The Realities of the Most Powerful Office in the World: A Comparison Between Public Opinion and the Legal Underpinning for Executive Action in U.S. Foreign Affairs

Cameron N. Brusko
cnb1004@wildcats.unh.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/honors

Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
https://scholars.unh.edu/honors/438

This Senior Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
The Realities of the Most Powerful Office in the World: A Comparison Between Public Opinion and the Legal Underpinning for Executive Action in U.S. Foreign Affairs

Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between public opinion data and the consequent policy decisions enacted by the federal government. Specifically, it will examine President Trump's policy implementations regarding the United States' role in foreign affairs. Multiple public opinion polls, both domestic and international, will be utilized throughout to establish an understanding of the public's complex views of this role. Antecedent to this, however, the nature of public opinion will be reviewed by providing a definition for public opinion, examining the various influences throughout one's life, evaluating the criticisms and problems associated with it, and understanding how it ultimately relates to policy making. Significant policy decisions executed by President Trump will be discussed, including the Paris Agreement, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Iran nuclear deal. His continually developing relationships with nations such as Russia, North Korea, and China will also be examined. Notable legal cases involving executive orders issued by President Trump will be assessed, namely the "Travel Ban," family separations, and the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA). Through in-depth analysis, the paper will illustrate that public opinion, especially among American citizens, does not significantly affect President Trump's decision making when leading the United States in world affairs.

Keywords
Trump, Public Opinion, U.S. Foreign Affairs, Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA), Travel Ban, Trade

Subject Categories
Law
The Realities of the Most Powerful Office in the World: A Comparison Between Public Opinion and the Legal Underpinning for Executive Action in U.S. Foreign Affairs

An Honors Thesis by
Cameron N. Brusko

University of New Hampshire

Author Note
Cameron N. Brusko, Political Science Department and Justice Studies Program, College of Liberal Arts, University of New Hampshire.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Cameron N. Brusko, Political Science Department and Justice Studies Program, College of Liberal Arts, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824.
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between public opinion data and the consequent policy decisions enacted by the federal government. Specifically, it will examine President Trump’s policy implementations regarding the United States’ role in foreign affairs. Multiple public opinion polls, both domestic and international, will be utilized throughout to establish an understanding of the public’s complex views of this role. Antecedent to this, however, the nature of public opinion will be reviewed by providing a definition for public opinion, examining the various influences throughout one’s life, evaluating the criticisms and problems associated with it, and understanding how it ultimately relates to policy making. Significant policy decisions executed by President Trump will be discussed, including the Paris Agreement, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Iran nuclear deal. His continually developing relationships with nations such as Russia, North Korea, and China will also be examined. Notable legal cases involving executive orders issued by President Trump will be assessed, namely the “Travel Ban,” family separations, and the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA). Through in-depth analysis, the paper will illustrate that public opinion, especially among American citizens, does not significantly affect President Trump’s decision making when leading the United States in world affairs.

Keywords: North American Free Trade Agreement, Flores Settlement Agreement
# Table of Contents

*Author Note* ................................................................................................................................. 1

*Abstract* ........................................................................................................................................ 2

*Introduction* .................................................................................................................................... 4

*The Nature of Public Opinion* .......................................................................................................... 4

  - Defining Public Opinion .............................................................................................................. 5
  - Sources of Public Opinion ......................................................................................................... 5
  - Criticisms and Problems .......................................................................................................... 8
  - Public Opinion and Policy Making ......................................................................................... 9

*Examining Public Opinion of the Executive* .................................................................................. 11

  - Public Opinions of President Trump ...................................................................................... 11
  - America’s Role in the World ................................................................................................. 13

*Comparing Executive Actions in Foreign Affairs With Public Opinion* ........................................ 14

  - Trans-Pacific Partnership ........................................................................................................ 14
  - Military ...................................................................................................................................... 15
  - Immigrants and Immigration ................................................................................................. 16
  - NAFTA ..................................................................................................................................... 18
  - NATO ....................................................................................................................................... 18
  - Paris Climate Accord .............................................................................................................. 19
  - North Korea ........................................................................................................................... 19
  - Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 20
  - Jerusalem ................................................................................................................................. 21
  - Trade ......................................................................................................................................... 22
  - Other Decisions ...................................................................................................................... 23
  - The Future ............................................................................................................................... 24

*Significant Legal Cases Involving Executive Decisions* .................................................................. 24

  - The “Travel Ban” .................................................................................................................... 24
  - Family Separations and *Flores* ............................................................................................ 28

*Conclusion* ...................................................................................................................................... 32

*References* ...................................................................................................................................... 33

*Appendix A* ..................................................................................................................................... 39

*Appendix B* ..................................................................................................................................... 44
The Realities of the Most Powerful Office in the World: A Comparison Between Public Opinion and the Legal Underpinning for Executive Actions in U.S. Foreign Affairs

Introduction

“From this moment on, it’s going to be America first... Together, we will make America strong again. We will make America wealthy again. We will make America proud again. We will make America safe again. And, yes, together, we will make America great again”

Donald J. Trump

On Friday, January 20th, 2017, President-elect Donald J. Trump echoed these words in his inaugural address to not only the people present in Washington D.C. and those watching across the United States, but to the entire world (The Inaugural Address, 2017). With these words, President Trump began a campaign to implement foreign affairs in his own form and fashion yet simultaneously created a stark division in public opinion. In order to understand the effects of this on his foreign policy, I will first discuss the nature of public opinion and what factors play a role in the development of an individual’s core thoughts, beliefs, and ideals. Next, I examine the general opinions of the public, both domestic and foreign, regarding President Trump. By scrutinizing his policy decisions in various foreign affairs, a comparison to what the public wishes the United States’ role in world affairs would be will be made. Finally, I assess the significant legal cases that have ensued regarding two specific executive orders: the “Travel Ban” and the separation of migrant families. By consistently exploring the relationship between public opinion and President Trump’s policy implementations I have found, as a result of often repudiating it, that public opinion, especially among American citizens, does not significantly influence President Trump in the majority of his policy decisions regarding U.S. action in foreign affairs. Ultimately, he has and will continue to fulfill his promise of “making America great again” by unremittingly positioning “America first” in his relations with foreign nations.

The Nature of Public Opinion

“...public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed.”

Abraham Lincoln

"The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right.”
Alexander Hamilton

"In no country is public opinion so powerful as in the United States."

James Bryce

Defining Public Opinion

The Declaration of Independence asserts that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed.” This contention implies that the government would have no legitimate powers if citizens chose to withdraw their consent. Consequently, when political leaders feel constrained by public opinion, they often attempt to influence it. For example, presidents strive to garner support during wartime because they urge citizens to make immense sacrifices, such as sending their children off to war (Glynn, Herbst, Lindeman, O’Keefe, Shapiro, 2018).

Public opinion can be defined as the aggregate of the views of individual adults on matters of public interest. “Adults” are specifically viewed as those ages 18 and older because they comprise the voting age population, and it is the opinions of voters to which elected officials and policy makers are more likely to pay attention. “Matters of public interest” incorporates a broad definition as “any issue of interest to the public, whether at the national, state, or local level, and at any point in the political process— during the campaign, prior to the vote on an issue, after a policy has been adopted— falls under the scope” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Private sector concerns in and of themselves must be distinguished from public interest. The best video game currently on the market, according to the public, is not relevant within this realm of “public interest/opinion.” Rather, their beliefs regarding government regulations on the content of such games for violence and nudity would fall under this definition (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).

Sources of Public Opinion

Political socialization is outlined as “the process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system” and through this multitude of influences, their public opinion views are shaped (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Paul Allen Beck states three conditions are required in order for people to be influenced: exposure, communication, and receptivity. As a result, children learn primarily from their parents as they maximize exposure, communicate frequently, and maximize conditions for receptivity. David Easton then summarizes the four stages that proceed for the political learning of children
and adolescents. Stage one is termed politicization and involves children becoming aware of authority figures, such as parents, other adults, teachers, laws and rules. In the second step, personalization, they identify with specific authority figures, such as George Washington or Martin Luther King Jr. Idealization, the third stage, encompasses identifying political authority as generally benevolent or trustworthy. Feelings of antipathy toward the government can occur for some children, however, as the idealization phase can be replaced by hostilization. The final stage is known as institutionalization and is represented by an understanding of political institutions (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).

Perception plays a vast role in the psychological formation of one’s public opinions. Three assumptions underscore several theoretical frameworks for determining this exact role—individuals care what others think about public issues; they form perceptions of what others think; and they modify their own opinions or behaviors (or both) on the basis of these perceptions (Glynn, et al., 2018). The looking-glass framework is defined as “the belief that others think the same as oneself” (Glynn, et al., 2018). This has been determined to be fairly accurate on uncontroversial issues. However, people in the minority tend to incorrectly perceive that most people agree with them on divisive issues. Ruben Orive contends that when “individuals cannot conveniently compare their opinions with actual others, they may engage in ‘social projection’ to create a ‘self-generated’ consensus” (Glynn, et al., 2018). Another form of perception is described as pluralistic ignorance. Glynn, Ostman, and McDonald profess that this occurs when individuals who hold the majority opinion regarding a given issue incorrectly perceive it to be the minority opinion. Ultimately, this leads individuals to consistently misjudge the number of others who think, feel, or act as they themselves do (Glynn, et al., 2018). Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann produced an alternative to these perceptions: the spiral of silence. She argued that people willingly change or repress their opinions in order to earn acceptance from others. Relationships are so important to us that to the individual, “not isolating himself is more important than his own judgment” (Glynn, et al., 2018).

Generational influences on opinion are complex. Based on presidential voter patterns, it is believed that older Americans are more likely to be Republican in their voting habits and more conservative on certain issues. Furthermore, 70% of registered voters over the age of 45 turn out to vote, as compared to less than 40% for those ages 18 to 20 years old. The tendency for older Americans to identify more as conservative than younger citizens is a generational difference
that can be accredited to life cycle effects. “As individuals age, they are more aware than ever of their own interests and will express opinions that support those interests, and they are probably more aware of changes in society that they do not approve or share” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Consequently, older generations are less comfortable with change and unwilling to participate in the changes that society is currently undergoing. Meanwhile, the younger generations of Americans are more interested in establishing their lives by way of a career and companionship than in discussing political issues. They are less likely to vote and participate in politics at an exceedingly low level. Changes regarding both the participation in and interest of public issues generally do not evolve until their priorities of settling down with and providing for a family in a given community are met (often age 30 or older) (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Furthermore, analyses have been conducted to identify true generational effects. A 2004 study indicates that individuals who were adolescents during the turbulent 1960s display a greater tendency to be liberal than earlier and later generations. Research also demonstrates that Americans who became engaged with politics during the Great Depression are likely to still be Democratic voters. Likewise, voters whose formative years occurred during the Reagan presidency may identify with the Republican Party in greater numbers than other generations. As no one party dominated during the years they became engaged, Baby Boomers tend to show much less inclination toward one party or another. Notably, “partisan identity, once fixed either by childhood socialization or a generational event, tends to persist for the rest of the individual’s life if the attachment is strong enough” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).

The role in which the mass media plays in influencing the public opinion of an individual is also a vast topic. Today, there is a preferred form of media for almost everyone as news is reported in newspapers, political journals, radio, television, the Internet, etc. Foremost, numerous indirect effects of media exposure exist via agenda setting, framing, and priming. Agenda setting is a primary function of media outlets, as they shape the public’s view of the most important issues of the day by identifying which stories and debates to cover and direct into the headlines. Framing is achieved by influencing how citizens regard certain topics by emphasizing or de-emphasizing certain facets of the issue. Giving media consumers criteria by which to choose their own positions on the issues is known as priming. “For example, an emphasis on the loss of jobs and the slowdown of the economy in conjunction with stories about the President could ‘prime’ citizens to think of the economic downturn as the president’s fault” (Bardes &
Oldendick, 2012). “Horse-race” journalism, which focuses on the competitive nature of political campaigns instead of a candidate’s platform or past experience, also primes voters to evaluate candidates merely in terms of their likelihood of winning an election.

The influence of school is not as significant as previously mentioned factors. Schools in the American education system often possess poor civics curricula and are more effective at teaching obedience than teaching responsibilities. College presents different findings, though, as an education at that level increases support for political tolerance and democratic values. It also has a liberalizing effect on students, for the number of people with post-graduate educations are more likely to identify as liberal than college graduates and noncollege graduates. Similarly, friends and peer groups do not play a large role in the development of one’s public opinions. This is because people tend to choose friends who are analogous. A person’s peer will endure a similar socioeconomic status, live in a similar region, and have a similar job and interests. Therefore, they tend to simply reinforce and solidify one’s views (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).

**Criticisms and Problems**

While the data measured by public opinion is valuable to assess, it is critical to note that there are criticisms within the field and potential problems always exist within the surveys. Foremost, in order for public opinion data to be trustworthy, they must be reliable and valid. Respectively, they must produce consistent results and measure what they intend to measure. Utilizing that definition of public opinion, a number of issues arise such as differences in intensity of opinion, the knowledge that underlies opinions, the division of opinion, and the role of multiple publics. Intensity of opinion can be defined as the strength of an individual’s views on an issue and generates a significant criticism by Herbert Blumer, a sociologist and critic of quantitative measurement methods. Blumer criticized the fact that all opinions are equally treated, highlighting that the views of an “individual who had never thought about an issue until asked about it by a survey interviewer are treated the same as those of a person who had a long-standing and passionate view on the matter” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Moreover, Blumer argued that the summation of individual opinions in a “one person, one vote” style was exactly what public opinion was not. He believed that public opinion was more accurately reflected in the views of the small number of individuals within a given community who paid more attention to and were more knowledgeable about matters of public affairs (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).
Issues also occur when conducting the surveys, especially concerning the questions themselves. It is imperative that every member of a selected sample has an equal probability of selection and was randomly selected, allowing researchers to employ the Central Limit Theorem and generate a standard error. Question wording and order and response order can affect responses. Any closed-ended questions must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, and the open-ended questions must be coded accurately. When contact is made with a respondent, there is a potential for people to exhibit nonattitudes, which transpires when individuals with a lack of information about a particular issue provide meaningless opinions that vary randomly in direction during repeated trials over time. Recency and primacy also affect survey responses. An individual is more likely to choose the last option presented (usually in an oral format or questions with long options separated by an ‘or’) or they are more likely to choose the first option presented that is satisfying (usually in a visual format). In certain cases, individuals will also answer questions about issues that do not even exist (Bishop, 2004). Additionally, response rates are decreasing which leads to less of the population being sampled. Multiple factors influence this decrease including the transition from in-person surveys to phones. As telephone answering machines and caller ID have transitioned to cellular phones, rates are continuing to decrease. Other factors such as fear of crime, increased cynicism, and concerns over privacy issues also contribute to the increase in refusal rates. Societal changes, such as the increasing participation of women in the workforce and the reduction in the number of adults per household, yields more households that are occupied a smaller percentage of the time than before (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).

**Public Opinion and Policy Making**

The federal government’s implementation and consequent use of polling data has rapidly increased over the past 80 years. Surveys are often used for data collection; however, most of the information collected is “not attitudinal data, but rather demographic and behavioral indicators that provide the context in which the American mind develops” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Various agencies across the federal government, such as the Department of Education, Department of Agriculture, and Department of State, utilize polling data to accumulate masses of data on demographic characteristics, behavioral indicators, crime victimization, energy-use, financial relationships, etc. Furthermore, many agencies conduct surveys for a multitude of purposes, including needs assessments, as part of an evaluation of a project or program, or in
addressing a specific policy issue. While these surveys are conducted by the agencies themselves, there are also numerous programs in which the federal government sponsors surveys within the states (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).

The effects that public opinion produces on policy making are more equivocal. While the evidence for policy implementation in response to public opinion has been extensive, it has also been ambiguous and difficult to evaluate on its own terms. “Some researchers perceive public opinion as substantially directing many policy debates; others see it as usually only constraining policy outcomes, and perhaps not even constraining them very much” (Glynn, et al., 2018). Researcher Alan Monroe performed a study that examined “congruence” between majority opinion and policy responsiveness. For example:

If in response to a survey question, 51 percent or more of survey respondents opposed the United States establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the government had not established such relations up to four years later, this would be a case in which government policy was… “congruent” with public opinion (Glynn, et al., 2018). Monroe found that policy outcomes were congruent with public opinion in 64% of the 222 nonspending cases that he examined. When he updated his findings for the period from 1980 to 1993, the figure declined but remained at 55%. Monroe emphasized, however, that this evidence did not establish that public opinion actually influenced policy. When analyzing the Cuban relations example, policymakers might simply oppose establishing diplomatic relations notwithstanding any public opinion regarding the issue. Moreover, pollsters’ decisions about what questions to ask affect the apparent rate of congruence because certain questions, including how they are asked, “could quickly establish congruence between public opinion and policy on dozens of ‘policy issues’ that are, in most people’s minds, not legitimate issues at all” (Glynn, et al., 2018). Additionally, highly salient issues will, in some cases, see policymakers ignore relatively clear public opinion. For example, public opinion polls showed that Americans generally thought Congress should only censure President Bill Clinton and no more, after his actions involving Monica Lewinsky in the 1998 sex scandal. The House Republican leadership, ignoring this data, undertook to impeach President Clinton, and eventually the House voted for two articles of impeachment, almost entirely along party lines. (Glynn, et al., 2018). In another study conducted by Benjamin Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, it was determined that policies had moved in the same direction as public opinion 66% of the time. Notably, they analyzed 231
instances of changes in policy preferences and changes of policy, and this percentage depended on their excluding 120 cases of “no change in policy” (Glynn, et al., 2018).

Examining Public Opinion of the Executive

Understanding how public opinion is defined and formulated, as well as the purposes and limitations of it, provides a concrete foundation for examining Americans’ opinions of President Trump and their desired role for the U.S. to play in world affairs. These facets of the Executive branch can also be studied from an international point of view.

Public Opinions of President Trump

Spearheading a hotly contested 2016 Presidential election, then-Republican candidate Donald J. Trump faced relentless amounts of scrutiny and criticism throughout the race. Ultimately, he defeated Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton and became the 45th President of the United States of America. However, the strong sentiments towards President Trump did not cease. Throughout his time in office, the American public has continued to have robust attitudes regarding his handling and leading of the nation. A recent study conducted by Pew Research Center indicated that Americans have more confidence in the leaders of France, Japan, and Germany to do the right thing regarding world affairs than they have in President Trump. French President Emmanuel Macron, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were all granted confidence ratings of at least 55%. Forty-eight percent of Americans reported confidence in Donald Trump. This figure is ahead of only Xi Jinping of China, Narendra Modi of India, and Vladimir Putin of Russia. Notably, 52% reported having no confidence in President Trump (Poushter & Fagan, 2018).

Confidence in the President’s handling of international issues also tends to parallel job performance.
ratings. As previously stated, 48% of Americans stated they had confidence that President Trump would do the right thing in world affairs. Thirty-nine percent also approve of his job performance. Comparably, in 2010, 65% of Americans had confidence in newly-elect President Barack Obama to do the right thing in world affairs. Forty-seven percent approved of his job performance at the time (see Appendix A: Figure 1).

Examining confidence in President Trump via party affiliation produces a wider gap. In 2018, 88% of Republicans acknowledged confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Sixteen percent of Democrats agreed. In 2010, 89% of Democrats and 34% of Republicans reported the same faith in then-President Obama (Poushter & Fagan, 2018). Republicans are also more confident in President Trump and Prime Minister Abe than Democrats who favor Chancellor Merkel and President Macron. There is a seventy-two-point difference for confidence in President Trump and a thirteen-point difference for confidence in Prime Minister Abe. Sixteen- and twenty-point differences exist for Democratic favor in President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, respectively. While more Republicans also have more confidence in President Putin than Democrats, it is still not a majority at 28% (Poushter & Fagan, 2018).

As Americans do not generally possess high amounts of confidence or appreciation for President Trump, he is unable to find any better success among international publics either. According to a thirty-seven-country survey by Pew Research Center, 22% of publics stated they had confidence in President Trump following his election to the Presidency. Unfavorable views of the United States also rose from 26% to 39% after the election (Wike, Stokes, Poushter, & Fetterolf, 2017).

Despite international publics’ confidence levels in President Trump rising to 27% in 2018, significant unfavorable views of the U.S. President still exist. Seventy percent assert that the U.S. does not take into account the interests of other countries too much or at all. Additionally, 37% pronounce the U.S. is doing less to help address major global problems (see Appendix A: Figure 2). Favorable views of the United States also vary greatly across the globe. Europe and countries such as Germany, Netherlands, and Greece tend to possess less favorable views. Asia and countries such as South Korea, Philippines, and Japan tend to display greater favorability (see Appendix A: Figure 3).
These figures coincide a substantial amount with the numbers generated when inquiring about the personal attributes of Donald Trump. Across all characteristics tested, President Trump is most likely to be described as arrogant. Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated this, with notable data coming from Spain, Canada, Jordan, and Mexico at 94%, 93%, 91%, and 91%, respectively. Sixty-five percent of international publics also render him intolerant. Sixty-five percent fear him to be dangerous (see Appendix A: Figure 4). Of the thirty-seven nations tested, in just ten do the people illustrate President Trump possessing charisma. In even less nations do the people deem him well-qualified to be President. His highest grades come from 71% of Vietnam, 67% of both Philippines and Ghana, 66% of Nigeria, and 62% of Russia. His lowest marks originate in Germany, Sweden, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, and Japan, which all report 15% or less (see Appendix A: Figure 5).

Despite these overwhelmingly negative viewpoints, 55% of publics, including those who lack confidence in him, still believe President Trump to be a strong leader (see Appendix B: Figure 5). Respondents declare that, over the past decade, China has played a more influential role across the world; consequently, respondents were probed, “Thinking about the future, if you had to choose, which of the following scenarios would be better for the world: the U.S. is the world’s leading power or China is the world’s leading power?” (Wike et al., 2018). The United States is the prodigious favorite. Nineteen percent indicate preference for China as compared to 63% for the U.S. The countries which prefer China include Tunisia, Argentina, and Russia (see Appendix A: Figure 6).

**America’s Role in the World**

Through passing generations, the American public has decreasingly identified as Republican and conservative and increasingly identified as Democratic and moderate or liberal (see Appendix B: Table 1). While party identification is an important factor in predicting one’s opinions on the positions the U.S. should maintain in international affairs, it is not the most statistically significant. A recent study conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs found one’s generation (or age) to be the strongest predictor in one’s views of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Seventy-eight percent of the Silent Generation, which includes those born between 1928 and 1945, believes the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs. Meanwhile, 51% of the Millennial Generation, those born between 1981 and 1996, agree (Thrall, Smeltz, Goepner, Ruger, & Kafura, 2018). While this figure is still a majority, it is a significant decrease
in the number of internationalist Americans. At the partisan level, Republicans are no less likely to say that the U.S. should play a leading role in world affairs than are Democrats (Newport, 2018). Specific foreign policy goals vary greatly among each Generation (see Appendix B: Table 2). These beliefs can perhaps be attributed to each Generations’ views on American superiority. Seventy-seven percent of the Silent Generation believes the United States of America is the greatest country in the world. This number decreases through the following generations until just 50% of Millennials believe in American supremacy. Similarly, roughly one-quarter of Millennials believe the U.S. should strive to be the dominant world leader (Thrall et al., 2018).

Comparing Executive Actions in Foreign Affairs With Public Opinion

“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years...”

Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution

“The President...of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

Article II, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution

Trans-Pacific Partnership

A mere three days after being sworn into the Oval Office, President Trump began to fulfill his promise of putting America and its workers first. “By the authority vested in [him] as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America” he directed the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was established under the Obama Administration (Presidential Memorandum, 2017). President Trump highlighted how the deal would “push manufacturing jobs overseas, increase the U.S. trade deficit, and fail to address currency manipulation by U.S. trade partners” (McBride & Chatzky, 2018). Furthermore, it was argued that it would erode and undercut wages, lower environmental and labor standards, increase the incentive to move manufacturing production to lower-cost countries, as well as provide global corporations with too much authority over domestic policymaking. Former Treasury Secretary under President Clinton and Director of National Economic Council for President Obama Larry Summers noted the deal’s potential to “increase inequality by allowing more earning opportunities for those at the top and exposing ordinary workers to more competition” (McBride & Chatzky, 2018). Despite this
departure, at least 56% of every generation of Americans either strongly or somewhat supported participation in the TPP (Thrall et al., 2018).

**Military**

In early April 2017, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad utilized the chemical weapon sarin in an attack against civilians. As a countermeasure, President Trump ordered a limited cruise missile strike on the Shayrat Air Base, which had been controlled by the regime, on April 7th, 2017 (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). One year later, in April 2018, more U.S. military strikes would be ordered on three facilities in Syria that were linked to President Assad’s chemical weapons program. As the regime continued its use of chemical attacks against its own citizens, the air strikes would serve as another response measure. Forces from France and the United Kingdom would join the attack (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). From December 2017 through February 2018, the Trump administration would also release a series of documents which portrayed China and Russia as major strategic competitors. These documents discussed national security and defense, and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) would request for the construction of two new nuclear missiles for submarines. Additionally, the NPR would broaden the requirements for which the U.S. could utilize nuclear weapons in the event of a cyberattack (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018).

When examining the use of military force and the role of the military in U.S. foreign policy, the greatest disparities across generations can be found. Maintaining superior military power worldwide is a very important goal for 70% of the Silent Generation, 64% of the Boomers (those born from 1946 to 1964), 54% of Generation X (those born from 1965 to 1980), and 44% of Millennials (Thrall et al., 2018). Support for the use of force is still relatively high, however. Americans of all ages support the use of force for humanitarian purposes more often than they do its use to defend allies or conduct regime change (see Satellite Imagery of the Shayrat Air Base in Syria following the U.S. missile strike. Source: Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments. (2018, December). Council on Foreign Relations.
Appendix B: Table 3). When probed about defense spending, Generation X, the Boomers, and the Silents all favor expanding over cutting with margins of +9, +22, and +34, respectively (Thrall et al., 2018). Markedly, Millennials are the only generation that supports cutting over expanding, which was reported at a margin of +9 (Thrall et al., 2018). Bruce Jentleson, a professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, (2018) attempted to explain these numbers. He stated, “the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and Iraq for close to half the lives of the oldest millennials, who were born in 1981, and most of the lives of the youngest, born in 1996. Despite America's vast military power, neither war has been won” (Jentleson, 2018). The following questions arise for Millennials then: Why make military superiority a priority? Why spend more on defense? Why not be skeptical about other uses of force? (Jentleson, 2018). However, on August 21st, 2017, President Trump would announce a new approach to the War on Terror that would focus specifically on counterterrorism efforts. He promoted a strategy that relies on the “instruments of American power:” diplomacy, economy, and military and calls on NATO allies to increase troops and funding. Furthermore, he emphasizes that dates and timetables of such events will not be announced and certain restrictions on rules of engagement will be lifted. President Trump concludes his speech with the statement, “Terrorists take heed: America will never let up until you are dealt a lasting defeat” (Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy, 2017).

**Immigrants and Immigration**

President Trump’s decisions regarding immigration into the United States has continually been contested. His enduring bid to build a wall has received significantly negative responses as only 39% of Americans view building a wall along the U.S. - Mexican border as a very or somewhat important goal (Suls, 2017). Encouraging a successor to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, President Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions also announced a departure from the plan on September 5th, 2017. A key program during President Obama’s tenure, the exit will leave nearly 800,000 beneficiaries susceptible to deportation (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018).

Currently, a caravan of migrants, estimated in the thousands, is travelling from Central America to the Southwest border of the United States. In a series of early morning Tweets on October 29th, 2018, President Trump avowed:
Many Gang Members and some very bad people are mixed into the Caravan heading to our Southern Border. Please go back, you will not be admitted into the United States unless you go through the legal process. This is an invasion of our Country and our Military is waiting for you! (realDonaldTrump, 2018).

This message would be followed with the deployment of over 5,000 troops to the southern border. Engineers, planners, military police, pilots, cooks, and medical personnel will comprise those who are being deployed and their activities will include building camps to house Customs and Border Patrol personnel along the border (Bowman & Wamsley, 2018). The cause for support roles being commissioned is the Posse Comitatus Act (PSA). The PSA bars U.S. military personnel from direct participation in law enforcement activities, including interdicting vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Specifically, Section 1385 of Title 18, U.S.C., states:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned…or both (The Posse Comitatus Act of 2013).

However, Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws. One avenue that could be employed by President Trump would be Sections 371-381 of Title 10, U.S.C., that allow counterdrug assistance (The Posse Comitatus Act of 2013). President Trump has indicated his desire to send anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 total troops to the border (Gonzales, 2018). Markedly, the current figure is roughly equal to the total number of troops currently stationed in Iraq and Syria combined and with his desired increase could equal the number of troops in Afghanistan (Chiwaya & Wu, 2018).

Currently, about half of Latinos say their situation in the U.S. has worsened over the past year and convey serious concerns about their place in American society. Moreover, 55% indicate worry that they, a family member, or a close friend could be deported. These feelings are the result of President Trump’s administration being “harmful to Hispanics” according to 67% of respondents (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, & Krogstad, 2018). Internationally, President Trump receives equally as negative views. Sixty-two percent of international publics express discontent
for introducing tighter restrictions on those entering the U.S. from some majority-Muslim countries. Additionally, 76% of respondents are against building a wall on the border between the U.S. and Mexico (Wike et al., 2017).

**NAFTA**

In a letter to Congress, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer acknowledged President Trump and the White House’s intent to “modernize” the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Originally established in 1994 with Canada and Mexico, they wished to include “new provisions to address intellectual property rights, regulatory practices, state-owned enterprises, services, customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labor, environment, and small and medium enterprises” (Lighthizer, 2017). The ultimate goal of revisiting the agreement was to “seek to support higher-paying jobs in the United States and to grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S. opportunities… [the Executive is] committed to concluding these negotiations with timely and substantive results for U.S. consumers, businesses, farmers, ranchers, and workers” (Lighthizer, 2017). Notably, Americans were split on their support of NAFTA. Forty-eight percent affirm it had been good for the country, while 46% proclaim it had been bad (Swift, 2017). Nevertheless, on October 1st, 2018, President Trump would publicize the arrival of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), formerly known as NAFTA. This trade deal contains a number of new provisions. Notably, it established stronger labor protections and fairer standards and greater protections for digital trade and intellectual property. Higher standards for the auto industry will also be generated which includes stronger rules of origin and “requiring at least 75% of every automobile to be made in North America in order to qualify for the privilege of free access to [those] markets” so as to ultimately usher in a new dawn for the American auto industry and autoworker (Remarks by President Trump on the United States, 2018).

**NATO**

President Trump made his first trip abroad as President of the United States in May 2017 when he travelled to Saudi Arabia, Israel, the West Bank, Italy, Vatican City, and Belgium. In Riyadh, he delivered a speech calling on the Muslim world to unite against terrorism. Leaders from over fifty Arab- and Muslim-majority nations were present during this speech (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). In Brussels, President Trump demanded that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their
financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their defense” (Remarks by President Trump at NATO, 2017). He also notes that if NATO members spent just two percent of their GDP on defense, an additional $119 billion would have been produced for their collective defense and financing of additional NATO reserves (Remarks by President Trump at NATO, 2017). In Italy, President Trump participated in the Group of Seven meeting and joined the U.S. in a joint declaration on fighting protectionism, which can be defined as the theory or practice of shielding a country's domestic industries from foreign competition by taxing imports (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). Ranging from 67% to 76% of among Generations, many still believe NATO to be beneficial to the U.S. (Thrall et al., 2018).

**Paris Climate Accord**

“As President, I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American citizens” (Statement by President Trump, 2017). President Trump emphasizes this point as he announces to the other 194 countries who previously signed on to the Paris Climate Accord that the United States will be withdrawing from the agreement. The decision to withdrawal comes despite the fact that over 69% of each generation supports participation in the Paris Agreement (Thrall, et al., 2018). He highlights the constrictions on U.S. sovereignty and its disadvantaging of the American economy and American workers. He states that the “cost to the economy at this time would be close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs, while households would have $7,000 less income” (Statement by President Trump on the Paris, 2017). Notably, President Trump wants to ensure that America remains the world’s leader on environmental issues but does so under a framework that is “fair and where the burdens and responsibilities are equally shared among the many nations all around the world,” including the world’s leading polluters. Specifically, he references China’s massive carbon emissions and the coal mines allowed to be built in India and Europe but that are supposed to be abolished in the U.S. (Statement by President Trump, 2017). Reiterating his belief of “America first,” President Trump concludes his speech with the statement, “It is time to put Youngstown, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania…before Paris, France” (Statement by President Trump, 2017).

**North Korea**

After North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un threatened to launch ballistic missiles into the area surrounding Guam, President Trump warned, “North Korea best not make any more
threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” (Remarks by President Trump Before a Briefing, 2017). Occurring on August 8th, 2017, hostile exchanges would continue to occur between the leaders (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). September 19th, 2017 would call for President Trump’s first discourse to the United Nations General Assembly. During the speech, he warns North Korea of “total [destruction]” if the U.S. is “forced to defend itself or its allies” (Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session, 2017). Moreover, he advocates for a strong, sovereign U.S. that serves as a beacon of light and hope to other nations because “in America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch” (Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session, 2017). Calling on not only the present world leaders, but their respective citizens as well, President Trump wishes for nations across the world to “reawaken” and revitalize their spirits, pride, people, and patriotism so as to defeat the evils of the world and bring a new comradery among all (Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session, 2017).

On March 18th, 2018, President Trump would accept an invitation from North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un to meet. The summit would not only serve as an opportunity to discuss the denuclearization of North Korea but would be the first summit between a sitting U.S. President and his North Korean counterpart (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). On June 12th, 2018, President Trump and Supreme Leader Jong-un would meet in Singapore and facilitate a relationship built on cooperation as opposed to confrontation. Although ambitious commitments were made, few plans were established to achieve such goals, one of which includes the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). Forty-six percent of Americans currently describe North Korea as an enemy of the U.S., and 58% of Americans view North Korea as a long-term threat. Among Democrats, 52% describe North Korea as an enemy of the U.S. The percentage of Independents and Republicans who agree is 45% and 42%, respectively (Jones, 2018).

Iran

Speaking on the Iran nuclear deal, President Trump broadcasts on October 13th, 2017 that he will not recertify Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Congress (JCPOA). Citing Iran’s negative behavior, he claims that they have violated the spirit of the agreement and solicits Congress to consider reemploying sanctions. Notably he does not initiate steps to nullify JCPOA (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). With 56% of the
Boomers displaying the lowest figure among generations, the number of individuals who support an agreement that lifts some international economic sanctions against Iran remained relatively high (Thrall et al., 2018). On the contrary, President Trump would eventually announce that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA on May 8th, 2018. He proclaimed that Iran did not sufficiently curtail its civilian nuclear program nor its regional aggression. Consequently, the U.S. would reinstate multiple sanctions on Iran that had previously been waived as a result of the original deal (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). These first set of sanctions, which arrived on August 7th, 2018, includes restrictions on Iran’s purchase of U.S. currency, their trade in gold and other precious metals, and the sale of Iran auto parts, commercial passenger aircraft, and related parts and services. The second set of sanctions, which arrived on November 4th, 2018, restricts the sale of oil and petrochemical products from Iran (CFR.org Editors, 2018). Markedly, international publics indicate a 49% disapproval rate for U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear weapons agreement (Wike et al., 2017).

Jerusalem

On May 14th, 2018, President Trump would officially move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). When Israel declared its independence in 1948, the Green Line was established, which gave Israel control over the western half of Jerusalem and Jordan control over the eastern half of the city. In 1967, Israel captured East Jerusalem, annexed it, and eventually declared the whole city as its capital. Passed on December 13th, 1980 by Israel’s Parliament the 9th Knesset, the “intention of the law [was] to establish the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and secure its integrity and unity [for]…Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court” (Basic Laws, 2018). The Oslo Accords would then be signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, which avowed that Jerusalem’s disposition could only be decided on in permanent-status negotiations between the two parties (Laub, 2017). The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, passed by the U.S. Congress, requires the relocation of the U.S embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem but allows for Presidents to waive the requirement in six-month intervals in order to protect national security interests. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have all issued waivers; as a result, this has illustrated, in the past, that the U.S. wishes to remain a neutral mediator in the disputes between Israelites and Palestinians over the capital (Laub, 2017). However, departing from decades of Presidential
standards, President Trump officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel on December 6th, 2017. Fulfilling a campaign promise and stating that Israel is a sovereign nation capable of determining its own capital, he believed this acknowledgment to be crucial to achieving lasting peace in the region (Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem, 2017). In the eyes of the American public, just 42% say Donald Trump is “striking the right balance” in the situation in the Middle East. By party, 79% of Republicans say they sympathize more with Israel than the Palestinians, compared with just 27% of Democrats (Republicans and Democrats, 2018).

**Trade**

Public opinion regarding international trade serves as the one facet of foreign affairs that President Trump has often found himself on the positive side of when interacting with other nations. Ranging from 60% of Boomers to 70% of Millennials, there is concurrence that globalization, which is defined as the process by which businesses or other organizations develop international influence or start operating on an international scale, is mostly good. Thrall et al. (2018) explain this relationship by purporting:

For younger Americans, the Internet, the steady flow of iPhones, computers and other products from abroad, and the expansion of global travel may have all contributed to a rising comfort level with the rest of the world generally, and to the acceptance that international trade is simply part of the fabric of the modern world. Furthermore, at least 52% of all generations believe that international trade is good for the U.S. economy, consumers like them, and for creating jobs in the U.S. (Thrall et al., 2018).

In a roughly two-week trip through Asia, President Trump traveled to Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines beginning on November 3rd, 2017. Trade and nations’ varying relationships with North Korea underscored the itinerary, but a “new vision for U.S. involvement in the ‘Indo-Pacific’” was also introduced (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vietnam, he would promote American prosperity and trade via new investments and energy sales.
that would produce more jobs for Americans (President Donald J. Trump’s Participation, 2017). In Manila, officials from the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would convene to discuss their apprehensions regarding China’s rise in power (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). In March 2018, President Trump would announce the imposition of tariffs on foreign-made steel and aluminum. Specifically citing national security concerns, he references the Secretary of Commerce’s reports on the effects of the importation of aluminum and steel. The reports state that the high volume of imports is weakening the internal U.S. economy and forcing the nation to be reliant on foreign producers. Furthermore, the domestic industries will potentially be “unable to satisfy existing national security needs or respond to a national security emergency that requires a large increase in domestic production” (Presidential Proclamation, 2018). These restrictions would be imposed on nations such as China, but they were suspended until discussions of long-term alternative means occurred for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and the members of the European Union (President Trump, 2018). The distinct application towards China would coincide with American beliefs as over six in ten citizens report that China’s trade practices are unfair (Newport, 2018). After the United States imposed these duties, however, China would retaliate with tariffs on U.S. products in the beginning of April 2018. By November 2018, the world’s two largest economies will have escalated the trade war immensely. The U.S. levied tariffs on about $250 billion worth of Chinese products, while China reciprocated the imposition on about $110 billion worth of U.S. goods (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). At the Group of Twenty summit in early December 2018, Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping would agree to an armistice and plan to formulate a broader trade deal within ninety days (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018).

Earlier in 2017 President Trump would, notably, roll back President Obama’s rapprochement with Cuba. He declared that the United States would enforce the ban on tourism and the embargo until it could be ensured that investments were afforded to the Cuban people directly. He wants them to begin to build their country’s future without the threat of the Castro regime (Remarks by President Trump on the Policy, 2017).

Other Decisions

Other foreign policy pronouncements have drawn criticism as well. On June 19th, 2018, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley would announce the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Human Rights Council. Citing the hypocrisy associated with the Council, Haley
describes a “chronic bias against Israel” and questionable human rights practices by members such as Venezuela, China, and Saudi Arabia. Critics believe, though, that the only way to move forward is to remain engaged and work with the partners (Dwyer, 2018). Additionally, when Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist, was assassinated inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018, investigations and accusations began to swirl. Evidence appeared to incriminate Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman. However, President Trump expressed support for the Saudi leadership, signaling the regional relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States which includes the supply of oil and purchasing of U.S. arms. This response drew backlash from the U.S. Congress and its allies (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018).

**The Future**

As the future approaches, certainty that overall U.S. foreign policy is headed in the right direction varies significantly based on age and party identification. The majority of Republicans of all ages believe these policies to be headed in the right direction yet the majority of Democrats of all ages do not agree. Furthermore, no age group occupies a majority who are confident moving forward. Overall, only 40% of Boomers, 32% of Generation X, and 29% of Millennials feel current U.S. foreign policy is headed in the right direction (see Appendix A: Figure 7). President Trump has displayed a tendency, however, to consistently execute policy implementations that directly contradict the wishes of many American citizens. Ultimately, these decisions embody his desire to put “America first” and make it great again, even at the cost of domestic and international support.

**Significant Legal Cases Involving Executive Decisions**

Of President Trump’s numerous foreign policy decisions, two in particular have garnered significant legal attention and found themselves traversing the U.S. court system. The first involved an executive order restricting immigration and would ultimately be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 26th, 2018. The second involved an executive order that utilized the longstanding Flores Settlement Agreement for legal justification of family separations and migrants crossing the border.

**The “Travel Ban”**

Citing the Constitution of America and its laws, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) §1101, and 3 U.S.C. §301, President Trump would
sign Executive Order 13769 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist entry into the United States). Occurring on January 27th, 2017, this order would suspend for 90 days the entry of certain aliens from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen because they had been “identified as presenting heightened concerns about terrorism and travel to the United States” (Executive Order, 2017). These heightened threats would consist of each country being a state sponsor of terrorism, being significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or containing active conflict zones, which all weaken the “foreign government’s willingness or ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the United States” (Executive Order, 2017). Specifically referencing 8 U.S.C. §1182(f), he states:

> Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate (Executive Order, 2017).

Additionally, Executive Order 13769 would temporarily suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days “pending review of [the] procedures for screening and vetting refugees” (Executive Order, 2017). For both forms of entry, he also permitted the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly grant case-by-case waivers when they determined it was in the national interest to do so.

Immediately following the signing of the order, a Washington state judge would block part of it, which ignited a media firestorm and a series of judicial challenges surrounding what opponents of the order would label the “Muslim Ban” (six out of seven of the countries are predominantly Muslim) (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). Explicitly stating that Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion, President Trump would later refute claims of any form of disposition:

> While that order allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion but was instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities — whoever they are and wherever
they reside — to avail themselves of the USRAP in light of their particular challenges and circumstances (Executive Order, 2017).

The order would navigate the U.S. legal system over the following months. As various rulings were issued by federal judges, President Trump would produce updated versions in attempts to comply with the rulings. In September 2017, he would issue Proclamation No. 9645, which sought “to improve vetting procedures for foreign nationals traveling to the United States by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries present a security threat” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018).

Similar to its predecessors, this order placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals were judged to be incompetent. An extensive review of each nation was performed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), State Department, and other intelligence agencies. Initially, they developed an information and risk assessment “baseline.” They proceeded to collect and analyze data for all foreign governments, identify “those having deficient information-sharing practices and presenting national security concerns, as well as other countries ‘at risk’ of failing to meet the baseline” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to improve their practices were then made, but it was concluded that Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen remained inadequate. Entry restrictions for certain nationals from each country were recommended with the exception of Iraq, which maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States. The recommendations varied based on the “distinct circumstances” in each of the eight countries. Lawful permanent residents were exempted, and case-by-case waivers could be provided under certain circumstances. It also directed the DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether the restrictions should be modified or continued, with reports to the President occurring every 180 days. (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018).

President Trump, after consulting with multiple Cabinet members, implemented the recommendations and dispensed the Proclamation. Again, referencing his authority under 8 U.S.C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), he determined that certain restrictions were necessary to “prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information” and ‘elicit improved identity management and information-sharing protocols and practices from foreign governments’” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Notably, at the completion of the first such review period, President Trump lifted restrictions on Chad after the first review
revealed that Chad had sufficiently improved its practices. The Proclamation, however, would ultimately face the U.S. Supreme Court on April 25th, 2018 after the State of Hawaii, three individuals with foreign relatives affected by the entry suspension, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii claimed that the Proclamation violated the INA and the Establishment Clause (*Trump v. Hawaii*, 2018).

In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts would deliver the opinion of the Court in favor of President Trump:

By its plain language, §1182(f) grants the President broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States. The President lawfully exercised that discretion based on his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency review—that entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interest. And plaintiffs’ attempts to identify a conflict with other provisions in the INA, and their appeal to the statute’s purposes and legislative history, fail to overcome the clear statutory language (*Trump v. Hawaii*, 2018).

The majority would proceed to provide their understanding of the textual limits in §1182(f). As the President is authorized to suspend entry “for such period as he shall deem necessary,” they acknowledge that the word “suspend” often denotes a “defer[ral] till later,” according to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. However, this does not mean that the President is required to stipulate in advance a fixed end date for the entry restrictions. Considering that a President may suspend entry in response to a diplomatic dispute or policy concern, it is acceptable for him to “link the duration of those restrictions, implicitly or explicitly, to the resolution of the triggering condition” (*Trump v. Hawaii*, 2018). They also note that not one of the 43 suspension orders issued by past Presidents had specified a precise end date. Furthermore, the opinion would reference the Proclamation’s established process of assessing these nations and their respective restrictions every 180 days and highlight President Trump’s removal of Chad from the list. They underscore the importance of the Proclamation’s ability to modify or terminate the “conditional restrictions” that remain in force until the identified “inadequacies and risks” are sufficiently addressed (*Trump v. Hawaii*, 2018). Lastly, the Court refutes plaintiffs’ argument that “class” must refer to a well-defined group of individuals who share a common “characteristic” apart from nationality. The text of §1182(f) does not state this, and the word “class,” according to the majority, “comfortably” incorporates a group of people linked by nationality. Plaintiffs contention that a given class cannot be “overbroad” is also repudiated
because it “simply amounts to an unspoken tailoring requirement found nowhere in Congress’s
grant of authority to suspend entry of not only ‘any class of aliens’ but ‘all aliens’” (Trump v.
Hawaii, 2018). The Court states that the Proclamation “properly identifies a ‘class of aliens’—
nationals of select countries—whose entry is suspended” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018).

In a concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas expanded upon the language of §1182(f) by stating that the Section does not set forth any judicially enforceable limits that constrain the President. Following this statement, he affirms, “Nor could it, since the President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Plaintiffs also provided evidence that the Proclamation displayed anti-Muslim discrimination in violation of the Establishment clause. While the Clause reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” Justice Thomas described the postulated evidence as “unpersuasive” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018).

By ruling in his favor, the U.S. Supreme Court provided President Trump with a landmark victory for his Presidency. Although unpopular, his policies have not proven to be illegal. Trump v. Hawaii illustrates that the U.S. legal system will grant the President broad and extensive powers, especially when engaging the nation in world affairs.

**Family Separations and Flores**

On July 20th, 2018 President Trump stated in an Executive Order, “It is the policy of this Administration to rigorously enforce our immigration laws…It is also the policy of this Administration to maintain family unity, including by detaining alien families together where appropriate and consistent with law and available resources” (Affording Congress an Opportunity, 2018). The order, coming after immense backlash from both parties, would reverse a “zero tolerance” policy announced in May 2018 by Attorney General Jeff Sessions that aimed to prosecute every adult who crossed over the American border illegally and additionally separate them from their child as required by law. It would also mandate the DHS, “to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, [to] maintain custody of alien families during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or immigration proceedings involving their members” (Affording Congress an Opportunity, 2018). The order also directs the Defense Department, as well as the heads of all executive departments and agencies, to provide available housing for immigrant families and construct such facilities if necessary. Furthermore, President Trump conveys that Attorney General Jeff Sessions should ask a federal court to
modify the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA) in *Flores v. Sessions*, to allow the DHS to “detain alien families together throughout the pendency of criminal proceedings for improper entry or any removal or other immigration proceedings” (Affording Congress an Opportunity, 2018). Currently, the FSA requires immigrant children to be released or transferred to a licensed facility within a reasonable period, set arbitrarily at 20 days.

The FSA is the result of a case involving Jenny Lisette Flores, a 15-year-old girl from El Salvador who immigrated to the United States in 1985. She fled the violence of El Salvador to be reunited with her aunt, who was living in the United States. However, prior to reaching her aunt, the formerly-known-as Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended and arrested Jenny at the border. Upon being handcuffed and strip searched, she would spend the next two months in a juvenile detention center waiting for her deportation hearing. This facility did not provide educational or recreational opportunities, and some of the minors in the facility had to share “bathrooms and sleeping quarters with unrelated adults of both sexes” (Lopez, 2012). The INS refused to release Jenny to her aunt according to a “regulation, promulgated in 1988 and codified at 8 CFR 242.24, which provides for the release of detained minors only to their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians, except in unusual and compelling circumstances” (*Reno v. Flores*, 1993).

The ACLU and four minors, including Jenny, filed a class action lawsuit against the INS, the INS Commissioner, and two private operators of INS detention facilities. They sought to address the treatment and detention of unaccompanied minors, as well as:

Challenge [the] (a) INS policy to condition juveniles’ release on bail on their parents’ or legal guardians’ surrendering to INS agents for interrogation and deportation; (b) the procedures employed by the INS in imposing a condition on juveniles’ bail that their parents’ or legal guardians’ surrender to INS agents for interrogation and deportation; and (c) the conditions maintained by the INS in facilities where juveniles are incarcerated…The plaintiffs alleged that the new policy resulted in lengthy incarceration of juveniles in substandard conditions, without education, supervised recreation, or reasonable visitation opportunities, unreasonably subjected them to strip and body cavity searches, and served as a thinly-veiled device to apprehend the parents of the incarcerated juveniles and to punish the children (Lopez, 2012).
The minors claimed that they had a right to be released to “the custody of ‘responsible adults’” under the constitutional right to due process (Lopez, 2012).

Initially, the District Court invalidated the regulatory scheme on unspecified due process grounds and ordered that “responsible adult part[ies]” be added to the list of persons to whom a juvenile must be released. Furthermore, they required that a hearing before an immigration judge be held automatically, whether or not the juvenile requests it. The Court of Appeals, en banc, affirmed, and the decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Ultimately, the Court found that the release procedures did not violate the minors’ substantive or procedural due process rights. They noted that respondents claimed that the regulation is an abuse of discretion because it permits the INS to hold the juvenile in detention indefinitely, once no relative or legal guardian is deemed available. The late-Justice Antonin Scalia, in delivering the opinion of the court, stated, “The period of custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation hearing, which must be concluded with ‘reasonable dispatch’ to avoid habeas corpus” (Reno v. Flores, 1993). Expected INS custody length was determined to be an average of thirty days. Additionally, the Court described the arrangements as “‘legal custody,’ rather than ‘detention’…since these are not correctional institutions, but facilities that meet ‘state licensing requirements for the provision of shelter care, foster care, group care, and related services to dependent children’” (Reno v. Flores, 1993). The Court also determined that the Attorney General was acting within his discretion and remanded the case to the district court. The parties reached a settlement agreement before the district court could make a final determination on the case (Lopez, 2012).

Consequently, the FSA was established and provided a “nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS” (Lopez, 2012). The policy required that immigration officials detaining minors provide:

1. food and drinking water, 2. medical assistance in the event of emergencies, 3. toilets and sinks, 4. adequate temperature control and ventilation, 5. adequate supervision to protect minors from others, and 6. separation [of children] from unrelated adults whenever possible (Lopez, 2012).

Moreover, the FSA required that the INS:

1. ensure the prompt release of children from immigration detention; 2. place children for whom release is pending, or for whom no release option is available, in the “least restrictive” setting appropriate to the age and special needs of minors; and 3. implement

Paragraphs 12A and 14 also require that the INS “release class members…without unnecessary delay” to certain adults or place them in a licensed program within five days of apprehension. The courts have acknowledged, however, that an extension to the five-day rule is permissible up to twenty days:

At a given time and under extenuating circumstances, if 20 days is as fast as Defendants, in good faith and in the exercise of due diligence, can possibly go in screening family members for reasonable or credible fear, then the recently implemented DHS polices may fall within the parameters of Paragraph 12A of the Agreement (Flores v. Lynch, 2015).

It is further noted that the extension will be permitted if it allows the DHS to keep the family unit together (Flores v. Lynch, 2015).

Notably, in 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act (HSA), which abolished the INS and established the DHS. Many of the functions of the former INS involving care of unaccompanied children were then transferred to the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The HSA charges ORR with “coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied alien children…making placement determinations…[and] overseeing the infrastructures and personnel of facilities in which unaccompanied children reside” (Homeland Security Act of 2002). ORR is further mandated to coordinate its efforts with other government entities and cannot release unaccompanied alien children upon their own recognizance. Additionally, the HSA preserves those administrative actions to which the INS was a party via a savings clause. This clause states that:

Completed administrative actions of an agency…shall continue in effect according to their terms until amended, modified, superseded, terminated, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by an officer of the United States or a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law (Homeland Security Act of 2002).

“Completed administrative actions” is defined as “orders…agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, licenses, registrations, and privileges” (Homeland Security Act of 2002). Therefore, the Flores Settlement is preserved and remains in effect as an “agreement” preceding the passage of the HSA.
On September 7th, 2018, HHS and DHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to the FSA that would align with President Trump’s desires. Ultimately, the Flores Settlement Agreement would hopefully be terminated, and the new rule would create an alternative to the existing licensed program requirement for family residential centers, which would include the ability to detain family units together during the entirety of their immigration proceedings. New rules regarding the apprehension, processing, care, custody, and release of undocumented juveniles would potentially go into effect (Homeland Security & Health and Human Services, 2018). A hearing on the proposed regulations occurred on November 30th, 2018 in the presence of Judge Dolly Gee. Ultimately, President Trump has shown, by issuing an executive order to reverse the “zero tolerance” policy and end family separations that were occurring, that certain public opinion can influence him in part. However, this has not deterred him completely as he attempts to terminate and reconstruct a new FSA in his continual fight for tight and secure borders.

Conclusion

This paper reviews and analyzes the nature of public opinion by providing a definition for public opinion, examining the sources of influence throughout one’s life, analyzing the criticisms and problems associated with public opinion, and understanding how this ultimately relates to policy making. I have found, as a result of often repudiating it, that public opinion, especially among American citizens, does not significantly influence President Trump in the majority of his policy decisions regarding U.S. action in foreign affairs. Throughout his tenure, he has consistently executed policies that counter the views and ideals of citizens and few of which have found themselves in the courtroom. Despite the fact that no majority of any generation of Americans feels that current U.S. foreign policy is headed in the right direction, President Trump will undoubtedly continue to fulfill his longstanding promise of “making America great again” by placing it above all other nations. Although the short-term effects of public opinion regarding foreign affairs are currently extraneous to the President, the long-term consequences, whatever they may be, will indubitably manifest themselves at the conclusion of the 2020 Presidential election. The future of public opinion and the legacy of President Donald Trump will continue to undergo new experiences in the years ahead.
References


realDonaldTrump. (2018, October 29). Many Gang Members and some very bad people are mixed into the Caravan heading to our Southern Border. Please go back, you will not be admitted into the United States unless you go through the legal process. This is an invasion of our Country and our Military is waiting for you! [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1056919064906469376


Appendix A

Figure 1. Confidence in President’s Handling of World Affairs as Compared to Job Approval Rating

Figure 2. International Image of America in 2018

Note: Percentages are medians based on 25 countries.
Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey. Q17a, Q30b, Q35c, Q33 & Q39.

Figure 3. Countries’ Favorability Towards the U.S.

Source:

Wike et al. (2018, October 1). Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.
Wike et al. (2018, October 1). Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.

**Figure 4. World Views of President Trump’s Negative Characteristics**

*Do you think of U.S. President Donald Trump as ___?*

![Bar chart showing international views of President Trump's characteristics across different countries and regions.](source)

Figure 5. World Views of President Trump’s Positive Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A strong leader</th>
<th>Charismatic</th>
<th>Well-qualified to be president</th>
<th>Caring about ordinary people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBAL MEDIAN</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, Q37a, b, d, f.

PCW RESEARCH CENTER


Source:
Figure 6. Preference of Countries For Who is the Leading World Power

It would be better for the world to have ___ as the leading power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Both/Neither/Dont Know (VOL)</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-COUNTRY MEDIAN</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Wike et al. (2018, October 1). Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.
Figure 7. Overall Direction of U.S. Foreign Policy

Source:

When it comes to overall US foreign policy, do you feel things are generally heading in the right direction, or are they off on the wrong track? (% right direction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boomers</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gen X</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Millennial</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix B

Table 1. The Changing Composition of America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party ID</th>
<th>Silent</th>
<th>Boomer</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Millennial</th>
<th>Net Change (Silent – Millennial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Republican</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>- 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Democrat</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Independent</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+ 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Silent</th>
<th>Boomer</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Millennial</th>
<th>Net Change (Silent – Millennial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Conservative</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>- 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moderate</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Liberal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>+ 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Silent</th>
<th>Boomer</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Millennial</th>
<th>Net Change (Silent – Millennial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>- 27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Source:

**Table 2. U.S. Foreign Policy Goals**

_Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all (% very important)._

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Silent</th>
<th>Boomer</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Millennial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Protecting the jobs of American workers</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Protecting the jobs of American workers</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maintaining superior military power worldwide</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Maintaining superior military power worldwide</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Securing adequate supplies of energy</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Securing adequate supplies of energy</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Improving America’s standing in the world</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Improving America’s standing in the world</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

Table 3. Support for the Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Silent</th>
<th>Boomer</th>
<th>Gen X</th>
<th>Millennial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conducting airstrikes against President Bashar al-Assad's regime</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops if North Korea invaded South Korea</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducting airstrikes against violent Islamic extremist groups</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops if China initiates a military conflict with Japan over</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disputed islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops if Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops to deal with humanitarian crises</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops to fight against violent Islamic extremist groups in Iraq</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct airstrikes against North Korea's nuclear production facilities</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops if Russia invades the rest of Ukraine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of US troops to stop or prevent a government from using chemical or</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biological weapons against its own people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending combat troops into Syria to fight violent Islamic extremist groups</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending combat troops into Syria to forcibly remove Syrian President Bashar</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Assad from power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send US troops to destroy North Korea's nuclear facilities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: