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Erratum
The citation for this review is 7 RISK 385 (1996) in most commercial databases.

Worldwide, people are validly concerned about a host of differing threats. Mr. Jeanes maintains that, even after the denouement of the Cold War, however, there is no greater threat than that of nuclear devastation. His trilogy is intended to be a reference source for those who wish to analyze its probability — whether a result of war, accident or terrorism. Jeans’ main premise is that the threat is quantifiable, and he attempts to reveal a perceived ambiguity in “popular and scholarly work regarding the dangers presently posed by nuclear weapons.”

The first book, *Formula k, The Guide,* “reveal[s] the end process of applying annual probabilities of initiating a nuclear strike year after year.” In it, Jeanes bombards the reader with a host of formulae, tables, charts and graphs. He discusses a *Reluctance Level* said to measure the average number of years before a given party with the capacity would be inclined to initiate a nuclear strike for any reason whatsoever. Overall, Jeanes attempts to establish statistically what might be an otherwise simple and believable fact: As more entities can produce or procure nuclear warheads, we face an increased probability of some form of hostile or accidental detonation.

Book two, *Unified Theories,* begins a long discussion of how the equations introduced earlier enable readers to analyze the likelihood of nuclear detonation and to be conversant in ways to increase the number of years before one is likely to occur. Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying:

> What the potential aggressor believes is more crucial than what is objectively true. Deterrence occurs above all in the minds of men.

However, Jeanes places little faith in deterrence; he argues that proliferation alone is the critical factor reducing the time until a nuclear explosion. He considers many historical and social perspectives relative

1 Comment, at iii.
2 At 37.
3 At 189.
to this problem. The history of the 20th Century is recounted, with interspersed discussions from moral and religious sources, to support his contentions.

Book three, *Unified Theories Defied in WW I, WW II and After*, is a tour-de-force, prosaic analysis of the course of history primarily since WW I. Yet, Jeanes even weaves threads from the U.S. Revolutionary War and Constitutional Convention in telling his tale. He addresses the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to produce the League of Nations and gives much credit for resulting imbalances to Henry Cabot Lodge. At one point, he places responsibility for WW II on both Lodge and Adolph Hitler.⁴ Jeanes continues spinning his tale of our nuclear future to a simple conclusion: “[T]he question is not so much one of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ guys, but the number of ‘guys.’”⁵

Some will find Jeanes’ book quirky, e.g., because of extensive citation to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a work he regards as generally underutilized. Also, a glossary of acronyms found at the beginning of Book II is not listed in the Table of Contents; nor is it logically located at the end of the text. Moreover, 77 tables and 178 figures are not indexed for quick access, and the organization is occasionally unclear.

I found *Forecast and Solution* a reminder of how little I know of statistics. Yet, I found it nonetheless fascinating and recommend it to all who are interested in, or involved, with nuclear energy — peaceful or otherwise.

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⁴ At 586.
⁵ At 653.
† Mr. Schaefer received his B.A. (International Relations) from the University of Colorado–Denver, where his senior thesis was titled “The PARADOX of United States Arms Reduction in a Three Tier Production Market.” He is an extern at the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva and a candidate for the J.D. at FPLC.