southall's (1983, p. 34) expression—a strategy of "divide and rule". The South African state was again employing ethnicity as a weapon; it essentially created officially recognized identities (which were loosely based upon traditional African society) in order to divide the African population and forestall the emergence of a more inclusive African identity (cf. van den Berghe 1965, p. 76). In addition, the South African government was also playing the "class card"; that is, it further attempted to divide the African population by creating a comprador class of bureaucrats and small entrepreneurs whose interests would be tied to "separate development"—and who would serve as agents of control for White South Africa (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 101-02).

While the South African government sought to portray its Bantustan policy as a concession which would lead to independence and African political empowerment, the reality was that very little power was changing hands. First, the homelands were (to quote Plenar and Simpson—1960, p. 25, cited by Magubane 1979, p. 237) "economic nonsense" in that they cannot begin to support their populations. Thus, the homelands remain underdeveloped and economically dependent upon South Africa, serving as reservoirs of cheap labor for South African industry. Moreover, the Bantustans remained politically subservient to South Africa: the "autonomous" homelands found that certain key functions had
been reserved for South Africa, while the power of the "independent" Bantustans was severely limited by their economic and military weakness (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 145-48; Southall 1983, pp. 247-80). Ultimately, South Africa hoped to create a network of small, dependent African states, thereby enabling it to retain political control and access to cheap labor while transferring the costs of government services to the inhabitants of the Bantustans. This, then, was the grand strategy. We will follow its progress when we consider more recent developments in the 1970s and 1980s.

A final issue for consideration in this section is the impact of Afrikaner political hegemony on Afrikaner nationalism; that is, how access to state power shaped group identity. During the first half of the twentieth century, Afrikaner ethnic mobilization had increased dramatically, triggered by intergroup competition in the context of South African capitalist development. With a growing array of ethnic institutions and the Nationalist Party as a political vanguard, Afrikaner nationalism emerged as a potent political force. It was this flood of nationalism—intertwined with eth-class interests—which brought the Nationalist Party to power in 1948. Thus, Afrikaner nationalism was important to the dominant eth-class—the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and the emerging capitalist class—for it was the cement which bound together the eth-class alliance with
the working class and enabled them to maintain their grasp on political power (van Zyl Slabbert 1975).

Given this central role of group identity, the Nationalist Party quickly moved to consolidate its ideological base. One step towards this end was advancement of the Afrikaner cultural/symbolic agenda—elimination of English influences from currency, the flag, and the national anthem (van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; de Villiers 1969, pp. 393-94). This process culminated with the achievement in 1960-61 of two long sought goals of Afrikaner nationalism: the establishment of South Africa as a republic and its subsequent withdrawal from the British Commonwealth—the shedding of the two most prominent remnants of British colonial domination (Spence 1969, pp. 486-88; de Villiers 1969, pp. 390-94). Of more substantive significance were government steps to expand the role of the Afrikaans language (including separate education for Afrikaner and English South Africans) and to establish a system of "Christian-National" education steeped in Afrikaner nationalist ideology and propaganda (Moodie 1975, pp. 239-45; van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; de Villiers 1969, p. 399). It was through this and other measures that the Nationalist Party further entrenched Afrikaner identity in South African society, thereby securing its political position.

Once the Nationalist Party was firmly installed in power (it increased its parliamentary majority in each
election), it appears to us that Afrikaner ethnic assertion underwent a transformation of sorts. Where previously the major focus of group mobilization had been to resist British political and economic power, it was increasingly clear by the end of the 1950s that the fight against the forces of assimilation and domination had been won—at least as far as the British were concerned. Consequently, Afrikaner nationalist leaders began to reach out towards British South Africans by emphasizing the commonality of interests within the White community (Giliomee 1979a, p. 116; Adam 1979a, p. 131; Moodie 1975, pp. 277-86; Spence 1969, p. 495). This is not to imply that any ethnic merger was occurring; indeed, the Afrikaner/British boundary remained distinct, as it was reinforced by British economic superiority (although the gap was narrowing) and an Afrikaner sense of injury (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 107-08). What we are suggesting instead is that the improvement of Afrikaner status within South Africa has allowed Afrikaners to cooperate with the British—this time as the dominant ethnic group within the White community (de Villiers 1969, pp. 375-76).

At the same time, however, Afrikaners became increasingly insecure with regard to African nationalism and its claim to political rights. Accordingly, Afrikaner nationalism is more frequently expressed as a negation of African status within South African society. Ideologically, this took a variety of forms: the claim to be a unique people--
White Africans—with a right to self-determination apart from others (thereby legitimizing the "separate development" of the Bantustan policy); the incredible assertion that Europeans and Africans arrived in South Africa at the same time (thus negating any prior African claim to South Africa); and self-characterization as the defenders of Western civilization in the face of African "barbarism" (van den Berghe 1965, p. 116; Spence 1969, p. 491; Saunders 1988, p. 149; Magubane 1979, p. 254; Moodie 1975, p. 264). On a broader level, Afrikaners sought to mobilize themselves (and any British South Africans willing to adopt a "proper" position) to defend the "fatherland" from the threat of communism (which included, by legal definition, any attempt to abolish apartheid), "British-American" liberalism, and general global condemnation (de Villiers 1969, p. 374; Spence 1969, pp. 489-92, 517-24). This linkage between Afrikaner mobilization and continued White domination was a key force in intergroup relations, for it solidified the political and ideological base of the apartheid system.

2. Apartheid and African resistance. The leitmotif of South African history in the post-1948 era is the dialectical confrontation between White domination (as manifest in apartheid) and African resistance to their subordinate status. Our use of the word dialectical is important, for it captures both the oppositional nature of the forces (e.g., White material well-being is grounded in the subju-
gation of the African population) and their interrelationship. This interrelationship is as important as the underlying contradiction, for just as the nature of apartheid was shaped by African resistance, the direction of African resistance was shaped by the actions of the apartheid state. Inasmuch as we have just examined the dynamics of White domination, our purpose here is to assess briefly the nature of African resistance to apartheid.

From our perspective, African nationalism in the 1950s represented a significant departure from the previous era. This transformation was due to a variety of factors: the crisis of the 1940s (the contradictions of the existing system of social relations fell most heavily upon the African population); Afrikaner nationalism and the emergence of the apartheid state; and the changing nature of the intergroup arena, especially the impact of global decolonization. At the same time, African group mobilization could also be viewed as having evolved from the struggles of the early twentieth century. The African National Congress (ANC) continued to be dominated by the petit bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia; however, it also experienced a dramatic upsurge in its membership. While this is at least partially attributable to continued proletarianization and urbanization, it also reflected the realization by the African petit bourgeoisie that it could not advance as a class, but instead must pursue an "ethnic" strategy in alliance with
the African working classes.\textsuperscript{101} In addition, both the ANC and African resistance in general were energized by a newer, more radical leadership (e.g., Mandela, Tambo, Mbeki, Sisulu and the ANC Youth League—the generation which came of age in the 1930s and 1940s—cf. Simons and Simons 1969, p. 546). Accordingly, the ANC was now better situated to form the alliance with the African working classes which would become the basis of the mass movements of the 1950s.

Two major strategic issues for the expanding African resistance were the form which mobilization would take and the particular tactics to be used to advance group claims. The question of form pertains to whether claims would be asserted in class or national terms (a debate reminiscent of the ANC-ICU division in the early 1920s), a question which was especially pertinent following the central role played by the working class in the resistance of the 1940s. Given the then existent stage of development of the working class (partially proletarianized, limited availability of unions), the domination of the nationalist movement by the petit bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, and the fact that ethn-class subordination was overtly expressed in ethnic/racial terms, group action took the form of an ethn-class "nationalist" alliance rather than a working class movement.\textsuperscript{102} Consequently, the explicit focus of group protest and demands was upon conditions which oppressed all Africans (e.g., pass laws, political exclusion) rather than the material inter-
ests of a particular eth-class, an inclusiveness which reinforced the emerging cross-class nationalist alliance.

Closely related to the form of the struggle was the question of tactics; that is, the specific strategies selected to pursue group goals. This was not an easy matter. The strategic options of the African population were constrained by their total exclusion from the political arena and by their economic and military powerlessness relative to the apartheid state. Moreover, unlike other nationalist movements, African South Africans were not confronting a colonial power (which could be induced to leave by increasing the cost of domination through either non-violent protest or guerilla warfare), but instead were challenging an entrenched settler community which was determined to hold on to power. What emerged in this context was a process of national mobilization—national by virtue of its grounding in an pan-ethnic African identity—which was marked by extraparliamentary mass action (Magubane 1979, pp. 298-99; Wolpe 1984, p. 236). The widespread nature of this movement constituted a break with the past on the part of the petty-bourgeois/intellectual leadership, a reflection of both the evolution of eth-class struggle and the realization that small-scale protests and petitions to the government were futile (especially given the actions of the apartheid state). As a result, movement tactics included varying types of mass action: mass demonstrations; strikes (e.g.,
the June 26, 1950 "Freedom Day" strike); the 1952 Defiance Campaign (mass disobedience of the pass laws); and economic boycotts (Kuper 1969b, pp. 461-63; Magubane 1979, pp. 299-307).

The transformation of African resistance can also be seen in the evolution of group ideology. Where the first protests of the ANC (1909-25) had essentially "requested" reforms from Whites, the 1949 ANC Programme of Action explicitly rejected White domination and asserted the right of national self-determination for Africans (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 298). Even more influential was the 1955 Freedom Charter, which called for liberation from apartheid and an inclusive democratic state (Kuper 1969b, 463-64; van den Berghe 1965, p. 180). These developments can be interpreted in the context of decolonization and, more importantly, as a response to increased White domination. While expanded African nationalism was already emerging in post-World War II South Africa, its growth was undoubtedly enhanced by the total oppression embodied in the apartheid state. Once again, we see that ethnonational ideologies arise in response to the exigencies of intergroup conflict.

One related issue of interest involves the role of the other non-White groups in resistance to apartheid. The post-1948 era brought rapid deterioration in the social and political circumstances of Coloureds and Indians (e.g., loss of franchise of representation; increased segregation),
thereby increasing their commonality of interest with the African population (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 272-76; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 151-52). On the one hand, this led to increased intergroup cooperation in opposition to government policies. Both the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 1955 Congress of the People (which produced the Freedom Charter) contained Coloured, Indian, and African components (Kuper 1969b, p. 463; Magubane 1979, p. 301). On the other hand, there remained elements which separated the three groups. Segregation (e.g., the Group Areas Act, separate educational facilities) limited intergroup contact and inhibited the potential for joint action. Furthermore, ethnic barriers remained: the Indian fear of Africans (particularly after the 1949 attack on Indians by Africans in Durban); the African resentment of Indians as a "middleman minority"; Coloured insulation and sense of superiority; and the sometimes exclusionary nature of African nationalism (van den Berghe 1965, 168-69; Kuper 1969b, pp. 462-69; Simons and Simons 1969, p. 599). Finally, the sheer numerical weight of the African population seemingly preordained that they would assume a dominant role in any resistance movement. Accordingly, while the 1950s brought increased intergroup cooperation, a full-fledged ethnic alliance failed to materialize.

Despite the significant upsurge in African nationalism and the emergence of mass resistance to apartheid, African
opposition was not successful in bringing about any changes in the South African social structure. One explanation for this lies in the persistence of divisions within the African population, which in turn inhibited the formation of an ethnic-class alliance and limited African ability for group action. The continued slow development of an urban working class (the result of the persistence of the migrant labor system and the Bantustan policy) reduced contact between different ethnic and class fractions of the African population. Likewise, government policies such as the system of Bantu education (which was designed to maintain linguistic divisions among the African population) and the Bantu Authorities Act (which strengthened the reserve-based comprador class) also contributed to the fragmentation of the African peoples. Even within the resistance movement itself, ideological schisms—between the multiracialism of the ANC and the exclusionary nationalism of the breakaway Pan-African Congress (PAC); between socialists and nationalists; between radicals and moderates—stood as an obstacle to national mobilization (Magubane 1979, pp. 307-10; Kuper 1969b, p. 468; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 177-78).

The paramount reason for the lack of success on the part of the national liberation movement was the repressive reaction by the apartheid state. Kuper (1969b, p. 459) aptly describes the Nationalist Party apartheid program as a counter-revolution aimed at crushing African resistance.
Each and every mass action against White domination was met by increasingly harsh police responses and a growing body of restrictive legislation. Even the drafting of the Freedom Charter resulted in the arrest of 156 leaders of the Congress Alliance on treason charges (Magubane 1979, p. 305). The early 1960s saw a further escalation of dominitive action by the state: the 1960 Sharpeville massacre; the outlawing (banning) of the ANC and the PAC; the emergence of a police state (mass arrests, state of emergency, expanded security apparatus); and the "decapitation" of the ANC via the Rivonia "treason" trials (Wolpe 1984, pp. 237-38; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 136-40; Magubane 1979, pp. 312-19; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 190-91). This repressive counter-revolution achieved its goals—at least for the short term—as overt African resistance declined dramatically during the middle and late 1960s.

In the context of the escalation of repression and the absence of change, it is reasonable to enquire exactly what was achieved by the African nationalist movement during the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps the major accomplishment of this political struggle was to heighten group consciousness among Africans, thereby providing an organizational and ideological base for subsequent action. In addition, the general rejection by Africans of the basic mechanisms of dominance—e.g., the Bantustan policy, Bantu education—increased the contradictions of the apartheid system and intensified the
pressure on the South African state by foiling attempts to achieve legitimacy for its policies. Furthermore, just as African mobilization resulted in increased reaction, so did state repression further radicalize the nature of resistance—as evidenced by the Pondo revolt, violent protest, and the formation of a military wing (Unkhonto We Sizwe—"Spear of the Nation") of the ANC (Magubane 1979, pp. 306-19; Kuper 1969b, pp. 464-65). Thus, while resistance may have been temporarily silenced, the seeds of group mobilization which were planted in the 1950s and 1960s would bear fruit in the decades to follow.

The other major achievement of the post-1948 African nationalist movement was the internationalization of the South African struggle. In the post-1945 era of global decolonization, apartheid became increasingly anomalous with respect to the international order. Within this context, the cycle of mass action and state repression evoked widespread condemnation of apartheid and increased the political isolation of the settler regime. Moreover, external support for African liberation enabled the resistance movement to persist during periods of inactivity (e.g., the ability of the ANC to survive in exile during the 1960s). The link between the conflict in South Africa and the capitalist world-economy was particularly evident immediately after the Sharpeville massacre, when international concern with the "instability" of the situation led to a flight of foreign
capital, which in turn triggered a (temporary) financial crisis (Southall 1983, p. 48). This vulnerability of the South African economy to international reaction to ethnic conflict would become a significant aspect of the intergroup arena in the 1970s and 1980s.

3. Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. The late 1960s and the early 1970s could appropriately be described as the "golden age" of apartheid. At this juncture, the general course of events appeared to favor the dominant Afrikaner petit bourgeois and capitalist eth-classes: South Africa was in the midst of an economic boom spurred by the rapid growth of industry; the Nationalist Party had established unchallenged political hegemony; and the African resistance of the 1950s and early 1960s seemed to have been crushed. In this environment, the South African state continued with its task of limiting African urbanization. The border industries policy sought to move industry near the homelands; forced removals increased segregation and reduced the number of Africans in urban areas; the cessation of African housing construction seemingly insured that the number of urban Africans would not grow; and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act removed even the limited South African citizenship of the African population (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 216-25; Freund 1988, p. 125; Southall 1983, p. 50). If Third World condemnation persisted, or industrialists objected to plans to reduce the African urban presence
(cf. Magubane 1979, p. 136), or the ANC engaged in isolated acts of sabotage—these were minor problems which could be solved. The South African state had apparently succeeded in creating a stable society held together by coercion and exploitation (cf. van den Berghe 1965, p. 218).

Within a few short years, however, the situation had changed dramatically. The four decade (1933-1973) cycle of economic prosperity which had supported the evolution of South African social relations came to an abrupt halt in the early 1970s. Decolonization in Angola and Mozambique and the liberation of Zimbabwe left South Africa surrounded by African-dominated states hostile to apartheid. Moreover, the virtually complete decolonization of Africa added to global sentiment against apartheid and led to the further political isolation of South Africa. Most significantly of all, African resistance, which had been thought to have been broken, emerged with renewed strength in a series of strikes (e.g., the 1973 Durban strike), increased ANC activity, and the 1976 student-led Soweto uprising (Magubane 1979, pp. 321-26; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 159-67; Wolpe 1984, p. 239). From this point onwards, it was clear that African resistance, although it might vary in intensity, would be a permanent feature of South African society.

These developments had their genesis in both processes of the world-system and the dynamics of South African capitalist development. The post-1971 downturn of the capital-
ist world-economy was felt in South Africa as slow growth, rapid inflation, increasing unemployment (experienced by all groups, but particularly the African working class), and rising balance of payments problems (Innes 1984, pp. 190-91; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 77). At the same time, the internal contradictions of "apartheid capitalism"—hitherto masked by the superexploitation of African labor and heavy foreign investment—emerged as obstacles to continued capitalist accumulation. Economically, while apartheid ensured White (especially Afrikaner) prosperity and supplied capital with a supply of cheap labor, it also restricted the growth of an internal market (by limiting African purchasing power) and (by preserving the migrant labor system) inhibited the development of a skilled work force (Freund 1988, pp. 125-26; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 70-73). This in turn placed a ceiling on industrial growth, as the stunted domestic market and the inability to develop a meaningful export sector (due in part to low productivity stemming from the shortage of skilled labor) left limited room for expansion.107

Equally if not more important were the political contradictions of South African capitalist development. White well-being has been grounded in the impoverishment of the African population—White income per capita is roughly five times that of urban Africans and fifteen times that of rural Africans; the South African Gini coefficient of income inequality is the highest in the world among countries for
which data are available; and an estimated sixty percent of the African population is living in poverty (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 17-19). Moreover, conditions for Africans have seemingly worsened as a result of recent (post-1960) capitalist development: mechanization of agriculture and the growth of capital intensive industry has resulted in a growing unemployment problem; Africans are disproportionately affected by inflation (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 71, 160; Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 84-93; Magubane 1979, p. 322; Southall 1983, p. 39). While inequality exists in every nation, what is politically explosive in the South African case is the direct correspondence between the high level of economic inequality and ethnicity, coupled with the fact that this relationship is maintained by an explicitly ethnically-based system of control and exploitation. This is the fundamental contradiction of apartheid: the specific form of eth-class domination gives rise to an implacable oppositional force, for only by drastically restructuring social relations can the material interests of the African majority be advanced.

For our purposes, the most salient aspect of the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s was the transformation of the inter-group arena which we have just outlined. At the same time, the impact of this transformation was magnified by a more gradual evolution of the South African eth-class structure during the post-1948 era. The joint effect of these two
dynamics was to alter both eth-class interests and the strategies available for pursuing group goals. New situations contain new opportunities and threats; evolving groups have new interests and new capacities for pursuing these interests. In the remainder of this subsection, we will explore the interests and strategies of the most significant eth-classes in the context of this changing intergroup arena.

One noteworthy phenomenon was the changing nature of the South African capitalist class, manifest in the increasing concentration and centralization of economic power; the creation of expanded links between South African and international capital; and the emergence of an increasingly powerful Afrikaner capitalist class (Innes 1984, pp. 220, 326-33; Adam 1979b, pp. 177-78). The rapid growth of Afrikaner economic power after 1948 was fostered by Afrikaner political power (e.g., the awarding of government contracts to Afrikaner firms; the flow of personnel between government and Afrikaner industry--Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 72-73; Magubane 1979, pp. 178-79) and by Afrikaner economic nationalism (cf. Magubane--1979, pp. 175-77--on the role of Afrikaner organizations in mobilizing Afrikaner capital). This development was significant for two reasons. First, the melding of political with economic power resulted in a redefinition of the interests of the dominant eth-class (i.e., the interests of the Afrikaner elite were now more
closely identified with those of capital because the Afrikaner elite now contained a larger capitalist, as opposed to petit bourgeois, component). Secondly, the growth of Afrikaner capital led to increasing differentiation and divergence of interests within Afrikanerdom (Adam 1979b, pp. 187-88). This reshaping of the eth-class structure would in turn alter both group strategies and state policies.

The effects of this evolution of the South African capitalist class can be seen in the conflicting interests of various White eth-classes with respect to the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, Afrikaner/British capital was seemingly willing to accept some change in existing social relations--e.g., higher wages, urban rights for Africans--in order to preserve South African capitalism (i.e., to avoid the "socialization" of production by the African majority). Moreover, South African capital needs to avoid continued political instability, which would undermine the confidence of international capital and jeopardize access to capital, credit, and technology. Given the increasing centralization of capital, these dominant classes would be able to retain economic power even in the face of significant concessions; indeed, they could potentially benefit from expansion of the domestic market and a greater supply of skilled labor. On the other hand, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, bureaucracy, and working classes tend to be adamantly opposed to change, inasmuch as they have the
most to lose—e.g., small businesses would be less able to pass on higher wage costs; without protection, the White working class and the Afrikaner bureaucracy would be vulnerable to African competition (cf. Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 79-91; Adam 1979b, pp. 187-90).

Politically, these conflicting interests emerged as divisions within the Nationalist Party, which, in the wake of the disappearance of the United Party and the political irrelevance of its successors (e.g., the Progressive Federal Party), was the center of White politics in the 1970s and early 1980s. Initially (until the mid-1980s), this involved the split over African policy between the verligte ("enlightened" or progressive conservatives) and verkrampte ("cramped" or reactionary) factions of the Nationalist Party, the former advocating reform, the latter espousing a "hard line" defense of apartheid (de Villiers 1969, p. 390). As was the case with previous divisions among White South Africans, the issue was not White supremacy per se, but rather how best to maintain it. What is different, however, is that this conflict no longer so neatly corresponds to the Afrikaner-British division; instead, the distinction is articulated more along class lines (e.g., capital vs. the petit bourgeoisie and working classes). For verligtes, this means preservation of "free enterprise"; for verkramptes, maintenance of White supremacy (reflecting both the threat of African competition and the fact that
many of their *verligte* opponents are also Afrikaner). Thus, both Afrikaner solidarity and ethnic divisions within the White community have been weakened by class differences, thereby reducing the material basis for Afrikaner mobilization (Giliomee 1979c).

Of greater significance are the effects of the changing eth-class structure on actual group strategies and actions; that is, upon how the South African state and key White eth-classes responded to the crisis threatening apartheid. Initially (i.e., the mid-1970s), the response of the Vorster government was to expand state repression (e.g., banning of organizations, mass arrests, state terrorism) and to step up the pace of the Bantustan policy (the cornerstone of apartheid) by granting "independence" to the Transkei and to Bophuthatswana (Southall 1983, pp. 50-53). This was, after all, the "final solution" to the "Black problem": there would ultimately be no Black South Africans (all Africans would be citizens of independent homelands); Africans would only enter "White" South Africa as "guestworkers". Despite these developments (and the subsequent independence of Venda and the Ciskei in 1979-81), it became increasingly clear that the Bantustan policy would not resolve the South African crisis. The Bantustans were economically, geographically, and demographically irrational; they were not recognized by any nation other than South Africa; and they were rejected by the overwhelming majority of the African
people. Thus, the Bantustan policy has essentially been in a state of limbo throughout the 1980s; it is retained by the South African government as a useful tool for dividing African resistance and for muddying the waters for future political negotiations.

Given this state of affairs, South African state policy underwent a transformation of sorts with the accession to power in 1978 of the Nationalist Party verligte faction led by P.W. Botha. What followed was a new attempt to preserve White supremacy and to protect the interests of South African capital, one which adopted the rhetoric of reform (e.g., Botha's oft-quoted "adapt or die" statement—cf. Marger 1985, p. 217). These reforms were part of what was presented as a "total strategy" for dealing with the South African crisis, a plan which included the regional assertion of South African power (e.g., destabilization of Angola and Mozambique, attacks on ANC bases, economic and political pressure directed towards neighboring states) and a propaganda campaign aimed at breaking the international isolation of South Africa (O'Meara 1986). With respect to quelling African resistance, the "total strategy" has entailed a series of minor (yet unprecedented for the Nationalist Party) concessions: a limited right to form unions; some recognition of urban rights; a curtailing of petty apartheid; and a relaxation of restrictions on African managers and entrepreneurs (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 117-37; Freund
From a strategic standpoint, these "reforms" can be interpreted as attempts to divide and co-opt segments of the African population—e.g., union vs. non-union workers; urban vs. rural dwellers; middle vs. working class. While the South African state did experience some success with the regional aspect of its strategy, by the mid-1980s it was evident that little headway had been made towards deflecting domestic opposition to apartheid. Indeed, throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s the ultimate foundation of White dominance remained the power of the state security apparatus, a force which the government found it necessary to employ with increasing frequency.

What becomes increasingly visible is the dilemma which reform presents for a South African capitalist economy which is so intimately linked to racial domination. From the perspective of the dominant eth-class (Afrikaner-British capital), some measure of reform is necessary to resolve the crisis and to preserve the core of group hegemony. Repression without reform (i.e., the verkrampte position) would seemingly only lead to a hardening of African resistance and the further international isolation of South Africa. At the same time, however, any softening of apartheid undermines the political power of capital by increasing the hostility of the White petit bourgeoisie and working classes—a group which is essential to Nationalist Party rule, but which
perceives any improvement in the status of Africans as threatening to its own eth-class interests (Magubane 1984, pp. 213-16). Furthermore, the situation is even more complex. As Saul and Gelb (1986, pp. 94-96) observe, change is a perilous path for those who dominate South Africa. Co-optation requires real concessions; however, reforms may increase expectations and assume a dynamic of their own (e.g., the emergence of "legal" African unions such as the National Union of Miners and the Congress of South African Trade Unions as a major force in the African struggle against apartheid). South African capital is as concerned at the prospect of rapid change as are the White petit bourgeois and working classes. Consequently, given these contradictory pressures, it is not surprising that the South African state has repeatedly drawn back from any meaningful reform of the apartheid system.

Thus far, our analysis in this subsection has focused upon changes in the eth-class structure of White South Africans and the evolution of group strategies. This is but half the equation. The actions of White eth-classes in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s can only be understood as a response to the assertion of African interests (and vice-versa). Eth-class struggle takes place in a constantly changing intergroup arena. Through this struggle, groups transform both themselves and their social environment, thereby creating a new context for subsequent
interaction. To complete our analysis, therefore, we must examine the evolution of the African eth-class structure and assess the implications of any changes for the interests and strategies of the various eth-classes.

In general, the shape of the current African eth-class structure reflects both the influence of previous patterns and the changes in the intergroup arena. Proletarianization proceeded hand in hand with the continuing decline of reserve agriculture; that is, an ever-increasing proportion of the African population became totally dependent upon wage labor, while significantly fewer were able to survive as peasant farmers without relying extensively on wages (cf. Southall 1983, pp. 219-21; Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 69-71). Although this suggests a rapid expansion of the urban working class, the persistence of the migrant labor system and the increasing enforcement of restrictions on urban settlement meant that an important portion of the working class remained partially proletarianized. In addition, the combination of dramatic population increases in the reserves and rising levels of urban and rural unemployment (both post-1960 phenomena) have led to the emergence of a significant African underclass. Considered in toto, the major effect of these processes has been to expand the proletarian base of the African eth-class structure (especially if we make the assumption that the underclass has at least some commonality of interest with the working class).
An equally important phenomenon involved alterations in both the size and the character of the African petit bourgeois and middle classes. Particularly striking in this regard was the expansion of the power and influence on the bantustan-based petit bourgeoisie—chiefs, politicians, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs—a class which was, for the most part, a deliberate creation of the Bantustan policy of the South African state (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 101-02; Southall 1983, pp. 173-94). Moreover, the interests of this class were tied directly to the apartheid-fostered notion of separate development: the power of the politicians was linked to territorial segregation and support from the South African government; African entrepreneurs benefited from government aid and from protection from White competition (Wolpe 1984, pp. 246-47). Yet the bantustan elites are but part of the picture. Also expanding in numbers are other fractions of the emerging petit bourgeois and middle classes: an urban commercial class, managers, professionals, and intellectuals—each with different interests with respect to existing social relations. A final addition to the African eth-class matrix was the rapidly growing number of students, whose declassé position (given the closed opportunity structure) has transformed them into a potent political force (Bigras 1986; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 185). In sum, the last four decades have seen
the evolution of an increasingly complex and differentiated class structure within the African population.

One important consequence of this proliferation of eth-class "fractions" is a multiplicity of group interests. As we have already noted, the Bantustan policy has resulted in the establishment of a comprador class whose economic interests are seemingly tied to apartheid—and stand in opposition to other African eth-classes. Furthermore, even though the remaining African eth-classes are united by opposition to apartheid, they also contain a diverse array of potentially divisive interests. For example, the African middle class (e.g., professionals, intellectuals) has served as the vanguard of resistance to White domination. Nevertheless, the common interests which unite them with the working classes stem more from the political (i.e., lack of political and civil rights) as opposed to the economic aspects of their oppression. As a consequence, the African middle class could potentially be pried away from the resistance movement by reforms which remove the barriers to their advancement. Indeed, this separation of African eth-classes could be viewed as the underlying goal of the government in its recent decisions to scrap aspects of petty apartheid and to extend limited urban rights; however, reforms to date have been too limited to achieve this goal (cf. Adam 1979a, p. 136). In contrast to the middle classes, the African working classes would seemingly have a
broader economic agenda (e.g., higher wages, an end to the migrant labor system, land redistribution) which would require more drastic social changes. The point to be emphasized here is that there is no monolithic "African" resistance to apartheid, but rather an alliance between eth-classes with interests which are overlapping yet discrete (and contain potential contradictions).

Politically, African mobilization reflects changes in both the eth-class structure and the intergroup arena. Continued mass action over four decades and the centrality of the Black-White divide as maintained by the apartheid state has resulted in an ever-broadening adherence to an African national identity--an ongoing process of ethnic merger despite government attempts to maintain ethnic divisions. From an organizational standpoint, while the ANC remains the core of African resistance, the political terrain has become infinitely more varied. Eth-class differentiation and the exigencies of struggle have led to a proliferation of organizations. Increased proletarianization and the legalization of unions has produced an enlarged working class presence (e.g., NUM, COSATU). The expansion of education and the oppressive nature of the Bantu Educational system gave rise to student resistance organizations (e.g., Congress of South African Students). African mobilization includes cultural nationalist groups (e.g., Azanian People's Organization) and organizations reflecting the interests of
the reserve leadership (e.g., Inkatha). Even the broad-based United Democratic Front is an umbrella for an array of organizations. What provides the basis for cooperation among most of these organizations (i.e., an eth-class alliance) is the totality of White domination—which creates a commonality of interests—and the "cement" of African nationalism.

If strategy (e.g., reform vs. repression) constitutes a dilemma for the White eth-classes, it is also a problematic issue for the African resistance movement. A military victory is unthinkable for the foreseeable future, yet Whites are unlikely to make meaningful changes voluntarily. Given the continuing total absence of African political rights (the emergence of an unrestricted franchise would constitute an effective transfer of power to the African majority), change cannot be sought through existing political institutions. What remains is mass action (perhaps accompanied by underground warfare)—the use of economic power (i.e., the fact that the South African economy cannot exist without African labor) and large scale protests to make existing social relations untenable. Yet even this strategy has its difficulties: the willingness of the state to use repressive measures has kept the cost of resistance high; the continuing banning of organizations and silencing of the African leadership inhibits group mobilization. Neverthe-
less, the ongoing trend in the 1970s and 1980s has been the expansion of the kind of mass action described above.

From our perspective, the above analysis contains significant implications for the evolution of African eth-classes. Mass action requires mass ideologies and a program which is sufficiently general so as to appeal to a broad range of interests (e.g., one person, one vote; legalization of organizations). Consequently, we would expect a continuing upsurge in African nationalism as a unifying force for group mobilization. At the same time, to the extent that proletarianization and exploitation of the working classes continue, we would also expect the further development of working class consciousness. As we have asserted before, identities emerge, persist, change, and disappear in the course of eth-class struggle.

Current scene. The post-1984 era has brought an intensification of previous trends. A dramatic increase in African resistance has intensified the level of intergroup conflict. In response, the South African state has imposed a draconian state of emergency, engaged in mass arrests and detentions, banned organizations and leaders, and imposed severe restrictions upon media coverage of African protests. Given the willingness of the government to use violence in an attempt to control African protests, South African society has been enmeshed in a low level civil war, with an annual death toll of several hundred. Nevertheless, while
the imposition of the state of emergency over several years has resulted in a temporary lull in the level of intergroup conflict, African resistance has not disappeared (e.g., an estimated two million Africans participated in a three-day strike in June of 1988, the 1989 election campaign has sparked organized action by the Mass Democratic Movement). Clearly, the next cycle of resistance and reaction could be even more cataclysmic.

Closely linked to these events has been a deepening of the economic and political crisis. During the past few years South Africa has been rocked by one blow after another: the flight of foreign capital in response to unrest; a decline in the value of the rand and increasing balance of payments problems; fiscal and political pressures upon the government as a result of the increasing cost of security and of the unsuccessful military involvements in Namibia and Angola; and the refusal of foreign banks to make additional loans to South Africa. In addition, the intensification of intergroup conflict has led to expanded international pressure upon the apartheid state, including the imposition of sanctions by the United States, which had hitherto at least tacitly supported the current government. Once again, the South African government was forced to talk of reform and negotiations with the African majority.

With respect to the White eth-classes, the second half of the 1980s has been marked by the persistence of the
intragroup conflicts which had emerged during the previous decade. The Botha government maintained the pattern of rhetoric suggesting significant change followed by minor reforms (a reduction of "petty" apartheid; a pro forma scrapping of the "pass laws", the creation of a tricameral--White, Coloured, and Indian--parliament). Similarly, capital (ever aware of the changing business climate and the reaction of international capital) has continued to push for change, even going so far as to make contact with the ANC in defiance of the government. Nevertheless, neither capital nor the government has demonstrated a willingness to contemplate significant power sharing, let alone meet the demands of the African majority. Caught in the contradictions of reform, the dominant eth-classes have also come under mounting pressure from the White petit bourgeois and working classes, both of which feel increasingly threatened by the course of events. Moreover, following the failure of "separate development," White politics suffer from the absence of a unifying ideology (cf. Adam--1979a--on "survival politics"). The result has been a dramatic growth in the political strength of the right (e.g., the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement) and a lesser but still significant growth in the left opposition, to the extent that the Nationalist Party was faced with the loss or reduction of its parliamentary majority in the September 1989 elections. While the new de Klerk government appears to be
adopting a more conciliatory approach towards the African population (e.g., increased toleration of protest, release of political prisoners, tacit acceptance of the ANC), the outcome of the still-unresolved political struggle within the White community will influence the course of the larger Black-White conflict.

Likewise, the African eth-classes continue to grapple with the same issues as before. Mass resistance has persisted; however, mobilization has been limited by ongoing repression and the banning of organizations. Accordingly, the search for effective strategies of resistance continues. In addition, ongoing conflicts between eth-class fractions (e.g., between "comrades" and "fathers" in the townships) and increased intragroup violence threatens to divide the African liberation movement. Finally, any political negotiations with the apartheid state will pose a new set of strategic and organizational dilemmas, as well as the potential for new intragroup eth-class conflict. Thus, a major challenge for the anti-apartheid forces will be to maintain their eth-class alliance in the face of mounting fissiparous tendencies.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter we have applied our theoretical framework for the study of ethnic relations to the South African case. As we stated at the outset, our purposes in doing so were twofold. First, by employing our model for the analy-
sis of a particular historical case, we intended to demonstrate its utility. Secondly, through this application, we hoped to be able to refine our framework. In this summary, we will focus upon the first issue; that is, the degree to which our framework is useful for understanding the evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa. The second issue, modification of the framework in light of our case studies, will be addressed in the final chapter.

Throughout our analysis, we stressed two basic themes. On a general level, we emphasized the role of capitalist development in shaping initial intergroup contact and in setting the context for intergroup interaction. Thus, the changing nature of economic life (i.e., forces and relations of production) gives a dynamic aspect to ethnic relations. On a more specific level (i.e., within the environment created by capitalist development), we focused upon intergroup resource competition (i.e., eth-class struggle) as the primary factor in the evolution of group identities. Social groups constantly redefine themselves and their relations with other groups as they pursue material interests. As we conducted our exploration of the South African case, we did so over a long period of time (1652-present) in order to capture the historical evolution of intergroup relations. The following is a reprise of the major themes raised by the application of our theoretical framework.
In examining the impact of capitalist development upon intergroup relations, we asserted that events in a particular society cannot be understood apart from global capitalist development. South Africa, like most of the non-European world, was shaped by the wave of European expansion which resulted in unprecedented levels of intergroup contact and social change. The fact that South Africa was initially colonized by the Dutch East India Company was reflected in both the emergence of a Dutch settler population and in the limited degree of settlement prior to 1800. Even more significant for the course of intergroup relations was the "second colonization" of South Africa by Great Britain in the early nineteenth century. This left South Africa with two settler populations (the British were not immigrants but rather a dominant colonial group) and meant that its economic and political development would be shaped by British imperial interests (e.g., protection of British interests vis-a-vis other core powers in the "race for Africa"). As we saw in our historical narrative, this led to the British-Boer conflict which dominated nineteenth-century South Africa and culminated in the South African War.

The impact of these "external" forces did not end with the independence of South Africa in 1910. For example, the nature of post-colonial society was shaped by British policies (e.g., deferment of the question of African franchise rights until after independence; the British decision not to
integrate Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland into the Union of South Africa). Structural changes in the world-economy—the decline of British hegemony, the emergence of transnational corporations as a vehicle for core investment—had important implications for South African society. Throughout the twentieth century wars and global economic cycles affected intergroup relations in South Africa (e.g., the post-World War I profitability crisis which subsequently led to the Rand Rebellion and the Pact Government). At times, external actors even exerted a direct influence upon South African intergroup relations (e.g., support for the ANC; international condemnation of apartheid; economic sanctions). The point is: not only did the dynamics of global capitalist development bring specific groups into contact with one another in South Africa, but they also continuously (even after the colonial era) shaped the environment in which these groups interacted. Consequently, we believe that any analysis of intergroup relations should take the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy as a point of departure.

At the macro level of analysis (societal as opposed to global) we asserted that South African capitalist development itself played a major role in shaping the course of ethnic relations. In other words, economic relations within a society determine the context in which groups interact. During the colonial period, a key factor affecting intergroup relations was the underdevelopment of South Africa;
that is, the limited development of the forces of production, the economic infrastructure, and the domestic market. From the standpoint of intergroup interaction, slow economic development was linked to limited immigration, the isolation of the interior, and the emergence of a specific set of production relations (e.g., the "feudal-like" relations of extensive agriculture). These processes in turn gave rise to a particular eth-class structure (e.g., a homogeneous Boer independent class, an African peasantry, the absence of other European immigrant groups) in which each group had specific material interests.

Even more significant was the impact of capitalist development over time; that is, the effect of changes in the forces and relations of production. For example, the mining revolution (i.e., the development of large-scale diamond and gold mining) effected the transformation of production relations (e.g., the emergence of a wage-dependent working class, the evolution of monopoly capital) which in turn altered ethnic relations (e.g., intensification of the British-Boer conflict, proletarianization of Africans and Afrikaners). Moreover, the specific nature of mining (i.e., the profit/cost structure and the need for cheap labor) had a major influence upon subsequent eth-class relations in the twentieth century (e.g., the migrant labor system, the colour bar, etc.). Over the long run, mining triggered a change in the forces of production (i.e., industrialization)
which resulted in a further restructuring of intergroup interaction—a pattern which continued with subsequent events (e.g., the crisis of the 1940s, the industrial boom of the 1960s, the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s). The key issue here is change: the progressive development of the forces of production and the contradictions inherent in any social formation mean that ethnic relations take place in a continuously evolving intergroup arena. Both the eth-class structure and the interests of individual groups are altered by the nature of capitalist development.

At our third level of analysis, that of intergroup interaction, we examined the role of eth-class struggle in shaping group identities. This required an emphasis upon particular eth-classes (e.g., the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie) and the strategies which they employ in order to pursue their material interests. Initially, the focus of eth-class struggle in South Africa was resource competition for land, a process whose denouement included the conquest of South Africa by European settlers, the transformation of traditional African societies, and the establishment of relations of domination and subordination between Europeans and Africans. This gave rise to a new set of social relationships which, like any social system, contained elements of both reproduction (e.g., control mechanisms, ideologies, and economic practices) and change (e.g., struggle by subordinate groups). Our central point here is that intergroup
relations are never static: they change not only (as discussed above) as a result of external forces and the evolving nature of production, but also as a consequence of the actions of social groups pursuing material interests. While later eth-class struggles in South African may have had different foci (e.g., labor market competition in the early twentieth century, the political struggles of the post-1948 era) and different strategies, the underlying dynamic—the pursuit of material interests—remains the same.

With respect to our core issue—the evolution of ethnic identities—this chapter traced the impact of intergroup interaction upon the various South African groups. From the outset, one major process entailed the deculturation of natives and the transformation of identities—a dynamic which was manifest most spectacularly in the disappearance of the Khoikhoi and the emergence of the "Coloured" group. For the African majority, a slower process of deculturation resulted in the creation of a "colonized" identity shaped by European settler society (indeed, the ability of settlers to affect African identities—e.g., via the mission schools, the "ethnic weapon", and the system of "Bantu Education"—has been an important factor in the persistence of European domination). During the same epoch, a second key development was the emergence of Boer/Afrikaner identity, a phenomenon linked both to resistance to British hegemony and their own assertion of domination over the African peoples. In
each of the above cases, group identities evolved through interaction with other groups.

This process was no less evident in the twentieth century, as new conditions generated new struggles and the further change of group identities. Indeed, eth-class struggle and ethnic change seemingly gained momentum as a result of the increased intergroup interaction which accompanied industrialization, proletarianization, and urbanization. In the Afrikaner case, we saw ethnic assertion (i.e., an alliance between eth-classes) in response to the economic superiority of British South Africans and the desire to maintain advantages with respect to the African population. This led to ethnic mobilization and the capture of state power (due to their weak economic position, Afrikaners needed state power in order to attain group interests), which in turn produced further changes in identity (e.g., an increasing emphasis on the need to maintain White dominance). Also occurring at the same time was the emergence of African nationalism, a process which involved the merger of subgroups into a pan-ethnic African identity (a process which to a lesser degree involved the forging of cross-class alliances). As we asserted in the chapter, this mobilization was a reaction to the overtly racial (i.e., ethnic) nature of Afrikaner petty bourgeois domination and the use of state power to maintain this state of affairs. In both the African and the Afrikaner cases, group identities have
evolved as a result of the exigencies of intergroup conflict and competition.

Throughout this analysis, eth-class has served as an essential organizing concept inasmuch as it has enabled us to account for intragroup (and intraclass) divisions which give rise to different interests. At first, the South African eth-class structure was marked by limited intragroup differentiation; that is, the correspondence between ethnicity and class was virtually total (e.g., the homogeneity of the Afrikaner independent class). From our vantage point, this had the effect of solidifying group identities and boundaries so that ethnic assertion was in effect also class assertion (e.g., Boer farmers vs. African labor or British colonial administration). These interrelationships were transformed by the mining revolution and its aftermath, as increased differentiation produced a more complex eth-class structure. As a consequence, we found it necessary to examine the interests and actions of a constantly evolving array of eth-classes--the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, British capital, the White working class, partially proletarianized African labor, the African petit bourgeoisie, and the reserve-based comprador class. The central finding of this analysis was that there were no Afrikaner or African (or Black or White) interests as such, only those of eth-classes or eth-class alliances. Ethnic identities (and racial ideologies) served to cement eth-class alliances
(e.g., the role of Afrikaner nationalism in uniting the petit bourgeoisie and working classes); they remained an effective basis for group mobilization due to the compatibility of interests between the different eth-class "fractions" of each group (e.g., the African petit bourgeoisie and working classes have a common interest in overturning a set of social relations which restricts Africans as Africans).

The final analytical concept which we employed was the notion of intergroup arena; that is, the general environment in which groups come into contact. In our examination of the South African case, we noted the impact of a myriad of variables—e.g., geographical location, ecology, mineral wealth, economic cycles—upon eth-class struggle. Each of these "background variables" shaped intergroup relations by changing interests, guiding strategies, and affecting the power of groups to achieve their goals. For example, we found that demography (i.e., the relative size of groups) played a particularly salient role in determining group strategies. Factors such as the overwhelming African majority, the sixty-forty split of the settler community between Afrikaners and British, and the small size of the Coloured and Indian groups all contributed to the historical evolution of South African ethnic relations (e.g., the strategies involved in establishing settler control over the African majority). Accordingly, one might wonder how the
course of events could have been altered if British settlers had achieved a majority within the White community as had been envisioned by Lord Milner at the turn of the century. Would a politically dominant British capitalist class have erected a less rigid system of domination than apartheid? Would an Afrikaner minority have adopted a secessionist strategy (perhaps in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State)? Would a less rigid but still onerous system of exploitation have led to the more rapid assertion of African mobilization? How would the various eth-classes have responded to these changed circumstances? While these questions are hypothetical, they underscore our larger point: different intergroup arenas produce different eth-class interests and, hence, a different evolutionary course for group identities.

As is evident even in this brief summary, our analysis of the evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa drew upon many different threads in order to explain the unfolding of events. If there is one overarching conclusion which emerges from our consideration of South African ethnic relations, it is that they are not the product of primordial ties or racist ideologies, but instead reflect the material interests of groups (which can, as we have noted on several occasions, be affected by ideologies stemming from previous interaction). Thus, apartheid is best studied not as an ideological system or a feudal relic, but as a changing
system of social relations which (although conditioned by past events) reflects both the interests and the constraints of particular eth-classes in a specific context. As eth-class struggle continues in South Africa, we may anticipate yet the further transformation of intergroup relations and ethnic identities.
CHAPTER VI

1. As we indicated in Chapter I, South Africa is currently viewed as semiperipheral; that is, as containing a mixture of core and peripheral activities (Arrighi and Drangel 1986). Nevertheless, given what we believe to be the relativity of the semiperiphery-periphery distinction as well as the clearly peripheral nature of South Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is our opinion that the South African case is best analyzed in the context of the periphery.

At this point, we might ask: Why choose South Africa as a peripheral case study? We believe that there are distinct advantages to the selection of South Africa. The stark nature of its ethnic structure has attracted considerable scholarly attention, thereby providing a rich store of material for secondary analysis. Moreover, the length of the South African experience (both colonial and post-colonial) incorporates a broader range of intergroup interaction, thus providing more "data" for analysis. Finally, South Africa constitutes an excellent laboratory for application of those precepts—the influence of capitalist development, intergroup material conflict, and eth-class struggle—which comprise the core of our theoretical framework.

2. As a refueling station for ships, Cape Town offered the advantages (vs. other African ports) of a temperate climate, local water, and a small native population (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 2).

3. VOC is a popular historical acronym for the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Nederlandsche Ge-Opgevoerde Oost-Indische Compagnie = United Netherlands Chartered East India Company—cf. Katzen 1969, p. 183). Henceforth, we will refer to the Dutch East India Company as either the VOC or the Company.

4. For a discussion of the issues involved in the choice of the Dutch East India Company between trade and colonization, see Wallerstein (1980, pp. 47-51).

5. Indeed, for much of its tenure the VOC viewed the Cape Colony as a net economic loss (Katzen 1969, pp. 202-03).
6. Indeed, VOC instructions for Jan van Riebeeck, the first governor of the settlement, emphasized that settlement should be limited (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 2; Katzen 1969, p. 189).

7. Indeed, the survival of a significant proportion of the native population (we are referring here to the Bantu-speaking groups as opposed to the Khoikhoi and the San) is an historical fact which in itself sets the South African experience apart from that of other European settler societies.

8. For an interesting comparison of European-native relations in South Africa and the United States, see Fredrickson (1981, pp. 3-53).

9. Although contact and conflict between the Dutch settlers and the Nguni-speaking peoples began in the late eighteenth century, consideration of this subject will be deferred to our discussion of the next historical era (1800-1910), which is when the bulk of the struggle occurred.

10. The Khoikhoi (pejoratively called "Hottentots" by the Dutch) and the San (called "Bushmen" by the Dutch) were "click" language speaking pastoralists and hunters who were physically and linguistically distinct from the other native peoples of South Africa. For a discussion of the Khoikhoi and San peoples and their societies, see M. Wilson (1969a).

11. For a discussion of the uniqueness of the "colonial" policy of the VOC—that is, how the desire to maintain trade relations provided an incentive for accommodation with native peoples—see Wallerstein (1980, p. 48) and Fredrickson (1981, pp. 19-20). On the other hand, if circumstances seemed to favor the acquisition of wealth instead of trade, the VOC could be particularly ruthless (Fredrickson 1981, p. 19; Magubane 1979, pp. 26-30).

12. According to M. Wilson (1969a, pp. 67-8), the Khoikhoi population of the Cape Colony dwindled from an estimated 200,000 in 1652 to approximately 20,000 in 1805.

13. The Bastaards or Griquas were a persons of mixed ancestry (Khoikhoi, Dutch, slave) who fled the Cape area and settled to the north of the colony. Described as "Europeanized" (e.g., religion, language, use of European clothes and arms), the Bastaards/Griquas established themselves as a new group. During the nineteenth century, however, they were absorbed by the
expansion of European colonial society and disappeared as a separate group (Macmillan 1963, p. 57; M. Wilson 1969a, p. 70).

14. The impact of this acculturation and assimilation was not lost upon the neighboring Nguni-speaking peoples, who referred to the early nineteenth century Khoikhoi as "the people without customs" (M. Wilson 1969b, p. 105). In comparison to the Khoikhoi, the fate of the San was even more stark (cf. M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 70-1). As the combined population of the Cape area increased the supply of game (upon which the San hunters were dependent) decreased, thus forcing the San to turn to cattle rustling for survival. As a consequence, they were hunted and exterminated in a genocidal manner. Those who did survive were absorbed into the Coloured group.

15. For further discussion of the notion of contradictory class location, see Wright et al. (1982, p. 710).

16. The initial plan of the VOC called for farming to be carried out by company soldier/farmers; however, the low productivity of this workforce forced the Company to encourage the establishment of free landholders in the hope that economic self-interest would inspire greater productivity—to the ultimate benefit of the VOC (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 5).

17. For a comment on how these conflicts were magnified in later South African history (to serve as an ideological cornerstone of modern Afrikaner identity), see de Kiewiet (1957, p. 8).

18. Environmental/economic factors which promoted migration into the interior included: abundant land (and the weakness of Khoikhoi resistance); low agricultural productivity (which required large landholdings and expansion to accommodate population growth); and the lack of markets, labor, and capital (which precluded alternatives to herding). For further discussion of these issues, see Katzen (1969, pp. 208-12) and de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 11-15).

19. Indeed, during the early years of European settlement, the Company went so far as to consider building a canal and/or a hedge to separate the settlers and the Khoikhoi (de Kiewiet, 1957, p. 20).

20. In essence, this created a self-fulfilling cycle. European settlement was tolerated due to the perceived unreliability of the Khoikhoi as trading partners. As
European expansion disrupted the native way of life, the Company became increasingly dependent upon White farmers and herders and, hence, more tolerant of further settlement (Fredrickson 1981, p. 33).

21. The small number of European immigrants, the existence of alternatives to unskilled labor (e.g., the availability of land for agriculture or herding), and the perceived social instability inherent in sizable White working class, meant that other sources of labor would have to be sought (Katzen 1969, pp. 200-02; Fredrickson 1981, p. 67). Similarly, while cattleless Khoikhoi could often be induced to labor for Europeans, the proximity of their own society made it difficult for Europeans to find a sufficient supply of stable, long-term labor. These circumstances were remarkably to those in the Southern United States as described in Chapter V.

22. For a more detailed discussion of the VOC debate on the relative merits of slavery and free labor, see Katzen (1969, pp. 200-04).

23. For an in-depth discussion of South African slavery, including interesting comparisons to the Southern United States, see Fredrickson (1981, pp. 54-93).

24. This process of miscegenation was not random with respect to choice of partners, at least from the perspective of the European population. Fredrickson (1981, pp. 110-117) describes a preference system in which persons of mixed or Asian background were favored over East Africans or Khoikhoi. Indeed, Dutch-Khoikhoi unions faced greater social disapproval and only tended to occur along the frontier. It was the socially outcast offspring of these latter unions who formed the bulk of the Bastaard (later Griqua) population mentioned earlier (cf. Fredrickson 1981, pp. 123-24).

25. Indeed, several studies cited by Fredrickson (1981, pp. 114-15) suggest that a considerable portion of the current South African Afrikaner population could be said to have mixed ancestry. Utilizing genealogical data, Fredrickson (1981, p. 115) calculates that approximately "twenty-four percent of the founding marriages taking place between 1688 and 1807 involved one spouse, usually female, who had some known degree of non-White ancestry."

26. According to de Kiewiet (1957, p. 30), the total population of the Cape in 1795 consisted of 13,500
persons in Cape Town and the western districts and an estimated 7000-8000 persons in the rest of the colony.

27. For discussion of conflicts between the Boer independent class and the VOC, see Katzen (1969, pp. 227-28), Macmillan (1963, pp. 43-47), and Davenport (1969, pp. 311-12).

28. This changing of the colonial guard was not marked by armed conflict; however, control of the Cape Colony oscillated over a period of eleven years at the beginning of the century. The British first occupied the Cape in 1795, then returned control to the Dutch (Batavian Republic) in 1803, and then assumed final control of the area in 1806 (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 30-33; Davenport 1969, p. 273).

29. According to de Kiewiet (1957, p. 70) net European immigration to South Africa during the period between 1820 and 1860 averaged roughly 750 persons per year.

30. By African we refer to the native peoples of South Africa other than the Khoikhoi and the San, those who are often loosely characterized as Bantu-speaking peoples. The major division within this group is between the Nguni-speaking peoples of southeastern South Africa (of whom the Xhosa and the Zulus were the most significant, but whose ranks also included the Ndebele and the Swazi) and the peoples of the northern interior (of whom the Sotho—subdivided into the Southern Sotho, the Northern Sotho, and the Tswana—were the largest group, but also including the Venda and the Tsonga. For an extensive discussion of these peoples, see M. Wilson (1969b; 1969d).

31. According to Thompson (1969c, p. 400), approximately 5000 Afrikaner voortrekkers had crossed the Orange by 1837, a number which roughly tripled in the next eight years. Physically, the Great Trek consisted of two separate movements: one northward along the high veld, where Boer migration was ultimately constrained by the Kalahari desert to the west and by environments conducive to malaria to the north and east (e.g., near the Limpopo River and towards the coastal lowlands); the other (initially more popular) northeast, then south through passes in the Drakensburg Mountains into southern Natal (Macmillan 1963, pp. 200-07; Thompson 1969c, p. 409; 1969b, p. 358).

32. According to Davenport (1969, p. 274), the White settler population expanded from 8554 in 1773 to 42,217 in 1819 to 187,439 in 1865.
33. As Macmillan (1963, pp. 195-99) indicates, this image is overstated inasmuch as the Great Trek was much less sudden than is often portrayed in history.

34. The initial British reaction to the Great Trek was weak: the colonial administration opposed Boer emigration yet made no decisive response (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 61; Thompson 1969c, p. 410). For cogent analyses of British imperial imperatives during this period, see de Kiewiet (1957, p. 65); Thompson 1969a, p. 368). For an enlightening discussion of British colonial "models" (e.g., settler societies such as Canada and Australia vs. colonies such as India—with South Africa located somewhere in between), see Thompson (1969b, p. 248).

35. During the following three decades (1836-67), British-Boer relations exhibited varying levels of conflict and cooperation. In general, Great Britain was willing to countenance Boer autonomy (which, after all, relieved Britain of the cost of governing—Macmillan 1963, pp. 324-25) as long as the Boer republics posed no threat to British imperial interests (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 65; Thompson, 1969a, p. 368). For their part, the Boers were too divided and too occupied with subduing the Africans to mount a significant challenge to British hegemony (Thompson, 1969c, pp. 425-35). This uneasy relationship between British and Boers was manifest in the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions (1852/54) in which Britain recognized the independence of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State—a tacit alliance between European groups where Britain agreed to supply arms to the Boers so as to enable the extension of White rule (Thompson 1969c, pp. 420-24; Fredrickson 1981, p. 187).

36. News of the discovery of the diamond fields was presented by the Colonial Secretary to the Cape House of Assembly with the now-famous (and prescient) words (quoted in Houghton 1969, p. 11): "Gentlemen, this is the rock on which the future success of South Africa will be built."

37. The Witwatersrand mines did not constitute the first discovery of gold in South Africa (small findings had been reported in the South African Republic as early as 1868—Innes 1984, p. 45); however, the scope of the Witwatersrand mines—described as the greatest in history (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 115-17)—makes 1886 the baseline for discussion of the influence of gold upon South African society.
38. For detailed data on South African gold output, see Innes (1984, pp. 246-47).

39. Indeed, without the gold and diamond industries, the subsequent evolution of South Africa would probably have been more similar to that of Southern Rhodesia Zimbabwe (cf. Arrighi 1979, pp. 184-90).

40. For more detailed discussion of the social and economic effects of the South African mining revolution, see de Kiewiet (1957); van Onselen (1979); Martin (1987); Magubane (1979); and Houghton (1969).

41. For example, Southall (1983, pp. 70-71) describes a measurable impact of mining upon native agriculture as far away as Pondoland on the border between the Cape Colony and Natal.

42. The emergence of South African monopoly capital also had important political ramifications. Rhodes' British South Africa company was a major force in extending British control into the interior of Africa (e.g., Bechuanaland and the Rhodesias), while Rhodes himself served as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in the 1890s.

43. The group system, as developed in the South African gold industry, entailed combining finance houses into groups which in turn controlled (as the dominant minority partner) several mining companies. This system enabled the industry to amass large amounts of capital while distributing (and thereby minimizing) risk, with the added advantage of maintaining liquidity for future investment—and even greater control of the industry (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 54-56).

44. Indeed, a major objective of the Chamber of Mines (an organization of monopoly capital in the gold industry) was the procurement of a stable supply of cheap labor (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 57-69).

45. For example, in his discussion of South Africa in 1870, Thompson (1969b, p. 245) describes five types of societies: independent African chiefdoms, protectorates (e.g., the Southern Sotho), small autonomous communities (e.g., the Griqua), the Afrikaner republics, and the British colonies.

46. Note the resemblance of this conflict to the conflict between Europeans and Native Americans—which we described as a "national" conflict in Chapter V.
47. The nineteenth century African societies which faced this European invasion ranged from small chiefdoms to large kingdoms (cf. M. Wilson 1969b; 1969c; 1969d). From a military standpoint, African societies had been weakened by rivalries between groups and by internal tendencies towards division, a situation often exploited by Europeans (Thompson 1969c, p. 438). These weaknesses were exacerbated by the Difagane and Mfecane—"forced migration" and "crushing of peoples" (Martin 1987, p. 864)—a domino-like series of wars and dislocations triggered by the Zulu conquests of the 1820s (Thompson 1969c).

48. For an illustration of the relationship between resources and intergroup conflict, see de Kiewiet (1957, p. 75) on the link between drought and border conflict.

49. Examples of African resistance abound. The Northern Sotho drove the Boers out of the northern Transvaal in the 1860s and 1870s; the Southern Sotho defeated an invasion by the Orange Free State in the 1850s; and the Zulu annihilated a force of 1600 British soldiers at Isandlwana in 1879 (Thompson 1969b, 1969c). On the other hand, the superior firepower of the Europeans often resulted in unequal outcomes (e.g., a small force of voortrekkers defeated and killed a much larger number of Zulus at Blood River in 1838—Thompson 1969a, p. 362).

50. For example, the estimated population of Natal in 1870 included 250,000 Africans, as opposed to only 18,000 Europeans (Thompson 1969a, p. 387).


52. Clearly, we are simplifying the complex process of incorporation of Africans into colonial society. The degree of autonomy/control varied in conjunction with such factors as location, degree of economic interdependence, etc.

53. For example, cultural diffusion (via trade) created new wants which in turn induced Africans to enter the colonial economy (e.g., either via cash crop production or wage labor). These external economic links weakened traditional African polity by eliminating economic basis of the power of African chiefs (cf. Thompson 1969a, p. 335). We should note, however, that this process occurred in varying degrees for different
African peoples.

54. Note, for example, the following recommendation of the Natal "Kaffir Commission" of the early 1850s (cited in Magubane, 1979, p.61):

All Kaffirs should be ordered to go decently clothed. This measure would at once tend to increase the number of laborers, because many would be obliged to work to produce the means of buying clothing; it would also add to the general revenue of the colony through Customs duties.

55. According to Thompson (1969a, p. 366), the voortrekkers described Africans as skepsels, or creatures of a different sub-species. In Natal, a commission empaneled to make policy recommendations regarding Africans described them as follows (cited in Thompson 1969a, p. 384):

When not effectually restrained and directed by the strong arm of power, the true and universal character of the Kafirs, as framed by their education, habits, and associations, is at once superstitious and warlike. Their estimate of the value of human life is very low; plunder and bloodshed are engagements with which their circumstances have rendered them familiar since their childhood; they are crafty and cunning; at once indolent and excitable; averse to labour; but bloodthirsty and cruel when their passions are inflamed.

56. On this point, see also Fanon (1968, pp. 236-48).

57. Given the role of Europeans—who were more race conscious (i.e., in terms of emphasizing the Black-White division and in terms of asserting White superiority) and who tended to view all Africans as a unitary bloc (more so than the Africans themselves)—in creating this new African ethnic identity, one might refer to this identity as a "Kaffir" identity (using the derogatory European term for Africans to reflect the ability of dominant groups to impose—and to debase—ethnic identities).

58. As a footnote to our discussion of conflict between Europeans and Africans, we should note its impact upon the Coloured population who figured so prominently in the first one hundred and fifty years of colonial history. With the expansion of South African society and the wholesale incorporation of African (i.e., Bantu-speaking) peoples, the influence of the Coloured group was reduced dramatically—except perhaps in the Cape
Colony--due to their small numbers relative to Africans. While some Coloured groups persisted along the frontiers until the 1870s--e.g., the Griqua states (cf. Thompson 1969b)--a more common process was the continued deculturation and amalgamation of Khoikhoi, San, and others (e.g., ex-slaves, persons with a "mixed"--including partially European background) into a mostly europeanized "Coloured" ethnic group (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 131-35; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 38-42; M. Wilson 1969c, p. 248). In both cases, Coloureds were absorbed into South African colonial society as an intermediate and marginal group.

59. As mentioned in our discussion of the pre-1800 era, the interests of settlers were different from that of the colonial power, even when this involved Dutch settlers and the Dutch-controlled VOC. Thus, we would suggest that while ethnonational divisions may have amplified or even added a new dimension to this colonial power-settler conflict, they did not cause it. Consequently, we reject the idealist interpretation (such as that of Davenport--1969, p. 277) of this conflict as one between pre-Enlightenment Calvinism and nineteenth century liberalism.

60. There did exist early Boer ethnonational resistance to British rule, particularly in the areas of language and education. On the other hand, the improvement in the economic position of the settlers (i.e., the effects of British liberalism vs. VOC monopoly control) had a dampening effect upon this conflict.

61. British settlers were more likely to be urban dwellers, merchants, and capitalist farmers (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 39; Davenport 1969, p. 274).

62. For natives in the British colonies, equality under the law did not mean social equality. Property qualifications for the franchise limited the native vote, while pass systems and "masters and servants" laws maintained a supply of cheap native labor. In addition, planned programs for native education and development were never carried out as Britain was unwilling to absorb the costs (Thompson 1969a, p. 375; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 35-51). For an enlightening discussion of the whole phenomenon of "Cape liberalism", see Fredrickson (1981, pp. 182-86).

63. Moreover, the ideological difference between British and Boers was less than would appear on the surface. When objective material circumstances were similar--as
was the case with British settlers in Natal (Thompson 1969a, p. 383)—there was a convergence of attitudes towards natives.

64. For a description of the annexation of the Transvaal and subsequent events, see Thompson (1969d, pp. 295-300) and de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 103-08). The British annexation of the Transvaal was made possible by a state of anarchy which existed in the Transvaal in the mid 1870s; however, Britain was unwilling to invest sufficient resources for effective rule. Afrikaner rebellion in 1880 resulted in the military defeat and withdrawal of Great Britain and the restoration of Afrikaner self government via the Pretoria Convention of 1881.

65. One key aspect of this identity should be noted; namely, the fusion of Afrikaner identity with the "rightful" domination of "inferior" Africans—the notion of baaskap (cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 193).

66. From an ideological standpoint, see Thompson's (1969d, pp. 301-05) interesting discussion of the role of the Cape-based Afrikaner Bond in providing a cultural base for Afrikaner nationalism.

67. Afrikaner strategies included: attempts at expansion (e.g., the annexation of Stellaland and Goshen to the west and Swaziland to the east); the search for an outlet to the sea beyond British control (i.e., the rail link to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese Mozambique and the use of tariffs to favor this route over ports in the Cape Colony and Natal); political flirtation with Germany; and restriction of the political rights of non-Afrikaner Europeans in the Transvaal (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 110-11, 122-26; Thompson 1969d, pp. 311-12).

68. From the vantage point of the gold industry, the policies of the South African Republic (e.g., tariffs, monopolies) and the political division of South Africa constituted a drag on profits (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 134-35).

69. For a more detailed discussion, see Thompson (1969d, pp. 313-24; de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 126-40).

70. For an outline of the military strengths and weaknesses of each side, see Thompson (1969e, pp. 325-26).

71. For example, see Marais (1961) and Le May (1965). See also the references cited by Thompson (1969e, p. 325).
72. On one hand, the South African War bears interesting similarities to the U.S. Civil War, which we interpreted in Chapter V as primarily a class conflict between the industrial North and the Southern plantation class (albeit with ideological rallying points—e.g., states' rights, antislavery). On the other hand, Afrikaner nationalism gives a unique tenor to the South African conflict, inasmuch as "Southerner" never fully emerged as an ethnonational identity in the United States.

73. Symbolically, Vereeniging, the site of the Anglo-Afrikaner treaty ending the South African War, means "union" in Afrikaans (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 143). From an African standpoint, Magubane (1979, p.48) describes the Anglo-Boer War as "a classic case of a 'thieves' falling out" and the Treaty of Vereeniging as a "reconciliation between the intruders." British generosity in victory towards the Afrikaners stands in sharp contrast to their treatment of the Zulus two decades previously (cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 48-49).

74. Some interesting historical similarities exist between the Afrikaners and French-Canadians in Quebec. Both were conquered peoples forcibly absorbed into British-ruled settler societies. Both groups nurtured identities in isolation during the nineteenth century. In both cases it was assumed that modernization would bring assimilation—and in both cases modernization instead contributed to the persistence of group identities.

75. For a discussion of forces promoting union, see Thompson (1969e). One issue of historical significance for the future of South Africa was the fact that the South Africa Act separated the High Commission territories of Southern Rhodesia, Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland from the Union of South Africa (cf. Thompson 1969e, pp. 362-63).

76. During the war, neither the British nor the Boers employed Africans as troops (Thompson 1969e, p.326). Furthermore, Africans were not allowed to participate in the drafting of the South African Constitution and were rendered politically non-existent by provisions which retained the existing colonial franchise laws. This meant that Africans were proscribed from voting in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, while franchise qualifications in Natal and the Cape effectively excluded Africans. For example, in 1910 Whites comprised 85% of the electorate in the Cape (with Coloureds constituting much of the remainder) and 99% of the electorate of Natal (Thompson 1969e, pp. 337-39).
77. According to Fredrickson (1981, pp. 195-96), British racism played a key role in the British willingness to sacrifice African interests. He quotes Lord Milner, British High Commissioner for South Africa during the post-war period, as follows:

A political equality of White and Black is impossible. The White man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many steps above the Black man; steps which it will take the latter centuries to climb, and which it is possible that the vast bulk of the White population may never be able to climb at all.

78. The importance of continued settler dominance was not lost upon the Afrikaners who, due to their lower class position, had the most to lose from any improvement in the status of Africans. In the words of Afrikaner leader Jan Smuts (cited in Magubane--1979, p.52):

two peoples [Black and White] cannot indefinitely go on living side by side without some major future explosion. For this day of reckoning we Whites must prepare. We must see that we have in our power all those things which can insure tactical and military superiority. . . . Manufacturing, industry, wealth, and education must be kept in White hands.

79. The decisions made in the writing of the South African Constitution (British South Africa Act of 1909) played a vital role in shaping the future of South African society. Key elements of this process included: (1) the adoption of existing voting systems (which assured the disenfranchisement of the African population); (2) the establishment of the Dutch language on equal status with English (thereby institutionalizing Afrikaner culture); (3) the establishment of a system of political representation which gave disproportionate influence to rural areas (thus increasing Afrikaner political power); and (4) the retention by Great Britain of its other colonies in Southern Africa--Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland, and the Rhodesias--which meant that they would not be included in the settler-dominated South African state. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Thompson (1969e, pp. 337-39).

80. This is not to assert that the African peoples were in themselves a class, but instead to recognize that they were universally incorporated into the working classes of the colonial economy.
81. As Freund (1988, p. 112) observes, prior to complete subjection Africans were often able to retreat beyond the frontiers of European settlement and thereby preserve the core of traditional economic structures.

82. In his definition of peasantization, Saul (1979, p. 304) emphasizes the "structural subordination" of peasants; that is, their incorporation into a larger system of stratification.

83. As part of the economic incorporation of Africans, colonial administrators and missionaries sought to encourage individual land ownership rather than the traditional communal tenure. For a discussion of this point, see M. Wilson (1969e, p. 60).

84. Land restriction imposed on Africans and unequal access to markets had the effect of limiting the emergence of capitalist agriculture, with the exception of those chiefs and their allies who were able to use extra-economic methods to amass land and cattle (Southall 1983, pp. 85-87). Thus, the African comprador class was able to use its position to become a rural "elite" (within the confines of the African community).

85. One exception to this agricultural underdevelopment was the introduction of Merino sheep, which, according to Houghton (1969, pp. 4-5), "carried the impact of the world market into the interior" of South Africa. Otherwise, farming remained mostly at the subsistence level.

86. This resulted in dramatic declines in productivity, to the extent that traditional grain exporters (e.g., Sotho in Basutoland; Mpondo in the Transkei) lost their ability to produce a surplus (Southall 1983, p. 72; M. Wilson 1969e, p. 69).

87. The status of migrant workers has been the subject of a debate as to whether they constitute a peasantry or a rural proletariat. On one hand, Arrighi (1979, p. 163) described peasants as increasing consumption by "raiding" the industrial economy. Monica Wilson (1969e, p. 68) and Saul (1979, p. 305) would define migrant workers with land rights as peasants. On the other hand, Innes (1984, pp. 60-61) described migrant workers as a proletariat located in rural areas. We would suggest that these peasants are at least partially proletarianized—to the extent that wage labor is necessary for survival—while recognizing that the migratory process limits the emergence of a traditional proletariat. This was especially true in
the latter decades of the nineteenth century.

88. Thus, South Africa experienced the contradictory condition of having both a labor shortage and underemployment (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 83-84).

89. According to Welsh (1969, p. 173), urban Africans in 1911 constituted only 12.6% of the total African population (although the migratory labor pattern undoubtedly meant that a greater proportion of the African population came into contact with urban society).

90. Interestingly, one lever which was not employed was raising wages. As F. Wilson (1969) notes, one tenet of colonial society was the belief that increased wages would only result in fewer hours worked by Africans (i.e., that less labor would be required in order to be able to purchase desired consumer goods). This was at variance with reality: African labor displayed considerable sensitivity to wage fluctuations (Innes 1984, pp. 62-67).

91. There is an interesting similarity between the Glen Grey Act and the Dawes Act (discussed in Chapter V) imposed by Whites upon Native Americans.

92. According to M. Wilson (1969e, p. 65), most Europeans viewed peasant status as a state of "idleness". More telling, perhaps, are the words of a Lieutenant Governor of Natal (quoted by Welsh--1969, p. 176):

   It seems impossible for a body of White men to live in proximity to the coloured races, without a conviction that as the dominant people, they have a right to command the services of the less civilized.

93. As we noted earlier, the key to profitability in gold mining--given that prices were set on the world market (virtually unlimited demand at a fixed price)--was cost control. Since the nature of gold mining in South Africa required a heavy investment in fixed capital (e.g., machinery), the major area for achieving economy (and, hence, insuring profitability) was wages (i.e., variable capital).

94. In other words, the existing wage level assumed that part of the subsistence needs of African workers and their families were being met by a source other than wages paid by the mining industry.
95. Many displaced farmers passed through intermediate steps before entering the wage labor workforce. Some became bywoners (i.e., tenant farmers), while others prospered as petty bourgeois entrepreneurs (e.g., brickmaking, transportation). Ultimately, however, these occupations fell victim to the expansion of market relations (e.g., large industry displaced the independent brickmakers; completion of the rail link to Johannesburg eliminated wagon hauling). For further discussion of this point, see van Onselen (1979); Thompson (1969e, p. 329); and de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 191-96).

96. The importance of cheap African labor was abundantly clear to White South Africans. For example, the Landsdown Commission of 1944 (cited in Magubane--1979, p. 97) commented that:

The gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand has indeed been fortunate in having secured, for its unskilled labour, native peasants who have been prepared to come to the Witwatersrand for periods of labour at comparatively low rates of pay. . . . That the results accruing from this cheap native labour supply have had a profoundly beneficial influence on the general economic development of the Union is a matter that needs no demonstration. Not only has the earth yielded up a great body of wealth which would have remained unexploited, but vast amounts of money have been paid away in wages and put into circulation for the acquiring of equipment and stores necessary for the working of the mines and this, in turn, has had the beneficial effect upon the development of secondary industries.

97. Indeed, as we will see below, the South African state played a unique and central role in industrial development. Beginning with the formation of the state iron and steel corporation (ISCOR) in 1928, government established korporasies came to play an increasingly important role in the South African economy (cf. Davies 1973, pp. 48-49; Southall 1983, p. 27).

99. South Africa was an attractive locus of investment for core capital for a variety of reasons: cheap African labor; low taxes and tariffs; an infrastructure sufficiently developed to support industry; and the distance of South Africa from the gathering storm clouds of European conflict (Magubane 1979, p. 203). For a list of core-based multinationals which established an early presence in South Africa, see Innes (1984, p. 131).

100. For a discussion of the problems of "low grade mines" (i.e., mines with smaller amounts of profitable ore given rising costs), see Johnstone (1987, pp. 102-04). According to the Chamber of Mines, two-thirds of South African gold mines in 1921 were only profitable as a result of the gold premium (Johnstone 1987, p. 130).


102. For a similar argument, see Burawoy (1974, pp. 527-28) on the interaction between base and superstructure in South African society.

103. Our point here is not that these were the only eth-class groupings in early twentieth century South Africa, but merely that they were the most significant political and economic actors. Other eth-classes clearly existed (e.g., Indian and Coloured working classes); however, they played a relatively minor historical role.

104. Our review of the literature found a rather disconcerting array of terms used to describe this eth-class, including "rural bourgeoisie" (Southall 1983, p. 32); "landed upper classes" or "landed aristocracy" (Burawoy 1974, p. 537); "Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" (Magubane 1979, p. 106); and "farmers" (F. Wilson 1969). While this undoubtedly reflects the increasing differentiation among rural Afrikaners, it also indicates a need for further research into the nature of this class. At this juncture, we believe that the term "Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" best captures the intermediate position of this eth-class (i.e., their ability to dominate African labor, their relative weakness vis-a-vis mining capital); however, we recognize that this represents an attempt to capture a continuum which ranges from a "landed aristocracy" comparable to that of the southern United States to small-scale indepen-
dent farmers. In any event, we believe that the exclusive use of such terms as "rural bourgeoisie" or "landed aristocracy" describes an entire class on the basis of a "fraction" of that class.

105. See Thompson (1969e, p. 341) on how British concessions following the South African War encouraged the accommodationist policies of Botha and Smuts. At the same time, this stance caused Botha and Smuts to be viewed as "traitors" by Afrikaner nationalists (Moodie 1975, pp. 82-88). For a discussion of the "internationalism" of Smuts and his role in the British Commonwealth, see Spence (1969, pp. 481-85).

106. This discussion will focus upon the actions and interests of mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie; issues of African working class resistance will be discussed separately below.


108. Due to opposition from Afrikaner agricultural interests, this additional land was not released until after 1936 when the limited African franchise in the Cape was terminated (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 131; Magubane 1979, p. 81).

109. For a description of "farming on the half", "Kaffir farming", and other South African systems of agricultural tenancy, see F. Wilson (1969, pp. 127-29). This provision was not completely successful, as many Africans were able to enter into illegal "squatter" tenancy arrangements with Afrikaner farmers (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 202-03; F. Wilson 1969, p. 130).

110. During the debate on the Natives Land Act, some members of the Labour Party characterized the legislation as a device designed to create "an abundance of cheap Kafir Labour" (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 130). The focus of the Act is stated even more clearly in the words of a prominent Afrikaner politician of the 1930s (Jan Hofmeyr, cited in Fredrickson 1981, p. 244):

   it is inconceivable that the White man should be able to completely dispense with the Black man's labor on his farms, in his mines, in his factories; it is just as inconceivable that there should be set aside for the Black man's occupation land sufficient to provide for all his needs
independent of the White man's wages.

111. For elaboration of this point, see Magubane (1979, pp. 93-97).

112. Indeed, Wolpe (1972, p. 437) maintains that the other provision of the Natives Land Act--the proscription against Whites purchasing land within the reserves--had the consequence of preserving the land base of the reserve economy. This protection of African land, in conjunction with limits on the size of landholdings and the seemingly deliberate underdevelopment of African agriculture, effectively maintained the reserve base of the migrant labor system (Southall 1983, pp. 76-79; Wolpe 1972, p. 438).

113. One effect of the pass system of the early twentieth century was to make it difficult if not impossible to bargain in the labor market. Africans were required to secure a pass within twenty-four hours of arrival in an area; if they had not secured employment within six day, they were subject to arrest and expulsion. In the same vein, passes were also required for Africans to leave mining compounds or to change jobs. For further discussion of this point, see Johnstone (1987, pp. 37-39).

114. Our purpose here in emphasizing the eth-class struggles between mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and between mining capital and the White working class is not to ignore two other significant eth-class issues, African resistance and Afrikaner ethnic assertion. These phenomena will be treated separately below.

115. According to Davies (1973, p.43) and Simons and Simons (1969, p. 271), Afrikaners constituted 75% of the mining labor force by the mid 1920s. Johnstone (1987, p. 105) asserts that this milestone was reached by the end of World War I. In either event, the key issue for our purposes is the increasing entry of Afrikaners into the working class.

116. An important aspect of the wage structure was, as de Kiewiet (1957, p. 210) observed, the absence of a graded wage scale and the existence instead of an abrupt gap between White and African wages. This increased the stake of the White working class in maintaining ethnically-based job distinctions. In the same vein, Simons and Simons (1969, p. 277) suggest that some White miners were both petty-bourgeois contractors and wage laborers to the extent that the
wages of supervisors were linked to the output of
African labor under their supervision. This would
further divide the interests of White and African
labor.

117. As Fredrickson (1981, p. 228) observes, Africans could
not be excluded in the same manner that Chinese and
Eastern Europeans were in the United States. Conse­
quently, the role of colour bar legislation was to
enable the continued exploitation of unskilled African
labor while protecting White workers from competition.

118. This reflects the "contradictory class position" of the
White working class; that is, their membership in both
the dominant ethnic group and a subordinate class (cf.
Simons and Simons 1969, p. 89).

119. The industrial colour bar had strong ideological and
material roots which can be traced back to the
beginning of European settlement. Underdevelopment,
limited immigration, and slavery had combined to create
an agricultural caste system—one in which only non-
Whites performed manual labor (F. Wilson 1969, p. 110;
Fredrickson 1981, p. 206). Moreover, the prosperity of
European settlers derived from their ability to command
non-White labor. When these economic interests were
compounded with racial and religious ideologies which
served to rationalize the dispossession and domination
of Africans, what emerged were cultural and institu­
tional practices (e.g., increasingly rigid group
boundaries, ideologies of White superiority) which
could easily be transplanted to new circumstances.
More recently (i.e., 1870), this relationship between
competition and discrimination had been evident when
White petty bourgeois diamond diggers created a colour
bar to eliminate their native competitors (Welsh 1969,
p. 181). Thus, the industrial colour bar reflected the
adaptation of earlier practices to new material
interests in a changing intergroup arena.

120. As evidence of the interest of capital in retaining
some form of colour bar, it is significant that after a
1923 judicial ruling (the Hildrick-Smith case) which
held that the colour bar regulations exceeded the
woming of the 1911 Mines and Works Act and therefore
had no legal basis, the mining industry made no attempt
to eliminate colour bars (cf. Johnstone 1987, pp. 145–
50).

121. During this period, the wages of White miners increased
by roughly 50%, while the wages of African workers
increased by only 9% (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 235).

122. Acquiescence to the Status Quo Agreement reflected the relatively weak position of mining capital in 1918—a situation which was recognized by the Chamber of Mines. For a discussion of this point, see Johnstone (1987, pp. 111-14).

123. For example, colour bar regulations requiring certain tasks to be performed under White supervision often reduced effective labor time for Africans to 5-6 hours per shift. By increasing the autonomy of African labor and using Africans as de facto supervisors (i.e., raising the colour bar), mine owners were able to increase output per shift (Johnstone 1987, pp. 128-39).

124. According to data presented by Johnstone (1987, p. 145), mine output and dividends rose following the strike, while cost per ton, total wages, and the number of White employees all declined.

125. In the 1924 parliamentary elections, the Nationalist Party won 63 seats, Smuts' South African Party won 54 seats, and the Labour Party won 17 seats (cf. van den Berghe 1965, p. 293). Given that 68 seats were necessary in order to establish a clear parliamentary majority, the coalition between Labour and the Nationalist Party was necessary in order to form a government. While this stood as the high water mark for the Labour Party in electoral politics (it was never thereafter a necessary component of a government and it eventually withered away), the eth-class alliance with the White working class remained an essential aspect of the Nationalist Party power base.

126. For example, Nationalist Party propaganda accused the mine owners and Smuts of "Blackening" the industrial sector while the party platform called for "saving Whites" (Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 321-22; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 224).

127. One indicator of the depth of concern of White South African society with this problem was the number of commissions which emerged to deal with the "poor White" issue (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 170).

128. With respect to the industrial labor market, Afrikaners were disadvantaged by the underdevelopment of South African agriculture (in essence, they were migrating from the periphery of the South African economy to the core) and were no more suited for industrial labor than were the Africans (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 217; Simons and
Simons 1969, p. 612). As a consequence, Afrikaner labor found it necessary to use its political power to secure a privileged position.

129. Application of terms such as "elite" or "labor aristocracy" to the South African White working class may be useful to describe the relatively privileged position of this eth-class; however, we believe that use of these terms has dangerous analytical implications. The South African White working class was not an elite; it was merely able to use its limited political power to realize material gains at the expense of other eth-classes.

130. As evidenced by the ability of Hertzog and Smuts to join together in the "Fusion" government of 1933 (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 185; de Villiers 1969, p. 379).

131. For example, Smuts' opposition to the Mines and Works Amendment Act was not that it promoted White supremacy (which he favored), but rather that its overt discrimination would increase African resistance and "make impossible any policy of appeasement and settlement between White and Black in this country" (Johnstone 1987, p. 165).

132. To some degree, it might be more appropriate to characterize Afrikaner mobilization as ethnic assertion; that is, the strategic use of group identity to pursue material interests within a society. On the other hand, given that the ultimate goal of Afrikaner mobilization was the acquisition of state power, it took on the characteristics of a nationalist movement. Accordingly, we will employ the term "nationalism" to describe Afrikaner group mobilization.

133. According to de Villiers (1969, p. 365), absorption with the threat posed by an external enemy became an integral component of Afrikaner group identity.

134. The British South Africa Act actually placed Dutch on an equal footing with English as official languages. One of the actions of the Nationalist-dominated Pact Government was to substitute Afrikaans for Dutch, an act which reflected both the increasing power of Afrikaner nationalism and the importance of language as a symbolic issue for group mobilization (van den Berghe 1965, p. 102; Giliomee 1979a, p. 106).

135. The urban proportion of the White population increased from 35.8% in 1891 to 51.6% in 1911 to 65.2% in 1936 (Welsh 1969, p. 173). Displaced Afrikaner farmers and
byvomers were a major factor in this increase.

136. This is not to imply either that no appeals were made to Afrikaner unity or that the Nationalist Party met with no success in promoting the nationalist agenda. For example, the Nationalist Party was able to substitute Afrikaans for Dutch as an official language; it also succeeded in securing a 1926 British Commonwealth agreement which asserted the autonomy of members (van den Berghe 1965, p. 102; de Villiers 1969, p. 391).

137. Nationalist rhetoric throughout this period attempted to downplay class divisions within Afrikanerdom and emphasize owner-worker solidarity (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 563; Magubane 1979, pp. 186-87; Moodie 1975, pp. 169-72).

138. As Gilliomee (1979b, pp. 156-57) has observed, while the rhetoric of Afrikaner economic nationalism focused upon the "poor White" problem, the reality is that this movement was designed to aid the fledgling Afrikaner capitalist class.

139. Explanations for this development vary, including a desire by Hertzog to remain in power during an economic downturn, an attempt to achieve British-Afrikaner unity (Hertzog subscribed to the more inclusive definition of Afrikaner), and a need to achieve a two-thirds majority to pass the "Hertzog Bills" which eliminated the African franchise in the Cape (cf. Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 463-69; de Villiers 1969, pp. 379-81; Magubane 1979, p. 185).

140. The Purified Nationalist Party later became the Reunited Nationalist Party (following a 1940 reunification agreement between Hertzog and Malan) and eventually (in 1951) returned to calling itself the Nationalist Party.

141. There was also considerable Afrikaner sympathy for Nazi Germany. Nazi-like (i.e., authoritarian, extremely nationalistic) movements in South Africa included the Ossewabrandwag and the New Order. The influence of these movements waned with the downfall of Nazi Germany and the rise of the Nationalist Party (Moodie 1975, pp. 208-33; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 527-28; de Villiers 1969, pp. 385-87).

142. This was clearly articulated by P. Ka I. Sebe (cited in Simons and Simons 1969, p. 133) during a 1911 appeal for African unity: "We are one people. Let us forget
the differences between Xhosa-Fingo, Zulus and Tongas, Basutos, and other natives."

143. For a brief discussion of regional differences in the situation of Africans in early twentieth century South Africa, see Kuper (1969b, pp. 426-31).

144. This "petty bourgeois" base of early African nationalism has a parallel in the early stages of the ethnic mobilization of Black Americans (cf. Bloom 1987, p. 219).

145. In a particularly cogent analysis, Magubane (1979, pp. 274-78) criticizes the tendency to dismiss the early efforts of the ANC as "reformist" or "naive" and interprets early nationalist ideologies and strategies in the context of their times (i.e., as the "moral" struggle of an educated minority elite which is simultaneously aware of both its oppressed status and its powerlessness to change its situation). The historical contribution of this movement was its ability to increase African national consciousness.

146. For a detailed examination of relations between the African and White working classes in early twentieth century South Africa, the work of Simons and Simons (1969) should be read in its entirety. Their discussion of the evolving position of the South African Communist Party is particularly insightful.

147. The Industrial Conciliation Act institutionalized unions and collective bargaining and established a system of arbitration to reduce industrial conflict. Africans, however, were excluded from the definition of "employee"; therefore, it was illegal for them to form unions (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 320).

148. For discussions of the dissolution of the ICU, see Simons and Simons (1969, pp. 353-76) and Magubane (1979, pp. 282-86).

149. The underlying philosophy of the Urban Areas Act was expressed by the Stallard Commission of 1921 (cited by Southall--1983, p. 25), which stated that Africans:

should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the White man and should depart therefore when he ceases so to minister.
After 1923, the Urban Areas Act was extended on several occasions—e.g., 1930 restrictions on African women, 1937 expanded police powers to remove "surplus" Africans (Welsh 1969, p. 198).

150. The elimination of the African franchise in the Cape particularly served the interests of the Nationalist Party as it (1) increased the Afrikaner proportion of the electorate, and (2) improved Nationalist electoral chances in the Cape where African voters (who were not likely to vote Nationalist), despite their small numbers, occasionally provided the winning margin in close elections.

151. One question not addressed thus far in this section was the status of the other South African ethnic groups—the Coloureds, Indians, and British. How did their identities evolve amidst the events described above? For the first two of these groups, Coloureds and Indians, group identities persisted in response to eth-class differentiation, unequal treatment, and rigid ethnic boundaries. Both groups occupied an intermediate position in the eth-class structure (i.e., one which was slightly above the position of Africans but significantly below that of Whites) and both were systematically excluded from economic and political power. In response to this state of affairs, both the Coloureds and the Indians engaged in ethnic mobilization (e.g., the African People's Organization and the South African Indian Congress; however, neither of these movements emerged as a significant political force. One major obstacle to effective group action was the existence of internal divisions, both sub-ethnic (e.g., Hindu vs. Moslem within the Indian community, "light" vs. "dark" Coloureds) and class (e.g., the dominance of the petit bourgeoisie within these ethnic organizations). Equally limiting was the smallness of each group (Coloureds comprised 9% of the South African population, Indians approximately 3%) and the lack of a significant economic or political niche. Thus, while material forces (e.g., their subordinate position) were strong enough to trigger ethnic mobilization and the persistence of identities, both Coloured and Indian ethnicity were for the most part salient only on the regional or local level.

Given their small numbers and economic and political marginality, an alternative course of action for Coloureds and Indians could have been an eth-class alliance or even an ethnic merger with other ethnic groups (e.g., Coloured merger with either Africans or Afrikaners). In this context, one possibility would
have been a cross-ethnic class alliance with the White working class or, in the case of the Coloured petit bourgeoisie (who had acculturated to Afrikaner society and who tended to pursue an accommodationist strategy), the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. This was precluded, however, by the exclusionary strategies of the White working class (which was interested in restricting group boundaries, particularly in light of the "poor White" problem) and by the emergence of a narrowly defined and race conscious Afrikaner nationalism (cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 272). The second course of action, eth-class alliance or ethnic merger with the African majority, was rejected by the Coloureds and Indians themselves, as both groups were reluctant to jeopardize the few privileges which they did possess in order to enter into an alliance with a lower status group (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 120). Thus, while increasing discrimination by Whites against both Coloureds and Indians narrowed intergroup differences and created a broader basis for common action with Africans, intergroup cooperation remained at best at a moderate level.

An entirely different case from the Coloured and Indian experience was that of British South Africans. The British occupied a somewhat paradoxical position in that they overwhelmingly dominated the economy, but were less able (given Afrikaner numerical superiority) to exert political power. This meant (1) that they had no economic grievances to generate ethnic mobilization and (2) that their material position was best maintained by muting their ethnicity—as assertion would only inflame Afrikaner nationalism. In addition, British South Africans were probably not unhappy with the general direction of government policy, for (despite British "liberalism") they too had a strong stake in continued White supremacy. Finally, the British ethnic assertion which did exist had an alternative outlet in support for Great Britain and the British Commonwealth (e.g., strong British South African support for Great Britain in World War I and World War II). Thus, while British South Africans were a self-conscious ethnic entity, their was no real material or ideological basis for ethnically-based group action.

Circumstances also militated against the emergence of an inclusive South African national identity. Non-Whites were excluded from the beginning, while the bifurcation of the White community limited any prospects of a White South African identity. Indeed, the existing eth-class configuration—the smaller, econom-
ically powerful British vs. the numerically dominant Afrikaners—was an ideal prescription for ethnic mobilization on the part of the latter group. While there were South Africans who envisioned a British-Afrikaner merger (albeit with varying emphases), their numbers were never sufficiently large to enable them to achieve this objective.

152. White South Africans were well aware of the threat posed by a stable urban proletariat. According to a 1945 Board of Trade and Industry Report (Cited by Southall--1983, p.30):

Racial and Class differences will make a homogeneous Native proletariat which will eventually lose all contact with its former communal rural relations which had previously given their lives a content and meaning. The detribalisation of large numbers of Natives congregated in amorphous masses in large industrial centres is a matter which no government can view with equanimity.

153. From the perspective of industrial capital, the existing relations of production (i.e., the coerced migrant labor system) constituted an obstacle to the development of the forces of production (i.e., industrial mass production) and to continued capitalist accumulation. Industrial committees and reports spoke of the waste of African labor and the retardation of industrial development (cf. sources cited by Magubane 1979, p. 129). Even if a fully proletarianized African workforce required higher wages, increased productivity and higher prices would mean that the manufacturing sector could accommodate such demands (Southall 1983, p. 30).

154. This fact was not lost upon Nationalist Party politicians, who by the late 1930s had begun to speak of the need to "save White civilization" (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 525). In a 1938 speech, future Prime Minister D.F. Malan (cited in Magubane 1979, p. 126) observed that:

the Afrikaner of the new Great Trek meets the non-White at his Blood River, half-armed or even completely unarmed, without barricade, without a river between, defenseless in the open plains of economic competition.

155. Third World condemnation of South African apartheid reflected the anti-colonial (anti-core) component of peripheral nationalist ideologies. Given the central
role of European racism in colonial domination, it is
not surprising that Third World leaders have found
apartheid to be particularly offensive (see, for
example, the quotations found in Beaud—1983, p. 188—and Spence—1969, p. 311). While this assault on South
Africa was grounded in ideology, peripheral anti-
colonialism and nationalism can in turn be linked to
core domination and global capitalist development. As
we observed earlier, nationalism is one of the
contradictions of capitalism.

156. Although the British South Africa Act of 1909 had left
open the possibility of transferring the High Commis-
sion Territories (e.g., Basutoland/Lesotho, Swaziland,
and Bechuanaland/Botswana) to South Africa), this was
clearly impossible in the context of post-1945 decolo-
nization and anticolonialism. Consequently, all three
colonies became independent nations in the late 1960s.
For an extended discussion of this issue, see Spence
(1969, pp. 496-503).

157. Indeed, South Africa capitalized upon the U.S. fear of
"communist expansionism" to gain support for its recent
intervention in Angola.

158. For a brief discussion of characteristics of semi-
peripheral states, see Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987,
pp. 773-774). For a theoretical and empirical analysis
of semiperipheral areas, see Arrighi and Drangel
(1986).

159. In separate analyses, both Arrighi (1979, pp. 186-87)
and Martin (1986, p. 111) discuss how the economic
development of other areas (e.g., Southern Rhodesia-
Zimbabwe) was undercut by South African capitalist
development.

160. The different party policies were reflected in the
reports of two commissions: the Fagan Commission
(United Party) and the Sauer Commission (Nationalist
Party). For discussions of these respective reports,
see Magubane (1979, pp. 129-31) and de Villiers (1969,
pp. 406-09).

161. The Nationalist Party received 120,000 fewer votes that
the United Party; however, due to the disproportionate
electoral influence of rural areas, it won 70 parlia-
mentary seats to 65 for the United Party. Neverthe-
less, the Nationalist Party was forced to enter into a
coalition with the tiny Afrikaner Party in order to
attain the seats necessary for a working parliamentary
majority (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 293-95).
162. Apartheid was defined by future Prime Minister Verwoerd (cited in van den Bergh—1965, p. 119) as "a process of continually increasing separation in all spheres of living, and this takes place even when there is no territorial segregation."

163. While we present these interests separately, they are clearly interrelated. For example, maintaining White domination over Africans had clear economic benefits for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie inasmuch as it was able to maintain a pool of cheap labor.

164. It is not our intention to present an overly instrumental picture of the South African state as a mere tool of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. Dominant eth-class interests were constrained by the interests and power of other groups (the British-dominated capitalist class, the White working class, international capital, and even the African working class). The seemingly instrumental nature of the apartheid state reflects the increasing political hegemony of the Nationalist Party juxtaposed against relative economic weakness—in other words, state power was the most ready (if not the only) means for attaining group objectives.

165. Our purpose here is not to provide a detailed discussion of the array of apartheid legislation, but instead to illustrate the connection between state policies and eth-class interests.

166. This point is captured in a quote by W. M. Macmillan (cited in Southall—1983, p. 75): "to locate the native reserves it is no bad rule ... to look for the areas circumvented or entirely missed by even branch railway lines."

167. While all South African political parties protected the economic interests of the White population, the success of the Nationalist Party since 1948 has been tied to its ability to project itself as the best defender of White interests. This was particularly important for the White working class (especially the less-skilled segments) which would seemingly have the most to lose from the elimination of segregation (cf. Davies 1973, pp. 51-55).

168. For more detailed discussion of these laws, see de Villiers (1969, pp. 409-14); Magubane (1979, pp. 132-38); and Southall (1983, pp. 33-44).

169. As an example of Afrikaner concerns in this area, the 1955 Tomlinson Commission (cited by Magubane—1979, p.
decried African urbanization as leading to "the westernization of the Bantu" and the eventual certainty "that the control of political power will pass into the hands of the Bantu."

170. Also falling into this category would be the 1956 elimination (after a five-year struggle) of the coloured franchise (de villiers 1969, pp. 405-06). While this was generally interpreted ideologically (I.e., as the Afrikaner drive for total segregation), it was also perceived by the Nationalist Party—which believed that the coloured vote could be decisive in a close election—as a key step in maintaining control of the government (Fredrickson 1981, p. 279).

171. The pass laws, which required all Africans to carry "reference books", were the centerpiece of the system of "influx control" which sought to maintain the migrant labor system by restricting African urban residence. Under Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, it was illegal for Africans to be in urban areas for more than seventy-two hours unless they (1) had resided there since birth; (2) had worked for the same employer for ten years; (3) were dependents of persons qualified under the first two categories; or (4) had been given permission by a labor bureau (established to funnel African labor to industry) to work as contract labor (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 118). Since few Africans could prove that they qualified under the first three categories, the bulk of legal urban residents were employed as contract laborers (and were not allowed to have their dependents reside with them in urban areas). Residential segregation (the Group Areas Act) and the pass laws facilitated enforcement of these policies. If apprehended, unemployed Africans could be declared "redundant Bantu" and would be "endorsed out" to the reserves or sentenced to serve as convict labor on White farms (Magubane 1979, p. 143). These laws were vigorously enforced: during the period 1950-1975, hundreds of thousands of Africans were arrested each year for pass law violations (see the figures provided in Wilson and Ramphele--1989, p. 209). By retarding African urbanization, these laws propped up the migrant labor system despite ever-increasing economic pressures for Africans to leave the reserves.

172. Direct control measures, which included the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, and the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, gave the South African state virtually unlimited power to suppress persons and organizations (Southall 1983,
p. 40; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 130-32).

173. We will consider the full implications of this indirect control in our discussion of the "Bantustan" policy. For a discussion of the control aspects of "Bantu Education", see van den Berghe (1965, pp. 129-30).

174. Moreover, change (i.e., greater African urbanization and proletarianization) would also potentially involve costs to capital—higher wages, further political demands, increased conflict with the White working class, and increased conflict with agricultural capital over access to African labor (cf. Wolpe 1972, 445-46).

175. See the statements of various Nationalist Party leaders cited by van den Berghe (1965, p. 118) and Southall (1983, pp. 45-46).

176. Moreover, as Southall (1983, p. 45) observes, there was little immediate response to the Bantu Authorities Act. Reserve Councils were slow to disband in favor of the new "tribal authorities"—the first homeland to accept this new arrangement was the Transkei in 1955.

177. Particularly interesting was the ideological shift which accompanied the evolution of the Bantustan policy. The Nationalist Party began to downplay racial dogmas (i.e., those stressing the inferiority of Africans) and instead began to emphasize "ethnic" (i.e., cultural) differences and the need for separate development (Wolpe 1972, pp. 450-51; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 100; Magubane 1979, pp. 234-36). Too much should not be read into this transition, for the doctrine of separate development was infused with a sense of paternalism and an implicit assumption of inferiority (e.g., Africans as different and less developed). For illustrative quotations, see van den Berghe (1965, pp. 121-24). For a discussion of the link between separate development and Afrikaner nationalism, see Moodie (1975, pp. 260-76).

178. For a discussion of the process leading to the "independence" of the Transkei, see Southall (1983, pp. 103-45).

179. Given the decline of reserve agriculture, superexploitation was no longer grounded in the contribution of peasant farming to the subsistence of migratory wage labor (which had previously allowed African wages to be below the subsistence level). Instead, superexploitation was now achieved through coercion; that is, via direct and indirect control measures instituted by
post-1948 governments which essentially forced Africans to accept low wages and to remain migratory labor. For elaboration of this point, see Wolpe (1972, pp. 444-50). For an insightful comparison of the Bantustan policy with Israeli policies towards Palestinians in the occupied territories, see Locke and Stewart (1985).

180. Thus, apartheid was presented as "positive" in that it would eliminate White domination and allow Africans to develop along their own lines (albeit by being confined to 13% of the land area of South Africa).


182. Towards this end, government spokespersons sought to promote the perception of African ethnic attachment to the homelands (see H. M. Verwoerd, quoted in Magubane 1979, pp. 241-42). For example one bureaucrat (cited by Wilson and Ramphale--1989, p. 213), in explaining the "voluntary" movement of Africans into the KwaNdebele homeland, observed:

What motivated the Israelis to go to Israel after the Balfour Declaration? Idealism gripped them and see what happened to Israel. It is the same thing in KwaNdebele. It is all about the magnetism, the pulling power of a spiritual fatherland. They are streaming in and we just can't keep up with the services there. They prefer to live there, in their own community.

In this context, it is not surprising that apartheid proponents opposed "denationalized Africans" (i.e., urbanized and educated Africans who espoused an "African" ethnic identity) and favored "civilized Bantu" (i.e., those retaining traditional group ties in the context of the homelands). For a discussion of this point, see Magubane (1979, pp. 242-43).

183. This was quickly evident to the South African government. The Nationalist Party's Tomlinson Commission (1955) estimated that even with heavy investment, the reserves could only support one-half of the African population (Southall 1983, pp. 36-37; de Villiers 1969, p. 409). While the Commission's financial recommendations were insufficient and its estimates of the carrying capacity of the land were gross overstatements, the point is that the Bantustans did not have a viable economic base. Moreover, the South African state was unwilling to expend funds at even the level recommended
by the Tomlinson Commission. What it did do was establish a few "development corporations" and promote the creation of "border industries"—White industries located adjacent to the reserves to take advantage of cheap labor (Wolpe 1972, p. 452; Southall 1983, pp. 36-39).

184. According to Southall (1983, pp. 210-12), a high proportion of the labor for of the Transkei must migrate to South Africa. The important point is that this economic dependence will perpetuate the underdevelopment of the homelands.

185. When it was clear that Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were to become independent nations and not part of South Africa, Prime Minister Verwoerd observed that South Africa would enjoy political and economic domination over these areas without having to assume responsibility for social welfare expenses (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, p. 205). This thinking carried over to South Africa's relations with the Bantustans, for although it continued to provide them with economic support, South Africa forced the Bantustans to become increasingly responsible for raising revenue through the taxation of their inhabitants (cf. Wolpe 1972, p. 451). The ultimate Nationalist Party vision for Southern Africa was a commonwealth type arrangement with South Africa as the regional core exercising economic and political suzerainty over "independent" African states (cf. Southall 1983, pp. 49-50).

186. The relationship between the Nationalist Party and Afrikaner nationalism is reflected in the slogan: "die party is die volk en die volk is die party"—"the party is the nation and the nation is the party" (de Villiers 1969, p. 370).


189. Thus, Afrikaner have assumed some of the characteristics of a dominant ethnic identity (e.g., a decreased need for assertion as compared to a minority identity). Some British South Africans, on the other hand, began to fear for their position in an Afrikaner-dominated
South Africa and moved towards assuming characteristics of a minority group (cf. Spence 1969, p. 486).

190. This ideological front was supported by such institutions as the Nationalist Party-backed South African bureau of Racial Affairs (de Villiers 1969, p. 401). For "academic" works in this tradition, see the references cited by van den Berghe (1965, p. 116).

191. Indeed, the position of the African petit bourgeoisie was seemingly worsening as a consequence of the segregative policies of the apartheid, of policies designed to protect White economic interests (e.g., restrictions upon African entrepreneurs—cf. Southall 1983, pp. 186-87), and of the decline of their already limited political power (e.g., the effects of the "Hertzog bills" of the 1930s).

192. This was, however, not a zero-sum proposition inasmuch as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) played an active role in the resistance movement and the ANC itself contained a socialist wing.

193. At the same time, it could be argued that the course followed by the resistance was predominantly a petty-bourgeois program inasmuch as the specific targets were the most significant obstacles to the interests of this class, as opposed to the more economic interests of the working class. This bears an interesting similarity to the U.S. civil rights movement, whose program for change (e.g., desegregation, voting rights) removed obstacles to the mobility of the Black middle class more than they improved conditions for the Black working class.

194. We should also make parenthetical mention of the existence of a White opposition to apartheid—e.g., the Liberal and Progressive political parties, the Congress of Democrats, and the Black Sash Movement (de Villiers 1969, pp. 419-21; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 171-74, 243-44; Magubane 1979, pp. 314-15). While often courageous in face of government persecution, White liberals made at best a limited contribution to anti-apartheid resistance, a fact which can be attributed to both the smallness of their numbers and the general unwillingness of liberals to consider the total restructuring (e.g., one person, one vote) of South African society.

195. This was particularly true for Indians, who were characterized by Nationalist Party propaganda as "unassimilable aliens" and who were subject to an unsuccessful government campaign to effect their return
This occurred in spite of the increase in gold prices engendered by the decline of the Bretton Woods Agreement. The important point here is that while gold prices could exacerbate or mitigate economic problems, mineral exports were no longer sufficient to insure economic prosperity. Moreover, to the extent that gold continued to play a key role, South Africa was vulnerable to sudden changes in international gold prices (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 76-79; Innes 1984, pp. 190-91).

Innes (1984, pp. 189-90) links the South African economic crisis to the peripheral relationship of South Africa to the core. Investment during the 1960s was extremely capital intensive, which required the importation of advanced technology from core nations. Given the limited ability of South Africa to export manufactures (due to low productivity and the high cost of White labor--both consequences of the apartheid system), this eventually led to balance of payments difficulties.

The impact of this inequality is such that although South Africa as a whole has a moderately high per capita gross domestic product, the African population, particularly the two-thirds who live in the reserves, ranks below many Third World nations on such key variables as income and life expectancy (cf. Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 22-28).

While the economic position of some segments of the African working class may have improved since 1970 (i.e., through wage increases for the urban working class), there is also evidence that the number of very poor has increased and that conditions for this group have worsened (cf. Wilson and Ramphele 1989, p. 21).

Although the advancement of the Afrikaner capitalist class placed in on an increasingly equal footing with British capital and resulted in the further diminution of British political power, this process was not objectionable to British capital inasmuch as it gave Afrikaners a greater stake in maintaining optimal conditions for capitalist accumulation. Indeed, some elements of British capital deliberately fostered the expansion of Afrikaner capital--cf. Innes (1984, pp. 158-59) on the role of the Oppenheimer family and the Anglo-American Corporation in facilitating Afrikaner penetration of the mining industry.
201. This point has not been lost upon the petit bourgeoisie, the White working class, and their political leaders. As Andries Treurnicht (currently leader of the Conservative Party) noted in a 1980 speech (quoted by Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 106), "free markets would jeopardize the whole edifice of apartheid."

202. By "political irrelevance" we are referring to the inability of parties to the "left" of the Nationalist Party to provide any meaningful electoral opposition or to stymie government policies. White "liberal" political parties probably did increase the overall level of opposition to apartheid and created additional maneuvering room for resistance movements; however, their unwillingness to accept broad social change precluded any meaningful alliance with African resistance movements. Some White radicals (e.g., the South African Communist Party) have exhibited total opposition to White supremacy (an interesting example of the ability of ideology to transcend material interests); however, their numbers are currently too small to enable them to play a significant role. For further discussion of these issues, see Simons and Simons (1969); Charney (1986); and de Villiers (1969, pp. 417-22).

203. The central theme of this conflict was evident in the difference between British and Boer colonial policy and in the many clashes between the South African/United Parties and the Nationalist Party.

204. Our point here is that the conflict is the same (capital vs. the petit bourgeoisie and working classes), but that it is no longer expressed in ethnic terms because the capitalist-petit bourgeoisie division no longer corresponds to the British-Afrikaner division. We should also note that while the verligte-verkrampte division reflects class interests, this does not imply a mechanistic division along the lines of Verligte=capital, verkrampte=petit bourgeois or working class. Ideologies may emerge from material interests; however, they can take on an independent existence.

205. This was explicitly stated in 1978 by Nationalist Party official Connie Mulder (quoted in Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 101):

If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the Black people are concerned, there will not be one Black man with South African citizenship.
206. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Southall (1983, pp. 202-308).

207. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 117-37).

208. As a result of increasing enforcement of the pass laws (approximately one-half million arrests per year) and forced removals (3.5 million people were resettled between 1960 and 1985), the proportion of Africans living in urban areas (33% according to official statistics—which probably underestimate the actual figure) remained the same between 1960 and 1980 (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 26; 209-19). For a conceptual discussion of issues of partial proletarianization, see Saul and Gelb (1986, pp. 147-51).

209. According to data presented by Wilson and Ramphele (1989, pp. 38-39, 84-88), the reserve population more than doubled between 1960 and 1980, while estimates of the proportion of Africans who are unemployed (data are limited; however, all sources agree that it is rising rapidly) begin at 20%-25%.


211. As we have noted earlier, the creation of such a reserve-based comprador class was part of the "divide and rule" strategy for inhibiting African national mobilization. The South African government has also employed this strategy in urban areas via municipal councils and assistance to entrepreneurs (Southall 1983, pp. 192-94; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 108-16).

212. To some degree, the emergence of the bantustan elite has undoubtedly weakened African resistance to apartheid. While commanding little popular support, bantustan governments have been ruthless in suppressing opposition and pursuing class interests (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 178-81). This in turn has led to violent clashes between bantustan elites and the national liberation movement (e.g., between Zulu-based Inkatha and the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front).

At the same time, this point should not be overstated. The interests of a comprador class may be in many ways linked to those of dominant classes (e.g., the dominant
White groups); however, they are not identical. For example, a dispute over territory and South African resettlement policies led the Transkei to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa from 1978 until 1980 (Southall 1983, pp. 268-75). For a discussion of the potential long-term role of the bantustans, see Southall (1983, pp. 281-308).

213. This would probably be more true of the urban petit bourgeois entrepreneurs, who, while adamantly opposing apartheid, are already inclined to adopt a more "moderate" line with respect to change (Wolpe 1984, pp. 246-47; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 183).

214. See, for example, the statement by Jay Naidoo, General Secretary of COSATU (quoted in Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 236):

> I told the ANC and SACTU delegations we did not want superficial changes, or Black bosses to replace White bosses, while the repressive machinery of state and capital remained intact. I expressed very clearly to them our commitment to see a society which was not only free of apartheid, but also free of the exploitative, degrading, and brutalizing system under which Black workers suffered. This meant a restructuring of society so that the wealth of the country would be shared among the people.

At the same time, the African working class could also be vulnerable to the divisive tactics of the South African state. Legislation permitting African unions and discussion of urban rights could be viewed as an attempt to split urban and rural segments of the working class by granting concessions to the former.

215. We recognize, of course, that the underdevelopment of South Africa was a reflection of its peripheral status (i.e., political and economic domination by the core) within the capitalist world-economy. Our interest here, however, is the nature of South African capitalist development--a lower level of analysis than the world-system.
CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

At the beginning of this work, we stated that our purpose was to develop a theoretical model useful for explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities. We summarized this endeavor in the question: What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear? In our effort to address this goal, we undertook an intellectual "long march" which included a conceptual discussion, a critical review of existing theories of the evolution of ethnicity and nationality, presentation of our own "class-based" theoretical framework, and two case studies in which we employed our model to interpret the historical development of intergroup relations in the United States and South Africa. Now that we have arrived at our destination, we will attempt to draw together the various segments of our endeavor.

We shall begin with a summary of the central arguments of each chapter in order to provide a succinct statement of the core of our work. In addition to this short summary, we also intend to consider briefly two global issues. First, we will assess the general implications of this work for the study of ethnic relations; that is, what we envision to be the most fruitful aspects of our model. Secondly, we will review our framework in light of our experiences with the
two case studies, our goal being the development of issues for future research.

Summary

From design to execution, we viewed this undertaking as an integrated series of tasks, with each part making a significant contribution to the larger whole. Following our introductory chapter, we began with a conceptual discussion (Chapter II) in which we sought to clarify basic issues of ethnicity and nationality (and, to a lesser degree, of class), a step which we felt was mandated by the definitional confusion which we believe characterizes the field of ethnic studies. In general, we described ethnicity and nationality as social attachments, as group affiliations grounded in presumed common origin and shared history. Moreover, these identities only become meaningful when actively contrasted with other such groupings (i.e., an "in-group" vs. "out-group"). We also proposed a fundamental distinction between ethnicity and nationality (one which we hope addresses the common tendency to confuse these two terms): that ethnic ties are asserted within a society, while national identities are more inclusive and linked to citizenship in a nation-state which is asserted on a global level. Yet our discussion did not end with these rather static definitions, for we then asserted that ethnic and national identities, while putatively communal, assume social significance in the course of intergroup resource
competition and ethnic stratification—conflict stemming from differences of power and in relation to the means of production. This then led us to the position that ethnic and national identities are variables (or, if one prefers, strategies), that they emerge, persist, change, or disappear as a result of intergroup interaction. In addition, this allowed us to posit the existence of intragroup variations in identity, differences which can be explained in terms of material interests.

Armed with this conceptual arsenal, we then turned to a critical review (Chapter III) of existing theories of the evolution of ethnic and national identities. We began with two basic assertions derived from our conceptual discussion: (1) that given their material base, a complete theory of ethnicity and nationality must consider them in relation to class; and (2) that given their variable (or evolutionary) nature, any theory of ethnicity and nationality must contain a theory of social change. In our review of existing theories, we noted the failure of classical (especially pre-1960) social theories—both mainstream and Marxian—to account for the persistence of ethnicity in modern societies other than as a precapitalist relic or an individual attribute (i.e., the attempt by mainstream U.S. sociologists to theorize ethnicity and class out of existence). Our critique notwithstanding, these initial theories of ethnicity experienced a paradigmatic "crisis" (to use Kuhn's—1970—
term) in the wake of worldwide ethnic persistence and mobilization in the post-1945 era. As a response to this state of affairs, the past three decades have seen the emergence of "new" theories of ethnicity and nationality which purport to explain the persistence of these bonds in modern societies, theories which we organized and criticized on the basis of the following typology: (1) primordialism; (2) plural society theories; (3) competition theories; (4) reactive ethnicity; and (5) class theories. In general, while we felt that all of these approaches contained some useful elements, each theory failed to address one or more of our core problems (e.g., intragroup variation, change over time, and the relationship between ethnicity and class).

Following these necessary preliminaries, we then presented (in Chapter IV) our theoretical framework for understanding ethnicity and nationality in the post-1800 era. While our model is best taken in toto, its central elements can be summarized as follows. We started with the assertion that, in the most general sense, the evolution of ethnic and national identities can only be understood in the context of global capitalist development. In other words, the study of social change at the societal level must embody some consideration of external (i.e., world-system) dynamics (cf. Wallerstein 1972, p. 222; Shannon 1989, p. 171). We further suggested that a central global dynamic is the uneven devel-
opment of the world-system, and that the evolution of group identities can be understood (as we attempted to do in a set of working hypotheses—see pp. 136-44) in the context of the core-periphery distinction. Moving to a "lower" level of analysis (that of an individual society or nation-state) we then outlined several key factors—the course of economic development, the ethnic and class composition of a society, political structure, and a series of contextual variables which we subsumed under the aegis of "intergroup arena"—which we believe play a key role in determining the course of group identities. Finally, with respect to intergroup interaction and ethnic change, we introduced our basic analytical concept for the explanation of group action: eth-class (i.e., social location in terms of both ethnicity and class). From our perspective, this concept could then be employed to explain ethnic, national, and class-based action in terms of eth-class "alliances" (of which we offered a typology—see pp. 120-22) where the bonds of ethnicity, nationality, or class were used to mobilize groups in order to pursue material interests.

In the last two chapters, we presented case studies (the United States and South Africa) in which we applied our model to the study of intergroup relations in historically specific circumstances. The underlying rationale in selecting these two cases was to allow us to explore the differential impact of core vs. peripheral capitalist development
upon the evolution of ethnic relations. In the case of the United States, we saw how economic expansion and movement into the core produced a complex ethnic pattern characterized by immigration and both persistence and change of group identities. For South Africa, on the other hand, prolonged colonization and peripheral status resulted in expanded external (i.e., British) influence and a slower development of "modern" ethnic identities. In both cases, processes such as industrialization, proletarianization, and urbanization—and the specific forms which they assumed in the course of national capitalist development—left an indelible imprint upon the nature of intergroup relations.

While we gleaned much from our case studies, what stands out is the utility of eth-class in explaining group mobilization and the evolution of identities. We found intergroup interaction to be an infinitely complicated process: identities and ideologies emerged from material (and non-material) practice, and in turn altered the course of subsequent resource competition. Nevertheless, by viewing group identities as linked to eth-class strategies, we were able to interpret such diverse phenomena as Black-American mobilization, European immigrant ethnic merger and assimilation, and the exclusionary actions of Anglo-Americans in United States; or Afrikaner mobilization, apartheid, and African resistance in South Africa. In addition, our eth-class/resource competition model enabled us to explain
differences *between* groups (e.g., why British South Africans downplayed group identity while Afrikaners engaged in ethnic assertion) and even differences *within* groups (e.g., why upper and middle class White Ethnics happened to assimilate more quickly than the enclave-based working class). Thus, as the culmination of our endeavor, the two case studies provided us with a diverse array of data with which to test our model. We will provide our evaluation of the results in the following sections.

The Study of Intergroup Relations

What conclusions can we reach about the study of ethnicity and nationality? At the outset, we posited that these group identities are not immutable, but that they *evolve* as a result of intergroup interaction. Throughout our analysis of the two case studies, we attempted to demonstrate that the explanation of this process of change must be grounded in global, historical, and material processes. Modern ethnic identities, whether Asian-American or Afrikaner, are forged during intergroup resource competition and shaped by the dynamics of global and national capitalist development and by the evolution of the arena in which groups interact. Having thus far completed our research, we would like to add that we are convinced of the essential validity of this statement.

By placing analytical emphasis upon *global* dynamics, we are asserting that the analysis of intergroup relations
within a particular society must take into consideration the impact of forces external to that society. Indeed, ethnic relations have their genesis in contact between peoples who were previously separate, most notably the processes of conquest, colonization, and immigration which characterized the centuries of European expansion. Moreover, we saw that the impact of global forces does not end once groups have been brought into contact. Specific processes of the world-system, such as core-periphery relations, continue to shape the context in which groups interact (e.g., the impact of the rise and fall of British imperialism upon relations between settlers and natives in South Africa).

Of equal importance to our approach to the study of intergroup relations is the emphasis which we have placed upon adopting a historical perspective. Simply stated, we believe that ethnic and national identities can only be analyzed as ongoing processes; that is, that the nature of group identification (and intergroup interaction) during any time period is conditioned by events which occurred during previous epochs. Ethnic change cannot be studied when it is isolated from history. This point was repeatedly illustrated during the course of our case studies. One cannot, for example, understand the current social significance of African-American ethnicity without linking it to such past
phenomena as the Civil Rights Movement, the Jim Crow era, and the institution of slavery.

The third component of our analytical trinity is a recognition of the overriding importance of material interests in the study of group identities and intergroup relations. Throughout our analysis, we explored the fundamental link between ethnic identity and resource competition between groups. From our vantage point, the assertion, masking, or alteration of group ties can be interpreted as strategies employed to pursue specific material, as well as meta-material, interests in a particular intergroup arena (e.g., twentieth century Afrikaner ethnic mobilization as a means for enhancing their economic and political position vis-a-vis other South African ethnic groups). As we have noted previously, this is not to reduce ethnicity to an epiphenomenon of economic life (indeed, we have repeatedly observed that while ethnic ideologies may emerge from material life, they are capable of assuming an independent social existence—and may in turn influence economic life), but to underscore the general primacy of material forces in the study of ethnic relations.

While we have linked the evolution of ethnic identities to strategies employed in intergroup resource competition, we also found that social reality is much more complex than attributing a single strategy (and, hence, identity) to an entire group. With few exceptions, ethnic groups are inter-
nally differentiated with respect to class (i.e., relations of production), thus giving rise to subgroups with potentially diverse interests and strategies. Throughout our examination of the United States and South African case studies, we repeatedly demonstrated the efficacy of the eth-class (i.e., objective social location in terms of both ethnicity and class) as a useful analytical tool for understanding the complexity of intergroup relations. As employed herein, the notion of eth-class captures the reality that ethnic groups contain class divisions (and vice-versa) and therefore cannot be studied as monolithic entities (as is too often done in the field of ethnic relations) but rather as separate "fractions" with unique group interests and which may employ different "strategies" with respect to ethnic identities. Consequently, when ethnic mobilization does occur, it represents a temporary alliance (due to a real or perceived compatibility of interests) among the eth-classes of a particular group (e.g., the use of "ethnic" strategies such as occupational networks and political machines in immigrant enclaves in the nineteenth century United States). At the same time, divergent interests among eth-classes may lead to strategies which are quite different (e.g., the different rates of assimilation for elite, middle class, and working class "White Ethnics" in the twentieth century United States). Only by employing
the concept of eth-class can we begin to unravel the complex web of intergroup relations.

In general, we believe that the approach presented in our model is useful in the analysis of a diverse array of ethnic phenomena. We have not provided a theoretical formula, but rather a set of interrelated concepts, propositions, and methodological directives. During the course of our case studies, we were able to employ our model to generate explanations for both the diversity of outcomes which mark the ethnic history of the United States and the more stable cleavages which divide South African society. We believe that a particular strength of our framework lies in its ability to account for change—historically a problematic issue for the study of ethnic relations. In the context of our framework, intergroup interaction assumes a dynamic nature; that is, it is continually shaped and reshaped by external factors, by the evolution of global as well as national forces and relations of production, and by the process of eth-class struggle. As a result, we see a constant reworking of group interests, strategies, and ability to achieve objectives. Consequently, we believe that we have achieved our goal of developing a model useful for explaining the evolution of ethnic identities.

**Directions for Further Research**

During our case studies, we asserted that one objective was to use the findings to suggest future refinements for
our theoretical model. Admittedly, as we developed and applied our framework, we painted with broad analytical strokes. Moreover, both case studies were concerned with intergroup relations in large arenas over periods of more than three centuries. As a result, we believe that our framework requires more detailed elaboration of the processes through which group identities evolve. For example, the emergence of African group identity, which we addressed in a few pages as part of a broad analysis, could be the focus of an in-depth examination which would undoubtedly yield further insights into the nature of both ethnicity and nationality. Likewise, other dynamics—e.g., the impact of industrialization and the spread of market relations, the demographic balance between groups—could and should be explored in more detail.

After completing the case studies, we are left with a lingering sense of uneasiness that our explanation of ethnic change is at times too idiosyncratic. In other words, although our model provides what we believe to be an adequate basis for the study of the evolution of group identities, it does so by linking this process to a unique configuration of elements and to the actions of specific groups in a particular intergroup arena. If we are serious about developing a class-based theory of ethnicity, then we need more nomothetic explanations—for example, more general statements of the conditions which give rise to such out-
comes as assimilation, ethnic merger, and group mobilization. Towards this end, we believe that our model would benefit from comparative application to the broadest possible range of cases—including what is happening nowadays in the way of ethnic assertiveness in the U.S.S.R. and other non-capitalist states. Only then can we develop a sufficient data base to enable us to make the general statements necessary for refinement of our model.

Another matter which demands further elaboration is the issues of level of analysis. As we observed in Chapter I, human social behavior takes place across a range of interrelated levels from the world-system to the dyad, with interactions at any level closely linked to events occurring on other levels. Accordingly, a theory of ethnicity should be able to articulate interrelationships between levels if it is truly to account for the evolution of group identities. While we believe that our framework adequately connects intergroup interaction within states to world-system processes, it became increasingly clear to us during the case studies that this is but part of the picture, that our model needs to be extended to incorporate ethnic relations at the regional and local levels, as well as the bureaucratic or institutional level. Where we did undertake such analysis—e.g., the examination of different trajectories of intergroup relations in the Northern, Southern, and Western United States—our ability to explain ethnic change was
greatly enhanced. At the same time, we recognize that other such phenomena remain unexplored; for example, regional variations in South Africa (e.g., intergroup relations in the Transvaal as compared to the Cape Province); the role of Hispanic ethnicity in the United States Southwest as opposed to Florida; Indian vs. African conflict in Durban, South Africa; urban vs. rural differences (e.g., among African-Americans); and the reported greater development of African ethnicity among Xhosa in the Eastern Cape than among Zulus in Natal. Clearly, such "lower-level" studies would constitute an important direction for future research.

Thirdly, we believe that our theoretical framework requires additional specification of the mechanisms through which groups form strategies and mobilize for action. As it stands, in application of our model, we could be accused of being teleological; that is, we have explained group actions in terms of material interests without directly linking the interests to the action, but merely by establishing an ex post facto correlation between actions and presumed interests. We need to address more thoroughly such questions as: What propels groups (and the individuals who comprise them) to mobilize for action and what determines the specific form and nature of this mobilization? On a theoretical level, this would involve linking our framework to theories of social movements, as well as specifying the role of ideology and culture (in relation to material interests) in group
mobilization (cf. Touraine 1988). This would then enable us to explain the timing and form of ethnic assertion (e.g., why the United States Civil Rights Movement emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, why it took the form of demands for inclusion, and why it gave rise to the development of a more radical Black nationalism among some group members). In our case studies, we would have to construct a more detailed exposition of the evolution of group strategies and action, perhaps through the use of primary sources (e.g., statements of leaders, intellectuals, and other key actors) which would enable us to explore the perceptions of actors and the formation of strategies. Where we did include quotes or extracts from official reports (e.g., in the debate over the homelands policy in our South African case study), they immeasurably added to the strength of our analysis. While this would entail exhaustive research, it would provide for the fullest possible explanation of group action and ethnic change.

Finally, we recognize that the preliminary nature of our framework has resulted in a number of issues being overlooked or incompletely addressed. We believe that these issues are significant and would provide fruitful ground for further research and subsequent refining of our approach. While we do not claim to address all possibilities, we would particularly like to emphasize the following issues:
1. The evolution of ethnic identities in non-capitalist societies. This question is particularly interesting following recent developments in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Tibet. While we believe that our framework--time-bound, as are all frameworks--could be applied directly to these societies during their periods of capitalist development, we also recognize that post-revolutionary societies would have their own laws of motion and class structures, which will in turn require new working hypotheses with regard to the evolution of ethnic and national identities.¹

2. The role of the non-material in influencing the shape and evolution of ethnic and national identities. Although we have acknowledged that ideas, ideologies, and the social-psychological aspects of ethnicity may in turn influence economic life--and, hence, our asserted material basis of ethnic identity--it is clear that our framework must be expanded in order to account for these processes inasmuch as they particularly sustain the ethnic component of the eth-class.

3. Further specification of the impact of relations of power and the role of the state upon intergroup interaction. While we made a first attempt at assessing the role of the state in intergroup relations and eth-class struggle, we recognize that additional elaboration is necessary (cf. Carnoy 1984; Nash 1989) if we are to
develop a more complete framework for understanding ethnic change.

4. The evolution of ethnic and national identities in other peripheral societies. Although we have chosen South Africa as our peripheral case study (its relatively long--for the periphery--period of incorporation into the capitalist world-economy constitutes a greater data base for analysis), we admit that its movement into the semiperiphery and its post-1974 emergence as a regional power disqualify it as an "ideal-typical" peripheral society. Consequently, application of our framework to more "traditional" peripheral societies (e.g., Chad or Senegal) would enhance our understanding of the impact of uneven capitalist development upon group identities.

5. Exploration of possible linkages between ethnicity, eth-class, and other bases for understanding group action--e.g., status-groups or "estates" (cf. Khleif 1984b). This could potentially involve reconsideration of race beyond our casting of it as a subcategory of ethnicity--particularly in light of our analytic emphasis upon the Black-White and White-non White divisions in our case studies of South Africa and the United States--and greater specification of the role of "racial" ideologies in intergroup relations.
Conclusion

As we stated at the outset, the goal of this work was not to present a finished theory of ethnicity and nationality, but rather to provide a point of departure for further inquiry. This undertaking emerged as a result of our dissatisfaction with existing approaches to the study of ethnicity, a judgement which we applied both to works within the field of ethnic relations and to more general approaches to the study of social behavior. In response, we sought to lay the groundwork for a class-based theory of ethnicity which incorporated insights from the study of both of these forms of group affiliation. At the risk of seeming presumptuous, we believe we can state that we have achieved this objective, that the concepts presented and demonstrated in this work provide a fruitful basis for understanding ethnic relations. What remains to be done is to continue to pursue this process on both the theoretical and the substantive levels—to see what calls for conceptual refinement. In other words, we must continue to seek to answer the question: What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear?

The potential rewards for this endeavor are great. The human propensity for using the communal bonds of ethnicity and nationality for group mobilization remains as strong as ever. As we write these words, ethnic conflict flares in the streets of New York City; in the seeming fragmentation
of the Soviet Union; in the cleavages which continue to
divide Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Palestine/Israel; and in the
renewed struggle to restructure South African society. Only
if we explore issues of ethnicity and class and their inter­
relationship can we hope to understand intergroup relations
in all their complexity. And only through such understand­
ing can we hope to develop strategies for the resolution of
intergroup conflict.
CHAPTER NOTE

CHAPTER VII

1. We recognize that issues of the nature of post-revolutionary societies and their links to the capitalist world-economy remain extremely controversial—both within and outside of the world-system paradigm. For a sampling of positions on these issues, see Chase-Dunn (1982); Sweezy (1980); Koves (1981); Nyiri (1982); Laibman (1978); and Mandel (1974; 1979).
REFERENCE


________. 1978. "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a . . . ." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1:377-400.


539


542


