

**Condors and Capitalism**

*Changing Interactions between Presidents and Indigenous Movements  
in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru*

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## ABSTRACT

Indigenous social movements began proliferating across Latin America in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, scholars have focused analyses on the factors shaping indigenous movement-state dynamics, with little consideration for how these interactions impact the larger indigenous population. This work addresses the question of how changing indigenous movement-presidential relationships affect indigenous political attitudes and behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, qualitatively using comparative historical analysis, and quantitatively using binomial logistical and ordinal logistical regressions. I conclude first that the inclusion of indigenous movements represents a democratic deepening, but has a destabilizing effect, as the system must expand and adapt to new actors; and second, that more representative and inclusive democracies do not necessarily garner more citizen support or engagement.

## INTRODUCTION

The UN General Assembly declared 1993 as the International Year for the World's Indigenous People. That same year, Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan activist of K'iche' descent, won the Nobel Peace Prize for her tireless work combatting the persistent injustice faced by indigenous communities in Guatemala. Menchu's efforts raised global awareness of the plight of indigenous people. In this sociopolitical context indigenous movements began proliferating across Latin America.

In the central Andean countries of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, indigenous movements organized to resist neoliberalism, the prevailing economic model of the time. Broadly, their struggle consisted of a set of shared demands, including state led development, limiting the foreign sector, land reform and establishment of plurinational constitutions (Silva 2018). In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, highland indigenous organization culminated in the formation of national movements and formal political parties. In Bolivia, Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) began as a coalition of left-wing organizations, spearheaded by future president and then leader of the coca growers union, Evo Morales, formalizing its status as a political party in the late 1990s. In Ecuador, the nationally recognized organized indigenous movement is called Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and is a separate entity from the indigenous political party, Pachakutik. Since the 1990s, the MAS and CONAIE indigenous movements have deployed their growing influence to advance indigenous rights within their respective countries, to varying degrees of success. In Peru, indigenous organization in the highlands remains weak and fractured. This is attributable

to several factors, including the Sendero Luminoso's violent repression of indigenous organizations in the Peruvian highlands during the 1970s and 80s, and Alberto Fujimori's decade-long authoritarian reign, which drastically recentralized the government and rejected ideas of pluralism (O'Neill 2006).

Mass indigenous mobilization in Ecuador and Bolivia garnered such far-reaching support that their respective governments were obliged to begin acknowledging indigenous rights to an extent previously unseen in Latin America. During the 1980s and 1990s, state attitudes towards indigenous people in the region were generally classified as assimilationist (Rice 2017), yet by the 21<sup>st</sup> century, indigenous movements had managed to create "new spaces for collective action and transformed the relationship between indigenous people and the state" (Rice 2017, pg. 3).

The late 20<sup>th</sup> century thus represents a turning point in the dynamics between indigenous groups and the state. In Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous peasants were organizing and subsequently mobilizing for the first time on ethnic identity. While in Peru, Alberto Fujimori's authoritarian style aimed to recentralize government and suppress ideals of pluralism, which partially explains the lack of political salience of indigenous identity in Peru. The culmination of these movements in Bolivia and Ecuador were the election of populist, left leaning presidents, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa in 2006 and 2007, respectively. In Peru, movements were unable to gain traction due to political instability, however, in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, presidential candidates such as Ollanta Humala and Alejandro Toledo aggressively courted their electoral support nonetheless to an extent not previously seen in Peruvian politics (Madrid 2011).

Regardless of the degree of political salience achieved by indigenous groups in each country, the state began considering indigenous groups as new actors in the domestic polity. The evolution of the indigenous-state dynamic in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been the subject of extensive scholarly research, which I explore in Chapter 1. Although the research makes inferences about how these interactions elicited changes elsewhere in each country's government and society, and in the internal dynamics of the organized indigenous movements themselves, it fails to explore how the interactions registered changes within the larger indigenous population. A deeper understanding of political attitudes and behavior within the larger indigenous population could have profound implications for democratic stability in the region, particularly as governments must navigate the precarious balance between economic development and marginalized populations in the context of climate change. Additionally, examination at the individual level helps determine whether changes in indigenous-state dynamics translate into tangible benefits for the people they claim to support. To that end, this research asks how indigenous political behavior and attitudes changed in the 21<sup>st</sup> century based on indigenous interactions with leadership in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. To do so, I examine how scholars describe interactions between indigenous movements and the state and then categorize them into four different groups. The literature focuses almost exclusively on factors shaping these dynamics, failing to consider the implications for the larger indigenous population. This research contributes to current scholarship by analyzing the interactions between indigenous movements and presidents throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century and classifying them by relationship type. Using Latin American Public Opinion Project

(LAPOP) data, I measure changes in indigenous political attitudes and behavior over the same timeframe and associate these changes with these relationship types.

### *Methodology*

The independent variable is indigenous interactions with presidents in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia from 2000 until 2019. Analyzing scholarly works and newspaper articles, I provide a historical analysis of interactions between presidents and indigenous groups in each country in Chapter 2. I then characterize these interactions and sort them into a descriptive typology organized by interaction type. The purpose of the typology is to synthesize qualitative findings and present them in a more succinct manner. I then examine whether presidential interactions with indigenous groups corresponded to changes in political attitudes and behaviors in the larger population.

To measure the dependent variable, indigenous attitudes and behavior, I rely on Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey data from Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. Data is analyzed longitudinally, from 2004 to the most current data set, 2019. Political attitudes are measured through variables relating to trust in government institutions, political efficacy, and interest in politics. Political behavior is measured using variables related to voting and protesting. A dichotomous indigenous variable helps distinguish between indigenous and non-indigenous respondents. Utilizing survey data to measure the dependent variable allows for more systematic assessment of changes at the individual level of analysis over a long period of time. These three cases were selected due to the asymmetries in political climate and movement success: Ecuador and Bolivia have had successful indigenous movements that culminated in a democratic deepening through the broad inclusion of indigenous people into national politics. Peru

does not have a successful indigenous movement; significant political participation remains inaccessible to indigenous people and the central government is plagued by pervasive corruption, producing widespread mistrust and dissatisfaction with politics among the mainstream population. Given these key differences, Peru serves as a control case to facilitate attributing changes in the dependent to the effect of indigenous movements, as well as highlight the possible outcomes associated with the continued disenfranchisement and marginalization of indigenous populations.

In chapter 1 I examine previous literature on indigenous movement-presidential dynamics and develop four relationship types based on salient themes in the literature. In Chapter 2 I provide a qualitative overview of the trajectory of indigenous-state interactions and then categorize and sort these relationships into a descriptive typology. The quantitative analysis and discussion of findings is found in Chapter 3, followed by the conclusion in Chapter 4.

## CHAPTER 1

### A Review of the Literature on Indigenous-State Dynamics

Scholarship on indigenous-state relations can be divided into four different types of interactions. The supportive type focuses on coalition building efforts and broadly classifies interactions as positive (Alberti 2015; Rice 2017; Madrid 2011), and marked by a bottom-up approach to leadership (Conaghan 2018; Silva 2018). The detached type is characterized by presidential indifference towards indigenous movements. This indifference often materializes as presidents systematically excluding movements from substantive participation or passively ignoring demands. Inherent to this type is a distinct top-down approach, in the sense that presidents are in the dominant position vis-à-vis movements and therefore are able to set the tone and extent of interactions (Silva 2018; Jameson 2011; Conaghan 2018). Tense relationships are marked by mutual hostility and often exists against a backdrop of social unrest (McNeish 2006; Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006; Rice 2017). Finally, presidential rhetoric that contradicts actual governance characterizes the discordant type. The defining attribute of these interactions are presidents who embrace policies antithetical to their professed pro-indigenous stance (Bowen 2011; Becker 2013; Ellner 2012).

#### *Supportive Type*

Supportive relationships between presidents and indigenous movements consist of generally positive interactions and coalition building efforts between actors (Silva 2018; Conaghan 2018; Alberti 2015; Rice 2017; Madrid 2011; Albó 2004). In Ecuador and

Bolivia, these efforts consisted of sustained mobilization of leftist organizations united in a common struggle against the last round of overtly neoliberal presidents from the beginning of the twenty first century. A portion of these efforts also entailed forming alliances with ideologically compatible, charismatic leaders, who ultimately won the presidential election in their respective country. Thus, in Ecuador and Bolivia, coalition building occurred vertically and horizontally—horizontally among grassroots movements, and vertically through forging ties with leadership. Upon the election of Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, dynamics between the two presidents and their indigenous supporters evolved distinctly.

Silva (2018) and Conaghan (2018) note that the vertical coalition between CONAIE and Correa strained after Correa was elected, as he systematically excluded the organized movement while generally retaining the support of the wider indigenous citizenry through his populist policies. Morales maintained a strong connection to the vast grassroots network that comprised MAS (Conaghan 2018). Alberti's (2015) take on the evolution of the Correa-CONAIE and Morales-MAS relationships is consistent with Silva and Conaghan, although she emphasizes Morales' eventual fall from grace. By his third term in power, indigenous groups had become "ambivalent and conflictive" towards him (pg. 67), which is likely attributed to certain controversial environmental and economic decisions that called into question the authenticity of his commitment to the indigenous agenda. Despite this, the enduring success of MAS even after Morales' forced resignation in 2019 is a tribute to the supportive alliance that characterized much of his interactions with indigenous groups, as well as his bottom-up approach to leadership.

In Peru, the notable absence of organized indigenous groups in the highlands precluded opportunities for sustained positive interactions; the lack of an organizational apparatus with which to articulate demands and forge ties with leadership left individual groups widely disconnected from national politics. Top-down vertical coalition building occurred as prospective presidential candidates courted the indigenous electorate. Madrid (2011) argues that during their presidential candidacy, Fujimori, Toledo and Humala's positive interactions with indigenous people were motivated by a desire to gain their support, which they achieved by presenting themselves as co-ethnics. These appeals featured both ethnic and populist overtones and were superficial in nature. Ethnic appeals consisted of the use of indigenous symbols in campaigns, wearing traditional indigenous clothing and making proclamations in native languages at campaign events (Albó 2004), while populist appeals included denouncing existing political parties and elites and emphasizing plans to help the poor. Madrid's argument highlights an important distinction within this type, that is those who feign support for the indigenous to further their own political objectives, as well as the fluid nature of coalition building. For example, the Cocalero Union?, of which Morales was leader, embodied the broader struggle against foreign interests in Bolivia by spearheading opposition to U.S.-led coca eradication efforts in the Chapare. Fragmented groups with similar grievances united and evolved into MAS. The origins of Morales' role in the movement were channeled first and foremost through his cocalero identity. However, as more indigenous groups joined, and because indigenous identity already overlapped with many of the other identities involved (i.e. peasant, cocalero, laborer), the movement reinterpreted its identity on an ethnic basis. Morales' identity as leader of the movement transformed simultaneously, as

his Aymara ethnicity became more prominent than that of coccalero. Madrid's argument implies the reinterpretation of identity to suit changing objectives.

### *Detached Type*

Silva (2018), Conaghan (2018) and Jameson (2011) posit that some indigenous-president dynamics are marked by physical or ideological distance between movements and leadership. Scholars in this approach generally contend that what motivates leaders is a desire to remain autonomous, either genuinely or in appearance only, of indigenous movements. Physical distance takes the form of presidential efforts to systematically exclude indigenous participation across various platforms, while ideological distance consists of presidents maintaining superficial proximity to a movement through the granting of minor concessions or tenuous access, while widely rejecting the ideology of the movement. A president's unwillingness to breach this physical or ideological divide characterizes this relationship type.

In analyzing the Correa-CONAIE relationship, Silva (2018) and Conaghan (2018) argue that Correa's top-down approach to governance is indicative of a desire to physically distance himself from CONAIE. Correa achieved this by limiting CONAIE's inclusion in substantive political processes. For example, he excluded them from conventional participation by refusing to appoint indigenous people to significant political posts and barring CONAIE from weighing in on policy decisions, particularly those that would heavily impact their communities. The 2008 Ecuadorean constitution grants indigenous communities the right to consultation prior to the government sanctioning mining activities in their territories. This has been selectively honored, if not outright ignored, in practice (Walsh 2010). Correa attempted to block nonconventional

participation by criminalizing indigenous and environmental activism. This style starkly contrasts Morales' supportive bottom-up approach as described in the previous section.

Jameson's (2011) argument focuses on how ideological distance is manifested in president-movement dynamics. He concludes that governments navigate ideological divides between themselves and movements by granting minor demands, often as concessions, while simultaneously pursuing their own agenda. In the context of Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, the most salient example of this ideological distance regards economic policy. With very little exception, political leaders of the region have pursued neoliberal economic agendas since the 1980s and 90s despite sustained opposition from indigenous movements. Such opposition stems from the indigenous assertion that that this particular model benefits elites and further disadvantages marginalized populations. In the Latin American context, the neoliberal model tends to rely on natural resource extraction, whose environmental ramifications pose numerous threats to indigenous culture and livelihood. Presidents and presidential candidates have leveraged indigenous opposition to neoliberal practices to suit personal objectives, while quietly preserving their own ideological commitment to it.

### *Tense Type*

Given the tumultuousness of Latin American politics, indigenous-state relations across all countries and time periods in this century always include an element of tension and civil unrest. Indeed, significant change has never occurred in the central Andes or elsewhere in Latin America without deploying nonconventional participation to some degree by disenfranchised groups. Scholars of this approach posit that tense relationships consist of mutual hostility and often occur against a backdrop social unrest. All scholars

attribute the tension and unrest to extensive structural inadequacies, which diminish the state's capacity to incorporate new actors (McNeish 2006; Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006; Rice 2017).

McNeish (2006) argues that mass protests in Bolivia during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was attributed to “lack of viable avenues for participation” (pg. 221), which were exacerbated by internal prejudices. In the 1990s, Bolivia implemented a host of pro-poor policies that included the Law of Popular Participation, Agrarian Reform laws, and efforts to decentralize government administration and guarantee indigenous land titles. As a result, Bolivia was hailed as the gold standard in economic development. However, by the early 2000s, many realized that the positive effects of these reforms had been grossly overstated, as rates of poverty had actually increased and access to political participation had greatly declined. McNeish concludes that genuine democratic openness was severely lacking because participation was limited to certain groups and on the state's terms.

Mayorga's argument combines McNeish's (2006) focus on the inadequacy of avenues for participation with Conaghan's (2018) emphasis on the failure of traditional political parties. He echoes Samuel Huntington's early work in arguing that a “crisis of governability”, in which the state could no longer interpret nor address social demands, explains the emergence of political outsiders, such as indigenous movements and populist leaders (2006, pg. 132; Huntington 1968). He claims that these new actors constitute the largest contemporary threat to democracy in Latin America because they seek to undermine liberal democratic institutions and replace them with their own “utopian”

version of democracy (pg. 133). Mayorga's argument implies that that liberal democracy and indigenous political ideology are mutually exclusive.

In stark contrast, Albó (2004) argues that the emergence of indigenous movements as new political actors is "a very positive development" (pg. 31), because it represents the opening up of politics to formerly marginalized citizens. He argues that "the installation of democracies in the region, as imperfect as they may be, opens up political spaces within which the indigenous can organize and advance their rights in a context that makes it difficult for judiciaries and security forces to deny citizens' rights guaranteed under both domestic constitutions and international conventions" (pg. 31). Thus, the arguments of Albó and Mayorga (2006) align in their characterization of tense interactions marked by civil unrest, but diverge in their interpretation of the outcomes. Albó also notes that many political parties were skeptical of ethnicity, which echoes Conaghan (2018) and Mayorga's assessment that the perceived inadequacy of traditional political parties is a predominant variable in tense indigenous-president relationships.

Rice (2017) asserts that, through the struggle and protests of the 1990s, indigenous movements achieved a new space for collective action in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This new paradigm emphasizes participation through conventional and nonconventional means. Rice argues that although indigenous social movements continue to rely on protest, which is emblematic of a tense relationship with the state, it is precisely through this deployment of nonconventional participation that they have achieved better access to conventional participation, in the forms of voting, traditional political parties, and occupying influential political positions.

### *Discordant Type*

This type is characterized by a president professing sympathy towards indigenous movements, while selectively honoring movement demands as part of a broader scheme to preserve the existing socioeconomic hierarchy. Arguments within this approach are generally aligned.

Bowen (2011) argues that leadership incorporates indigenous movements into the political system superficially to minimize threats to existing elites. Becker (2013) describes a type of symbiosis that exists between indigenous movements and certain political parties, namely, “leftist political parties cannot gain traction against the entrenched economic and political interests of the traditional oligarchy without the enthusiasm and energy of mass social movements, but neither can social movements achieve their ambitious transformative agenda without gaining control over governmental structures” (pg. 45). Presidents have come to rely on indigenous social movement support to further their political objectives, even when these objectives conflict with the movement’s agenda. To this end, they placate the movements through gestures of solidarity to retain their endorsement. Ellner (2012) defines interactions through leadership’s attempts to consolidate power through legitimate constitutional processes, such as referenda, frequent elections and efforts to promote direct participation. These measures are successful largely through the support of indigenous movements, despite the fact that their tacit objective is to preserve existing political structures. Ultimately, 21<sup>st</sup> century leaders’ failure to authentically incorporate indigenous actors into politics demonstrates a pervasive unwillingness to genuinely address systemic oppression for fear of threatening the existing social hierarchy (Bowen 2011; Becker 2013; Ellner 2012).

## CHAPTER 2

### Understanding Presidential-Indigenous Dynamics in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia from 2000-2020: A Historical Analysis

This chapter provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of interactions between indigenous movements and presidents from 2000-2020 in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. Interactions are characterized into one of the four relationship types outlined in the literature review (supportive, detached, discordant, tense) and organized into a descriptive typology. Table 1 illustrates the central actors in presidential-indigenous movement dynamics within the three cases.

**Table 1:** *Key Actors in Indigenous-Presidential Dynamics*

Case	Name of national indigenous movement	Size of national indigenous movement	Name of indigenous political party
Bolivia	Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS)	Large	MAS
Ecuador	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas Ecuatorianas (CONAIE)	Moderately Large	Pachakutik
Peru	None	N/A	None

**Table 2:** *Descriptive typology of relationships between presidents and indigenous organizations 2000-2020*

Supportive	Detached	Tense	Discordant
Mesa 2003-2005	Quiroga 2001-2002	Palacios 2005-2007	Gutierrez 2003-2005
Morales 2006-2019	Rodriguez 2005-2006	Sanchez 2002-2003	Toledo 2001-2006
Vizcarra 2018-2020	PPK 2016-2018	Garcia 2006-2011	Humala 2011-2016
	Noboa 2000-2003		
	Correa 2007-2017		
	Moreno 2017-present		

*Legend:* Peru; Ecuador; Bolivia

*Summary of types:*

- Supportive- This type consists of generally positive interactions, coalition building efforts between movements and leadership and a bottom-up approach to governance.
- Detached- This type is characterized by presidential indifference towards indigenous movements, which takes the form of political exclusion and ignoring demands. Characterized by a top-down approach to governance.
- Discordant- This type is characterized by presidential actions that contradict the indigenous rights they purport to support.
- Tense- This type consists of mutual hostility and usually exists against a backdrop of social unrest.

***Ecuador***

*Background: CONAIE and President Jamil Mahuad 1998-2000.*

Ecuador was in a state of turmoil in 1998. Amid a crippling recession and runaway inflation, President Jamil Mahuad announced his plan to salvage the failing economy. Central to this plan was a push to dollarize Ecuador, whose currency at that time was the Sucre. The dollarization plan drew fierce opposition that exacerbated the existing and widespread unrest and ultimately erupted into a full-scale mobilization against Mahuad (Jameson 2011). These uprisings, of which CONAIE was a primary player, culminated in Mahuad's ousting in 2000 (Buckley 2000). Mahuad's departure represented a victory for CONAIE and solidified their position as a major actor in domestic politics at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The leaders of the uprisings established a junta to replace Mahuad. Called the Government of National Salvation, the junta was comprised of CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, Col. Lucio Gutierrez and Carlos Solorzano. They were in power for 24 hours before Mahuad's vice president, Gustavo Noboa, was sworn in as president (Buckley 2000; Darling 2000). Although the

junta only lasted for 24 hours, the fact that CONAIE was a major force in toppling what they perceived as an ineffectual president, and then CONAIE president Antonio Vargas was a founding member in the junta, is indicative of CONAIE's ascendant trajectory.

*Detached: CONAIE and Gustavo Noboa 2000-2003*

CONAIE had finally gained a national platform to promote indigenous interests and seemed positioned to enjoy more influence within the political system, the ultimate goal of which was achieving greater recognition from the state (Albó 2004; Rice 2017). However, CONAIE was disappointed that their work to topple Mahuad only resulted in a replacement with identical political and economic ideals, Vice President Gustavo Noboa. As such, they vocally opposed Noboa's government from the outset (Darling 2000; Ecuador: protests 2000). Cognizant of CONAIE's proven track-record of effecting change through mobilization and protest, Noboa sought to minimize the potential for social tensions before the upcoming election cycle by committing to continuous dialogue with CONAIE (Gerlach 2003). In Noboa's first month as president, CONAIE presented a list of demands, which included tangible measures to end corruption and poverty, as well as economic reforms (Darling 2000). CONAIE also stated its intention to call for a national referendum.

Gerlach (2003) outlines three main gestures of goodwill extended by Noboa to CONAIE. First, remaining true to his word, he engaged in negotiations with Antonio Vargas and reached a tentative agreement on improving healthcare, education, land rights and housing for indigenous and poor people. In exchange, Vargas agreed that CONAIE would not incite or participate in any uprisings. Second, Noboa established the "El Fondo Indígena" (*The Indian Fund*) with money from the Inter-American Development

Agency and the Ecuadorean government. Third, he agreed to unfreeze bank accounts and grant amnesty to low-level participants in the January 15<sup>th</sup> uprising. While the government was granting these minor concessions to maintain social harmony, they were simultaneously pursuing the neoliberal reforms outlined by Mahuad's administration. Such reforms included austerity measures, such as terminating gas and food subsidies, as well as initiatives to expand the privatization of mining, oil and telecommunications and finalization of the plan to dollarize the economy (Jameson 2011). Furthermore, Gerlach notes, Congress denied CONAIE's request for a referendum on the grounds that national referenda must have congressional approval, which this one did not. Additionally, Noboa quietly changed the financial terms of the initial agreement with CONAIE to allow the central government more fiscal flexibility. In response, Vargas terminated negotiations and shortly thereafter, mass uprisings ensued in response to the austerity measures.

Interactions between Noboa and CONAIE were characterized by a notable give and take, where Noboa was open to dialogue and granted some superficial concessions, but did not budge on CONAIE's more substantive demands relating to the economy. Understanding how powerful CONAIE had become, Noboa's desire to maintain open dialogue represented a strategy to appease the indigenous organization, rather than a genuine desire to include them. On this Noboa stated, "We're willing to build schools, roads, and make infrastructure improvements, especially in Indian Areas, but they have to work with us..." (Jameson 2011, pg. 66-67). Also, CONAIE had popular support to call for a referendum but was ultimately blocked by Congress. Thus, CONAIE gained changes through concessions and protest, not conventional participation within the political system, from which they had been intentionally and systematically blocked. The

Noboa-CONAIE relationship is characterized as detached. Neither party was outright hostile or overly supportive, Noboa maintained an open dialogue while deliberately maintaining CONAIE at arm's length from any real influence over the policy process.

*Detached to Discordant: Lucío Gutierrez 2003-2005*

While in prison for his role in the January 15<sup>th</sup> uprising that deposed Mahuad, Lucío Gutierrez published a summary of the historic uprising, in which he strongly implied his consideration of a future presidential bid, saying, "I would try to form a movement of national identity in which would come together the aspirations of all the people and nationalities of Ecuador.... We think of a great movement that integrates the Indians, the blacks, the mestizos and all of the underprivileged of this country" (Gerlach 2003, pg. 227). Gutierrez was subsequently pardoned by Noboa and later announced his intentions to run in the 2002 presidential elections.

Gutierrez had an existing relationship with CONAIE through their mutual participation in the January 15<sup>th</sup> uprising. He hailed from a humble background and his darker complexion gave him a more ethnically proximate appearance to indigenous voters than previous presidents (Freedom House 2004). Gutierrez won the presidency largely through the support of a CONAIE-Pachakutik coalition and the relationship between his government and the indigenous movement started strong. As a gesture of his commitment to greater inclusion for marginalized groups, Gutierrez named 3 indigenous people to top cabinet positions, an unprecedented number for the time (Jameson 2011). His agenda, he promised, would prioritize measures to end corruption and combat poverty, especially in rural indigenous areas. It soon became apparent that the economic policies he favored conflicted with the pro-indigenous discourse underpinning his

agenda. For example, he encouraged private investment in the oil industry and he increased bus fares and oil prices, opposition to which have been central to CONAIE's platform for decades (Freedom House 2004; Jameson 2011).

The relationship eroded over time and eventually, two inciting factors caused the terminal rupture between Gutierrez and the indigenous coalition that backed him. First, Gutierrez began cozying up to the U.S. and took several friendly visits to Washington. Second, he entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (Jameson 2011; Freedom House 2004). These actions were in stark opposition to indigenous demands, among which were limiting foreign investment in key industries through nationalization and the rejection of transnational lenders, whose financial support was accompanied by strict terms that often disadvantaged the poor. Prominent indigenous groups viewed these actions as a betrayal. Pachakutik publicly revoked support and CONAIE was left suspicious of Gutierrez's true motivations (Conaie decidió desconocer gobierno del coronel Gutiérrez 2004). Shortly thereafter, the Gutierrez-CONAIE dynamic broke down completely. The indigenous ministers serving in his cabinet resigned or were forced out (Protestas callejeras en rechazo al precio de los combustibles 2003). CONAIE eventually cut ties, but its relationship with Gutierrez left the organization internally divided and disconnected from its base (Madrid 2008). As a result, CONAIE retreated from the national spotlight to regroup and did not participate in the subsequent uprisings that removed Gutierrez in 2005 (Conaie decidió desconocer gobierno del coronel Gutiérrez 2004).

Gutierrez-CONAIE interactions at the beginning were mutually supportive. Gutierrez's promises to be sympathetic to the indigenous agenda while simultaneously

advancing overtly neoliberal economic policies, which included U.S. backed efforts to expand foreign investment in oil as well as working with the IMF, revealed a dissonance between his rhetoric and actions that is consistent with a discordant relationship.

*Discordant to Tense: Alfredo Palacios 2005-2007*

Gutierrez lost popularity quickly by imposing harsh economic austerity measures while simultaneously consolidating power. Social tensions rose steadily during his presidency and were further inflamed by his decision to dissolve the Supreme Court (Gutiérrez declara estado emergencia y disuelve la Corte Suprema 2005). Mass uprisings led by the Forrajido movement ensued. The Forrajido movement was comprised of mostly mestizo and working-class citizens and was led by future president Rafael Correa (Silva 2018). Internally divided and alienated from their base, CONAIE declined to participate (Madrid 2008). Amid the chaos, Congress eventually voted to remove Gutierrez and Alfredo Palacios assumed power.

Like his predecessors, Palacios was strongly committed to neoliberal reforms. The Palacios-CONAIE relationship is widely unremarkable. There is no available scholarly work dedicated to his presidency in the context of this research, and very few newspaper articles focus on different interactions between him and CONAIE during his short two-year presidency. The majority of available work focuses on Andean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which this research considers as the defining issue of the CONAIE-Palacios relationship. Negotiations for AFTA began in 2003 and drew broad opposition and social unrest across Ecuador, to such a degree that Ecuador withdrew from collective negotiations to engage in individual negotiations with the U.S. (Andean-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement Negotiations 2005). In November of 2005, CONAIE led a

march of thousands of indigenous people from across Ecuador's diverse regions to Quito, to demonstrate their fierce opposition to AFTA. Upon arrival, they shared a private audience with President Palacios to outline their grave concerns about how the signing of AFTA would disproportionately impact their communities (Palacio dialogó con indígenas en Carondelet 2005). They demanded that Ecuador withdraw from AFTA negotiations and expel US-based Occidental Petroleum Corp ("Oxy") from the country over alleged financial misconduct. Palacios heard their concerns but was undeterred. The signing of AFTA was planned for March 23, 2006 and the government declined to act expeditiously in the matter of Oxy's expulsion. In response, CONAIE led another round of mass uprisings, which were so fierce and widespread that several northern provinces were completely paralyzed. Palacios deployed the military to "restore order" by any means necessary (Creamer 2006; Ecuador: Militant Opposition to Andean Free Trade Agreement Blockades Several Regions, Moves to Capital 2006). CONAIE issued a manifesto on March 20<sup>th</sup>, condemning the signing of the AFTA and accusing the government of acting in the interest of wealthy elites (CONAIE manifesto 2006). One sentence from the communique perfectly embodies the indigenous struggle since the 1990s: "We are tired of the rich and powerful in our country; they violate the law, swindle, steal and in the end have total impunity" (CONAIE manifesto 2006). Ultimately, Ecuador did expel Oxy and AFTA negotiations were suspended indefinitely. The Ecuadorean Government stated increased oil revenues as the rationale behind Oxy's expulsion, though sustained pressure from CONAIE is cited as a prominent factor by external sources (Ecuador cancels an oil deal with Occidental Petroleum 2006).

Although Palacios' time in office was brief, the chaos surrounding AFTA in many ways defines his relationship with CONAIE. Palacios' willingness to engage in dialogue about AFTA after the initial march to Quito presents him as sympathetic to the indigenous movement. However, AFTA negotiations proceeded nonetheless and were held in the strictest of secrecy with only wealthy economic and political elites present. Palacios declined to invite indigenous representatives or incorporate indigenous demands in the negotiations. This demonstrates that Palacios did not give genuine consideration to CONAIE's articulated concerns about AFTA.

The Palacios-CONAIE relationship further decayed after the March 2006 uprising. CONAIE refused to continue recognizing the authority of Palacios' government, and Palacios accused the indigenous movement of attempting to overthrow democracy (*Las protestas indígenas en Ecuador contra el Tratado de Libre Comercio se intensifican 2006*). The matter of AFTA inspired such mutual hostility between Palacios and CONAIE, this relationship would be classified as Tense.

*Tense to Detached: Rafael Correa 2007-2017*

Rafael Correa ascended to the presidency through the support of a broad leftist coalition, which included both CONAIE and Pachakutik. From the outset, CONAIE had high hopes that a Correa presidency might finally bring many of their long-held demands to fruition. His movement, dubbed the "Citizen's Revolution" promised "economic, social and political policies that emphasized economic nationalism, state-led development, redistributive social policies to improve social equity, ecologically sustainable development, clean government, observance of citizen rights, agrarian reform, and effective support for indigenous peoples' rights, especially over territory"

(Silva 2018). Correa aggressively courted indigenous support through ethnic and populist appeals (Madrid 2008). For example, his swearing in ceremony took place in the Andean town of Zumbahua. He wore traditional dress and was presented with a scepter to represent the bond between his administration and the indigenous communities across Ecuador. Upon receiving it, he vowed “I will never fail you” (Caseli 2011).

Correa estranged himself from CONAIE soon after his election because of what many experts have classified as intentional efforts to systematically exclude the movement from the national dialogue. This exclusion was part of Correa’s broader attempt to consolidate power. Despite this, Correa retained the support of the larger indigenous population, who attributed the tangible improvements in their lives to his social policies (Becker 2013; Silva 2018).

The terminal rupture in the CONAIE-Correa relationship is attributed to the following: First, Correa labelled CONAIE an interest group and based on this, shut them out of the policy process (Silva 2018; Conaghan 2018). Correa created public policies to serve “popular sector interests” (Bowen 2011) while simultaneously excluding groups representing such interests from the policy-making process (Silva 2018; Bowen 2011; Radcliffe 2012). Second, In June 2010, Ecuador hosted a summit on minority rights in Latin America in Ótavallo, a town sacred to indigenous tradition. Leaders and lawmakers from all over Ecuador and Latin America, including Evo Morales, attended. Invitations were not extended to CONAIE or Pachakutik (Caseli 2011). Third, Correa aggressively pursued extractive activities in indigenous territories, despite earlier promises not to, while selectively honoring if not outright ignoring the constitutionally protected right that impacted groups be consulted (Silva 2018; Becker 2013; Walsh 2010). Fourth, Correa

repressed indigenous organization and criminalized activism, which included detaining activists without due process, forbidding indigenous organizations from participating in politics, and declaring any organizations not formally authorized by the state illicit (Becker 2013; Ecuador's Indigenous People See Protest 'Criminalized' Under Correa 2016). As a result, by the end of his first term, Correa had lost the support of CONAIE, while generally retaining support of the larger indigenous population (Silva 2018).

The Correa-CONAIE interactions have hallmarks of both a tense and a detached relationship. However, for the purposes of this research, it will be classified as detached. The tension and mutual hostility flared toward the middle and end of his decade long presidency are a direct result of his intentional efforts to exclude CONAIE. Distancing himself from CONAIE provoked the unrest, which waxed and waned, while the distance was pervasive throughout his presidency.

#### *Detached to Detached: Lenin Moreno 2017-2021*

Lenin Moreno served as Correa's vice president from 2007-2013 and in 2017 he was elected president, campaigning on a platform of continued populist policies as championed by his predecessor. The tenuous relationship between Correa and CONAIE caused indigenous people to overwhelmingly support Moreno's rival, Guillermo Lasso, in the 2017 elections (Madrid 2012). When Moreno was declared the winner, CONAIE published an open letter to the new president, which reaffirmed their collective demands, encouraged Moreno to take advantage of this opportunity to make genuine change and reiterated their commitment monitoring his politics (CONAIE Press Bulletin 2017). This relationship opened on a positive note. During a December 2017 meeting with CONAIE leadership, Moreno agreed to suspend all new mining permits and scrutinize existing

permits that were suspected of noncompliance, including the requisite (but often ignored) measure to consult affected indigenous territories. Additionally, Moreno agreed to mandating bilingual education, supporting community transportation infrastructure, and titling land to indigenous communities (Tras cita con CONAIE, Lenín Moreno detiene concesiones mineras 2017).

Moreno inherited an economy in turmoil due to Correa's overreliance on oil exportation and mineral extraction to fund his extensive social programs. The 7.8 magnitude earthquake of April 2016, combined with a dip in global oil prices, which began in 2014, produced a recession (Bristow and Kueffner 2019) in which the fiscal deficit reached 8% of GDP (Bello 2019). Second, throughout Correa's decade long presidency, public spending had increased to almost 40% of the country's GDP, and by 2016, debt exceeded the legal limit of 40% of the GDP (Bristow and Kueffner 2019). By this time, public sector wages had almost doubled and corruption was rampant. For example, *The Economist* reports that five major projects featuring PetroEcuador included roughly 2.5bn in overbilling by contractors (Bello 2019). To confront the growing crisis, Moreno enacted harsh austerity measures. A key feature of his economic recovery plan was a multibillion dollar IMF loan whose terms stipulated that effective immediately, the government must terminate the 40-year old fuel subsidies on which Ecuador's poor and indigenous heavily relied (Ecuador's New Economic Plan Explained 2019). The price of diesel more than doubled overnight, with a commensurate hike in bus fare (Chappell 2019).

Unrest ensued immediately. Protests began in early October and lasted 11 days, during which time a state of emergency was declared and Moreno moved the capital to

the coastal city of Guayaquil for fear that protestors would storm the capitol in Quito. On October 12<sup>th</sup>, Jaime Vargas, leader of CONAIE, agreed to enter negotiations with the president. He cited the following demands: The fuel subsidy be reinstated, that the negotiations be broadcast national television networks, and that the president promise to discuss the cessation of extractive activities in their territories (Valencia and Taj 2019). The two parties reached an agreement on October 13<sup>th</sup>, and President Moreno promised to repeal Decree 883 immediately. Upon hearing this news, indigenous protestors celebrated, cleaned up the city, and promptly went home.

In the wake of the protests and subsequent talks with CONAIE, Moreno announced the government's intention to establish a new plan to stabilize the economy, based on the principal that "those who have more, pay more" (Ecuador President Proposes New Finances Reforms after Turmoil 2019). Centered on wealth redistribution, the plan proposed to include new taxes on high earning businesses, and on certain items, such as plastic bags. No tangible improvements from this plan ever materialized. Subsequent interactions between CONAIE and Moreno were not overtly friendly. In October of 2020, CONAIE filed a lawsuit against Moreno for crimes against humanity for his response to the October 2019 protests (Ecuador: Citizens reject economic decisions to please the IMF 2019; Ricci 2020). The commission's finding that Moreno's government used excessive force to repress protestors in October of 2019 was made more egregious by the additional finding that Moreno was acting unconstitutionally when entering into the first IMF deal. In March of 2020, Moreno announced another set of austerity measures as part of an IMF loan to address the dire economic situation in the

wake of COVID-19 (Ecuador: Citizens reject economic decisions to please the IMF 2019). By 2020, Moreno had an approval rating of 9% (Ricci 2020).

The Moreno-CONAIE relationship is characterized as Detached. Although his presidency is marked by the October 2019 uprisings for their scope and duration, mutual hostility was not the salient theme of interactions. Throughout his presidency, Moreno showed a willingness to dialogue with CONAIE, but did not incorporate any of their demands or suggestions into his decisions, consistent with a distanced relationship.

### ***Bolivia***

#### *Background: Hugo Banzer and indigenous people 1997-2001*

Former military dictator Hugo Banzer was democratically elected in 1997 under the slogan “Pan, Techo y Trabajo” *Food, Shelter and Work* (McNeish 2006). His government’s primary focus was combatting poverty by strengthening democracy. To that end, he enacted the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS) which aimed to expand avenues of participation to civil society by creating a national dialogue on matters such as resource allocation and economic policy (Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006). Later studies revealed that this did very little to expand participation or alleviate poverty, as poverty indicators worsened and frequent, and violent protests indicated that avenues to conventional participation were inadequate (McNeish 2006). One such example of this were the Cochabamba Water wars, which was a series of protests that occurred in Cochabamba from 1998-2000 in response to the privatization of Cochabamba’s municipal water supply. Banzer also adopted a hardline anti-drug agenda, which aimed to systematically eradicate the cultivation of coca in the highlands. Feeling that their culture and livelihood was increasingly threatened by neoliberal policies and coca

eradication efforts, a broad coalition of leftist social movements, including labor unions, peasant unions and cocaleros (coca grower unions) began organizing (Madrid 2012; Conaghan 2018; Silva 2018). The movement continued gaining momentum and national influence, eventually adopting the name Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) (Conaghan 2018).

*Detached: Jorge Quiroga 2001-2002*

Jorge Quiroga, Banzer's vice president, assumed power when Banzer resigned due to health concerns. An extensive review of the literature and available newspapers revealed that there was almost no sustained dialogue or meaningful interactions between Quiroga and MAS, most likely a result of Quiroga inheriting the presidency (and thus not needing to appeal to indigenous groups for support), as well as his short time in office. Needless to say, the most meaningful aspect of his presidency in the context of this research was the continuation of Banzer's aggressive coca eradication campaign in the Chapare. This shortsighted campaign failed to consider the socioeconomic ramifications for vulnerable and marginalized populations who depended on the coca trade for their livelihoods. Furthermore, neither Banzer nor Quiroga offered an alternative development plan for affected populations (Hooper 2005; Mayorga 2006). This, along with Quiroga's continued commitment to neoliberal economic policies, further emboldened MAS, who staged uprisings and protests across the country (New president takes over in Bolivia 2001).

Quiroga's adherence to a neoliberal agenda through the systematic eradication of coca characterized his interactions with MAS. There was no overt hostility on behalf of

his government, yet Quiroga's agenda stood in opposition to the indigenous demands articulated by MAS. These interactions are consistent with a detached relationship.

*Detached to Tense: Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 2002-2003*

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, known as "Goni", served his first term as president from 1993-1997 and was later reelected in 2002. Goni was a strong proponent of neoliberal economic reforms, however, mindful of the potential negative effects to indigenous people, he enacted some corrective measures and also promoted new rights for indigenous people (Albó 2004). This relationship began on a positive note, but was soon embittered by the event that came to define his presidency: the Gas Wars and subsequent brutal repression of protestors, for which Goni was later tried and convicted in the United States in 2018 (Ramos 2018).

The Gas Wars erupted in October of 2003 in opposition to Goni's plans to export natural gas through Chile to the U.S. This plan was highly contentious due to vast opposition to natural gas privatization and the acrimonious relationship between Bolivia and Chile, which began with the Atacama border dispute in the 1800s and was exacerbated by the War of the Pacific, when Bolivia lost its Pacific coastline and became a landlocked state. MAS spearheaded the protests, and soon more groups of laborers, coca farmers and other indigenous and non-indigenous organizations of the left joined. In response to the unrest, Goni dispatched the military, who engaged in brutal repression. Goni attempted several times to quell the unrest, the most notable of which was to offer a referendum on the issue of natural gas exportation (Assies 2004). McNeish (2006) importantly notes that the referendum did not include the citizens most opposed to the reforms, rural and indigenous populations. MAS and others on the left continued to

demand his resignation. Goni eventually conceded and submitted his resignation on October 17, 2003 (Octubre negro: cronología del caso que enlutó a Bolivia 2018). Evo Morales, the leader of MAS and a highly visible indigenous figure in the Gas Wars, later centered his presidential campaign on the nationalization of key industries, which he promptly enacted upon winning the election (Relea 2003).

The majority of scholarly works and newspaper articles contextualize Sanchez de Lozada's interactions with MAS and other indigenous groups by the Gas Wars. This research therefore considers the Gas Wars, a bloody and violent event, the issue that defines the Goni-MAS interactions and characterizes the relationship as tense.

*Tense to Supportive: Carlos Mesa 2003-2005*

Carlos Mesa was Goni's vice president and assumed power after Goni was deposed. His presidency, although short-lived, is considered a major turning point in Bolivian politics. At this time, the national dialogue was centered on the question of natural gas nationalization (Relea 2003), a contentious topic which further exacerbated an existing regional divide between the leftist indigenous people of the highlands, and the traditionally wealthy, European descendants of the eastern lowlands (Webber 2010; Assies 2004). Counterintuitively, Mesa enjoyed sustained support from MAS and Morales despite the fact that his policies were not overtly aligned with the indigenous agenda. Some speculate that this was a calculated move on Morales' part to present himself as more politically moderate to attract conservative mestizo voters in anticipation of the 2006 elections (Webber 2010). Indigenous groups unaffiliated with MAS did not support Mesa, as they felt his policies served the interests of the wealthy elite who

demanded open markets and business ties with neighboring countries (Webber 2010; Forero 2004).

Mesa was caught between blocs with diverging interests: the leftist indigenous highlanders and the conservative European lowlanders. He spent the entirety of his presidency precariously navigating these opposing forces, never fully committing to either side. This led to the eventual collapse of his government. On this Webber says, “His neoliberal reformism was insufficiently generous in its concessions to the October Agenda to secure the support of the left-indigenous bloc, which began to assert once again the necessity of fundamental structural solutions to the problems of racism, poverty, inequality, class exploitation, and imperialism. At the same time, the eastern-bourgeois bloc was growing increasingly discontented with his moderate adherence to the minimal demands of the October Agenda” (2010, pg. 57). Although Mesa eventually lost the support of MAS for what they perceived as a weak stance on royalties for foreign companies operating in Bolivia, his presidency began with a proclaimed commitment to supporting indigenous rights (Relea 2003). He appointed two indigenous cabinet members and executed a referendum on the natural gas industry and taxes, promising to commit to gradual nationalization of the gas industry (Webber 2010; McNeish 2006).

The Mesa government is an interesting study within the Bolivian case. The non-MAS affiliated leftist indigenous groups opposed him throughout the duration of his presidency, yet MAS under Morales’ leadership was his closest political ally until shortly before his resignation (Webber 2010). Assies (2004) suggests that this very allegiance explains the absence of demonstrations and uprisings during his presidency. When the government set out to reform the new hydrocarbons law, MAS demanded 50% royalties

be charged on the profits of foreign gas companies (Webber 2010), which Mesa, not wanting to anger his neoliberal backers, failed to enact. In response, MAS publicly denounced Mesa and mobilized grassroots forces to stage uprisings across the country in what had come to be known as the second gas wars. This event ultimately prompted Mesa's resignation in 2005. The issue of full gas nationalization became the cornerstone of Morales' presidential campaign in 2006 (McNeish 2006).

Although the end of Mesa's presidency was marked by mutual hostility with MAS, the majority of their interactions were supportive. It is notable that Mesa did not make grand gestures of support to the indigenous cause, instead, MAS, under the guidance of Morales, intentionally moderated its stance on many issues to better align itself with Mesa. One must also reiterate the divergence between MAS and non-MAS indigenous groups in their attitudes towards Mesa. Indigenous groups vehemently opposed him and his neoliberal economic policies, despite his close alliance with Morales until they cut ties in 2004. Although the relationship terminated amidst widespread social unrest, the majority of interactions preceding the second Gas Wars were consistent with a supportive relationship.

*Supportive to Detached: Eduardo Rodriguez 2005-2006*

Following Mesa's resignation, Eduardo Rodriguez, then Chief Justice of the Bolivian Supreme Court, assumed the presidency on an interim basis. When he assumed power, social unrest was ongoing over the question of whether or not to nationalize the natural gas industry (El jefe de la Corte Suprema, Eduardo Rodríguez, Sucede a Carlos Mesa como president de Bolivia 2005). There is scarce literature dedicated to Rodriguez's policies or governance and what is available focuses on the unprecedented

circumstances facing Bolivian society at that time: four presidents in 5 years, widespread civil unrest, a country divided by region, race, ethnicity and class, and the ongoing and an increasingly acrimonious national debate on the gas industry. Rodriguez did not make any significant changes during his short time in office, stating that his primary goal was not to raise his political profile, but to restore order in anticipation of a general election. Rodriguez announced that he would respect the results of Mesa's referendum on hydrocarbons and would let the winner of the 2006 general elections address the lingering question of whether to nationalize the natural gas industry (El jefe de la Corte Suprema, Eduardo Rodríguez, Sucede a Carlos Mesa como president de Bolivia 2005; de Zárate 2014). A divide between MAS and the larger indigenous population appeared under Mesa and widened throughout Rodriguez's presidency. Morales extended a truce to Rodriguez, further inflaming tensions with other indigenous groups who continued to demand the full nationalization of the natural gas and hydrocarbon industry (Bolivia prepara la reforma constitucional para renovar todos sus cargos politicos 2005).

As there is little available evidence of sustained interactions between Rodriguez and MAS, whether positive or negative, this relationship is characterized as detached.

*Detached to Supportive: Evo Morales 2006-2019*

Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia in 2005 and assumed office in 2006. A rural coca farmer of Aymara descent, he emerged as the leader of Bolivia's coca growers union (cocaleros) in the 1980s through his campaign against U.S. led efforts to eradicate coca farming in the Chapare region of Bolivia (Albró 2019). In many ways, the social conflicts of the previous years, most notably the coca eradication of the Chapare, the Water Wars of 2000 and the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, shaped Morales'

presidential agenda as he promised to finally deliver results on many of these long-held grievances of the indigenous population. Such grievances included decolonizing and nationalizing key industries, extending political inclusion to marginalized groups, and expanding environmental protections in indigenous territories. In this way, the Morales presidency breached the existing divide in the indigenous community between MAS supporters and non-MAS, as MAS began attracting more support from previously unaffiliated indigenous people. According to LAPOP data, in the 2005 elections, 9% of indigenous people voted for Evo Morales and MAS, while 20% of indigenous people supported Morales and MAS in 2009.

Prior to Morales' election, indigenous Bolivians experienced inequitable access to avenues to conventional participation (Albró 2019; McNeish 2006). Recognizing this, Morales' movement forged a path to participation for the country's most marginalized citizens. He made early campaign promises to protect their political and human rights by vowing to write a new constitution. Bolivia adopted the new constitution in 2009, which defines Bolivia as plurinational, non-capitalist state, guided by the Quechua principle of *Buen Vivir*, or *Living Well* (van Schaick 2009). Once elected, Morales staffed 14 out of the 16 cabinet positions with indigenous men and women (Albró 2019). As MAS gained popularity, more and more indigenous people were elected to regional and national posts, thus expanding indigenous political inclusion. The broad inclusion of indigenous people into politics is one of the greatest achievements of Morales's presidency (Albró 2019). In bringing awareness to the indigenous cause, Morales also gave visibility to the indigenous way of life, which is often absorbed and overshadowed by the dominant, capitalistic culture.

Two main pillars of Quechua culture are the good of the group over that of the individual, and deference to nature and the environment. Their conception of development emphasizes collective advances, such as a new school or clinic for the community, and remains strictly opposed to the extraction based economic development strategies pursued by modern Latin American governments (Bjork-James 2020). Seeing their territory destroyed, stripped of resources or sold off to private interests, indigenous people have witnessed firsthand the harmful effects of economic development policies centered on natural resource extraction. In 2006 Morales announced his economic plan called *Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democratica Para Vivir Bien*, which denounced such unsustainable practices, and promised to align Bolivian development with the tenets of Sumak Kawsay—living in harmony with nature, placing spiritual well-being over acquisition of goods, and collaboration over competition (Pinneo 2014). Further exemplifying his purported commitment to environmentalism, he passed an unprecedented Law of Mother Earth in 2012, the first of its kind, which equates nature’s rights with human rights (Ramirez 2019). In 2010 he sponsored a UN Resolution, which makes access to clean water and sanitation a human right (Ramirez 2019). These large shows of support for environmental protection endeared him to indigenous and environmental activist groups nationally and internationally for a time.

Six years into his presidency Morales began losing the trust and support of his indigenous backing because he diverged from his pro-environment platform. The initial rupture came in 2011 when his government tried to build the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos highway through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (Stauffer 2018; Bjork-James 2020). He fostered relationships with opposition groups in

agribusiness that were built on concessions, which included everything from promoting biofuels to “not following through on the regulation of the social-economic functions of medium-sized landholdings and business-scale landholdings, which allowed large landowners to preserve their ownership of land.” (Bjork-James 2020). The divide further widened when he constructed a \$34 million presidential skyscraper and residence in the historical Plaza Murrillo (Stauffer 2018), a move that stood in stark contrast to the values of Buen Vivir he supposedly espoused. Throughout all of this, Morales was quietly consolidating his power in defiance of the presidential term limits outlined in the new constitution, resulting in his serving 13 years and 3 terms in power (Stauffer 2018). After disputed results for election to what would be his 4<sup>th</sup> term, Morales fled to Peru in fear for his safety (Stauffer 2018).

Evo Morales changed the face of Bolivian politics and society. He gave a voice to the country’s millions of disenfranchised indigenous people and improved their quality of life drastically: Poverty fell from 60% in 2006 to 35% in 2017 (Dearden 2019) and indigenous culture gained hitherto unknown prominence in society. These interactions were both Supportive and Discordant in nature. However, despite a contentious end to his presidency, his legacy is overall a positive one and is widely consistent with a Supportive relationship. His symbolic gestures were insufficient to retain indigenous support. According to 2019 LAPOP survey data, only 5.5% of indigenous respondents indicated that they would support the current? president. Jeanine Añez served as interim president after Morales’ departure from 2019-2020.

## *Peru*

Much of the literature on Peruvian indigenous movements focuses on Amazonian groups, who have historically had better organizational capacity and national visibility due to ongoing disputes over extractive practices in the Amazon. As such, the Peru case will not use a specific indigenous organization as the unit of analysis, because highland indigenous organizations are regional, tend to only represent regional interests, and interact more sporadically with national leadership and thus are not equivalent to the movements analyzed in Ecuador and Bolivia. Therefore, this section will use the term “indigenous organizations” or “indigenous people” to collectively refer to the individual indigenous movements of the highlands and assumes that these atomized groups broadly align in their objectives and views on national leadership.

### *Background: Alberto Fujimori 1990-2000*

While campaigning for the presidency, Alberto Fujimori actively courted the indigenous electorate. This strategy consisted of adopting a pro-indigenous discourse while simultaneously distancing himself from elites. Outsider status was central to his political platform. He also wore traditional indigenous dress, held campaign events in sacred locations and employed indigenous symbology throughout his campaign (Madrid 2011). At the same time, Fujimori made populist appeals that appealed poor and disenfranchised people, many of whom were indigenous. For example, he focused his campaign in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas and promoted his ideas to alleviate poverty, such as legalizing street vendors and to creating a bank to lend to businesses in the informal sector (Madrid 2011).

Once elected, Fujimori did not fulfill any of these promises. He dramatically restricted civil liberties, aggressively centralized the government and overtly rejected any ideals of pluralism (Albó 2004). He adopted a robust market-oriented economic agenda that went in direct opposition to many of his pro-poor campaign promises, and while it stabilized the economy, it left impoverished citizens far worse off (Madrid 2011; Boesten 2007). Fujimori's administration was hostile to indigenous people. From 1996-2001, his government undertook a forced sterilization campaign in the Peruvian highlands. Occurring only in the highlands, the campaign was sold to the public as family planning assistance. It was later revealed that the project's true intention was economic benefit, because poor indigenous people were perceived to be preventing economic growth, Fujimori attempted to alleviate this by forcibly restricting their population size (Boesten 2007; Ko 2021)

After winning reelection once, Fujimori's regime finally collapsed in 2000 and left Peru in disarray. It destroyed democratic institutions, weakened political and social actors and further disadvantaged vulnerable populations. Despite his authoritarian legacy, he is widely credited with defeating the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group.

*Discordant: Alejandro Toledo 2001-2006*

Alejandro Toledo was elected president during a precarious time in the ongoing dynamic between Peruvian indigenous people and the state. He employed similar campaign strategies as Fujimori to woo electoral support from indigenous people, speaking frequently of his Incan roots and wearing traditional Incan clothing (Albó 2004; Madrid 2011). Toledo was of indigenous decent and was raised in rural poverty in the Chapare, apart from that, however, he was far removed from Quechuan culture, having

been educated in the U.S. and now positioned firmly among Peru's elite (*Peru Reports*). Toledo employed populist rhetoric to win over indigenous voters by denouncing political parties while his wife, a Belgian, spoke Quechua on his behalf at campaign rallies. Similar to Fujimori, Toledo campaigned directly to the poor, many of whom were indigenous. For example, he often held events in poor neighborhoods and promised to expand social programs, such as health insurance for disadvantaged women and children, agricultural banks to provide loans to small farmers, and promises to improve sanitation of shanty towns in Lima (Madrid 2011; Greene 2006). Additionally, Toledo aggressively sought alliances with indigenous and peasant organizations.

To fortify his alliance with the indigenous community absent genuine commitments to economic reform, the first lady created the National Commission on Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA). The Commission elicited heavy criticism from the general public for its presumably political motives and conspicuous lack of indigenous leadership. In response to this, Toledo attempted to regain some approval points by creating the Development Institute for Andean, Indigenous, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA) as a concessionary gesture (Greene 2007; Greene 2006)

Many of these overtures to indigenous people were little more than empty gestures. Despite his promises to pursue the core demands of the indigenous agenda and his efforts to expand political inclusion<sup>1</sup>, his presidency was plagued by scandal and accusations of corruption (Puertas 2004; Forero 2004). Despite this, there was an explosion of ethnic politics under Toledo as Andean and Amazonian groups tried to unite

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<sup>1</sup> Madrid (2011) reports that 70% of congressional representatives had indigenous surnames in the 2001-2006 session of congress.

under one large umbrella organization. Toledo's pattern of contradicting words and actions is consistent with a discordant relationship.

*Discordant to Tense: Alan García 2006-2011*

Alan Garcia served his first term as president from 1985-2000, during which time his mismanagement of economic and social issues left a weak and divided Peru aptly positioned for authoritarian Alberto Fujimori to win the election. García narrowly beat left-of-center candidate Ollanta Humala in 2006.

García aggressively pursued a neoliberal economic agenda underpinned by robust and unapologetic mining practices in the Peruvian Amazon. Indigenous people perceived this as a direct assault on their territory and cultural rights, garnering García immediate and sustained hostility from indigenous people for the entirety of his presidency (Stetson 2012). Determined not to repeat the economic disasters of his first presidency, experts report that his dogged commitment to economic growth above all else was achieved at the expense of socioeconomic development, (Welcome, Mr. Peruvian President: Why Alan García is no hero to his people 2010; Collyns 2010)

Much of the indigenous-García dynamic involves Amazonian groups, as the salient interactions involving the two centered on oil, mining and logging rights by multinational corporations in the Amazon. Garcia further marginalized indigenous communities by not consulting them about these practices, which provoked a massive uprising in Bagua that killed as many as 40 indigenous protestors. Despite later admitting that not consulting indigenous groups was wrong (Welcome, Mr. Peruvian President: Why Alan García is no hero to his people 2010), Garcia's government engaged in a propaganda war, which smeared indigenous people as antidevelopment (Stetson

2012). They aired short clips of indigenous demonstrations, portraying them as blood thirsty and violent criminals trying to harm the humble policemen. García's government publicly accused the indigenous people of wanting to hold Peru back from development (Aiello 2009; Collyns 2010). García's legacy is a bloody one, the Guardian reports that "According to Peru's public ombudsman, 195 people were killed in clashes with security forces between January 2006 and September 2011; most of them died during García's five-year term" (US Congress offers support for Peruvian Amazonia land disputes 2009; Peru's indigenous people: From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012). The sustained, mutual hostility between indigenous groups and García, which unfolded against a backdrop of widespread civil unrest, is consistent with a Tense relationship.

*Tense to Discordant: Ollanta Humala 2011-2016*

Ollanta Humala employed similar strategies as Fujimori and Toledo to appeal to indigenous voters by prominently featuring ethnic demands in his campaign for presidency. For example, he called for recognition of Peru as a multicultural country and endorsed multicultural education and the use of indigenous languages in the military and government offices. He demanded the legitimization and incorporation of traditional practices of indigenous medicine and justice, and vocally denounced ethnic inequality. He purported to support a redistributive and state led economic model and vowed to defend Peru's natural resources from foreign exploitation, in stark contrast to Toledo's heavy reliance on foreign investment and resource privatization (Madrid 2011). As a result, he won the support of Peru's indigenous organizations.

Shortly into his presidency, Humala passed a historic law giving indigenous people the right to consultation on mining projects on their territories, a measure that was

repeatedly blocked in all forms by García (Collins 2010). Although this represented a historic victory for indigenous people, it soon became apparent that Humala would fail to deliver on many of his most prominent pro-indigenous campaign promises, especially regarding economic policy (Ollanta Humala Peru Reports; Peru's indigenous people: From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012; Stauffer 2011). Furthermore, given his pivot away from the leftist ideology espoused while campaigning in favor of a distinctly more market-oriented approach, people were rightly skeptical about whether the new consultation law would be genuinely upheld (Stauffer 2011). This concern came to fruition, as protests erupted over government approval of the U.S.-led Conga mine in the Cajamarca region (Peru protests at huge Conga gold mine in Cajamarca 2011).

As social tensions flared, Humala publicly called for dialogue with indigenous groups to resolve the disputes, while quietly deploying the military to repress protests (Peru's indigenous people: From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012). Amazon Watch reports 150 conflicts over the environment and mining in the highlands under Humala (Miller 2016).

Interactions between Humala and indigenous people had elements of a supportive relationship, such as the Law of Consultation, and of a tense relationship, such as the militaristic handling of social unrest. However, the salient feature of interactions overtime were Humala's tendency to promise one thing to indigenous people and then do different thing in practice. Therefore, this relationship is characterized as discordant. Humala was a vocal supporter of the indigenous agenda, yet failed to deliver on almost all substantive promises throughout the duration of his presidency.

*Discordant to Detached: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 2016-2018*

Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, known as PPK, had previously served twice as economy minister and mining minister. He supported free market economic policies and made frequent claims about wanting to improve socioeconomic equality in Peru, though he made no specific mention of indigenous people in these promises (Who is Peru's new leader Pedro Pablo Kuczynski? 2016). Besides supporting an initiative to broadcast news and radio in Quechua to fight discrimination of indigenous people, there is no evidence of any notable interactions sustained over time between PPK and indigenous organizations (Nickolau 2016; Peru's Indigenous Language Push 2017). Shortly after winning the election, evidence implicating PPK in a graft scandal surfaced, and proceedings to remove him began in 2017 (Fowks 2017; Kurmanaev and Zarate 2019). He resigned in 2018.

*Detached to Supportive: Martin Vizcarra 2018-2020*

Literature about the relationship between indigenous highland communities and Vizcarra is sparse. This can be explained by several factors. First, as he was not elected outright, he did not personally need to forge bonds with indigenous communities through overtures of support for their cause. Second, Peru's political history is one of rampant corruption and profound instability, and as a result, trust in political institutions is among the lowest in Latin America (Carrion 2019). Accordingly, Vizcarra's agenda seems to focus mainly on anti-corruption efforts. In 2019 he enacted his constitutional right to dissolve a Congress whose internal political rivalry was obstructing the government's ability to legislate (Quigley 2019; Tegel 2019). Congress responded by accusing him of executing a coup on Peruvian democracy and attempting to suspend him (Tegel 2019).

Vizcarra's dissolution of Congress meant that new general elections would be called, empowering Vizcarra to govern by decree in the meantime. Ultimately, this move gained him great popularity among Peruvians, as evidenced by his approval rating jumping from 52% in September to 82% in October (Quigley 2019). Third, the indigenous groups native to the Peruvian Amazon are embroiled in more visible conflicts given that the majority of natural resource extraction, a highly contentious and widely reported on issue, occurs in the Amazon. Finally, highland indigenous communities do not have an organized, national movement (Callirgos 2018; O'Neil 2011; Yashar 1998), in stark contrast to Ecuador and Bolivia who have highly organized and politically mobilized highland indigenous movements. Peruvian highland communities, therefore, do not have a formalized communication apparatus to articulate their demands or maintain dialogue with leadership.

Unlike Correa and Morales, who appealed to indigenous groups on a wide breadth of long-held issues, Vizcarra made no formal commitments about broadly incorporating the indigenous platform into national politics. However, he has made one promise to indigenous groups: in a July 2019 meeting with indigenous leaders, Vizcarra doubled down on a May 2018 promise that his administration would title all indigenous communities by 2021 (AIDSESEP y Presidente Vizcarra se reúnen para asegurar titulación de todas las comunidades indígenas para antes del 2021 2019). This would be a huge step forward for indigenous rights, and by default, environmental protections. Studies suggest that indigenous people face more bureaucratic hurdles to becoming titled than non-indigenous people (Getting a Land Title in Peru Almost Impossible for Indigenous Communities 2015; Fraser 2019) and government agencies are ill equipped to navigate


the complexity of requests due to lack of cultural understanding (Fraser 2019). Further studies indicate that land titled to indigenous groups show smaller rates of deforestation and are generally healthier than non-indigenous owned counterparts (Blackman, Corral, Santos Lima, Asner 2017).

Unlike Correa and Morales who endeared themselves to indigenous groups by purporting to enforce strict environmental regulations and curb resource extraction in their territory (although ultimately failing to do so), Vizcarra has made no such promises. In fact, in July of 2019 he granted a permit for the Tia Maria mine, a project that has been in limbo for a decade due to local opposition (Cervantes 2019). Vizcarra's government has opposed a bill proposing to close off portions of the Amazon to logging to protect vulnerable indigenous communities from exposure to coronavirus. As of 2014, 21% of Peru was controlled by mining concessions, most of them foreign (de la Flor). Vizcarra presided over a country heavily occupied by multinational mining operations, while indigenous people, lacking formal representation, resort to mass protests to oppose these practices and the damage inflicted to their communities (DuPee 2019). In November of 2020, Congress voted to remove Vizcarra on vague charges of corruption and mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. A popular uprising in support of Vizcarra ensued, as many Peruvians saw him as the only viable means to ending rampant corruption in the political system (Armario and Briceno 2020). Indigenous people protested the ousting of Vizcarra and demanded the new president, Manuel Merino, step down.

The relationship between indigenous organizations and Vizcarra had ups and downs, with periods of hostility and unrest interwoven with periods of great support and

mutual admiration. The extent of Vizcarra’s indigenous support was only apparent after his forced departure, when thousands took to the street in protest. Vizcarra did not make grand promises to indigenous people and then quietly do the opposite, nor did he woo their support for personal gain. He adopted a transparent and pragmatic approach early, and evidence suggests that he attempted to act in good faith, despite the occasional and fierce unpopularity of some environmental and economic decisions. Overall, relationship is characterized as supportive.

**Figure 1: Relationship type by year**



While president-indigenous movement relationships during the first 8 years of the twenty first century all show variability by type across all three countries, relationships tended to be more volatile in Peru and Ecuador. Stability in relationship types in Ecuador and Bolivia from 2008-2018 are attributed to the decades-long presidencies of Morales and Correa. This is a compelling finding when considering the relative strength of each country’s indigenous movement. Peru, who has the weakest movement, has had longer

and more frequent periods of discordant and tense relationships, the two types generally associated with negative interactions. Bolivia, who has the strongest indigenous movement, has longer and more frequent periods of detached and sympathetic relationships, generally associated with neutral or positive interactions. Thus, larger indigenous movements are associated with more positive president-movement relationships. However, as we will see in the subsequent section, they are not always associated with democratic institutional stability. The relationship between well-organized indigenous movements and positive president-movement relationships could be explained by the fact that larger indigenous movements tend to have the clout and resources available help their preferred candidates get elected. Conversely, some presidents may feel obliged to maintain positive relationships with the larger, more powerful movements to minimize the likelihood of protests and social unrest. Indeed, both the Ecuadorean and Bolivian movements have a proven track record of removing undesirable presidents through mass mobilization and the deployment of nonconventional tactics: CONAIE was a principal actor in deposing two Ecuadorean presidents since 1996, and the Bolivian indigenous movements that comprise MAS led the mobilizations that ousted two presidents since 2000.

Bolivia and Ecuador have had significant presidential instability and extremes throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century: Ecuador has had three partial term presidents due to being forcibly deposed (Mahaud, Palacios Gutierrez) and one president who consolidated power over time to eventually serve a full decade in office (Correa); Bolivia has had four partial term presidents (Mesa, Quiroga, Rodriguez, Sanchez) forcibly deposed and one president who consolidated power to end up serving over a decade in office (Morales).

Both Correa and Morales enjoyed widespread support from indigenous people. In contrast, Peru is known for extensive government corruption and dysfunction, yet has had all but one president in the past two decades serve full terms (PPK). These findings would suggest that while the political inclusion of indigenous movements certainly strengthens democratic institutions by extending participation to previously disenfranchised populations, thereby increasing representation, it may have a destabilizing effect on politics as Huntington suggested. As these movements gain power and meaningful access to further their agenda, the system becomes more susceptible to volatility as it must expand and contract to accommodate new actors.

## CHAPTER 3

### Regressions and Discussion of Findings

#### *Analysis*

This section proceeds in two parts. The first part features a broad exploration of political attitudes, behavior and efficacy in the general populations of Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru from 2000-2019. Political efficacy will be examined in addition to indicators for attitudes and behavior because it assesses the health of civil society, which is directly linked to citizen participation and perception of politics. In the second part, I will focus my analysis on the indigenous population in the year 2019, using binomial and ordinal logistic regressions and controlling for standard demographic and socioeconomic factors.

To measure political attitudes, I rely on two LAPOP questions:

1. *To what extent do you trust political parties?* Responses were coded from (1)not at all – (7) a lot.
2. *To what extend do you trust the president?* Responses were coded from (1)not at all – (7) a lot.
3. *How much interest do you have in politics: A lot, some, a little, none?* Responses were coded from (1) none – (4) a lot.

To measure political efficacy, I rely on the following LAPOP questions:

1. *Politicians care about what people like you think. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this?* Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree – (7) strongly agree.
2. *You feel that you have a good understanding of the most important political issues in the country. To what extent to you agree or disagree with this?* Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree – (7) strongly agree.


To measure political behavior, I rely on the following LAPOP questions:

1. *In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or public protest?* Results originally coded as (1) yes or (2) not.

2. *If the next presidential elections were this week, what would you do?*  
 Responses were coded as (1) I wouldn't vote, (2) I would vote for the current president or party, (3) I would vote for the opposition candidate or party, (4) I would cast a blank ballot.

*General trends in political attitudes and behavior over the 21<sup>st</sup> century*

**Figure 2:** *average participation in a protest in the last 12 months by year*



The previous section concluded that stronger indigenous movements are associated with more positive president-movement dynamics, but may have a destabilizing effect on democratic institutions, if only temporarily, as the system adapts to accommodate new actors and demands. Figure 2 generally supports that claim. Bolivia, the country with the strongest indigenous movement of our 3 cases, has consistently higher percentages of participation in a protest in the past 12 months. In some cases, it is more than twice as high as Ecuador. For example, in 2016 there are 13 percentage points difference between Ecuador and Bolivia's participation.

Contrary to expectations, Ecuador's rates of participation in a protest are consistently below 10%. This could be attributed to the criminalization of protest under Correa, which certainly discourages widespread participation. It could also be that people were generally satisfied with his policies and governance and therefore did not feel compelled to protest. Despite opposition from CONAIE, most rural, poor and indigenous communities benefitted from Correa's drastically increased social spending. To achieve local improvements, Correa diverted federal funding through local municipalities, who were charged with the undertaking of various public work projects in the name of the central government. Thus, citizens of these communities saw tangible improvements as coming directly from Correa's government. Under this clientelist system, Correa ensured their ongoing support by establishing a direct link between local improvements and his government (Silva 2018).

**Figure 3: Voting intentions by year**




Figure 3 shows that on average, people would vote for the opposition candidate or party if elections were next week. This illustrates the general cynicism and distrust of politics in these three countries. For example, even in years with more popular presidents (such as Vizcarra in Peru from 2018-2020), respondents still indicated they would vote for the opposition, on average. The closest we see to a value of 2 (I would vote for the current candidate or party) is in Ecuador in 2008 and 2014, which coincide with Correa’s presidency. In 2016 and 2018, respondents were more likely to vote for the opposition in Ecuador on average. This aligns with Moreno’s presidency. Figures 4 and 5 support these findings in the case of Ecuador.

**Figure 4:** average trust in political parties by year




The results of Figure 4 are somewhat counterintuitive based on the results of the historical analysis and the descriptive typology of relationships. Conaghan (2018), Madrid (2008) and Mayorga (2006) all argue that it was the failure of traditional political parties that permitted political outsiders to emerge, indigenous political parties and presidential candidates more specifically. Therefore, one would assume that the rise of MAS, whose inclusive platform and overwhelming popularity in national politics, would generate higher levels of trust in political parties among the people. Instead, trust declines sharply the year Morales (and MAS) take office and remains at below average levels until 2019. This suggests that MAS did not enjoy high levels of support in the larger population. Shockingly, respondents in Peru and Bolivia (situated at opposite ends of the spectrum in the context of this research), have maintained roughly the same below average levels of trust in political parties throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Overall, Bolivia

registers a 1.5 unit decrease on the x and Peru only registers a .5 unit decrease. This means that there was a larger decline in trust in political parties in Bolivia than Peru. All of this suggests that increasing representation by incorporating formerly marginalized groups does not necessarily translate into higher levels of trust within the mainstream population.

Ecuador's trust in political parties follows a positive trend, which coincides with most of Correa's time in power. Trust declines in Ecuador post-2014, shortly before the election of Moreno. This is counterintuitive because Correa and Moreno were from the same party, Alianza Pais (AP), therefore one would expect similar levels of trust. This suggests that peoples' perception of a political party is heavily influenced by their opinion of its leader. Correa, and AP by default, were widely popular among poor, rural, working class and mestizo voters. Once elected, Moreno immediately reversed nearly all of Correa's social spending policies and enacted extreme austerity measures to address an impending economic crisis. This caused him to lose the support of the electorate who had supported Correa.

*Figure 5: Average trust in the president by year*



On average, Peruvians have consistently lower levels of trust in the president from 2000-2020, which is consistent with expectations. The 1 unit spike in 2012 coincides with the presidency of Ollanta Humala. Humala espoused a left-leaning populist rhetoric while campaigning and throughout the beginning stages of his term. Shortly into his presidency, he began embracing the garden variety resource extraction based neoliberal model common to the region. While the pivot to neoliberalism was supported by the private sector elites, to the mainstream population it revealed Humala to be yet another disingenuous politician, flip flopping between stances to suit his personal objectives. Trust increases in Peru in 2016, which coincides with Vizcarra's assuming office. Vizcarra enjoyed extensive support among the larger population for his strenuous commitment to combatting corruption in the government.

In Bolivia, Morales maintained slightly above average levels of trust within the larger population throughout his presidency. In Ecuador, levels of trust in the president are consistent with levels of trust in political parties: increasing under Correa, then sharply declining under Moreno. In Ecuador, Correa’s generous social expenditures provided under a clientelist system sharply contrasts with Moreno’s austerity measures, suggesting that overall trust in government institutions is associated with the state’s provision of benefits.

**Figure 6:** *political efficacy by year*





Figure 6 shows us that in Ecuador and Bolivia, where the inclusion of indigenous movements has increased participation to formerly disenfranchised citizens, people may feel that politics is more accessible. Accessibility of politics instills a sense of agency over the unseen forces that impact peoples’ lives. Levels of political efficacy in Peru are

lower than in Ecuador and Bolivia across the board, which aligns with expectations given the chronic government corruption and resulting distrust among the larger population. It is notable that efficacy levels in Peru are highest from 2016-2019, which coincides with Vizcarra's time in office.

**Figure 7: Understanding of politics by year**



According to Figure 7, respondents in all 3 countries report average levels of understanding of politics from 2008-2019. One would expect to see Ecuador and Bolivia have significantly higher levels of efficacy than Peru given that expanded avenues to participation is indicative of a more representative democracy. The fact that levels are basically consistent across all three countries suggests that citizens remain widely disconnected from politics. Graphing interest in politics by year also shows very low levels of interest across all years in all countries, which supports the finding that citizens are generally disengaged.

### *Summary of Part I findings*

Based on the figures above, political attitudes and behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru are generally consistent with the results of the historical analysis. Ecuadorean respondents' higher levels of trust in institutions and lower levels of protesting underpin the previous claim that Correa, while remaining unpopular with CONAIE, enjoyed widespread support among mainstream voters, most likely for his generous social spending. Peru's respondents showed consistently lower levels of trust and efficacy and higher levels of protesting. Taken as a whole, these results are indicative of pervasive disengagement, most likely the result of widespread dissatisfaction with a dysfunctional political system, comprised of corrupt institutions and inept leaders.

One would expect to see Bolivia have similar results as Ecuador, given the parallels between the strong indigenous movements and left leaning populist presidents both of whom served for roughly a decade in power. Counterintuitively, Bolivia's results are closer to Peru than Ecuador overall, especially regarding participation in protests, trust in political parties, voting intentions and trust in the president. Furthermore, all three countries have the same average to low levels of political efficacy over time. All of this is to suggest that expanding participation and representation in a democratic system does not necessarily translate into higher amounts of engagement or support within the larger population.

This idea is supported by the discordant type as described in the literature review, which posits that presidents and presidential candidates feign support for socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens while quietly enacting policies that directly benefit elites and preserve the existing social hierarchy. In other words, because a

democracy appears sympathetic to the needs of vulnerable populations does not mean that elected officials will represent their interests in good faith. Therefore, expanding participation to formerly disenfranchised and marginalized groups does not necessarily translate into higher levels of trust or efficacy in the larger population.

### *Part II: Regressions*

Measuring changes in political trust, behavior and efficacy in the larger populations of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia helped to reveal general trends overtime. The results of the historical analysis helped contextualize these trends within the broader sociopolitical climate of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I will now engage in a more focused analysis by employing binomial and ordinal logistic regressions to determine the current state of indigenous political attitudes and behavior in 2019. This year is significant because it is immediately following the presidencies of Correa and Morales. Indigenous movement empowerment and growth is directly linked to these presidencies; their respective decades in power ushered in a critical turning point in marginalized citizens' ability to advance their rights from within the system. Analyzing indigenous attitudes and behavior in 2019 will illuminate the legacies of Correa and Morales in Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively. Especially in terms of whether the indigenous-state dynamics under these two leaders translated into tangible benefits for the larger indigenous population. The control case of Peru will help attribute changes in the dependent variable to the effect of indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as highlight what is at stake should indigenous people remain on the margins. In all models, I control for the standard socioeconomic and demographic factors, including, age, sex, municipality, education, and income.

### *Indigenous Trust in the President*

Prior to the indigenous awakening of the 1990s, this demographic was largely overlooked. Relegated to the margins of society, continue to endure high levels of systemic repression. As indigenous groups across Latin America began organizing in opposition to neoliberalism—and finding incremental success-- the existing paradigm governing indigenous-state relations began to shift. In Ecuador and Bolivia, this transformation was evidenced by the election of Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, two explicitly left leaning, populist presidents with a strong indigenous backing at the start. In Peru, where indigenous identity has not achieved salience, numerous presidents over the 21<sup>st</sup> century have courted their widespread electoral support through grand gestures and bold promises, with very little of substance actually occurring after their election.

Using ordinal logistic regression, models 1a-1c examine the relationship between trust in the president and indigenous ethnicity in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia using a 2019 LAPOP question that asks, “*To what extent do you trust the president?*”

**Table 3: Trust in the President**

Independent Variables		Model 1a Trust in President Ecuador
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	-.270 (.198)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	-.024 (.013)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	-.510* (.247)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	-.031 (.092)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.082** (.031)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	-.002 (.015)

<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.020
	N	1481

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  
\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Independent Variables		Model 1b Trust in President Bolivia
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	-.307* (.136)
	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	-.111*** (.012)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	-.565* (.269)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	-.180 (.092)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.082** (.029)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	-.028 (.015)
	<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
	N	1495

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  
\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Independent Variables		Model 1c Trust in President Peru
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	.477*** (.124)
	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	-.031* (.014)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	.270 (.240)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	-.197 (.095)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.066* (.033)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	.039* (.016)
	<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
	N	1420

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  
\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Models 1a-1c show indigenous likelihood to trust the president in 2019. The variables in this model predict 10% of trust in the president in Bolivia, which is the highest percentage of the three models. When controlling for key socioeconomic and demographic indicators, indigenous people in Peru are significantly less likely to trust the president than indigenous people in Bolivia, who are slightly more likely. This is counterintuitive to Figure 5, which shows that in 2019, trust in the president in the larger population is on the ascent in Peru, and the descent in Bolivia. This suggests that there is a discord between indigenous perceptions of the president and the general population’s perceptions of the president in those countries. Indigenous ethnicity was not significant in the case of Ecuador when predicting trust in the president, which is to be expected given the overwhelming and immediate dissatisfaction with Lenin Moreno throughout Ecuador. This result tells us that indigenous ethnicity was not a factor when determining trust in Moreno, because nobody really seemed to trust him. Municipality is significant in all models, which shows that where people live—rural town, large city, etc.—impacts the likelihood of whether they trust the president.

*Indigenous Participation in Protests*

**Table 4:** *Participation in Protests*

Independent Variables		Model 2a Participation in Protests Ecuador
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	.825* (.328)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	-.010 (.028)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	.326 (.522)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	.044 (.032)

	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.025 (.067)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	.044 (.032)
<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.014
	N	1477

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Independent Variables		Model 2b Participation in Protest Bolivia
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	.211 (.201)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	.28 (.019)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	1.015* (.403)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	.001 (.139)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.050 (.044)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	-.017 (.023)
<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.018
	N	1507

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Independent Variables		Model 2c Participation in Protest Peru
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	.519** (.185)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	.066** (.023)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	.730 (.395)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	.313* (.156)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.139* (.054)
	<b>Age</b>	.081**

	Measured in age cohorts	(.026)
<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.051
	N	1427

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  
 \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Models 2a-2c use binomial logistic regression to explore the relationship between participation in a protest and indigenous identity by using a 2019 LAPOP question that asks, “*Have you participated in a protest in the last 12 months?*” The variable was recoded so that (1) has participated in a protest and (0) has not participated. The variables included in this model predict the largest portion of the dependent variable in Peru, predicting around 5% of participation in a protest. All variables in the model except income are significant in Peru.

In Ecuador, indigenous identity was significant when predicting participation in a protest and controlling for key socioeconomic and demographic indicators: .825 more indigenous respondents reported having participated in a protest than non-indigenous respondents in the last 12 months, on average. In comparing these results with trends in the larger population, we can assume that the levels of protesting in Ecuador shown in Figure 2 are indicative of indigenous participation in a protest, which supports the finding that, as a proportion of the total population, there were more indigenous protesters than non-indigenous from 2000-2020.

In Bolivia, indigenous identity is insignificant in predicting participation in a protest when controlling for all other factors. Given the trends over time shown in Figure 2, indigenous identity’s insignificance in predicting protest is consistent with expectations because many Bolivians were protesting, not just indigenous Bolivians. Moreover, not all of the organizations of the left driving protests identified primarily with

indigenous ethnicity (many were labor unions, coca growers, women, etc.), although there was likely significant overlap with indigenous identity.

According to the data, the main differences in protesting behavior in Bolivia and Ecuador are that in Bolivia, everyone was protesting, while in Ecuador, it seems that mostly indigenous were protesting. This could be attributed to key internal differences in each country's respective indigenous movement, MAS and CONAIE. MAS retained a broad base of support beyond ethnicity due to its inclusive platform, while CONAIE's platform became increasingly politically and ethnically motivated, which alienated non-indigenous supporters (Madrid 2012). Therefore, when these organizations mobilized to protest, MAS was able to mobilize support beyond coethnics, while CONAIE did not enjoy such broad appeal.

#### *Voting Behavior*

The original 2019 LAPOP question about voting asks, "*If voting were being held this week, what would you do?*" (1) I would not vote, (2) I would vote for the current president or party (3) I would vote for the opposition candidate or party (4) I would turn in a blank ballot. To facilitate binomial logistic regression and to account for the fact that voting is mandatory in each of these three cases, the voting variable was recoded to make it dichotomous, so that the previous values of (2) and (3) =(1) I would cast a valid vote, and the previous values of (1) and (4) =(0) I would cast a blank ballot.

Indigenous identity is not significant in predicting voting behavior in any of our models. Indigenous identity is not significant in predicting voting behavior in any of our models, which means that an indigenous person is just as likely to cast a valid vote or a blank ballot as a non-indigenous person. A question central to the study of ethnic politics

is, are coethnics more likely to support each other electorally, why or why not? These findings suggest that indigenous presidents do not necessarily attract more electoral support from indigenous voters.

Notably, education level is significant in all Models (3a-3c). Expanding access to quality public education has proven a persistent challenge in this region, particularly in rural, indigenous areas. Education level directly impacts the accessibility of conventional participation, from knowing how to access and interpret information about voting logistics or candidate platforms, to the role of literacy in reading and filling in the ballot. Morales and Correa’s social policies included expanding access to bilingual public education in the Andean highlands. These models show that there is a significant link between education and casting a valid vote.

**Table 5: Voting Behavior**

Independent Variables		Model 3a Voting Behavior Ecuador
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	-.297 (.233)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	.084*** (.016)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	.207 (.291)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	.225* .109
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.149*** (.038)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	.038* (.018)
<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.049
	N	1446

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Independent Variables		Model 3b Voting Behavior Bolivia
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	.088 (.167)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	.033* (.015)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	-.054 (.324)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	.253* (.111)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.031 (.035)
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	.048 (.019)*
<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.016
	N	1374

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  
\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

Independent Variables		Model 3c Voting Behavior Peru
<b>Indigenous Ethnicity</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b> (1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous	.181 (.144)
<b>Socioeconomic Indicators</b>	<b>Education</b> Last academic year completed successfully	.065*** (.017)
	<b>Income</b> Number of consumer goods owned by respondents	.610* (.280)
	<b>Gender</b> Women = 0 Men = 1	.082 (.110)
	<b>Municipality Size</b> 1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city; 5=capital	-.053 .038
	<b>Age</b> Measured in age cohorts	.017 (.019)
<b>Model Summary</b>	Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.031
	N	1384

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  
\*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

## CHAPTER 4

### Conclusion

This research attempted to fill a gap within existing literature on the relationships between indigenous movements and the state by asking, how do these interactions register changes in the larger indigenous population? The historical analysis provided a summary of interactions between indigenous movements and presidents in our three cases since 2000, and classified and sorted interactions into a descriptive typology of relationship type: *supportive*, *detached*, *tense* and *discordant*. Graphing relationship type by year in the three countries (Figure 1) illustrated that relationships were generally more positive in Bolivia, more neutral in Ecuador and more negative in Peru and found that the cases containing larger, more well-organized indigenous movements were associated with more positive interaction types, and the case with a weak and fragmented movement had more negative relationship types.

Findings from the Typology of Relationships and Figure 1 suggest that countries with stronger indigenous movements experience more institutional instability, manifested in erratic presidential patterns and higher levels of protesting. Bolivia and Ecuador both had several partial term presidents each after these presidents were ousted by mass protests (in which indigenous movements played a prominent role in all examples except Gutierrez in Ecuador). This string of partial term presidents was followed, simultaneously in both countries, by the election of populist leaders who ultimately consolidated power through constitutional means and ended up serving over a decade each in power. In stark contrast, Peru, who, although possessing a regionally divided and

weak indigenous movement, has had all presidents since 2000 serve full terms (with the exception of PPK). Therefore, the erratic and unpredictable nature of presidential continuity in Bolivia and Ecuador may be attributed to the presence of powerful indigenous movements in these countries.

Scholars have theorized about how the inclusion of indigenous movements would impact democracy in the region. Mayorga (2006) argues that their inclusion represents a grave threat to democracy, while Rice (2017) and Albó (2004) assert that their inclusion represents a strengthening of democratic institutions. This work suggests that it is not one or the other, but both. While the inclusion of formerly disenfranchised people does in fact represent democratic deepening, it also has a destabilizing effect as the system must expand and adapt to new actors.

Counterintuitively, the graphed trends overtime reveals several notable instances where Bolivia and Peru were more similar than would have been expected (*see* Figures 2, 4, and 5). This suggests that a more inclusive and representative democracy through the inclusion of indigenous movements does not necessarily translate into broad mainstream support. Indicators for political efficacy and interest in politics are below average across the whole timeframe and show very little variability by country, which is indicative of the polarization and mass disengagement with politics in the region.

This work presents several opportunities for continued research. First, the relationship types in the descriptive typology were classified after undertaking an in-depth survey of scholarly works and newspaper articles. In the future, it would be helpful to develop a set of measurable indicators based on recurring themes in interactions to classify types in a more systematic and empirical manner. Additionally, discussion of the

regression findings in this work only featured an explanation of variable significance and direction. Future research will offer a more in-depth analysis of the relationships between variables.

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