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Nationalists & Guerillas

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NATIONALISTS & GUERILLAS:
HOW NATIONALISM TRANSFORMED
WARFARE, INSURGENCY & COLONIAL RESISTANCE
IN LATE 19th CENTURY CUBA (1895-1898)
AND THE PHILIPPINES (1899-1902)

BY

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BA, Earlham College, 2008

THESIS

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ABSTRACT
NATIONALISTS & GUERILLAS

by

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University of New Hampshire, May, 2016

In the modern age, nationalism has profoundly impacted warfare. While nationalism has helped transform pre-modern societies into nation-states in part arguably to more efficiently wage warfare, it has also lead to a decline in the effectiveness of conventional military power. Warfare in late nineteenth century Cuba and the Philippines demonstrates many of the new features of "nationalist warfare," showing increased violence is brought about not just by conventional technological developments, but also by "social technology" like nationalism. Nationalist ideology makes it nearly impossible for conventional military forces to occupy or control a nationalist society and suppress resistance to foreign rule. Attempts to suppress nationalist resistance can only be achieved by denying the rebellion external support and directly targeting the civilian population. The difficulty of suppressing nationalist resistance ensures increasingly protracted, bloody and destructive wars will be the norm and that within these conflicts targeting non-combatants and civilian infrastructure is virtually unavoidable.

INTRODUCTION

How has the development of nationalism changed warfare since the eighteenth century? Most scholars agree the frequency and intensity of warfare has greatly increased with the rise of the nation-state (Tilly 1995; Posen 1995; Wimmer 2013; Downes 2008). The literature on nationalism and war is still being developed, but three main areas have been heavily explored to date: first, how warfare transforms a people into a nation-state (Grant 2005; Hutchison 2009); second, how nationalism transforms a state's conventional military capabilities (Tilly; Posen); and third, how nationalism has increased the overall amount of wars and the level of violence in wars, especially towards civilians (Wimmer; Downes).

Many scholars focus on how war leads to greater nationalist sentiment and helps transform societies into modern nation-states. Examining the myths, memories and monuments of 19th century America, Susan Mary-Grant argues national consciousness is framed through a process of remembering sacrifices in warfare (2005, 509). According to John Hutchison, "warfare acts as a mythomoteur (or constituting myth) in the historical consciousness of many populations, becoming an organizing framework for explaining events and evaluating their place in the world" (2009, 2). Building public memorials and engaging in public rituals also helped "territorialize" the nation in people's minds (Grant 510).

Some scholars argue the desire to wage war more efficiently induced many states to adopt nationalist ideology. Charles Tilly argues nationalist principles are adopted and mimicked by states for their ability to help centralize, modernize and unify infrastructure and institutions, thereby increasing the state's ability to wage war (1995, 190). Tilly observes a distinction between "state-led" and "state-seeking" nationalism, the former initially brought about by powerful European states in an effort to increase their war-making capacity, the latter initiated by non nation-states reacting to the new and powerful military abilities of nation-states (1995, 190). Barry Posen argues because nationalism increases "the ability of states to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice…it is purveyed by states for the express purpose of improving their military capabilities" (1995, 136). Wimmer agrees, arguing nationalism "made the first nation-states of Great Britain, the United States, and France militarily and politically more powerful than dynastic kingdoms or land-based empires because they offered the population a more favorable exchange relationship with their rulers who were considered more legitimate" (2013, 5).

Scholars also note since the modern nationalist age began there has been an increase in the frequency and intensity of warfare. Starting in the nineteenth century, there is a sharp rise in the amount of wars caused by various state and non-state contenders seeking control of the state in the name of a homogenous people (Tilly 190-91). Indeed, Wimmer argues nationalism doesn't simply cause greater amounts of warfare during messy nationalist birthing periods, it also results in established nation-states being contested both from within and without

more often than before they become nation-states (2013, 24-26). Wimmer observes, "Statehood has become so much associated with nationalist principles that the terms nations and states are often used interchangeably, as in the 'United Nations' or in 'inter-national" (2013, 2). Wimmer's extensive data sets shows a sharp rise in nationalist warfare across the world after 1800: at the beginning of the nineteenth century only 25% of global wars were "ethnic and nationalist," but by 1900 that amount had risen to 40%; by 1950 it had risen to 65%; and by 2000 it had risen 85% (2013, 3).

Closely parallel to studies suggesting that nationalism increases the modern frequency of wars, recent scholarship argues nationalism increases the intensity of warfare and likelihood of violence towards civilian populations. In *Bombing Civilians*, Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn Young argue non-combatants have become legitimate targets in modern warfare (Tanaka & Young 2009, 236). Downes concurs with the general body of literature suggesting wars have become more common and violent, observing modern "armed conflicts devolve into protracted wars of attrition," in which "the probability mounts that non-combatants will be victimized as means to reduce cost and avoid defeat" (2008, 243). Increased violence is even more probable when states attempt to annex foreign territory, as groups who perceive themselves as ethnically distinct from "foreign" invaders are more likely to resist, making invaders more likely to target civilians as a means of suppressing non-combatant military resistance (Downes 2008, 4-5).

Ironically, however, some military historians focus on how nationalism might actually decrease the effectiveness of conventional warfare. Russell Weigley explores this phenomenon in *The Age of Battles*, in which he rather fascinatingly concludes that the age of conventional military warfare essentially ends in 1815, right around the same time most political scientists start to study the relationship of nationalism and warfare. Weigley argues nationalism transforms warfare from being strictly a military conflict, to being a political contest as well – the ability of irregular forces and non-combatants to resist "foreign" occupation, gives nationalist populations the endurance to grind down superior opponents in long wars of attrition (Weigley, 1991). As Wimmer explains, nationalism propagates "the idea that each people should be self-ruled, that ethnic like should be governed by like," making it much hard to employ conventional military power to conquer populations that no longer view foreign rule as politically acceptable or legitimate (2013, 2).

Famed military theorists Carl von Clausewitz lived through the French Revolution and wrote extensively about how it transformed France's conventional military capabilities, but he also noted the American and French Revolutions gave birth to a new kind of "warfare by insurrection" whereby civilian resistance to conventional armies became a "genuine new source of power" in defense of the nation (Clausewitz (1832) 1993, 446-447). When nationalists are defending their nation, conventional military success will rarely compel nationalist populations to stop fighting. Instead a state of total war between nationalist populations occurs, in which attacking civilian populations, resources and

infrastructure becomes viewed as legitimate and necessary military strategy (Weigley 1973; Downes 2008).

Indeed nationalism transforms a societies' ability to defend itself from invasion by greatly enhancing its ability to use guerilla warfare to resist conventional conquest. In his exhaustive study of the history of Guerilla Warfare, *Invisible Armies*, Max Boot argues while many ideologies have motivated guerilla warfare throughout history, nationalism has overwhelmingly been the primary motivator for guerilla fighters (Boot 2013, 564). Unsurprisingly, Andrew Mumford argues modern guerilla resistance is so fierce that only by denying insurgents material resources can it be overcome (Mumford 2012).

The phenomena needs to be more fully examined, to help us understand first, that nationalism changes a population's ability to resist foreign occupation; and second, that this development leads directly to increased violence towards non-combatant populations and civilian infrastructure. The strong commitment nationalist populations demonstrate towards resisting foreign occupation suggests in the future aggressive military deployments in foreign regions and state-building projects should be avoided at all costs. As warfare in the nationalist age has become so destructive and violent, we need to reject the idea that it will be waged humanely and more carefully consider the long-term consequences of fighting the kind of wars needed to subjugate populations in the modern era.

How do we determine whether or not popular resistance to foreign invasion is motivated by nationalism? How do nationalists believe they can successfully resist and defeat stronger conventional military forces? How do

foreign military planners respond to encountering nationalist resistance? If nationalist resistance is almost impossible to suppress, under what conditions can it actually be defeated? Just how much material support from local or foreign sources do nationalists need to continue fighting? While it is beyond the scope of this study to comprehensively answer all these questions, it will attempt to parse out some initial answers by comparing two cases of nationalist resistance at the turn of the twentieth century in Cuba (1895-1898) and the Philippines (1899-1902).

Examining each case study, I will offer two related hypotheses. First, nationalist military leaders in both societies eventually adopted guerilla attrition strategies to wear down occupying forces, however such strategies require a certain amount of foreign assistance to succeed. Second, foreign military leaders responded to widespread guerilla resistance by increasing the levels of violence and destruction towards civilians and infrastructure, which they viewed as necessary to defeat the nationalist insurgency. Indeed, effective counterinsurgency warfare is not about winning battlefield victories or "hearts and minds," but instead about denying guerillas the means to continue operating and punishing civilians for choosing to resist after the collapse (or in the absence of) conventional military and government structures.

While far from a comprehensive set of cases, the general time period and variation between the two cases does offer some advantages. First, there is a high amount of geographic and cultural variance between each case, which helps us highlight the very similar processes of nationalist resistance despite the

particular local features of each society. Second, nationalist resistance was successful in Cuba but failed in the Philippines, allowing us to contrast the various factors that lead to different results. Third both wars occurred before the age of aerial bombing, tanks, and other forms of technology often blamed for increasing violence towards civilians, demonstrating that modern technology is not solely to blame.

There are two main limitations to the study proposed. First, how do we determine whether or not popular resistance to foreign invasion is motivated by nationalism? Reconstructing popular discourses in these societies and measuring "how nationalist" each society was is very difficult to achieve with any empirical certainty. Thus a primary goal of the study is to measure nationalism through various levels and types of civilian resistance and foreign-military responses to such resistance. Second, the limited number of cases allows us to provide rich depth, but makes it difficult to draw too many larger conclusions. Is the small number of cases and specific historical time period affecting the results? Hopefully, by at least offering a rich historical narrative, specific empirical features of nationalist resistance and warfare can be parsed out for future large-N studies.

The study will be broken up into four parts. Chapter one will briefly examine the origins and historical background of nationalism, as well as the evolution of European conventional warfare and European humanitarian war-fighting principles since 1648. Chapters two and three will examine the Spanish-Cuban and Philippine-American wars respectively. Finally chapter four will use

some of the historical background and theory provided in chapter one to analyze

and compare the two case studies.

CHAPTER I: NATIONALISM & MILITARY THEORY

Section I: Nationalism

The majority of nationalism scholars argue nationalism originated sometime in late eighteenth or early nineteenth century Western civilization "as a product of the democratic and industrial revolutions" (Gorski 2000, 1429). Within this general consensus, scholars vary in which aspects of modernist thought they emphasize. First, some emphasize the constructed or imagined nature of nationalism (Gellner 1995, 41; Anderson 1995, 49). Second, some emphasize the development of vernacular languages and print-capitalism (Gellner 47; Anderson 56). Third, others focus on the deeper development and reach of capitalism and modern state institutions (Breuilly 1995, 61).

However, we will also consider the ethnosymbolist challenge to the modernist consensus, which contends nations and ethnic groups are at least somewhat derived from pre-modern cultures and ethnic groups (Smith 1995; Kaufmann 2002). Ultimately, however, it is necessary to synthesize modernist and ethnosymbolist approaches to effectively understand nationalism (Kaufmann 2008). It is important to understand nationalism as a political process, rather than a fixed idea – the process of nationalist thinking is what determines the arbitrary ethnic, racial religious or cultural boundaries of modern states, not the other way around (Verdery 1993).

Modernist origins and Nineteenth Century development

According to the modernist consensus, nationalism became a socially relevant and measurable force sometime in the later half of the eighteenth century. By that time, the growth of print-capitalism and the spread of modern vernacular languages substantially helped spread nationalist thought throughout Western and Central Europe. (Gellner 1995, 47; Anderson 1995, 56). This "explosion of book making in vernacular languages" allowed for widespread communication between people from the same language groups (Anderson 1995, 55). The extensive use of print languages helped foster the growth of nationalist thought by reinforcing the concept of "ethno-linguistic" groups while simultaneously undermining "the imagined community of Christendom" (Anderson 1995, 55-57). Finally, modern literacy allowed people to engage in direct communication with each other and the state (Gellner 1995, 47). Ultimately modernists emphasize the importance of understanding nationalism in terms of empirically measurable phenomena usually related to the development of capitalism and modern state institutions. As Ernest Gellner observes, "homogeneity of culture is an unlikely determinant of political boundaries in the agrarian world, and a very probable one in the modern, industrial/scientific world" (1995, 44).

However, some modernists argue that nationalism is more properly a nineteenth century phenomenon, caused by deeper capitalist penetration and

institutional development. John Breuilly argues the "development of nationalism as a modern form of politics was closely bound up with the nature of political modernization in nineteenth-century Europe" (1995, 70). According to Breuilly, nationalist ideology could not develop until after the establishment of the modern state, because only the state "possesses an elaborate institutional structure which delimits, justifies and exercises the claims attached to sovereignty" (1995, 61). Capitalist development molded these new national institutions in favor of individualistic free-market principles, reorienting society from a distinction between "ruler and ruled," to one between "state and society" (Brueilly 1995, 64). Thus, these institutional forces transformed feudal political identity, allowing people to "relate to the total [national] society directly, without mediation, rather than by belonging first of all to one of its sub-groups" (Gellner 1995, 46).

Ethnosymbolist challenge, synthesis, and the "process" of nationalism

Some nationalist scholars challenge the consensus view that nationalism is a modern phenomenon to begin with. Anthony Smith and the ethnosymbolist school contend modern nations are unified by "a whole range of cultural and symbolic components – myths and symbols, but also values, memories, rituals, customs, and traditions" which produce "distinctive clusters" that serve to "unite the members of each *ethnie* and structure their relations and activities" (Smith 1995, 26-27). Thus, while "nationalism is a modern ideological movement," it

must draw upon "the cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities and categories" (Smith 1995, 30).

Smith partially embraces cultural constructivism in his formula – recognizing that "the ethno-historical heritage handed down through the generations, is always being reinterpreted and revised" – but ultimately he stresses cultural continuity as foundational for nation building (1995, 29). Eric Kaufmann agrees with the modernist view that national identity is highly constructed and fluid, however he explains why admittedly somewhat arbitrary ethno-historical heritage is still important to nationalist discourses:

> Broad limits often emerge on the plausible range of historical, archaeological, geographic, genealogical, institutional and cultural 'facts' which have been deposited over time in a particular territory. Scientists, rival groups and members of one's own community all serve to check implausible claims. This does not mean that fantasy and invention cannot survive, especially in an illiterate, closed or premodern context. However, in our increasingly reflexive world, the horizons of the nationalist imagination are bound ever closer to the empirical record (2008, 453).

The important issue is not how much cultural continuity actually exists between modern and pre-modern societies, but how these symbolic resources are employed in different political and ideological discourses at different times. To best understand nationalism it is important to move past the modernist/ethnosymbolist divide. Historically, nationalists in all societies have adopted both "organic" (ethnosymbolist) and "voluntarist" (constructivist) narratives, depending on different ideological or material interests (Kaufmann 2008, 459). Instead of focusing on an arbitrary threshold that determines exactly what nationalist credentials a country needs before becoming sufficiently "nationalist" or a "nation-state," we should focus on variations in "the intensity and scope of nationalist mobilization" (Gorski 2000, 1459).

Thus when trying to understand nationalism it is vital to focus on the political expression or ideological process of nationalism. According to Katherine Verdery, "the most comprehensive possible agenda for the study of nationalism" is "the study of historical processes that have produced" nation-states "differently in different contexts" (1993, 43). As the process of "stable" nation formation is never complete, "what really is worth exploring is not 'national identity' but the ideology of nationalism – and unlike 'national identities,' nationalism has clear empirical referents" (Malesevic 2011, 286). The relevant question is not when the nation is "founded" or "established," but when a society starts to exhibit nationalist political discourse or social organization. This distinction is critical for understanding the nationalist phenomena. As Gorski concludes, nationalism is "any set of discourses or practices that invoke 'the nation' or equivalent categories…[it] is not something that happened at a particular place and time; it is something that happens in many places and times, and in many different ways" (Gorski 2000, 1461-62).

Nationalism evolves and is interpreted differently by different groups and individuals within society, thus "fragmentation is the rule…we can think of the coherence of national identity as waxing or waning to the degree that individuals converge in their view of the nation" (Kaufmann 2008, 465). Even some modernists like Anderson argue because the "authenticity" of nationalist identities can never be established, nationalist "communities are to be distinguished, not be their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (1995, 49). Thus nationalism will be defined here as the ideological belief that

individuals should be organized into states and ruled by other individuals who share a common linguistic, ethnic or cultural background.

SECTION II: Military Theory

The evolution of European warfare and The Thirty Years War

Pre–seventeenth century European warfare was destructive and deadly to non-combatants, however weak states, small economies, poor infrastructure, small populations and limited available technologies all served to reduce violence inherent in warfare. Thus while most sixteenth century armies had no problems killing non-combatants, often for non-military reasons, the above factors capped the amount of overall violence and suffering visited upon most populations at the time. Indeed, there were no protections for most peasants and pillaging was common and considered part of the "spoils of war," but so long as wars remained small, short and inconclusive, the destruction they caused remained manageable. By the dawn of the seventeenth century conditions began to change.

Since the early sixteenth century trade and contact with global societies brought wealth and resources to Europe, which helped economies prosper and populations grow. The Protestant reformation destroyed the central authority of the Catholic Church, opening the way for European states to become increasingly organized around local "national" identities. These new dynastic-

nation-states increased in size and wealth, allowing them to employ huge privately recruited mercenary armies. New technologies made carrying and using muskets and cannon much easier, while religious conflict created new wartime justification for attacking peasants. Thus by 1618 armies were much larger, more deadly, and able to campaign farther away from their home state.

During The Thirty Years (1618-1648) the private-mercenary system completely broke down, causing tremendous humanitarian suffering across central Europe. Although the quasi-religious nature of the war ensured a certain level of added violence, the real problem was the new dynastic-nation-states simply could not feed, pay or control their private mercenary companies. During the sixteenth century armies were still small enough (that is to say supply needs were still manageable enough) that they could sustain themselves by buying supplies, foraging the countryside, or at worst pillaging for food. But by the 1620s central European populations were too large to feed large mercenary armies using this system, especially during such long conflicts. As a result, mercenaries took matters into their own hands, first buying, then foraging and pillaging anything they could get their hands on. By the 1640s most central European states were starving and in a state of virtual anarchy, incapable of protecting their own people even from their own soldiers, much less the enemies. If European monarchs planned to continue waging war with the same speed and vigor they had during the Thirty Years War, something would have to be done to artificially restrain and moderate the violence modern warfare was now capable of generating.

In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia brought an end to what was at the time the most destructive conflict in European history. The destruction was so great that it led to a wholesale reexamination of both the European state system and method of waging war. The conflict brought the idea of international law to the forefront of European politics and indeed helped create the nation-state system that still structures world governance today. This new international state system and corresponding body of international law radically changed the way European states waged war after 1648.

The Peace of Westphalia, absolutism and humanitarian warfare

The mercenary system was modified to best serve the needs of absolutist European states, increasingly oriented towards nascent national identities. These new dynastic-nation-states created centralized military command and supply systems and took over direct control of the mercenary system. Although several states continued to employ small amounts of foreign soldiers, by the eighteenth century most countries recruited soldiers primarily from their own territories and populations. As a result of all these changes European states were able to impose strict standards for the conduct of future warfare. Modern bureaucracy and economic productivity helped create a supply system that could feed armies and spare the cities and country from damage caused by armies merely passing through their territory.

Far from being the natural right of victory and spoils of war, armies strictly prohibited murder, rape, and pillaging and frequently executed violators, even when invading another country. Despite a political climate characterized by stifling absolutism, eighteenth century states made substantial progress in making war far less destructive and violent towards civilians. Frederick the Great, the Prussian monarch and military genius who best exemplified the spirit of enlightened despotism in the eighteenth century, strongly felt it was the duty of all monarchs to protect their subjects from the evils of war. As Clausewitz further explains, absolute monarchs stopped plundering and looting people in the 18th century because it was seen as ineffective and unnecessarily barbarous, "a practice that hurt the enemy's subjects rather than their government," provided invitation for similar reprisals, and impeded "the advance of general civilization" (1993, 714).

However, despite the general nobility of Frederick's sentiments, they also belie part of the reason he and his fellow monarch-statesmen were able to take control of the mercenary system and wage war using such enlightened humanitarian principles: they were gaining absolute control over society with powerful new state bureaucracies. As Clausewitz observes, people in the eighteenth century were largely the instrument of the state, having little meaningful involvement in the conduct of society or war (1993, 706). The absolute will of eighteenth century states commanded the political obedience of both its soldiers and peasants, which had a doubly positive effect on mitigating the violence caused by warfare. Soldiers were controlled, fed and paid by the

state, ensuring their loyalty and preventing them from being unleashed against local populations. As subjects and property of the dynastic-nation-state, territories and the people inhabiting them could easily be transferred from one state to another depending upon conventional military outcomes.

Wars were won and lost based on conventional military goals – defeating enemy armies and fleets and capturing key geographic, political and military areas. Monarchs used these powerful new centralized states like their own personal resources, gambling when and how long to fight for their own personal gain. Clausewitz refers to this as "Diplomatic Warfare," which he viewed as merely "a somewhat stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method of negotiation, in which battles and sieges were the principal notes exchanged" (1993, 713).

Diplomatic Warfare reduced the inherent violence of war and benefited peasants in another subtle way: by clarifying the rules, means and methods of war, eighteenth century dynastic-nation-states made war far more predictable. Because states used the same conventional methods and means of waging war, it became easy to anticipate the probable outcome, and easier for the weaker side to avoid a negative outcome by never going to war to begin with. Conventional Diplomatic Warfare made it easy for states to know exactly what it would take for other states to defeat them – how many troops they needed to fight and which capitals, cities, forts and ports they needed to take to force the other absolutist dynastic-nation-state to capitulate.

Thus eighteenth century wars were often waged for limited aims by monarchs unwilling to substantially risk their resources. Generals were praised for waging wars of maneuver that featured as few battles and as little bloodshed as possible (Clausewitz 1993, 308). Clausewitz derisively notes most wars before the French Revolution were "more a matter of observing the enemy than defeating him" (1993, 623). Thus we must ask, what happened to idealistic goals such as waging wars without effecting non-combatants and trying to win wars with as little bloodshed as possible? One possible answer is the transformative effect of nationalism on modern warfare.

Revolution, nationalism and Total War

Before the American and French Revolutions, large centralized absolutist states waged conventional warfare against each other with great success because they commanded the political obedience of their subjects and could use domestic authoritarian conditions to command them to accept the results of a war. However, the twin Atlantic revolutions unleashed the forces of nationalism and radically transformed modern warfare. Clausewitz began serving in the Prussian military right as the French Revolution was reaching its zenith in 1792, and he saw first hand the awesome military power the forces of nationalism helped unleash in France. The ancien regime government and military had totally collapsed, while the new French government was unstable and rarely under the control of the same group or individual for most of the 1790s. Yet despite these

severe handicaps the French nation-in-arms easily defended their country

against the combined conventional forces of the rest of Europe. As Clausewitz

explains, other European powers

> tried to meet [The French Revolution] with the diplomatic type of war that we have described. They soon discovered its inadequacy. Looking at the situation in this conventional manner, people at first expected to have to deal only with a seriously weakened French army; but in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again become the business of the people – a people of thirty million, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens (1993, 715).

European powers had no answer to the French Revolution until they

adopted its lessons. The most important lesson was the more involved the

general population becomes in the war effort, the more effective the state

becomes at fighting wars. Employing mass conscription to increase the actual

size of the armies was a major factor, but some of the changes were harder to

empirically measure. Increasingly after the French Revolution, states and people

began to conduct warfare with a much higher level of energy. Because the

population of nation-states view themselves as citizens with nationalist rights and

obligations, they transform themselves into a far more effective fighting force

than obedient ancien regime soldiers and peasants could ever be (Clausewitz

1993, 717).

However, while modern states employ nationalism to transform their

conventional fighting capacities, the rise of nationalism also led to another

development in modern warfare: the rise of guerrilla war. Here it is important to

make a distinction between "wars that were fought outside the national soil" that

"lacked full legitimacy," and "wars fought in defense of national soil" (Hutchison

2009, 10). Besides making a nation-state's conventional armed forces more

effective, nationalism also makes nation-states incredibly resistant to conquest due to the unwillingness of modern citizens to accept political rule by a perceived foreign power.

As Clausewitz observes, destroying enemy forces is often useful, but it is merely means to political-ends, the point being to get the enemy country to accept a new political settlement dictated by the invader (Clausewitz 1993, 268). However nationalist societies usually continue resisting even after the collapse of its government and conventional armed forces. Worse still, the lack of clear conventional objectives means guerilla war tends towards "Total War," where there are virtually no social restrictions to using violence (Clausewitz 1993, 640). Downes suggests modern states target civilians and infrastructure as a result of frustration with failed counterinsurgency strategies, but it is probably more likely that most effective counterinsurgency strategies target civilians to begin with (2008, 4) As a result, a people in arms can easily elevate war to the absolute level, making total destruction or genocide possible (Clausewitz 1993, 269).

Clausewitz observed and documented the growth of nationalist warfare outside France as well, arguing that "war by means of popular uprising" was a 19th century phenomenon. Indeed, the term "guerilla," which means "little war" in Spanish, originated from the Spanish War of Liberation against the French (1808-1814). (Clausewitz was aware of the American War of Independence and briefly mentions it in conjunction with the Spanish War but he did not study it carefully). As the nineteenth century progressed, Spain and Russia demonstrated against the French what the Americans had against the British in

the 1770s: that "the prospect of eventual success does not always decrease in proportion to lost battles, captured capitals, and occupied provinces…something diplomats used to regard as dogma" (Clausewitz 1993).

However, there is a crucial difference between American, Spanish and Russian resistance to foreign occupation and late nineteenth century guerilla resistance in Cuba and the Philippines: conventional forces were never fully defeated in America, Spain and Russia, whereas in Cuba and the Philippines guerillas continued to resist occupation without help from conventional forces. Let us now turn to the turn of the twentieth century to examine the effects of nationalist resistance in warfare outside of Europe, where Europeans found their newfound enlightenment commitment to conventional humanitarian warfare sorely tested by guerilla nationalist resistance.

CHAPTER II: WARFARE IN CUBA (1895-1898)

Section I: Historical background 1492–1895

Spanish mercantilism, early Anglo-American ties, and the sugar economy

Columbus arrived in Cuba in 1492 and claimed the island for Spanish crown, which established its first permanent colony there in 1511. Over the course of the sixteenth century most of the native 350,000 Taino Indians were killed by Spanish labor, swords or germs, though many probably intermixed with Spanish colonists, who were disproportionately male. By the early seventeenth century native-born Spanish administrators, soldiers, merchants and clergymen known as *peninsulars* stood atop the island's socioeconomic system. Second generation or Cuban born creoles were below the *peninsulars* but still possessed some political and economic rights and were still above Indians and slaves. As Philip Foner explains, "the *peninsulars* occupied "nearly all off the positions in the colonial bureaucracy" and "dominated the commercial life of the island," while the creoles "were principally landowners – cattle raisers and tobacco, coffee and sugar planters – and the professional people" (1972, xv).

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commercial agriculture was less productive in Cuba than in French or British Caribbean colonies due to inferior sugar refining technology, smaller labor supplies, inadequate shipping, and crippling Spanish taxes. As Louis Perez observes, "On all counts, and all at once, Spanish colonialism was straining to accommodate the changes transforming the Cuban economy and revealing itself incapable of doing so" (1990, 1-3).

The pressure Spanish mercantilism placed on the Cuban economy was partly alleviated first by British occupation of Havana in 1762 during the Seven Years War, and second by the American War for Independence in 1776. Towards the end of the Seven Years War, Great Britain invaded Cuba and occupied Havana for a year between 1762-63. The British allowed Cuba to trade with British North America and form new business contacts with the Anglo-American world. In a single year of occupation Britain also allowed Cuba to import ten times as many slaves as the Spanish usually permitted (Perez 1990, 4).

When the American colonists rebelled against Britain in 1776, Cubans were allowed and encouraged to openly trade with the thirteen colonies again. However after the United States became independent, Spain reverted to many of its more stifling mercantilist policies, such as forcing Cubans to trade only with Spain and ship their goods using Spanish merchants. This process further alienated creoles from Spain and the *peninsulars* because "it increased the strength of the mercantile/commercial sector, largely Spanish, over the agricultural/ranching sector, mostly Cuban" (Perez 1990, 4-9).

Changes in the 1790s further altered the Cuban economy and temporarily forestalled the growing conflict between Cuban creoles and Spain. The Haitian Revolution (1791–1803) led to a collapse in world sugar production and resulted in the creation of the second independent republic in the Western hemisphere. Haiti was the world's leading producer of sugar before the revolution, thus global sugar prices tripled as a result of the rebellion. An influx of Anglo-American capital and technology combined with Spain's vigorous importation of slaves allowed Cuba to take advantage of the Haitian crisis by establishing a sugar industry that would dominate world sugar production during the nineteenth century. However, not all Cubans benefited from the newfound success of Cuban sugar. Though the sugar industry developed rapidly, many of the riches flowed into the Spanish treasury or *peninsular* merchants and officials "who dominated the critical import-export nexus around which the Cuban economy was developing" (Perez 1990, 8).

Latin American revolutions, Cuban demographics, and Spanish finances

Between 1810 and 1825 rebel armies in Central and South America destroyed most of Spain's New World Empire, but Spain continued to rule Cuba by maintaining the racial hierarchy and complex socioeconomic ties with the United States. Some Cuban creoles wanted to join their sister colonies in their revolt against Spain but the United States prevented any serious attempt from occurring. In 1825 Mexican and Venezuelan agents planned to send military aid

to help eject the Spanish from the island, "but the United States, fearing an independent Cuba would lead to the end of slavery with repercussions in the Southern states, let it be known that it would block any move to liberate Cuba from Spain" (Forner 1972, xvi).   Changes in Cuban demographics from 1762 onwards explain why the U.S. perplexingly supported a European colonial power in the Western hemisphere merely two years after President Monroe issued his famous doctrine. Between 1512-1762 about 60,000 Africans were imported to Cuba, but between 1762-1797 more than 100,000 entered the colony (Perez 1990, 8). The influx of slaves made the idea of Cuban independence dangerous to both white Cubans and American elites. The existence of one independent black republic in Haiti comprised of former slaves already threatened to undermine order in other slave societies around the Caribbean basin, so white elites in both Cuba and the United States had a mutual interest in supporting each other's slave systems. As John Tone explains, "Racial fear, heightened by the memory of what had happened in Haiti and kept alive by frequent slave mutinies…induced a certain docility among whites, who saw Spain as the guarantor of the slave system and of white supremacy in Cuba" (2006, 16-19).

Although Cubans failed to gain independence in 1825, several other developments over the course of the nineteenth century weakened the political bonds between Spain and Cuba. The beginning of the nineteenth century was disastrous for Spain, as Tone explains "Maritime war with Great Britain before 1808 and Napoleon's brutal occupation of the country afterwards destroyed the Spanish fleet and commerce, lives and property" (2006, 17). Furthermore, after

loosing control over most of their colonies, the Spanish lost their primary source of revenue. Constantly in debt and in search of new revenues, the Spanish government taxed its remaining colonies to pay its bills. Spanish taxes crippled Cuba and "for most of the nineteenth century Cubans paid roughly twice as much in taxes per capita than Peninsular Spaniards" (Tone 2006, 17). As the nineteenth century continued to unfold, the cost of five civil wars and colonial wars in Africa, the Americas and Asia only worsened Spain's financial problems (Tone 2006, 18).

By the 1860s many Cuban creoles had gained wealth but still desired political rights and freedom from high Spanish tariffs. Events in Haiti and the Dominican Republic helped precipitate the first break between Cuba and Spain. Haiti invaded the Dominican Republic in 1861 and the Dominican government agreed to accept renewed Spanish authority in exchange for military help. However after the Spanish defeated the Haitians, the Dominicans decided they did not want to be ruled by the Spanish again after all. Dominican guerilla tactics and tropical disease induced Spain once again to leave the island by the summer of 1865, perhaps not incidentally also right after the U.S. Civil War ended, leaving the United States free again to defend the Monroe Doctrine. The Dominican war demonstrated to Cubans the potential effectiveness of guerilla fighting, but more importantly it led Spain to impose additional crippling taxes on Cuba in 1867. Disaffected Cuban creoles finally raised the banner of revolt in October 1868 (Tone 2006, 22-24).

The First Cuban War for Independence or "Ten Years War"

During the first Cuban War for Independence or "Ten Years War," Cuban rebels gained control over large parts of eastern Cuba, but the rebellion did not gain momentum until after rebel leaders declared themselves against slavery in 1870. The massive surge in slave importation starting in 1762 radically altered the demographic picture of the island by the mid-nineteenth century. By 1841 Cuba had a population of one million people, 436,000 slaves, 153,000 free blacks and 411,000 whites (Perez 1990, 12) Elite creole nationalists were everywhere on the island, but the majority of guerilla fighters were black or multiracial and from the Eastern part of the island or "Oriente." The majority of Cuba's population was now black and for them political independence was fundamentally interwoven with emancipation and gaining social rights. Thus only after the rebels declared themselves for independence and emancipation did the movement gain popular support "as thousands of Afro-Cubans flocked to the insurrection" (Tone 2006, 24). Rebellious white Cuban creoles realized they could not liberate the island without the Afro-Cuban population, who would indeed comprise the majority of guerilla fighters in both wars (Tone 2006, 22–25).

Despite several years of successful resistance, the Cuban rebels were ultimately defeated in 1878. Spain was trapped in various states of revolution, civil war and domestic disorder between 1868 and 1875, which limited the government's initial response to the rebellion. After the Spanish monarchy was

restored in 1875, the government was strong enough to pursue a "divide and conquer" strategy against the rebels. By the 1870s Cuba was divided between a "poorer, blacker and more rebellious" East and a "richer, whiter, and more tranquil" West (Tone 2006, 28). At first these division helped get the rebellion started – the far less developed East proved difficult to access for Spanish troops and rebels were able to subsist off of local agriculture and artisanal production. Ultimately, however, the increasingly divergent lines of development taken by each half of the island meant that while independence or at least autonomy from Spanish rule had great appeal in the East, Westerners still felt loyal to Spain.

The Spanish took advantage of this situation by constructing a "*trocha*" or trench that divided the island in half and isolated the Easterners. The rebels lacked experience and discipline, so Eastern troops were largely unwilling to fight far from their homes and without international support they constantly suffered from a lack of modern weapons, ammunition and supplies. As they grew more desperate Cuban guerillas adopted the strategy of systematically destroying commercial agriculture, which led to "an equally destructive Spanish response" (Tone 2006, 1). However, the strategy was barely tested, mostly because the rebels could not access valuable commercial areas located on the Western parts of the island, but in part because leadership feared it was too destructive (2006, 1).

Indeed the fears of Cuban rebel leadership were well founded. The limited campaigns of destruction the rebels carried out gave Spain cause to destroy suspected rebel homes, crops and even institute a basic form of re-concentrating

the population into controlled hamlets. By 1878 the rebels were spent and they agreed to the Pact of Zanjon, officially ending the first Cuban War for Independence. As Tone explains, "Even a second-rate standing army can defeat inexperienced insurgents who are not fighting in collusion with regular forces and who are not receiving significant outside help" (2006, 22-25). However as Foner explains, the "Treaty" of Zanjon "was nothing but a truce. The first War for Independence had opened an abyss between the Spanish metropolis and its Cuban colony…Revolutionary activity did not cease after 1878" (1972, xix).

Emancipation, global economics, and Cuban nationalism

Matters still had to deteriorate for some time in Cuba before an island wide revolt could be initiated. The most important factor was the abolition of slavery, which Spain gradually implemented between 1878 and 1886 as part of the Treaty of Zanjon (Tone, 25). This was doubly injurious for Spanish rule because by freeing Afro-Cubans Spain provided a ready pool of guerilla fighters for the next conflict while simultaneously removing the primary reason white Cubans had to continue supporting Spain. The remaining factors were mostly caused by international economic conditions that Spain had little control over. The growth of the extremely efficient European beet sugar industry led to a decline in the value of Cuban sugar, which was only partially offset by importing and employing even more capital–intensive American sugar refining techniques. However, these developments benefited large plantation owners and foreign investors and

creditors far more than small owners, farmers or workers (Tone 2006, 26–27, Perez 1990, 56–57).

As a result of these changes, previously well-to-do or at least marginally profitable smaller local producers could no longer compete, making rebellion even more appealing to them. At the same time all these economic hardships meant less work and opportunity for newly freed Afro-Cubans. As Perez argues, "the collapse of sugar prices affected every sector of the local economy and announced calamity for Cuba…Across the island the Cuban grip over production slipped, announcing the demise of the Creole planter class" (1990, 56).

The situation was made even worse by Spain's financial neglect of Cuba. From 1878 onwards Spain did not invest in any new development projects and spent almost nothing on building or maintaining infrastructure for the island. The final push was the massive global recession of 1893, which led both Spain and the United States to raise protective tariffs that crippled the Cuban economy. Indeed, Tone notes that some contemporary observers felt once the 1894 McKinley Tarrif bill passed, revolution in Cuba was inevitable (2006, 26–28).

While many different Cubans opposed continued Spanish rule, they were divided between two principal camps. Whiter, wealthier, Cuban creole rebels with strong ties to U.S. businessmen and government provided much of the leadership, propaganda and finances for the rebellion, but while they desired formal independence from their colonial masters, they still wanted to maintain much of the old socioeconomic order and hierarchies that benefited them. In truth they feared full democracy almost as much as continued Spanish rule, and they

heavily embraced their European and American connections, political, social and financial. Many white creole children were educated in the United States, and as Cuba descended into a state of quasi-anarchy in the 1880s, elite creoles increasingly moved their wealth to America as well. As Perez explains, "Fearful of political turmoil and haunted by the specter of race war and social chaos at home, Cuban elites in increasing numbers took to investing abroad…By 1895 an estimated $25 million from Cuba was on deposit in U.S. banks" (1990, 66-67).

During the war men like Generals Maximo Gomez and Calixto Garcia, both white creoles and veterans of the Ten Years War, represented the interests of Cuban bourgeoisie (Tone 2006, 3). However, even they did not entirely represent the wealthiest elites and their elite American connections, who remained behind the scenes throughout most of the war. Despite their race and class, both Gomez and Garcia were strongly committed to full independence throughout the war, suggesting that despite their relative conservatism, even they were more closely politically aligned to the lower classes than many Cuban elites (61). Indeed, Garcia was so disgusted by the outcome of the war and American treatment of his troops that he resigned shortly after the American occupation began in 1898 (Perez 1990, 97-98).

However, wealthy Cubans were not the only ones forging ties of intimacy with Americans during this time. "Over the later half of the nineteenth century, more than one hundred thousand men, women, and children, almost 10 percent of the population, took up residence abroad…mostly in the United States" (Perez 1990, 65). While wealthier Cubans tended to migrate towards cities on the

American east coast, working class Cubans tended to migrate to Florida and especially Tampa, which was barely even a city before the arrival of the Cuban cigar industry (66). Cuban migrants to Florida were more likely to be politically radical, either anarchist or socialist, and tended to sympathize more with the poorer, blacker afro-Cubans who would provide most of the soldiers and local agriculture and infrastructure to support the rebellion. These groups embraced a different kind of national rebellion, one that began by eliminating formal Spanish rule and then proceeded to overturn the old socioeconomic order and hierarchy that denied them basic rights and opportunities. As Perez explains, "disaffection with colonialism had become as much a dispute between Cubans themselves as between Cubans and Spaniards. Inequity in Cuba by the 1890s had a peculiarly home-grown quality" (80). General Antonio Maceo, also a veteran of the Ten Years War, represented the interests of poorer and more radical nationalists groups. During the Ten Years War he was probably one of the only Afro-Cubans to become an officer, and his refusal to sign the Peace of Zanjon and its "gradual promise" to end slavery in 1878 earned him great respect among the Afro-Cuban population (Foner 1972, xix).

Both groups were nationalist in that they wanted to see Cuba free from formal Spanish rule, but they remained divided into the early 1890s over whether the future rebellion was meant to create a state along liberal–capitalist–republican lines or "liberational"–socialist–democratic ones. Although Jose Marti was born into a family that sympathized more with the former kind of thinking, over time he began to advocate strongly for the welfare and interests of all

Cubans. As Perez observes, "For decades, *Cuba Libre* had remained an essentially undefined and wholly ambiguous formulation. Most agreed that free Cuba meant free separation from Spain. In the 1880s, largely through the efforts of Jose Marti, *Cube Libre* came to mean something more" (1990, 77).

Initially Marti attempted to organize a new political party advocating independence for Cuba in conjunction with elite Cuban émigrés in New York, however he found them fundamentally opposed to his new vision. As Perez adds, "Marti was an indefatigable political activist" and he understood "the need to establish a revolutionary party to give *Cuba Libre* ideological substance and institutional structure" (1990, 77). Thus in 1892 Marti moved to Tampa and formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC). Marti pledged to commit the PRC "to armed struggle by uniting Cubans in exile with patriots on the island for the common purpose of waging a war for independence and providing moral and material support for the revolution in Cuba" (1990, 77). As Tone explains, before the 1890s

> there had always been a great deal of tension between Cuban-Working class organizations and the separatists, the workers sometimes fearing the Cuban 'bourgeois' revolutionaries more than the Spanish. In contact with the exiled workers in Florida, however, Marti developed a new and appealing social agenda. Independence now came to mean agrarian reform, better wages and conditions for workers and other concessions to the laboring people. This was the formula that finally mobilized Cuban workers – both émigrés and those still on the island – behind Marti and independence (Tone, 36).

However despite Marti's and the PRC's commitment to social as well as political revolution, "above all, Marti was passionate and uncompromising in defining the goal of Cuban arms: independence, full and complete sovereignty, from both Spain and the United States" (78). Given their willingness to acquiesce

to the Platt Amendment in 1901, (which restricted Cuba's full sovereignty and independence), it is likely wealthy Cuban elites were only using the dreams of poor creoles and Afro-Cubans to help supply the manpower necessary to defeat Spanish armies, however for the time being Jose Marti's vision and propaganda united the Cuba émigré community with Cubans aspiring for political and social changes at home. Whatever their vision of the future, Marti managed to unite Cuban nationalists of all varieties in common opposition to continued formal Spanish rule and helped get the rebellion off the ground.

SECTION II: Warfare in Cuba February 1895–February 1896

Spanish inaction, Marti's death and Total War

It is difficult to fix an exact point when the Second Cuban War for Independence began, but most historians mark the citizens uprising at Baire on February 24 1895 as the official starting point. The recession of 1893 further blurred the line between banditry and rebellion in Cuba, so Spain did not take the revolt seriously for the first two months, hoping recently enacted reforms would satisfy the increasingly rebellious population. The rebels took advantage of Spain's inaction by expanding their control over Eastern Cuba with relative ease, ensuring Spain would have to mount a substantial and costly military effort in order to restore control over the island. As Tone explains, the Spanish "tried to act as if nothing were amiss, for to do otherwise would have been to admit the painful truth that the time for reforms had passed" (2006, 46). As the reforms

failed and the rebellion spread, political turmoil in Spain nearly collapsed the Spanish government and brought a new more reactionary administration to power. In April the reforms were abandoned and a new military commander, Martinez Campos, was sent to the island alongside thousands of reinforcements to deal with the rebels more aggressively (Tone 2006, 43-49).

By the time Campos arrived on the island, Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, Antonio Maceo and many other rebel leaders were already consolidating their forces. In late April 1895 the rebels initiated a series of small offensives against Spanish controlled towns in Eastern Cuba. Unfortunately Marti died within weeks of landing, leaving the war effort to be directed largely by Gomez and Maceo, both military men who earned their reputations as excellent guerilla commanders in the Ten Years War. After Marti's death, Gomez and Maceo convinced rebel leadership to adopt a strategy of Total War waged using guerilla tactics. Indeed Marti's manner of death itself – killed while charging Spanish regulars atop a white horse – served as somewhat of a metaphor for the failure of conventional tactics to bring about the desired results in Cuba or other colonial situations. Even though the rebels had more support and resources in 1895 than ever before, it was still not enough to defeat Spanish forces in open combat. Tone explains: "Cuban insurgent leaders knew that there was no profit in openly facing Spanish armies, so they pursued a guerrilla campaign of hit-and-run operations aimed at property, civilians loyal to the colonial regime, and means of communication and transportation" (2006, 9).

According to the new strategy, "Cuban forces would avoid the Spanish except under very controlled circumstances and attack instead the economic resources of the island: crops, structures, and civilians" (Tone 2006, 57) Thus the rebel strategy of initiating "Total War" entailed much more than merely fighting a guerilla war of attrition designed to slowly bleed Spain of soldiers and resources. Total War meant annihilating the Cuban economy in order to deny the Spanish crown and foreign investors revenues and profits. In short, the rebels planned to make government and business so unprofitable in Cuba that Spain would see no point in spending more lives and treasure to maintain control and foreign investors would loose faith in the Spanish government. The hope was that members of the international community would either exert pressure on Spain to grant Cuba independence or recognize the rebel government and deal with it directly (60).

During the Ten Years War, Gomez tried to implement a policy of annihilating the Cuban economy, but he was constrained by other rebel leaders who felt the policy was simply too barbarous and destructive (Tone 2006, 64). Indeed as Tone argues, Cuban leadership "knew that the strategy of shutting down the economy would bring dislocation, desperation, emigration and death" (2006, 60). However to Gomez victory was the only thing that mattered: The Cubans were fighting a war of "extermination" against the Spanish and would expel the Spanish from the island by any means they could (Tone 2006, 61). Furthermore, Gomez' scorched-earth strategy dovetailed nicely with another

Total War policy he implemented: refusing to acknowledge the existence of non-belligerents in the war (65).

Cubans had to choose either Spain or the rebellion, with no room left for anything in between. The Cubans employed a policy of "deconcentration" whereby civilians living in or near Spanish zones of control were required to leave their homes and move to Cuban controlled zones in the countryside (Tone 2006, 66). Movement between Spanish and Cuban zones was not to be tolerated and any Cubans found supporting the Spanish in virtually any way could be summarily executed.

Of course Cuban Spanish loyalists engaged in similar practices towards captured rebels. Total War resulted in assassination and terrorism on both sides and it also unofficially began reconcentration by forcing many peasants unwilling to join the rebellion to seek protection in Spanish cites and towns (Tone, 217). While it seems doubtful Jose Marti would have embraced the idea of burning Cuba to the ground to liberate it, as far as we know, no one else in the rebel camp seriously challenged Gomez on this point. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude wealthier rebels were willing to give Total War a try if it meant winning the war and gaining independence from Spain.

Eastern liberation, rebel advantages and Spanish dispersion

Rebel leadership wanted to invade the West as soon as possible, but they needed several months to gain the necessary manpower, weapons, and supplies

to do so. Maceo felt Cubans lost the Ten Years War because the Spanish isolated them in Oriente, so invading the West was vital: the rebels could not allow themselves to be penned up in Oriente as they had been during the first rebellion (Tone 2006, 70). By June the Cubans had control over large portions of the Eastern part of the island except for the major towns and forts. In Tone's view, most Easterners were probably at least sympathetic or directly supporting the rebellion at this point (72). The hot climate generated rains and tropical disease that effectively immobilized Spanish forces in June, July and August. Thus during the summer of 1895 Maceo regularly attacked Spanish outposts, couriers and convoys with relative ease and success (70–75).

Attacking weaker Spanish forces generated good press and helped recruit more soldiers for the Cuban Liberation Army, but it was not the rebel's main objective. Spain wanted Cuba for profit, so the rebels decided the surest path to liberation was to make Cuba unprofitable. In July 1895 the rebels issued a proclamation banning farmers from transporting and selling food and other commodities in Spanish controlled territory. Cubans who violated these rules were sometimes tried, but more often summarily punished by rebel troops. Rebel leadership justified these harsh measures because destroying the Cuban sugar economy "would make empire unprofitable to the Spanish government, to Spanish merchants, manufactures, and laborers, and to Cuban planters allied with Spain" (Tone 2006, 58).

This policy also had the effect of creating thousands of unemployed refugees, but the rebels felt such people would either join them or flee to Spanish

safe zones, thereby straining Spain's ability to feed and protect them. This was also an exercise in social engineering and class warfare, as the rebels especially planned to target "big planters, manufacturers, mining operations, urban properties, and lines of communication and commerce, while protecting small farms that lay in rural regions beyond the reach of the Spanish" (Tone 2006, 58). The Provisional Cuban government even declared that large estates would be distributed between small property owners after the war (Tone 2006, 57–59).

By July the Spanish were tired of looking for the Cuban rebels and started sending out intentionally smaller detachments hoping to lure a larger Cuban force into battle. On July 14th Maceo and a Cuban force of 2,000 men laid a trap for one such detachment near Peralejo in the province of Santiago de Cuba. Spanish informants spoiled the trap but the Cubans managed to win the day largely due to Spanish overconfidence and Cuban tactics. As Tone explains, "the Cubans employed superior tactics at Peralejo, using their rifles to fight in a modern, open formation, while the Spanish fought as if on a Napoleonic battlefield" (2006, 79). Spanish soldiers were trained to fight conventional European wars, while Cuban guerillas were prepared by their own previous experience in the Ten Years War. Indeed as the American Civil War recently demonstrated, the development of accurate high-powered rifles with long ranges was making conventional frontal engagements increasingly useless and often suicidal.

Of course non-attachment to outdated tactics was not the only advantage Cuban guerilla troops had. Cuban rebels benefited massively from detailed

knowledge of local geography possessed by local supporters and informants who provided them with military intelligence about Spanish movements and plans (Tone 2006, 76-77). The rebels also took advantage of early Spanish inaction by rounding up most of the local horses, and because Spain was unable to transport enough replacements to the island, the rebels always had more cavalry and the advantage of mobility. The core of the CLA was mounted, and during the first year and half they could usually evade heavily armed Spanish regulars (Tone 2006, 76-79). Tone argues geography also benefited guerilla war: "In effect, all of Cuba's neighbors share a long border with the island, and in the nineteenth century all of them could serve as a jumping-off points for expeditionaires – called *filbusteros* – bent on arming Orientales to overthrow Spanish rule" (2006, 22).

Meanwhile another rebel force under Gomez moved westward into Puerto Principe, destroying property, requisitioning supplies, and evading larger Spanish forces in his famous "circular campaign" around the province. Gomez also had enough men to carry out some surprise attacks against Spanish garrisons and towns, and their success along with the triumph over the Spanish at Peralejo helped recruit thousands of men during the summer of 1895 (Tone 2006, 81). Spanish counteroffensives in October and November yielded limited but ultimately insignificant success against small groups of rebels. Although the Spanish now had almost 100,000 regular troops on the island, most of them were dispersed in towns, garrisons and plantations. This left the Spanish with about 25,000 mostly dismounted and often diseased infantry to chase around several

thousand mounted Cuban guerillas. The results were predictable: Spanish

soldiers died in scores from tropical disease while Cuban guerillas destroyed

property and recruited men with relative ease (2006, 113).

The problem with troop dispersion was that garrisons were often too small

to defend the sugar cane fields, which were very easy to burn. Furthermore

garrisons could only control the town or fort they were tasked to defend, they

could not protect the countryside and were utterly depended on constant

resupply columns that were easy targets for Cuban guerillas. Lastly when the

main body of the Liberation army formed up, only the largest garrisons in major

cities and forts were truly safe from being overrun. While the loyalty of Cuban

elites, businessmen and Westerners superficially appeared to be an asset, the

need to defend such people against guerilla opponents was a liability (Tone

2006, 114).

Mal Tiempo, invading the West, and the Cuban civil war

In late November Gomez and Maceo gathered their strength to move

west. The *Trocha* in Puerto Principe had been left to rot since 1878 and the

rebels had no difficulty passing through it, while the Spanish decision to disperse

forces throughout the countryside left them without enough manpower to stop the

rebel advance. In December 1895 the rebel columns entered the province of

Santa Clara and were preparing for the final push into the island's Western

"sugar bowl." On December 15 at Mal Tiempo Cuban forces won a second

battlefield victory against the Spanish. Once again the Spanish had sent several smaller detachments out trying to entice the Cubans to give battle and once again the Cubans found and defeated one of their detachments, capturing a substantial amount of supplies in the process. According to Tone, the victory at Mal Tiempo was a turning point of the war because "it opened the way for the invasion of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, where the Liberation Army began at last to make good on Gomez's promise to shut down Cuba's export economy by burning down everything associated with the commercial production of sugar and tobacco" (2006, 125).

After the victory at Mal Tiempo the rebels invaded Matanzas province and found themselves firmly in "Spanish Cuba." In many cases the residents were quite literally Spanish – almost 420,000 Spanish migrated to Cuba between 1868 and 1894, and in parts of Western Cuba they possibly even outnumbered native-born Cubans (Tone 2006, 93). The war in the east was primarily a war of liberation, but the war in the West took on many of the features of a civil war. This was in part because of the presence of so many native born Spaniards in the region, but also because the West was the stronghold of white supremacy (Tone 2006, 94). When the Liberation Army moved through Western provinces, they were most often joined by Afro-Cubans. When Spanish forces reasserted control over areas, they placed special emphasis on punishing blacks in order to reassert the racial order (Tone 2006, 140). As Tone explains, "the arrival of Maceo's easterners in the West was never simply moment of 'liberation' but a

complex encounter characterized by collaboration, resistance, and attempts to avoid either" (2006, 142).

In western Matanzas Spanish forces at Coliseo finally repulsed the Liberation Army, halting its advance towards Havana. Unfortunately for the Spanish the victory was entirely negated by superior Cuban strategy. Seeing the Cubans in full retreat towards the East, the Spanish transported their army by sea to block their path. However the Cubans anticipated this and after four days of retreat doubled back to find the path west now conveniently cleared for them (Tone 2006, 137). Traditionally after being defeated in battle conventional armies would retreat along their line of supply line towards their base of operations, however Cuban rebels embraced a strategy that placed no value on such things.

By the end of January 1896 the Cuban Liberation Army made good on its promise to destroy the West. Indeed, the rebel's achievements shocked the Spanish: "Between late November and late January, the Cubans had marched the length of the island, avoiding larger Spanish armies, defeating or at least fighting to a draw several smaller ones, and making their presence felt in every corner of the island. Smoke from burning cane fields and the ruins of dozens of sugar mills, bridges, and towns testified to the Liberation Army's success" (Tone 2006, 150). As a result the Spanish government relieved Martinez Campos and sent Valeriano Weyler to take command of Spanish forces. To Weyler the solution to the problem the Spanish faced was clear: "the key to victory would be to relocate the population" (Tone 2006, 158).

SECTION III: WARFARE IN CUBA February 1896–August 1898

Trochas, counterinsurgency, and concentration camps

Like many of the senior Cuban commanders, and unlike most Spanish officers, Weyler had previous experience fighting guerilla wars. As a young officer during the Ten Years War he set up the antecedent for "free-fire" zones, where, just as in Vietnam, civilians who did not evacuate were considered enemy combatants and legitimate targets (Tone 2006, 155). In 1891 as Governor of the Philippines, Weyler attempted to crush guerilla fighters in Mindanao by concentrating the local civilian population in Spanish controlled zones. Fascinatingly, Weyler even attempted to reconcentrate Filipinos in areas mixed in with Peninsular Spanish and Chinese immigrants. While many criticized this scheme as inhuman at the time, it was an attempt to diffuse revolutionary resistance by removing revolutionary minded Filipinos from their native regions and mixing them with different ethnic and cultural groups (Tone 2006, 157).

Weyler arrived in February 1896 and outlined his plan. Ineffective for protecting property, small garrisons and detachments would be eliminated and formed into several field armies. Larger field armies would systematically work their way through western Cuba, clearing out rebel forces and driving them back East across the _Trocha_. The _Trocha_ would be substantially reconstructed and reinforced to isolate western rebels from the heart of the rebellion, a strategy that

worked somewhat successfully in the Ten Years War. Lastly the Spanish would implement full-scale reconcentration of the civilian population into Spanish zones of control (Tone 2006, 160).

Weyler also decided normal rules of war no longer applied to Cuban rebels. Prisoners were to be shot and known family members would be arrested, their assets seized or destroyed. With a new plan and new rules of engagement in place, the Spanish finally began to act with speed and vigor. In February and March of 1896 the Spanish campaigned hard, forcing the Cubans to divide their forces. Maceo's column moved to the westernmost province of Pinar del Rio, while Gomez and the main body retreated east back across the *Trocha* to the safe confines of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba. Meanwhile strong pro-Spanish sentiment in the western provinces of Havana and Matanzas reversed many of the gains made by the rebels since November (Tone 2006, 164–166).

In order to better protect "Spanish Cuba" and further isolate rebel forces, the Spanish started to build a second *Trocha* in the spring of 1896 to cordon off Pinar del Rio from Havana and Matanzas. Maceo's column was trapped in Pinar del Rio and lacked strength to fight the larger Spanish columns now routinely pursuing rebel forces, leaving them little else to do but continue the Cuban Liberation Army's campaign of destruction. Smaller and more dispersed groups of rebels did the same in Havana, Matanzas and Santa Clara. The arrival of hot summer rains and a lack of good east-west transportation helped protect rebels in eastern provinces, but even Puerto Principe and Santa Clara became more dangerous for rebel forces to operate in (Tone 2006, 168-172).

The fact that the Spanish were able to accomplish so much during the summer season was not a good sign for the guerillas. By invading and destroying the west, the Cuban Liberation Army had already achieved more than most at the time thought possible, but hard campaigning and Spanish counter-guerilla tactics had badly depleted rebel manpower and resources. However, by plunging Cuba into a state of Total war, Cuban rebels increasingly attracted international attention for their cause, especially in the United States. From the beginning the rebels hoped that by destroying the sugar industry they could convince American businessmen heavily invested in the Cuban economy that if Spain could no longer protect their property they would have to support an independent Cuba. Rebel leadership understood they were now simply in a war of attrition – one that would be very difficult to win without help from abroad (Tone 2006, 176-177).

Press censorship, economic warfare, and a timely assassination

Weyler attempted to censor the press in order to prevent Cuban rebels from gaining international attention, however the policy backfired badly. Ironically because the Spanish heavily censored official press reports, international journalists preferred to work with Cuban rebels who freely gave them accounts of their successes, both real and imagined. As a result, accounts of Spanish mistreatment and terrorism towards Cuban civilians were widely disseminated in the global press, while similar CLA behavior was rarely discussed. Indeed as Tone argues, while the Spanish ignored the press, Cuban rebels "had grasped

the crucial role that the press and world opinion would play in the outcome of the war" (2006, 219-220).

The Cuban Liberation Army's assault on the Cuban economy enticed the Spanish to engage in economic warfare as well. In April 1896 Spain prohibited the export of raw tobacco to the U.S. in an attempt to deprive Cuban cigar rollers in Florida of income they could use to aid the rebellion. In September the Spanish shut down the Cuban sugar industry entirely. This drastic measure was designed to deprive the rebels of property to destroy, conveniently also removing the need for Spanish garrisons to protect the sugar industry. However both measures proved foolish because shutting down the tobacco and sugar industries was exactly what the rebels wanted. Unemployed Cuban workers were easily recruited by the CLA and shutting down the Cuban economy angered foreign owners and investors. Cuban rebel leadership smartly reasoned that if the loss of Cuban lives would not motivate the international community to help, the loss of Cuban commerce might (Tone 2006, 162-163).

The winter campaign of 1896–97 went poorly for the rebels. Starting with Pinar del Rio in October, the Spanish began systematically clearing provinces from west to east. The newly constructed western *trocha* effectively blocked the remaining rebel forces in Pinar del Rio under Maceo from moving back east into Havana province. Maceo's columns were harassed, worn down and dispersed and Maceo was killed trying to cross the *trocha* in early December. Over the next four months the Spanish cleared out Havana, Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces, scattering remaining rebel forces, dismantling their government and

economy, and reconcentrating the rural population. The Cuban Liberation Army never recovered in the West, but they were also never fully defeated. Their ability to maintain low-intensity guerilla operations throughout the conflict was important to the rebel war effort (Tone 2006, 181-189).

Indeed, the Spanish discovered by 1896 that low-intensity guerilla activity was virtually impossible to combat. It was impossible to tell the difference between fighters and civilians or to ignore the valuable military services being performed by non-combatants. Likewise, among the masses in the countryside, it was impossible to tell the difference between loyal Cubans and rebels. Even if they were loyal at heart, the Spanish correctly realized CLA terrorism was inducing many Cubans to help the rebels anyways. Rebels were always short of weapons and supplies and they often did not want to fight far from their homes. These problems were ultimately part of the nature of insurgency, but they were probably helping the rebels more than hurting them. Local populations could provide shelter and food, and while the Cubans hid the Spanish died from disease. As Tone argues, "Dispersing and doing nothing cost the Cubans less than active campaigning – and damaged the Spanish almost as much" (2006, 87).

Thus starting in October 1896 Spain began rounding up Cuban civilians into entrenched camps outside large Cuban cities and towns. Cultivation zones were set up outside the camps to feed the refugees. The Spanish army now considered anyone or anything outside the safe zones a legitimate military target. While these harsh rules applied to all Cubans in theory, wealthy estate owners

were usually exempted and poor rural owners were especially targeted (Tone 2006, 193-194).

As the Spanish prepared in the spring of 1897 to invade the rebel stronghold in the eastern provinces, it seemed to most observers that the rebels were in trouble. Yet while "Reconcentration worked to undermine the Cuban insurgency," it also "backfired by creating an outcry in the United States" (Tone 2006, 224). As Tone continues to explain, this was largely because "The effect of reconcentration was generally to turn the poor into refugees, regardless of their politics" (2006, 195). It created an outcry in Spain as well, especially in the more liberal autonomous seeking regions. In August 1897 an anarchist assassinated Spain's leading conservative minister, Antonio Canovas del Castillo, paving the way for the Liberal party to take control of the government in October. Unwilling to pour more money or troops into what the international community now viewed as a humanitarian disaster, the Liberal government made sweeping changes to Spanish policy. In less than two months the new government replaced Weyler, ended reconcentration, halted major offensive operations and most importantly drafted a new constitution granting Cuba autonomy and all Cubans the right to vote (Tone 2006, 233-235).

Humanitarian disaster, Spanish reforms, and American entry

By late 1897 reconcentration had already caused tremendous suffering and Spain officially ended the policy in November. However the process was

difficult to reverse because the rebels were also somewhat responsible for the

nightmare of reconcentration. When the war started the rebel government quickly

embraced an attitude of total war in which neutrality was not to be tolerated. The

rebel campaign of destruction made little distinction between loyalists and

neutrals, and from 1896 on it forced many destitute Cubans to seek Spanish

protection in larger towns and cities, effectively starting the process of

reconcentration civilians.

Thus unsurprisingly even after the Spanish ended the policy, the Cuban

rebels still refused to recognize neutrality, which made it difficult or impossible for

many refugees to return home. Indeed, the refugee crisis lasted long after Spain

exited the island (Tone 2006, 217-218). As Tone explains, the rebels did

everything they could to maintain reconcentration well after Spain abandoned the

policy:

> 'Because the enemy is trying to allow the reconcentrados to leave the towns and
> return to the countryside,' read one [rebel] proclamation, the Liberation Army would
> have to be more strict in enforcing the 'system of warfare' put in place by Gomez.
> Townsfolk would not be allowed to leave, unless they came all the way over the
> revolutionary camp. Simply returning to their homes was not to be permitted. On the
> contrary, 'heads of families and men over sixteen years old' would be required to
> plant crops in zones protected by the republic-in-arms, and if they refused, they
> would be 'expelled' from Cuba Libre and forced back into the cities. If the Spanish
> would not enforce reconcentration, the insurgents would (2006, 218).

Tone estimates that about 170,000 Cubans or one-tenth of the population died

in concentration camps during and after the war (2006, 8).

Ironically at this point the Cuban rebellion faced a new problem: Spain's

grant of autonomy might be enough to satisfy international outrage, as well as

some Cubans still resisting the Spanish. Some Cubans from the Liberation Army

and Cuba Libre surrendered after being granted autonomy, partly out of war

weariness but also perhaps because it promised to bring real political rights to the whole Cuban population. However the leadership of the CLA was still heavily drawn from the more conservative reformist class of Cuban revolutionaries and they influenced Gomez, Garcia and most remaining senior CLA officers. They also controlled access to key U.S. political and business interests and they did not want to see the autonomist regime implemented (Tone 2006, 235-236).

Another major consequence of Spanish reform efforts was convincing loyalist Cubans Spain was no longer able or willing to maintain the social and racial hierarchy of the island. Perez notes, "Cuba was lost to Spain. Cuban successes had all but nullified Spanish claims to sovereignty" (1990, 90). Perez continues, "Loyalists found themselves caught between the ebbing of metropolitan authority and the advancing tide of colonial rebellion. Political separation from Spain became necessary to forestall independence under Cubans" (1990, 88). Ex-loyalists wanted American entry because it would all but guarantee Spain's exit from the island and give them a larger role in shaping a new constitution and government. Nevertheless, Tone argues most CLA fighters ultimately remained committed to full independence, irrespective of the views of loyalists, rebel elites or the rebel population. Thus as the Spanish withdrew into defensive positions, the rebels reconsolidated their hold over the eastern provinces and reiterated the call for full independence (Tone 2006, 237-238).

In February 1898 the U.S. battleship Maine was destroyed in Havana harbor and the Spanish were promptly blamed. As Tone argues, American imperialists "wanted a war for economic, political and strategic reasons," but they

used "the twin tragedies of reconcentration and the *Maine*" to justify a declaration of war against Spain in April 1898 (Tone, 249). Later that month U.S. Congress passed the Teller Amendment, disclaiming any American intentions to exercise sovereignty over Cuba. As Perez notes this "calmed Cuban misgivings" and led most rebels to believe U.S. intervention "made common cause with separatist goals" (1990, 96). Garcia observed the U.S. never entered a formal accord with the rebel government-in-arms, but thought U.S. recognition of "our right to be free and independent" was good enough (Perez 1990, 96).

The United States entered the war in April 1898 and quickly defeated what remained of Spain's military power. Indeed, after being at war for less than four months, "Crushing defeats on land and sea convinced the Spanish that continued war with the United States was futile" (Tone, 282). Unfortunately Garcia probably should have paid more attention to the absence of a formal accord; as Perez notes "The intervention transformed a Cuban war of liberation into a U.S. war of conquest" (1990, 97).

"Liberation," neocolonial dependency, and victory?

During most of the nineteenth century "the United States had pursued the economic colonization of Cuba without direct rule," (Tone 2006, 246) and rebel leadership understood American capitalists were tired of dealing with Spanish protectionism and the loss of property and profit caused by the war. American businessmen wanted to secure their assets and investments in the Cuban sugar

economy and so long as the war continued, the CLA would continue to destroy American property Spain could not protect. However U.S. interests were concerned with more than protecting their investments – they also wanted to protect the "North American claim of sovereignty" and "expectation of colonial succession" (1990, 94). As Perez explains,

> The Cuban war for national liberation became the 'Spanish-American War,' nomenclature that in more than symbolic terms ignored Cuban participation…The construct legitimized the U.S. claim over the island as a spoil of victory. The North Americans had not arrived as allies of Cubans or as agents of Cuban independence. They had gone to war, as they always said they would, to prevent the transfer of sovereignty of Cuba to a third party (1990, 97).

With Spanish administration safely departed and American business interests secured, elite whites, including former loyalists, were empowered to govern the island. Meanwhile the vast majority of Afro-Cuban rebels would not even be able to vote for office under the new constitution (Tone 2006, 282-285). In 1901 U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment effectively forcing the Cuban government to accept American controls over several aspects of Cuban governance before U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Indeed, the United States influenced, restricted and controlled the Cuban government so extensively after 1898 that the island was effectively a U.S. protectorate until 1934 (Loveman 2011, 182).

Nevertheless it is important to recognize Cuban rebels did win to the extent that they were able to force the Spanish to give up formal control of their country. Ultimately the only thing most rebels had in common was opposition to formal Spanish rule. Different Cuban rebels fought for different reasons, but for the most part those that chose to fight remained committed to earning formal

Cuban independence even at the risk of being politically and socially subverted by fellow countrymen of a different class.

Although it is ironic that in defeating the Spanish the rebels traded formal Spanish controls for informal American ones, the distinction is significant because it demonstrates that guerilla resistance in the nationalist age makes it incredibly difficult for foreign imperialist powers to use military force and other formal government controls to indefinitely occupy and influence different regions of the world. Rebels in the CLA and Cuban civilians that supported them did not know what independence from Spanish rule would bring them, but the incredible resistance they offered against Spanish rule demonstrated just how motivating the desire to not be ruled by people from someone else's "imagined community" had become in Cuba.

CHAPTER III: WARFARE IN THE PHILIPPINES (1899-1902)

Section I: Historical background 1565–1899

Spanish conquest, economic transformations, and the *Ilustrados*

Spain began colonizing the Philippine Islands in 1565 and established basic control over most islands except Mindanao by the end of the sixteenth century. During the 17th and 18th centuries Spain used the Philippines primarily as a trading station between her New World Empire and China, shipping precious metals to China in exchange for valuable commercial goods. Spain primarily wanted to control the port of Manila and the valuable goods that flowed through it, so Spanish friars, soldiers and local Filipino elites known as maguinoo were left to administer the rest of the islands with little oversight from Madrid. As Filipino historian Reynaldo Ileto explains, "The main task of Spanish missionaries and soldiers in the seventeenth century was to concentrate or resettle people within hearing distance of the church bells" (1998, 42).

The Spanish organized the majority of the Filipino population around towns or church–plantation complexes called pueblos, were the people could be safely controlled by Catholic propaganda and employed in commercial agriculture or local artisanal production. Spanish friars were the ultimate power in the countryside but they shared power and profits with the maguinoos to better

cement their control. Indeed, Ileto suggests the success of the Spanish system

depended in part on maintaining continuity with traditional Filipino customs and

society, noting "The pattern of Filipino settlements–local churches as focal points

of population concentrations…bears comparison with centers of population in the

Indic states of Southeast Asia" (1998, 43). As Ileto explains,

> Reinforced by Hindu-Buddhist ideas of kinship, a ruler in the Indic states was a stable focal point for unification. His palace was a miniature Mount Meru; hi himself was the source of the kingdom's well being–the abundance of its harvests, the extent of its trade relations, the glory of its name. What made all this possible in the first place was the notion that the ruler participated in divinity itself, represented by the supreme ancestor apotheosized as a Hindu god (1998, 43).

  The Spanish often intentionally built new churches on the highest ground and

promoted the idea of their extreme divinity to naturally take advantage of pre-

established social systems.

Staring in the late eighteenth century the economic and demographic

situation began to shift in the Philippines. As Ileto explains, "increased economic

opportunites, such as commerce in export crops, land speculation, and tax

farming, brought to prominence a new class of Chinese mestizos" (1998, 43).

These leaders eventually fused with the maguinoos a local governing class

known as *principales*, who used their authority to amass wealth, land, and more

power. As Spanish rule continued into the nineteenth century, the *principales*

increasingly resented the colonial government and the Friars, who they viewed

"as the remaining obstacles to their rise in power" (Ileto 1998, 43).

After the collapse of Spain's rule in the Americas, Spanish administrators

in Madrid sought to make the Philippines profitable by creating an export

economy based on large-scale commercial agriculture, especially rice and hemp.

Madrid asserted direct control over many parts of the colony it had previously ignored, creating further resentment among the *principales*. Meanwhile these transformations in the island's economy deprived Filipino farmers of their traditional land rights and created unemployment forcing many Filipino workers into debt peonage, extreme poverty or banditry. As Brian Linn explains, "By the 1890s much of the Philippines was in severe distress, plagued by social tension, disease, hunger, banditry, and rebellion" (2000, 16).

As the nineteenth century transformed the Filipino economy, it also began to transform Filipino political and social consciousness. The children of elite *principales* increasingly travelled to Spain where they were educated and influenced by Spanish ideas and culture. By the 1870s these social interactions were birthing a new class of educated Filipino elites known as *ilustrados*, literally meaning "enlightened," who unlike earlier generations of *principales* felt all Filipinos were entitled to the same rights as Spanish citizens. As Vincente Rafael explains, the *ilustrados* "were well-travelled and multi-lingual, though Spanish was the preferred lingua franca…From the 1880s to the middle of the 1890s they engaged in campaigns calling for reform of the economic, political and educational conditions in the Philippines" (1990, 594).

This peaceful reform campaign came to be known as the "Propaganda movement," and it included a wide range of activities meant to disseminate and popularize Filipino nationalist thinking among all classes of Filipinos. Aside from organizing with other Filipino expatriates, *Ilustrados* also "wrote novels as well as philological, ethnological, and historical studies of the colony" and "publicized

nationalist causes in the liberal Spanish press and, from 1889–95, in their own propaganda newspaper, *La Solidaridad*" (Rafael 1990, 594). The movement, which was nominally led by author and poet Jose Rizal, initially "had an assimilationist nature," calling for Filipinos to be granted equal rights as full Spanish citizens (Rafael 1990, 594). However, by 1896 the gradual assimilationist position had lost most of its appeal and supporters as it became clear Spain would not grant the Filipinos representation or even the same basic rights as Spanish citizens. The assimilationist position finally died in December 1896 when the Spanish government executed Jose Rizal for sedition and treason shortly after the rebellion began, even though ironically he never advocated violent revolution (Rafael 1990, 594).

Filipino geography, demographics and nationalism

The Philippines are a vast archipelago of over 7,600 islands east of the South China Sea in Southeast Asia. Comprising over 300,000 sq. kilometers, almost 95% of the land mass is broken up between the 11 largest islands. In the Northern group the largest and northernmost island of Luzon lies south of Taiwan. Manila is located in the center of Luzon and was and still is the largest city, port and capital. Also in the northern island group south of Luzon are Mindoro and Masbate, as well as long and skinny Palawan jutting off towards Malaysian Borneo. The second largest island is Mindanao in the far south just north of Celebes. Relatively speaking only Luzon and Mindanao are very large,

each comprising about a third of the total Philippine landmass. The central Visayan island group consists of several islands much smaller than Luzon or Mindanao tightly packed together in shallow coastlines. These islands include Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte and Samar. The terrain is dense with heavy jungles and steep mountains located in the center of most islands. There are beeches on most islands, but few large rivers, plains or open spaces.

By the 1890s the Philippines islands had a population of about seven million people, mostly concentrated on eight islands: Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Leyte, Bohol, Negros, Samar and Mindanao. Though figures somewhat vary, according to the last Spanish census taken in 1887, about 5.5 million Filipinos were Catholics, six to eight hundred thousand were polytheistic, three hundred thousand were Muslim, and seventy five thousand were Chinese (Halsted 1898, 99-100). The vast majority of Catholic Filipinos belonged to four main ethnic sub-groups: 3.2 million were Visayan, 1.5 million were Tagalog, eight hundred thousand were Ilocanos, and five hundred and fifty thousand were Bicols. The latter 3 groups were mostly located on the large island of Luzon, while the Visayans dominated the central island group of Panay, Cebu, Leyte, Bohol, Negros and Samar. The Muslims, known as Moros, controlled the southernmost island of Mindanao (Worcester 1914, 203).

The break down of traditional agriculture and local production naturally disrupted most Filipino's political and social orientations and opened up new possibilities for how these orientations might be reconstructed. Indeed the idea of the Filipino nation is something largely derived out of years of colonial

development under Spanish rule, and subsequent resistance and opposition to that rule. The *ilustrados* argued that freedom from formal Spanish rule would bring political, economic and social benefits Filipino people desired, and they helped construct a nationalist political discourse that both *principales* and Filipino peasants could use as vehicle for relief from loss of power, profits and livelihoods. Indeed, despite being very Europeanized relative to the average Filipino, Ileto argues the *ilustrados* were successful in part because like the Spanish colonizers they assimilated aspects of pre-nationalist Filipino culture into their late 19th century nationalist discourse. As Ileto observes, Rizal and the *ilustrados* were "definitely a product of the colonial order" that "through modern education, heralded the birth of modern Southeast Asian nationalism," yet they also "generated meanings linked to other – largely hidden – narratives of the Philippine past" (Ileto 1998, 77-78).

While it is true that different classes and different ethnic groups on different islands perceived the "nation" differently, Rafael reminds us this is merely part of the natural process of nationalism being constantly defined and re-defined. As Rafael adds, nationalism "reveals the mutability of all sorts of hierarchies. Rather than take power for granted as natural and inherited, nationalism asks about 'rights' and thereby opens up the problem of representation: who has the right to speak for whom and under what circumstances?" (Rafael 1990, 592)

Thus the wealthier land-owning *principales* usually favored formal independence with political rights and minor changes to the social system, while

lower-class peasants often wanted political independence and more substantial social reforms. Meanwhile *Ilustrados* and *principales* on different islands did not always have the same vision of what the future Philippine Republic would look like; elites from Luzon desired a centralized state and government organized around Manila, while elites from the Visayas favored a federated system titled towards local autonomy (Worcester 1914, 187).

However, nationalism was unifying in that by 1896 almost all groups opposed continued Spanish rule and desired to form some kind of new polity or polities in its place. Exactly how big the nation or nations were to be and who was to be included was a matter, like in Cuba, that could not be fully sorted out until after the colonial power was ejected from the islands. Linn questions whether the independence movement "represented an emergent Filipino nationalism or merely ethnic identity, class consciousness, an estrangement from Spain, and a desire for local autonomy," but this is because instead of focusing on the "process" or "presence" of nationalism he is fixated on the idea that nationalism means fervent and unified belief in a simple and clear idea of a Filipino nation. Nationalism is not an end or fixed product, but the vehicle by which ethnic identity, class consciousness, estrangement from colonial powers and desire for local autonomy can express itself, and "when combined with the deterioration in living conditions, it represented a potent threat to Spanish rule" (Linn 2000, 17).

The Katipunan rebellion, Emilio Aguinaldo and the Treaty of Biak-na-Bato

Although *ilustrado* propaganda succeeded in raising awareness about the plight of Filipinos, it ultimately failed in getting the Spanish to change their policies. As a result, starting in the mid-1890's Andres Bonifacio and many other Filipinos from the lower classes began organizing secret societies such as the Katipunan organization committed to total liberation of the islands. In 1896 Spanish authorities began uncovering and arresting Katipunan members, compelling Bonifacio and the Katipunans to initiate their rebellion against the Spanish throughout Luzon. Most of the Spanish army at the time was busy in Cuba and most of the 18,000 Spanish troops in the Philippines were busy fighting the Moros on the southernmost island of Mindanao, so despite being disorganized and undersupplied, the rebels easily gained control over most of Luzon by the end of 1896. Initially many *ilustrados* and *principales* stayed out of the fighting, but the Katipunan's successes compounded with national outrage over the poorly timed Spanish execution of Jose Rizal compelled most Filipino elites to join the fight by the end of year (Linn 2000, 17).

Despite his popularity and success, Bonifacio lacked political connections and resources and he was replaced by a well-connected *principale* named Emilio Aguinaldo in March 1897. Aguinaldo joined the Katipunans sometime in 1896 before many members of his class revolted giving him somewhat more credibility among the lower classes. Nevertheless the fact that Bonifacio was quickly

arrested and mysteriously executed after Aguinaldo replaced him strongly

suggests late-coming rebellious *principales* did not want their independence

movement led by a potential social revolutionary. Max Boot, among others,

argues Aguinaldo engineered Bonifacio's execution, probably with the approval

of other leading *principales* (2002, 103).

Indeed, John Larkin argues as a result of Bonifacio's death "leadership [of

the rebellion] passed into the hands of the Tagalog landed class" (1967, 312).

As Linn explains, once Aguinaldo was in power he "called for political reforms

that all Filipinos – or at least the elite – could agree on: the expulsion of the friars;

representation in the Spanish Cortes; and an end to discriminatory laws" (2000,

18). Nevertheless, Aguinaldo was still "the only person who could hold together

the alliance of *ilustrados*, warlords, and local politicians that made up the

nationalist leadership" and he consolidated the independence movement despite

not sharing the same vision as all Filipinos (Linn 2000, 20).

By spring 1897 Spain had reinforced the island enough to begin its

counteroffensive and Spanish regulars easily regained control of most towns and

defeated rebels in open combat. The rebel infighting that resulted in Aguinaldo's

rise and Bonifacio's death also helped Spain make quick progress. Although

some rebels left the ranks to return home after the defeats, many joined

Aguinaldo and other rebel leaders in the countryside in starting a guerilla

campaign against the Spanish. As Spain had already discovered in Cuba,

clearing out conventional rebel resistance was easy, but stamping out guerilla

resistance was hard (Boot 2000, 103).

Distracted by the growing disaster in Cuba, Madrid attempted to bargain with the Filipino rebels instead of trying to defeat them in their own element. In December of 1897 Spain signed the treaty of Biak-na-Bato with Aguinaldo, which promised future political reforms and gave Aguinaldo and *ilustrado* leadership a large bribe to stop fighting and leave the Philippine islands. Aguinaldo and the other leaders accepted the bribe with the intention of using it to buy weapons and re-organize the rebellion in Hong Kong. In the meantime rebel forces remained active throughout Luzon, demonstrating that guerilla resistance did not depend upon the presence of Filipino elites (Linn, CP 6; Larkin, 312).

Archipelago wide rebellion, American entry, and the Treaty of Paris

Initially the rebellion was confined to the island of Luzon and most rebels were from the island's dominant Tagalog ethnic group; however starting in early 1898 secret societies on the islands of Panay and Negros began organizing for rebellion as well. Although many of the inhabitants of these islands were from different ethnic groups and not directly connected to Aguinaldo's rebels, they shared a desire for autonomy if not outright independence from Spain. When the Spanish-American war began in April 1898 the Americans made contact with Aguinaldo's group and transported them back to the Philippines to resume their campaign against the Spanish. The Americans destroyed the Spanish fleet in May, effectively isolating Spanish forces from further reinforcements and

supplies. Aguinaldo laid siege to Manila and Spanish control over the island quickly slipped away (Linn 2000, 20). As Linn explains,

> Suspicious of their Filipino troops, and with much of their manpower besieged by Aguinaldo in Manila, the Spanish garrisons in the provinces were isolated and soon capitulated. By the fall of 1898, military power in much of the archipelago was in the hands of regional Filipino forces, most of whom recognized Aguinaldo's authority in principle if not in practice (1989, 6).

The first American troops landed on the island in late June 1898 and joined Aguinaldo's forces in sieging Manila. However the alliance between the Americans and Filipinos did not last long. Just as in Cuba, Washington instructed American commanders not to recognize the rebel government. The McKinley administration decided most Filipinos were incapable of self-government and that only the United States could teach them how to be truly civilized and democratic. As Boot explains, "There were also more practical reasons for grabbing the Philippines. The race for colonies was in full swing, and the Americans feared that they would be locked out of the Asian market" (2002, 104).

Even more liberal and progressive Americans believed at the time it was cruel to leave citizens incapable of self-government at the mercy of any number of predatory imperialist powers. Disregarding the racist logic, there is some truth to the idea that Germany or Japan would have attempted to conquer the Philippines had the Americans simply left the islands. With the exception of Liberia, Ethiopia, Siam, Japan and (somewhat) China, virtually every other territory in the Eastern hemisphere was formally occupied by a European power or Japan between 1871 and 1914 (Linn 2000, 7-8).

Nevertheless fears that the Philippines might be gobbled up by another major power should not obscure the fact that a powerful American imperialist lobby wanted the islands foremost for strategic and commercial reasons. In 1898 they convinced the public that America had to become an imperialist power precisely to prevent other imperialist powers from locking them out of foreign markets. International law was still relatively underdeveloped and the delicate and volatile balance of global power meant the U.S. probably only had two choices: occupy the islands or let someone else do it.

Indeed even most anti-imperialists within the United States objected to annexing the islands on the grounds that the people there were racially inferior and could neither practice self-government nor be assimilated into American political culture, thus it is doubtful the United States would have done much to help preserve the Philippine Republic against potential German or Japanese invasion. Most Americans at the time were primarily concerned with finding new markets to alleviate cycles of overproduction and depression and maintaining their own domestic racist order; spreading or supporting a cosmopolitan concept of liberalism to non-white peoples was largely at odds with both objectives (Boot 2002, 105–107).

As the rebels became increasingly aware of U.S. intentions, relations between the two groups rapidly deteriorated. In August 1898 American forces "attacked" Manila in what many observers at the time reported was really a mock-battle between the Spanish garrison and American forces. By this point the Spanish-American War was basically over and both the Spanish and Americans

wanted U.S. troops to take control of the city without the help of the Filipinos and with the intention of keeping them out of Manila. Boot explains,

> The commanders of the Spanish soldiers trapped inside the capital had no desire to fight, but feared the consequences should their former subjects take over. So they negotiated an elaborate hoax with Admiral Dewey whereby U.S. troops would lob a few shells into Manila and then the Spanish could surrender. The sham "battle" of Manila occurred on August 13 1898 (2002, 105).

In response the rebel army decided to maintain the siege around Manila leaving the old city and port to be controlled by the American expeditionary force. Tensions between the Americans and Filipino rebels continued to build until December 1898 when, as part of the Treaty of Paris, the U.S. agreed to buy the Philippine islands from Spain. By this point it was clear to the rebels that the Americans meant to occupy and even conquer the islands if necessary (Linn 2000, 8-10).

However, the actual war between the Americans and Filipino rebels did not begin until early February 1899. Justifiably concerned about the intentions of the United States, Aguinaldo and the *ilustrados* began to realize their last hope of avoiding a war was that anti-imperialists in the United States could convince the Senate to reject the Treaty of Paris and U.S. acquisition of the islands. Seeing as the treaty was eventually ratified by a margin of one vote, this was not an unreasonable hope.

Most fortunately for the McKinley administration fighting somehow broke out between American and Filipino forces outside of Manila mere days before the Senate voted to ratify the treaty, effectively creating a state of war before the final vote could force the issue. The Americans had just demolished the Spanish military and thus were confident they could do much better against Filipino rebels

than a declining Spain had. However, the Americans were about to discover the Filipino Liberation Army's conventional strength formed a first line of defense only, and in the guerilla phase of the war, massive superiority in conventional strength counted for very little (Linn 2000, 11-12).

Section II: Conventional Operations February 1899–November 1899

The Army of Liberation, Battle for Manila and Filipino military weakness

The war started outside Manila on February 4th 1899, two days before the U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by one vote. The Americans occupied Manila since August 1898 while Filipino rebel forces maintained siege positions around the city waiting for the Americans to act. A confrontation between an American and Filipino soldier resulted in the American killing his Filipino counterpart and reporting to his comrades that the city was under attack. Some historians have claimed the Americans orchestrated the whole affair as a pretext to create a state of war before the treaty was signed, but whatever the truth the incident was enough to start a full scale battle outside Manila (Boot 2002, 106).

Both sides built up their strength in the months leading up to the Battle of Manila, but the Americans benefited much more from the build up as they had much better equipment and better trained and supplied troops than the rebels. The Americans had 20,000 troops in the greater Manila area, 11,000 of which manned the front lines facing the Filipinos. To counter them the Filipino

Liberation Army had 80,000 troops in the vicinity, with 20,000 of their best troops manning the system of trenches besieging the Americans in Manila. The Filipinos had twice as many men defending well–prepared positions, but it did not stop the Americans from attacking the Filipino trenches on February 5th. As discussed in the Cuban chapter, late 19th century rifle technology was deadly and accurate, making frontal assaults against disciplined entrenched troops suicide. Fortunately for American soldiers Filipino troops were neither accurate nor disciplined (Boot 2002, 108).

Unlike many Cuban leaders and soldiers, most Filipino rebels had very little experience fighting and virtually none in open conventional combat. Comparatively speaking most of the 40,000 Cubans who fought against Spain were probably little better trained and supplied than their average Filipino counterpart. However unlike the Filipinos, Cuban rebels benefited from the presence of veteran guerilla commanders and several thousand fighters who gained valuable experience in the Ten Years War. Cuban veterans were unable to win open combats against Spanish regulars, but unlike the FAL, they were able to bloody and repulse their opponent when defending preparing positions. Unlike the Cubans, the Filipinos did not have enough veteran leadership or fighters and as a result the FAL "suffered from a lack of trust and coherence" (Linn 2000, 62).

Consequently when the serious conventional fighting began around Manila the Americans easily defeated the numerically superior Filipino forces. Many Filipino fighters lacked both shoes and rifles, and even though the

American army was largely comprised of state volunteer units, the Filipinos "had even less training" (Boot 2002, 108). Indeed many soldiers with rifles didn't know how to use them, lacking basic knowledge of "how to use their sights" (Boot 2002, 108). At the Battle of Manila the FAL had more weapons, supplies and troops than at any other point during the war, but they failed to win a defensive battle with 2:1 odds and failed to cause the Americans significant casualties in the process. Indeed, the battle was such a disaster for the Filipinos that rebel commanders began to fear that if Filipino Liberation Army faced another open battle against the Americans it might simply melt away (Linn 2000, 62-64).

A hybrid rebel strategy and American economic warfare

The crushing defeat outside Manila placed Aguinaldo and other rebellious *ilustrados* in a difficult position. The battle cost the FAL valuable manpower and supplies that could not be easily replaced. The American naval blockade made the prospects of future arms shipments especially dim. However the immediate problem was the FAL's abysmal battlefield performance in such favorable circumstances, which made it difficult to expect any conventional military success in the future. Some of Aguinaldo's advisors urged him to abandon his desire to renew a conventional campaign, but Aguinaldo and the rebel government remained determined to fight in the open if they could (Linn 2000, 136).

Politically any chance of international recognition depended on the Republic maintaining a standing Army and seat of government, although this did

not preclude guerilla activity entirely. Essentially rebel strategy called for Filipinos to fight conventionally until defeated and overrun by American forces, at which point they would switch to resisting occupation with purely guerilla tactics. Right after the war began in February the rebels divided up the islands into various command zones, each with its own local rebel governance, economy and guerillas. Indeed, in many areas the Americans did not realize they were appointing officials to important government positions who were actually rebels (Linn 2000, 137-138).

Not surprisingly the Americans implemented counterinsurgency measures long before the actual conventional war ended and the purely guerilla phase started. Quickly realizing the rebels were drawing resources from inside the American zone of control, the Army heavily restricted trade and movement around Manila and other large population centers in order to deprive the Liberation Army of food or any material resource that could help them. As Linn astutely notes, "The Manila garrison's early and escalating efforts at food restriction would make it much easier for officers outside the city to impose far more draconian policies of food deprivation and destruction" (2000, 93).

It did not take long for more draconian policies of destruction to develop. In March 1899 General Otis dispatched forces to clear out rebels and punish peasants supporting the rebellion south of Manila. The American commander, General Llyod Wheaton, fought under Sherman during the Civil War, and he zealously introduced his mentor's method of war to the Philippines. By the end of the weeklong campaign one correspondent with the army noted, "the once fertile

countryside was now desolate – crops trampled, farms and houses burned, towns blackened and depopulated." As Linn concludes, "Whether as retaliation or to create a 'dead zone' to protect the southern lines, it was a harsh measure that fell chiefly on people who had committed no acts of war" (2000, 93-95).

Interestingly, General Wheaton's campaign of destruction did not gone unnoticed by officials in Washington, so American forces across the islands were given much stricter orders to respect private property and do their best to demonstrate the benevolent nature of American occupation. As American General Arthur MacArthur observed to his troops, "To exasperate individuals or to burn or loot unprotected houses or property is not only criminal in itself, but tends to impede the policy of the United States and to defeat the very purpose which the Army is here to accomplish" (Linn 2000, 103-105). Politically the Americans wanted to appear as the protectors of individual liberty and property; however waging a war of occupation often forced them to compromise their liberal ideals.

In addition to the efforts of the Army, the U.S. Navy vigorously blockaded trade throughout the archipelago. All ports but Manila, Iloilo City and Cebu City were closed to trade, and all waterborne trade throughout the island group had to flow through these ports or risk being seized as contraband. Because so few ports remained open and because the contraband list prohibited the trade of basic necessities and foodstuffs, including rice and fish, inter-island trade was almost impossible for most of 1899. Thus while the blockade did damage the rebel cause by preventing inter-island communication and trade, it also created

food shortages throughout the Philippines. Admiral John Watson, commander of American naval forces, even questioned the legality of the blockade. Local *principales* warned the Americans the blockade might drive some Filipinos into the rebel camp, and even General Otis "noted it left many areas without food and badly undercut the revival of commerce, ad thus greatly increased the problems of reestablishing order and prosperity on the islands" (Linn 2000, 130-131).

Conventional American victory and the start of guerilla operations

Despite ominous signs of guerilla resistance on the Visayan Islands, the American commander General Otis continued to believe the only real threat to American occupation were Tagalog Filipino rebels on Luzon. After the defeat at Manila, Aguinaldo and part of the Liberation Army retreated north to Malolos, which was serving as Philippine Republic's capital. As Linn observes, "In conventional military thinking, the north held the enemy's centers of gravity: its government, its commander in chief, its capital city, and its army. The destruction of all – or, in Otis's optimistic mind – any of these could end the war quickly and painlessly" (Linn 2000, 88).

The Americans began their northern offensive towards the end of March 1899. U.S. forces quickly occupied a burned-out Malolos but were unable to trap the Liberation Army. The Americans were still embracing a conventional mindset but the rebels preferred to torch their capital rather than risk loosing their army to defend it. Indeed General Luna, commander of the Liberation Army, ordered

rebel troops to burn most towns and supply centers as they retreated, making it clear both sides were rapidly becoming committed to Total War (Linn 2000, 95-100).

The American columns renewed their advance, finding the Liberation Army entrenched in prepared positions. As usual, the Americans defeated such positions by outflanking, outgunning or simply directly assaulting them. More concerning for the rebels, the defeats were beginning to severely drain their manpower. Filipino forces frequently suffered ten times as many casualties in pitched combats with heavily armed American troops. Once again the battles proved in conventional warfare the Liberation Army was incapable of defending strong positions or making the Americans pay for taking them (Linn 2000, 105-108).

As a result of the Liberation Army's poor battlefield performance and inability to protect Manila or Malolos, some *ilustrados* and *principales* began to defect to the Americans. Towards the end of April Aguinaldo asked the Americans to agree to a three-week armistice, but the Americans did not want to grant the rebels time or diplomatic recognition and refused. In May the American columns resumed their advance, blooding and dispersing rebel defenders while capturing several towns and rebel supply stores, including the valuable rail line at San Fernando. In the middle of May American forces captured the relocated rebel capital of San Isidro, another "easy and barren victory" in the view of one accompanying war correspondent (Linn 2000, 115).

The Americans captured some territory and several strong defensive positions during the spring, but the gains had no real strategic importance. Worse, during the summer of 1899 consistent rebel activity throughout American "zones of control" demonstrated just how fragile and hallow those gains were. The American line was full of holes and smaller garrisons were always in danger of being isolated and besieged by local rebel forces. As Linn explains, throughout July and August, "Small enemy detachments moved with relative impunity through the gaps; indeed, guerrillas operated all the way to the outskirts of Manila, harassing supply columns, cutting telegraph wires, sniping at soldiers, and, perhaps most serious, intimidating any civilians inclined to cooperate with the invaders" (Linn 2000, 122-123).

After the spring campaign the Liberation Army shrank to about 4,000 men. Aguinaldo increasingly feared General Luna would take control of the Army, so he had Luna assassinated in early June. Luna was not a very good tactician, but he did inspire some confidence in his men, making his death an unfortunate loss for such a demoralized army. The final conventional American offensive began in October 1899, and within two months the American army effectively crippled the Army of Liberation's ability to continue even limited operations. By this point the rebels realized the futility of continuing conventional resistance – in nine months of fighting they failed to hold any defensive positions or score any tactical victories against the Americans. Thus in mid-November Aguinaldo dissolved the Army of Liberation and ordered all rebels to disperse and begin purely guerilla operations. Fittingly the conventional phase of the war ended not with a climactic

battle but with the Liberation Army and many of its commanders melting away into the countryside where they would become "Amigos" by day and guerillas by night (Linn 2000, 144-158).

Section III: Guerilla Warfare November 1899–July 1902

Guerilla strategy and Visayan resistance

Although Filipino resistance was generally decentralized and uncoordinated after 1899, Aguinaldo and the rebel government did provide general outlines. Guerillas throughout the archipelago received three primary directives from Luzon: wage a war of attrition using guerilla tactics, prevent Filipinos from collaborating with the American military and government, and launch a general offensive in the fall of 1900 with the hopes of influencing the American Presidential election. As Linn notes, in many ways the shift in strategy was subtle – from the beginning the rebels had been using guerilla tactics, but such methods were initially viewed as a last resort and secondary to conventional resistance. From 1900 on guerilla tactics became primary to the rebels' strategy (Linn 2000, 185-186).

Instead of attacking or defending conventionally important locations, rebels focused on attacking random and isolated areas, and only when they had "overwhelming superiority." The new goal was simply to preserve weapons and troops and prolong the fighting as long as possible, which naturally became

much easier once the rebels abandoned all conventional military goals. In 1899 the rebels wasted manpower trying to take or hold conventionally important positions; adopting a purely guerilla strategy allowed the rebels to preserve their troops and weapons by only engaging in lighting quick ambushes or combats and melting away into terrain full of geographic obstacles and bobby-traps (Linn 2000, 187-189).

The Americans wanted to believe only ethnic Tagalog Filipinos from Luzon would resist them, but they quickly discovered the reality was much different. In early 1898 Filipinos from the Visayan Islands rebelled against Spain independently of Aguinaldo's Liberation Army, which should have been enough to indicate their probable stance towards indefinite American occupation. After the victory at Manila, American forces waiting off the coast of Panay demanded armed rebel forces controlling the valuable Visayan port of Iloilo City surrender within four days or face bombardment and assault. Keeping their word, the U.S. Navy bombarded and occupied the city in mid-February, forcing rebel militants to disperse and take to the countryside. Combined with acts of rebel arson, the combat virtually destroyed Iloilo City, but it did nothing to prevent the widespread guerilla resistance that soon materialized across the Visayan island group (Linn 2000, 67-69).

American forces landed on Negros and Cebu in the spring of 1899 meeting similar guerilla resistance on both islands. Although Filipino rebels in the Visayan Islands sometimes operated in the open due to American manpower shortages, unlike the Liberation Army on Luzon, rebels in the Visayas almost

always declined conventional battle. General Martin Delgado, commander of the rebel forces on Panay, attacked a small American garrison in early March, in which less than a quarter of Filipino troops even had rifles. Predictably the heavily armed and fortified American troops easily defeated and repulsed the attack, causing enough casualties in the process to prevent Delgado from taking future offensives (Linn 2000, 70-71).

The Americans easily gained control of most towns and ports as well as the support of most local *principales* but they couldn't secure the vast majority of the countryside or find and defeat most rebel forces. In a sign of things to come, the American commander on Panay blockaded the island and strictly controlled the distribution of foodstuffs in an attempt to starve the rebels into submission. By August 1899 this measure doubled the Filipino population living in the American safe zone on Panay, however the American commander astutely realized the new refugees were not truly loyal to American governance. More to the point it also indicated a substantial amount of Filipinos were inclined to resist American pacification, so long as they could sustain their basic material needs. After the Americans occupied a town, most *principales* willingly collaborated and claimed to speak for the general population. Inevitably, however, guerilla resistance would develop in the back country of most islands, indicating the population was rarely as loyal and pro-American as the *principales* wanted American troops believe (Linn 2000, 72).

By late December 1899 General Otis felt confident that "war in its proper meaning had ceased to exist." Between January and February 1900 the army

was dispersed throughout the archipelago in order to establish American governance and restart the Philippine economy. Brief campaigns in southern Luzon and Panay cleaned up remnants of conventional resistance, while expeditions to the hemp ports in southeastern Luzon and the islands of Samar and Leyte established American presence throughout the archipelago. As a result some restrictions on interisland trade were lifted and the valuable hemp trade was renewed. However by loosening the blockade the Americans also helped Filipino rebels gain foodstuffs and taxes, indicating American economic warfare was not without effect or utility (Linn, 2000, 164-181).

Principales for McKinley, Amigos for Bryan

The Americans did not suffer their first real setback until the purely guerilla phase of the war began. In early December rebel agents from Luzon landed on Negros and managed to restart the uprising there, partly by assuring local residents that William Jennings Bryan was going to defeat McKinley in the upcoming Presidential election and grant the Philippines independence. The promise that a Bryan victory would lead to Philippine independence was one of the rebels main recruiting tools and propaganda points throughout 1900. Bryan was a Democrat from Kansas and he campaigned on an anti-imperialist platform, so the rebels spread as much propaganda as possible assuring Filipinos that Bryan would win and the Americans would then leave. Aguinaldo even intensified guerilla activity in the months leading up to the election (Boot 2002, 113-114).

The *principales* of Negros remained loyal to the Americans, but the majority of the population remained loyal to the rebellion. The affair on Negros demonstrated the differences between Tagalogs and Visayans were not so great as those between Filipino elites and peasants. After a month long campaign the Americans disrupted and scattered the rebels, but only the continued presence of an American garrison kept the situation stable. The *principales* had previously assured American forces they were speaking for or at least had control over the majority of the island's inhabitants, yet as Linn notes, "three revolutionary agents and a small force of riflemen had been able to gather sufficient support there for an uprising" (Linn 2000, 172-173).

Before the war the Americans argued only a small group of *ilustrados* and *principales* desired independence, but the rebellion actually received most of its support from lower-class Filipinos. Unfortunately for the Americans, interactions with Filipinos did little to clarify the situation. The only source of information the Americans had was from the *principales*, and years of telling the Spanish exactly what they wanted to hear had prepared them well. Of course the fact that most Americans perceived Filipinos as being incapable of self-government made the false narrative the *principales* gave them easy to adopt. Finally as conventional resistance collapsed, many initially rebellious *principales* defected to the American side, further enabling "the American government to belittle the resistance that still raged," and to "depreciate the leaders of the resistance by categorizing them as heads of minority groups or to malign them as bandits" (Constantino 1972, 237-238).

These assertions became harder to support as the war went on and tenacious guerilla resistance continued. By late January 1900, American troops were already reporting signs that the rebels were establishing secret government and military organizations throughout the islands. Different rebel groups did not always coordinate their resistance but they were always unified in their resistance to foreign rule and their desire for self-government. Aguinaldo's government had little authority in the countryside, indicating Filipino peasants throughout the islands didn't need to be motivated or centrally coordinated to risk their lives, and eventually their families lives and property as well. Moreover guerilla activity was not limited to the countryside. As Linn observes, "Many townspeople were active allies of the guerillas in the field, hiding weapons and providing food and shelter, ready at any time to attack the garrison" (Linn 2000, 181).

Archipelago-wide guerilla warfare and Benevolent Assimilation

General Otis believed the war was over and his mission fulfilled, so he requested to be relieved in April 1900. Though Otis never fully acknowledged the scale of resistance to American occupation, even he was forced to concede in his final report, "Guerrilla and robber bands still quite active in various sections of islands and considerable element [of the] natives untrustworthy" (1902, 1148). Indeed Otis had to admit at least *some* of the armed groups still fighting were guerrillas, though Otis still characterized resistance by the general population as

"untrustworthiness" more than political activity. His replacement, General Arthur MacArthur, eventually came to a very different conclusion about the situation.

By the time MacArthur took command of American forces in May 1900 they were dispersed throughout the islands engaged in "Benevolent Assimilation," President McKinley's term for highlighting the positive U.S. intentions behind the occupation. Over the course of year the Americans substantially increased the number of garrisons from 53 in November 1899 to 413 by October 1900 (Linn 2000, 199). The Americans improved the lives of many Filipinos with their peaceful pacification efforts, establishing municipal governments and encouraging economic activity. Linn notes that even by early 1900, "Roads and bridges, schools, new marketplaces, improved drainage and sanitation, and other signs of progress where everywhere" (2000, 208).

However, these improvements did little to slow down rebel activity, and given the likelihood that many Filipino officials worked for both sides, they possibly even aided the rebel cause at times. While things were relatively quiet during February and March 1900, rebel activity spiked throughout the islands during April. Heavy fighting broke out on Luzon, Samar, Leyte and Mindanao. Most ominously starting in April the Americans began fighting more engagements and suffering more casualties then they had during the conventional war (Linn 2000, 208-209).

Towards the beginning of the guerilla campaign most American troops viewed the rebels as an external threat to their garrison, but what they did not realize was that many of the townspeople were in fact working for the rebels.

Most American military and government personnel were initially blind to the threat because they wanted to believe Filipinos welcomed their presence and the end of conventional hostilities meant the end of all hostilities. This allowed rebel shadow governments to operate all throughout the islands, "collecting taxes, recruiting soldiers, maintaining morale, and administering justice more efficiently than could its American-sponsored counterpart" (Linn 2000, 191). The fact that the rebel war effort was so decentralized was another advantage for them because individual American successes meant little and "there were no key supply routes for the Americans to interdict or sanctuaries to invade" (Linn 2000, 192).

MacArthur realized the rebels were far from defeated and understood Benevolent Assimilation alone would not be able to convince them to stop fighting. By the end of May MacArthur thought the decision to disperse the Army throughout the islands had been a mistake, thus he outlined a plan to concentrate American forces into larger columns that could sweep the countryside. However this was no longer practically possible because the garrisons were critical to maintaining control of the towns and protecting Filipinos collaborating with the Americans. Yet even if the Americans had employed MacArthur's strategy it is doubtful it would have succeeded, because it still rested on the false premise that guerilla resistance had a center of gravity that could be found and destroyed. Trying a different track in June 1900 the Americans offered a general amnesty to any rebels that surrendered, but this too yielded meager results (Linn 2000, 210-211).

The monsoon season made campaigning impossible during the summer of 1900, but by the fall of 1900 the Americans had 70,000 troops on the island ready to operate in the dry season. As planned by Aguinaldo and the rebel government, rebel groups on several islands carried out successful attacks against isolated American garrisons in an attempt to influence the American Presidential election. Although they were unable to help Bryan win the election, contrary to the prognostications of many American jingoes McKinley's re-election did not bring the war to an end either. More importantly the relative success of the rebels' general offensive convinced the Americans it was time to complement their policy of Benevolent Assimilation with a harsher form of warfare. MacArthur dispensed with the fiction that the people they were fighting were primarily bandits, observing in his annual report for 1900 that there was "considerable evidence" the bandits actually attacked the guerillas and the guerillas were trying to protect the population from them. In the same report MacArthur persuasively argued:

> The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion; how it is brought about and maintained is not so plain. Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear, as the only motive, is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people (PIS, Pt. 10, 24, 62-63).

There was no doubt the rebels threatened, kidnapped and assassinated other Filipinos who collaborated with the Americans, but as MacArthur understood, this was not enough to explain the level of resistance the occupation experienced. General Robert Hughes, who served as Otis' chief of staff and later directly in the field, concurred with MacArthur's sentiments: "The whole

population has been rank insurrectos from hide to heart, and all have been contributing to the support of the cause in one way or another to their ability" (PIS, pt. 11, 33). Considering both men exercised high command and fought throughout the archipelago, their estimation of the level of Filipino resistance the United States faced is worth trusting.

Martial law, harsh warfare, and concentration camps

At the beginning of the war Washington gave American occupation forces strict orders to respect the lives and property of all Filipinos; however the Army was also authorized to take more extreme measures against guerilla activity, which the U.S. still viewed as criminal and outside the conventional laws of war. According to western international law at the time, occupying armies had responsibilities to treat civilians well but civilians also had a duty not to resist occupation. According to contemporary U.S. military regulations, "combatants not in uniform would be treated like 'highway robbers or pirates' and, along with civilians who aided them, they could be subject to the death penalty" (Boot 2002, 116).

Nevertheless between February 1899 and November 1900 U.S. leadership emphasized protecting Filipino lives and property and avoiding severe punishments, although individual American commanders and troops sometimes destroyed property and executed prisoners (Linn 2002, 212-213). However by late 1900, most American field commanders felt they were engaged in what they

frequently termed as "Indian-style warfare," which they viewed as savage and outside the normal rules of war conventional war. Americans won the west by harassing, relocating and often directly targeting Native American civilians, so they decided to employ a similar strategy against the Filipinos. Indeed, 26 of the 30 U.S. generals who fought in the Philippines had experience fighting Indians in North America where they gained "invaluable experience" in irregular warfare (Boot 2002, 127).

Starting in December 1900 the Americans declared martial law and issued a proclamation throughout the islands declaring guerilla warfare to be illegal and punishable by death. As a result American courts began sending prisoners to the gallows "with far more regularity" (Linn 2002, 213). Those considered guilty of materially supporting the rebels were fined, imprisoned, and had their property confiscated, and the Americans often held them until they gave information or their relatives were captured. Even people only suspected of rebel sympathies could have their rents suspended and property seized. Prominent *principales* who had yet to openly declare for the Americans were told to do so or become enemies of the United States. Unsurprisingly, this shift in strategy caused massive destruction throughout the islands. As Linn explains,

> "Despite MacArthur's injunctions to avoid unnecessary hardship, he tolerated, even encouraged, campaigns that can only be described as punitive. Crop and property destruction, euphemistically called 'burning,' became far more common; and there was less effort to ensure that only property clearly used by the insurgents was torched…areas were systematically devastated to deprive the guerillas of food and punish their supporters" (2000, 213-215).

The Americans implemented one final measure to their counterinsurgency campaign: concentrating the rural population of certain provinces into protected

American zones. The U.S. Army had previously employed concentration camps or "reservations" to wage war against the American Indians, "in order to separate the insurgents from the population base" (Boot 2002, 124). Anyone found outside of these safe zones was considered an enemy combatant and could be punished as such.

As Linn observes they were harsh methods but they worked – between December 1900 and July 1901 "the army conducted a series of regional campaigns that ended armed resistance in twenty-one of the thirty-eight rebellious provinces" (2000, 214). Interestingly, "MacArthur increased press censorship so that word of his tough tactics would not get out" (Boot 2002, 116), although unlike Cuban rebels, Filipinos did not have significant contacts or sympathies within the international press. Though it is difficult to make an exact estimate, probably around 200,000 Filipinos died in concentration camps during and after the war (Boot 2002, 125).

After July 1901 substantial rebel forces remained active only in southern Luzon and Samar, though Aguinaldo was not captured until November 1901. Nevertheless despite the success of the Americans' new pacification program and the capture or surrender of most prominent rebel leaders by November, the war still lasted until July 1902, yet another indication rebel activity was never dependent upon *principale* leadership and coordination (Linn 2000, 215-219).

American forces waged the final two campaigns in Southern Luzon and Samar with particular ferocity. The wanton killing of prisoners and non-combatants on Samar "provided ample ammunition for critics of the Army" and

led Senate hearings and court martials. In Batangas province in Southern Luzon, the U.S. Army rounded up 300,000 inhabitants into concentration camps and scoured the countryside "destroying all foodstuffs and capturing or killing all able-bodied men" (Boot 2002, 124). The U.S. press heavily criticized the Army for using the same tactics they had previously decried the Spanish for using. As Boot observes, "It was true. Confronted with a native insurgency, the U.S. had resorted to many of the same tactics used by European colonialists" (2002, 123-24).

CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS

How many nationalists does it take to start a rebellion?

Whether or not these wars are indicative of "national resistance" remains for some authors a subject of historical contention. As Linn observes, the rebel government in Luzon was effectively a centralized Tagalog oligarchy, whose elitist policies "weakened their authority in the countryside" and left them at odds with Filipinos outside of Luzon who "favored a federal government with considerable provincial autonomy" (Linn 2000, 323).

	CUBA	THE PHILLIPINES
Total Population	1,700,000	7,000,000
Total Rebel Fighters	40,000	150,000
% Total Pop. Fighting	2%	2%
Total Fighters Killed	9,000	16,000
% Fighters K.I.A.	23%	11%
Total Civilians Killed	170,000	200,000
% Total Pop. Killed	10%	3%

Table 1 (Rebel fighter and general population statistics)

However, Linn misses the point that nationalist guerilla resistance does not require coordination or a politically unified population to be effective. To the contrary both wars suggest that a committed core of fighters and civilian supporters is more than enough start a nationalist rebellion irrespective of how the general population feels. Indeed as Table 2 shows above, only 2% of the

Cuban and Filipino population took up arms during the rebellions. As we can also see, both wars inflicted far more death upon the general population than combatants.

FEATURE	CUBA	THE PHILIPPINES
Conventional resistance?	NO	YES
Guerilla resistance?	YES	YES
Tactical success?	YES	NO
Strategic success?	YES	YES
Open borders/coasts?	YES	NO
Popular support	YES	YES
Elite support	YES	NO
Foreign arms/military support?	YES	NO
Ethnic/religious divisions	NO	YES
Racial divisions?	YES	YES
Guerilla economic war?	YES	NO
Occupier economic war?	YES	YES
Guerilla total war?	YES	YES
Occupier total war?	YES	YES

Table 2 (Selected features of both wars)

The failure of benevolent counterinsurgency and need for "harsh warfare"

Linn argues the American effort in the Philippines was "the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in U.S. history," adding that "Given the recent interventions into internecine regional struggles, the history of the Philippine War has much to offer both civilian and military leaders" (2000, 328). However, American counterinsurgency strategy was successful in the Philippines because it denied the Filipinos foreign support and it directly and indiscriminately targeted and punished civilians in war zones.

U.S. counterinsurgency tactics underwent two phases during the war. During the first phase between February 1899 and December 1900 the United States attempted to counter the rebels by dispersing their forces throughout the islands in local garrisons, much like the Spanish had during 1895 in Cuba. Unlike the Spanish, however, the Americans made serious efforts to win over the population with McKinley's program of benevolent assimilation. The McKinley administration hoped by providing local governance and civil rights, while building schools, roads and improving other badly neglected infrastructure, they could win Filipinos over to the benefits of American rule. These efforts were not entirely fruitless but they were wholly inadequate by themselves to end the rebellion.

Starting in December 1900 the Americans shifted strategy towards attacking the rebels' support and infrastructure, which quite simply meant treating all Filipinos in active combat zones as potential hostiles or enemy combatants. Thus during the second phase of the war, between December 1900 and July 1902, the Americans adopting a much more aggressive counterinsurgency program that emphasized punishing civilians perceived to be supporting the rebels. During this phase of the war, many non-combatant Filipino civilians lost their jobs, property, and personal freedom. Finally in 1901 these policies culminated in adopting a reconcentration policy similar to the Spanish in Cuba, forcibly removing civilians out of the countryside into concentration camps in American zones of control (Linn, PW 199-200).

Successful Spanish counterinsurgency strategies also indiscriminately targeted civilians, and their methods "almost destroyed the Cuban independence

movement, along with a great part of the Cuban population" (Tone, 234).

However, paradoxically the Spanish discovered that while targeting civilians

proved effective at slowly defeating the insurgency, it also attracted what

guerillas need most: international attention and assistance.

Foreign assistance critical to guerilla success

Nationalism provides guerilla warfare with the popular support it needs to

sustain a long-term strategy of attrition against foreign colonial occupiers, but

nationalist guerilla resistance requires foreign assistance to successfully defeat

the occupier. Rebel forces can gain foreign support in three main ways. First,

rebels can acquire vital shipments of arms, munitions and supplies from abroad.

Second, rebel governments-in-arms can seek diplomatic recognition and/or

belligerent status, making it easier to borrow money and purchase weapons

while providing the rebel cause with additional moral support. This can also

pressure the occupying nation to consider negotiating or leaving altogether.

Third, rebels can gain conventional military support from a friendly foreign

government openly hostile to the occupying power. While both rebellions lasted

several years and received substantial amounts of popular support, Cuban rebels

benefited from all three types of foreign assistance, while Filipinos received only

minimal amounts of the first kind.

Recent scholarship on counter-insurgency strategy emphasizes the importance of this point. In his 2012 work, *The Counter-Insurgency Myth*, military theorist Andrew Mumford argues:

> The level of external support insurgent groups receive has proved itself to be a critical enabler of insurgent success. An absence of exogenous funding and weaponry has stunted insurgencies and fatally undermined their potency. Arguably external insurgent support is more important to the effectiveness of an insurgent group than the level of internal support it receives amongst its own population. An armed group without weapons is irrelevant, yet an armed group with minimal popular support is still an armed group. The security threat remains (2012, 151).

Although U.S. officials did stop some ships from bringing men, weapons and supplies to Cuba, they usually let everyone go and – most importantly – returned the seized assets. The Spanish navy was not large and the Cuban coastline was long and full of landing spots, so Cuba effectively had an open border that the rebels could always use to bring in more weapons and supplies (Tone 2006, 51). Cuban émigrés based in the United States sent dozens of filibustering expeditions to Cuba from 1895 to 1898 (Tone 2006, 82).

The Cleveland administration declared the U.S. as a "neutral" in the war, but fundamentally the U.S. government did little to stop the flow of weapons and supplies into Cuba. Additionally the governments of Mexico, Costa Rica, Columbia and Venezuala were also either unwilling or unable to stop Cuban émigré communities from organizing and sending supplies to the island. Meanwhile, the Spanish navy was far too small to effectively blockade 2,000 miles of coastline (Tone 2006, 83). The steady supply of weapons and ammunition was vital for the Cuban rebel's ability to maintain continuous operations against the Spanish.

The situation in the Philippines was quite a different story. By 1899 Aguinaldo commanded an Army of 80,000 men on paper, but in reality the Army of Liberation didn't have the conventional resources to stand up to a contemporary regular army. The Filipinos had no cavalry, artillery nor even enough guns and ammunition for every fighter. They had no means of domestically producing arms or supplies except one hastily established munitions factory near Manila, which was quickly overrun by American forces after fighting began. They also did not have enough uniforms, shoes or medical supplies. The only way the rebels were able to acquire key military resources was through capture or purchases abroad. Without a navy the Filipinos would have difficulty getting any supplies from abroad past the American blockade (Halsted 1898, 123-124).

Indeed, the U.S. navy "played a crucial role," blockading foreign arms shipments and bottling up interisland trade. The American fleet made it so the rebels "could not send large numbers of troops outside Luzon," while "Navy gunboats shut down coastal traffic– absolutely essential in an archipelago lacking roads–and disrupted the revolutionaries' efforts to raise and transport funds (Linn 2000, 325). The absence of naval support was an impossible difficulty for the Filipinos to overcome. In the 1770s rebellious American colonists were fortunate enough to have a small conventional army and didn't have to contend with the difficulty of defending an archipelago. Yet despite their advantages, even the Americans required naval support from the French to help them get regular shipments of supplies and deny the British their own naval support at crucial

moments such as Yorktown in 1781. According to Weigley, "The French Navy had given the American revolutionary cause the additional moral impetus that was almost certainly indispensable" (1991, 241).

Racial ambiguity in Cuba vs. racial inferiority in the Philippines

At the beginning of the war Aguinaldo and the other leading *ilustrados* were determined to form a rebel government, administration and conventional army to defend their country in a traditional European manner. The *ilustrados* were well aware that most of the Western world considered Filipinos inferior and uncivilized, and they wanted to form a Western-style government and army to demonstrate their level of civilization and potentially gain crucial foreign recognition and support.

American General Charles Whittier, who had accompanied the expeditionary forces as an advisor, met with Aguinaldo and discussed the difficulty of the Filipinos' military situation shortly before the conflict began. Whittier explained to the revolutionary leader that he "must consider that they are without any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the development of the country," and essentially "that the Philippine Government alone did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of the islands without the assistance of other governments" (PIS, pt. 6: 65-67). Interestingly, Aguinaldo agreed with Whittier, further suggesting he was hoping domestic U.S. politics or foreign powers would aid the rebel cause.

Although the Filipinos quickly defeated Spanish forces outside of Manila and occupied the rest of Luzon in 1898, this was largely because the Spanish were fighting two rebellions and the Filipinos received critical support from the U.S. Spain lacked adequate resources and political will to seriously defend the Philippines, which eventually became a moot point after the U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish fleet and blockaded Spain from reinforcing the islands. However despite their weakness, the Spanish were still largely able to suppress the rebellion in Luzon before American entry into the war.

Some rebel *ilustrados* hoped that by defeating the Americans outside Manila and perhaps even capturing the city the Filipinos might gain foreign recognition or support, but this simply was not a realistic hope after the Senate accepted the Treaty of Paris. In July 1899 Benito Legarda, one of the three Filipinos who served on the Philippine Commission and a member of the Municipal Council in Manila, criticized rebels who still "dream a European intervention in our favor is to take place, without reflecting that the Treaty of Paris was made before all the civilized world and with its assent" (PIS, pt. 8, 27).

More than a year later collaborating *ilustrados* on the island of Panay tried to get rebel forces in control of the interior to stop fighting using a similar logic: "The other nations will not interfere here when they have not done so in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and are all more or less preparing themselves for events of greater interest to them" (PIS, pt. 11, 59). The Philippines were not part of the "civilized" world and not entitled to the same political rights or independence as Westerners. Defeating the Americans on the battlefield and

capturing Manila would do nothing to change the Filipinos' status in this regard. The *ilustrados* of Panay were right: if European powers weren't going to help Boer colonists descended from Europe, they certainly weren't going to help the Filipino people.

Both Filipino and American leadership understood that either conventional or guerilla resistance would ultimately not be successful if the Filipinos could not receive recognition, military aid, and possibly even direct military support from another foreign power. Geo-political circumstances at the end of the 19th century uniquely benefited Cubans and hurt Filipinos. The extreme level of racism most Western populations exhibited towards non-white peoples made it difficult for Filipinos to get foreign support because the consensus international view held non-whites to be less than human.

White supremacy was the lynchpin of the increasingly fragile pre-World War I global order, so even opportunistic new powers like Germany and Japan would not risk helping non-white rebels in another country for fear of inspiring those under their own colonial administration. The Cubans were fortunate (from a military perspective) because of the ambiguity surrounding their "whiteness." Cuba was already informally part of the American economic imperium and American capitalists wanted to sever Cuba's formal connection to Spain, so American media overwhelmingly and erroneously depicted the rebels as basically white. Indeed, before Americans arrived on Cuba the American press the depicted the Spanish as barbaric and less than white at the beginning of the conflict. However just prior the U.S. intervention, American newspapers

transformed Cuban revolutionaries into "anarchist negro hordes," while the

whiteness of Spain was rediscovered (Tone 2006, 11-12). The lesson was clear:

at the turn of the twentieth century, any population that was not considered white

enough by the international (really Western) community could not count on

foreign military aid in nationalist wars of colonial liberation.

CONCLUSION

Waging a guerilla war of attrition is a strategy that takes time and almost always requires outside help, whether it be recognition of belligerency, critical loans and arms shipments, or direct military aid from a state hostile to the occupying powers interests. Although the Philippine-American war demonstrates nationalism can prolong domestic resistance against a powerful occupying foreign nation, it also shows that without some kind of external support such resistance can be defeated by targeting civilians. Filipinos desperately needed foreign support, but given the racist logic of the time they had little chance of receiving it.

In order for a guerilla strategy to work, it is also important for rebels to carefully guard resources and avoid the desire to form a conventional army and wage a conventional war effort. Thus another major difference between the Cubans and Filipinos was Cuban rebels smartly choose to avoid conventional operations and focus exclusively on guerilla tactics, while Filipino rebels wasted resources forming conventional forces and attempting to campaign like the American army. Nevertheless, that Filipinos resisted as long as they did without substantial support is further testament to how widespread national resistance to American occupation was. Linn is critical of the Filipinos for waging a conventional campaign and tying so many of their hopes to a potential Bryan

election in 1900, but this was probably the best (albeit still slim) chance they had

for gaining independence at the time (Linn 1900, 187).

The general weakness of Spain was also a major factor in explaining the

different outcomes. Had Cuba still been under the control of any major European

power, it is extremely difficult to imagine the United States intervening in Cuba,

humanitarian disaster or no. The British carried out an equally brutal and

destructive counterinsurgency campaign against Boer civilians in South Africa

between 1899-1902, but even the humanitarian suffering of white colonists was

not enough to induce another major power to fight the mighty British Empire.

Nationalist guerilla warfare had become a powerful force by 1900, but it did not

become routinely effective at defeating colonial powers until the global white

supremacist order started collapsing in 1945. By the 1950s communist Russia

and China began strongly supporting national liberation in non-white societies,

giving anti-colonial guerillas an endless stream of critical military supplies.

Nationalism remains a powerful force in modern society – one that

scholars have long recognized shapes and is shaped by war (Tilly 1995;

Hutchison 2009). This is clearly demonstrated by the recent wars in both

Afghanistan and Iraq, the current war in the Ukraine, and even probably by the

Islamic State movement, which arguably is far more nationalist than religious in

character (using religious language and symbolism to propagate primarily

nationalist discourse). Thus it is also becoming clear that nationalism has

increased the frequency and intensity of warfare – despite the proliferation of

modern democracies, warfare is becoming harsher and more violent (Downes

2008; Wimmer 2013). The era of effective conventional military combat ended long ago, and that the rise of nationalism has caused modern states to pursue increasingly violent and destructive strategies to combat nationalist resistance. (Weigley 1973 & 1991; Downes 2008). Indeed warfare in Cuba and Philippines demonstrated the difficulty of waging a war of occupation while simultaneously maintaining liberal humanitarian ideals.

There is an old military adage that "generals are always preparing to fight the last war." However, nationalism has transformed warfare so much since the classic age of conventional warfare, it would be more accurate to say modern generals are still preparing to fight in the pre-nationalist "Age of Battles." Current military and political leaders must recognize how profoundly warfare has changed in the age of nationalism. If nationalist insurgencies cannot be isolated and denied material support to continue fighting, then conventional military forces will be unable prevail (Mumford 2012). Additionally, even if nationalist are denied material support, substantial levels of violence and wars of long duration are inevitable (Downes 2008). Modern leaders would do well to recognize these new realities to avoid excessive waste of blood and treasure over wars that can no longer be won.

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