Public Support for Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Southern Cone

Patrick James Baga

University of New Hampshire, Durham

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PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE SOUTHERN CONE

BY

PATRICK J. BAGA
Baccalaureate Degree (BA) in Political Science, University of New Hampshire, 2017

THESIS

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in
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On December 3, 2018

Approval signatures are on file with the University of New Hampshire Graduate School.
Acknowledgements

I have been fortunate throughout my life to have been surrounded by people who have encouraged me to pursue whatever it is that I wish to pursue. I understand that this is not guaranteed, and I know that this freedom has helped contribute to the completion of this project.

This begins with my parents, Jim and Nora, first and foremost. Everything that they do since my brother, David, and I have entered their world has been geared towards providing us with opportunities to enjoy ourselves and be comfortable in our surroundings. This began at the outset from family trips to coaching youth sports to driving us to and fro wherever we needed to go and whenever that needed to be, and this commitment to our betterment has never waned. I don’t know of a world without it, but I do know that the selflessness you embody is something to which I strive. You are admirable people, and you are kind, and the sacrifices you make for others, day after day, does not go unnoticed.

To my brother, David, I am grateful to have been able to discuss this project with you and receive your feedback. Your penchant to help others who are in a position less fortunate than yourself is derived from our parents, and it has been a pleasure to watch you develop into a young man with purpose and devotion. You will go on to do great things, as if you have not already done so. I will reflect fondly upon watching the Chilean national team with you at Gillette Stadium or that frantic bout between Argentina and France in the World Cup or of course when Edinson Cavani was at the double against Portugal. These are moments in which I will forever associate family with the region I was keen on studying.

To my grandparents, who have always showered me with a great deal of affection and support. My childhood is very much associated with trips to your homes, and activities and conversations that were impressionable to me. The relationships you have maintained with your children and built with my brother and I mean the world to me.

To my friends, to whom without I would laugh less. Adam, Doogie, James, Jason, Max, and Richie—I’ll keep it alphabetical so I don’t receive any blowback here—do know that I cherish you all very much and your families who have always welcomed me with such open arms. I look forward to navigating the rest of life alongside all of you.

To Professor Malone, whose passion for Latin America inspired me to learn as much as I can about the region. Your willingness to always be available to talk with me about my intellectual curiosities and what I could do with them is unparalleled. I am very fortunate to have received your guidance, and the way in which you approach your profession as an educator is how I hope to impact those who should ever seek guidance from me.

To Professors Devasher and Sowers, who graciously accepted the invitation to serve on my thesis committee. Your courses challenged me to rigorously examine the dynamics of the
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As with these sorts of things, there are more people that have helped me get to this point than I have time to mention. I am indebted to more friends, to other members of the Political Science Faculty, and to my colleagues in the program. I hope you enjoy reading what I’ve put together.
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ABSTRACT

Public Support for Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Southern Cone

By

Patrick J. Baga

University of New Hampshire, December, 2018

This is an analysis of the countries of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay which argues that public support for democracy and the rule of law in these countries is impacted by the institutional reform processes which are mediated by the social cleavages within these states. The paper begins with a qualitative overview of each country’s experiences before, during, and after military dictatorship. The overview assesses the degree to which each country underwent successful institutional reform at the time of transition to democracy, and how institutional reform impacts public perceptions. Also built within the qualitative overview are the historical experiences which ultimately divide these societies into clusters which voice support for various initiatives based upon their socioeconomic and class identities. Institutional reform and these cleavages, crafted by the historical experience, thus act in conjunction with one another to impact public perceptions. Subsequent sections take a closer look at the public opinion data to conduct cross-national and within-region analyses. The paper concludes with what lessons can be learned from the qualitative and qualitative analyses conducted.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Following periods of military rule and state terrorism (Argentina: 1974-1984, Chile: 1973-1990, and Uruguay: 1973-1985), Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay transitioned to democracy. During the transitional phase, and indeed well after it, the state is tasked with the question of how to apportion justice for crimes against humanity. Naturally, perpetrator and victim have competing interests in how the past is framed, blame is assessed, and justice is served.

The purpose of this study is to determine how the style of institutional reform chosen by each country now impacts contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law. I argue that key parts of institutional reform can shape public attitudes, but also that the impact of institutional reform is mediated by each country’s shared historical memory and practices. As such, I argue that the relationship between institutional reform and the amnesty vs. accountability balance and contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law is not direct. Socioeconomic and generational divides make it so that certain segments of the population respond differently to the style of institutional reform pursued. Therefore, factions also differ in contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law. These divides serve to illustrate that there is no uniform way in which institutional reform has been processed. Thus, while certain approaches may lead a majority of the population to draw a certain conclusion that impacts their views in the present, it is not the case that certain institutional reforms will signal a uniform consensus regarding whether a decision strengthens or hinders public support for democracy and institutions. The reality is opposing socioeconomic classes and generations usually desire different ends. And whether the government is pursuing policy that they believe is
aimed at reaching those ends can impact support of their government and sometimes in turn democracy at large.

One component of institutional reform that is particularly impactful is whether members of complicit institutions under dictatorship are predominantly given amnesty or prosecuted. Another is whether these institutions are given a great deal of discretion post-transition or are more closely monitored. Relatedly, whether these institutions have been able to overcome tarnished legacies of yesteryear and gain the public trust in the present is an additional key driver of contemporary public attitudes. These are all developments that begin at the time of institutional reform and impact the current public support for democracy and the rule of law—building upon the shared historical foundation provided by the experience of military dictatorship.

Observers often compare Argentina and Chile’s approaches to transitional justice, describing Argentina’s as a kind of retributive justice, while Chileans opted instead for restorative justice: the former punitive and passionate, the latter reconciliatory and forgiving (Robben 2010). Uruguay, alternatively, is known for largely ignoring the transitional justice question altogether. For some time, scholars have sought to understand why these Southern Cone nations have gone down divergent paths, and the power of the military post-transition, public opinion, and the relationship between the executive and the judiciary have all been considered in attempts to provide holistic explanations for why each nation chose its respective path.

I argue herein that one type of institutional reform will not unilaterally lead to an outcome, as the socioeconomic and demographic composition of a country can mediate the relationship between institutional reform and public support for democracy and the rule of law. Drawing from the premise that shared historical memory of past military dictatorship impacts
public attitudes, a reasonable assumption is that citizens who lived under military dictatorship will harbor different attitudes than citizens only living under democracy. Southern Cone citizens with experience under dictatorship could be more supportive of democracy, for instance, since they know what the alternative can be. Alternatively, they could feel as though democracy grants citizens and elites too much discretion, perchance increasing the likelihood of crime and corruption, and they harbor nostalgia for the perceived stability and order of dictatorship. My analysis tests out these competing hypotheses.

Socioeconomic status, too, could be a key predictor in whether citizens prefer democratic or authoritarian measures. The wealthy are considered to be the economic beneficiaries of Pinochet’s Chile and Argentina’s juntas, and in Uruguay, economic collapse cut the military’s reign short, but they did try to appeal to the wealthy while in power, targeting leftwing activists. Does this create a contemporary situation whereby the wealthy are nostalgic for the neoliberal policies of yesteryear? Or are the wealthy now good democrats, in part because the neoliberal consensus is rarely challenged nowadays by popular movements from the left? The wealthy, then, have no reason to fear democracy from an economic standpoint. Is it the case then that the Southern Cone follows other Latin American trends that show the poor are the staunchest proponents of authoritarian measures, particularly harsher approaches to crime, as they deem their greatest threat to be their fellow working poor, perhaps of an alternative racial complexion? In this regard, class solidarity before and during dictatorship is no longer as palpable amongst the poor, and it becomes the poor, like the wealthy of the past, who perceive it to be in their best interest to support authoritarian measures. In the context of Chile, then, an authoritarian enclave of around one-third of the population could still persist, even if it does not consist of the same
third, from a socioeconomic standpoint, that Pinochet’s did. These competing theories, too, are put to the test.

The three cases illustrate very different patterns of reform. In Uruguay, institutional reform was sought largely independent of any great efforts to prosecute. Resultantly, while contemporary democratic measures hold quite strong, there are practices under the dictatorship that continue to persist in the present that disproportionately negatively impact the Uruguayan poor. Given Uruguay’s history in which the industrial elite have aligned with the national security apparatus and mixed messaging from political elites who constitute the poor’s elected officials, absolute reform is stymied by the fact that majority sectors lack incentives to fully complete the project.

Chile’s democratic reforms can be predominantly characterized as a success, for this analysis makes it clear that a healthy majority of Chileans, based on several public opinion polls, never abandoned a democratic predisposition in the first place. Furthermore, Chileans, across all demographics, increasingly render a negative assessment of military government and the 1973 coup, and nowadays Chileans with the greatest wealth are the strongest proponents of democracy—a phenomenon that was not the case in the build-up to military dictatorship. What has held constant in Chile since the 1970s is that assessment of the economy has proven to be the most important concern when choosing to support or oppose the government, well outpacing human rights concerns. This held true under Pinochet as well as today, and so the ultimate test for Chile will likely be how its wealthy react to the next severe economic downturn.

Finally, in Argentina, there is significant distrust in both the police and military—certainly not ideal for a healthy democracy. With regard to the military, this is in part due to the humiliation of the military during transition, a humiliation that has been criticized for placing too
much blame on the military at the expense of other complicit agents. A silver lining is that trust in military is on the rise and as of 2012 north of 50%, a positive trend that serves as a testament to the military’s efforts to refrain from influencing political outcomes. Trust in the police, however, lags behind the military’s, and this is in part due to increases in crime following transition and in part due to failed attempts at police reform. Disappearance and torture continue and, perhaps most troubling, police have transitioned to targeting the poor so as to win the approval of the middle class—and the media helps to frame the narrative of a criminal poor that must be aggressively policed.

Analyses confined to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are a rarity, and Uruguay in particular is often overlooked in examinations of Latin American justice reform and democratic transition. To my knowledge, a direct comparison of these cases and their contemporary democratic framework has not been conducted. Insofar as a keen understanding of these cases is pivotal in determining whether their efforts at institutional reform have yielded healthy democracies, what this study can also do is pinpoint areas in which these states can improve their institutions in order to ensure democratic continuity. For sometimes democratic transition is perceived as a static event that occurred in the past as opposed to something that is constantly evolving. As such, even if it is conceded that mistakes occurred at the time of initial transition, this does not mean that there are no ways to rectify past missteps in the present. Since this study maintains its gaze on past influential events—ranging from labor struggles to coups to constitutional reforms—while also dissecting contemporary survey data and events on the ground, the account is holistic and appreciates the dynamism of a past and present that are inextricably linked.
For much of what initially draws oneself to Latin America is the splendor of revolution, the rise of the underdog who sees that a better world is possible—or at least that the struggle on the path to a better world is a worthy pursuit. Of course, the fate of the revolutionary often reads as a Shakespearean tragedy. Allende whets the palate of those seeking a revolutionary tale, and the story is worth revisiting to determine what can be learned from it. However, sometimes Latin America is confined to its past revolutions, and, in a sense, the present is neglected because it lacks the luster of the past. These cases at hand are of interest because they are the byproduct of the fireworks of yesteryear; the revolutionary impulse of idealists does not die when a state transitions to democracy, and it is alive and well all the more so when reform is perceived to be inadequate.

In recent years in Uruguay, student protests have erupted—demanding increased funding for education. A key reason as to why the military dictatorship imploded in Uruguay was because it cut social spending and did not appreciate the welfare state legacy of Uruguay; to this day, we can plainly see the importance this tradition holds in Uruguay, and that students will even protest left-wing governments that make cuts to education.

Chilean students, similarly, have protested court decisions to allow universities to be for-profit, as well as the use of police violence upon peaceful protestors. These protests demonstrate the younger generation’s divergence from older Chileans: since higher education was free until Pinochet “paved the way for the emergence of private universities with no constraints on tuition fees” in 1981, younger Chileans know that historically the Chilean state was able to provide free

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education, and furthermore they may well associate for-profit universities with dictatorship.\(^2\)

Unlike older Chileans who either attended for-profit universities or who are less likely to take to the streets due to fear of repercussions instilled by the Pinochet dictatorship, younger Chileans are using their understanding of history to demand better educational opportunities and do not bring with them the same trauma that holds back their older counterparts. That police brutality is also a topic of protest is important; while police have a relatively high degree of trust in Chile, engaging in brutality runs the risk of lessening trust and, as a result, weakening democracy.

Anti-austerity protests as well as protests against the freeing of heinous human rights abusers have occurred in Argentina during the Macri presidency. Such protests serve as evidence that the grassroots in Argentina has been frustrated by Macri’s economic policies, which are perceived to be hurting the poor, and his approach to human rights, which activists argue “fits a pattern of his administration’s tamping down efforts to seek justice for the atrocities carried out during the dictatorship”. In the words of Nora Cortinas, a leader of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, “We stood up to a dictatorship and are still fighting — why would we stop now?”\(^3\)

Cortinas’ sentiment is emblematic of a sentiment that can be applied across the three cases: the fight continues. Advocates of social progress are still necessary to ensure the government represents the interests of its people. The battle may no longer be to restore democracy, or the levels of abject poverty that inspired an Allende may no longer be as high as they once were, but there are still conditions that are unsatisfactory, and, in a positive sense, many are conditions that can be improved. Justice reform is at the heart of the social reform agenda. The public needs to be able to trust its justice institutions: its courts, police, and military.

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in order for there to be a rule of law. Political elites and members of these institutions have agency in increasing the public trust, in large part by applying the same standard to everyone and refraining from engaging in corruption and human rights abuses. Reformists will continue to apply pressure on powerful actors, and citizens, in turn, should report attitudes that are reflective of the quality of democracy on offer. This study and these cases matter because they provide insight into what is working and what needs fixing.

These cases are fascinating ones for analysis, as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have each implemented institutional reform in their transitions to democracy. Furthermore, each country has provided amnesty to some perpetrators of state violence and prosecuted others. The balance that each country has struck differs due to the aforementioned variables at play.

I examine how these institutional changes may shape public support for democracy and the rule of law, which I measure by the public’s trust in democracy and its institutions. The Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan states all uphold the core criterion of democracies, although justice reform is still an Achilles heel. Because institutional reform impacts public belief in a state’s democratic commitment, questions including whether Argentines, Chileans, and Uruguayans would justify a military coup or the degree to which they trust their police and military will be analyzed. The dispositions that each state’s public harbors ultimately serve as the measurements for public support for democracy and the rule of law.

In Chapter 1, I have provided a definition of the purpose of this study, its intellectual contribution, and a brief introduction to the cases and the variables that are prevalent throughout subsequent discussion. Henceforth, Chapter 2 will expand upon the methodology used in this project including how exactly I measure key variables of interest: institutional reform, quality of democracy, and the rule of law. Chapter 3 will then provide the qualitative overview of the
institutional process in each case, as well as highlight the high degree of interrelation between key institutions such as the executive, courts, and military. Chapter 4 will consist of an evaluation of public support for democracy and the rule of law, relying upon survey data. Chapter 5 will then involve a discussion of the socioeconomic and generational divides that serve to intervene between institutional reform and contemporary trust in democracy and its institutions. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of what the findings mean to the relationship between institutional reform and contemporary public support for democracy and the rule of law.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

I will analyze institutional reform, the independent variable, qualitatively. For each case, I provide a brief historical overview of the period of military rule, followed by a discussion of the conditions of each state at the time of transition. How much power did the executive, judiciary, and military respectively yield during transition? What were the desires of these bodies of government and, if these desires clashed, which bodies were able to use the mechanisms of the state to get their way? What role did public opinion play in the state’s approach to transitional justice? In order to paint a holistic picture regarding who or what determined the path of institutional reform pursued, these are the questions that need be answered, and a qualitative assessment of these cases is the best way to reach necessary answers to these questions.

In order to measure public support for democracy and the rule of law, the dependent variable, survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) will be utilized. Citizens in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are all asked questions pertaining to support for a military coup, executive unilateralism, trust in police, military, fair elections, democracy, human rights protections, torture, and approaches to crime prevention. These questions, directly or indirectly, gauge public commitment to democratic principles. Altogether, the data from LAPOP provides a wealth of information regarding how the citizens of the Southern Cone view the quality of their democracies, and allows for me to confidently assess public support for democracy and the rule of law in these countries from the vantage point of the people whose mandate ensures democratic continuity.
The 2012 LAPOP survey contains questions that help operationalize different dimensions of support for, or opposition to, democracy. In accord, I have selected 15 questions that measure public support for democracy and the rule of law, and provide each question with an accompanying conceptual definition. Further, I divide the 15 questions into 4 categories separated thematically: I. Support for Authoritarian Measures, II. Trust in Institutions Involved in Authoritarian Rule, III. Quality of Democratic Government, and IV. Abuse of Power / Authoritatarian Measures.

For Category I, support for a coup d’état and support for executive unilateralism are examined. To be certain, if a high percentage of a populous is either supportive of a coup or strongman rule, this is a sign that a democracy is at risk of reversal. One can further deduce that high support of a coup endorses giving high discretion to the military to act in its preferred manner, which opens the door for human rights abuses. Executive unilateralism, equally, risks shutting out other branches of government, and grants a great deal of discretion to the president to do as they see fit independent of dictates of the constitution. Overall, high levels of support for either of these principles are troubling signs for democracy and the rule of law.

Support for Democracy

Measures of the Dependent Variables

Table I: Support for Authoritarian Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual definition</th>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Percentage stating yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for a Coup d’état</td>
<td>Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion would a</td>
<td>Index of support for a coup d’état: ranges from 0 (no) to 100 (yes) whereby 100 indicates high support for a coup.</td>
<td>Unemployment:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina: 11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chile: 7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay: 9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard deviation: .29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Category II includes trust in police, police integrity, trust in the military, and military respect for human rights—all variables that gauge public trust and support of institutions that are most closely associated with authoritarian rule. If trust in these institutions is low, this does not bode well for democracy: either the public still associates these institutions with authoritarian rule, or, they no longer associate them with authoritarian rule but instead distrust them on the basis of their current practices. Malone highlights this pivotal process by which citizens learn to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Coup Justification</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>military coup be justified under the following circumstances?</td>
<td>Argentina: 38.2%</td>
<td>Argentina: 32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When there is high unemployment; When there is a lot of crime; When there is a lot of corruption</td>
<td>Chile: 26.7%</td>
<td>Chile: 18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses were originally measured dichotomously as yes and no.</td>
<td>Uruguay: 35.4%</td>
<td>Uruguay: 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation: .47</td>
<td>Standard deviation: .45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Support for Executive Unilateralism | Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament? | Index of support for executive unilateralism: ranges from 0 to 100 whereby 100 indicates high support for executive unilateralism. | Argentina: 10.4% |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| Chile: 6.7% |
| Responses were originally measured dichotomously as yes and no. | | | Uruguay: 10.3% |
| Standard deviation: .29 | | | Standard deviation: .29 |
trust institutions previously associated with dictatorship: “Rather than dismiss state actors like the courts, who served to legitimize state repression and corruption under authoritarian rule, citizens need to turn to justice institutions to redress problems and grievances” (Malone 2012: 14). Her focus in this passage is justice institutions, but the same premises very much hold for security institutions as well. Citizens either learn to trust these institutions, trust earned by an impartial enforcement of the rule of law, or they do not—either because these institutions do not reform and apply the same standard to everyone or the public is unwilling to believe that they are doing so. Ultimately, without trust, “it is unlikely that they [these institutions] will be transformed into pillars of the rule of law” (Malone 2012: 16).

Trust in police and military and military respect for human rights were originally coded on a 1-7 scale, in which the lowest number corresponds with the lowest degree of trust. These responses were then recoded so that a response of 1 represents a score of 100 and a response of 7 represents a score of 0. The purpose here was to comprise graphs in which the higher score corresponds with a higher level of authoritarian disposition. Police integrity was originally coded on a 1-3 scale in which “Police protect people from crime” was coded as 1, “Police are involved in crime” was coded as 2, and “Neither, or both” was coded as 3. These responses were recoded so that a response of 1 represents a score of 0, a response of 2 represents a score of 100, and a response of 3 represents a score of 50. Altogether, this process allowed for me to put all survey responses on the same 0-100 metric.

Table II: Trust in Institutions Involved in Authoritarian Rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual definition</th>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Scores (0-100 scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Police</td>
<td>To what extent do you trust the National Police? Responses were on a</td>
<td>The original 7-point scale was transformed into a 0-100 scale in which 100 denotes low trust (high</td>
<td>Argentina: 56.7&lt;br&gt;Chile: 33.5&lt;br&gt;Uruguay: 47.7&lt;br&gt;Standard deviation:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Category III assesses public trust in the electoral process and the government’s respect for human rights. Naturally, trust in free and fair elections is vital for a democracy; if this trust erodes, the door is opened for suitors who use the electoral lack of legitimacy to stake their claim to rule on the basis that the electoral process is illegitimate anyways. The question regarding human rights is actually quite curious as there is the option to express a belief in *too much* respect for human rights. Seemingly, such a respondent believes that some human rights ought to
be rescinded from other individuals or minority groups, and political leaders have been known to
fan the flames of support for harsher anti-criminal policies to gain electoral support. Dammert
discusses this very phenomenon:

Now there is not a dichotomy between prevention and control. Now the antinomy in
populist discourse is this: I am with the victims and you are with the criminals. There is
no more debate between those supporting prevention and those advocating control. Now
the political fight is to see who can succeed in claiming to champion the rights of victims,
and who can cast their political opponents as friends of delinquents. Garantismo
(protectio of civil liberties) has become a plague in Latin America, without ever
becoming a reality first (Appialoza and Dammert 2011).

One can readily see why branding a political opponent as pro-delinquent, anti-victim
could be both politically advantageous and drive up support for more punitive measures,
independent of their actual effectiveness in reducing crime. According to this perspective, laws
protecting the human rights of criminals is decreasing public safety and impeding punishment for
offenses; the remedy is to roll back protections for criminals, and grant public officials ample
discretion. If a high percentage of the population does believe that respect for human rights is too
prevalent, this is threatening to democracy: the door is opened for strongmen offering the
promise of a rescinding of human rights granted to minority groups, political opponents, etc.

Once again, original responses were on a 1-7 scale, in which the lowest number
corresponds with the lowest degree of trust. These responses were then recoded so that a
response of 1 represents a score of 100 and a response of 7 represents a score of 0. The purpose
here was to comprise graphs in which the higher score corresponds with a higher level of
authoritarian disposition.

Table III: Quality of Democratic Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual definition</th>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Scores (0-100 scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free and Fair Elections</td>
<td>To what extent do you trust elections in this</td>
<td>The original 7-point scale was transformed</td>
<td>Argentina: 42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chile: 35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Category IV gauge</td>
<td>Response details</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Respect for Human Rights</td>
<td>To what extent do you believe that the basic rights of the citizen are well protected? Responses were on a 1-7 scale.</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Respect for Human Rights</td>
<td>The original 7-point scale was transformed into a 0-100 scale in which 100 denotes the belief that basic rights are not well protected.</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Respect for Human Rights</td>
<td>The original 7-point scale was transformed into a 0-100 scale in which 100 denotes the belief that basic rights are not well protected.</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Respect for Human Rights</td>
<td>The original 7-point scale was transformed into a 0-100 scale in which 100 denotes the belief that basic rights are not well protected.</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category IV gauges support for torture, iron fist crime prevention, non-elected leaders, and alternatives to democracy. Approval of any of these approaches signals trouble for democracy: there are no shortage of strongmen willing to offer these prescriptions to a public should the possibility open to subvert democracy. Support for practices such as torture or an iron fist approach to crime may additionally reveal that a state has yet to overcome its authoritarian legacy. In Uruguay, for instance, torture still persists, apparently, because no elites have prioritized eradicating it (Skaar 2015: 84-85). Police are able to, at times, adopt an iron fist approach to crime prevention in Argentina partly due to elite backing, but also likely because they have shifted their target from the middle class to the poor. Resentful “New Poor” residing in the middle class are appreciative of the fact that the police are targeting the undeserving poor and not themselves, and the wealthy are always susceptible to supporting punitive approaches to crime that does not affect their livelihoods. The media in Argentina also depicts the poor as criminals with great regularity, driving up support for punitive approaches from the middle and wealthy classes.
### Table IV: Abuse of Power / Authoritarian Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual definition</th>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Scores (0-100 scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Support for Torture                | If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand? | The original 3-point scale was transformed into a 0-100 scale in which 100 denotes approval of torture. | Argentina: 29.6  
Chile: 26.2  
Uruguay: 30.8  
Standard deviation: .76 |
| Support for Iron Fist Crime Prevention | Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? | Iron-fist government = 100  
Everyone’s participation = 0                                                                 | Argentina: 30.5  
Chile: 38.8  
Uruguay: 22.1  
Standard deviation: .46 |
| Support for a Non-elected Leader   | There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think?  
(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected  
(2) Electoral democracy is the best | Percentages listed for the percentage of respondents who expressed support for  
(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected.  
Strong leader unelected = 100  
Electoral democracy is the best = 0 | Argentina: 7.2  
Chile: 8.8  
Uruguay: 5.1  
Standard deviation: .26 |
| Democracy as Best Form of Government | Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you believe in democracy? | The original 7-point scale was transformed into a 0-100 scale in which 100 denotes low belief in democracy | Argentina: 16.82  
Chile: 25.83  
Uruguay: 13.46  
Standard deviation: |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic vs. Nondemocratic Government</th>
<th>agree or disagree with this statement?</th>
<th>democracy as best form of government.</th>
<th>1.47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a government is democratic or nondemocratic, or (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.</td>
<td>Percentages listed for the percentage of respondents who expressed support for (1), (2), and (3) respectively.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Doesn’t matter = 100</td>
<td>Democracy preferable to any other form = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian government may be preferable under some circumstances = 50</td>
<td>Argentina: 12.88</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chile: 23.21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Uruguay: 8.53</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard deviation: .44</td>
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CHAPTER 3: QUALITATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

Uruguay

Uruguay experienced predominantly uninterrupted democratic rule up until the 1960s but, like many other countries in the region, US-inspired anti-communism compelled Uruguay to enter into an “authoritarian interlude” (Skaar 2015: 68). Uruguay was a participant in Operation Condor, sharing intelligence with other participating nations and engaging in the “killing of real or imagined opponents of the regime” (Skaar 2015: 68). Uruguay’s dictatorship (1973-1985) is noteworthy for having the largest number of political prisoners per capita in the world. This statistic earned Uruguay an infamous nickname: “the torture chamber of Latin America” (Lessa 2015: 2).

The dictatorship’s primary target were the Tupamaros, a left-wing urban guerilla group based in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, whose mission was societal revolution via the practice of robbing the rich and giving to the poor. Holmes (2006) deems the two primary causes for Uruguay’s eventual slide towards authoritarianism to be the threat of the Tupamaros guerilla movement along with the failure of Uruguay’s economy. As such, a closer examination of the Tupamaros is necessary in order to understand the Uruguayan landscape pre-dictatorship as well as during the dictatorship.

The Tupamaros was founded by socialist lawyer Raul Sendic and, although later renowned for its mobilization in Montevideo, began in the north of Uruguay as a movement aiming to improve the legal rights and social conditions of sugar workers. Initially committed to using nonviolent tactics, their protests centered around addressing poor labor and housing conditions, but their actions were generally in vain. Indeed, the lack of success in the countryside
prompted Sendic to reconsider his tactics, and the two changes he made were to use a clandestine guerilla model and move the base of operations to Montevideo (Milligan 2012: 5).

Following the move to the city, “the Tupamaros achieved the first stages of their strategy without terrorism,” redistributing wealth and garnering public support in the process because of the very fact that it was using nonviolent methods and shrewdly exposing corruption in clever ways. It can additionally be surmised that the Tupamaros’ earlier commitment to nonviolence when they were merely a rural workers’ movement further lent them credibility; in the eyes of the public, their motives were pure. However, a steadfast commitment to nonviolence would not last, and Milligan points to the election of Colorado candidate Juan Maria Bordaberry in 1972 as the moment in which the Tupamaros’ “campaign of violence relaunched with a renewed vigour,” sparking an increase in violence and threat to both the state and the civilian population (Milligan 2012: 6).

In turn, the public began to rapidly withdraw support for the now perceived-to-be dangerous Tupamaros, and this provided the state with the opportunity to suspend civil liberties with the rationale being that guerilla violence had created a national emergency (Holmes 2006: 147, Weinstein 1988: 39). Milligan considers this suspension of civil liberties to be a pivotal moment in the evolution of the dictatorship, as the dictatorship would later continue to suspend civil liberties even when the Tupamaros were no longer a threat to societal peace (Milligan 2012: 6). In other words, once the state was able to set the precedent of suspending civil liberties, it was able to continue to do so even in the absence of the justification, the Tupamaros threat, for the inaugural suspension.

1972 was additionally such a turning point because the Tupamaros now faced “an increasingly well-equipped and adequately prepared military that had finally been given a
blankcheck to get rid of the problem [the Tupamaros]” (Weinstein 1988: 41). Holmes corroborates Weinstein’s claim as military spending under the Bordaberry regime approximately doubled from 13.9% to 26.2% of total government outlay, and education spending was the resultant casualty as spending was reduced from 24% to 16% of the national budget (Holmes 2006: 91). In this regard, a once proud cornerstone of the Uruguayan welfare state, education, at least temporarily, was undermined in favor of a budget allocation that was atypical by Uruguayan standards.

Weinstein’s account of the Uruguayan slide towards authoritarianism is measured: the Tupamaros does share responsibility for escalating violence that increased the political influence of the armed forces in Uruguay, but what they cannot be blamed for are the practices employed by Uruguay’s rulers from 1973-1984 (Weinstein 1988: 40). For while one could concede to the armed forces that the Tupamaros threat in 1972 required an aggressive military presence, these same conditions were not present from 1973-1984 and yet the armed forces continued to rule in the same manner as they did when the threat was at its peak. Handelman argues that the armed forces were enabled by a largely supportive industrial elite who sought and successfully forged bonds with the military, very much a familiar tale in the greater context of military dictatorships in Latin America (Handelman 1981: 379).

Handelman’s study on Uruguay is particularly fascinating as he compiled strike data in the decade preceding the military regime, during a time of economic crisis most assuredly, but he argues that the data serves as a “symptom of the wider polarization of Uruguayan society at the time” (Milligan 2012: 11). This assessment runs counter to the typical account of Uruguay as a state with minimal socioeconomic divide and class conflict. Such conventional wisdom may indeed still hold post-dictatorship, but, according to Handelman, in the pre-dictatorship 1960s
“class conflict had a great effect on the attitudes of the industrial elite, to the extent that the sector came to condone repressive measures in controlling the country’s labour force” (Handelman 1981: 376). At the very least, any pretense that the military was acting unilaterally while a uniform Uruguayan population looked on passively can be dismissed: the industrial elite aligned with the military. Handelman’s 1976 survey adds credence to this conclusion: nearly half of all industrialists saw the strike actions and guerilla movement as part of a single coordinated campaign by the political left (Handelman 1981: 378).

According to Holmes, the Tupamaros threat had essentially been eradicated by 1973, and yet the government was still using the Tupamaros threat as a means to crackdown upon striking workers. And the industrial elite consciously aligned with the government and its repressive tactics. Milligan contends that Uruguay experienced what Nun coined as a “middle class military coup” and Handelman called Uruguay’s case “a coup partially instituted in response to the needs of the nation’s industrial elite” (Nun 1967, Handelman 1981: 379). Either way, an influential elite, altogether separate from the Uruguayan populous at large, paved the way for the military to serve their interests even when the terrorist threat was long gone. And even if we are to grant that Uruguay has less socioeconomic division than the vast majority of Latin America, and certainly more so than Argentina, this relative class homogeneity does not preclude an industrial elite from existing nor from using their influence to manipulate the levers of power within society.

While the industrial elite seized the opportunity to forge a close bond with the military, for they realized they had a stake in military rule’s continuity, it is pivotal to note that the Uruguayan population at large had a low degree of faith in the state as it was functioning under democracy. Milligan argues that in the wider population the overriding perception was that “the orthodox democratic government...was now guilty of a failure to cope with the economic slide
of the 1950s and 1960s” (Milligan 2012: 12). Such a point serves to illustrate that it was not as if the military was taking democracy away from a public that was very much committed to maintaining it; while the population may not have considered democracy to be the reason as to why the state could not counteract the economic slide, they bluntly lacked incentives to prioritize maintaining a democratic system that struggled to deliver economic results. Moreover, authoritarian measures did quell labour conflicts and the Tupamaros so, insofar as one desired relative stability in the economic and national security realms, military rule might well be amenable, and thwarting the Tupamaros threat lent the regime credibility to apolitical and conservative sectors of the population. As faith in democratic institutions diminished, confidence in the armed forces grew.

Appealing to the apolitical was a conscious strategy of Uruguayan military rule. In refraining from politicizing social life under the dictatorship, a sort of ‘antipolitics’ prevails and “reduces the levels of popular political participation” (Sondrol 1992: 192). In this respect, the Uruguayan military’s approach of ‘depoliticization’ is very much in the mould of Pinochet’s Chile or present-day Argentina under Mauricio Macri: the public is asked to, by and large, disengage from politics and allow for the technocrats and hegemonic forces to steer the political ship.

The military regime found allies in civil society as well. The Catholic Church, pivotal to the support network of the Argentine junta as well, found common ground with the military on “preaching a return to traditional values of duty, order and nationalism,” creating both a conservative coalition but equally importantly “diverting citizens’ attention from politics to other realms,” such as family and sport (Sondrol 1992: 195). Thus, the Uruguayan dictatorship’s decision to refrain from engaging in all aspects of societal life, and instead align with forces that
are natural allies and allow for them to aid in diverting citizens away from politics showcased that, according to Sondrol, “the military saw its project, in fact, as defensive; saving traditional society from subversive Marxism’s revolutionary ideology, which was seen as attacking the spiritual assets of the nation, with a view to imposing a new order of values” (Sondrol 1992: 195). The framing here is in lockstep with Pinochet’s Chile, but the Uruguayan dictatorship deviates from Chile in its lack of ambition. While the Pinochet regime immediately consolidated its power and refused to recognize any limitations, the Uruguayan dictatorship recognized limitations such as its “singular lack of expertise in the fields of economics and foreign policy,” which forced them to accept a civilian role in the executive, or the democratic legacy in Uruguay (Handelman 1981: 3). Democracy was of course steeped in Chilean history too, and Pinochet did not boast economic expertise and instead outsourced this endeavor to the Chicago Boys, so hypothetically, Pinochet, too, could have acknowledged limitations that would have restricted consolidating his mandate. Pinochet did not do this, and this divergence in approaches could well help explain the divergence in outcomes.

So Uruguay’s military regime did not have the same transformative ambitions as a Pinochet’s Chile, but they were still able to largely present themselves as innocuous to political neutrals by allowing them to remain tied to their institutions of choice. In turn, the public allowed the military to rule, and the military left alone anyone who was not stridently left-wing. “Unlike authoritarian Argentina or Chile,” contends Sondrol, “Uruguay was less a tyranny of horror and death than one of stringency and insipidness” (Sondrol 1992: 198). Indeed, the junta claimed to be building a new Uruguay, but their actions mostly reinforced the status quo. They did not attempt to abolish Uruguay’s major political parties, and politicos that were cultivated by the military regime emerged post-transition firmly committed to democracy and civilian rule. It
begs the question that, if the military did not overplay its hand and eventually transition to engage in mass arrests, would the Uruguayan populous have allowed them to rule longer than they were ultimately able?

For what remains curious about the Uruguayan case is that the public did not aggressively lobby for prosecution of Uruguay’s military officials. Yes, Uruguay has less social division than other cases, but Handelman’s findings suggest social division still existed to the extent that one would expect classes who were victimized by the regime to mobilize around accountability. Perhaps what could be a useful explainer for this phenomenon is the regime’s deliberate strategy of refraining from entirely uprooting the democratic framework; in essence, even though the military did eventually proceed to engage in arrests and mass detention, it was still confined to the political left, and they either coddled or left alone powerful institutions like the Church and political parties across the Uruguayan political spectrum. Thus, insofar as citizens take political cues from party elites, Frente Amplio elites were not terribly mistreated by the military regime and therefore did not seek vengeance upon the military once democracy was restored. Its base, too then, may have adopted a similar perspective: yes, military rule was a momentary lapse in reason, but they did not destroy our democratic framework, and further yet they showed restraint on this count—they never attempted to abolish Uruguay’s democratic impulse when they very well could have tried.

Despite exhibiting some degree of restraint and a willingness to align with sympathetic sectors of society and leaving be neutral sectors, Uruguay’s military regime proceeded to squander the legitimacy the public bestowed upon it, in large part due to its great reductions in social spending. The military regime proved no better at handling the economy than the previous civilian government, and therefore the public was no longer able to associate solely democracy
with poor economic performance. Now losing legitimacy, and actually now on the receiving end of vocal opposition in the 1970s, the military government doubled down on its initial approach by continuing to increase military spending and granting more discretion to law enforcement to treat the population forcefully (Milligan 2012: 16). Torture, interrogation, and disappearances became the norm.

The military would have preferred lower-middle and working class elements of society to remain disengaged from politics, but when these elements proved stubborn, the military opted for a repressive approach that would “terrorise citizens into avoiding politics, by banning elections, exiling politicos and torturing activists” (Sondrol 1992: 194). Sondrol writes that “the diffusiveness, excessive breadth and unpredictability of this criterion [used to repress a large faction of society] induced a pervasive and arbitrary witch hunt against a wide swath of relatively compliant Uruguayan society” (Sondrol 1992: 196). The Tupamaros were eradicated, and yet by mid-1976 the regime had jailed 6000 political prisoners, amounting to 1 in every 500 Uruguayans. Inevitably, such an iron-fist approach lacking any semblance of nuance loses in the court of public opinion.

The sequence of events suggests that internal opposition to the military regime filled the void left by the Tupamaros. The problem for the military was that internal opposition was not violent in the way that the Tupamaros movement eventually became; in essence, the military proceeded to disproportionately crackdown against an opposition that did not possess the same capacity as the Tupamaros, and such tactics only further eroded public support for military rule. The military desperately wanted its opposition to behave in the same manner as the Tupamaros, as that would garner public sympathy for aggressive retaliation, but, in superimposing the same model it used against the Tupamaros upon a far less militant opposition, it alienated the
population. Drawing from Handelman, “since the military has justified its political intervention and accompanying political repression in terms of the alleged threat of ‘internal subversion,’ it must accept the principle that its rule is finite” (Handelman 1981: 3).

Like most bodies that come to power, the military was not willing to accept that, according to the terms of the original mandate, its rule would end when the threat of ‘internal subversion’ did, and in accord they tried to create an artificial ‘internal subversion’ to justify its rule. They were unsuccessful in this regard, and in fairness to them it is hard to envision a way in which they could have been successful: the dynamics had changed, and Handelman further notes that “even the armed forces found it difficult to blatantly reject the principle [of democracy]” which had been a cornerstone of the Uruguayan state throughout the 20th century (Handelman 1981). In this sense, military rule was always likely to be temporary, its legitimacy lasting as long as a threat that permitted the suspension of civil liberties was existent.

Jose Mujica, president of Uruguay from 2010-2015, was infamously imprisoned by the dictatorship for 13 years for his association with the Tupamaros. Following the same script as other military dictatorships in the region, communists, anarchists, and other left-affiliated groups were targeted by the regime as well, via means of disappearance, detention, exile, and torture. Scholars estimate that 2% of Uruguay’s population, at the time 3 million, were detained and tortured at some point, while other scholars find the number to be closer to 200,000 Uruguayans illegally detained, imprisoned, or tortured (Lessa and Fried 2011). Skaar uses findings that put the percentage of the Uruguayan population thrown into prison at 10% (SERPAJ 1989).

Uruguay’s transition was pacted, and similar to the Chilean case the power of the military remained intact. Argentina bucks the trend of initially seeking amnesty for perpetrators of state crimes, but Uruguay falls firmly in line with other Latin American transitions and expectations at
large. The newly-elected rightwing government of the Colorado Party, with Julio Maria Sanguinetti (1985-1990, 1995-2000) at the helm, had no intention of challenging military power. The close association between the Colorado Party and the Uruguayan military is well-documented, and both Sanguinetti and the military operated under the consensus they would protect each other during the period of transition.

Borrowing from the “two demons” theory most closely associated with Francisco Franco and the Spanish amnesty of 1977, Sanguinetti called “for the establishment of a “symmetry of guilt” between Tupamaros and the military,” with the clear intention of assigning equal blame to the Tupamaros and the dictatorship” (Schallenmueller 2014: 12). Although the first referenda on the amnesty law held in 1989 largely split along partisan lines, the fact that the immunity for the military won 56.7% of the vote is suggestive that Sanguinetti was at least partially successful in purporting his narrative. The referenda emboldened his policies of refusing demands for truth and “rejecting requests to order judicial inquiry on the whereabouts of missing persons” (Schallenmueller 2014: 13).

Uruguay is also notorious for the degree to which it did not prosecute officials guilty of crimes during dictatorship. In 1986, the Uruguayan Parliament enacted an amnesty law, the Ley de Caducidad, and for 25 years this law prevented any investigation into the crimes of the dictatorship. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), in particular, has been critical of Uruguay’s “silence” which creates, in their estimation, “a legacy of impunity”. Skaar notes that “pressure for transitional justice was largely absent in the 1980s and early 1990s,” so with minimal grassroots pressure the state was able to continue its policy of impunity with very little pushback (Skaar 2015: 70). Uruguayan lower courts initially proved themselves to be willing to hear cases brought to them by individuals and NGOs, but provisions in the amnesty laws ensured
“that as long as the president opposed judicial action against the military, no punitive action would take place,” and this “effectively curbed judicial independence” (Skaar 2015: 72). Judges were virtually sidelined from the Uruguayan human rights question for the ensuing two decades.

Uruguay’s failures in the area of judicial reform are worthy of further examination. The two Sanguinetti governments in Uruguay stand out as being particularly hostile to demands for truth and justice because, in addition to crafting amnesty laws in collaboration with the military, the executive has the power to decide whether each case should be investigated. Naturally, if an executive wants no cases to be investigated, then that is how it shall be. Skaar finds that in Uruguay, of the first four administrations following transition who all opposed trials and handcuffed the judiciary (Sanguinetti I, Lacalle, Sanguinetti II, and Batlle), only under Batlle’s administration did any trials occur—and even in this case their purpose was only for truth-finding and not prosecution (Skaar 2010: 15). It is not until Vazquez’s administration in 2005 that trials in earnest could begin, a testament to the fact that he favored trials and therefore could allow them even though the judiciary was still non-independent due to the restrictions of the Ley de Caducidad. Vazquez holds the distinction of being the only president across Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay to hold successful trials even when the judiciary was still non-independent. While independent judiciaries were able to overcome executives unfavorable to trials in Argentina and Chile, this did not occur in Uruguay. Regarding Vazquez, Skaar writes, “executive endorsement provided space for judicial action and some liberal/activist judges made use of it, no longer fearing sanctions” (Skaar 2010: 17).

Uruguay does rank first in the world in terms of its number of truth-seeking projects, but Skaar does find that “the practice of torture was left largely unaddressed by all four truth-seeking attempts” (Skaar 2015: 69). Two parliamentary commissions were established right after the
transition, but their mandate was restricted to investigating disappearances, thus precluding illegal detention, imprisonment, and torture. They also lacked official recognition from the Sanguinetti government, and therefore were never afforded the opportunity to link institutions under the military dictatorship with the crimes being investigated. Subsequent commissions “promised to pay reparations to families of victims who died in detention under military rule, as well as to the victims of guerilla violence” (Skaar 2015: 76). Reparations are oft criticized as a means of “paying off” victims at the expense of justice, this is certainly a prevalent topic of contention in the Argentine case, but nevertheless this has been the preferred means of apology chosen by the Uruguayan government.

Skaar raises the point that Uruguay has chosen to refrain from pursuing a “systematic documentation of the most widespread violation: torture” (Skaar 2015: 76). Uruguay has been widely criticized for its continued practice of torture in the present, and it is entirely plausible that there is a link between its unwillingness to bring instances of torture under the military dictatorship to the forefront and the prevalence of torture today.

Since the fall of dictatorship, Uruguay held two referenda on the amnesty law: the public just happened to vote to keep the law on both occasions, in 1989 and 2009 respectively (Skaar 2015: 67). In this regard, Uruguay tackled the amnesty question with an approach becoming of a democracy, even if the results were not those desired by the human rights community, nor necessarily the expectations in a society as progressive as Uruguay’s.

President Tabare Vazquez (2005-2010, 2015-present) of the left-wing Frente Amplio coalition is credited with making the most progress on dictatorship accountability during his first term as president. His presidential mandate rendered led to eventual verdicts against former dictators Juan Maria Bordaberry (1972-1976) and Gregorio Alvarez (1981-1985). Accountability
slowed down under Vazquez’s predecessor Jose Mujica (2010-2015), somewhat surprising given his progressive reputation and domestic agenda.

Under Mujica, the Movement of Popular Participation (MPP), refused to annul the Ley de Caducidad, in effect punting on the issue when stating “I already said that it was not my problem…the government will maintain the same profile as before of keeping out of the discussion” (Fernandez 2011: 1). Furthermore, Mujica felt that it was “the political force that had to take charge of that problem [because] the government…considered it a very difficult issue” (Fernandez 2011: 1). Taking Mujica’s comments at face-value, one ascertains that he did not feel as though the government had the political leverage to overturn the law, regardless of his personal feelings on the matter. His 2011 stance is consistent with his sentiments in 2010 that Frente Amplio legislators should resolve the issue “if they can…but I already have too many problems in government and if the political force does not have the votes, it does not have the votes: that simple” (Fernandez 2011: 1). Quite clearly, Mujica considered annulling the law to be politically impracticable, and as a result the eventual annulment was not executive-driven.

Mujica’s position, however, did draw ire from fellow party elites such as senator Constanza Moreira who said, “these are historical moments in which a leftist force assumes its historical commitment or abandons it, decides whether it is left-wing or not” (Fernandez 2011: 1). Intraparty dissent such as Moreira’s undermines the idea that party elites were wholly unified behind Mujica’s passivity, and further challenges the conception that party elites are uniformly unresponsive to the human rights question. And contrary to the perception that Uruguay lacks a grassroots base on the human rights question, Fernandez argues, “the anger and the indignation grow from below” on a range of issues from human rights to the privatization of the railway to lands increasingly going into the hands of large landowners and multinationals (Fernandez 2011:
1). While difficult to quantify just how many Uruguayans on the left for which Fernandez was speaking in 2011, there was dissatisfaction with the Mujica-led Frente Amplio’s policies that they perceived as a turn to the right.

The *Ley de Caducidad* was overturned by the Uruguayan parliament in October 2011, which signaled to many the possibility that Uruguay was ready to commit to thorough investigations of crimes committed by the dictatorship. However, the data reveals that such expectations have not come to fruition. As of 2015, only 6 out of 256 criminal cases have been completed with a final sentence from the Supreme Court, amounting to 2% of the total cases. 164 cases, or 63%, are in the pre-indictment stage. By contrast, during the same period of 2011-2015, Argentina completed 58 trials—resulting in a discrepancy of approximately 10: 1 (Lessa 2015: 2). While it is the case that Argentina has been prosecuting dictatorship officials for longer and with more vigor, such a lopsided discrepancy brings into question Uruguayan claims that the country is truly committed to prosecution following the overturn of the *Ley de Caducidad*.

Skaar’s findings regarding court cases are more optimistic than Lessa’s. She finds that “conviction rates relative to the number of cases presented in court are much higher [for Uruguay] than for Argentina” (Skaar 2010: 2).

A common perspective is that amnesty laws achieve the goals of peace and stability, what Skaar classifies as a “negative peace, meaning the absence of armed violence” (Skaar 2015: 83). Uruguay has not experienced a democratic reversal since its pacted transition and initiation of amnesty laws, so perhaps it is the case that justice is the price to pay in order to ensure democratic stability. The counterfactual cannot be played out in Uruguay, of course, though Argentina provides us with the most diametrically opposed approach to Uruguay in this study.
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset corroborates the idea that Uruguay is a solidly democratic nation. Uruguay has received the highest score of 2 (on a 0-2 scale) in three of four indicators since its transition in 1985, the only exception being torture (Skaar 2015: 84-85). Torture has received a score of 0 in 2 of the last 5 years Uruguay has been scored (1995 and 2005), and torture has never received a score of above a 1. Trailblazer Uruguayan prosecutor Mirtha Guianze notes that “human rights violations are taking place everywhere” and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) found in a 2013 report that, “in spite of having very low crime rates, [Uruguay] has one of the highest rates of inmates in preventive (pretrial) detention in all of Latin America: 180 per 100,000 inhabitants” (IACHR 2013: 30). This “existence of a deep-rooted culture among justice operators favoring the use of pretrial detention as a precautionary measure” is clearly embedded in society, and although Uruguayans are no longer targeted for their political views it remains the case that suspected criminals are excessively detained and at great risk of exposure to indecent treatment (IACHR 2013: 21).

Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, stated after visiting Uruguay in 2009, “I did receive numerous credible allegations of force in prisons, police stations and juvenile detention centres,” adding that at a particular penitentiary he saw both convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees held together “like animals in metal boxes” for almost 24 hours a day, often drinking from toilets. Nowak also reported that detainees were cutting themselves in order to receive medical care from doctors that they would otherwise be denied.4 The Pan American Health Organization’s 2015 poll on prisoner health conditions found that “medical treatment was inadequate,” “slightly

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more than 8% [of inmates] attempted suicide,” “and 18% alleged suffering mistreatment”.⁵ A
similar report from the government’s National Mechanism for the prevention of Torture
“reported as major problems the lack of sufficiently trained staff, poor building conditions that
resulted in overcrowding and violence, and insufficient social and educational activities”⁶.

Prison Insider has highlighted Uruguay’s highly punitive penal policy as well: the rate of
297 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016 ranked Uruguay 2⁷ nd in the region, and they too
point to “excessive use of pretrial detention,” accounting for 65% of Uruguay’s total incarcerated
population, as one of the primary causes for this high rate.⁷ They further note that the
incarcerated population is “primarily composed of young people, poor… and living in
neighbourhoods that lack the resources to reverse the processes of economic and social
imbalance”.⁸ With respect to the question of why the Uruguayan public has tolerated both
minimal prosecutions of military officials and increasing incarceration rates in a state that at
face-value should not yield a high prison rate, the answer could then lie in the fact that both
populations (human rights advocates and prisoners) are more prone to coming from poor
backgrounds. Wielding hardly any political influence, the poor are subject to the consensus of
the middle and wealthier classes, along with the elites, constituting the majority of the
population, who do not prioritize such concerns.

Uruguay’s inability to move away from torture is puzzling considering its success in
consolidating democratic institutions. The judiciary is widely regarded as one of the best and

⁵ See https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265832.pdf.
⁶ See https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265832.pdf.
most independent in all of Latin America (Rios-Figueroa 2006). 2014’s Rule of Law Index placed Uruguay 20th out of 99 countries, 1 spot below that of the United States. Its criminal justice system ranked middle of the road, but this is in large part due to the legacy of the amnesty laws that are now defunct. Overall democratic institutions are held in high regard, and the fact that Frente Amplio won elections in 2005 has greatly reduced the link between the military and the ruling political party.

According to data collected by UNDP-LAPOP, Uruguay registers a public perception of police participation in crime of 32% and a trust in police score of 52.3 on a 0-100 scale. These scores firmly place Uruguay between Chile, which boasts the lowest public perception of police participation in crime and the highest trust in police score, and Argentina, registering the highest public perception of police participation in crime and the lowest trust in police score (UNDP-LAPOP 2012). These findings are unsurprising considering Uruguayan society “is not plagued by drug trafficking, and homicide rates are among the lowest in the region” (Skaar 2015: 67). If Uruguay were to abandon its practices of preventive detention and torture, and it seems well within their capabilities, these numbers should only improve and challenge Chilean statistics.

Chile

On September 11, 1973, the democratically-elected socialist Chilean president Salvador Allende was overthrown by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet became the military dictator of Chile, a position he held until 1990, following the plebiscite in 1988 in which the Chilean people voted to restore democratic elections. Under the Pinochet regime, 28,000 people were tortured—predominantly young leftists supportive of or to the left of Allende’s Unidad Popular, as well as communists, academics, university students, union members and leadership, and working-class peasants.
A brief analysis of the events, particularly in 1972 and 1973, in the build-up to the overthrow of Allende are in order. Beginning with the question of whether a military coup was inevitable in Chile, the answer must be negatory for the sheer reason that the possibility of a military coup never enjoyed much public support in Chile. In June of 1972, only 16.7% believed that “a military government is convenient for Chile,” and while this number did increase to 25.7% by February of 1973, this number never climbed above 30% of the electorate. Unsurprisingly, this number was higher on the political right than the political left (35.4% to 19.8%), but the fact still stands that the number never reached anywhere near a majority of Chileans (Navia and Osorio 2016: 5).

Indeed, one must wonder if these numbers were in the back of Allende’s mind when he made his political calculations. Surely a military coup could not occur in Chile because Chile was a democracy, and moreover the public did not desire it. Marxist author Ralph Miliband, in his fascinating, raw account entitled “The Coup in Chile,” written in October 1973, spends time musing on Allende’s decisions and what both he could have done differently and what lessons the international left could take from the episode. He points out that in March 1973 the Allende coalition actually increases its vote share, and it is at this time that the Right seriously considers a military coup. The Right proceeds to engage in economic sabotage, and by September 1973 Allende proposes a plebiscite which would either provide the mandate for his presidency, in truth already provided by the March elections, or he would resign (Miliband 1973).

A particularly harrowing quote he employs to describe the brutality unleashed by the Pinochet military is from Sartre quoting de Goncourt in 1871, “It’s good. There has been no conciliation or compromise. The solution has been brutal. It has been pure force, a bloodletting such as this. By killing the militant part of the population puts off by a generation the new
revolution. It is twenty years of rest the old society has in front of it if the rulers dare all that needs to be dared at the moment” (de Goncourt 1871). De Goncourt’s 20 year estimation fits about rightly with the Chilean case: minimal leftist activity occurred on Chilean college campuses in the 1970s and 1980s, and union leadership was decimated. As public opinion data will later show, it takes about 20 years for Chileans to vociferously clamor for democracy, and an additional 20 before revolutionary calls for justice would permeate throughout a majority of the Chilean population.

As for the question of whether Allende could have altered his fate, Miliband is rather agnostic and noncommittal. Miliband is highly critical of Frei’s CDP, adding that “one understands better the savage contempt which Marx expressed for the bourgeois politicians he excoriated…the breed has not changed,” quite clearly suggesting that Allende stood a chance if the center did not abandon him. Allende’s unwillingness to arm his supporters and entertain civil war is examined as well, for Allende served as evidence of the paradoxical revolutionary with a steadfast commitment to nonviolence, “the blood of others horrified him,” adds Miliband (Miliband 1973). Where Miliband is most critical of Allende is in his inability to create “a parallel infrastructure” to counteract the one the Right was building, but ultimately it can only be concluded that Allende’s commitment to democracy and nonviolence, though noble, proved suicidal when the other side was willing to dare in the manner de Goncourt posited a century prior.

In 1973, support for the military government was strongest among those who identified with the right and those in the low middle class, while opposition to the military government was strongest among those who identified with the left and the middle class (Navia and Osorio 2016: 10). The ideological divide is self-explanatory, but the fact that it was the lower middle class that
was more supportive of the military government than the middle middle class is somewhat surprising, if one was to assume that Allende’s support-base was strongest among the poor and lower middle classes. An alternative theory might well reveal then that Allende’s base was strongest amongst the poor, for economic reasons, and the middle middle class, in small part due to economic incentives but moreso due to a commitment to democracy. Meanwhile, as is often the case, the Right was able to coopt the lower middle class to align with the interests of the wealthy on the grounds of restoring order and punishing subversives.

Perceptions of the economy were also an expected strong predictor of support or opposition to military government in 1973, with those who assessed the economy most negatively more prone to support military government. Women were also more supportive of military government than men, which comes as no surprise given Allende’s well-documented struggles to court women voters and the persistently conservative values of Chilean women more generally (Navia and Osorio 2016: 10-11).

The Chilean military still wielded substantial influence at the time of transition, and it is not until Pinochet stepped down as the head of the armed forces in 1998 that the army was “safely back in the barracks” and policy regarding human rights could be pursued without fear of retaliation (Skaar 2010: 13). Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) assumed the Chilean presidency immediately following the transition, and although he was receptive to the strong human rights movement in Chile, he inherited the self-amnesty law proclaimed by Pinochet and the military, and therefore was unable to make substantial unilateral headway on the human rights issue. While the courts retained independence immediately following the transition, according to Skaar’s metrics they did not have a liberal or activist disposition under Aylwin and therefore only pursued a single trial in the Letelier-Moffitt case (Skaar 2010: 15). The court was packed to
be Pinochet-friendly by the outgoing military dictatorship, so while they can be classified as independent in the sense that there was no law prohibiting their ability to prosecute, for all intents and purposes they were non-independent and in the corner of Pinochet and the military. Aguilar and Hite contend that the upholding of the 1978 amnesty law “reflected the Concertacion’s calculation that it did not possess the force in government to confront those responsible for gross human rights violations” (Aguilar and Hite 2004). This is fair but implies the Concertacion possessed the agency to make a calculation in the first place: repealing the amnesty law via democratic means is impractical when a coalition is constitutionally barred from doing so and the courts are packed.

Heiss raises criticisms of the Concertacion that ascertain they gave up “too much, too quick, to demands of the military and political right…to ensure compliance by their opponents to the new rules of the game” (Heiss 2003: 29). This perspective, though, under appreciates that the rules of the game were written by the side that owned the constitution, courts, military, and had already shown in the past that it would wage a coup against someone in Allende who had increased the government coalition’s vote share in March of 1973 and was still willing to hold a plebiscite in September of 1973 to gauge his legitimacy to appease the right. Hindsight bias suggests the center-left could have been less conciliatory to the right in 1973, one could even argue that very case for Allende, but limited opportunities presented themselves in 1990 for the center-left to necessarily take a stand against a faction with so much power and, by design, legitimacy.

Heiss further considers the idea that “political elites are almost obsessed with consensus building, [and] an undercurrent of violence and a sense of injustice remain latent in Chilean society” (Heiss 2003: 29). Indeed, a common perspective shared across the international left is
that the bipartisan consensus can be pursued by the elites at the expense of all else—namely policy gains and a greater sense of justice. Contemporary Democratic Party elites are criticized by the left for their insistence that there are noble Republicans, for instance. Again, however, in the Chilean case, while it is a reasonable criticism that the center-left’s desire for a bipartisan consensus ultimately lost Chile its democracy in 1973, the context of 1990 is entirely different. There are opportunities when consensus building is a choice, but in 1990 this simply was not such a case.

The Pinochet regime not only ensured the military would stay powerful post-transition, they also “guaranteed a budget ensuring operational autonomy and high salaries for their officers” (Huntington 1993). Such a tactic is shrewd insofar as the military is protected from fluctuations in the national economy as well as budget cuts that could entice officials to retire or pursue a career change. A paid military is a happy military, unified and loyal to those who brokered their deal; the chance of a coup is reduced when they lack the financial incentives to instill change, but equally so it creates a situation whereby it is very difficult to hold such a powerful institution accountable for past abuses. The military is still perceived as the most powerful institution in Chile by both supporters and opponents of the military alike (Linz and Stepan 1996: 224). Coupled with a social base that was sympathetic to and the economic beneficiaries of Pinochet and his neoliberal policies, along with a media including the paper of record in the conservative El Mercurio that aided Pinochet as he consolidated power in 1973, human rights activists were rather hamstrung in the early 1990s.

Heiss, writing in 2003, sees this budgetary autonomy along with the institutional constraints of the 1980 Constitution as key reasons as to why “civilian control over the military and security forces has not been achieved” (Heiss 2003: 26). Her pessimism continues in her
verdict that “the ideal of a shared truth, set by the Rettig Commission, has not been achieved” (Heiss 2003: 27). Those more sympathetic to Pinochet will not deny that human rights abuses took place, but they will attribute police and military excess to what amounts to a natural consequence of fighting a “war” against communism. It is unclear what more can be done to change intransigent public opinion that adopts Pinochet’s thinking: sectors that benefited under Pinochet expectedly hold more favorable views of his legacy, but also Chileans coming of age in the late 1970s and the bulk of the 1980s are tasked with overcoming an education gap as universities were also packed with Pinochet appointees to spread his message. When a society’s labor radicals are purged and the public is indoctrinated in the media and university system, counterhegemonic forces are at a severe disadvantage.

It was not until the “Mesa de Dialogo” in 1999 that the military acknowledged the committing of any crimes under the dictatorship. But even in this instance the relatives of victims and the communist party considered this to be a case of the military attempting to stop judicial proceedings of conspicuous cases of disappearances. In this respect, the talks “became more a political protection for human rights violators than an advance towards obtaining more information” (Heiss 2003: 10). This remains a peculiar aspect of the Chilean case: the amnesty law is only invoked when the location of the victim is known. Thus, paradoxically, “persons whose whereabouts and circumstances of death were hidden to avoid judiciary consequences became…the way to circumvent the Amnesty Law” (Heiss 2003: 21). Guilty military officials, then, have had incentives to candidly disclose the location of disappeared if their trust in the amnesty law’s application had not waived, or in a best-case scenario their victim’s location could be disclosed anonymously.
The 1990 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, more commonly referred to as the Rettig Report, was also limited in scope by design. Abandoning judiciary action, the commission only sought to establish a shared account of the past. As Heiss recounts, “justice was left to the tribunals,” who duly closed cases without investigating (Heiss 2003: 7). The report to its credit was extensive, investigating 3,400 cases and disclosing the general circumstances of each case, though it infamously did not disclose the identities of individual perpetrators.

Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) did not favor trials, but a liberal/activist judiciary ensured trials would carry on anyway, and then in the case of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), expectedly as someone who favored trials with a still liberal/activist judiciary, trials occurred at a rapid pace with executive and judiciary on the same page. From a human rights perspective, it is highly encouraging that judiciaries were able to overcome opposing executives under the tenures of both Frei and Lagos. 1998 once again stands out as a key year in Chile as, in addition to Pinochet stepping down, “the Supreme Court reform brought more liberal-minded justices to the Court and created a special chamber for criminal cases” (Skaar 2010: 19).

Following the amnesty law put in place in 1978 which initially precluded military prosecution at the time of transition as well, from the mid-1990s onwards, Chilean judges increasingly prosecuted the military. In addition, constitutional reforms allowed for judicial independence that eluded Uruguay for some time longer, for example. By the end of 2000, Chilean courts had convicted just 28 people for human rights violations, but this number shot up to 296 convictions between 2000 and 2010 (Hilbink 2007, Universidad Diego Portales 2010). As of 2010, Skaar contends that Chile “is the country that has made the most progress in holding the military to account for its past abuses” (Skaar 2010: 3).
The National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation was created in 1992. Heiss notes that “Chile’s transitional justice is notorious for the amount of reparations,” and she details some of the many forms of reparations including life-long pensions, educational benefits, psychological services, and exemptions from military service” (Heiss 2003: 4, Kritz 1995: xxxvii). Chilean exiles have also requested double citizenship, and Lagos’ government did propose legislation for this, but the proposal was rejected by the right who operated under the logical assumption this would increase the left’s vote share in national elections (Heiss 2003: 22).

The Chilean human rights community was organized by the Catholic Church under the umbrella of the Vicariate of Solidarity, *Vicaria*. The *Vicaria* took action over a high proportion of extrajudicial executions and suspected disappearances (Collins 2010: 69). Generally speaking, human rights lawyers were committed but under resourced. Collins recounts one senior lawyer who felt the human rights community should have gone hard after Pinochet and the military immediately following Rettig, but refrained from doing so because “everyone had just bought into the notion that something like that was unthinkable” (Collins 2010: 73). Collins is quick, however, to point out that the first direct challenge to the amnesty law post-transition only produced a hardening in the courts, and right-wing members of Congress had effective veto-power in Congress.

In 1997, as pointed out by Gillis, “the Supreme Court increased from 17 to 21 members and there was mandatory retirement for judges over the age of 75” (Gillis 2015: 13). This was a crucial development as only 4 of the 17 original Pinochet appointees remained in place thereafter, and “the military also saw the retirement of all generals closely tied to Pinochet and the dictatorship” (Gillis 2015: 13).
Collins credits minority civil actors with justice developments in Chile since 1998, as opposed to the seemingly reasonable assumption that prosecutions were sparked by a “renewed state determination to act against impunity” (Collins 2010: 86). She finds that state response in Chile has “generally oscillated between indifference and active dissuasion,” so in this regard clashes with Skaar who would contend Aylwin and Bachelet were decidedly pro-trial (Collins 2010: 86). Given this conclusion, private endeavors are what get results in the post-transitional realm, and her skeptical view of executive state action is in line with grassroots left Chilean thinking that has been disillusioned by the Concertacion’s approach to the memory issue.

Chilean public opinion with particular respect to support for military prosecutions will be considered, but Stern’s estimate of 45-50% support for the military dictatorship in the late 1970s is a useful baseline to begin an assessment of Chilean public opinion. Stern reaches this number by combining an analysis of the 1980 constitutional reform vote results accounting for fraud, and a commonsensical assessment of the Chilean electorate in the 1960s and 1970s which placed roughly a third of Chileans on the political Left, Center, and Right respectively. Operating with the understanding Pinochet lost about half of the Centrist/Christian Democratic base, due to social tragedy and policy critiques, by the late 1970s, this allows Stern to arrive at the number of just shy of or equal to 50% (Stern 2006: 437).

By 1983, there were clear signs that Pinochet’s support was waning. Loveman references a public opinion survey conducted by the Chilean weekly Hoy which found that, by 1983, 21.6% of respondents believed that the best government formula for solving national problems was the current one, 15% preferred a government without Pinochet but including military participation or directed by a leading Rightist politician, 24.2% desired a new government formed by the opposition but without communists, and 22.7% preferred a new government formed by
opposition elements without exclusions (Loveman 1986: 4, Hoy 1983: 15). Generously, taking half of the 15% who preferred the Right and military in charge but not necessarily Pinochet as still generally supportive, this is suggestive of Pinochet having about 30% of public backing or at least a 20% drop in support from the late 1970s roughly 5 years earlier. Such an assessment is further corroborated by the fact that almost 60% of respondents favored “reestablishment of full democracy” by 1985 and over 75% of respondents favored said reestablishment before 1989 (Hoy 1983: 15). According to Navia and Osorio, “after the end of the dictatorship in 1990, support for democracy has stabilized at around 60% (since 1995, when Latinobarometro first asked the question), but views on the military government have become increasingly negative” (Navia and Osorio 2016: 5).

Loveman argues, and the survey data assuredly backs, that “the Constitution of 1980 enjoyed little domestic support from the majority of Chileans, and that it could not survive much beyond Pinochet himself” (Loveman 1986: 4). The Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACS) conducted national and Santiago polls throughout the 1980s and their findings largely echo Stern, Loveman, and Navia and Osorio: in 1985, 13.3% of Chileans believed that authoritarianism was sometimes desirable, while 57.5% believed that democracy should be the preferable form of government (Baño 1993). Five additional polls between 1986 and 1989 showed “stable low support for authoritarianism and high support for democracy,” and in 1987, when asked if authoritarianism or democracy would do a better job on several dimensions, Chileans believed democracy would do a better job in 11 of 12 domains (Baño 1993: 11). Some standout areas where democracy was preferred to authoritarianism include: reducing unemployment (64%), improving Chile’s image abroad (63.1%), reducing social inequalities (58.9%), and fostering economic development (57.7%). Authoritarian governments ranked their
highest—but still worse than democracies—in eliminating terrorism (21.2%) and securing public order (21.7%) (Navia and Osorio 2016: 11-12). The 1987 survey additionally found that 66.5% believed that a democratically-elected government was superior to any other form of government, a number that held approximately constant at 65.8% in 1989 (Baño 1993: 11).

Just as perceptions of the economy predicted support for military rule in 1973, the 1987 FLACSO poll found that economic concerns were more important than human rights concerns in criticisms of the military regime. While 21.2% of Chileans mentioned human rights violations as a concerning aspect of the dictatorship, more than double, 43%, mentioned unemployment. In terms of positive accomplishments, 30.4% mentioned alleviating extreme poverty, both the most common accomplishment referenced and well above secondary references such as fighting communism (13.6%), modernizing the country (11.7%), and security/order (9.8%). Notably, 26.2% said the dictatorship had no accomplishments—a number that roughly mirrors a Chilean left that never bought into Pinochet’s human rights approach and neoliberal policies (FLACSO 1988: 14, Navia and Osorio 2016: 12). Consistently, economic perception outweighed all other concerns for the Chilean population.

A 1986 poll from the Center for Studies of Contemporary Reality (CERC), confined to just Santiago residents, found “strong support for democracy (69.7%), low support for the continuation of the Pinochet government (13.2%), and even lower support for dictatorship (5.2%)” (Huneeus 1987: 63, Navia and Osorio 2016: 12). Recalling the Hoy 1983 nationwide survey which put support for the Pinochet government at 21.6%, it is reasonable to conclude that Pinochet’s support continued to wane as the 1980s progressed, and by the end of his reign he certainly enjoyed no more than 20% of nationwide support, and perhaps lower—unless Santiago’s support for Pinochet by 1986 drastically differed from the nation at large. That
Santiago’s support for democracy came in at a whopping 70% suggests that the city tilted marginally to the left of the nation at large, in fact support for democracy among leftists was around 90% contrasted by 50% of those on the extreme right supporting authoritarianism and Pinochet, but it is also worth remembering that all of these surveys found support for democracy to be around or north of 60% throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Hueneus 1987: 64).

Lest one overestimate anti-Pinochet sentiment near the time of transition, a 1987 poll also conducted in Santiago paints the picture of a mostly indifferent populace: 12.5% supported the government, 29.1% were opponents, and 47.9% identified as independents. Upon moving half of political independents to the government supporter’s column, a reasonable thing to do to predict the vote share in a hypothetical 1987 referendum, he would get over a third of the vote—admittedly largely consisting of tepid supporters. The same poll also found that 20.6% of respondents had a lot of interest in politics compared to 37.3% that said they had little interest and 41.1% that declared to have no interest at all—reflective of a society that has long had and maintained a relative disinterest in politics, but also a glowing endorsement of Pinochet’s efforts to remove political debate from public life (FLACSO 1987: 17, Navia and Osorio 2016: 12-13).

Furthermore, the 1988 FLACSO poll points to a polarized assessment of the Pinochet government: on a 1-7 scale, the lowest scores (1-2) received 35.6% support, 28.5% gave a 3-4, and 30.5% gave a 5 or higher (FLACSO 1988: 16). While these numbers also point to a clear minority of citizens as overwhelmingly supportive of Pinochet, they perchance actually challenge that Pinochet enjoyed support well south of 30% by the time of the 1988 referendum.

Overall depoliticization under the military dictatorship appears to have had an effect on Chileans’ political views: by 1988, 58.8% did not identify with a political party while only 33.2% did. Moreover, while the ideological breakdown roughly consisted of the three thirds prior
to the dictatorship, as contended by Stern and several others, by 1988 64.4% defined themselves as close to the center—with only 7.3% choosing left and 5.5% choosing right (Navia and Osorio 2016: 14). Navia and Osorio’s overall conclusions are that there is sufficient evidence that democratic values did not decrease under the dictatorship, and that low support for the dictatorship by the end of the 1980s was due more to economic concerns than human rights violations. Bearing these findings in mind, it is plausible that Chileans were successfully able to restore democracy due to the very fact that the population always remained highly supportive of it even in its absence.

Navia and Osorio also point to trends in Latinobarometro polls conducted regularly since 1995: support for democracy has been stable and above 60% while support for authoritarianism remains below 20% and has marginally decreased since the early 1990s. LAPOP surveys between 2006 and 2012 find that 3 of every 4 Chileans believe democracy to be the most preferable form of government. LAPOP’s number did drop to 59.9% in 2008, but this is likely attributable to worldwide economic crisis. Altogether, this consistent 55%-75% support for democracy in Chile since the 1970s has proven to be incredibly consistent, and recent surveys suggest that overall this number is gradually continuing to rise. Also between 2006 and 2012, less than 10% of Chileans agreed with the assessment that they needed a strong leader not elected democratically—14.5% in 2008 once again serving as the outlier (Navia and Osorio 2016: 14).

Stern also references widespread Chilean public support for the Valech Report, a record of abuses committed by the military regime. Serving as a call for “historical and political justice,” the 2004 report was supported by 74% of Chileans. Furthermore, 86% found the
findings and victim testimonies truthful, constituting what amounts to a shared truth throughout society (Stern 2010: 299).

Since the CERC began asking Chileans about their views on the September 11, 1973 coup, a majority of Chileans consistently believe the coup destroyed democracy, and positive views of the military coup have declined over time. In the mid-1990s, a third of respondents believed the coup liberated Chile from Marxism, but by 2013 less than 20% concurred with mid-1990s opinion. The emotional impact of the coup on the Chilean people was also on display in their response to survey questions in the early-mid-1990s: 30% associated it with pain, 12% with indignation, and 18% with impotence (Huneeus 2003: 37). While 33% believed the coup “belongs in the past and has lost importance in the present,” 49% disagreed with this assessment. In all polls between 1990 and 2003, more than 50% of respondents believed that “there was a civil war in 1973 that forced the military to use a heavy hand” (Navia and Osorio 2016: 14).

Chilean public opinion on the period of military dictatorship has evolved rapidly over the course of the 21st century. In 2003, 36% of Chileans believed that the military had good reasons to stage the coup of September 11th, 1973, but a mere 10 years later, in 2013, just 16% of Chileans were supportive of this viewpoint (Navia and Osorio 2016: 5). This drop in support is a rather remarkable testament to efforts to publicize the abuses of the dictatorship as well as to the Chilean populace who were willing to let new information that had come to light influence their perspective on a polarizing past.

In regards to contemporary public opinion in Chile on support for democracy, a 2010 national opinion poll found that “12.09% of the population believed that a coup by the armed forces would be justified” (Gillis 2015: 3). Gillis also discusses a phenomena raised by legislator Guillermo Teillier who has stated that the Congress is full of legislators who “idolize Pinochet”
and defend the coup (Montes 2014). This assertion is compounded by the fact that, on the 40th anniversary of the coup, President Pinera claimed that the coup was a “predictable outcome” caused by Allende’s “violations of the rule of law” (Serrano 2013, Gillis 2015: 3). Pinera’s statements are simply false, but the more concerning aspect of these developments is that there are still elites that harbor strong pro-Pinochet, coup-apologist sentiments. Assuming they have a political base who listens to them, they can still wage influence, and possibly foment soft authoritarian support.

LAPOP’s 2012 poll also provides insight. 19% of respondents responded that it did not matter if the regime were democratic or non-democratic, while 72.7% believed that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Only 8.3% declared that, under some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable (Navia and Osorio 2016: 15).

Chilean public perception of police participation in crime is the lowest in the region at 15.38%, and their trust in police is the highest in the region at 65.7 on a 0-100 scale. The citizenry’s high confidence in Chile’s Carabineros is a key component to Chile’s reputation as a leading democracy in the region, and high trust runs counter to any expectation that the Chilean police force still bears responsibility for the crimes committed by the Pinochet regime in the eyes of the public.

Scandals do have the potential to erode the gains that police and military have made. In 2016, the military “which is considered to be less corrupt than the police, according to a public survey,” endured a case of internal fraud in which officials misused over $8 million in funds. The police, similarly, have faced backlash for the “revelations that a corrupt network syphoned around $12 million from the agency between 2010 and 2015” (Yagoub 2017: 2).
Argentina

A series of military juntas ruled Argentina from 1976-1983, and in the process the juntas disappeared over 30,000 people. In 1983, the National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) was created by presidential decree, and its findings “confirmed the disappearance of 8,693 people, acknowledged the existence of 340 clandestine torture centres, and listed the names of 11,351 people including doctors, judges, journalists, bishops, and priests, who had co-operated with repression (Barahona De Brito 2001: 121). Thus, CONADEP differed from Chile’s Rettig Report with respect to the fact that it did not cloak perpetrators in anonymity. The government also annulled the military’s self-amnesty law in 1983, opening the door for prosecutions. In 1985, nine former members of the juntas were prosecuted, including former presidents Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-1981) and Roberto Eduardo Viola (1981). However, by 1985 the government “faced a process…it could not control or limit so…it tried for the first time to limit prosecutions,” a decision which led to widespread public outrage and protest (Ernudd 2006: 17).

Argentina was one of the first countries in the world to “prosecute its own military in national courts for excesses and abuses committed during the so-called “Dirty War”’” (Skaar 2010: 2). Its transition is distinguishable from Chile and Uruguay because it was brought about by military collapse and not the ballot box. In accord, due to explicit military defeat, “it [was] considered practically possible to suggest holding the military to account” (Skaar 2010: 7). Argentina began “prosecuting their military at the moment of their lowest legitimacy, following the defeat in the Falklands war,” but, following confrontations between the government and military, the Full stop law was implemented in 1985 to shield military officials from further prosecutions (Ernudd 2006: 9). Like Chile, Argentina increasingly prosecuted military officials
from the mid-1990s onwards and reformed their judicial systems via constitutional reforms (Skaar 2010: 4). Skaar credits the constitutional reform of 1994 with “broadening the scope for judicial review” (Skaar 2010: 19). A landmark ruling by Judge Cavallo in 2001 “was the first to declare the amnesty laws invalid, arguing that the violations committed during the dirty war, were of “sufficient gravity and scale” to be exempt of the statues of limitations” (di Paolantonio 2004). And in 2003 the Argentine Supreme Court ruled that “protecting military personnel from prosecutions was unconstitutional” (ICTJ). As of 2010, more than 800 accused faced criminal charges, and 200 have been sentenced (ICTJ).

Argentine military uprisings are an integral part of the story, as there were several of them under both Alfonsin and Menem. Democracy was not overthrown in its fragile early stages, and it is worth appreciating in hindsight that this was not guaranteed, but the uprisings were very much effective in achieving policy gains. For example, “following the Easter Week Rebellion of April 1987 the government enacted the due obedience laws, which precluded further prosecutions of active duty officers for human rights violations” (Huntington 1993). Alfonsin closed avenues of criminal accountability due to military agitation, and ensuing president Menem pardoned convicted junta members (ICTJ).

Such realities undermine the reductionist account of the Argentine transitional justice story which claims the military was incredibly weak and therefore held little to no sway; the military was battered and vulnerable, but still very much could mobilize to put pressure on the government to adopt policies that aligned with its interests. With this being said, the Argentine military was still at a severe disadvantage relative to Chile’s military: state crises and economic fluctuations did affect the Argentine military’s budget, and any institution that is not protected from economic fluctuation nor guaranteed high salaries is weakened at the negotiation table. The
military’s budget, personnel, and political influence decreased under the Alfonsin and Menem administrations, and the four failed military uprisings only further exacerbated the military’s descent (Mora et al. 2017: 27).

Malamud-Goti argues that “trials conducted under the Alfonsin presidency were misguided since they focused solely on the military” (Ernudd 2006: 20). In his estimation this disregarded other important complicit actors including the “Catholic Church, right-wing vigilante groups, the Peronist Alianza Argentina Anti-comunista, the Montoneros, and the ERP” (Ernudd 2006: 20). This a noteworthy critique as this one-dimensional focus on the military could help explain contemporary distrust in the Argentine military; alternatively, if the government had spread the blame proportionally, perhaps the military would have more legitimacy and blame-assessment at large would be assigned in a more nuanced manner by the public. Typically disproportional blame assessment is a leftist critique laid upon conservative regimes who purport “two demons” or “symmetry of guilt” narratives that equate widespread state abuse with minimal grassroots retaliation, for example, but the Argentine instance serves as a case whereby one primary actor in state abuse is given disproportional attention at the expense of other people and institutions complicit in state abuse.

Skaar finds that the first Argentine president following transition, Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989), initially favored limited prosecutions but later rescinded this policy position and attempted to “severely restrict prosecutions once they occurred on a larger scale than anticipated” (Skaar 2010: 15). Trials continued despite Alfonsin’s policy reversal, and Skaar contends this is due to the liberal/activist disposition of the independent Argentine courts. Indeed, court disposition trumped executive attitudes in Argentina just as it did in Chile under trial-averse Frei and Lagos: President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) was on par with the
Uruguayan Sanguinetti in terms of being the staunchest of anti-trial presidents across the three countries, and Argentine courts still were able to conduct trials during his second term (despite his packing of the courts and pardoning of military officials). Trials continued under nonreceptive Fernando de la Rua (1999-2001) and Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003). And trials also occurred under pro-trial Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and his successor Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2015), although, at times during the Kirchner administrations, overwhelmed justices were unable or unwilling to conduct trials in a speedy manner (classified by Skaar as “slow trials”) (Skaar 2010: 15).

Grassroots pressure in Argentina to hold perpetrators of state violence accountable has been significant. Escraches, public demonstrations aimed at drawing attention to officials guilty of human rights abuses through social condemnation, serve to “challenge the notion…that by silencing the past Argentines could achieve reconciliation and their democracy would be fortified” (Vaisman 2017: 371). Human rights activists have been critical of what they refer to as a “continuity of the judicial apparatus of the dictatorship,” a reference to specific judges who consistently rule in favor of the genocidas. Activists contend that “impunity for past crimes is tied to…the basic structures of the repressive apparatus that were constructed before and developed during the dictatorial rule” (Vaisman 2017: 379). Such claims argue that institutions are still embedded with elites or norms that stymie justice, and while certain justices are singled out it is the police as an institution that activists argue serve as evidence for their thesis. Given that activists believe individuals within the police force still act as they did under dictatorship, it then follows that trust in police lags behind the military and several other institutions.

There are alternative reasons as to why trust in police lags in Argentina, however. Following transition, from 1983-1989, “the rate of crime and the rate of intentional homicides
recorded by police institutions increased by 73% and 85%, respectively” (Quirós 2017: 93).

While Quirós goes on to note that the Argentine government opted to deepen democratic institutions in response rather than answer fears of crime with punitiveness, a response that at first glance is measured and altogether positive, there is the possibility that segments of the public that are more supportive of punitive measures to reduce crime held the police responsible for refusing to adopt such measures. The government did eventually cave to adopting punitive measures, however, as the federal prison population increased by 52% between 1989 and 1995, while the crime rate continued to grow constantly between 1985 and 2002 (Quirós 2017: 95).

Taking these developments into account, it is unlikely that the public is critical of the police for its inconsistency regarding adopting punitive versus nonpunitive measures, but rather that neither approach was successful in deterring crime between 1983 and 2002. Malone (2012) notes how “surges in violent crime [across Latin America] has hampered efforts to reform the rule of law,” and this undoubtedly applies to the Argentine case as well where “institutional inability to confront crime successfully has lead many citizens to dismiss them as hopelessly ineffective and corrupt” (Malone 2012: 15-6). Sozzo (2011) argues that the collective memory of state crimes of the dictatorship in Argentina makes it very difficult to promote claims of open punitiveness toward ordinary criminality, but Quirós’ analysis would suggest the record is decidedly mixed: post-dictatorship, more and less punitive approaches have both been adopted at various points. Either way, rising crime rates undermine public trust in justice institutions, and make it nearly impossible for reformers to implement effective rule of law practices or for the public to buy into the idea that the state is sincerely committed to doing so.

Bonner finds that 213 people were disappeared and 4,100 people were shot or tortured to death by Argentine security forces between 1983 and 2013, and that such cases have steadily
increased since the return to electoral democracy (Bonner 2014: 235-6). His assessment of the police force is largely negative: police practices from the dictatorship have continued, attempts at police reform have been “ineffective or ephemeral or both, and police impunity remains high” (Bonner 2014: 236). Further, there is a common link between the victims under the dictatorship and now post-transition: “those who oppose or are marginalized by neoliberalism are the most common victims of state violence” (Bonner 2014: 246). Following this logic, while the sheer quantity of victims have been reduced, the underlying systemic oppressor-oppressed dynamic has not necessarily been altered, and this can be conceived as a shortcoming of the state. Seri and Kubal argue that the Kirchner administrations have more closely tied human rights to security in their rhetoric, but this has actually facilitated the continuation, even gradual escalation, of police violence (Seri and Kubal 2013).

Related to Seri and Kubal’s musings on neoliberalism, the class dynamic to the Argentine story is essential to a holistic analysis. Like in Chile, the vast majority of victims were under 30 years old (70.78%), and indeed most were under 25, but nearly 70% (69.8%) were middle class—mostly from Buenos Aires (CONADEP). This runs counter to expectations that targets would consist of the working poor, but what is further so compelling is that “traditionally, the middle class supported military coups in Argentina and military coups happened in defense of the interests of the middle class” (Bonner 2014: 251). Thus, a rather confounding situation existed where the military was quite literally targeting the youth of its support-base. In contemporary Argentina, police primarily target the poor, particularly men and those with a darker complexion, much more in line with expectations. The security apparatus has then effectively reframed the “other,” and chosen an “other” who appeals much more to its natural middle class and wealthy base. Indeed, the police’s transition from targeting the middle class to
targeting the poor could explain gains in police trust, in the sense that they are performing more in line with traditional expectations.

Seri discusses a phenomenon that suggests this stratagem is very much a conscious one on the part of hegemonic forces: mainstream media presents “a narrative of middle class victims and of shantytown residents as criminals” because police journalists and editors believe this to be “the best manner to reach their target or largest audience possible” (Seri 2012, Bonner 2014: 253). Nun reasons the middle class has supported coups because it is not a “well-integrated hegemonic group” and therefore fears popular movements; since crime threatens their economic gains (under dictatorship but also more broadly under all periods of neoliberalism), and the military is perceived as a delegitimized institution that betrayed the middle class under dictatorship, the middle class turns to the police to be the protector of their interests (Bonner 2010: 253). Admittedly this line of argumentation presupposes the middle class is very much conscious of the fact that their youth were the targets of the dictatorship, and this perspective would contradict overall survey data that suggests the military is held in higher regard than the police, but then again support levels for these institutions could break down along class lines. In other words, Nun’s proposition could be corroborated by much higher middle class trust in the police relative to the poor; alternatively, the poor would trust the military far more than the middle class.

Similar to accounts regarding reduced resources being granted to the military following transition, Alfonsin decreased police resources, although he also sought to “improve police training and tighten internal discipline” (Bonner 2014: 241). But this policy approach is hardly constant amongst Argentine elites, and there are leaders willing to reverse or limit police reforms in order to pivot in a more iron-fist direction. One such example is Daniel Scioli who was elected
governor of Buenos Aires in 2007 while running on a platform of reversing police reforms enacted by his predecessor (Bonner 2014: 249).

According to the 2012 UNDP-LAPOP survey, 44.4% of Argentine citizens have the perception that police participate in crime, a higher rate than both Chile and Uruguay and a middling rate by Latin American standards, and Argentine trust in police at 43.3 on a 0-100 scale is lower than both Chile and Uruguay and also middling by Latin American standards (UNDP-LAPOP 2012). This survey result is in line with a survey undertaken by Latino Barometro in 1995: “fewer [Argentine] citizens than in any other country in the Southern Cone believe that the military is still powerful” and “the least wanted and trusted military is in Argentina” (Ernudd 2006: 21).

Mora et al. find reason to be optimistic in the military’s favorability. While they cite Argentine military favorability at 42% in 2001-2002, on par with trust in the police in 2012, they note that this is the highest favorability rating for the military since 1983. They attribute this rise in favorability to “the military show[ing] no propensity to interfere or influence political outcomes” even amidst the economic and political crisis of 2001-02 (Mora et al. 2017: 5). They also find an urban-rural divide in military favorability with rural areas more favorable to the military than urban areas (Mora et al. 2017: 26).

AmericasBarometer in 2008 found that trust in the military was 36%, and that 40% believed the armed forces respected human rights. Mora et al. attribute these low percentages to the “constant harassment and blaming of the military for all the country’s ills and accusations of human rights violations against retired officers” during the Kirchner era. LAPOP’s 2012 survey, however, found that 51% of the Argentine population trusted the military and 55% believed the armed forces respected human rights, which represents a substantial increase from
AmericasBarometer’s 2008 findings. AmericasBarometer’s 2012 survey reports similarly: 55% of Argentines reported that they felt the military was doing a good job (Mora et al. 2017: 28). Comparing police and military directly, according to 2012 data, the military is trusted roughly 8% more than police (51% to 43%).
CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION OF SURVEY DATA AND NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

In this section, I begin each analysis by stating my hypotheses for each of the 15 chosen questions from the 2012 LAPOP survey (broken up between four thematic categories). I will then discuss the results for each of the selected questions. Of particular interest will be statistically significant deviations between the countries. In order to determine statistical significance, I conducted Independent Samples t tests, which compare the means of each of the countries for each question. In cases where there is statistically significant difference, I will argue, based upon my background research and qualitative overview, why there is an observable difference. Most intriguing will be instances in which my statistical findings diverge from my original hypotheses that took into account the qualitative story. For such cases, there are clearly variables at play impacting public opinion which even a thorough qualitative analysis does not effectively predict; I will best argue why said phenomena is observed.

Category I: Support for Authoritarian Measures

In predicting support for a coup due to unemployment, a useful starting point is to consider the countries’ unemployment rates. The unemployment rate is below 10% in each of these cases and, compared to other countries in Latin America, economic indicators in these countries are strong. While economic incentives encouraged affluent sectors to generally ascent to military coups in the past, these economic incentives are not currently present. For poorer sectors, the military has rarely been a friend, and they are not hurting as much as they could be either during an economic downturn. There also has not been a coup in the Southern Cone for several decades: to back a coup would be to back something that has arguably been “de-normalized”.
H$_1$: There will be no statistically significant difference between the countries regarding support for a coup due to high unemployment. Support will be low across the cases.

Graph 1: Support for a Coup d’état due to High Unemployment

None of the Southern Cone countries are particularly supportive of a coup d’état due to high unemployment—an encouraging sign, for if any of these countries were to be highly supportive of a coup due to high unemployment then any economic downturn would pose a significant threat to democracy. Most notably, there is a statistically significant difference between support for a coup due to high unemployment between Argentina and Chile: though a
substantial majority of both countries’ citizenry are not supportive of a coup due to high unemployment, Argentines are more likely than Chileans to support such action.

One possible explanation for this statistically significant divergence between Argentina and Chile is that Chile registers the lowest percentage of respondents who report food insecurity (7.9%), whereas Argentina registers a more middling number of 14.3% (Uruguay is at 11.5%) (Seligson et al. 2012: 25). Insofar as food insecurity is felt more palpably, it could be the case that this increases support for democratic alternatives such as coups to address one of the primary causes of food insecurity: unemployment.

Regarding predicting support for a coup due to high crime, Chile’s comparatively more successful institutional reforms, particularly with regard to its police which is broadly trusted by society, will allow for the public to entrust them with combating any crime endemic. Crime is comparatively low in Chile as is, but, even if crime were to rise with high levels, Chileans will believe they have the institutions to effectively combat it without resorting to a response as drastic as a military coup. And in the present, Chileans may well attribute their low crime rate to its successful institutions and institutional reform process. In their estimation, why uproot a framework that is working effectively?

**H$_2$**: There will be a statistically significant difference between Chile and the other two cases: Argentina and Uruguay. Support will be lower in Chile than in Argentina and Uruguay.
All citizenries are far more likely to support a coup d’état due to high crime than they are to support a coup d’état due to high unemployment. The extent of the differences are quite startling, both with respect to just how much more supportive each citizenry is to support a coup due to crime than unemployment and in how much more supportive Argentina and Uruguay are than is Chile. With this being said, only minorities of each population are supportive of such measures. Nonetheless, elites prioritizing democratic continuity should take the differences into account when constructing policy: high crime is more likely to drive citizens to support democratic alternatives than is high unemployment. Chileans are statistically significantly less likely to support a coup due to high crime than are Argentines and Uruguayans. In this regard,
Chileans have more leeway: presumably, it would require a higher degree of crime in Chile than in Argentina or Uruguay for Chileans to abandon their democratic commitment.

A possible explanation for why Uruguayan support for a coup due to high crime is statistically significantly greater than in Chile is that Uruguayans are far more likely to say crime or violence is the most important problem facing the country. 56% of Uruguayans supported this sentiment, only trailing Venezuela (66%) and Trinidad & Tobago (59.7%), far outpacing Chileans who expressed this sentiment 37.5% of the time (Argentines are at 43.7%) (Seligson et al. 2012: 130). Argentines and Uruguayans also report much higher percentages of having a crime victim in their houses, 34.7% and 34.2% respectively, than Chileans (21.6%), a reality that is further on display when considering percentages of the population that report a crime victim in their households in the national capitals: Montevideo (46.5%), Buenos Aires (43.8%), and Santiago (23.5%) (Seligson et al. 2012: 144-5). Insofar as a public perceives crime and violence to be a great threat, this very well could increase the likelihood to support a coup to address the issue, even in a country like Uruguay which does not boast many indicators that would suggest it is fertile grounds for support for coups.

**H₃:** There will be a statistically significant difference between each of the three cases with regard to support for a coup due to high corruption. Support will be lowest in Chile, because they trust their institutions, as detailed in **H₂**, and corruption in the country is low. Support will fall in between Chile and Argentina for Uruguay, as trust in institutions is middling but corruption is low. Support will be highest in Argentina, as trust in institutions is also middling but the perception of corruption is much higher than in the other two cases.
Support for a coup d’état due to high corruption is akin to support for a coup d’état due to high crime. Each country is slightly less likely to support a coup due to corruption than a coup due to crime, but also much more likely support a coup due to corruption than a coup due to high unemployment. Elites who focus on democratic continuity should thus prioritize rooting out crime and corruption—presumably initiatives that go hand in hand with one another. Once again, Chileans are statistically significantly less likely to support a coup due to high corruption than are Argentines and Uruguayans.
Interestingly, just 3.2% of Uruguayans perceive corruption to be the most important problem facing the country; El Salvador (2.7%) is the only country in the region registering a lower percentage (Seligson et al. 2012: 131). Yet, Uruguayan support for a coup due to corruption is on par with support for a coup due to crime, a problem Uruguayans do consider to be quite pressing.

Argentines are far more likely to report being a victim of corruption (19.2%), than are Uruguayans (8.2%) or Chileans (5.8%). As it follows, they also perceive corruption at a higher percentage (79.5%) than Uruguayans (61.8%) and Chileans (64.9%) (Seligson et al. 2012: 153, 156). This could help explain why Argentines are most supportive of a coup due to high corruption, but is not particularly helpful in explaining why Uruguayans are right behind despite recording a far lower perception of corruption percentage. And as for Chileans, institutional reforms targeted reducing corruption and succeeded in doing so: as before, Chileans are content with the integrity of their institutions.

On shutting down Congress, it is simply likely to be considered a very drastic measure. Such an action would be abnormal for these countries, and its citizens are aware of the negative impact this course of action has had on other countries who have adopted this approach more recently. Removing such a check on the executive would seemingly open the door for corruption as well, so any citizens concerned with the problem of corruption would find no reason to support this course of action.

H₄: There will be no statistically significant difference between the countries regarding support for shutting down Congress in difficult times. Support will be low across the cases.
Graph 4: Support for Shutting Down Congress in Difficult Times

A substantial minority in each country is supportive of the executive shutting down Congress in difficult times. A possible caveat is that “difficult times” is quite vague, and a more specific scenario which evokes sympathy towards the executive could drive up support for such a measure. Nonetheless, the low percentages here are encouraging. Chileans, as they are for support for a coup due to high crime and high corruption, are statistically significantly less supportive of the executive shutting down Congress than are Argentines and Uruguayans.

Institutional reform for each of the cases has emphasized the importance of the separation of powers and checks and balances. For the citizenry to support shutting down Congress in
certain instances would amount to a wholesale rejection of the democratic principles institutional reform has, at least partially, sought to engender. Chileans register statistically significantly less support for shutting down Congress, in all likelihood, due to superior institutional reform and lesser crime and corruption. There are no reasons why shutting down Congress would be sensible to them.

Category II: Support for Institutions Involved in Authoritarian Rule

H₅: Chileans will have the most trust in their police force due to reforms following transition increasing police professionalism. Argentina will have the least trust in its police due to its close association with military dictatorship, and its unwillingness to tackle impunity. Uruguay will land in between Chile and Argentina—having undergone some reforms but still lacking in some respects.
Graph 5: Distrust in the Police

Trust in police is less encouraging than are support for authoritarian measures such as coups or executive unilateralism. Trust in police in Chile is high, a testament to the professionalism and oversight of the Chilean Carabineros. While recent instances of brutality and corruption have occurred and ought to be eradicated, overall perception of the Chilean police is quite positive. Uruguay’s trust in police is moderate: about half of Uruguayans trust the police, and slightly less than a third believe they engage in corrupt practices. No longer engaging in any form of torture, and improving prison conditions, would go a long way in improving Uruguay’s trust in police scores—which as they stand represent a high floor with room for improvement.

Argentina’s trust in police is relatively low, which is concerning. Impunity remains high, reforms
have proven largely ineffective, and, while they do not target the middle class as they did under the dictatorship, they now disproportionately target the poor who are demonized by the media. The numbers suggest Argentina needs to take steps to improve its policing practices and represent all sectors of society. Should they continue down the current path, they run the risk of alienating the poor to the point that they seek alternatives to democratic rule if this is the style of policing that democracy yields.

Argentine distrust in police is particularly discouraging, as it eclipses the median threshold on the 0-100 scale. Regardless of the degree to which the Argentine public is stubborn in forgiving the police for their role in the Dirty War, police need to do more to earn back the public trust as the military has effectively begun to do so. Discontinuing a disproportionate targeting of the poor would be an effective start, and the media should be more responsible in its framing of crime which disproportionately blames the poor. Such reforms run the risk of alienating the middle class who are the perceived benefactors of the policies and framing, but one would hope that, in reformation, the middle class would appreciate a police force striving for fairness—outweighing the benefits of not being disproportionately targeted like the poor. Ideally, the middle class would remain not targeted unfairly anyway, and thus experience no net change in their interactions with the police.

Notably, the hypothetical positive response by the middle class detailed above is, in all likelihood, wishful thinking: the middle class does not enjoy when the poor is treated the same or make gains that place them on a level playing field. Even if the game is not necessarily zero-sum, reforms would anger the middle class. But ultimately, even though the middle class might resent that the poor begin to receive similar police treatment to what they experience, fair and
honest policing would in all likelihood drive up overall trust in police. At the least, fair policing helps contribute to a society that is more trusting of each other.

Uruguay’s trust in police, although not as low as Argentina’s, is not particularly reassuring either. Uruguay’s police face similar issues: they are associated with the crimes of yesteryear, but they also disproportionately target the poor and minorities and engage in rampant pretrial detention. Discontinuing these practices would go a long way towards improving the public trust in the police as an institution. Chileans are statistically significantly more trusting of their police than are Argentines and Uruguayans, and Uruguayans are statistically significantly more trusting of their police than are Argentines. On this count, a clear hierarchy between the countries exists.

H₆: In accord with H₅, Chileans will be the least likely to believe police are involved in crime, while Argentines will be the most likely to believe police are involved in crime. Uruguay, once again, will fall in the middle.
The perception that police are involved in crime tells a very similar story to distrust in police. Naturally, if a citizenry does not trust its police force, it would follow that a key reason as to why is because they believe the institution is corrupt. The same relationships between the countries are existent as were with regard to police trust, and the only noteworthy discrepancy between the two variables is that Chileans are approximately 6% less likely to believe the police is corrupt than they are to distrust the police. Granted that it is still a clear minority of Chileans that are either distrustful of the police or believe that the police are corrupt, the logical deduction
here is that there are Chileans who are distrustful of the police for reasons outside of the belief that they are corrupt.

$H_7$: Chileans will be the most trusting of their military, and Argentines will be the least trusting of their military. While the Argentine military has made strides, it has had to dig out of much greater depths, in terms of public opinion, than has the Chilean military. Trust in the Uruguayan military will fall in between Chile and Argentina.

**Graph 7: Distrust in the Military**

![Graph showing distrust in the military across countries](image)

- **Argentina**: Distrust rate of 48.4
- **Chile**: Distrust rate of 35.2
- **Uruguay**: Distrust rate of 44.5

*Error bars: 95% CI*
Public distrust in the military in both Chile and Uruguay is comparable to their respective public distrust in the police. Citizens either do not make a clear distinction between the military and the police when they consider their trust in them, indeed they may put them both in the same “security basket,” or the police and military in each country have been similarly effective in cultivating their image. Uruguayans are statistically significantly less likely to trust their military than Chileans, so there are clear steps the Chilean military has taken, or perhaps a level of prosecution and atonement undergone by the Chilean military, that the Uruguayan military has eluded. While the Uruguayan police’s perpetuation of excessive pretrial detention and poor prison conditions could help explain the discrepancy between Chilean and Uruguayan trust in police, my research has not yielded any findings that would suggest that the Uruguayan military is less likely than the Chilean military to engage in human rights abuses. In fact, as Graph 8 will show, there is no statistically significant difference between Chilean and Uruguayan perception that their respective militaries engage in human rights abuses. Therefore, barring an unaccounted for factor, it is highly likely that Chileans are more trusting of their military than are Uruguayans because the Chilean military did not entirely escape justice. In Uruguay, the military has skirted prosecution and atonement, and quite naturally the public is less trusting of the institution.

Argentine trust in its military is higher than in its police, and in recent years has been on the rise. The military’s ability to make strides in rebranding its image is a testament to its staying out of influencing democratic politics. While crime remains high and the police continue to alienate members of society, the military has mostly stayed in its lane, and as a result the public has softened on them. This is an encouraging sign as it reveals that institutions can rebrand their negative image if both they and the public take steps to integrate them into the new democratic order. There is always the possibility looming that an overly-positive assessment of the military
could pave the way for a future coup with substantial public backing, but generally speaking it is better for the public to trust its military than the alternative. Argentina’s middling, but rising, numbers are positive, and the police could learn from some of the actions taken by the military to improve its image.

Argentina’s military is the least trusted of the lot, but unlike with respect to the police, there is no statistically significant difference between public distrust of the military in Argentina and Uruguay. The Argentine public is far more favorable of its military than its police—a testament to the military’s reforms which are discussed at more length in other sections. The discrepancy between Chilean and Argentine trust in its military is in all likelihood due to the fact that the Argentine military was disproportionately blamed for the Dirty War in a way the Chilean military was not, a phenomenon also discussed extensively elsewhere. Nevertheless, trust in the Argentine military has continued to increase in recent years, and it is possible that in the near future trust in the Argentine military will overtake Uruguay and perhaps even challenge Chile. Pivotal, even though this variable shows Argentina with the greatest distrust in its military, the combination of positive trends, tangible reforms, and the fact that it began its “rebranding” from such a discredited position make this finding an encouraging one for the prospects of Argentine democracy.

H₈: Following from H₇, Chileans will be the most likely to believe the military respects their human rights. Argentina will be the least likely to believe the military respects their human rights. Uruguay will fall in between.
As aforementioned, Chilean and Uruguayan perception that the military respects human rights is nearly identical, and this must mean that there are alternative reasons as to why the Chilean public trusts the military more so than the Uruguayan public. I posit this is because the Uruguayan military was never held accountable for its role in human rights abuses under the dictatorship. Also worth noting, these numbers amount to considerable percentages who believe their militaries engage in human rights abuses: even in Chile, where the military is more trusted than in Uruguay, the public still might very well associate the military with its legacy of human rights abuses. Unless proven otherwise, publics could tacitly assume the military still engages in
abuses for which they are historically notorious. And in Uruguay, since the military has been reluctant to admit guilt for abuse, nor held accountable, this could also help explain its higher support than in Chile.

Argentines are statistically significantly more likely to believe their military engages in human rights abuses than are Chileans and Uruguayans, but this sentiment is trending downwards. The survey data shows that the military still has a great deal of work to do yet to secure a clearly positive image, but the Argentine military is taking positive steps, and the public is taking notice.

**Category III: Quality of Democratic Government**

**H_0:** There will be no statistically significant difference between these countries with respect to trust in free and fair elections. I would expect that citizens of all these countries, by and large, trust their electoral processes. Transition to democracy in these cases led to similar electoral structures, and each country has observed the peaceful transition of executive power from one ideologically-opposing political party to the other.
Uruguayans are statistically significantly more likely to trust their elections are free and fair than are Chileans and Argentines, and Chileans are statistically significantly more likely to trust their elections than Argentines. Uruguay’s results are highly positive: people trust the elections, and political elites have done nothing to reduce such trust. Power has been peacefully passed between parties, and, as discussed in more depth in Chapter 3, the Uruguayan dictatorship actually maintained several aspects of the democratic framework.

Although constituting a clear minority of the populace, Chileans are more likely to believe elections are not free and fair in comparison to Uruguayans. Argentines are marginally more distrustful than Chileans, but quite clearly Argentine and Chilean distrust is more akin to
one another—both countries are far less trusting in their electoral process than Uruguayans. This finding is perplexing: both countries have also passed power between both parties peacefully, and electoral fraud is not a prominent theme in the literature examined during this study. One possibility is that Argentine and Chilean citizens feel as though they are only ever able to vote for corrupt politicians, and therefore their interests are never actually represented because politics is rotted with corrupt officials. From this vantage point, elections are not fixed or unfair, per se, but they are limited in effecting change and futile at worst.

**H₁₀: There will be no statistically significant difference between these countries regarding belief in respect for human rights. I would expect that citizens of all these countries, by and large, believe their human rights are respected.**
Graph 10: Lack of Respect for Human Rights

All three countries report a very similar belief in the idea that human rights are respected. Chileans are statistically significantly more likely to believe human rights are respected than are Argentines, but just barely. Across the board, these numbers are middling, but, given the capabilities of these countries, there is room for improvement for each of them.

Category IV: Support for Abuse of Power / Authoritarian Measures

In predicting support for police torture, a key dynamic to consider is that, although Chileans have the greatest trust in their police, I do not see this support translating to condoning
torture in large number. Argentines trust their police the least, and therefore would not grant them a “blank check” to practice torture. Uruguayans have middling trust in their police and live in a society which still practices torture; while a majority of Uruguayans would not support torture, it is my belief that the practice is desirable to a sizable minority and, given middling police trust, support for police torture will be on par with their Southern Cone counterparts.

**H_{11}: I do not expect for there to be a statistically significant difference between the countries regarding support for police torture.**

**Graph 11: Support for Police Torture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support for Police Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Error bars: 95% CI
All three countries report similar support for the use of torture by police. Albeit by a very slim margin, Uruguay leads the pack here in supporting torture. Given Uruguay’s unwillingness to completely abandon torture post-transition, this lends credence to the idea that, for a minority but still considerable number of Uruguayans, torture has been accepted and normalized. The clear remedy is for Uruguay to completely abolish torture: as a society, Uruguay possesses all the prerequisites for having extremely low support of torture. The state’s reluctance to capitalize on these conditions is bewildering, and frankly constitutes as state negligence.

In consideration of support for iron-fist government, worthy of appreciation is that conservative Chileans who still identify with Pinochet likely constitute a sizable minority support base for iron-fist rule. Argentina, too, has social classes which perceive iron-fist rule to be to their benefit—cracking down on poorer classes. Uruguay does not have as much socioeconomic divide as other cases, but, given that crime is such a concern in Uruguay, I believe this will drive up support for iron-fist rule to be on par with Chile and Argentina—even if a lack of socioeconomic divide would suggest Uruguay would trail the other two cases.

\[ H_{12}: \text{I do not expect for there to be statistically significant differences between the countries regarding support for iron-fist government.} \]
Support for Iron-fist government is highest in Chile and lowest in Uruguay, and each country is statistically significantly different from one another. Chile’s relatively high number reveals a potential drawback of relatively high trust in the police and military: a population is more willing to grant these institutions discretion, and this can lead to a greater chance of institutional abuse. Ideally, Chileans would desire to protect its trust in these institutions, sensibly regulating them and acknowledging that they are relatively highly trusted because they are unable or unwilling to act with an iron-fist, but a substantial minority of Chileans are not in lockstep with this line of thinking.
Classes that have wealth sometimes express a desire to protect it at any and all costs, and an iron-fist approach to crime is a necessary, calculated sacrifice—and one that will not negatively affect them. Quite possibly, a lesser socioeconomic divide may contribute to less support for an iron-fist government in Uruguay: there are less wealthy calculating the need to protect their gains from the poor “Other”. What is more clearly substantiated by other findings is that Uruguayans are unlikely to support an iron-fist government because they are less trusting of their police and military than Chileans, and one of their greatest gripes is that the government once ruled with an iron-fist and was never held to account. Argentines are in the middle of the pack here: they are less trusting of their institutions than their Southern Cone counterparts, but their wealthy and middle classes also want to protect their gains.

**H₁₃:** I do not anticipate there will be statistically significant differences regarding support for a non-elected ruler. I expect support to be low across the board.
None of the three states have high support for a non-elected leader. Interestingly though, Chileans are statistically significantly more supportive of a non-elected leader than are Uruguayans. Nostalgia for Pinochet lives on, apparently, and there may be the occasional leftist respondent who wishes an alternative to Pinera could emerge undemocratically. Altogether though, these countries are not supportive of an unelected leader.

When considering support for alternatives to democracy, I believe inequality plays a key causal role. In spite of perceiving crime to be an important issue, I believe Uruguay’s relative lack of inequality will make it the strongest adherents to democracy. Argentina boasts worse
economic measures, but its citizens do not highly trust the institutions that stand to gain from democratic reversal. Chileans, alternatively, do boast relatively strong economic indicators, but retain a conservative, authoritarian enclave that is ever open to democratic alternatives.

H₁₄: I expect Uruguayans to support democracy the most; I would then expect Argentines and Chileans to report similarly.

Graph 14: Democracy isn’t the Best Form of Government

Even though each country is highly unsupportive of a non-elected leader, there is far more widespread belief that democracy is not the best form of government. Uruguayans are the most committed democrats, and Argentines trail closely behind. It is Chileans who are
statistically significantly far more likely to say that democracy is not the best form of government relative to Argentines and Uruguayans. These findings are corroborated in LAPOP’s 2012 Regional Report (Seligson et al. 2012: 214).

The discrepancy between Chilean support for a non-elected leader and support for the idea that democracy is not the best form of government is quite fascinating. Initially paradoxical, the discrepancy may well be attributable to the fact that a non-elected leader immediately evokes the image of Pinochet, a figure increasingly discredited in the 21st century, while entertaining that democracy may not be the best form of government does not immediately make one feel as though they are supportive of Pinochet or necessarily dictatorship for that matter. And while a non-elected leader might immediately compel a leftist to think of Pinochet, the prospect of alternatives to democracy does not do the same. Lest a false equivalency be created, too, even though this question may invite leftists more than the previous one, it is those on the Chilean right that are far, far more likely to express support for authoritarianism. As such, the Chilean number is composed of many, many more on the right than the left. Nonetheless, altogether, this finding goes to show that there are pockets of support for soft authoritarianism in Chile that simply are not nearly as prevalent in Argentina or Uruguay. And as speculated in the Introduction, it is possible that this “authoritarian enclave” in Chile does not consist of the exact same socioeconomic group as Pinochet’s: this new enclave may well consist of many poorer citizens who identify with more authoritarian approaches to crime.

An additional explanation for why Uruguayans emerge as the most committed democrats of the cases is that they register a higher level of civic engagement. 9% of Uruguayans report having attended a local government meeting, a percentage that is actually comparatively low in Latin America, but more than doubles Argentina (4.3%) and Chile (4.1%) who report the lowest
levels in the entire region (Seligson et al. 2012: 170). Additional research could investigate why civic participation in Argentina and Chile is so low; indeed, this is a phenomenon that appears to be known and accepted, but an explanation for why other citizenries with similar historical pasts engage politically in a way Argentines and Chileans do not does not obviously lend itself.

As has been noted, Chileans trust the institutions that were empowered by the dictatorship more than Argentines. While this contributes to a reluctance for Argentines to entertain alternatives to democracy (and instead alternatives for Argentines are supported on economic grounds), for Chileans an authoritarian enclave persists, and institutions associated with dictatorship are respected. I have considered that the enclave may no longer consist of the same socioeconomic makeup as it did under Pinochet, and that many poor have joined as wealthy “new democrats” have undergone a mass exodus, but it is also quite possible that the nature of the transition itself contributes to the persistence of the enclave. Institutions associated with the dictatorship were not vilified, and Pinochet and fellow political allies enjoyed seats in Congress and on the courts in the 1990s and early 2000s. Another explanation for why the enclave persists could then be that, like a fire, it was given oxygen for more than a decade after transition. The base’s interests were normalized in the young democracy, its elites held on to significant power. Thus, democracy never signaled to the enclave that its expiration date had come because Chile was now a democracy.

H15: Along the same lines as my justifications for H14, I would expect Uruguayans to report the least openness to democratic alternatives, followed by Argentines and Chileans who will have no statistical difference, but notably for different reasons.
Similar to the previous finding, a considerable minority of Chileans are statistically significantly much more likely to be open to alternatives to democracy than are Argentines or Uruguayans. Uruguayans, again, show to be the most committed democrats, and Argentines are right behind. Chileans are a distant third. It is ironic because Chileans have solid metrics across the board for all other predictors of why a population might seek an alternative to democracy, and yet they are still the most open to an alternative. Those who were “winners” under Pinochet still must remember his tenure fondly, but perhaps there is more to it than that. After all, Chilean wealthy, indeed the winners under Pinochet, now are the strongest backers of democracy.
Chile’s findings invite the possibility that, when democratic measures are ticking along quite well, populations are susceptible to the idea that conditions would be fine without it. In essence, it is not democracy which is driving success, and the same initiatives which have been adopted under democracy could just as easily be adopted under authoritarian rule. The allure of authoritarian directness, particularly one that would align with one’s own policy prescriptions, appears to linger in a sizable minority of the Chilean collective. This predicament is also worthy of further examination, with a particular focus of what can be done, if anything, to reduce it.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF GENERATIONAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DIVIDES

Now that Chapter 4 has provided a cross-national comparison of the cases, in Chapter 5 I will consider how different groups within regionally salient social cleavages behave in regards to their democratic attitudes. Knowledge of which demographics may be more and less supportive of democratic values can help in creating targeted messages to rein in groups that are susceptible to authoritarian dispositions. I will first begin with a breakdown by socioeconomic status, then by age, and lastly by gender. For socioeconomic status and age, I use Pearson correlation coefficients to measure whether there is a statistically significant linear correlation between my chosen categories (x) and democratic attitudes (y). For gender, considering there are minimal statistically significant differences, only questions which featured statistically significant differences within at least one of the cases will be considered and discussed.

Socioeconomic Status

For regional socioeconomic status, I have separated the classes into three groups: New Poor, Structural Poor, and Wealthy. The structural poor and wealthy are, indeed, the classes that earn the least and most amount of income, respectively, and own household items that are commensurate to the income they earn and the lifestyle their incomes can afford. LAPOP divides income into 16 different earning brackets and, for my purposes, brackets 0-6 constituted incomes of the poor and brackets 7-16 constituted incomes of the wealthy.

The “New Poor,” alternatively, are people who were once middle class, but now earn incomes that would be classified as poor. The new poor are distinguishable because they own household items that are above what their income would allow them to afford; in other words,
their household items were obtained when they earned a middle income living (or at least 
someone in the family did). Often times, new poor, consisting of low income earners, move in 
together with other family members to create larger households (numerically), and the 
disproportionate number of household items are a relic from more prosperous times when they 
could be afforded without pooling so many resources together and/or moving in to more crowded 
households.

I distinguish the new poor because they are a class in of themselves, but it is also 
important to see how they view themselves and the institutions of society that have ultimately 
created the situation they now find themselves. Do they act as class allies of the structural poor—
now that they earn the same as them? This would create a situation whereby the new poor would 
advocate for similar redistributive economic policies as the structural poor, if not consciously 
then at least subconsciously acknowledging that neoliberal policies are responsible for the lot of 
themselves as well as the structural poor. Or, do the new poor behave more like the wealthy? Are 
they more prone to resent and blame the structural poor as to whom they now earn the same, and 
in essence hold a class view that perceives themselves as temporarily embarrassed millionaires? 
The latter supposition, that new poor harbor particular disdain for the structural poor, is 
supported by the fact that many Argentine new poor are known to have shown disgust with 
Kirchner era policies that targeted reducing income inequality. The new poor felt as though the 
structural poor were receiving “free stuff” at their expense, and that this was bringing them down 
to the levels of the structural poor to no fault of their own (Roich 2017). This does go to show 
that the middle class is typically more easily able to cast its scorn downward when their relative 
position in society is deteriorating than to align with lower classes and see the common causal 
enemy that which is above.
The questions used in my study do not directly address support for various economic policies, but what can be observed from the data is whether the new poor is in lockstep with either the structural poor or the wealthy on democratic attitudes and support for the rule of law, or if they adopt a line of thinking that is distinctly their own. Moreover, should they adopt positions that are consistent with either the structural poor or the wealthy, then I can cautiously predict how this would relate to economic perspectives and who they ultimately see (or at least vote with) as class allies and enemies.

Table for Category 1: Pearson Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Support for Coup Unemployment</th>
<th>Support for Coup Crime</th>
<th>Support for Coup Corruption</th>
<th>Shut Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Poor</td>
<td>-.019 (.216)</td>
<td>-.014 (.352)</td>
<td>-.019 (.210)</td>
<td>.005 (.753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Poor</td>
<td>.095** (.000)</td>
<td>.141** (.000)</td>
<td>.115** (.000)</td>
<td>.027 (.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>-.095** (.000)</td>
<td>-.141** (.000)</td>
<td>-.115** (.000)</td>
<td>-.027 (.137)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

For authoritarian measures, the structural poor are more willing to support coups due to high unemployment, crime, and corruption than are the wealthy. Supporting a coup due to high unemployment is consistent with a class-centered economic outlook insofar as if a democratic government is not delivering employment opportunities for the poor then entertaining the possibility that a different government via coup could do is a coherent perspective. Economic considerations are less helpful in explaining higher structural poor support for coups due to crime or corruption, however, they are in line with expectations that structural poor are more receptive
to authoritarian measures. The new poor do not behave like the structural poor nor the wealthy on these counts.

**Table for Category 2: Pearson Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police Trust</th>
<th>Police Integrity</th>
<th>Military Trust</th>
<th>Military Respect for Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Poor</td>
<td>-.006 (.671)</td>
<td>-.033* (.037)</td>
<td>.004 (.792)</td>
<td>-.047** (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Poor</td>
<td>.013 (.438)</td>
<td>-.007 (.691)</td>
<td>.048** (.007)</td>
<td>.016 (.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>-.013 (.438)</td>
<td>.007 (.691)</td>
<td>-.048** (.007)</td>
<td>-.016 (.381)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

The new poor are more likely to believe the police are engaged in crime and corruption than either the structural poor or the wealthy. This is quite an interesting finding: the new poor, to some degree, may blame the police for their decline in society. Perhaps, now earning poor income levels, they are now being policed in a way that they were not used to being policed when middle class, and this drives up belief in the notion that the police are involved in crime. Such a hypothesis, however, is not helpful in explaining why there are no statistically significant differences in police trust.

Sentiments pertaining to the military reveal fascinating findings as well. The structural poor are more trusting of the military than the wealthy, and it is the new poor that are more likely to believe the military engages in human rights abuses than either the structural poor or the wealthy. These findings suggest the military is doing best with gaining the approval of the poor and should explore ways to appeal to the wealthy who are the least trusting of it. Regarding
respect for human rights, the new poor are least likely to believe the military respects them. In Argentina, this could in part be due to the lasting memory of the military targeting the middle class: presumably, of which, many new poor would have identified with at the time. This line of thinking is less helpful in the Chilean and Uruguayan cases where it was mostly the poor who were targeted. Either way, the military should find ways to appeal to the new poor in their countries; they are not adopting the same positive perceptions of the military as the poor and, on perceptions of human rights abuses, they are the military’s staunchest critics.

Table for Category 3: Pearson Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Electoral Trust</th>
<th>Respect for Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Poor</td>
<td>-.021 (0.169)</td>
<td>.007 (0.637)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Poor</td>
<td>-.047** (0.006)</td>
<td>.017 (0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>.047** (0.006)</td>
<td>-.017 (0.322)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Regarding the quality of democratic government, the wealthy are more likely to believe elections are free and fair than are the structural poor. The new poor, although not statistically significantly so, adopt a framework that is more in line with the structural poor than the wealthy. This gives further credence to the idea that the poor do not view the options and candidates for which they are voting to be truly addressing their needs: they very well may view most politicians as corrupt and hardly looking out for their interests. Politicians should take note: if perceived as only representing the interests of a particular social class and/or engaging in corruption, this ultimately undermines trust in democracy.
Table for Category 4: Pearson Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police Torture</th>
<th>Iron Fist</th>
<th>Non-elected Leader</th>
<th>Democracy as Best Form of Government</th>
<th>Alternatives to Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Poor</td>
<td>.018 (.227)</td>
<td>.014 (.353)</td>
<td>.018 (.240)</td>
<td>.001 (.962)</td>
<td>-.017 (.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Poor</td>
<td>.022 (.205)</td>
<td>.082** (.000)</td>
<td>.043** (.017)</td>
<td>-.029 (.091)</td>
<td>.061** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>-.022 (.205)</td>
<td>-.082** (.000)</td>
<td>-.043** (.017)</td>
<td>.029 (.091)</td>
<td>-.061** (.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

On abuse of power and authoritarian measures, the structural poor are more likely to support an iron-fist government, a non-elected leader, and alternatives to democracy than are the wealthy. These findings are all consistent with the thesis that the structural poor are more receptive to authoritarian measures, as the findings regarding support for coups corroborated earlier. The new poor generally fall right in between the structural poor and the wealthy on these measures: neither as supportive of authoritarian measures as the structural poor nor as committed to democracy as the wealthy.

For policymakers, making strides in addressing the needs of the structural and the new poor would seem to increase democratic commitment. In theory, such initiatives would win support of the structural poor and decrease erosion of support of the new poor. Clearly, it is a delicate balance: a true commitment to the poor unfortunately alienates the wealthy, a class that is quite committed to democracy now but knows its economic supremacy has historically not been challenged by military dictatorships in the region. And a commitment to the poor can even alienate the new poor, as evidenced by Kirchner era reforms perceived to only be benefiting the structural poor displeasing them. Overall, representing the interests of the country broadly
proportionate to the socioeconomic profile of the region seems viable: genuine interest representation can only increase democratic support.

Moving away from neoliberal approaches, particularly in Argentina and Chile, could bother the wealthy, but any loss in democratic support from the wealthy could and should be offset by gains in support from the poor who would feel as though they were heard. The reality, right now, is they are more at-risk to abandon democratic commitment than are the wealthy. One could certainly retort that it is only when the wealthy abandon democratic commitment, in this region, that democracy could fall (in other words, the poor have no agency to undermine democracy), but it is the values of democracy that are at stake as well. Democracy at large may not be at-risk in the region, then, but the type and values of democracy certainly are: democracy can condone or prohibit policies such as police or military abuse. Finding ways to drive down support for these policies, lest more officials successfully campaign on the backs of them, a la a Bolsonaro in Brazil, are pivotal.

Age

Moving on to generational cleavages, I have separated these into three categories: those who have experience living under the dictatorship, those who had experience living under the democratic transition (but not the dictatorship), and those who are schoolage (having not lived under dictatorship or transition). Naturally, the intent here is to see whether experiencing times of dictatorship or democratic consolidation impact contemporary support for democracy and tolerant attitudes.
### Table for Category 1: Pearson Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support for Coup Unemployment</th>
<th>Support for Coup Crime</th>
<th>Support for Coup Corruption</th>
<th>Shut Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Dictatorship</td>
<td>-.037* (.015)</td>
<td>-.069** (.000)</td>
<td>-.080** (.000)</td>
<td>.005 (.746)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Transition</td>
<td>.015 (.314)</td>
<td>.052** (.000)</td>
<td>.053** (.000)</td>
<td>.011 (.465)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoolage</td>
<td>.029* (.050)</td>
<td>.026 (.083)</td>
<td>.040** (.008)</td>
<td>-.021 (.175)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

On the count of support for a coup due to unemployment, those who lived under dictatorship are significantly less supportive of them than schoolage citizens. On support for a coup due to crime, those who lived under dictatorship are significantly less supportive of them than those who only lived under transition. And on support for a coup due to corruption, those who lived under dictatorship are significantly less supportive than those who only lived under transition and schoolage citizens. As is quite apparent, those who lived under dictatorship express less authoritarian attitudes than those who only lived under transition or schoolage citizens: they have experience with the trauma associated with coups and military rule, and are less willing to support measures that would invite the risk of repeating them. Given those who did not live under dictatorship are more willing to entertain coups, initiatives that educate the younger generations about the realities of the dictatorship should remain funded and supported.
Table for Category 2: Pearson Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police Trust</th>
<th>Police Integrity</th>
<th>Military Trust</th>
<th>Military Respect for Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Dictatorship</td>
<td>.230** (.000)</td>
<td>.156** (.000)</td>
<td>.141** (.000)</td>
<td>.103** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Transition</td>
<td>-.147** (.000)</td>
<td>-.091** (.000)</td>
<td>-.097** (.000)</td>
<td>-.074** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoolage</td>
<td>-.119** (.000)</td>
<td>-.090** (.000)</td>
<td>-.064** (.000)</td>
<td>-.044** (.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Those who lived under dictatorship are more trusting of the police and the military than those who only lived under transition and the schoolage citizens. It can be deduced that, across the region, those who lived under the dictatorship have shown willingness to forgive these institutions for the crimes of the dictatorship. Alternatively, they may have lower expectations of these institutions, resulting in a relatively more positive assessment than the younger generations.

It is equally plausible that the younger generations are less trusting of these institutions because they are more likely to have negative interactions with them—perhaps because they are more likely to be poor than members of the older generation. Also possible is that they hold these institutions responsible for the crimes of the dictatorships in a way that the older generation who actually lived through them does not: this would create an interesting dynamic wherein those who have only heard stories of the dictatorship are more resentful of complicit institutions than the people who lived through it. However, considering younger generations are more likely to entertain coups than the older generation, it would seem the more likely theory is that they are more likely to have negative interactions with these institutions in the present.
Table for Category 3: Pearson Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Electoral Trust</th>
<th>Respect for Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Dictatorship</td>
<td>.086** (.000)</td>
<td>.071** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Transition</td>
<td>-.032* (.030)</td>
<td>-.084** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoolage</td>
<td>-.073** (.000)</td>
<td>.012 (.415)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Those who lived under the dictatorship are more likely than those who lived under transition and those who are schoolage to believe elections are free and fair, and they are more likely than those who lived under only transition to believe their human rights are respected. Similar to possibilities previously considered, it could be the case that those who lived under dictatorship are more appreciative of elections under democracy, having had experience with times in which elections were not a staple of society. Alternatively, those who lived under the dictatorship could feel as though their interests are more represented by elected officials than those who lived only under transition or schoolage citizens, though this would presuppose that these categorical cohorts act as coherent voting blocs expressing broadly uniform interests. As such, the former theory seems to be the most plausible.

On human rights, again, expectations may be lowered: those who lived under dictatorship know just how restricted human rights can be. Alternatively, it could be the case that their human rights simply are not as disrespected as younger Southern Cone citizens who may be more prone to have negative interactions featuring human rights abuse. Those who only lived under transition, interestingly, are most likely to believe their human rights are abused: perhaps coming of age during the promise of transition has increased their demands for justice and greater human
rights protections. Insofar as they perceive the state to not be delivering on these grandiose promises, they will render a negative assessment of commitment to human rights.

**Table for Category 4: Pearson Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police Torture</th>
<th>Iron Fist</th>
<th>Non-elected Leader</th>
<th>Democracy as Best Form of Government</th>
<th>Alternatives to Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Dictatorship</td>
<td>-.050** (.001)</td>
<td>.071** (.000)</td>
<td>-.003 (.866)</td>
<td>.030* (.046)</td>
<td>-.015 (.314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived under Transition</td>
<td>.021 (.156)</td>
<td>-.042** (.005)</td>
<td>-.016 (.306)</td>
<td>.028 (.064)</td>
<td>.025 (.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoolage</td>
<td>.039** (.009)</td>
<td>-.041** (.007)</td>
<td>.024 (.126)</td>
<td>-.075** (.000)</td>
<td>-.011 (.451)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Those who lived under dictatorship are less supportive of police torture and more supportive of the idea that democracy is the best form of government than schoolage citizens. This is consistent with the position that younger citizens are more likely than those who lived under dictatorship to hold nondemocratic attitudes. With this being said, one counterintuitive finding is that those who lived under dictatorship are more likely to support an iron-fist government than are those who lived under transition and schoolage citizens. Perhaps, greater trust in democracy and its institutions is leading those who lived under the dictatorship to feel as though they can grant them more discretion while younger cohorts, more skeptical of the integrity of these institutions, are less willing to do so.

It is also worth considering that with regard to the question regarding support for iron-fist government, it may simply not be a good survey question. What I mean by this is that it is not yielding good results or eliciting responses from respondents that are in align with everything
else they are saying. The term “iron-fist” may be being interpreted too broadly, perhaps to extend to perceptions of economic approaches which it is not intended to necessarily gauge, or it could simply mean different things to different people. As a result, surveyors should consider whether the question pertaining to iron-fist rule should be amended or dropped from future questionnaires.

**Gender**

**Graph 1: Support for a Coup due to High Crime**

Chilean women are statistically significantly more likely to support a coup due to high crime than are men. This is consistent with scholarship which discusses the general conservative
disposition of Chilean women. Allende found it difficult to garner the support of Chilean women, particularly of the churchgoing upper-middle class variety, and it is women who took to the streets to usher in the Pinochet era with great enthusiasm.

Graph 2: Support for a Coup due to High Corruption

Chilean women are also more likely to support a coup due to high corruption than are men.
Argentine and Uruguayan men are statistically significantly more likely to support police torture than Argentine and Uruguayan women. On this count, men in these countries have a more authoritarian disposition. Chilean men also registered higher support for police torture than women, but not statistically significantly so. That only in Chile did men and women not statistically significantly differ likely shows that the authoritarian-democratic gap is less pronounced by gender in Chile than it is in the other cases. And in all likelihood, it is because Chilean women’s conservatism closes the gap in a way not seen in Argentina or Uruguay.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Throughout this analysis, I have argued that public support for democracy and the rule of law is the byproduct of the process of institutional reform mediated by social cleavages, such as socioeconomic and generational divides. My three cases validate this argument.

In Uruguay, citizens deem crime to be an important problem, and crime rates in the likes of Montevideo suggest this sentiment is justified. Resultantly, Uruguayans are more likely to support a coup due to crime than are Chileans. Its modest institutional reform at the time of transition, which granted a great deal of discretion to the executive and the courts to determine whether human rights violators would be prosecuted, ensured limited prosecution would take place. For post-transition executives and courts were anti-prosecution. The public has been given an opportunity to repeal amnesty laws on two occasions via referendum, but in both instances voted against doing so. Indeed, the stymieing of holding human rights abusers accountable has been a collective effort in Uruguay.

This prevention of holding abusers to account, I argue, contributes to middling trust in police and military. Having never fully atoned for their actions under dictatorship, Uruguayans are more distrustful of their military and police than Chileans. The irony is that, if the public would have voted in favor of either previous referendum, this would have provided the opportunity to begin to mend relations. In this regard, the 2013 repeal of the amnesty law by the Uruguayan parliament has provided an opportunity that the public simply refused to provide.

Poor prison conditions and rampant pretrial detention do no favors to improving trust in police either, particularly with regard to poor Uruguayans who are the disproportionate victims
of these practices. Professionalizing the police as an institution, like has occurred in Chile, would open the door for better poor-police relations in Uruguay. Similarly, discontinuing the practice of torture altogether would improve relations, and I argue there is little stopping Uruguayan elites from discontinuing such practices.

Chileans register high trust in their institutions, and successful reform of the police at the time of transition can be credited with contributing to high trust in the police. The military was not humiliated like in Argentina either, so, while the argument can certainly be entertained that Pinochet and his allies retained too much power post-transition, this did contribute to trust in the military never dipping too, too low. Encouragingly, just because Chileans trust their police does not compel them to condone police torture: in fact, the polling indicates they very much trust the police because they refrain from acting with impunity.

And yet, Chileans are the most likely to consider alternatives to democracy. This gives credence to the idea that the soft authoritarian pocket in Chile was normalized at the time of transition when so much power was still given to the Pinochet-wing in the new democracy. Could more have been done to ensure this pocket would not be normalized at the time of transition? I argue this would have been very difficult considering Pinochet and the military held the cards in determining the rules of the game. With that being said, there would appear to be ways to chip away at this pocket in the present: my research suggests it is prioritizing economic policies that aid the poor who are more prone to find the pocket appealing.

Finally, in Argentina, it is clear that food insecurity and high crime rates, particularly in urban areas, contribute to a desire to consider coups more than in Chile. Quite naturally, addressing these problems is key to driving down these support numbers. But it is the police that is the most urgent concern. When an institution is often perceived to be acting with impunity,
and the data shows they are disproportionately targeting the poor, alarm bells begin to ring. While I argue that a lack of trust in institutions may very well be contributing to Argentines being more committed to democracy, for democratic oversight puts a check on these institutions, the police are not being properly checked. Argentine elites need to prioritize police reform, and I argue they have blueprints and other models they can follow if they were to take this positive step.

The socioeconomic and generational findings across the region showcase that it is the young and the poor who are most at-risk in terms of abandoning democracy. Institutional reform absolutely plays a causal role, but so too do these mediating social cleavages. Those who lived under dictatorship are more supportive of democracy as they are more appreciative of what it has provided. Similarly, the wealthy are more supportive of democracy, because they are more economically prosperous under the current system. In accord, at-risk groups of society need to be sold on the benefits of democracy if these numbers are to improve.

Regarding the young, continuing to educate them on the horrors of dictatorship is vital. Initiatives that aim at defunding historical memory centers or whitewashing the crimes committed under dictatorship are socially irresponsible. Hegemonic narratives that which seek to downplay the abuses that were committed need to and will continue to be combated by activists and truth-tellers. In this regard, counterhegemonic forces should continue to fight the good fight, and will do, despite the obstacles that are thrown in their way. Regarding the poor, who are also often the young, crafting an economy that grants them economic mobility will best ensure their commitment to democracy.

Altogether, these cases and my findings present a complicated picture because social forces within countries are complicated. If it was straightforward and the causal chain direct,
there would be little need to study these trends in depth. There are positive takeaways and there
are negative takeaways from these three cases and the region at large. Approaches can be taken
that reduce the negative aspects, and alternatively others can be taken that exacerbate them. The
next chapter in the Southern Cone will, in large part, be written by those who make the decisions
that shape public support for democracy and the rule of law.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Paolantonio, Mario Di. "Tracking the Transitional Demand for Legal Recall: The Foreclosing and Promise of Law in Argentina." *Social & Legal Studies* 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 351-75.


