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18 May 2022

IA701 Capstone Research Paper

UNH Honors Thesis

Advisor: Professor Fredrik Meiton

*Creating an Integration Framework for the European Union? Comparing the Role of
Language in Integration Policy Regarding Education and Labor Participation Rates in
Germany and Sweden*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

1.1	Background and Defining the Problem	4
1.2	Aim of the Paper and Research Question	5
1.3	Defining Main Concepts	6
1.4	Structure of Thesis	7

Research and Methods

2.1	Research Design	8
2.2	Primary Source Evaluation	8
	a. Source Types	8
	b. Possible Weaknesses	9
2.3	Literature Review of Secondary Sources	10
	a. Theoretical Models of Integration	10
	b. Immigration Policies and Integration Policies	13
	c. Concept of Citizenship in Germany and Sweden	15

Integration Policies and Outcomes in Germany and Sweden

3.1	Historical Perspectives of Migration (1945 – 2015)	17
3.2	Current German Policies and Outcomes	19

a.	Integration and Language Policy	20
b.	Labor Market Integration	21
c.	Education Policy and Integration	22
3.3	Current Swedish Policies	24
a.	Integration and Language Policy	25
b.	Labor Market Integration	26
c.	Education Policy	27

Analysis and Data

4.1	Analysis of the German Integration Situation	28
4.2	Analysis of the Swedish Integration Situation	30
4.3	Role of Language Policies within Germany and Sweden	32
4.4	Language Policy Effect on Educational Attainment and Labor Participation ...	35

Framework for the EU?	38
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Conclusion	41
------------------	----

Bibliography.....	43
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Primary Sources	51
-----------------------	----

Introduction

1.1 Background and Defining the Problem

There has been constant migration to Europe, which started at the end of the Second World War and has continued into the present day. The migration of people into new countries has a profound impact on society, both socially and economically, prompting the creation of immigrant integration policies globally and, particularly, in Europe. War, political conflict, and climate change in the 21st century have created a new era of migration that has produced several waves of immigrants that have surpassed any country's previous experiences. These new waves of migration have affected the fabric of European society, creating social and economic challenges on a new scale.

The 2015 Refugee Crisis resulting from the Syrian Civil War was a turning point for the EU regarding the importance of immigration and integration policies. With 1.3 million people arriving on the European continent seeking asylum, the need for a more comprehensive integration policy became clear; especially for countries that already had large migrant populations before the crisis. The two EU member states with the highest number of immigrants per capita in 2015 were Germany and Sweden, which were also the two EU member states that accepted the most refugees throughout the crisis. These countries are facing the same urgency to integrate their new populations, yet they have had different policy stances regarding the integration of immigrants into their society at both social and economic levels.

This paper aims to discuss Germany's and Sweden's histories of migration, current integration policies, their social and economic effects, and the role language proficiency policies play in the successful integration of immigrants. Looking at these two countries through this lens

will attempt to answer which country has a more effective integration policy and if that integration framework should be considered as the policy basis for the entire EU.

1.2 Aim of Paper and Research Question

Germany and Sweden are two countries that are ideal cases for comparing immigrant integration policies. The countries are similar culturally and, since 2015, both have admitted similar numbers of refugees per capita. According to the *Statistikmyndigheten*, the federal Swedish statistical authority, 25.9% of the Swedish population has a migration background. Similarly, according to the *Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt*, the German federal office of statistics, 26.7% of the German population has a migration background. Each country is different in its needs, yet a need they share is the ability to integrate their populations of refugees to utilize their skills as their populations' age. By comparing these countries, I aim to show that language proficiency in the host country's language must be met through social programs and policies to integrate and utilize immigrant populations successfully.

Germany and Sweden are known globally for high education levels, skilled economies, and formerly homogenous populations, making them perfect case studies that reflect much of Western society. If research is done and solutions are created studying two highly developed countries with systems and infrastructure already in place to create improved integration policies, then a possible framework can be created as a guide for other Western advanced countries. A new framework would help countries integrate their current immigrant populations more effectively and incentivize them to accept larger amounts of migrants in the future due to the positive impact integration policies can have on the labor market.

The first research question that I will answer in this paper is: *How have the different language acquisition requirements affected educational attainment and labor participation rates in Sweden and Germany?* The second question is: *Which country has implemented an integration policy that could be used as a framework for the EU immigrant integration policy?*

1.3 Defining Main Concepts

It is essential to have a clear understanding of the definition of “immigrant integration” agreed upon by the EU Commission, as it is the definition that both Germany and Sweden abide by when creating their national policies. The EU Commission agreed that “integration is defined as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident Third Country Nationals and the host society, which provides for full participation of the immigrants to all sectors of society” (EU Commission, 17). By definition, integration is a relationship between immigrants and their host society where the country grants rights in society’s social, political, economic, and cultural realms. In turn, the immigrants maintain a respect for their host country by actively participating in the opportunities legally granted to them. This paper will discuss the current integration policies of Germany and Sweden with this definition as a basis for understanding the ultimate goal posed by the EU. It will argue that, in order to abide by the EU definition of integration, there must be a stronger focus on language proficiency by the host society. Without it, full participation by immigrants cannot be achieved.

The term “language proficiency” is also essential to understanding the scope and purpose of this research. According to the book *Planning Meaningful Instruction for ELLS*, “language proficiency” for those learning another language is “the ability to use language accurately and appropriately in its oral and written forms in various settings” (Ernst-Slavit, Chpt.2). This paper will use this definition of basic understanding and use of language as the standard for language

acquisition in Germany and Sweden's immigrant populations. The definition is foundational but provides the precise requirement of being able to use language accurately and appropriately in various settings, which is essential for entering educational settings and the labor market.

Abiding by this definition, versions of the host language spoken in minority communities will not be considered "proficient" for this research.

1.4 Thesis Statement

The claim I will argue in this paper is that *the German assimilation model for immigrant integration is a more relevant framework for the European Union than the Swedish multicultural model.*

This claim is posed after researching the integration outcomes after 2015 in both Sweden and Germany. Data, long-term statistical predictions, experiences of immigrant populations through written texts and interviews, and policy briefs at the federal and EU level suggest that the previous view of having multicultural, egalitarian policies for immigrant integration have created parallel societies within countries. The integration outcomes in Sweden refute the claim that multicultural policies create a more integrated and diverse national community. This paper will argue that immigrants do not obtain the necessary skills to succeed in society educationally and economically without specific assimilation policies and tougher requirements. Through scholarly debates and research, it is clear that Sweden and Germany have different approaches to how they have integrated immigrants and refugees in the past. After the 2015 refugee crisis, the data shows a higher long-term return on German policy than Swedish due to immigrants being pressured to meet country-specific capital requirements. For this research, language proficiency is the main country-specific capital requirement being examined.

Research and Methods

2.1 Research Design

This research uses quantitative data mixed with qualitative data to support the statistics. I will consult federal statistics from both countries as the foundation for my thesis and a building block to add to existing scholarly research throughout this paper. The data will be used in different formats; I will consult figures and percentages within the text, provide official figures and data when needed, and supply comparative data in a visual form to support my thesis. The laws, policies, and briefs will be consulted to identify and dissect specific language regarding theories, migrant/ethnic groups, gendered language regarding education and labor participation, and political rhetoric to compare and contrast the policies in both countries and the effects. In consulting with these sources, I will be able to compare Sweden and Germany's policies against each other and ultimately with the EU briefs.

2.2 Primary Source Evaluation

a. Source Types

The primary resources that I will be consulting within in my research are Swedish and German federal statistics on labor and education, Swedish and German federal laws and policies regarding immigration and integration, European Union briefs and policy, and Statista, Eurostat, PISA, and OECD survey data. The formats of each of these sources vary. Federal statistics from Germany and Sweden are formatted in downloadable Excel spreadsheets, annual federal reports, and simplified tables online. The laws and policies of both countries were found on web pages and were also downloadable from each government's website. For linguistic clarity, the quoting and understanding of policies and statements from each country were read in their original

language, not as an English translation. European Union briefs and policies are published online in English and German; they are not offered in Swedish. Finally, OECD data was found on the official website graphically and in the form of individual reports published in English.

b. Possible Weaknesses

One potential weakness that can be found in my primary resources are the differentials in detailed data from both countries. The *Statistikmyndigheten* (Swedish Statistics Bureau) stopped publicly releasing origin country statistics of immigrants in 2007. Consequently, while we can look at immigrant statistics and assume for the years after 2015 a majority percentage is migrating from off-continent, there is no way to differentiate European migration from third-country nationals (off-continent immigrants). In Germany, the *Deutsches Statistisches Bundesamt* (German Federal Office of Statistics) groups immigrants by continent or category – the category for third-country nationals is “*Wichtige Asylherkunftsländer*” (Important Asylum Origin Countries), which includes Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa. However, like Sweden, this data does not specify exactly which country immigrants/refugees have come from.

Another potential weakness that can be found in my primary resources is the possibility that EU Commission briefs, policies, and agendas could be skewed towards a more German perspective due to the stronger influence the country has over the organization and the European economy as a whole.

2.3 Literature Review of Secondary Sources

Some research suggests that language plays a role in integration, but there has yet to be an in-depth discussion of the importance of language for immigrants focusing specifically on education and labor participation outcomes. This paper explores how language policies relate to

the success, or lack thereof, of educational attainment and labor participation in both countries and how that need has been exacerbated post-2015.

Existing research comparing Germany to Sweden was published in the early 2000s. Building on, but significantly departing from that work, this paper will provide a more up to date picture of the current policies and outcomes. Therefore, I aim to not only fill in a gap of missing knowledge but also to fill in the gaps time has created from the last research done on the two countries while adding the discussion of a possible European Union framework.

A large number of secondary sources from various scholarly communities are used to create this paper and the discourse within it. The scholarly communities of discourse consist of literature discussing integration into Europe (post World War II), immigration and integration theory, policy, education policy, second language learning, linguistics, economic and labor market theory, citizenship, and the role of the European Union. Each of these communities has different perspectives on the issue of immigrant integration and the role of language for immigrants – while some communities of discourse converge, others disagree regarding integration policies and their scope.

a. Theoretical Models of Integration

There are four agreed-upon theoretical models for immigrant integration relevant in this field of research: “the assimilationist, multicultural, the melting pot, and differential-exclusionary models” (Korkmaz, 7). The two integration theories relevant to this research are the multicultural approach and an assimilationist approach.

The multicultural theory employed by Sweden is defined as “an ideal in which members of minority groups can maintain their distinctive collective identities and practices. In the case of

immigrants, proponents emphasize that multiculturalism is compatible with, not opposed to, the integration of immigrants into society; multiculturalism policies provide fairer terms of integration for immigrants” (Stanford, 1). Sweden’s use of a multicultural policy approach to integration and language creates policies geared toward fostering diversity within social spaces, making integration courses voluntary, and promoting the idea that cultures can exist in one national space without asking immigrants to ‘become’ Swedish.

The assimilationist theory employed by Germany is defined as “the process by which a minority integrates socially, culturally, and/or politically into a larger, dominant culture and society... Assimilation usually involves a gradual change of varying degrees. Full assimilation occurs when new members of a society become indistinguishable from native members” (Lumen, 3). Germany’s use of assimilationist policies that are geared toward the goal of creating an environment for effective immigrant entrance into the German society. Its policies have requirements for language, a minimum of courses that need to be taken, and tests that must be taken to get a work pass – productivity is the primary goal rather than the diversity approach.

The literature offers support for both assimilationist and multicultural integration policies and most papers use Germany and Sweden in their discussions due to their immigration histories, creating a richer discourse for this paper. In the paper *Comparison of Swedish and German Immigrant Integration Policies within the light of the European Union Framework* by Toros Korkmaz, the author argues a multicultural approach offers the incentive for immigrants to engage in society fully because they can be part of the national space as they are whereas in Germany immigrants must transform themselves to become part of the society. He concludes that Sweden has a higher success rate based on surveys of happiness from immigrants. They also

have a long history of creating integration policy that puts them ahead of Germany with their experience and knowledge, which will only continue to progress.

Anja Wiesbrock offers a counter to Korkmaz's discourse in her paper *The Integration of Immigrants in Sweden: A Model for the European Union?* by discussing Sweden's choice to use a different immigrant integration policy approach as compared to the rest of the European Union and how although it may seem through external reviews with international organizations that Sweden is leading other European countries with integration, statistical data refutes that claim. Using OECD and Eurostat reports, the author discusses the reality of the Swedish system against other EU member countries, indicating that Sweden has had a wide gap between native and immigrant populations within the labor market since the 1990s that has continued to widen into the present day, there have been social conflicts due to reliance and expenditure of the welfare system on migrant populations and an incentive to enter Swedish society at a base level there will be no incentive for immigrants to learn Swedish, further/start education, and or enter the labor market due to a high skill demand for labor or a low skilled demand that requires a language base.

One of the main points Korkmaz argued was that Sweden had a long history with immigrant integration policies and was ahead of their European member states therefore, their knowledge and experience in multicultural policy outweigh the rigidity of German assimilationist policy. Wiesbrock, however, pushes against that claim by stating that although Sweden was among the first to create policy, that policy hasn't been changed nor amended nearly enough since it was created in 1965. The reason for migration, origin countries, and age of those migrating have changed drastically since the first policy was put in place. Although it has longevity, it does not mean that it is the most equipped for the modern situation.

b. Immigration Policies and Integration Policies

Although Germany and Sweden kept their borders open during the 2015 Refugee Crisis when other European countries halted border flow with guards and wire, they have since taken restrictive stances regarding immigration. The tightening of immigration policy is a reaction to the large numbers of immigrants that arrived in both countries. They were oversaturated and needed to control the numbers of immigrants that they accepted for the sake of their infrastructure and native populations. The literature surrounding this topic discusses why both countries chose to restrict their borders, the exceptions made by countries – especially regarding family reunification policies, the human rights issues that arise when restrictive policies target certain regions, and how the integration policies work with immigration policy. There is a restrictive stance on immigration and granting of visas paired with an intensive integration program with linguistic, economic, and social requirements in Germany. Immigration to Germany is selective, and the integration is thorough in maintaining a high functioning society with working systems.

Before 2015, Sweden had a relaxed immigration policy that made it easy to enter the country and stay. However, after the crisis, Sweden adopted policies that made it one of the most restrictive immigration policies in the EU member states. This restrictive turn has been criticized in some literature, especially by those who support multicultural and liberal immigration policies, arguing that Sweden is going against its constitutional commitment to global humanitarianism and are now contributing to human suffering. Others have applauded Sweden for taking a more restrictive approach as it will benefit their systems in the long term and allow them to control their integration obstacles.




Figure 1 - Visual Comparison of Germany and Sweden's Immigration Numbers 2011-2020




Figure 2 - Germany's 2011-2020 Immigration Statistics, Data Taken from Statista Database




Figure 3 - Sweden's 2011-2020 Immigration Statistics, Data Taken from Statista Database

Figures 1, 2, and 3 above show the immigration numbers to both Germany and Sweden from 2011 to 2020 published by Statista Database. Figure 1 is a comparative line graph to show that

while Germany and Sweden both let in nearly the same percentage per population of immigrants in the wake of the refugee crisis and year after, the actual numbers of immigrants was vastly different. Due to the differences in statistics both countries are broken down into their individual graph to visualize the downward trend of immigration after 2016. Figure 2 shows Germany's immigration numbers and the downward trend begins in 2016 and stays relatively stable in the years after, the significant dip in the 2020 data is attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Figure 3 shows a clearer visual of Sweden's immigration numbers and it has a sharper downward trend than Germany. Sweden became more restrictive after the surge of immigration in 2016 and it has been a steady decline of immigration since, like Germany the extremely low immigration in 2020 is attributed to COVID-19 as well and there was an increase in 2021.

What is interesting about the restrictive stance on immigration policy seen above in Sweden is that there has not been a move towards a restrictive immigrant integration policy to match. Instead, there has continued to be a liberal and multicultural approach to integration that has not benefitted the state nor the immigrants already there. Therefore, Sweden has restricted the ability for more immigrants to arrive, which has helped their overwhelmed social systems. Still, by not properly integrating the populations of immigrants already in the country, issues that were meant to be avoided through restrictive immigration continue.

c. Concept of Citizenship

An essential component of understanding immigrant integration policies is understanding the concept of nationality and citizenship, specifically in Germany and Sweden. Citizenship designates a form of legitimacy over a citizen and grants a sense of belonging to a society with rights and duties. While refugees and immigrants are often granted asylum and residence permits, which give them specialized rights and access to certain levels of social services, in

most cases they are not naturalized as citizens of their host country immediately. Instead, that is seen as an end goal of a lengthy integration process.

The similarities between Germany and Sweden are, as previously stated, what make them ideal for research and comparison, as they both have robust welfare systems, large migrant populations, and relatively stable labor participation rates. Germany and Sweden also share similar citizenship acquisition laws by birth, but they diverge in immigrants' citizenship and permanent residency laws. Like the previously discussed theories of integration used by Germany and Sweden, there are also citizenship models that coincide with them; Sweden with a multicultural model and Germany with an ethnic model. The literature surrounding citizenship in both countries discuss the requirements for citizenship, the rights granted to permanent residents, and exceptions/limits on asylum seekers.

Sweden is a nation that primarily confers citizenship through the principle of *jus sanguinis*, the “principle of descent/blood.” This means that citizenship occurs automatically if one parent of the child is Swedish. Although this principle still stands for those born in Sweden or to Swedish parents while abroad, there have been exceptions and expedited citizenship laws put in place for immigrants and asylum seekers. Since 1984, Sweden has allowed permanent residency for asylum seekers, and they can apply for naturalization after three years without any language or society exam. The requirements for Swedish naturalization are for one to “be able to verify [their] identity; have met the requirements for habitual residence, which means that [one] must have lived in Sweden a certain amount of time (5 consecutive years); have lived an orderly life in Sweden; have a permanent residence permit, or have the right of residence or a residence card (for those who are EU citizens or a close relative of an EU citizen) or have residence status.” (*Migrationsverket*). The requirements do not contain a language component, making it

an accessible process for immigrants. According to the Swedish Migration Agency, “a total of 85,000 people were granted Swedish citizenship last year. 27,340 of them were Syrians, 4,067 were Somalis, and 3,471 were Eritreans.” (SMA, 1). Sweden also allows for dual citizenship as long as the other nation of citizenship also permits it, allowing immigrants to maintain their cultural ties at home while being Swedish citizens.

Germany, like Sweden, is a nation that practices the principle of *jus sanguinis* regarding citizenship. Germany takes a restrictive stance on the granting of permanent residency and citizenship for asylum seekers and immigrants entering the country. Naturalization is not common in Germany, as many requirements must be met to qualify to apply. The requirements for German naturalization are as follows: “you must have lived in Germany for at least eight years with a residence permit, or you must have lived in Germany with a residence permit for seven years and have attended an integration course; you must have at least B1 German language skills; you must be financially able to support yourself and your family without government assistance; you must be a law-abiding citizen with no criminal record; you must pass a citizenship test; you must renounce previous citizenships” (Germany-Visa, 1). Therefore, more often than not immigrants remain permanent residents of Germany rather than naturalized citizens and, if they are to become citizens, they need to have linguistic proficiency.

Integration Policies and Outcomes in Germany and Sweden

3.1 Historical Perspective of European Migration (1945 – 2015)

Spurred on by the displacement of the Second World War, the Cold War, and the burgeoning globalization of industry at a large scale, the end of the 20th century saw an increase in human migration. At the end of the Second World War, Germany was already experiencing

the impact of loss and emigration. Not only had its population shrunk from 80 million in 1939 to 65 million in 1946 (*Statistisches Bundesamt*), but the country was also divided into Eastern and Western sections. A divided Germany was determined to rebuild its infrastructure as quickly as possible and new government, economic, and education systems, as well as the physical cityscape, needed to be created from the rubble. While East Germany was part of the USSR behind the Iron Curtain of communism, West Germany was being rebuilt by the allied powers as a democratic republic with capitalist markets. The race to rebuild against the backdrop of the Cold War prompted the West German government to recruit *Gästarbeiter*, guest workers, through a work incentive program starting in 1955. Inviting immigrants to join the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) in West Germany meant immigrants could come and get paid to rebuild by granting immediate work visas. The guest worker initiative prompted a mass influx of immigrants to arrive with their families in Germany, many of which would end up staying and building a life in their host country. This influx of guestworkers through this program remained steady until the mid-1970s, and even after the program ended, Germany continued to be a country that attracted immigration.

Sweden's population was relatively untouched in 1945 and increased between 1939 and 1950, as it had taken a stance of neutrality in the Second World War. In 1950, the population of Sweden was around 7 million. Although the population numbers were stable during this period, the internal migration of this populace was not. During the Second World War, and directly after, Swedes began to move away from rural farmland and started to mass migrate to urban centers and cities. The Swedish government did not have official guest worker programs and policies put in place after the end of the Second World War. Still, "the demand for labor immigrants grew with economic expansion following World War II. Between the 1950s and early 1970s, the vast

majority of immigrants [arriving in Sweden] were guest workers. The number of foreign-born residents tripled during this time, from 198,000 to 538,000” (Skodo, 2). The immigrants arriving during this period were mainly European and often returned home after a few years of working. Nonetheless, as Sweden’s economy continued to expand and their social programs became stronger, the country became an attractive place for workers to stay in and for others to migrate to. Sweden has attracted many immigrants due to their open borders, egalitarian policies, high employment rates, and healthy welfare system. The Swedish system attracts high skilled workers to immigrate and that has been a continued a benefit to the country’s economy.

Both Germany and Sweden have histories of mass immigration due to labor market and economic reasons, as waves of immigrants chose to migrate to join each society and start a new life. The change towards a mixture of economic and forced immigration began for both countries in the 1990s during the Yugoslavian Civil War, with millions of former Yugoslavians being displaced across the European continent. It was during this period that the EU and member states begin to discuss the possibility of needing transnational policy regarding immigration and the share of asylum seekers each country receives. There was push back from some member states that not all countries were equipped to handle migrant populations and this comment was repeated again by member states during and in the aftermath of the 2015 Refugee Crisis. Starting in 2015, the switch from a high percentage of economic immigrants to forced immigration became clear and a new era of immigration began for Germany and Sweden.

3.2 Current German Policies and Outcomes

Germany has a deep-rooted history with migration and emigration, both of which have impacted the stance that the nation has currently regarding immigration and integration. With a current population of 83.24 million, 26.7% are of migration background meaning that Germany

has had to create new policies to integrate and meet the needs of their changing demographic. Drastic change in population over the last six decades creates experiences of success and failure within policy and society, especially during the period of reunification. The current Federal Republic of Germany consists of 16 federal states that have independence within their regional governments, “the federal states enjoy, in particular with regard to the police, disaster control, the law, and culture...[t]he close links between the federal states and central government is unique, resulting in the state governments having numerous opportunities to play an active role in central government policy” (Tatsachen über Deutschland). Therefore, integration policy can be interpreted differently in each federal state, but they are all bound to the central governments federal requirements through policies and laws. In 2015, at the height of the crisis, former Eastern bloc states were critical of immigration and resettlement which led to a rise in right-wing sentiment. That sentiment has lessened over the past 7 years with dropping poll numbers and Germany’s federal states are beginning to see success from their integration policies.

a. Integration Courses and Language Policy

The German integration system is one of the more demanding and complex programs within the EU member states and was the spearhead of a tougher stance in requirements for immigrant integration. In Germany, it is federally mandated by the *Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF)* that immigrants take a minimum of 700 integration courses upon arrival, “*Der allgemeine Integrationskurs des BAMF dauert 700 Unterrichtseinheiten (UE). Je nach Ausrichtung des Kurses kann die Gesamtdauer auch bis zu 1.000 UE betragen. Eine Unterrichtseinheit dauert 45 Minuten. Personen mit guten Lernvoraussetzungen können den Integrationskurs auch als Intensivkurs mit 430 UE absolvieren* (The general integration course of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) lasts 700 teaching units. Depending on

the orientation of the course, the total duration can be up to 1,000 units. A lesson lasts 45 minutes. People with good learning requirements can also complete the integration course as an intensive course with 430 teaching units.)” The course length requirements Germany imposes on integration are intended to help immigrants pass language and society exams that provide access to employment and education opportunities.

The current exam for the language requirement in Germany is through the federal program *Deutsch als Fremdsprache*, German as a Second Language. Through this program there is a specialized *Deutsch-Test für Zuwanderer*, German Test for Immigrants, taken to receive a certificate of their language skills, there is an adult exam and an exam for adolescents used in the youth integration courses. This certificate shows that the holder is proficient at a B1 level and “offers [one] a great deal of advantages. It certifies an adequate knowledge of German and important basic knowledge of German society. It can also help with naturalization” (BAMF, 4). The certificate is able to be used at employment centers to help immigrants find jobs and aids in the access of educational and social services.

b. Labor Market Integration

The German labor market has a complex history due to the division of the state during the Cold War, but since reunification has seen a highly productive labor force that has contributed to it being the EU’s largest economy and 6th highest employment rate in Europe at 76.7% in 2021 (Statista). Germany is a highly developed nation that leads in the fields of pharmaceuticals, engineering, and automated technology, but it is also unique in its maintaining of a strong unionized middle class known as the *Mittelstand*. The *Mittelstand* is the core of the German working class and has strong cultural ties, along with strong worker unions. What makes the *Mittelstand* unique to Germany is that although automated technologies are a major export of

Germany there has been slow automation of jobs in the manufacturing sector. While most countries have attempted to automate completely and remove human labor from manufacturing Germany's unionized middle class has made it hard for the government and companies to do so. Therefore, the jobs available in Germany are not just service industry but also offer labor jobs that are not necessarily offered in other European countries.

The second largest trade union in Germany, *Ver.di*, that represents over 2 million members of the Mittelstand published a brief discussing the German government's policy for immigrants in the labor market. It states that the federal government has aims to promote "ein Arbeitsmarkt der guten Löhne, menschenwürdige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse und soziale Absicherung befördern nicht nur den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt, sondern auch die Beschäftigungschancen der eingewanderten Menschen – inklusive ihrer materiellen und sozialen Teilhabe, sprich der gesellschaftlichen Integration (A labor market with good wages, decent employment and social security that not only promotes social cohesion, but also the employment opportunities of immigrants - including their material and social participation, i.e. social integration)" (ver.di, 1). The connection between the labor market and integration policies has become a standard of the German government in their integration policies as it promotes the use of German language and creates positive interactions with the labor market as well as German members of society.

c. Education Policy and Integration

The German education system is a tiered system that has different tracks for students – both foreign-born and German. School is compulsory for students until age 16 and after that time some attend Gymnasium to prepare for university and others attend a vocational school that train them to enter the trades and workforce. The education integration of immigrant students is varied across the federal states and therefore results in statistical differences of educational outcomes.

Looking at the country report done by the OECD as a whole Germany has succeeded in some education integration policies but there are still many improvements to be made as noted in the report. According to the PISA 2018 survey, “in spite of their relative socio-economic disadvantage, 16% of immigrant students scored in the top quarter of reading performance. In PISA, immigrant students are defined as students whose both parents were born outside the test country. Germany is considered a long-standing destination country with many settled, low-educated immigrants” (PISA 2018, 1). This is a positive outcome of integration policy and highlights the benefit of integration courses for students as well, when immigrant students are able to perform well at lower education levels there is a higher chance they will continue to higher education. Nevertheless, the 2018 PISA report also stated that there is a lack of reading and language comprehension in immigrant students “The gap in reading performance between advantaged and disadvantaged students in Germany is large and increased by nine score points since 2009” (PISA 2018, 1). Literary gaps are tied to language proficiency and therefore, there is improvement to be made in that sector of education integration for immigrant students.

While many immigrants do not get the opportunity to attend a German university, there is a strong tie between education and integration. The Dual System of education and industry training in Germany is not unique, other European countries also employ vocational systems, but it is very regulated with tight connections between industries, institutions, and the government. The *Kultusministerium*, German Ministry of Culture, reported that “*Dabei versteht es sich von selbst, dass diese Ziele nicht durch Bildungseinrichtungen allein, sondern durch das Zusammenwirken verschiedener Akteure und Maßnahmen des Sozialraums umgesetzt werden müssen. Nur bei einer umfassenden sozialen Integration kann Zuwanderung in der aufnehmenden Gesellschaft die kulturelle und soziale Vielfalt sowie die ökonomischen Potenziale entfalten* (It goes without

saying that these goals do not have to be implemented by educational institutions alone, but through the interaction of various actors and measures in the social area. Immigration can only develop cultural and social diversity as well as economic potential in the receiving society if there is comprehensive social integration) “(Bildungs Bericht, 2). The concept of binding educational institutions with social and economic systems to aid in integration helps immigrants receive a rounded entrance to German society with practical use of skills gained in integration courses. The institutions and policy’s ultimate goal is work together to create an effective system of integration, education, and employment.

Despite its positive PISA ratings and high functioning Dual System the German education system is still skewed towards German-born students that are not socioeconomically disadvantaged. A 2021 Internal Report from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research have stated that, “how well a child does in school is closely linked to their parental background, with immigrants and their children particularly affected by structural inequalities... In the 30 to 35 age brackets, just 18.7% of those with a migration background born in Germany have attained a university degree. Among those with two German born parents, that figure rises to 29.6%” (Lawton, 2). Therefore, while there have been improvements in PISA ratings in the past decade, Germany still has problems with foreign-born students achieving university level educations which means integration has not reached its full potential.

3.3 Current Swedish Policies and Outcomes

Sweden has been regarded as an ideal for social systems across the European continent and globally. Generous welfare systems, multicultural policies that aim to foster acceptance of all, gender equality, high levels of humanitarian aid given each year, and easy entrance into the country make it an attractive country to reside in and use as a framework for systems elsewhere.

I would argue that, before the 2015 crisis, Sweden was an appropriate ideal as a framework for other countries to follow. Much of the literature pre-2015 agreed that Sweden was leading the EU in their integration policies and outcomes. However, in the past three to four years, the discourse has been changing as new EU data emerges.

a. Integration Courses and Language Policy

The Swedish Integration Program contrasts with other EU member states as it has continued to be characterized by principles of multiculturalism and diversity within immigrant populations as they integrate into life in Sweden. The main characteristics of the Swedish Integration Program are “1) participation is voluntary (outside of the 2.5-day mandatory society course introduced in 2021, discussed below); 2) the content of the program is employment-oriented, not geared towards teaching basic Swedish language and society skills; 3) the program is primarily decentralized with implementation varied at the municipality level; and 4) citizenship and naturalization are granted as a part of the integration process rather than the ultimate goal to achieve *from* the process” (Wiesbrock, 51) . Sweden has introduced a few mandatory requirements since Wiesbrock published her research, but they have not been significant and often the requirements are unenforced by the Swedish Migration Agency.

As of October 2021, there were changes made to the Swedish Integration Program that changed from a completely voluntary integration course system to requiring an introduction to Swedish society course conducted by the Swedish Migration Agency that takes 2.5 days to complete. As stated on the agency’s website, the goal of this new requirement is “to give asylum seekers a greater understanding of how Swedish society works [and of their] rights and obligations as asylum seekers, but also [to promote] better conditions for integration in the country for those who are granted a residence permit” with the course consisting of four focus

areas: the asylum process, life in Sweden, Swedish legislation and democracy, and Swedish norms and values. The course is required for all asylum seekers over the age of 15 and is recommended to be completed within 14 days of arriving.

Currently, there is no language requirement policy put in place by the Swedish government, although there are voluntary courses offered for Swedish language learning with the goal of labor market integration.

b. Labor Market Integration

Sweden has the 5th highest employment rate in Europe at 76.9% in 2021 (Statista) and the 7th largest economy of the EU member states as of 2021 (Eurostat). The main exports from Sweden are machinery, vehicles, and electrical equipment yet their largest industry is services economic assistance and residence permits remain independent from integration performance.

The dynamic nature of the Swedish market makes it increasingly hard for immigrants to enter it. Sweden's technological and manufacturing sector producing their largest percentages of exports is not manned by human labor but rather employs the use of advanced technologies and artificial intelligence for efficient and rapid production. "Routine based middle-wage occupations that have been perceived as safe and reasonably well-paid are nowadays managed by machines. Left are highly specialized and well-paid occupations since the machines provide increased productivity and globalization in turn provides larger markets, as well as simple service jobs with high competition which in turn squeeze down the wages of these jobs. Many occupations in the middle of the income distribution disappear throughout the whole western world" (Gustavsson, 8). This reality for Sweden has made it hard for immigrants to enter a low

and middle level jobs due to their lack of skills making them uncompetitive against those who speak basic Swedish and have higher levels of education.

The high threshold for skills in the labor market creates a gap between Swedish citizens and foreign born citizens leading to differentials in employment statistics as well as types of jobs available for each. As service is the largest industry in Sweden at 67% of the GDP (Statista) most of the lower wage jobs available are in that sector of the economy, yet immigrants are struggling to enter that sector as well due to lack of basic Swedish skills and education with competition from the shrinking Swedish-born middle class. The inability to compete for service jobs leads to a segregated labor market that forces immigrants to find jobs within their own ethnic communities reinforcing that there is no incentive to learn Swedish when the only jobs available are in an immigrants native tongue, “*Den svenska arbetsmarknaden är etniskt segregerad. Invandrare jobbar oproportionerligt ofta med invandrare och framförallt med personer från det egna födelselandet. Ett begränsat kontaktnät och brist på referenser är en (av flera) troliga orsaker till svårigheterna för utrikes födda att få sina första jobb.* (The Swedish labor market is ethnically segregated. Immigrants work disproportionately often with immigrants and above all with people from their own country of birth. A limited network of contacts and a lack of references is one (of several) probable reason for the difficulties for foreign-born people to get their first jobs.)” (IFAU, 2). Sweden’s labor market is competitive and therefore requirements and policy must be put in place for immigrants to be incentivized to leave their communities.

c. Education Policy and Integration

The Swedish education system is a model revered by many countries around Europe for its inclusion and integration efforts. However, in 2019, the PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) survey conducted by the OECD reported that Sweden was facing

difficulties with its migrant school-aged population. There were reported differences in the educational outcomes, participation, and resources received by Swedish students and foreign-born students. The 2019 report offered constructive critiques to the Swedish education system and, “proposes to revise the procedures to recruit teachers from a migrant background, offering them financial support during the necessary preparation to become a teacher in Sweden...moreover, the report deals with the theme of the teaching language to be used with migrant and refugee students. It highlights the importance of promoting individualized learning plans in the early stages of the integration process, with a continued support through the process, including students' families as part of the language learning process...” (EU Commission, Fernandez).

The 2019 critique published by the OECD was not the first time data had been published showing the differences between native and foreign-born students in Sweden, rather it was a report exacerbating issues that existed in the 2010 OECD Report on Sweden. The gap between native students and foreign-born students has not narrowed it has expanded over the past decade providing evidence that there needs to be better integration in the education sector.

Analysis and Data

4.1 Analysis of the German Integration Situation

The German integration process is ongoing and evolving to meet the needs and demands of the population. Many were critical of former chancellor Angela Merkel when she allowed more and more immigrants to cross the German border. With a pre-existing populous migration background, there was a belief that Germany could manage accommodations for the refugees. Seven years later, Germany is seeing a high percentage of the 1.7 million people who applied for

asylum between 2015 and 2019 feeling that they have a strong sense of belonging in their German communities. “More than 10,000 refugees that arrived in Germany in 2015 have mastered the German language sufficiently enough to not only work in Germany, but also enroll at university. More than half of the 1.7 million people who apply for asylum are working and paying taxes” (Oltermann, 2). Although it is inherent that there is another percentage of the population of immigrants that have not integrated as well as this, nor have any interest in becoming part of the German society.

There have been negative effects relating to integration in Germany as well. Although there is a high percentage of the immigrant population that wants to integrate, there have also been numerous incidents of crime that have sparked controversy in the country over whether integration has been successful or if integration is even possible. Terror attacks at Christmas Markets, mass sexual assaults on German women on New Year’s in Cologne, and many other religious and racial aggressions caused panic in the aftermath of the crisis. The result of the panic is the presence of alt-right and nationalist groups in Germany, namely the *Alternativ für Deutschland* (AFD) and they cannot be ignored when discussing the integration situation in Germany.

The AFD was former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s biggest critic in 2015, arguing that she surpassed her constitutional rights as Chancellor by granting over 1 million refugees to apply for asylum in 2015 and 2016. The nationalist political party gained momentum in the aftermath of the crisis, especially in the former Eastern bloc, by creating xenophobic sentiment and pro-European campaigns. The AFD received over 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 German elections, giving them a section in Parliament for the first time. This result caused controversy in Germany and raised many questions about the rise of the right and the safety of immigrant populations.

This fear seems to have waned with the successful integration has had as a whole in Germany, as in the 2021 German election the AfD received only 10.3% of the vote.

Germany has experienced highs and lows regarding their integration policies, but they have been successful in creating opportunities for immigrants through social systems, requirements, and community. Its success has come from a shared responsibility on the side of the immigrant populations and the German government; programs have been provided and have been utilized by the populations that need them. Access to education and language courses through required integration courses has aided in Germany's long-term success 7 years after the refugee crisis.

4.2 Analysis of the Swedish Integration Situation

The Swedish integration situation and its current state have received a myriad of opinions from scholars, politicians, and citizens. Scholarly research found that “(t)he unemployment rate in 2018 was four times higher among those with an immigrant background, which includes those born abroad as well as Swedes whose parents were born abroad” (Skodo, 4). Further, on 28 April, 2022, Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson announced that Sweden had failed to integrate the vast number of immigrants it has taken over the past two decades, leading to parallel societies and gang violence. Concentrations of immigrant populations live in segregated suburbs of Sweden's three major cities, Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, and these suburbs have become parallel societies neglected by the Swedish population and government. In her same address to the country, the Prime Minister was unusually critical of the State when discussing Swedish integration policy stating “segregation has been allowed to go so far that we have become parallel societies in Sweden. We live in the same country but then completely different realities” (Reuters, 2). The voluntary stance on integration requirements have

consequently created a chasm between the different cultures within Sweden because there is no shared language or cultural understanding. Without language abilities communities feel more comfortable living in their own parallel realities within Sweden rather than joining the majority of society to create a diverse national culture.

The current integration situation in Sweden is not a failure due to a lack of effort. Rather, immigration numbers have been so large in recent years that integration policies have failed to keep up with them. To mitigate these negative effects, Sweden will need to assess their integration policies and how they can incentivize successful integration into society for these sub-communities.

One of the most obvious ways to integrate immigrants into Swedish society is to require them to learn the language. When there is a shared level of communication, one can access the services culture and communities around them. The missing piece of language proficiency is often a large contributor to the creation of parallel societies. The violence and increased dependence on welfare and low unemployment statistics are symptoms of that failure. Sweden has become more restrictive in their immigration into the country, yet its integration policies have remained under a multicultural pretense. Therefore, they can use the situation to their advantage by having lower numbers of immigrants arriving and creating policies that attempt to integrate its pre-existing immigrant populations.

Sweden is at a crossroads with its integration policies and scholars suggest that the country is on the verge of veering away from its traditional multicultural perspective within integration policy. During this research, many proposals for policy change have been brought forward for discussion in the Swedish Parliament, though not many have come to fruition at a

real parliamentary level. These discussions include further mandatory requirements for integration courses, citizenship language exam, and an intensive labor force integration program.

Like Germany, right-wing groups fighting for restrictive immigration policy and promoting Swedish nationalism have gained traction since 2015. The Sweden Democrats are a conservative party in Sweden that is bringing a more restrictive and assimilationist approach to the Swedish Parliament, “[t]he party's rise reflects a backlash in Sweden against decades of liberal immigration policies and disillusionment with multi-culturalism.” (Reuters, 3). They have led the discussion on a more demanding approach towards immigration and integration proposing the introduction of a language exam for citizenship. While this has faced backlash from the Swedish population in past years it is now a possibility that Swedish policy and popular opinion will align with these kinds of policies.

4.3 Role of Language Policies within Germany and Sweden

Language proficiency is an integral part of the successful integration of migrants into a host nation, as it is arguably the most active and visible part of a society that provides access to needs and services. Through written and spoken language, populations can communicate, participate in daily activities, work in a labor market, make decisions for themselves, and engage in civic duties. Language is often thought to be a natural integration experience that happens individually after living in a country for a certain period. When living in a country being surrounded by the language written and spoken, it is easier to engage in the language daily and in time learn it.

Germany and Sweden have experienced immigration before 2015 that saw immigrants coming for economic reasons and, therefore, were incentivized to learn their host country's

language. They were active participants in society and labor markets and fulfilled the definition of integration set by the EU of shared responsibility and relationship between government and migrants. The discourse regarding language integration policy was not needed, nor was as urgent as it has now become in these two countries. The migration waves of 2015 to the present day have been forced due to political strife, war, and natural disasters. The reason for migration was no longer economic but, rather, for survival. Therefore, moving as well as learning the language was not a wanted choice by most refugees seeking asylum in Germany and Sweden. Often migration is seen as migration no matter the cause, but the experience of an economic migrant and refugee fleeing violence are very different; thus different policies must be made to adequately meet the needs of a new wave. Language integration must now be incentivized by social programs and required by the government to be successful, as there is a lack of choice on the refugees' side, making their experience different from other immigrants.

Germany has created a policy that has incentivized immigrants to learn German, but have also put requirements in place to reinforce the reality that, to contribute to the German economy and society, one must be able to speak proficient German. As a result, there are strict integration course requirements that must be met by refugees and immigrants over the age of 15. This age requirement is because education is only compulsory till the age of 16 in Germany, meaning that anybody over that age who is not intending to continue into higher education or vocational learning must still complete language courses outside of the federal education system. Although integration courses are run independently by each federal state, and each municipality can decide resource allocations, there is still a federal standard that must be met as all be one language requirement tests are the same. Sweden currently has no required policy or infrastructure for general integration courses and language integration courses. The Swedish migration agency

offers voluntary language resources as well as integration courses. Still, there is no incentive to attend as no exam needs to be completed to be granted citizenship or a work permit.

There are still changes both Germany and Sweden can make for language integration policies more successful and accessible to immigrant populations. There needs to be more incentive for Sweden for migrants to learn the language, starting with requiring a language exam if a migrant is to be naturalized as a Swedish citizen. Having a language exam as part of the process of becoming a citizen places importance on fulfilling the relationship between migrant and host country stated within the integration definition of the European Union. Currently, it is a failure on both sides as immigrants feel no need to learn the language as they do not deem it necessary to receive the services they need, and the government is not requiring any quota to be met or providing comprehensive courses. By placing requirements for language, the Swedish government will provide incentives and opportunities for immigrants to participate in society and or give them the opportunity of choosing to participate in aspects of social life after they have committed to meeting a specific level of Swedish language proficiency. The choice, which is reflected in current policy, should not be to not learn Swedish nor give an option as to whether or not immigrants want to integrate. Through granting asylum and citizenship, there is an implicit requirement that the citizens abide by Swedish laws and participate fully in society.

In Germany, there is still work that must be done even though they have effective language programs in place. Having resources unequally distributed between federal states makes integration different across the country, some states have more success than others, although federal requirements are the same. It must be incentivized in Germany that immigrants not only attend integration and language courses but that they also receive the same level of education and commitment from their instructors.

4.4 Language Policy Effects on Educational Attainment and Labor Force Participation

Research done on the immigrant population arriving in the EU member states has shown high differentials in labor force participation in educational attainment between native-born citizens and foreign-born. Having an educated populace is positive reinforcement for productivity in the labor market with lower unemployment and welfare distribution levels. Both Germany and Sweden are facing declining population rates in their workforce as fertility levels decline among native-born citizens. This situation can be mitigated by utilizing the skills of immigrant populations and putting policies in place that bridge the gap of skill and knowledge between native populations and immigrant populations.

Creating language proficiency policies for immigrants can aid in reducing the differentials in labor participation in educational attainment over a period of time. Policies are meant to be structures put in place to create opportunity in society while also maintaining the stability of existing systems by making sure each part is contributing and functioning correctly.

Sweden has seen that without language policies and requirements, stability within social structures begins to disintegrate. Resource shortages, reliance on welfare, the closing of schools in migrant communities due to lack of staff, and the unpreparedness of the Swedish migration agency to provide mandatory courses I'll show that there is a holistic system failure that effective language policies can mitigate.

Germany has language policies put in place that require immigrants to reach a level of basic proficiency that can be used for general activities and jobs in the service industry. The completion of a B1 exam warrants a permit that shows the holder has federally met the

requirements for basic German. Yet, there are still resource differentials in Germany as well as gender differentials and who is taking these courses.

Both Sweden and Germany could benefit from policies that make language a priority for all migrants by incentivizing the labor force and educational attainment. Education systems, as well as labor market structures, are highly developed in both countries with Germany being the largest economy in the European Union with low unemployment and Sweden has the “highest labor force participation rate by age sex and education in their native population” (Marois et. al, 127). These conditions make differentials between the population obvious, but they also can be used as a stable foundation in which additional policies can enhance further to test their success.

By creating programs where immigrants can learn the language as well as foundational skills that are capital specific to the host country there is an increased chance that they will not only have a positive reaction to the whole society but that they will also want to contribute as an active part of the labor market due to feeling supported and empowered by their new government. For example, one way these governments can create positive policy outcomes is highly incentivizing second-generation migrants and immigrants from earlier waves of migration to join the labor market as teachers of integration and language courses. Sweden has attempted to create a special investment program for recruiting immigrant teachers to fast track their integration by giving them intensive courses in Swedish so they can become teachers in Sweden although there has been no data recorded on the outcomes nor the participation in such programs, *“De lärare som fått gå en arbetsmarknadsutbildning på högskolenivå inom de så kallade snabbspåren upplever att de fick god kunskap om den svenska skolan och att deras motivation att arbeta som lärare i Sverige ökade. Det är dock inte möjligt att mäta om fler kommit i arbete till följd av satsningen* (The teachers who were allowed to attend a labor market training at

university level within the so-called fast tracks feel that they gained good knowledge of the Swedish school and that their motivation to work as teachers in Sweden increased. However, it is not possible to measure whether more people have found work as a result of the investment” (IFAU, 5). Nevertheless, refined policies can be made that promote relationships like these that are able to be tracked with data and overseen by federal agencies. Language and teaching policies encompass an understanding of the importance of recognition and representation in a new country and labor market but also show that opportunities are waiting when one engages in the language and culture of the host country. Having the representation of language learning can become less daunting as it has been taught by a fellow immigrant with a shared experience.

Another important way in which policies regarding language can bolster rates of economic and educational attainment is by creating opportunities for immigrant women. Sweden is a leader in gender equality within the government and society, but Germany is not yet as progressive as the Scandinavian country. Yet, both countries would benefit by engaging with a large part of the immigrant population that is normally excluded from the labor market and educational settings due to lack of prior experience and or cultural reasons. Policy regarding this must be culturally sensitive but what benefits both parties socially and economically. Teaching women language skills has the possibility to not only contribute to the labor force but also will reinforce language learning with children at home. In both Germany and Sweden, a large issue regarding failed language integration is that students are not speaking the host country’s language at home with either parent. Looking at the migration waves, women culturally tend to be at home more often with student-age children therefore the benefit of targeting women with language policies is enormous.

Utilizing immigrant populations is a way to smooth population decline, create societal cohesion and understanding, and increase the rate of labor force participation, all of which benefits both the host country and immigrant citizens. Nevertheless, without higher levels of language proficiency in immigrants, the differentials and educational attainment can limit the potential these populations have for contributing to the labor market.

Framework for the EU?

After comparing all of the data and discussing the structures, policies and obstacles of both Germany and Sweden, which country would provide a better framework for the European Union regarding integration policy? I argue throughout this paper and assert here that Germany currently has a better integration framework if the European Union plans to create a transnational integration framework. By no means is the German situation perfect, as discussed in the section above, but their current policies and requirements regarding language integration are more advanced than in Sweden.

The facets of the German system that make it a better framework for the European Union are 1) the language requirements needed to work and ultimately gain citizenship if one so chooses to go through that process after seven years; 2) longer integration course lengths are required for all immigrants over the age of 15; 3) due to the high language threshold needed to participate in the labor force and society within Germany, there is an incentive for immigrants to attend their integration courses as well as their language courses; and finally 4), although the German system has monetary resource requirements that must be met by immigrants arriving, the policy is intended to meet sustainable long-term goals not just to create a comfortable

immediate fix for populations. By demanding more from immigrants, particularly with language proficiency, the long-term outcomes of integration are more effective and yield higher societal and economic benefits for the country.

Categories of Data	Germany’s Statistics	Sweden’s Statistics
Length of Required Integration Courses	4 – 12 Months	2.5 Days
Percentage of Migrant Population Not Proficient in German	44%	57%
Percentage of Migrant Population without Job after 7 Years	32%	40%
Percentage of Migrant Population with >9 Years of Education	27%	31%

Figure 4 - Comparative Statistics for Integration in Germany and Sweden Regarding Course Length, Language Proficiency, Labor Participation, and Education

Although scrutinized in the early 2000s and in the immediate aftermath of the 2015 crisis, looking at Germany seven years later research shows that these policies have had a positive impact on the labor market and over time have seen a decrease in the initial societal pushback created by the AFD after the 2015 crisis. Successful integration is never immediate, nor is it a goal that can be met. Rather, integration in and of itself is a process that has no definite end.

Sweden is a country with wonderful systems that can be restructured and utilized to meet the needs of the growing immigrant population. Multicultural policies are no longer sustainable for the country and its welfare system in town and to yield the benefits from their increased younger population. By creating language policies and requirements, Sweden will be investing in the long-term sustainability of its systems and society. Often, requirements are seen in a negative light. However, integration requirements have the ability to positively impact the immigrant

populations and the Swedish society. This positive effect is a higher level of understanding of the language and culture, easier access to the labor market, and the opportunity to engage in a national society. Creating systematic relationships and means of communication between native populations and immigrant populations ultimately fulfills the goal of multicultural policies and integration by creating a diverse space in which different cultures can exist, but can also communicate and understand one another.

Literature regarding the creation of a transnational EU integration framework is divided. Some scholars argue that it would have a positive effect on EU member states due to a shared understanding and responsibility while others ascertain that immigration situations are so unique to every individual country that a singular framework will not fit each place and their needs. While I can understand that each immigration situation is unique to each country, I do believe that there is a benefit to having a universal EU framework for integration. Having standardized policies for EU member states means that each country will share in the responsibility of refugee and forced immigration resettlement by having the support, tools, and framework to do so effectively for their individual situations. In 2015, the lack of transnational policy led to member states such as Hungary and Poland refusing to take any refugees due to concerns over integration and failed multiculturalism attempts in other countries. Many other EU member states over the months of the crisis followed the same course of restriction leaving countries such as Germany and Sweden to take in large populations of migrants until they too had to taper off allowances. If a policy had been put in place for not only immigrant distribution but also a step-by-step policy guide to integration, there may have been more willingness to accept immigrants.

Having a backbone of support and certainty through shared experiences and policies, there is more accountability placed on the European Union and other member states to uphold

policies and support one another. Due to differences in economics and cultures, there will naturally be pushed back by certain member states that do not feel as though immigration is a burden they must bear. Creating policies aimed at the effective integration of migrants into society and the labor market could mitigate the angst shown by certain member states that fear the negative effects of immigration. Language policies that promote active participation in society and the labor market can ease that fear by creating conditions that make immigrant populations benefit how societies in economies. Therefore, it would not be an easy or small feat to create a standardized framework for the EU, but it would be naïve to argue that there is no benefit in this course around the topic.

Conclusion

The twenty-first century has brought a new era of forced migration to the borders of the EU. In the 2015 Refugee Crisis Germany and Sweden were the two countries in the EU with the highest number of refugees per capita. Both of these countries have extensive histories with immigration but have different policy approaches in the integration of their refugee and immigrant populations into society. Germany's demanding assimilationist policies for integration require immigrants to participate in integration courses with a focus on language proficiency which will give them access to the host society and its services. Sweden's multicultural integration policies are of a voluntary nature with no language requirements to formally enter any part of society. Through research looking at federal policies of integration, language policies, labor market policies and statistics, as well as education policies and outcomes for both countries it is argued that Germany has a more effective framework for integration due to their language requirements. The requirements Germany places on its immigrant population have proven through data to be successful regarding integration into the host society. By valuing language as

an essential form of currency for immigrants, Germany's policy and framework has shown to be effective in the seven years after the refugee crisis. While Sweden has well established infrastructure and a robust welfare system their lack of requirements for learning the Swedish language has led to parallel societies where cultures and languages live apart in the same country. There are many improvements and policy changes both countries can make to improve integration outcomes, the current data suggests that the German framework is more effective in language outcomes which affect educational attainment and labor market participation of immigrant populations.

Germany, Sweden, and the rest of the European Union member states will continue to face large populations of immigrants in the coming years as political tensions rise. During the duration of conducting this research "over 6.1 million Ukrainian refugees have been displaced across Europe while an estimated 7.7 million people have been displaced within the country" (BBC) with the possibility of fleeing into the continent. If this research aims to show anything it is that migration has become a part of modern life and perhaps has always been a part of human life. In our media-filled, globalized world now more than ever there is a need for updated policies that will serve immigrant populations as well as the native populations in host countries. Language is a form of currency between peoples, and it must be valued at a higher cost than it has previously if government structures and welfare systems in Germany and Sweden are to be maintained in the future.

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