Review of M. Peillon, Welfare in Ireland

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George Steinmetz
University of Michigan

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's Empire has presented the most striking example in recent years of sophisticated social theory being picked up by extraparliamentary political activists, not to mention the mass media. If this alone were not enough to draw the attention of sociologists, Empire also purports to make theoretical sense of ongoing large-scale transformations of social life—surely one of sociology's central considerations. Hardt and Negri draw on theorists considered as founders of sociology—from Montesquieu, Marx, and Weber to Habermas, Castells, and Luhmann. It is an interesting paradox that the most influential book in recent decades on a classic sociological theme has been written by a specialist in comparative literature (Hardt) and a political scientist and activist (Negri). Empire is yet another illustration of the breakdown of disciplinary boundaries, even between the “two cultures” of the humanities and the social sciences. It also reminds sociologists that they no longer can purport to own the ontological space designated for them by the discipline's founders.

“Empire” is defined by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as a new global form of sovereignty “composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under single logic of rule” (p. xii). Imperialism, the form of rule that preceded empire in their schema, centered on nation-states and the extension of their sovereignty; empire is decentered and deterritorializing. Empire is not a conquest state but is nonetheless restlessly expansive, tending to encompass the whole world. It is “dedicated to peace, though bathed in blood.”

The bulk of this long book consists of two large sections. The first, “Passages of Sovereignty,” traces the historical emergence of the “juridical structure” of the new, imperial form of sovereignty. The authors trace the genealogy of empire back to Rome and through the successive stages of Renaissance humanism, the American Revolution, Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations, and the creation of the United Nations. At a more abstract level, the emergence of empire involves the discovery of the “revolutionary plane of immanence” over the course of European modernity. Traditional understandings secured sovereignty and knowledge in a transcendent authority located outside of worldly affairs—God or the Hegelian state. Against this, the revolutionary humanist philosophy

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of immanence, expressed most powerfully by Spinoza, put “humanity and nature in the position of God,” transforms the world into a terrain of practice, and affirmed the “democracy of the multitude as the absolute form of politics” (p. 77).

Building on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the American Revolution, the authors argue that the U.S. Constitution represents the most significant stage in the post-Enlightenment (re)emergence of the ideas of immanence and deterritorializing imperial sovereignty. The message of the Federalist was that “the order of the multitude must be born not from a transfer of the title of power and right, but from an arrangement internal to the multitude” (p. 161). Linked to its “emancipation of humanity from every transcendent power” (p. 165), this new form of sovereignty is characterized by a “tendency toward an open, expansive project operating on an unbounded terrain.” Such an expansive tendency is sharply differentiated from the expansionism of the “transcendent sovereigns” or from the colonial extensions of the modern nation-states. The authors acknowledge the presence of tendencies opposed to empire within the U.S. Constitution, beginning with the exclusion of Native Americans, which creates a “negative foundation” (p. 170), but this tendency has supposedly been superseded by empire since the end of Vietnam War. Hardt and Negri conclude that the contemporary idea of empire was “born through the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project” (p. 182).

The authors’ insistence on this specifically American genealogy of empire’s positive sides is linked to their desire to channel the new struggles against globalization away from a focus on the United States. No individual nation leads empire, and there is “no longer an outside in a military sense” (p. 189). Wars today are civil wars, internal conflicts.

The second large section, “Passages of Production,” renarrates the pre-history of empire from the standpoint of the plane of “production.” This shift in focus from sovereignty to production is understood as a movement to a more fundamental level of analysis. The “Intermezzo” between the two large sections is meant “to function something like the moment in Capital when Marx invites us to leave the noisy sphere of exchange and descend in the hidden abode of production” (p. xvii). This deeper realm of the productive and desiring powers of the proletariat is where the real motor of the transition to postmodern empire is located and also where “the most effective resistances and alternatives to the power of Empire arise” (p. xvii).

This renarration begins not with slavery or feudalism but with late-19th-century “imperialism” explained in basically Leninist terms as European capitalism’s “internalization” of the non-European outside due to pressures on profits. The authors then turn to the rise of Fordism during the New Deal and finally to the recent emergence of post-Fordism in an account that relies on the French school of regulation theory associated with writers like Aglietta. It is also linked to a distinctive understanding of the post-Fordist “regime of social control” as centered on biopower,

PROOF 2
defined as a form that “regulates social life from its interior,” reaching “down to the ganglia of the social structure and its processes of development” (pp. 23–24). Capitalist production is now the production of social life itself.

The central agent in all transitions from one form of sovereignty or production to the next is “the multitude.” The authors reject older notions of “the people” or “the working class” as the locus of productive and historical agency and insist that new forms of social regulation are invented not by capital but by the multitude. For example, the restructuring of production that yielded post-Fordism was “anticipated by the rise of a new subjectivity”; “capitalism did not need to invent a new paradigm . . . because the truly creative moment had already taken place” (p. 276; emphasis added). Indeed, the multitude not only invents empire but in a sense is empire. The multitude represents heterogeneity, difference, openness, and mutual incommunicability. But because empire is the multitude and because both are coterminous with social reality, the disconnected struggles against “globalization” are able to congeal into some sort of totalizing form, a sort of unity in difference, despite their lack of transcendental program, hegemonic leadership, or common set of demands. The authors warn current antiglobalization protesters not to try to roll back the clock on empire; this would be tantamount to a sort of ontological self-negation. Instead the militants are urged to “push through empire to come out the other side” (p. 218).

Reviewers of Empire in the mass media have been almost evenly split between the gushingly enthusiastic and the unremittingly hostile. Enthusiasts are hoping to consecrate a Bible or manifesto for the antiglobalization movement; critics accuse the book of being soft on terrorism. Both readings are problematic. This book has little new empirical knowledge to offer most antiglobalization activists. Without an extensive background in social and cultural theory, most activists will also be unable to decipher Empire’s telegraphic references to authorities or to sort through its thicket of philosophical ideas. Critics unfairly warn that the book legitimates attacks on the West, despite Hardt and Negri’s repeated argument that “the West” is no longer the center of global power and in a sense no longer even exists as a distinct entity. There are real problems with the book’s inability to distinguish right-wing and left-wing politics and with its undifferentiated hatred for “the state” in any and all of its forms. Democracy is defined so broadly as to encompass any movement whose population is a “vital” and “expansive” “terrain of immanence.” Democracy is thus equated with “barbaric” nomadic hordes and with the wolf packs of Deleuze and Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus. None of this is likely to satisfy theorists of democracy, who are not even mentioned in the book.

Hardt and Negri also collapse politics and the state too readily into the economy. Although the authors also reject the traditional Marxist distinction between base and superstructure, they ultimately grant no more autonomy to politics than the most traditional of Marxists. The develop-
opment of the books argument suggests that “production” functions as a kind of foundation for transitions in forms of political sovereignty. This underestimation of the autonomy of the political leads the authors to neglect the possibility that nation-states might reassert their power and that protectionism might reemerge as a response to economic crisis, declining U.S. hegemony, or the rise in terrorism. Like earlier theorizations of “late” capitalism from Lenin through Mandel, the authors also fail to consider the possibility that another model for organizing capital may rise up to replace the current one.

Culture is also granted too little autonomy from production in *Empire*. The attacks of September 11 called attention to the fact that even if nation-states and core zones are no longer “objectively” central, they can continue to figure centrally in the minds of would-be enemies of the United States. Just as anti-Semitism can flourish in the absence of Jews, anti-Americanism could flourish in a world no longer dominated by the United States.

Since the book treats so many theories and historical periods it is bound to offend specialists. The authors fail to address the ways in which Luhmann’s notion of “de-differentiation” is fundamentally hostile to their arguments. Carl Schmitt is mobilized to define empire as a permanent “state of exception,” but the authors ignore the fact that his state centrism locates sovereignty firmly within the national state. Colonial historians will object to the claims about the binarizing effects of imperialist rule. The section that follows Lenin in tracing the 19th-century scramble for colonies to accumulation crisis in the capitalist lore ignores historical evidence about the unprofitability of most of the colonies that were seized in that period. The authors criticize others for failing to recognize the power of the new social movements to create solutions for capitalist crisis, but this is exactly the argument that theorists like Margit Mayer and Roland Roth have been making for years. Neo-Marxist state theorists may balk at Hardt and Negri’s claim that a “theory of the state can be written only when all . . . fixed barriers [to the world market] are overcome and when the state and capital effectively coincide” (p. 236). Not only have Marxists been “writing state theory” for several decades, but most of them have rejected the traditional insistence on the coincidence of state and capital.

Finally, there is the question of whether the period since September 11, 2001 has not seen a reassertion of U.S. imperialism, political boundaries, and centralized state power. The authors may not have been able to foresee these developments, but they do raise the question of whether *Empire* is already a historical account rather than a manifesto for the future.

These shortcomings are perhaps the necessary price for a book that ties together an enormous range of philosophical and social-theoretical literature and treats a broad sweep of global history. Even if *Empire* turns out to have described a historical moment just when it was giving way to something new, it represents a grand synthesis that should be read by all sociologists.

PROOF 4

Ruth Frankenberg
University of California, Davis

Kathleen Blee’s *Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement* is a magnificent continuation of her groundbreaking work on the place of women in the world of the U.S. far right. This new book draws on her in-depth interviews and years of long observational attendance (participant observation is the wrong term) at far-right racist movement events.

Throughout, Blee achieves an ideal balance of accessible language and complex analysis—both of which are critical when one strives, as she does, to study a movement and also to seek means of challenging and disturbing its continuing presence in the United States. Blee offers readers new to the field an introduction to the far right, explaining the diverse histories of the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, Christian Patriots, and others. She also insists that, despite some ideological and attitudinal connections, there are more differences than similarities between committed racist activists and the everyday racism that, one might imagine, provides the fertile ground from which those involved in far-right racism would emerge. Thus, for example, while anti-Semitism is declining in everyday opinion around the United States, it has become an increasingly central aspect of the far-right racist agenda.

Blee’s findings demonstrate that the circumstances of most individuals’ entry into far-right movements—into “the overarching activist ideology that [Blee terms] extraordinary racism” (p. 75)—do not conform to stereotypic expectations. Most are not, for example, raised in racist homes. Most are neither poorly educated nor economically disadvantaged (progressive movements have long viewed economic well-being and education as preventive resources with respect to racism). Moreover, most did not feel strongly racist sentiments before joining a racist organization. Rather, she argues on the basis of her data, women (and men also) tend to develop strongly racist senses of self and racial identity after, rather than before, joining racist movements. As Blee puts it, “Intense racism can be the result, not the cause, of involvement with organized racism” (pp. 27–28).

The question of how it is that individuals become activists for racism is a significant one—and it is an area that Blee approaches carefully. Her analysis of the making of racist selves and collectivities is subtle and convincing. While drawing to great effect upon the voices of her women interviewees, she refuses to take their self-descriptions at face value. Rather, she argues, their stories say as much about the discursive framing within which their lives are told, once in racist organizations, as they say, in any simple way, about their lives in the years prior to their entry into
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the world of organized racism. Thus, Blee says, “Racial conversion stories are best understood not as literal accounts of the process of ideological transformation but as learned accounts, shaped retrospectively by mainstream cultural themes as well as by the political, ideological and even stylistic conventions dominant in racist groups” (p. 43).

In the end, the question of how these white women became “extraordinary racists” cannot, perhaps, ever be fully answered. It is easier to understand the life paths of those who had grown up in racist households, organized or not. However, others seemed to have entered far-right racist groups with a kind of serendipity that was frightening to behold, often entering through a friend, distant relative, or workmate. Ultimately, the staying power of the racist organization in individual women’s lives (until the frames of meaning took hold and were adopted) seemed to have as much as anything to do with the pleasure of joining a welcoming social group. In this cozy space, room was made for leaders, other group members, and written propaganda to offer, in the name of Aryan supremacism, “a schema of immediate threat that necessitate[d] defensive action” (p. 76).

As in Blee’s first book, Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s (University of California, 1991), analysis of the meaning of gender in racist lives is critical. In the extensive chapter, “The Place of Women,” Blee demonstrates the crucial yet contradictory positioning of women in the movement. To cite one example, far-right discourse argues that women are critical to the reproduction of the race and also that they are inherently more likely than men to betray it by crossing the racial-sexual line. To cite another example, while women know themselves to play a significant role in the movement, and are indeed key to lending it social credibility, very rarely do they hold formal office. Here as elsewhere in the book, then, Blee offers crystal clear sociological analysis and makes careful use of the voices of her interviewees.

This book will, very likely, become a staple in several subfields—gender studies, whiteness studies, race studies, social movement studies—and also in those courses whose goals are to offer students a broad introduction and contemplation of the discipline of sociology.


William Sites
University of Chicago

Late 20th-century globalization is often seen as having fatally undermined the capacities of local communities to mobilize members and exert political influence. Dry Bones Rattling focuses on an interesting counterexample.
Over the past 25 years, the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) has built local networks of community-based organizations that mobilize demands for government-provided infrastructure improvements, housing, education, and job training. Mark Warren’s book is an important and well-researched case study of the Texas IAF, the most successful network of its kind.

The Texas IAF’s faith-based, institutional approach to community organizing involves building local and regional coalitions. Coalition members are primarily religious organizations (Catholic parishes, Protestant churches, and other congregations, but also social-welfare advocacy groups and union affiliates) whose leaders agree to work together on issue-specific campaigns in order to generate political influence and community improvements for lower-income, minority constituents. IAF staff recruit clergy and lay congregants (often middle-aged women), who receive training in organizing and who coordinate nonpartisan political campaigns that combine bottom-up mobilizations of base constituents and top-level relationship-building with public officials and other allies. This approach grafts Saul Alinsky’s traditional IAF organizing model (indigenous leadership, local and “winnable” issues, nonideological appeals to self-interest, and a reliance on nonviolent conflict) onto a more explicit religious foundation, resulting in what Warren calls an interfaith “theology of organizing” based on shared value commitments to family, community, and faith-with-a-social-justice-mission. While the earliest Texas IAF organizations of the 1970s emerged in Hispanic communities, more recent coalitions have centered on multiracial collaboration, particularly between Hispanics, blacks, and Anglos. Warren, relying on Putnam’s influential emphasis on social capital as the key to strengthening American democracy, sees recent IAF initiatives as uniquely promising efforts to create both “bonding social capital” (intracommunal solidarities) and “bridging social capital” (cross-racial coalitions) that lead to more inclusive and democratic political participation.

Conceptions of social capital, however, are not by themselves sufficient to comprehend the success of the IAF strategy. Unlike with many communitarian visions, IAF-style community building does not shy away from power politics; organizers not only foster trust and cooperation, but also use conflict as a resource, usually in the form of controlled confrontations with elected officials that follow carefully planned pressure campaigns. IAF leaders also do not share the reflexive antistatism of many champions of civil society. While falling short of a full-blown social-movement strategy, IAF mobilizations meld community building with a kind of hardball interest-group populism, one that substitutes for certain functions of traditional party organizations and that seeks welfare-state expansion along with community self-renewal.

Notions of social capital are also insufficient for understanding two further characteristics of the Texas IAF, which is perhaps why the concept recedes somewhat in Warren’s most interesting and original chapters (7,
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8). While religious values may provide the moral foundation for the IAF’s community-based political action, institutional structures also matter. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church is highly conducive, as Warren shows, to IAF organizing. Texas bishops, fearful of losing their Hispanic congregants, have consistently supported IAF activities; parish priests, relatively secure in their authority, can encourage lay participation and even lay leadership in IAF organizations. The more decentralized structure of African-American Protestant congregations, on the other hand, means that black pastors often keep their jobs only by demonstrating their indispensability. This institutional reality, says Warren, has slowed the movement of black lay congregants into positions of IAF leadership, a problem that—when coupled with IAF reluctance to directly confront racial-injustice issues of central importance to African-Americans—has hampered multiracial collaboration.

Warren’s focus on authority and democracy within the IAF network is also illuminating. While the organization’s public statements often emphasize its grassroots character, the IAF operates with a top-down hierarchical structure embodied in distinct levels of leadership. Top IAF leaders and longtime organizers control staffing decisions, but they also govern internally through the organizer-training sessions that are used to launch clergy and lay members into secondary-level IAF leadership positions. Accountability within the organization is enforced not through formal democratic procedures but through a consensus on the nature of effective leadership and the promotion of activists who exhibit it; organizers and leaders who cannot consistently generate a following (i.e., get bodies out for meetings and public actions) are eventually replaced. Impressed by this mode of consensual hierarchy, Warren argues forthrightly for the importance of authority to democratic processes. Yet he does not fully wrestle with the historical fact that other movement organizations, particularly unions, have ignored questions of internal democracy at their own peril. Furthermore, questions of authority and formal accountability become more troublesome when notions of democratic citizenship are grounded on religious values, “interfaith” or not.

Warren’s study is persuasive in its recognition of IAF’s political accomplishments. IAF-style activism is still a long way from reversing entrenched patterns of upward economic redistribution or short-term-oriented governmental policy making, and it is not clear that the organization represents, as observers like William Julius Wilson have maintained, a model-in-embryo for a new national politics. Yet Dry Bones Rattling suggests implicitly that the IAF network has surmounted many of the classic dilemmas of poor people’s organizations identified by social-movement theorists (e.g., Olsen or Piven and Cloward), to the extent that further growth and evolution should not prove surprising.

PROOF 8
Ever heard of the Unocal oil spill in central California’s Guadalupe Dunes—the largest oil spill in American history? No? You are not alone. Why did it escape recognition and definition as a legitimate problem for nearly 40 years (1952–90)? While focusing on this single spill, <i>Silent Spill</i> nevertheless facilitates our general understanding of passivity and inaction in the social construction of similar types of incremental and cumulative problems. It is especially because this spill was ignored for so long that we should examine it as a telling example of our choices over whether to respond to festering environmental troubles. As such, this work extends the literatures on the social construction of environmental problems, risk perceptions, blind spots, and formal organizations. Furthermore, given its inherent focus on misrecognition and nonresponse, this book also contributes to the burgeoning literature on the second face of power in the construction of environmental nonproblems.

Beamish’s goal is to uncover how and why the Guadalupe spill escaped recognition and response at the same time that general environmental awareness and policy making were rapidly increasing. An underlying theme is that the spill—like a significant number of environmental problems—is qualitatively different from many other disasters of which we are aware. It differs from the type of sudden, spectacular, and, to some extent, “sexy” catastrophes—like the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill—that dominate the media, instill a sense of dread in the general public, and are on the mind of policy makers when they design environmental legislation. The Guadalupe spill is a crescive—that is, incremental and cumulative—problem that was largely viewed as “normal” for decades. (“Of course there will be some oil spillage; it is an oil field!”) According to the author, this “chronic, crescive, and unspectacular” (p. 131) spill inspired little dread but considerable corporate, regulatory, and community accommodation until it passed a critical threshold in the 1980s, thereby shifting it from a normal to a troubling condition.

Using an inductive approach, Beamish traces “the career of knowledge of the spill through its social contexts” (p. 7; emphasis in original) with a mixture of field interviews and archival data to seek an explanation that accounts for the multitude of relevant stakeholders who failed to respond timely to the spill. In short, the author identifies three groups of actors that failed to recognize and respond to the repeated spillage and accumulating petroleum until too late: the workers and the management of Unocal Corporation, regulators, and the local community. Besides obvious factors—such as self-interest and corporate avaricious-
ness—organizational, cultural, and social factors at Unocal emerged as key factors in the passivity of workers and management. Certain organizational characteristics (e.g., managerial hierarchies, a formal seniority system, and internal promotion) and the physical and organizational isolation of the Guadalupe oil field from other Unocal branches, as well as from regulatory agencies, allowed local managerial power to conceal criminal culpability for the spill. Furthermore, the occupational culture of oil work legitimated the organizational scripts (e.g., rules and routines) at the oil field so the actors at the field shared taken-for-granted ideas about what constituted “oil work.” Also, the social cohesion among workers diminished the chance that any one worker would risk marginalization or perhaps termination by blowing the whistle on Unocal.

The failure of Unocal to recognize and report the oil spill facilitated the passivity of relevant regulators. Beamish argues that regulators were indisposed to respond to chronic problems, and because the oil spill did not meet the expectations of regulators, their attention was intermittent and unfocused. Bureaucratic rotations, promotions, and staff attrition in government agencies and debates between agencies and personnel over who had jurisdiction over the oil field also led to fluctuations in regulatory participation. In short, the agency response, as found with other environmental mishaps, coincided with what is expected in an interorganizational “garbage can” model. Agencies reached into their garbage cans for routine solutions (e.g., emergency response and surface clean-up with heavy machinery) rather than solutions that matched the particular characteristics of the cresive oil spill. Finally, the local community did not recognize the severity of the spill until the mid-1990s when environmentalists, the local media, and community residents connected the spill to other regional events (e.g., the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and the installation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Facility) and framed it as yet another instance of “corporate negligence and governmental complicity” (p. 111).

Beamish offers a powerful illustration that our “social and institutional preoccupation with the ‘acute’ and the ‘traumatic’ has left us passive and unresponsive to festering problems” (p. 2). However, while convincingly describing the shortcomings of self-monitoring and self-reporting mandates in environmental legislation, his analysis unfortunately falls short in pointing to solutions—a problem shared with many analyses of environmental problems. Beamish briefly outlines a “systems” approach but with inadequate detail and direction to provide guidance in crafting reasonable solutions to the passivity and inaction in ameliorating cresive environmental problems like the spill. Nevertheless, this book will be of obvious interest to scholars of environmental sociology, risk, formal organizations, and environmental policy. But, owing to the engaging topic and its far-reaching analysis, the book is likely to have an even wider appeal to anyone interested in social problems and public issues.
Democracy at Work: A Comparative Sociology of Environmental Regulation in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States.


Eugene A. Rosa
Washington State University

Few contemporary topics have cut a wider swath across such a broad range of perspectives—theoretical, comparative, normative, and policy—than the evolving patterns of democracy in this era of late modernity. The new complexities of the contemporary age, including the increasing role of the so-called fifth branch of government, has confronted nations with the need to develop new institutional arrangements and to expand democratic processes to deal with these complexities. Few of these challenges are more pronounced than those stemming from questions of the environment and the technological risks societies impose on it. Accordingly, environmental policy and politics provide especially fertile ground for unpacking the changing structure and processes of democratic governance, and a growing number of scholars are planting their intellectual seeds here. In Democracy at Work Richard Mäch and his colleagues claim to offer hope of harvesting an even richer theoretical crop by eschewing political science, on the one hand, and by bringing “back sociology to the study of politics” (p. viii), on the other.

The authors first articulate a syncretic structure comprising elements of structural-functionalism (Mäch has been a persistent leader of this perspective), of Durkheim and of Giddens’s structuration theory, along with Weber’s notion of ideal-types and Geertz’s method of thick description (paradoxically considered antithetical to structured theory). Key elements of the structure include networks of actors, institutional practices and normative rules, the role of professions, and—most important—culture and meaning. The structure is then used to analyze a key environmental policy (the passage of clean air regulations) in four advanced democracies with contrasting policy styles: Germany (consensus style), the United States (pluralistic style), France (technocratic etatism), and the United Kingdom (compromise style). A case study is presented for each democracy. The book ends with a chapter by Mäch that interprets each of the case studies in light of the theoretical framing.

Sometimes insightful, sometimes historically informative, and sometimes revealing of subtle nuances of culture, the book’s potential is nevertheless unrealized on many fronts. In the course of the analyses, the structure adopted to organize the continuities and contrasts in national policy styles becomes, in application, a polysemous framing that, like an aircraft carrier, serves as a ready platform for whichever aircraft returns...
from its mission. So, one is left wondering whether the empirical evidence lands on the structure or the structure navigates to the evidence.

While structural in approach, the book’s content is about culture, though this central concept remains inchoate and underexplicated. The authors’ thin definition of culture (as an interpretive category comprising “the underlying system of signs and symbols, interpretations and assessments” [p. 32]) and its application reveal the concept to be a residual catch-all category, not an analytic framing that guides the empirical work. Furthermore, despite the centrality of culture as an organizing concept, the work does not build upon (nor even cite) the standard-setting comparative study of the cultural shaping of environmental policy by James Jasper (Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France [Princeton University Press, 1990]).

The role of social movements in stimulating a reexamination of democratic processes is recognized, but there is virtual silence about the role of such movements in the national arenas of policy debate and implementation. The authors are equally silent about public participation except to say, remarkably enough, that in the case of Germany, it is guided by emotion rather than reason.

The role of science and technological expertise—the sine qua non of environmental policy—is examined sometimes as an institution and sometimes as a profession, but not as a force of convergence in policy process and style despite growing evidence to that effect. Similarly ignored is the convergence of national policy structures around environmental risks, an illustration for some scholars of the globalization of “new institutionalism.” Furthermore, in their haste to dismiss political science, they ignore the sizable and growing volume of contributions from its comparative-politics wing.

That the authors ignore risk is especially puzzling since it is at the core of environmental policy making and since Münch has previously engaged the topic (Riskopolitik [Suhrkemp Tsachenbuch Wissenschaft, 1996]). Furthermore, to ignore risk is to ignore concomitantly a major theoretical perspective for informing environmental politics: the reflexive modernization theories of Beck and Giddens, centered as they are on the very issue of how to develop institutional mechanisms for democratically managing the growing volume of human-generated risks. This myopia also results in ignoring the mostly European efforts to embed the challenges of environmental risk within a theoretically structured plan of public involvement (e.g., the work of theoretician-practitioner Ortwin Renn and his associates to map Habermas on to practical means for public engagement—with most applications in Germany, the very backyard of the authors). Added to these difficulties is a prose style—apparently translated accurately from the German—that emphasizes rhetorical prolix over analytic clarity and thus leads one to read the book in short bursts of engagement.

In sum, this is an erudite book by erudite scholars. But as part theory
development, part case study, part elite interviewing, part civic lesson, and part a history of political philosophy it serves many masters and ends up serving none faithfully. Its undisciplined multiple foci empties it of both theoretical and empirical depth, and we are left wondering if theory is concordant with the postulated national styles or whether we have witnessed a hardening of conventional (and contested) policy categories. In sum, *Democracy at Work* fails to provide the promised bountiful harvest, for it neither deepens our understanding of this important topic nor convinces us that this sociological conceptualization can unlock its fundament.


Tom Janoski  
*University of Kentucky*

Münch states that collective identities and structures of citizenship create specific modes of integrating immigrants that have internal and external effects. He presents a model of how nations create modes of integrating immigrants that results in positively and negatively bringing a country together and into its region. The author then presents the four cases of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany. After showing how the model works, he consolidates his argument by explaining the processes of collective identity. His data consist of the primary texts of scholars, government documents, survey data summarized in other sources, and secondary literature.

The first four chapters each cover a country. The United Kingdom has emerged from the civil society of landowners, the bourgeoisie, and, eventually, workers. Integration is based on civic community and is largely independent of ethnic origin in order to promote movement in the empire and not to populate a vacant land. More recently, its doors have been closing to immigration. Institutional rules in the United Kingdom are rooted in the social work and charitable professions that coordinate integration. The United States has gone the furthest in developing a “pluralistic community of citizens” with a “true sense of citizenship” (p. 48). The United States emphasizes the market and voluntary associations, but its excluded groups have recently pushed very hard for group, as opposed to individual, rights. Ethnic associations have been strong in keeping immigration open. The rules that guide integration are “equality of opportunity and fairness in competition for chances of achievement” (p. 63), and lawyers, lobbyists, and political entrepreneurs are most involved in this process. France is a contradiction between a state strongly embracing revolutionary universalism and a largely unorganized society whose be-
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liefs tend toward particularism and regionalism. This limits France’s ability to integrate immigrants. An empire supported state universalism, but decolonization has erased much of this. France’s institutional rule is state sovereignty, with administrators managing the integration process but without the needed cooperation of civil society. German integration is based on a network of bureaucratic administration and semipublic welfare organizations with purely voluntary associations left out. Its rule is “legality” framed by the constitution and enacted laws. The most active professions are bureaucratic jurists, lawyers, and courtroom judges. The weakness of this approach is that it lacks the support and participation of the lay population.

The second half of the book presents 11 theses about European identity being formed through differentiation from outside and inside; internal homogenization; inclusion of diverse cultures; the activities of an Europeanizing elite; tensions with new nationalisms, regionalisms, and globalisms; dialectic of identity gain, loss, and growth; value creation through innovators; medialization through upward and downward spirals; and virtual identity creation through communication. This forms a model of how European identity is being transformed under globalization and European integration, but the development of European identity “does not progress smoothly and without opposition” (p. 184). Münch’s approach makes one sensitive of how collective identities are shaped, contorted, and developed in a global economic and mass media age.

Münch develops the process of collective identity formation in a united Europe further. He takes issue with Yasemin Soysal’s privileging of transnational discourse and Christian Joppke’s emphasis on national law and institutions in determining integration. He proposes that the division of labor influences transnational economic integration, along with both transnational discourse and national politics, to promote the extension of citizenship rights to noncitizens. This explains the transformation of solidarity “from national mechanical to multilevel organical solidarity, from national homogeneity to national and transnational heterogeneity, from a strong and concrete collective consciousness to a weak and abstract one.” Thus, we are not just talking about changing a few laws or regulations, but rather “a transformation of the whole solidarity structure and the meaning of rights” (p. 193).

The strength of this book is putting collective identity into a central place in explaining immigrant integration, along with national institutions, transnational associations, and a globalizing economy. Münch’s argument that one must balance the emerging transnational forces with the continuing strength of nation-state laws and institutions makes great sense. Giving force to transnational economic integration and elites seems good as far as he goes, but one might want to see more conflict than mechanical and organic solidarity might allow.

One might question three issues: balance, presentation, and focus. First, Germany is covered in more depth, and its chapter is more than twice
the length of the others. German intellectual developments are covered in some depth from Luther and Goethe to the postwar reevaluation. Second, the public opinion data would have benefited from tables. Much of the presentation became difficult to follow without tables to illustrate core points succinctly. Finally, the intention of the book was a bit obtuse at times. The book covers two continents and implies even more, but the thesis and the second half of the book seem to be exclusively concerned with Europe. But these are small points.

This is an excellent book with detailed evidence on institutions and public opinion. The author dances well on both sides of the divide between generalizing social science and particularizing history and ethnic experience. Thus, Münch poses the question of nations and citizenship in a new light.


Amy E. Ansell
Bard College

“I want to be English when I want to be” (p. 1). So begins *Accent on Privilege*, an analysis by author Katharine W. Jones of the results of her interview study of 34 white, predominantly middle- and upper-class English immigrants living on the East Coast of the United States. To this quote by Ken, one of her interviewees, could be added the sentiment that they want to define for themselves their own version of what it means to be English. In doing so, interviewees refer variously to attachment to place (landscape and pubs), shared traits of national character (a wry sense of humor and stiff upper lip), or a connective bond born of common heritage (a homogenous white national grouping). Jones challenges what she refers to as the “ubiquitous discourses of naturalness” (p. 222) inherent in immigrant and native definitions of Englishness and employs her critique of essentialism as an opportunity to argue that national identities, like all other forms of identity, are socially constructed. In contrast to macrotheoretical or poststructuralist approaches, however, Jones presents a highly individualized version of social construction. Hers is a practice-based approach to identity construction attuned to the manner in which her interviewees in daily interactions negotiate, reinterpret, accept, or reject the stereotypes associated with their national identity.

Although the author draws on a number of conceptual models to inform her interview findings (including symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, social psychology, feminist theory, critical race theory, and whiteness studies), the most overarching and compelling theoretical tool she uses is in the area of identity construction. Perhaps because so many
various theories are brought to bear on different aspects of the empirical findings, the book neglects to contextualize adequately what I regard as the main argument within current debates on identity theory. The intervention based on her “theory of identity at work” is clear, though, especially in its emphasis on the agency of individuals to contest, reject, or affirm their identities in everyday interactions. Applied to the empirical study at hand, the upshot is that despite the majority of her interviewees understanding their national identities either as natural or a product of American Anglophilia (or a combination of both), Jones demonstrates that they in fact put considerable identity work into being English. The analysis is most convincing in its examination of how the interviewees “did” their Englishness, whether it be in the form of playing their accent up or down, working to appear reserved or understated, holding their beer glass or cigarette in a certain way, wearing Doc Martens as opposed to sneakers, or exhibiting a particular taste in humor or popular culture.

The chapter entitled “Gee, I Love Your Accent” is instructive in this regard. Jones insightfully examines the work interviewees did to maintain their accents; how they turned their Englishness on and off in different contexts, all the while pursuing and protecting material (jobs and housing) and psychological (self-esteem) benefits. Highly conscious of the cultural capital associated with their accent in the United States, interviewees were adept at using and sometimes even exaggerating American English (when they wanted to “pass”) and British English (when they wanted to distinguish themselves from Americans or gain privileges from them). Such performative manipulation of presentation of self could be said to be a common practice hardly unique to this group of English immigrants. What is original to Jones’s argument is that the kind of identity work in which her interviewees are engaged is oriented to the negotiation and maintenance of a sense of entitlement and privilege garnered from American Anglophilia. The implications for theories of identity construction and stereotyping are sometimes provocative. For example, despite the fact that the stereotypes relate to a group identity that is positively rather than negatively valued, Jones found that her interviewees were irritated by and resented constant comments by Americans about their accents or marking processes associated with other aspects of their national identity in contexts not of their own choosing.

The chapters that relate to race and empire rehearse familiar conceptual themes rather uncritically and draw heavy handedly on just a few select authors and sources (Ruth Frankenberg and Paul Gilroy, in particular). However, some of the empirical findings regarding how immigrants privileged by their difference negotiate or reconstruct their racial (white) identities are valuable additions to critical whiteness studies, especially those that relate to comparisons interviewees made between the United States and England concerning race relations. Jones finds that many interviewees do not think of themselves as immigrants (nor do many of their hosts) because of their whiteness, and as a result, they express annoyance at
their inclusion in bureaucratic processes such as foreign student orientations at American universities; such events suggest an outsider status. Evidence is also presented that interviewees feel disgust with white American responses to the O. J. Simpson affair, for example, or that they consider themselves more comfortable with racial diversity or positively identified with black music. From such evidence, Jones concludes that interviewees combined their whiteness with their Englishness as a way to distance themselves from American whiteness, which they regarded as a more problematic identity. As with the rest of Accent on Privilege, readers will enjoy these chapters for the fresh insights the interview data bring to a range of conceptual concerns and subdisciplinary foci.


James Mahoney
Brown University

The literatures on democratic transitions and social movements do not speak to one another as much as they should. Too often, theories of democratization fixate on elite strategic choice and leadership, downplaying the role of mass actors and collective protest. By contrast, social movement theories concentrate on the formation of collective protest, but they often reduce elite politics to little more than political opportunity structures. John Glenn’s Framing Democracy is a useful corrective to these tendencies, bringing together a concern for elite politics with an emphasis on mass social movements in a comparative-historical analysis of political regime change.

Glenn focuses on the contrasting paths to democracy in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Poland is seen as following a path of “democratization from above,” in which a political pact between the Solidarity Party and the government produced competitive elections and eventually the defeat of the Communist Party. By contrast, Czechoslovakia follows a path of “democratization from below,” in which Communist authorities capitulated in the face of a popular upsurge. The goal of the book is to identify the causes and political consequences of these different paths.

Glenn accepts that democratic transitions in Poland and Czechoslovakia probably would not have occurred without fiscal crises, the end of Soviet support, and the decline of legitimacy for Communist governments. Nevertheless, to explain the two contrasting paths to democracy, he argues creatively that one must take into consideration the framing strategies employed by civic movements to mobilize followers and bargain with governments. In this sense, he moves beyond elite-centered theories of democratization by emphasizing the “fit” that exists between, on the one
hand, the discourse of opposition challengers, and, on the other, the goals of longstanding social groups (e.g., the Catholic Church in Poland; the theaters in Czechoslovakia) and the Communist governments.

In Poland, democratization from above occurred because Solidarity pursued a framing strategy built around negotiation and “honorable compromise.” This strategy fit well with the goals of General Jaruzelski’s government, but when roundtable negotiations led to competitive elections, the strategy also enabled Solidarity to win the support of the Catholic Church, whose local parishes were crucial in mobilizing the anti-Communist vote. The crushing electoral defeat of the government and eventually the defection of coalitional allies of the Communist Party paved the way for the remarkably peaceful transition marked by General Jaruzelski’s resignation. However, this pacted transition ultimately led to a fragile democracy, marred by bickering and competition among many different contending parties.

In Czechoslovakia, democratization from below occurred because civic movements adopted a framing strategy that emphasized their role as citizens without political aims. This strategy was successful at winning the support of striking theaters and students, even as it directly challenged the government’s repressive orientation. Following the general strike of November 27, 1989, the government was on the defensive, culminating in Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec’s pressured resignation. In the Czech Republic, where the opposition was strongest and the government most repressive, the previous Communist regime was quickly dismantled and a stable democracy emerged. In Slovakia, however, the civil movement was smaller, and the Communists endured longer, posing problems for the stability of democracy in the years to come.

This book suffers from some of the organizational and stylistic problems that one might associate with a revised dissertation. The text is sometimes a little repetitive, the goals and arguments of the study are not always sharply focused, and the narrative occasionally spends too much time on less essential points. Nevertheless, Glenn’s fascinating comparative story usually makes for quite engaging reading.

I wondered about alternative explanations that are not systematically considered. For example, to what extent are the contrasting paths to democracy a product of differences in the institutional organization of the antecedent Communist regimes? In this spirit, one could argue that the position of repressive forces (stronger in Czechoslovakia; weaker in Poland) ultimately drives at least some of the processes studied by Glenn.

More generally, Glenn’s argument has important but underexplored parallels with previous explanations that emphasize different “modes of democratic transition,” such as the work of Samuel Huntington, Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter, and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. I wonder if Glenn believes his work undermines the hypothesis of this literature: that mass-based transitions are likely to breed special difficulties for new democracies.
Lingering question aside, *Framing Democracy* is a fine contribution to the literatures on democratization and post-Communist transitions. In its effort to bring social movement theory into the study of democratization, it is far more theoretically ambitious than many works in this area. And in its simultaneous use of detailed knowledge from particular cases and systematic comparison across those cases, it sheds new light on the ways in which Communist systems were transformed into democratic regimes.


Nancy A. Naples
*University of Connecticut*

As Congress and state officials consider the next wave of welfare reforms, legislators and policy analysts would be wise to read this timely and engaging collection of essays on the experiences of the poor and the limits of neoliberal policy. Coeditors Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky hope their collection will provide “an antidote to recent popular and political discussions of poverty” that construct “the poor as invisible, passive, pathological, or in need of charity or moral reform” (p. 3). In their introduction to *The New Poverty Studies*, Goode and Maskovsky stress that “the new poverty can be explained in terms of three interconnected processes—*economic polarization, political demobilization,* and *market triumphalism*” (p. 4; emphasis in original). This chapter describes how the wide gap between the wealthy and the poor, the diminishment of political participation, and the celebration of the market have contributed to the decline of the welfare state and thwarted the American public’s willingness to address the structural factors that contribute to poverty. In this “*post welfare moment,*” they argue, it is especially important to redirect “*poverty studies toward a repoliticization of poverty and inequality in academia and elsewhere*” (p. 17).

The four chapters in the first section of the book provide an overview of some of the historical and regional factors that contribute to differences among the poor. Leith Mullings’s chapter on households headed by women draws on the experiences of African-American mothers in Harlem to emphasize how they face the challenges posed by the growth of unemployment, homelessness, drug use, and violence in their community. Mullings concludes by highlighting the “*transformative work*” many of these women perform on behalf of their families and communities. This theme is found in a number of essays in the book and builds on the rich feminist scholarship on African-American women’s community work and activist mothering.
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Peter Kwong focuses on the complex interdependency of the Fuzhou-nese community in the United States, illegal Chinese immigrants, their families in China, and those who smuggle the immigrants into the United States. Kwong explains why state agencies have not been able to address the “legal loopholes” that help facilitate the exploitation of illegal workers. Several other chapters in the book also foreground immigrants’ experiences in the United States. For example, Patricia Zavella analyzes the experiences of Mexican immigrants in Santa Cruz County and considers the social and economic consequences of the so-called Latinization of California.

The three chapters in the second section of the book address “the fallacy of ‘reform’.” In their chapter, Sandra Morgen and Jill Weigt compare contemporary workfare with the much-maligned Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973. In contrast to critics of CETA, Morgen and Weigt point out the importance of CETA for supporting the work of community-based organizations while also giving workers from poor communities “the opportunity to do socially valuable work” (p. 163).

Part 3 includes four chapters that offer a critique of “neoliberal governance.” Susan Brin Hyatt criticizes the contemporary discourse on volunteerism and argues that the appeal to volunteerism obscures the state’s ongoing role in reproducing inequalities. In the next chapter, Donna Goldstein discusses how the neoliberal discourse of self-esteem and self-blame found in microenterprise training programs serves to shift attention from the structural forces that contribute to poverty.

One of the main themes of the collection is whether or not it is possible for the poor to organize against the neoliberal agenda. Vincent Lyon-Callo explores the extent to which the shelter residents can mobilize to challenge the structural that contribute to homelessness. Lyon-Callo concludes that once the “connections between systemic inequalities and homelessness” were generated through dialogue among the staff and homeless shelter residents with whom he worked, “new practices and resistance strategies” emerged (p. 313). Although the resistance was short-lived, Lyon-Callo believes that this experience illustrates the possibilities for politicization and mobilization of shelter residents and their allies.

The last section focuses on the challenge of progressive activism in this post welfare era. Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron address the debates concerning transnational migration, with particular focus on emigration from Haiti to the United States. Given the precarious economic situation of most Haitians, those who emigrate often assume the burden of providing economic support for their relatives in Haiti while living marginal lives in the United States. Schiller and Fouron argue that despite the great economic and emotional toll paid by transnational migrants, “long-distance nationalism can mobilize people to demand liberation from hunger, poverty, malnutrition, and political oppression,” and thus they can participate in progressive global struggles against poverty, violence, and economic exploitation (p. 350).
Judith Goode explores the material consequences of racial discourses in her analysis of community organizing in Philadelphia. She argues that “the very state discourses invoked to heal [racial] rifts . . . interfere with emerging politicized class identities” (p. 366). Matthew Ruben shifts the lens from the limits of racial discourse to the absence of class in “the language of urban representation” (p. 463). In his view, two key factors contribute to the absence of class: “the erasure of the poor from the public sphere” and “the suburbanization of American consciousness” (p. 438). Ruben explains that the strategies designed “to stimulate urban investment are inseparable from . . . those employed to attract suburban consumers and tourists” (p. 438).

In his concluding chapter, Jeff Maskovsky asks scholars to “tailor our research agenda so that it contributes to the grassroots efforts of the poor” (p. 471). The New Poverty Studies demonstrates the power of ethnography for revealing the limits of contemporary discourse on poverty and neoliberal policy solutions. The book provides a rich resource for activist scholars interested not only in deconstructing the discourse and practice of neoliberalism, but in identifying constructive alternatives.


Deborah L. Little
University of Michigan

In 1988, poverty knowledge was applauded for informing the debate that led to passage of the Family Support Act. In 1996, liberal poverty researchers reeled from their inability to stop welfare repeal in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act. How did we travel this distance? It is common to blame conservative ideology and politics. While historian Alice O’Connor does not ignore these elements in her assessment of the end of welfare, she lays much of the blame squarely at the feet of the liberal poverty research establishment itself.

In a comprehensive history of a century of poverty research, she details the limitations of an agenda that turned from a Progressive Era focus on the political economy and the problems of wage-earning to contemporary concerns with a culture of poverty and welfare-to-work demonstration projects. O’Connor blames this narrowing of vision on the combination of several things: a liberal commitment to maintaining a capitalist economy and market even while advocating state intervention to protect citizens, a belief in neutral value-free science that she exposes as anything but, a professionalization project that elevated the professors over the poor, and an unhealthy dependence on state and foundation funding that
rendered poverty researchers followers, rather than leaders, in policy debates.

Part 1 describes poverty research from the Progressive Era through the 1950s. O’Connor lauds the Progressive Era research agenda and then explores the turn to cultural and psychological analyses of Southern and African-American poverty. Part 2 examines the 1960s shift to a Keynesian model focused on economic growth, high unemployment, and individual skill deficiencies. O’Connor describes the struggles in the Office of Economic Opportunity where economists supplanted sociologists and created the econometric modeling techniques and cost-benefit analyses that now drive the poverty research industry. Part 3 lays bare the dependency of poverty knowledge on government and foundation funding, the politically determined focus on dependency and welfare, and the resulting 1990s consensus on work and welfare reform.

O’Connor argues that poverty knowledge is neither neutral nor apolitical. Poverty knowledge rests on a tension about whether inequality requires structural and institutional reform or individual change. The distinctively political answer has usually been the latter. While acknowledging the successes of poverty knowledge in describing the poor, detailing government spending on poverty, linking economic performance with poverty rates, and documenting Social Security’s role in reducing poverty, O’Connor also demonstrates why researchers could not effectively rebut Charles Murray’s conclusions in Losing Ground (Basic Books, 1984). Poverty knowledge has been about the poor and not about the working class, minorities rather than structures of inequality, behavior rather than political economy, and targeted intervention rather than structural changes in capitalism.

Poverty knowledge has also been influenced by its reliance on government and corporately organized philanthropic foundations, particularly since the late 1960s. O’Connor’s analysis of the role of these agencies in setting research agendas, creating and subsidizing research institutions, and formulating an approach that reduces social problems into quantifiable, individualized variables is a major contribution to the history of poverty knowledge.

No story of U.S. social science can be told without attention to race. Yet O’Connor contends that poverty experts have often failed to challenge their own biases in measuring the poor against white middle-class norms of behavior and family formation. However, many researchers have transcended their own class, race, and gender identities yet suffered from the effect of racial politics on research agendas. For example, O’Connor examines how researchers used culture in the 1930s and 1940s to repudiate notions of black biological inferiority. But in giving causal significance to the alleged cultural and psychological pathology of lower-class blacks, they laid the foundation for behavioralist explanations of poverty.

O’Connor is blunt in her criticism of the poverty research industry’s own “dependency” and focus on pathologies of the poor. She also ac-
knowledges the reformist impulses of many researchers and the un-intended political uses of some poverty knowledge. She details the work of scholars who have pursued alternative formulations, while lamenting the failure of mainstream poverty research to incorporate their perspectives and findings.

O’Connor urges a return to the reformist project of Progressive Era researchers, who sought to depauperize poverty by studying markets as social, political, and economic institutions that generate income inequalities. She advocates the production of knowledge within a more diversified, less government-dependent, set of institutions. Her book clearly demonstrates the difficulties of making such a change.

While some aspects of O’Connor’s critical interpretation of poverty research will be familiar, O’Connor offers a challenging evaluation of its recent failure. She paints a compelling picture of liberal social science gone awry, hung by its own unrecognized biases, ideology, and dependency, as well as its extraordinary successes in describing poverty in America. This is a book that should be read by everyone engaged in poverty knowledge and social policy.


Rita S. Gallin
Michigan State University

Iman Bibars’s Victims and Heroines is a thoughtful and theoretically grounded study of the effect of state welfare policies and programs on low-income female heads of household in urban Egypt. Beginning with the introduction to her study, she explores debates about the nature of the state and its relationship to women. This is followed by a chapter in which she describes her methods, situating them within a discussion of feminist research and the concession that its goals may be difficult to achieve in an “academic” study. Next, she discusses debates about the definition of female heads of household. Noting the complexity of the notion and the varied criteria used to define the concept, Bibars adopts an inclusive characterization that defines women who head households as “the chief provider who bears the main economic responsibility for the management and maintenance of the household,” regardless of a man’s presence or absence (p. 47).

Bibars then turns to her findings. After reviewing debates about the nature of the welfare state, she shows that Egypt’s assistance programs are grounded in patriarchal assumptions that interpret women’s needs in gendered ways. Next, she discusses “the politics of exclusion,” demonstrating how the state excludes women from welfare assistance programs.
by mandating a particular family form and code of female behavior that provides women with inadequate incomes and leaves them no alternative to survival other than a male breadwinner. Here, she also highlights how some women cope with the system, using strategies such as adopting stereotypical female behaviors, using informal ties to gain access to services, and establishing patron-client ties with government bureaucrats. Bibars then explores welfare policies and programs sponsored by Islamic groups and the Coptic Church, concluding that they are as biased and exclusionary as those organized by the state. Finally, she presents the voices of eight women who she interviewed in depth, illustrating their heterogeneity.

In her concluding chapter, Bibars argues that while women oppose oppressive structures they do not resist them. Describing resistance as a challenge to oppressive structures and opposition as “coping within constraints” (p. 64), she maintains that women’s attempts to deal with men are “survival strategies” rather than conscious actions to change the system. Following Richard O. E. Burton (Afro-Creole: Power, Opposition, and Play in the Caribbean [Cornell University Press, 1997]), she maintains that by drawing on discourses of the dominant culture, women reassert and reinforce their own oppression. As she acknowledges, this argument may constitute the most controversial theme of her book. While she provides numerous examples of women using dominant language, she also offers examples of women using language that defies cultural rules. For example, she reports, “The concept of a useless husband emerged repeatedly during my fieldwork” (p. 145). Nevertheless, she does not interpret the use of such language as a public act of defiance by which women rejected the characterization of themselves as the inferior “other” and subverted the view of husbands as pillars of the family. Nor does she consider discourse that differed from the dominant one as challenging prevailing meanings and constructing possibilities for alternative discourse and practice. One could argue that while the low-income urban women she interviewed embraced the dominant language, their choice to use an alternative discourse suggests that they viewed the world as one in the making. In fact, Bibars acknowledges that discourse may be open to interpretation, noting that “what is presented . . . is affected by my own perception of these women, their stories and how they affected me” (p. 124).

Yet others may find her criticisms of postmodernist feminism controversial. While she adopts several of its tenets in her analysis (e.g., difference and a space for those who heretofore have been silenced to voice their concerns), she considers advocates of this perspective cultural relativists. In her view, because they fear being labeled “ethnocentric,” “culturally insensitive,” or “imperialist . . . [they] select moments of subversion and call them resistance . . . , [thereby allowing themselves] to ignore aspects of oppression . . . and to describe their subjects as resourceful and empowered” (p. 168). By so doing, she argues, “feminists are abdicating
their role of helping to empower their sisters” (p. 178). While any number may resent such an assessment, Bibars’s attack opens the way for strategies of change to be debated.

Despite these caveats, Iman Bibars’s book makes a contribution to the understanding of the relationship between women and the state and to the increasing feminization of poverty worldwide. It shows that this phenomenon is a product of the gendered ideology of the welfare state and its bureaucracy, as well as of deteriorating economic conditions in countries such as Egypt. Her book thus should be of interest to feminist and Middle Eastern scholars, those interested in women and welfare, and those concerned with change that has implications for how women construct and reconfigure their worlds.


Robert Dingwall
Univrsity of Nottingham

Divorce lawyers often get bad press for running up bills, stirring up conflict, and overcomplicating simple disputes. Law and society scholars have long found this odd. Academic studies of civil litigation, including studies of divorce practice, have pointed to an overwhelming preference for settlement—at least partly in the interest of containing costs. This book explains the discrepancy. People who write for the press, or who are part of the same social class, often have quite a different kind of divorce than ordinary people. They tend to employ specialist lawyers, who are happy to spend their clients’ money doing everything by the book. Ordinary people often use more generalist lawyers, who give them the service they can afford and who emphasize settlement and commonsense dealings with the lawyer on the other side.

Within this framework, there are numerous paradoxes. The adversarial lawyers who do richer folks’ divorces tend to be women: they may be more sensitive to their clients’ emotional needs, but they are much more aggressive litigators. They also work in bigger firms where there are strong pressures to limit pro bono work or concessions on fee scales to reflect client means. Poorer people more often get male lawyers, who quietly bill them for what they can afford but feel guilty about their inability to sustain a high-profile pro bono service. The view of these small-scale or solo general-practice lawyers in the literature on the legal profession often has been negative. They are seen as offering a technically poor and sometimes corrupt service to low-income clients. Mather et al. offer a more nuanced picture, where the quality of service is dictated by client resources and where small traders struggle to reconcile the ideals of law school and
Bar Association ethics with the economic pressures of everyday practice. The authors relate the views of one attorney at a small practice, who observed that there was no point in a client complaining about the costs of raising three kids when he had three kids of his own and had to worry about how to pay for their college.

Although *Divorce Lawyers at Work* is ostensibly about one particular segment of legal services, it has a wider relevance to the study of colleague control in professional work. Much of this has been done in hospitals, where practice can be highly visible, even if rendered socially invisible. Mather et al. examine a field where the players are only intermittently visible to each other. Nevertheless, at least in the small towns of New England, mutual self-interest can clearly be quite a powerful force in imposing a particular approach to practice. However, it is vulnerable to incursions, whether from specialists or from city-based law practitioners —in this case from the Boston area—who do not form part of the community of practice. The gradual drift of attorneys into firm-based practices, of whatever size, also tends to weaken the community. The lawyer’s first duty is to his or her firm’s interest rather than to other peers or to the profession at large. The economic imperatives of the partnership structure override older ideals of altruism and public service. Similar arguments have been made in relation to the increasing institutionalization of salaried or contracted medical employment. There is clearly an important research agenda to be pursued on the implications of the shift to organized professional practice, particularly when so much of the legitimating rhetoric of the professions still invokes images from solo, fee-for-service days.

The core data in this study are from New Hampshire and Maine, which may not be representative of the United States. Certainly, this study would be worth replicating in a city practice, although it is arguable that urban professionals form comparable communities, except perhaps where there are high rates of migration. The high rate of alternative dispute resolution in Florida might, for example, be an artifact of an environment where lawyers find it hard to form communities of practice because of a high level of inward migration, so they use formal mediation as a functional alternative to picking up the telephone for informal negotiation with other lawyers. The authors deal neatly with the methodological limitations of their survey data.

All in all, this book deserves wide readership among all sociologists with an interest in professional work, not just those with a specialist concern for law and lawyering.

Michele Dillon  
University of New Hampshire

Michel Peillon has written extensively about the structural dynamics of Irish society, and, in this current book, he provides a strong theoretical analysis of the evolution of Irish social welfare institutional politics and practices. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, Peillon uses the concept of a welfare field to delineate both the external forces that influence welfare policy in Ireland and the competitive struggle over resources that occurs between various policy actors. From the outset of the book, Peillon argues that Ireland’s welfare system is difficult to characterize in terms of established analytical schemas; it is neither singularly liberal, social democratic, conservative, or corporatist. It entails rather a mix of elements—a centralized (but not necessarily strong) state; diverse economic mechanisms (e.g., the presence of multinational firms, a significant self-employed business class); a vibrant civil society; an array of voluntary organizations, including strong labor and employers’ unions; the feminist movement; and an activist Catholic Church—that all play, to a greater or lesser extent, interacting roles depending on the policy issue and the time interval under study.

Peillon provides a concise and informative overview of the evolution and character of Irish welfare policies, and he argues that while state welfare programs redistribute income, they also have a stratification effect. Anyone who studied or visited Ireland during its socioeconomic transformation in the late 1960s and 1970s might be under the impression that, despite its historical semiperipheral economic status, it is quite a generous welfare state. Those years saw an impressive expansion in major benefits (e.g., old age pensions) and have led many scholars to comment on Ireland’s highly developed welfare society. Peillon challenges this consensus. He argues that Ireland is in fact a “reluctant welfare state” (p. 22); currently, it is among Europe’s welfare laggards because, essentially, as the data for social expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product show, it is not using its newly acquired post-1990s wealth to maintain its commitment to welfare provision (pp. 6–7). Moreover, Peillon contends, Irish welfare policy follows a needs-based/means-tested approach rather than a philosophy of universal social citizenship rights (pp. 10–11).

Using a welfare field approach allows Peillon to focus on the ruptures and transformations in Irish social policy and on the organizational actors and economic and sociocultural developments that have determined the contours and content of Irish welfare. It is these players and processes that comprise much of Peillon’s analysis. Peillon finds a useful and illuminating frame for his discussion of welfare activity by explicitly applying several of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts. For example, he offers the
notion of a welfare “habitus” and discusses how the habitus of welfare recipients and agency personnel differs depending on the welfare category and type of social insurance benefit received. Recipients of means-tested benefits (usually the poorest stratum) lack economic, cultural, and political capital, and along with other (better off) beneficiaries, service professionals (e.g., doctors, social workers) and the welfare administrative agencies comprise a largely “misrecognized structure of domination,” wherein control is misperceived as care (pp. 32–34). Thinking of welfare in terms of competitive, differentiated, and multidirectional relations thus enriches and enlivens the analysis of social policy more generally and highlights the dynamic character of the internal and external forces that shape the welfare field.

Peillon also observes how the state, constrained by the competing interests of its corporatist social partners such as labor and employer unions, but emboldened by strong electoral support for welfare state provisions, is able to redistribute economic resources in ways that enhance its symbolic capital and public legitimacy. Yet, because of the symbolic and political capital enjoyed by other actors (e.g., the Catholic Church), the state has had little autonomy historically in shaping new policy directions in specific sectors (e.g., education and health). But, as is critical to Bourdieu’s and Peillon’s analysis, capital circulates. Thus, Peillon notes that an apparent recent decline in the Church’s political capital has propelled it to enhance its symbolic power by becoming, increasingly, an advocate for the interests of Ireland’s economically dispossessed groups. Similarly, while women’s organizations have enjoyed a relatively substantial stock of political capital, Peillon argues that as the state assumes greater responsibility for these “caring functions” (e.g., in regard to battered wives, sexual abuse), the feminist movement risks attenuating some of its material and “power” capital (p. 96).

By focusing sociological attention on the multiple players in the welfare field and the differentiated and relational character of their competitive struggles, Peillon’s book offers a vibrant and complex analysis of the sociology of welfare. This book should be of interest to graduate students and scholars studying social policy or Irish society; in addition, any serious reader who seeks a deeper understanding of social institutions and of how they work in particular sociohistorical contexts will find much to appreciate in this monograph.


Sue Penna
Lancaster University

This book is a wide-ranging study of economic planning during World War II and its aftermath. It was designed “to explain the origins of ec-
onomic planning philosophies and the sources of contention over planning" and aims to provide “an explanation of the prominence of economic planning in post-war discussions of economic policy” (p. 278). In providing such an explanation, it also sets out to rethink the origins of the welfare state (p. 2). Comprising a study of six countries—the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Austria, France, and the United States—the book proceeds through a qualitative examination of the contexts and social actors involved in planning for war mobilization and the reconstruction process after the end of war, adopting a historical-institutional approach to the subject.

The central argument of the book is that significant continuities existed between the warfare and welfare states, and in this respect, it makes an important contribution to the study of welfare states, where such continuity is often ignored. Mobilization for the war effort greatly expanded the capacities and authority of the nation-state. This is proposed as a causal variable in explaining the extraordinary policy changes that resulted in the European postwar welfare states. Institutional continuity persisted once the planning infrastructure was established during the war years. The consistent pattern of continuity between wartime economic policies and postwar policies that the author notes is offered to support the position that the postwar reconstruction and adjustment process took the forms it did because of institutional variables, and here the author emphasizes such variables against explanations that take statist legacies, national cultural variations, or system-specific logics of action as explanatory frameworks. The emphasis, then, is on the remarkable expansion of state capacities during the war years—even in a neutral country such as Sweden—that resulted in a shift in the balance of the institutional bases of public and private power.

This war restructured the national state, endowing it with greatly increased capacities for planning and representing a historically unique period of economic nationalism. The nature of war in Europe meant that economies and societies became closed to foreign trade and, coinciding with the publication of Keynes’s influential proposals for economic management, placed the nation-state as the central actor and organizer of policy development, planning, and politics. The reconstruction process saw the Keynesian model adopted as the institutional framework for domestic reconstruction, in which social and economic policy became conjoined in the planning process. While important continuities existed, different paths to national development emerged that, over time, displayed the variations that have led to many (other) authors describing different “regimes” of welfare or capitalist development. The bulk of the book is historical, detailing the war and the reconstruction years. Despite the title, the book says little about the present other than concluding that planning has fallen out of favor, although given the author’s definition of planning (p. 4) and welfare state (p. 3), it could be argued that planning on a massive scale is currently taking place at the level of the European Union.
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Overall, the book provides a wealth of detail about the minutiae of planning, but it suffers from a number of problems. Most of the material is derived from secondary sources. The primary data is extremely thin, although the pulling together of a lot of secondary material on economic planning in relation to six countries is a useful contribution. However, there is no sustained methodological or conceptual discussion in the book. The methodological discussion is very short and does not address the difficulties of cross-national qualitative research in any meaningful way. Mostly the book applies the language of quantitative research to qualitative material, a pretty hopeless strategy that does not allow for a plausible exposition of the central methodological point—that policy choice is contingent on resources and historical events, and that such contingency militates “against grand theorising” (p. 258). Perhaps this explains the lack of any systematic engagement with the debates in which the author is inserted. Mostly these are political science debates, but they occur piecemeal, here and there in the book, in an odd sentence or so, in a remarkably polemical manner that I found highly irritating. While definitions are provided of planning and the welfare state, given that the focus is the nation-state, some definition and engagement with the concept of the state or the governance literature would have been useful. Despite these problems, the book is in many ways a fascinating glimpse into a defining historical period that now seems light years away. It is likely to be of interest to anybody specializing in social and economic development in the mid-20th century.


Barbara Cruikshank
University of Massachusetts

This book includes 19 engaging and wide-ranging studies of how individual identity is documented and certified by states as far flung as medieval Europe, colonial and contemporary Rwanda, the former Soviet Union, and Argentina. Part of the editors’ intent is to provide a historical overview of the documentation of individuals by states, and the volume succeeds admirably in doing so. It lays the groundwork for future research that could include modes of individual documentation that take place outside the state as well. In many ways, the credit card is today more ubiquitous and “useful” to the state than the passport or birth certificate. These essays situate our present-day fears and sense that state surveillance apparatuses are more effective and more insidious than in times past, as well as our enthusiasm for DNA typing for medical and judicial purposes.

PROOF 30
Each essay consists of detailed and preliminary studies that eschew any grand schemes of periodization or overarching theories about the documentation of individuals or the relationship between states and individuals. Indeed, these essays seem designed to befuddle efforts toward grand history and theory. For example, Jon Agar does not offer an overarching explanation for why some European states maintained national identification systems devised in wartime, while England abandoned it after periods of war. Instead, the essays tear down explanations that simply reiterate the categories of national identification, such as the claim that “Britishness” explains the failure of national identification systems in England.

In the introductory essay, the editors attempt to differentiate the volume from recent studies in governmentality and related studies such as Ian Hacking’s work on statistical representation. They do not mention scholarship in other fields, such as John Tagg’s work on the history of photographic documentation. The editors seek to distance the volume from existing bodies of scholarship rather than speaking to them in order to set up the history of documenting individual identity as an entirely new field of scholarship. The editors assert that “the documentary apparatus of identification itself has driven the history of categories and collectivities” (p. 3). However, the editors do not succeed in making their case that the history of documenting individual identity is an entirely new field of research unto itself or even that it is important to establish it as such. Nevertheless, these important essays will certainly find their way into existing fields of scholarship.

The volume demonstrates that techniques for documenting individual identity have historically been both emancipatory and repressive, depending upon the degree to which the state is democratic. While categorization by the state may stigmatize a population or group, it may also secure a group’s rights. A majority of the essays tell stories of how the process of state rationalization is both enabling and constraining, both individualizing and totalizing. For example, frauds and impostors rely upon a system of documentation to subvert. The categories of identification themselves do not definitively shape individual identity, but they do create and reproduce the cultural, strategic, and political conditions of identification.

From branding and anthropometry to DNA and fingerprinting, the history of individual documentation is never determined or driven solely either by the designs of the state or the available technology. Collectively, the essays leave one with a reassuring sense that bureaucratic bungling, subversion, and the perpetual failure to implement the techniques of identification into rational and total systems of social control will protect us against overreaching states. Yet there are cautionary tales here as well. Purposes such as conscription, policing, security, taxation, and public health are all legitimate state functions for which the documentation of individual identity is necessary. The danger, as author Pamela Sankar...
describes it in her essay on DNA typing and fingerprinting, is “function creep,” the inevitable use of data collected for one purpose being utilized for another purpose later on. One essay, by Timothy Longman, demonstrates that previously fluid categories of ethnic identity were fixed by the colonial state in Rwanda and later served to structure genocide. The volume will upend the reader’s sense that surnames, for example, are “private” or customary and benign, as Jane Caplan demonstrates they were stabilized by the state.

Documenting Individual Identity will be useful to scholars and teachers in a number of fields whether their interests are citizenship, representation, social groups, labor, individualism, migration, (post)colonialism, criminology, or government. It will also be of interest to general readers who will find a medley of entertaining stories of deception, unexpected confusion, police work, and haunting stories of eugenics and genocide. The essays are uniformly rigorous, well-written, and fascinating.


Damian Tambini
Oxford University

At the turn of the millennium, politicians all over the world were gripped by a new utopia: a vision of a digital information society boosting economic productivity, transforming social structures, and imploding space. Social theorists lined up into opposed ranks of gradualists, who argued that this was an exaggerated view and little would change, against those such as Manuel Castells, who argued for new policy thinking based on the view that a genuine paradigm shift was occurring. The result, tracked by this book, has been a haphazard political obsession with networks, interactivity, and technology. For the left, technology functionally replaced socialist utopia, and for all politicians, it offered a means to depoliticize conflictual issues that could be presented as neutral “modernization” problems. Andrew Barry’s new book attempts a critical deconstruction of this technological millennialism, employing the sharpest of Foucauldian archaeological trowels.

The book, transparently, is a collection of loosely related essays. They do belong together as a project, but the attempt to construct an overarching theory in order to link them seems a little forced. This might be because the elements of the book are in some ways opposed. Barry is not a purist “wrecker” deconstructor: he draws on theoretical traditions that make strange bedfellows—not only Ernesto Laclau and Michel Foucault, but also regulation expert Giandomenico Majone—that would not usually interact. The result is a unique account of an enormously complex field of public policy. This should not be read as an introduction to the field
of European thinking on technology and politics, but as a shocking refresher for those in need of new perspective.

The book offers an overview of a series of policy areas and some commentary on protest movements. The chapters cover the idea of the network in political practice and discourse; the relationship between technology, empire, and transnational relations; the problems of standardization and harmonization; and the notion of “interactivity.” There is a separate discussion of intellectual property rights. This is a contribution to a debate of central importance, though the lack of a discussion of the work of Lawrence Lessig seems a glaring omission.

Barry succeeds in problematizing the problematic of the “network society” and spurring policy analysts—including this one—to reexamine some of their assumptions about public policy on new technologies. But if it is read also as a constructive contribution to public policy thinking, the book seems to stop short of its target. He seems to make the claim that the European Commission’s overarching commitment to harmonization in its network society objectives is somehow mistaken, but I am unconvinced. Just as there was a key public policy role in setting standards for rail networks, there is a strong argument that governments and bodies such as the European Commission are rational when they take a proactive role in building networks to compete with the United States. So, the lengthy description of the vision of the various harmonization projects of the European Commission, while interesting, lacks critical bite.

Some of this lack is in method, as this style of work embeds claims in the body of text, rather than separating them out for empirical or theoretical scrutiny. Either we are convinced or we are not. Take, for example, Barry’s claim that “the extraordinary significance and prevalence of the concept of the network today cannot be accounted for simply by pointing to the existence of networks in the real world. For the function of the concept of the network is not merely ‘cognitive’ or representational; the use of the concept and the various practices, social scientific disciplines, policies and technologies with which it is associated, entail an effort to reconstitute and reorganize the social field. The discourse of networks and networking has a performative and technological as much as a representational function” (p. 86). This complex of claims seems plausible and is thought-provoking to an extent, but—and this is the central point really—I could still argue that the reason we are so obsessed with the image of the network is that in many ways the infrastructure of the network society is unfolding before us.

It would be unfair to criticize this book—which is an excellent read for those interested in technology and in critical social theory—for failing to do what it does not set out to do. It does not set out to criticize the empirical bases of the policy paradigms of the network society. It does not ask whether the discursive smoke examined by the book is evidence of friction caused by a genuine structural shift in the fundamental infrastructure, spatial relationships, and productive capacity of advanced so-
ciety. Because if they are merely puffs of discursive smoke with no basis, then we might be more critical of the politicians that exhale them.


Jim Leitzel

*University of Chicago*

In the effective introduction to *States and Illegal Practices*, anthropologists Josiah McConnell Heyman and Alan Smart indicate that they do not want to argue that illegality is acceptable, even if it is normal (p. 21). Many of the nine chapters that follow, however, reveal potential social benefits stemming from illegal behavior. States can form or be strengthened, for instance, through interactions with outlaws. David Nugent’s contribution, based on the competition for control of local government in the Chachapoyas region of Peru circa 1900, observes that illegal political networks “may themselves be key mechanisms by means of which state organization is brought into being and reproduced, and vice versa” (p. 70). In a chapter on bandits (more generally, “military entrepreneurs”) and the state, Thomas W. Gallant comes to similar conclusions: “Bandits helped make states, and states made bandits” (p. 25).

Illegal activities can simultaneously enrich and subvert a state, as Alan Smart documents in his analysis of bribery in China. Although he is reluctant to endorse corruption as a productive force (characterizing corruption [p. 107] as “double-sided”), Smart nevertheless explains how many of China’s extremely successful policy changes have been brought about by the eventual legitimation of rule evasion that was tolerated due to local-level corruption. Despite the possibility of economic benefits, however, corruption can weaken the state. The discretion to appoint people to positions where they can make money by corrupt means helps authorities to maintain control. But bribes concurrently undermine the implementation of government policies (p. 116)—another aspect of the double-sided nature of corruption. In their investigation of the Sicilian mafia, Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider are less equivocal. They reject the view of the “mafia as an organization that fulfilled a necessary function in society” (p. 175) and instead emphasize its “predatory nature.”

In an engrossing chapter concerning failed state building, historian Alfred W. McCoy chronicles the rise and fall of Khun Sa, a man who was responsible for much of the influx of high purity heroin into the United States between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. “Though few knew his name on the fashion ramps or the club floors, it was Khun Sa who had made heroin chic happen” (p. 142). Khun Sa parlayed drug money into military and political strength, eventually attempting to create his own nation, based around the Shan, an ethnic group of some 4 million
people in northeastern Burma. The Shan state proclaimed independence from Burma in 1993. “By investing all his resources in the Shan national cause, he sacrificed the outlaw’s flexibility of maneuver among states that had served him so well” (p. 143). In the person of Khun Sa—McCoy recounts a gripping personal encounter with the drug lord—one can glimpse the complex interconnections between states and outlaws, politics and contraband.

Illegal activities tend to be hidden, so the case studies in this volume—which range from Russian protection rackets to illegal shrimping in Mexico—are most welcome. Simultaneously, however, States and Illegal Practices implicitly reveals the limits of existing theories of illegal behavior and the state. The Gallant analysis invokes world-systems theory, but the heart of the chapter is almost independent of that approach. Smart proposes a taxonomy for the persistence of illegal activities, though its usefulness remains uncertain. Mercer L. Sullivan and Barbara Miller persuasively argue that a disproportionate reaction—a “moral panic”—can be discerned in the response to the surge in serious adolescent violence in the United States from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s. Heyman, in making an analogy between the war in Vietnam and illegal immigration from Mexico into the United States, focuses on the escalation of force in the face of policy failure. Why moral panics or escalations sometimes take place and sometimes do not, and what can be done to prevent these inappropriate responses, are questions largely left unanswered.

Will a useful general theory of the interaction between states and illicit activities be forthcoming? Surely the acceptability or desirability of illegal behavior depends on the quality of the rules that are being evaded, while the response of the state to a surge in illegality will depend on how closely the state is attuned to the interests of its citizenry. A careful elucidation of the quality of rules and the responses that likely will be invoked when the rules are broken would then seem to be in order. An evasion-based theory of policy and state transformation probably would require distinctions to be made between corruption and other forms of rule evasion, and between short-term and long-term effects. States and Illegal Practices provides much raw material for further developments along these lines, and interested researchers should buy, beg, borrow—but not steal—a copy.
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_Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China’s Floating Population._ By Li Zhang. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001. Pp. xiv+286. $49.50 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).

David Wank  
_Sophia University_

Marketization in China since the early 1980s has produced a huge movement of persons from rural areas to cities and coastal regions seeking their livelihood. It is on their backs that China has emerged over the past two decades as the lowest-cost producer in the global capitalist economy. Estimated at between 100 and 200 million persons, it is surely one of history’s largest labor migrations.

_Strangers in the City_ examines this phenomenon through an ethnography of a migrant community in a Beijing suburb. Chain migration has created highly organized and economically specialized migrant communities in the capital. For example, migrants from Henan province sell vegetables and recycle trash, Hunan province migrants do construction work, and Anhui migrant women work as maids. Migrants from the Wenzhou district in the southern province of Zhejiang, reflecting its traditions of interregional mobility, craft production, and middleman trade, have created a large textile production and marketing enclave only five kilometers from Tiananmen Square. Li Zhang, a China- and United States-educated anthropologist, conducted 16 months of fieldwork in the mid-1990s in this community of 100,000 persons, derisively called Zhejiangcun (Zhejiang Village) by Beijing residents and the state-run media. The result is an extraordinarily insightful and vivid account of the relationship between accelerating marketization, privatization, and globalization, on the one hand, and lingering socialist institutions and practices in China, on the other hand.

The narrative blends Marxian concerns for the making of capitalist production sites with Weberian inquiry into the maintenance of authority relations to trace Zhejiangcun’s development. The transformation of a Beijing suburb into a migrant economic enclave was unleashed by reforms in 1979 that fostered a market economy and private business. But Zhejiangcun’s development has also been constrained by the household control system instituted in 1958, which granted citizenship rights that are only enforced in a person’s locale of registration. From the late 1950s until the 1970s, this system and the elimination of the market economy suppressed labor migration. By traveling to the national capital and developing a new economic space after 1979, Zhejiang migrants simultaneously responded to new market policies and challenged lingering Mao-era practices of social control.

As their household registrations were in Zhejiang, migrants lacked formal rights in Beijing to land use, police protection, electricity, water, and...
social services. They forged clientelist networks to manage their flexible
economic activities and uncertain political status. They consciously es-
chewed creating formal organizations because, as unregistered migrants,
any associations they set up would be labeled subversive by the party-
state and repressed. Predictability in land use and infrastructure came to
be embedded in ties with suburban village and local district party-state
cadres. Within the community, allocation of housing, production and mar-
keting space, and policing and social services proceeded through networks
centered on the migrant bosses of housing compounds and market sites.
Nevertheless, this explosive growth outside party-state structures worried
central authorities and led them to order the demolition of Zhejiangcun’s
housing compounds. The migrants, desperate to stay in the lucrative ur-
ban market at the center of the national transportation network, ingen-
iously rebuilt their community within months. They forged alliances with
bankrupt state enterprises by giving them money in return for permission
to reside and produce in the enterprise compounds.

Drawing on such concepts as Gidden’s structuration and Bourdieu’s
politics of naming, Zhang describes the contesting discourses representing
Zhejiangcun, the interests behind each, and the actions they legitimated.
Her data is especially rich as she interviewed a wide sample of people,
from migrant bosses to seamstresses, and from government officials to
Beijingers. She convincingly portrays patterns of conflict and cooperation
between urban and rural populations, Zhejiangers and other migrant
groups, husbands and wives, bosses and workers, patrons and clients,
state and Zhejiang migrants, and different levels within the party-state
surrounding Zhejiangcun’s rise, demolition, and reconstruction.

In short, this is an excellent ethnographic analysis and a moving piece
of social commentary on China’s late socialism. While its economic and
political contradictions have been described before—the party-state view
of private business as both a necessity and threat, diverging economic
interests of local and central governments, simultaneous emphasis on law
with rising corruption—they are portrayed here with unusual clarity. The
account of party-state attempts to penetrate and regulate this migrant
enclave challenges Western social thinking that equates market formali-
zation with the rule of law, and the attribution of such problems in the
migrant community as crime and corruption to contradictions within late
socialism challenges popular Chinese attributions of these problems to
the migrants’ culture. *Strangers in the City* should be read by advanced
undergraduates and senior scholars alike who are interested in migration
and ethnic enclaves, state-society relations in late socialism, gender re-
lations, workplace organization and culture, informal economies, and con-
temporary China.
American Journal of Sociology


Richard Lachmann
State University of New York at Albany

New York in 1979 was a city just emerging from bankruptcy: youth unemployment was over 75%, the South Bronx was burning, and the subway system was about to enter its worst years of fires, breakdowns, and crashes. Nevertheless, the New York Times and the Koch administration were convinced that “the real cause of cynicism, sadness, and hopelessness . . . was the actions of young vandals, including those writing their names on the subways” (p. 144). Austin examines how graffiti became the central metaphor and measure of the city’s decline in the 20 years from the first writing on subways in the late 1960s until the transit authority’s final victory over the subway graffiti in the late 1980s. He traces the changing ways in which graffiti was understood—first, in the early 1970s, as an unstoppable epidemic and an overt sign of youth disaffection and delinquency, and later in the decade as a crime deserving concerted police response to signal that the authorities were in control of the subways and the city at large.

Austin analyzes the ways in which graffiti, the writers who created it, and the campaigns to stop it were framed by public officials and the media, above all the New York Times, which then, as now, set the agenda for debate and action in New York. Austin properly links the image of graffiti as a symbol of the breakdown of authority to the later “broken windows” theory of crime. Austin sees this approach’s “emphatic attention to the surface appearance of the social order” as “postmodern” (p. 146). Perhaps it might better be understood as an instance of what Walter Benjamin describes as “the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic” (Illumination [Schocken, 1969] p. 242).

A great merit of this book is Austin’s attentiveness to the ways in which the antigraffiti campaigns affected the social organization of graffiti writers and the production processes of graffiti. Graffiti writers’ code of honor prevented them from writing over the work of others, so when the available spaces for graffiti on the subways became filled, innovation slowed and novice graffiti writers were unable to find the space to develop reputations for quantity or quality. Whenever the transit authority cleaned the outsides of subway cars, they inadvertently created new space for graffiti, which had the unintended effect of spurring artistic innovation and drawing new cohorts of writers into the subways. Full car murals were first created after a spasm of subway cleaning in the early 1970s.

Austin mentions some of the new techniques that graffiti writers developed to respond to the vast spaces the transit authority had cleared for them. I wish Austin had conveyed a stronger sense of the rapid in-
novation of this site-specific art form. Much of the best graffiti was meant to be appreciated in motion, as it passed through dark and dingy stations or on elevated tracks. Photos and graffiti canvases cannot convey the energy and aura of giant artwork in motion, which makes it difficult for Austin to find a way to convince readers of his belief that “[graffiti] writing manifests the greatest art of the late twentieth century” (p. 271). The criticism that will properly place graffiti within art history has yet to be written, perhaps because the art galleries that paid brief attention to graffiti presented these canvases as a social statement rather than as serious art. Austin, in his eagerness to challenge the official view of graffiti, underestimates the ways in which galleries’ casual fling with graffiti undermined writers’ social networks and collective systems for appraising their work.

Austin traces graffiti through its elimination from the subways and its further development in the late 1980s and early 1990s as it was placed on stationary walls. The transit authority’s success in eradicating graffiti led many muralists into retirement, while the less aesthetically interesting creators of simple tags practiced their self-advertisements on above ground spaces all over the city. Innovation slowed as writers’ networks became less dense and there no longer were forums, either in the subways or at galleries, for writers to evaluate and critique one another’s work. Today, the most interesting graffiti is being created, as Austin points out, in Germany and California by writers who learned of graffiti from art books, movies, and music videos.

Taking the Train is the most comprehensive history of graffiti now available. It should supplant Getting Up, Craig Castleman’s pioneering study (MIT Press, 1982), as the basic reference work on this phenomenon. Austin is exemplary in showing the social and artistic inventiveness of the young people who created and elaborated this form of expression. Austin also is concerned with understanding how the graffiti writers themselves, as well as their supporters among art dealers and critics, writers, and part of the general public, responded to the various official attacks on graffiti. To that end, Austin has examined a vast array of newspaper and magazine articles and letters, as well as zines, videos, and movies. His footnotes reveal the hold that graffiti had on the consciousness of public officials, journalists, and other artists. This book should inspire further work into the aesthetic and social development of graffiti in New York City and beyond.
American Journal of Sociology


Steve Pile
Open University

For me, the term “urban memory” in the title of the book sets a very basic problem for understanding cities. In combining urban and memory, a very basic question is asked about how we identify and interpret the relationship between the spaces and the histories of the city. The urban is evocative, say, of a whole host of social and physical aspects, such as buildings, streets, parks, infrastructures (roads, water supplies, electricity, etc.), family life, work, workplaces, labor relations, political organization, and so on. That is, it is evocative of the kinds of things the Chicago school once detailed as being constitutive of and distinctive about urban life. Memory, meanwhile, suggests a range of personal and collective experiences that involve recollection, remembering, memorializing, forgetting, and reminiscence. So, urban memory must be about the “mutual constitution” of the urban and of memory—but what does this mean, and how is this “mutual constitution” (if that is what it is) to be conceptualized?

Srinivas’s book explores these issues, as it were, from the ground up. It seems to me that Srinivas arrived at the title, rather than started there. The main focus of this book is on a special religious performance that takes place in Bangalore. The Karaga “jatre” (pilgrimage) occurs over nine days in March or April every year. What is remarkable and fascinating about this book is how Srinivas approaches an understanding of this “performance.” The dust jacket of this book describes the analysis as rich—for once, this is not dusty hyperbole. I know I cannot do justice to Srinivas’s multithreaded analysis, but I can hint at some of the ways the book maps out the various social, physical, spiritual, embodied, political, and spatial dimensions of the Karaga jatre.

With care, and probably knowing that many readers will not be particularly familiar either with Bangalore or with religious practices in southern India, Srinivas takes time to take the reader through the various contexts for the Karaga jatre. We are told about the festival and how it celebrates the goddess Draupadi. In particular, we hear about the popularity of the festival and how this connects to the development of Bangalore as a modern city—the central paradox being that Bangalore is also the location of many high-tech industries and is distinct among Indian cities because of its position within global circuits of capital, labor, and knowledge. For Srinivas, this means that there is a particular relationship between the sacred and the civic in Bangalore, and the Karaga jatre becomes an ideal site where these relationships can be explored and understood. This is especially so because of the actual performance of the
Karaga jatre, which is composed of various rituals, but also of processions through the city.

For Srinivas, religious processions and embodied ritual performances are spatialized (urban) acts of memory: processions connect places to places, but also times to times, mapping out sacred and political memories of the city. Meanwhile, performances transform bodies and spaces. By tracing out the significance of various sites (of the processions, of various rituals, of embodied performances, of transformations), alternative and “hidden” memories of the cities are teased out. We learn, therefore, about changing patterns of land-use (since the 16th century—these memories are long!), about changing political and social hierarchies in the city (before, during, and after the British), about the class and caste composition of contemporary Bangalore (and especially struggles between groups over land and water), about gender relations, and about migrations of people to and through the city. This is, indeed, a rich analysis, and it is backed up by thorough sociological investigation (from a quantitative survey of the main social group involved in the festival, to qualitative interviews, tape-recorded field notes, photographs, maps, and more). This book is a real work, both empirically and analytically.

It was Srinivas’s ideas about “space” that really drew my attention, as well as her interpretation of the religious practices. Aside from the weight of material about Bangalore, this material has real life: in some ways, this was about “exotic” (to me) acts such as fire-walking and goat-sacrifice; but Srinivas also gave a sense of how these rituals and performances made and remade “ordinary” space, how they drew together multiple aspects of everyday life, and how they in turn rendered everyday life itself sacred. In this sense, the full impact of the work is actually to provide an alternative model of urbanism—one which takes seriously the sacred, not as something else that happens in cities, but as an essential “back-beat” to city life. In this book, Srinivas offers a model for understanding urban memory that must now be read, not just for its insights into religious performances in Bangalore, but for the questions it now sets for understanding urban memory elsewhere—including here.


Peter Beyer
_University of Ottawa_

In 1990, David Martin published the influential _Tongues of Fire_ (Blackwell), which discussed the rapid contemporary growth of Protestantism in hitherto Catholic Latin America. The present volume is to some extent a sequel to that effort, updating it and focusing more explicitly on key sociological questions such as differential regional receptivity and the truly
global character of this Christian religious idiom. The work is thereby also in explicit continuity with Martin’s much earlier *General Theory of Secularization* (Blackwell, 1978), above all in the close attention it pays to the way that regional, cultural, and historical contexts inflect and particularize broader social developments, whether secularization, Evangelical Protestantism, or Pentecostalism. Indeed, the author’s nuanced and contextualized treatment of secularization in the 1970s has stood the test of time better than most other pronouncements on that theme, so much so that its basic approach has proven relevant in the understanding of what for many will seem to be the opposite, namely the rise and global spread of Pentecostalism. Critical factors in this flexibility are that, in this book as in the others, Martin takes seriously what people—both elite and subaltern—are actually doing, and he resists deriving sociological law from what may only be present trends.

The various chapters of *Pentecostalism* have different but related aims. In the first two, Martin focuses on the theoretical questions of why Pentecostalism has become so globally successful and yet why there have been such different degrees of receptivity in different parts of the world. His complex answer to the first question can be summarized as follows: the Pentecostal modality offers a spiritual resource uncontrolled by centralizing agencies and not tied to ethnicity or place. As such, it responds to the needs of, above all, the marginalized and mobile, those who have migrated away from their ethnocultural localities and aspire to inclusion or at least survival in a predominantly urban modernity that too often excludes and degrades them. Pentecostalism offers these social pilgrims a form of empowerment, a narrative in critical and varied continuity with local religiocultural styles that includes them and facilitates self-discipline and incorporation in stable, supportive families and local communities. It can lead to greater economic, political, educational, and health improvement, but it is not a disguise for these aims; its primary attraction for its adherents is as a religion.

Pentecostalism and its related phenomena have found particularly fertile ground in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of east Asia. In addition, the United States has proved much more receptive than the roughly northern Christian belt stretching from Melbourne through Toronto to London, Rome, and Moscow. Receptivity is therefore not just a matter of rich and poor. Martin’s attempts in his second chapter to explain such differences are multidimensional and complex; one cannot do justice to them in a short review. Among the factors he stresses, however, are divergence in cultural attitudes toward the form and place of religion as such. In the United States, he avers, people expect decentralized and voluntaristic mobilization in the production of social capital, and that expectation very much includes the churches. They are less inclined to trust centralized and elite-run institutions such as (quasi)established churches and the state. The reverse orientation becomes more and more prevalent as we move from Australia and Canada through Britain and...

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onto the European continent. Moreover, in much of the latter, strong, secularist discourses (e.g., laïcité in France), stemming from the way that historical modernization was enacted in these countries, add a relative distrust of religious institutions of any kind. It is this, in part, that for Martin also explains the difference in receptivity between Catholic Latin Europe and Catholic Latin America.

The bulk of Martin’s book applies the general frames of the first chapters to Pentecostalism in its areas of greatest receptivity, above all in Latin America, including its indigenous people, and then sub-Saharan Africa and east Asia—mostly South Korea and the Philippines. The relative centrality of Latin America repeats the emphasis of Tongues of Fire and contrasts with other treatments of global Pentecostalism such as Harvey Cox’s Fire from Heaven (Perseus, 1995). In these chapters, Martin treats an array of themes, such as the implications of Pentecostalism’s rise with developments in global capitalism, and the differential importance of “rivals” such as Catholicism, Islam, and Buddhist movements in Latin America, Africa, and East Asia, respectively. Throughout, he incorporates empirical material and theoretical arguments from the important and rapidly growing literature on worldwide Pentecostalism, thus situating his own interpretations clearly in the ongoing sociological and wider scholarly discussion.

Martin’s Pentecostalism represents an important contribution in several ways. The book offers insightful interpretations, clear conceptualizations, and a richness of empirical overview that is reminiscent of Max Weber’s writing. It nicely synthesizes much of the recent literature on its theme. Perhaps most significantly, Martin demonstrates how religion, even and especially the apolitical religion of the culturally despised subaltern, is a regular feature of the global social landscape: not a remnant, not a faute de mieux, but a vital resource for getting along in this world. As such, it will be of interest to anyone who seeks a better understanding of the global society in which we all live.


William A. Mirola
Marian College

As a main proponent of applying rational choice theory to the study of religion, Stark provides readers with a comparative-historical analysis of several of the world’s monotheistic religions with the intent of describing the social effects of belief in one god. Stark begins his analysis by theorizing what human beings look for from the gods, and his answer is clear: resources that come through an exchange relationship with deities. Stark argues that humans look for three characteristics in a god: God must be
rational, responsive, and dependable. Three broad hypotheses follow from this argument that form the basis of his walk through the history of monotheism. First, people prefer a single god who is all three of the above over gods that are abstractions or beings who have none of these characteristics. Second, individuals prefer to believe in a few gods who do a lot than in many who do a little. Third, the greater the scope of the god, the greater will be the commitment of believers and the greater will be the god’s ability to mobilize human action.

Using historical data on (predominantly) Islam, Judaism, and Christianity from wide-ranging primary and secondary sources, Stark takes readers through an analysis of missionary activity, religious conflict, religious persistence, and religious pluralism. Each of these topics addresses a unique set of issues in the history of monotheism. Missions suggest the need for religions claiming the true faith to proselytize others who either have other beliefs or have somehow adopted beliefs labeled as heresy. Religious conflict between as well as within groups is the source of religious vitality, requiring more intense commitment from believers. Religious persistence addresses why minority religions are allowed to continue and not simply eliminated by majority religious groups. Religious pluralism brings readers to the question of whether there is hope for harmony or at least civility from coexisting monotheistic religions. All of these are important on their own terms, and Stark does an excellent job of weaving the stories of specific religions together to unpack his theoretical points.

Paralleling my sentiments after reading his earlier foray into theorizing about the development of early Christianity, I enjoyed Stark’s study as a thoughtful discussion about the emergent dominance of monotheistic traditions. Nevertheless, several issues remain after reading through the histories of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity included here. First, if monotheism is a rational belief system, why is it that the one true god needs a supporting cast? This is a question that Stark addresses inadequately. Within Christianity, for example, what function do saints and angels serve as beings to which many of the faithful appeal if one god is enough? Second, is it possible to think beyond the narrow definition and conceptions of monotheism (i.e., that we are talking about Allah, Jesus Christ, Yahweh) and apply Stark’s thinking to other “religious” scenarios? For instance, can the theoretical insights Stark provides be used to understand and elaborate on the capacity of “divine” Caesars, of causes that generate social movements (social justice, labor, civil rights), of Nature, or of civil religions of states to mobilize human action without reference to a deity? While I recognize that all of these are outside the scope of the book, Stark’s analysis left me with the impression that nothing but these familiar gods could mobilize human action in the ways he describes. I do not mean to suggest this is what he believes, but one sees it implied here. Moreover, since Stark does not allow for many alternative interpretations, the reader is left to draw his or her own conclusions.

Third, although chapter 4 addresses the persistence of minority religions
within monotheistic cultures, I am more interested in why nonmonotheistic religions continue to exist at all. Is there some evolutionary scheme at work here that assumes humans eventually choose a more rational religious form because it will be so self-evident that belief in one true god will rationally be a better deal and always beat out nonmonotheistic religions?

Another issue that Stark’s analysis raises in my mind is about the forces that undermine monotheistic belief. At one point he discusses the disappearance of Judaism in China (p. 195). This suggests that monotheistic religions do not inevitably persist over time. It would be interesting to know more about these processes. What exactly are the forces that can contribute to the syncretization of monotheistic traditions? Are the forces that were at work on Chinese Jews before the 18th century at work elsewhere? What role does the syncretization of cultures and social institutions, spurred by global capitalism, play on what monotheistic beliefs and practices look like globally? Stark’s work pushed me to ask more questions about these grand narratives of religion.

As a sociologist of religion who draws on critical and neo-Marxist theoretical approaches and as a person of faith, I grew tired with the author’s perpetual attacks on any theoretical view that approached religion with a materialist, Marxist, neo-Marxist, or other critical lens. Stark’s initial point that the best socially scientific study of religion will suspend both atheistic and theistic assumptions about the “true” nature of religion seems to be sufficient to his point (p. 5). Nevertheless, Stark keeps returning to the point throughout his analysis in a way that made me wonder whether the real story of this work was to analyze the existence of “one true theory,” that is, his own. Stark offers no room for theoretical contributions to understanding these historical narratives from other perspectives.

Moreover, Stark ends his work with a five-page discussion that lays the blame for social “incivility” at the feet of “secularists, both churched and unchurched,” without a clear definition of who is and who is not a secularist (p. 251). This diatribe seems a departure from the best kind of social science which he calls for above. The discussion is unnecessary, unhelpful as a concluding argument, and certainly lacks the kind of empirical grounding that Stark provides elsewhere in the book. Stark asserts (without providing evidence) that “for all the Christian Right preoccupies secularist publications, secularists, in turn, are rarely mentioned in evangelical publications” (p. 256). Apparently, we are to assume the three evangelical periodicals he names (Charisma, Christianity Today, and First Things) are representative examples of all evangelical media. A walk through any evangelical bookstore will shed light on the vast amount of writing done to warn Christians of the threats of secularism. I am simply unable to account for Stark’s claim here. What is more, following this discussion the book simply ends. Readers should not expect a conclusion that revisits the larger issues at stake here or what his analysis tells us about debates in the fields of religious history or sociology.
American Journal of Sociology

In sum, *One True God* mirrors Stark’s larger intellectual project to provide more historical data to support rational choice models of religion. Will this build solidarity and commitment to rational choice models among scholars who share this framework? Yes. Does he convert those of us who do not? No. Can we live together in academic civility despite our theoretical differences? One can only hope.


Wenda Bauchspies
*Pennsylvania State University*

A software engineer saw *Mechanizing Proof: Computing, Risk, and Trust* sitting on my desk. He questioned, Why a book on proof and trust? For him proof and trust are obvious because in his line of work he depends on formal verification to provide him with knowledge of the computer system to do his job. Donald MacKenzie focuses on the interrelations of computing, risk, and proof to discuss this “obvious” question. By doing historical sociology, MacKenzie details the how, where, why, who, and what of proof making since the 1950s. He balances enthusiasm for computing with a fear of dependency on computing to explore deductive knowledge production by addressing it from a technical and sociological perspective. Specifically, he asks, What is the nature of knowledge production for computer systems and deductive proof? Or, in other words, what are the effects upon deductive knowledge when we try to reliably “predict the behavior of computer systems upon which human life and security depend” (p. 6)?

Dependability of computer systems, reliability of testing, role of mathematics, and logic are the topics of the historical case studies that provide the groundwork for his discussion of automation of the mathematical proof. Here, the plot divides into a discussion of theorem-proving in machines as being “pure logic” or “human like.” The importance of theorem-proving for artificial intelligence is clear and MacKenzie neatly maps out the various camps and schools of thought that developed in the early 1960s. This discussion opens the door for a close examination of mathematics and the role of computer proof, focusing on the 1976 proof of the four-color conjecture that clearly illustrates the two opposing viewpoints on computer proof. One side is entirely uneasy with the use of computers, while the other accepts the computer as useful but sometimes challenging to humans. No discussion of computing, risk, and proof would be complete without a discussion of the vulnerability of computer systems and the issues this raises for national security (chap. 5). Here, the conflict between trust in human versus trust in machines is played out with the application
of the Bell-LaPadula model that required trusted humans to override the system for national security.

The heart of the argument for computing and trust, and for the book, is the debate between computer-generated proof that is thousands of lines long and is based upon formal logical inferences and proof that is the product of humans understanding, checking, accepting, discussing, modifying, rejecting, and using information. I am not sure who or what wins, but the book is a wonderful historical and sociological story of underdogs and boundary walkers challenging the establishment through philosophy and sociology. After two theory-action chapters, MacKenzie brings the book and the reader back into the real world and discusses proof and its application to real problems. The first real world example was an experimental aircraft control system and peer review conflict. The second was the use of automated theorem provers to verify tasks controlled by humans. Computer-related accidents are discussed in chapter 9, and the Hoare paradox is used to discuss why software-based systems have killed relatively few people.

Overall, MacKenzie details how different knowledge communities are deciding what formal proof is and why they are making these decisions. For some communities, machines are trustworthy agents of proof, while others would prefer to resolve aspects of human deductive reasoning before they completely trust machines as “performer[s] of formal proof” (p. 307). In the various knowledge communities, what is formal proof, what are the criteria for proof, and what is mathematics’ role in proof take on different meanings and importance.

MacKenzie illustrates the variety and diversity of “cultures of proving” from the discussion of the cleanroom and automated verification to the role of mathematics in proof. His analysis of the intersubjectivity of the process of proof review in the cleanroom is reminiscent of Helen Longino’s analysis of the creation of objectivity in science. MacKenzie outlines properties of computer systems, dependability of computer systems, and the nature of deductive and automated proof. He also details arguments between philosophers, mathematics, and computer scientists about acceptable criteria for proof. Underlying this discussion is the question of “What is the role of humans and of computers in proof verification?”—a question that we are only now starting to address. In the introduction, MacKenzie poses the question, “If machines can prove, does it mean that proof is not social?” (p. 12). After plowing through seven dense chapters, it is very apparent that, yes, proof is social.
Serious single gene disorders with a clear hereditary pattern in families affect relatively few medical consumers. If genetic medicine focused only on genetic disease thus defined, it would play a minor role in health care and scientific research. But in recent decades, attention to the role of heredity in the complicated diseases of modern prosperity has made genomic medicine directly relevant to public health, clinical care, medical education, and biomedical research.

In their study of the “new genetics,” Petersen and Bunton have therefore wisely made public health the central thread. Avoiding almost entirely discussions of the bizarre (and unlikely) possible applications of genomic technologies that appear in so much of the contemporary literature, they present a broad introduction to actual practices and policies in the global marketplace, the media, medical care, and genetic counseling. They draw on media and cultural studies, on risk studies, and on science studies, and they are interested in language, metaphor, and imagery. Their goal is to interrogate key assumptions that have often guided political and scientific thinking about genetic technologies and their health impact.

The result is a well-grounded introduction to the existing literature and a relatively moderate presentation of a sometimes heated and emotional debate. The style and scope of the text make it a useful teaching resource, and it could serve as a clear introduction to the field for scholars unfamiliar with the issues. Each author contributed their own expertise in the form of single-authored chapters, and Petersen is first author for a reason: he wrote five chapters, and Bunton, two. The authors have slightly different styles but are both good at explaining the basics. Those basics include treatments of technological systems theory, of the history of the body, of contested definitions of life and humanity, and of the problem of interpreting popular culture and its impact.

Petersen explores the emerging notion of “genetic citizenship” as institutions seek to draw a poorly defined “public” into the assessment of genetic technologies. He also examines genetic support groups and their promotion of genomic medicine, noting the sometimes contrasting concerns of disability activists who question the biomedical emphasis on impairment. The child who will have a disability, such critics suggest, is viewed as an individual problem, rather than as a participant in a cultural negotiation of the experience of social life.

In her consideration of globalization and genetic medicine, Bunton reviews the links between knowledge and capital that have shaped scientific practice since the rise of genetic engineering in the 1970s. Her explorations of controversies over the proposed Human Genome Diversity Project, the
Health Sectors Database of Iceland’s deCODE Genetics, and genetically modified organisms suggest some enduring tensions. The practices involved in patenting, blood collection, genetic marketing, and product control have enraged critics around the world. Some geneticists’ expectations of uninhibited blood collection in remote and isolated populations proved premature, and some tribal groups are now demanding that older samples, collected in the 1950s and 1960s and long stored frozen in laboratories in the United States and Europe, be returned immediately. If the genome is a commodity, it has some unexpected claimants.

An analysis of Australian media images of genomics and public health is the basis of Petersen’s treatment of science and the media. His attention to the repetitive vocabulary of press accounts is particularly compelling. He looks at the active, definitive verbs used to describe genetic results—genes are found, isolated, identified, pinpointed—and considers how these words assume that the gene can be treated as an unproblematic, decontextualized, and solid reality (p. 116). Journalists also frequently refer to a riddle, map, code, jigsaw puzzle, or book, suggesting that scientists unearth what is hidden and provide a guide to future action (p. 118). He also notes that news stories only rarely mention the influence of nongenetic factors on diseases and other conditions, even when those nongenetic factors are widely recognized and accepted. The gene discovery, it seems, trumps all other causal narratives.

The literature on genetic medicine and its impact is vast and growing. The topic seems to attract bioethicists, philosophers, legal scholars, physicians, geneticists, and memoirists of all perspectives. Some of the recent portraits of a technophilic neoeugenic future are enough to make the reader nostalgic for the ineptitude of the old eugenics: at least the science was generally inaccurate. Some of the more macabre contemporary proposals might actually work. In any case, the market for glorious stories of the genomically transformed future is apparently interpreted by publishers as limitless. Petersen and Bunton’s account is by comparison engaged only with the quotidian social realities of market forces, emotional needs, political and economic power, and contested narratives. Their study is a solid contribution to the emerging debate in all its complexity.


Jackie Orr
*Syracuse University*

This is a slender book with a significant aim: to make visible the “social machinery” (p. 6) that produces the cultural authority of science advice, that particular genre of scientific knowledge directed toward a public, often policy-oriented, audience. Positioned in the fractious borderlands...
between science and politics, between disinterested expertise and the public interest, science advice plays an “indispensable role in the modern state” (p. 3). State institutions use science advisors to guide regulatory policies on a broad array of topics, from genetic testing to the radiation risks of interplanetary travel. More profoundly, Hilgartner suggests, science advice helps to legitimate state institutions by claiming to separate out the scientific/technical from the political features of complex, hybrid (scientific and political) issues. How does science advice achieve such credibility? And how is that credibility sometimes successfully contested?

Taking as his case study the most prestigious advisory body in the United states, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Hilgartner limits his analysis to the rather small historical stage of three NAS reports. Written between 1980 and 1985, the reports and their varied public reception mark a moment of transformation in scientific and governmental views on the influence of proper nutrition in preventing illnesses like cancer and heart disease. Given growing scientific and popular concern about the diet-disease link, the NAS was faced in the 1980s with the question of what diet advice would be appropriate for the general public. Hilgartner’s portrait of the emergent debates over diet, health, and disease prevention, and of the NAS and its procedures for producing expert advice, is thorough and fascinating.

Hilgartner uses the metaphor of performance to analyze the “theater of scientific authority” (p. 83) in which the three reports on diet and health enact a stylized, strategic play for credibility. Drawing throughout on Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical vocabulary, he explains how the more or less successful mobilization of “dramatic resources” (p. 112) by the NAS, or its critics, accounts for the differing public fates of each report. Identifying the “stage management” of information as a key technique for controlling audience perception, Hilgartner, following Goffman, conceives of a “front-stage” and “backstage” region in the performance of advisory reports. The front-stage constitutes the public display of the report, while the backstage conceals a potentially contentious drama of conflict and consensus building. While backstage information and action are off limits to the audience, the front-stage narration of backstage procedures becomes a decisive element in the public performance of the NAS’s authority. When the credibility of the NAS’s 1985 revision of the Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDAs) was hotly contested and when, in a stunning move, the director of the National Research Council halted its publication, the NAS engaged in a losing battle for control over both backstage information and the front-stage image of what took place “behind the curtain.”

The tight textual focus on three NAS reports at times gives the sense that Hilgartner is doggedly trying to tell a far-reaching sociological tale while trapped inside a tiny empirical closet. The narrow attention to the three reports—as well as the dramaturgical framework itself—has the effect of “backstaging” and “front-staging” selective elements in Hilgartner’s own theoretical performance. For example, his emphasis on the
drama of information control makes sense given the sanctioned secrecy built in to NAS proceedings (reports are discussed and drafted in closed meetings), but does it address the bulk of science advice produced through a more open, public process? More troubling, the metaphor of “performance,” at least as Hilgartner uses it here, tends to backstage the very power dynamics that may constitute a good portion of the NAS’s backstage activity. While he describes the concerns of critics about a possible conflict of interest when NAS committee members who draft dietary advice are also consultants for the food industry, the materiality of economic or political power in the play for credibility is largely absent from Hilgartner’s analytic theater. Since the secrecy of NAS proceedings has itself become contested political terrain (we learn that a 1997 Supreme Court decision to uphold a ruling requiring the NAS to grant greater public access to its proceedings was overridden by special congressional action), it would have been helpful to see Hilgartner engage that contest more directly.

For those interested in the burgeoning field of science and technology studies, for sociologists of knowledge and the still-lively crowd of Goffman students, the book will be quite interesting. For readers who have followed the language of “performance” in the many theoretical theaters it has traveled post-Goffman—including its role in recent cultural studies, feminist, queer, and even science studies work—Hilgartner’s theoretical framework may be less seductive. What remains most impressive about the book is how it quietly performs that magic trick of a useful sociology: to make visible the invisible. When I now hear reports of the latest NAS pronouncement, I see, churning and clanking, pieces of the machinery that make it persuasive.


Michael S. Goldstein
University of California, Los Angeles

This book is part ethnography of psychiatric training (the author is an anthropologist), part sociologically informed account of the recent history of psychiatry, and part exhortation for psychiatrists to get their act together. Despite being repetitious, the book is quite well written and will appeal to both a professional and lay intellectual readership. Although Luhrmann begins with the statement that sociological theories about the nature of mental illness “seemed absurd to me” (p. 5), almost everything she has to say will seem reasonable to most sociologists who study mental illness and the health professions.

Luhrmann’s basic thesis is that American psychiatry has become split into biomedical and psychodynamic factions—each with its own value
system, ways of knowing, and style of training and practice. Although she believes each perspective to be “substantially correct and equally effective” (p. 10), she views the split itself as fundamentally destructive of psychiatry’s ability to carry out its mission. Luhrmann trained with psychiatric residents in a wide array of settings, and the book’s great strength is its account of how biomedical psychiatric training imparts the disease model of mental illness as reality. The detailed descriptions of how the residents move from memorizing lists of criteria to recognizing prototypes that are then treated as part of the “natural world” and applied to real people will delight labeling theorists. At one point Luhrmann is entertained by residents diagnosing patients by glancing at them through a window. Eventually, even these categories become too restrictive, and diagnosis is determined largely by which medications work. This “willingness to diagnose post facto on the basis of medication” (p. 49) is viewed favorably by young residents because it makes them “feel like doctors” (p. 50).

The training in psychodynamic therapy received by the residents is another world entirely. While the formal training in theory and technique is shockingly superficial, and the residents are rarely observed at work by their supervisors, the interaction between the resident and his or her supervisor is intense and profound. In supervision the residents demonstrate mastery by learning to tell their supervisor a convincing story, with little regard to its truth or utility. Luhrmann convincingly makes the case that psychiatric training consists of two very separate worlds.

Luhrmann’s detailed accounts, drawn from a range of hospital settings, supports a classic sociologic view of mental hospitals by showing how residents learn to be detached from (and at times resent and hate) patients on inpatient services as part of the “toughness needed to survive” (p. 99). What will be new to many sociologists is Luhrmann’s description of how both intense and demoralizing training in psychodynamic therapy is for the residents. The more sophisticated the residents become, the less they believe in psychodynamic categories and the less they trust the technique to work.

Luhrmann’s participant observation (she had supervision and did some therapy herself) serves her well in realistically describing the different role models (research scientist and psychoanalyst) held out to young residents. The portrait of what academic biomedical research has become is right on target. Her account of how psychiatric science has come to define itself as a (sometimes scornful) rejection of psychodynamics is also well done. It is balanced by a sympathetic description of the professional lives of analysts, who build their world around unblinking honesty and authenticity. But, in the end, analysis is judged as ineffective and naive in creating therapists who come to “know everything about their patients except what they are like in normal human relationships” (p. 195).

After spending the first half of the book describing psychiatry’s intellectual split, Luhrmann switches gears in her assessment of why contem-
Book Reviews


T. M. Luhrmann
University of Chicago

This book is a solid and scholarly exercise that exemplifies a style of thought that directly undercuts its aims. Wirth-Cauchon gives what she perceives to be a feminist interpretation of a psychiatric disorder. She calls it feminist because she believes that her perspective is liberating and empowering for women. In fact, if we took her conclusions seriously, we would not only treat the women she talks about dismissively, but we would strip them of their power to ask for help. This paradoxical and self-destructive feminism is not original to Wirth-Cauchon, but is in fact a powerful undercurrent in some parts of academia.

In psychiatry, there are no “objective” tests, like blood analysis or brain scans, to distinguish between someone who is mentally ill and someone who is not. There is something obviously wrong with someone who is prototypically schizophrenic, but the more schizophrenics you know, the more the category seems like a wastebasket for a range of conditions. Moreover, it is clear that mental illness is involved with our social fabric and that the way mental illness is socially conceived does seem to alter the way it is individually expressed and experienced. To try to understand the way that mind and culture “make each other up,” in Richard Shweder’s memorable phrase, is an important practical and intellectual endeavor. To ignore the fact that people struggling with mental illness

porary psychiatric practice has become a disaster area. While the two opposing camps in psychiatry have made all sorts of unsubstantiated claims on their own behalf and have continually denigrated each other, the real problem is the takeover of all medicine by a businessManaged care model. Today the demands of insurers have nearly obliterated outpatient psychodynamic therapy, reduced biomedical psychiatry to a frequently ineffective pillPushing caricature, and compromised the training of young physicians. Luhrmann’s description of the role in this process played by DSM-III, NIMH, and the community mental health movement will be of particular interest to sociologists. A financial crisis combined with ideological conflict in the profession has been a devastating combination.

The final chapter begins by perceptively noting that the book “might have ended with the previous chapter.” The conclusion is a mishmash of thoughts on topics like suffering, JudeoChristian values, and the meaning of compassion and heroism. Still, the book provides a very useful contribution to the sociology of mental illness and the health professions.
are actually ill and in pain and need our help—that is an act of great cruelty.

*Women and Borderline Personality Disorder* claims that the diagnosis of “borderline personality disorder” emerges out of the contradictory expectations of women’s behavior in the late modern era. Wirth-Cauchon points out that the diagnosis refers to “a pervasive pattern of instability of self-image, interpersonal relationships and mood, beginning in early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts,” (cover) she then suggests that women may appear to be unstable only because they are trying to reconcile the roles and expectations imposed upon them by the broader society. “Borderline patients’ symptoms can be read as signs of cultural and social ills, through an analysis that depathologizes them and politicizes them, placing them in the larger context of gender and power” (p. 200). Yet women—yes, almost always women—who are given this diagnosis typically have irrational, out of control rage, a sense of inner emptiness, great emotional intensity and great charm, and an unfortunate tendency to slice open their arms with razors, to overdose on their medication, and to die. Repeated, dramatic, theatrical attempts to commit suicide and repeated, dramatic acts of self-mutilation, among them slicing, burning, starving, and repeatedly vomiting, are the kinds of behaviors that lead to this diagnosis. Life for women in late modernity has not always been easy. But large “cultural and social ills” cannot by themselves account for this specific and significant cluster of behaviors. You cannot explain the way a firework explodes by giving a historical account of state celebration. Moreover, most psychiatrists and other mental health professionals now believe that people who present with the kinds of symptoms that get identified as “borderline personality disorder” have developed those symptoms because they have been sexually traumatized as children. If so, they are female, because most of the children who are sexually abused are female. Wirth-Cauchon, who does not discuss this etiological argument in any detail, treats the trauma reported by one of her case-studies as a narrative strategy. “[The patient]’s recovery of a traumatic memory renders her symptoms meaningful as adaptive responses to an external event” (p. 163). However, Wirth-Cauchon continues, this is not a sufficient explanation of her symptoms. “[Her] own narrative appears to complicate this early childhood interpretation as the sole cause of her conflicts. . . . Her narrative returns repeatedly to gender conflicts in her life and to her present secondary status as a woman” (pp. 163–64). In other words, it was not being mauled by her babysitter and raped in college that caused this woman to be suicidal and self-mutilating, it was her experience of her lesser status as a woman.

This kind of depathologizing argument does not empower these women; it humiliates and deems them the way psychoanalysts humiliated and demeaned them in the 1960s and 1970s when stories of incest were dismissed as libidinous fantasies. Indeed, if we were talking about cancer, this kind of depathologizing analysis would anger those who read it,
because it would seem obvious that the consequence of depathologizing cancer would be to deny hospital care to sufferers. But because this is a psychiatric problem, it can seem noble to claim that these women are not sick, but somehow gloriously rebelling against an oppressing hegemony. The historical circumstances undoubtedly play a significant role in the emergence of the particular clustering of symptoms one sees in women identified as borderline, just as industrial pollution and a longer lifespan play a role in the high rates of cancer in recent years. But it would seem immoral to deny that people who are dying from cancer are sick and need our help, and it should seem immoral to make the same claim about mental illness.

That said, Wirth-Cauchon’s general question is a good one. We should indeed try to understand what the emergence of the borderline personality disorder diagnosis in the 1970s can tell us about gender and society. “Borderline” is indeed a label often used as a slur. Young psychiatrists learn to describe female patients they do not like as borderline, and their dislikable symptoms are in fact entwined with gender categories. Wirth-Cauchon has some thoughtful remarks to make about this process, but she could have been more respectful of human pain.


Norman K. Denzin
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This handbook is a marvelous accomplishment. Organized in seven sections, it skillfully captures, maps, and interprets the wide range of theory that now operates in the discipline. Each of its 31 chapters is carefully crafted by a master theorist. Each of the seven sections corresponds to a major theoretical tradition. Hence, part 1 refers to theoretical methodologies; part 2 covers the cultural turn; part 3, interaction processes; part 4, the systemic level; part 5, evolutionary theorizing; part 6, power, conflict, and change; and part 7, rationality.

This is a glittering gallery of sociological theory written by the preeminent theorists working in the field today. Turner asked each author to “[tell] us about their latest work . . . to tell the reader about what they are doing, right now, rather than what others have done in the past” (p. vii). Turner asserts that he did not “seek textbook reviews of fields, rather forefront work in the field . . . the result is a volume that provides overviews of traditions but more importantly that shows where theoretical sociology is going” (p. vii). His directives were not always followed; too many of the chapters linger in the past.

Turner believes that sociology today is experiencing a “hyperdifferentiation of theories” (p. 1); too many theories are competing for the same
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space. There are now at least seven distinct approaches to theory. This proliferation works against sociological theory ever becoming fully scientific, and if sociological theory is not scientific, what is it (p. 3)? Too much of what passes as theory, for Turner, becomes “various mixes of journalism, ideological preaching, critique of perceived wrongs, and vague philosophizing” (p. 3). Such approaches do not “take sociology in a very healthy direction. They assure that we will be a watered-down humanities and that we will be irrelevant to policymakers and our fellow academics” (p. 3).

I believe that Turner thinks there are six theories too many, that there is really only one true approach to theory and that is his. In the main, the other six approaches, such as action theory, make pretensions of being scientific but are not, or they engage in “micro- or macrochauvinism” (symbolic interactionism, conflict and rational choice theory, evolutionary theory, and macrotheory), or deductive reductionism (exchange theory), or offer illusive resolutions of the micro-macro gap (multidimensional, cultural, and structuration theory), or represent low-level middle-range theories. The result is a hyperdifferentiated discipline.

In contrast, the obvious solution to the micro-macro problem, in Turner’s mind, lies in recognizing that reality unfolds “along micro, meso, and macro dimensions; that each of these levels reveals its own emergent properties; that these properties are driven by forces distinctive to each level; that theory is about the dynamic forces operating at each level; and that theoretical integration will always be about how the properties of one level load the values for the unique forces operating at other levels” (p. 6). This kind of synthesis may not yield a unified theory, but it will produce “a series of theoretical models and principles” (p. 6).

I disagree with Turner. Social theory’s problem today is not the proliferation of theory; it is not the absence of models or unifying principles that specify causal links, within and between levels. Theory is the problem of social theory today; that is, theory as it has fallen into the hands of theorists who think in terms of models and unified theories. I suppose this is where the problem started, when social theorists of a younger generation, after the fall of Parson, took on the job of making theory and sociology respectable, testable, and unified. Answering to the call of power, this generation sought to carry on a project that would make sociology relevant to policy makers and academic deans, while differentiating the field from the humanities and the natural sciences.

Sociology’s founding trilogy—Marx, Weber, and Durkheim—asked what their sociology could do for society. This was a critical social science that sought to help people make the histories that democracy under capitalism demanded. This was progressive social theory that criticized, cajoled, satirized, and mocked social formations and nation-states that reproduced violence, repression, and inequality. This was social theory that anticipated, in some forms, liberation movements based on identity politics, race, class, and gender. This was not social theory that aimed for
causal principles and unified models. It was progressive, critical social theory that incessantly criticized the workings of democracy under racist, sexist, and patriarchal capitalism.

Of course there are traces of this version of theory in Turner’s handbook in the chapters by Ritzer, Burawoy, Wright, Sica, Tilly, and Chase-Dunn. At the same time, there are gemlike chapters that show creative theorists at work, doing what good theorists do best, which is figuring out how the social world works. But in the main, if this handbook is about where theoretical sociology is going today, then sociology is in trouble.

Art as a Social System. By Niklas Luhmann. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. x+425. $45.00 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

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“Art is merely one of society’s functional systems,” states Niklas Luhmann in Art as a social System, and therein lies the tale his book tells. “We are not offering a helpful theory of art . . . Art becomes a topic in the first place because of the assumption that a social theory claiming universality cannot ignore the existence of art” (p. 3). Luchmann’s clearly stated objective, then, is not to provide us with a theory of art, but to assimilate what he calls the “system of art” into his well-known theoretical edifice, a theory predicated upon what he calls “evolutionary differentiation.”

The God-term in Luhmann’s universe is “autopoesis,” essentially the self-direction of the systems of society, including that of art, toward greater autonomy and complexity. Although Luhmann was a student of Talcott Parsons and his work bears the evolutionary interest of the functionalist paradigm, it is what many partisans of the older version might consider to be a mutant functionalism. As Luhmann avers, he considers “system differentiation” as “the heart of Parsons’s theory” (p. 350, n. 4) yet unlike Parsons’s optimistic sense that differentiation was undergirded by functional imperatives such as adaptive upgrading, Luhmann’s own sense is that the process of societal evolution “does not presuppose central norms, no matter how generalized” (p. 2). Essentially what this means is that society is composed of a set of systems (economy, politics, law, and art, among others) that evolve and complexify but not toward any unified state, such as Parsons’s “societal community.” Rather, each system tends toward its own independence and standards, and thus much of Luhmann’s book explores what he calls “the autonomy of art,” that is, the ability of the art system to develop its own “self-description.”

Although an influential figure within German social theory for decades, Luhmann has never been an especially popular figure in American circles, perhaps because his theory is in actuality what many sociologists have accused Parson’s of being: a theory reducing social actors to nothing more
than epiphenomena of their social system. Hence, Luhmann’s book consists of his application of concepts such as system/environment, medium/form, first- and second-order observation, self-reference and external reference and above all the distinction between psychic systems (systems of consciousness) and social systems (systems of communication) to the realm of art, thereby conceptually transforming it into the “art system.” One of the ironies in Luhmann’s analysis is that his claim for the “autonomy of art” is seemingly refuted by his own, wholly social, assessment of it. Indeed, reading Luhmann’s book is a little like watching Frankenstein at work: his conceptual apparatus renders the ostensibly organic associations we might have of art as being instead mechanical and clinical. For all of Parsons’s own romance with systems theory and cybernetics, his central concern was always with the cultural product of those systems, which he referred to variously as “instrumental activism” and “institutionalized individualism,” that is, the way in which differentiation led to the production of a more complex and sophisticated individualism within the societal community. This constituted Parsons’s standard for the evolution of societies. Luhmann, meanwhile, consistently held that social systems operate “behind the backs” of actors, operating to reduce complexity for such actors, on the one hand, while furthering systems imperatives, on the other. This contrast between mentor and student becomes most obvious in their respective views of culture: while Parsons never fully unpacked the concept of culture in his own work, his emphasis on values and norms opened the door to what today is known as the “sociology of culture” in the work of influential students like Robert Bellah and Clifford Geertz (Geertz’s own assessment of art some years ago, for example, was pointedly entitled *Art as a Cultural System*). Luhmann’s view could not be blunter nor more different, as he calls culture “one of the most detrimental concepts ever to be invented” (p. 247).

“What interests us here ... is how art functions as communication,” Luhmann says (p. 39), and that is the crux of his conception of art: it is the medium and not the message that is important. The work of art is produced exclusively for the purpose of communication and that it accomplishes this goal or fails to do so by facing the usual, and perhaps increased, risks involved in all communication. Art communicates by using perceptions contrary to their primary purpose. ... Art seeks a different kind of relationship between perception and communication—one that is irritating and defies normality—and just this is communicated ” (pp. 22–23; author’s emphasis). Thus, what is most interesting about Luhmann’s view of art is also what is most interesting about his general theory: its sophisticated and elaborate explorations in the evolutionary development of the media of communication, which are perhaps un paralleled in contemporary theory. But due to his bracketing of the cultural dimension of art, he views the message or meaning that the artwork itself claims to convey as wholly residual. And what is art without meaning? Not only is this a problem for art, it is a problem for Luhmann’s theory;

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he cannot clearly define the source of art’s “irritating” character nor the
“normality” it seeks to defy because he brackets the ideas and ideals that
consist of the meaning (read: message) of any conceivable artwork. This
gives the 300-plus pages of Luhmann’s book a rather repetitive and tiring
quality; it constantly seems as if he is writing around art rather than about
it. This is the price he pays for a theory in which the criterion is systems
complexity rather than cultural meaning.

Theories are always, in some way, about their theorists. While Luh-
mann’s variant of mutant functionalism is not palatable to American
tastes, his theories are as reflective of late-20th-century European sensi-
bilities as Parsons’s were of mid-20th-century America or Bellah and
Geertz’s of the upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, some art critics
have warmed to Luhmann’s book as an exemplar of one of the newer
“cool” theories of art; that is, those that challenge more subject-centered
and humanist theories and aim to accommodate the growth of new me-
diums such as digital art and cyberspace. But in any conception of art
that includes culture, the medium is only as good as the meaning it con-
veys. And it is the meaning of art that is sorely lacking in Luhmann’s
appraisal. Paul Ricoeur once wrote that “materialism is the truth of a
world without truth.” It might then be said of Luhmann’s conception of
the art system that it is the truth of art without meaning.