Playing the man: Masculinity, performance, and United States foreign policy, 1901--1920

Kim Brinck-Johnsen

University of New Hampshire, Durham

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PLAYING THE MAN: MASCULINITY, PERFORMANCE, AND US FOREIGN POLICY, 1901 – 1920

BY

Kim Brinck-Johansen
BA St. John's College, 1985
MA American University, 1995

DISSERTATION

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in

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This dissertation has been examined and approved.

Dissertation Director
Kurk Dorsey, Associate Professor of History

Nicoletta F. Gullace,
Associate Professor of History

Lisa Watt MacFarlane,
Professor of English

Robert M. Mennel,
Professor of History and the Humanities

Lucy E. Salyer,
Associate Professor of History

Date
8 December 2007

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to Annelise and Renée, with love and gratitude.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have worked on this dissertation for many years, and I have received a great deal of assistance and support from many people. The Chair of my dissertation committee, Prof. Kurk Dorsey, deserves special thanks for sticking with me during the long process, as do the rest of the committee, Professors Nicoletta Gullace, Lisa MacFarlane, Robert Mennel, and Lucy Salyer. They have been generous with their support and knowledge during my time at the University of New Hampshire, and especially during the dissertation writing process.

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ABSTRACT

PLAYING THE MAN: MASCULINITY, PERFORMANCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1901-1920

by

Kim Brinck-Johansen
University of New Hampshire, December, 2004

"Playing the Man": Masculinity, Performance, and US Foreign Policy, 1901-1920 argues that early twentieth century conceptions of masculinity played a significant role in constructing US foreign policy and in creating a new sense of national identity. It focuses on five public figures (Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, John Reed, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson). Although their conceptions of masculinity varied, each of these central historical figures based his or her US foreign policy position on the idea that in the conduct of US foreign relations, the United States needed to "play the man." Similarly, even when their policy prescriptions differed, all argued for foreign policies that reinforced masculinity in the US, and that equated this masculinity with American national character.

The dissertation begins with a discussion of the cultural and historical roots of the nineteenth century. The next chapters focus on Theodore Roosevelt and his circle, and the men who codified the dominant construction of American masculinity at the beginning of the twentieth century. The following chapters trace some of the opposition to the Rooseveltian construction of a strenuous national masculinity. These differing approaches to domestic and international politics, expressed by individuals such as John
Reed, Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Woodrow Wilson, sought to reframe the connection between masculinity and foreign policy. Though these individuals agreed with the Rooseveltian equation of manhood and national identity, they had differing conceptions of ideal American manhood, and so they differed in their prescriptions for US foreign policy.

The conclusion discusses the ways that the Great War affected the central figures, and the ways in which the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment affected the nature of politics, and political rhetoric in America. Finally, it traces some of the legacies of the combination of masculinity and foreign policy, and points out some of the many aspects of US foreign policy that still bear the stamp of the Rooseveltian construction of masculinity.
INTRODUCTION

PLAYING THE MAN:
MASCULINITY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1901-1920

U.S. foreign policy is shaped and determined by ideals of manliness. One of the best articulations of the link is Theodore Roosevelt’s speech at the Minnesota State fair on September 2, 1901, just a few weeks before the assassination of William McKinley made him President of the United States. In the speech, titled “National Duties,” Roosevelt used a metaphor that would become defining for American foreign policy in the 20th century. He compared the United States to a man, and argued that international action should be manly action. “Exactly as each man, while doing first his duty to his wife and the children within his home, must yet, if he hopes to amount to much, strive mightily in the world outside his home, so our nation, while first of all seeing to its own domestic well-being, must not shrink from playing its part among the great nations without.” In this speech, as in hundreds of speeches and articles, Roosevelt explicitly linked the masculinity of American men with the conduct of American foreign policy. With this simple analogy, Roosevelt argued that as men are to their society, so is the nation to the world. Furthermore, the code of conduct that governs both men and nations is identical. Both must "play [their] part," - that is perform - with manly resolve in order
to take their rightful place in American society, and in the world. The performance of manliness is the key to international success.¹

But how does a nation perform manliness? In 1901, as now, manliness was very difficult to define. People debated the meaning of manhood and came up with very different answers; what it meant to be a man varied a lot depending on who was doing the defining. While Teddy Roosevelt offered one paradigm for masculinity, many of the figures discussed in this manuscript offered alternative paradigms. What is most interesting, however, is that everyone seems to have accepted Roosevelt’s metaphoric premise; all agreed that the United States should play a man’s part in world affairs, even if their beliefs about how “real men” should behave were radically different.

Roosevelt’s own masculine ideology was influential and powerful. The speech he delivered at the Minnesota State Fair was but one example of his frequent exhortations to live what he described as “the strenuous life,” a phrase that sums up Roosevelt’s approach to masculinity. Roosevelt believed that a man should live his life as if he were in a boxing ring or a wrestling match. Ideal men should grapple with life, engage with it energetically, and wrest from it material success, spiritual well-being, and personal satisfaction. Roosevelt scorned the life of ease, and admired the men (and women) who strove “mightily in the world.”

Roosevelt’s construction of the manly “strenuous life” created a paradigm for manly behavior that was very influential in American culture. But few men today consciously model their behavior on Roosevelt’s strenuous paradigm. Even in 1901, many American rejected his model of manliness. Since the meaning of masculinity was

so fiercely contested in the period (as it is today), it is surprising that there was strong consensus that masculinity must shape U.S. foreign policy. This dissertation examines that paradox.

Although masculinity was (and is) a fluid concept which can be defined in many radically different ways, it nonetheless shaped and determined U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century. Regardless of their political purposes or their beliefs about masculinity, no one in the period challenged the fundamental premise that the United States must act like a man; instead, the argument always centered on the (seemingly unrelated) question of how a man should, ideally, perform his masculinity.

The consequences of this nearly indestructible link between masculinity and U.S. foreign policy are one subject of this dissertation. The more central subject, however, is the link itself. I am examining the ways that competing models for international relations became limited to competing models of masculinity.

Before we examine the contradictions, let us examine Roosevelt’s 1901 speech more closely. In the speech, the nation is actually a man – Roosevelt pushes his metaphor to its biological limit, describing the United States as one heroic male, with national loins that must be girded up for battle. “We gird up our loins as a nation,” he said, “with the stern purpose to play our part manfully in winning the ultimate triumph; and therefore we turn scornfully away from the paths of mere idleness, and with unfaltering steps tread the rough road of endeavor, smiting down the wrong and battling for the right...”


2 Once again, note the language here: Roosevelt wants Americans “to play [their] part.” A large part of masculinity during this time appears to be rooted in “playing” a role, or in
Stirring language is common in Roosevelt’s speeches and writings, but this turn of phrase is particularly notable both because it describes masculinity in terms of performance (Roosevelt urges Americans to “play our part manfully”) and also because it attempts to ground national performance of masculinity in an abstract male national body by discussing the national “loins.” The word “loins” is an archaic euphemism for genitalia; a man’s children were described as the "fruit of his loins" for example, while "loin-cloths" covered only their genitals. “Girding up one’s loins” is, as Roosevelt used it, an expression of preparation for a task that is difficult and dangerous, but the phrase refers literally to the binding of genitalia to prevent their injury during the course of battle.

The use of the word “loins” makes clear in a very graphic way the extent to which masculinity and national identity were intertwined in Roosevelt’s mind. This powerful image of national masculinity needs to be taken seriously, and literally, because this trope illustrates Roosevelt’s conception of the United States, and perhaps more importantly, his view of the way that the United States should take part in the world.

The modern reader of Roosevelt’s bombastic oratory may be tempted to immediately discount this masculine language as mere rhetoric. But since his entire speech, 16 pages of text, is built upon this analogy, it is difficult to ignore. In light of the fact that this is also the speech that introduced the phrase “speak softly and carry a big stick” to the American political lexicon, the male metaphors demand serious attention.

the performance of a particular gendered stereotype. Gender theorists such as Judith Butler have begun to focus more attention on this aspect of gender identity. See, for example Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, New York: Routledge, 1999. The Roosevelt quote is from Theodore Roosevelt, “National Duties,” p. 480.
Of course, the “big stick” itself is a crude phallic metaphor. My point is that this is not a coincidence or a simple joke: big stick diplomacy is actually originally described as manly diplomacy, even phallic diplomacy. The nation that carries the big stick is the very nation that has girded up its loins and left its wife and family home as it goes out to play the man on the global stage.

Because Roosevelt frequently used masculine language, it is essential to interrogate his concept of masculinity. What was Roosevelt’s goal in pushing the masculine analogy nearly to the breaking point? Why did he use masculine language so often, when it is clear that the United States, a huge geographic territory of earth, water and rock, a nation of 45 states populated in 1900 with nearly 76 million women, children and men, was not a “man” in any real sense at all? Why did Roosevelt, and so many other politicians, critics, and intellectuals, use the masculine model so frequently when discussing the United States’ role in world affairs during the first decades of the twentieth century?

These questions are crucial to understanding U.S. foreign policy during the early twentieth century. There is more to the conjunction of masculine discourse and foreign policy than just the felicitous turn of a phrase. Roosevelt and many of his contemporaries believed in the essential truth of the national manhood model. Nations were like men, they argued, and international relations, in an age when Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theories were influential, were conceived of in terms of competition, survival and elimination. The world was the arena where these nations contested their comparative worth, and the key to national power and prestige, Roosevelt and other like-minded
individuals believed, lay in the manhood of its citizens, which served as the blueprint for
the performance of national masculinity on the world stage.

The goal of this work is to explore the effects of conceptions of American
national masculinity upon U.S. foreign policy. The combination of what Theodore
Roosevelt once described as “Manhood and Statehood” helped to shape American
foreign relations during the first decades of the 20th Century. Because the dialectic
interaction of masculinity and foreign affairs coincided with the emergence of the United
States as a world power, an understanding of the gendered language of foreign policy, as
expressed in speeches, documents, essays and other writings is essential to an
understanding of how the United States became a world power.

Although masculine language is important to many aspects of U.S. culture, the
language of national masculinity is notably dominant in the field of foreign policy,
particularly in the early twentieth century. In the foreign policy arena, masculine
conceptions of American identity were laid out very explicitly. Speeches and writings
composed during this time debated the future role of the United States in world affairs,
but they did not debate Roosevelt’s equation of manhood with statehood. To the
contrary, the following chapters will show that the different approaches to U.S. foreign
policy during the first twenty years of the twentieth century shared a common assumption
of the connection between national manliness and international action. This consensus is
remarkable, and indicates that the trope of masculinity was more than merely a rhetorical
flourish.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, there was a shared awareness that the
United States was in a period of transformation from a regional power focused primarily
on its internal and regional issues, to a world power with global ambitions and interests. During this time period, participants in the foreign policy debate shaped their arguments about American foreign policies in terms of masculinity regardless of viewpoint (liberal, conservative, Republican, Democrat, male, female, white, black). Critics as well as proponents of particular foreign policies argued their cases in terms of the behavior of the ideal man. Since the nation was universally understood as a man, the question revolved around how a man should behave. Though there was a great deal of difference on this point, the main assumption of the masculinity of the American nation remained unchallenged.

Early twentieth-century efforts to enact American national masculinity on the world stage have had wide-ranging consequences. Like the rest of the American political system, U. S. foreign policy is rooted in arguments of precedent; policy decisions based on notions of Gilded Age masculine behavior are still very much with us. In many ways, these precedents continue to limit the options available to contemporary foreign policy analysts to those options that appear to be the most in line with their own interpretations of masculinity (the need to be “tough on communism” during the Cold War, is a good example here). In addition, because the masculine language of the Gilded Age was prevalent during the decisive period when the United States first stepped onto the world stage, current American foreign policy still relies on the language and attitudes of the early twentieth century.\(^3\)

\(^3\) A case in point is President George W. Bush’s address to the nation where he promised that Osama bin Laden would be apprehended “dead or alive.” Bush was relying on the language of the western, a uniquely American genre of film and literature that pits good versus evil in small towns in the Western United States. In his use of the language of the fictional frontier lawman, Bush was referring back to *The Virginian*, the definitive
The point here is that the masculine model of an idealized male United States, which replaced the pre-Civil War model of state-based American identity, provided the organizing framework for American foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century, and continues to do so to this day. Framers of U. S. foreign policy still use Gilded Age ideals of manliness as a measure of viability. “Strength” and “weakness” in foreign policy are still viewed as if the American nation were a man, and opposition to “tough” policies is met with allegations of “wimpiness,” “feebleness,” and other coded language that impugn the masculinity of both the policies and their critics. Therefore, an analysis of the foreign policy language, and the attitudes behind it, can help to reveal the unexamined gender ideology that serves as the basis for much U.S. foreign policy. This analysis may also help to shift considerations of national security and well-being from the main street of Dodge City to a location where outmoded notions of masculine behavior no longer shape world affairs.

In this exploration of the effects of the combination of masculinity and national identity on U.S. foreign policy, I employ some of the approaches used by scholars who practice what has come to be known as cultural studies.4 By questioning the ways that gender, class, race, and ethnicity have affected U.S. foreign policy formation, I am using

western novel written by Owen Wister, that was published in 1902 and dedicated to Theodore Roosevelt. Bush, whether he knew it or not, was viewing the conflict with bin Laden, al Qaeda and eventually the Taliban government in Afghanistan, through the lens of a Gilded Age conception of masculine heroism. For Bush’s speech, see the New York Times, September 18, 2001, A 1.

4 There are too many cultural studies texts to list here, but an excellent overview of cultural studies writers and approaches can be found in Lawrence Grossberg, et al., eds., Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge, 1992. Soon to be reissued in a revised edition,
approaches that are increasingly being brought to bear on the study of the history of American foreign relations.

To begin with, I understand gender to be a socially constructed concept that has changed greatly over time and that has differed from place to place. Although the physiology and biology of sex have remained relatively constant, the meanings of words like “man” and “woman,” not to mention “homosexual,” “transgendered,” “gay,” “lesbian,” and “straight,” are continually being redefined. Following current usage, I use “sex” to refer to bodies, “gender” to describe socially shaped identities, and “sexuality” to refer to identities defined in terms of sexual desire. In examining gender issues, I am following a path originally staked out by gender theorists such as Joan Scott, while Judith Butler’s more recent discussions of gender as “performance” also shapes my approach.5

In addition, I have sought to come to an understanding of the ways that class, race and ethnicity are linked. Much recent work has focused on the late nineteenth century and the ways that these three invidious categories played themselves out in American political and social life. The work of David Roediger, Theodore Allen, Dana Nelson, and Noel Ignatiev, among others, has shown that definitions for concepts like “man” and “white,” far from being static, and hence normative, have fluctuated greatly and have been bitterly contested.6

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In general, by exploring American political culture during the early twentieth century— in getting to know the individuals, their political discourse and their personal values, the political institutions and the debates that echoed in their corridors – I have sought to understand the conceptions of nation and self, world and other, as well as the hopes for the future and the global visions as delineated during that era.

To this end, I focus a great deal of attention on the language employed by the individuals that make up the central personae in this work. I aim, literally, to take the individuals at their word – my goal is to allow individuals such as Jane Addams and John Reed to speak for themselves and to illuminate some of the arguments that their speeches and writings made regarding masculinity and foreign policy. The masculine language used by these individuals expressed their approach to foreign policy, and to the world. But more importantly the discourse of masculinity shaped their foreign policy actions. Each of the figures I examine accepted the analogy between manhood and statehood (as Roosevelt framed it); more than this, each individual conceived and described foreign relations in the same language as they described human relations, more specifically, in the language of manly interaction. Because of this, all of the figures discussed here argued for national actions based on his or her masculine ideals. A close analysis of the gendered language employed by these individuals will yield great insight into the time and thought of the era, with a specific illumination of the debates surrounding the construction of U. S. foreign policy. The better we understand each author’s concept of


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masculinity, the better we can understand his or her attitude toward the U.S. as a national actor on the world stage.

Recently, there have been many historians who have begun to mine these veins, and to explore the intersection of masculinity and American culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Works such as Anthony Rotundo’s *American Manhood*, Kim Townsend’s *Manhood at Harvard*, Michael Kimmel’s *Manhood in America*, Mangan and Walvin’s *Manliness and Morality*, Dana Nelson’s, *National Manhood*, and Kaplan and Pease’s *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, are excellent examples of this kind of scholarship. These works, of course, are just a few among many in a growing literature that explores the relationship between gender and American history in general, and its role in the formulation of foreign policy in particular.7

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In terms of my own project, I am following in the wake of three important works that deserve special mention, not only because they share a similar theoretical approach, but also because they share a similar topical focus.

Gail Bederman’s *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917*, focuses on the way that conceptions of white middle-class masculinity, particularly notions of white supremacy, were defined in terms of opposition to other races. Bederman’s book explores the connection between masculinity and race, and argues that, during the time period between 1890 and 1917, white middle-class men developed the idea of “civilization” as a means of justifying their continued social and political pre-eminence. “During these years,” Bederman writes, “a variety of social and cultural factors encouraged white middle-class men to develop new explanations of why they, as men, ought to wield power and authority.” Bederman’s book has helped me to explore the linkage between constructions of masculinity and American culture in this time period. At the same time, however, there are differences between our work, for where Bederman focuses on the way gender issues played themselves out within the United States, I am more interested in the way the same issues have affected American foreign relations, and the way that foreign relations contribute to a sense of American national identity.

Kristin Hoganson’s *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* illuminates the

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intersection between Gilded Age masculinity and U.S. foreign policy. Hoganson’s book examines how this combination led to a particularly vehement resurgence of white middle-class masculinity and argues that this masculinity contributed to the clamor for war in 1898. Hoganson addresses the social and political background to the conflict and describes the gender anxiety that led to the belief in war as a means of saving American men from decline. Her work is very convincing when discussing the jingoist discourse of the time, explaining how the jingos’ language was rooted in their fears of white middle-class male decline, and the relationship between that anxiety and the surge in wartime masculinity.

My project is similar to Hoganson’s in that we both explore masculinity and U.S. foreign policy, but there are many differences between our work. Hoganson focuses primarily on the years from 1898 to 1901, while my study concentrates on the years between 1901 and 1921, from when Roosevelt became President, to the end of Wilson’s Second Administration. I am interested in seeing what happens after the masculinization of U.S. foreign policy that Hoganson describes has occurred, and masculinity has become determinative. I explore the arguments that were made about masculinity and U.S. foreign policy in the decades after 1898, when all of the actors accepted a basic connection between masculinity and national action.

Both Hoganson and Bederman focus on white male masculinity at the turn of the previous century and both examine the ways in which this identity was constructed and shaped by social, cultural, and political forces. While the traditional view had seen

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gender and sexuality as permanent and immutable, newer approaches such as those used by Bederman and Hoganson have gone a long way toward showing that gender is a social construction that develops as a result of particular influences at particular times; as a result, there is a great deal more that needs to be considered when examining gender identification than mere biology.

One of the more interesting (and useful) approaches to gender is that developed by Judith Butler in her groundbreaking book *Gender Trouble*.11 Beginning with an examination of the debate on the nature of gender (is it something you are, or something you have?), Butler draws on the work of feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray, among others, who argue against the definition and the positioning of women in society by means of their relationship to men. Where de Beauvoir believes that women are “the second sex” as a result of the conflation of the universal with the male gender, Irigaray goes further and argues that women do not even make it as a “second sex.” Where de Beauvoir sees the construction of women’s gender as a response to the male universal, Irigaray argues that the male conception of “men and women,” constructed as a discourse of “self and other,” in effect leaves women out – as Irigaray states, “woman does not have a sex.”12 This is echoed, and strengthened, by Julia Kristeva, who adds that, "strictly speaking, women cannot be said to exist.” The traditional gender argument, Butler points out, has been that there are but two gender categories: “men,” and “not men.” In this definitional circle, male gender is still universal, in both its positive and negative aspects. The problem with this definition is

12 Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, page xxx.
that women are *not* "not men". As a result of this logical fallacy, both gender and the origins of gender must be understood as fundamentally problematic, or troubled.\(^{13}\)

Butler's solution to this gender trouble grows out of her reading of the works of Michel Foucault, in particular his writing about the hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin. Barbin, by his/her very nature, does not fit into the binary gendered system, and as such is the perfect contradiction to the entire system of gender construction. As Butler explains, Barbin's duality forces us to dispense with the traditional approaches to thinking about, and defining, gender:

> Once we dispense with the priority of "man" and "woman" as abiding substances, then it is no longer possible to subordinate dissonant gendered features as so many secondary and accidental characteristics…\(^{14}\)

In other words, once "man" and "woman" are no longer thought of as unchanging, permanent entities, then it is no longer possible or even necessary to force individuals who do not match those categories into tightly defined gender identities. When traditional gender definitions are dispensed with, the problems of gender adherence are also eliminated. What remains, then, is a definition of gender that also grows out of the experience of Herculine Barbin: if she/he embodies both genders, then what defines her/him is the way she/he behaves; when clothed as woman, and moving with "feminine" motion, Barbin *is* a woman. Conversely, when dressed as a man, and moving with "masculine" movements, Barbin *is* a man. Butler: "In this sense, *gender* is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free floating attributes, for we have seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled by the regulatory practice of

\(^{13}\) Butler, *Gender Trouble*, pages 3-33.

\(^{14}\) Butler, *Gender Trouble*, p. 32.

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gender coherence." Barbin becomes a man precisely because he/she acts like one, and she/he is a woman because of her/his performance in that role as well. In sum, Butler writes that "[t]here is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; ... identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results."\(^\text{15}\)

The definition of gender as performance is very useful for this attempt to come to terms with turn-of-the-century masculinity and U.S. foreign policy. But applying the performance model of masculinity to public policy is a significant leap from Butler's own work, which is focused primarily on private persons and their identity as individuals. In this study, I examine the wide-ranging effects of masculine ideology on public policy. I argue that policy makers framed policies with the purpose of making the United States perform a masculine gender identity on the world stage.

In discussions of masculinity, it is very difficult to untangle the public from the private. No one understands gender as a completely abstract or impersonal conceptual framework; each person's ideas about the masculine and the feminine are shaped by private experiences and personal and family history as well as by broad cultural forces. When public figures attempt to frame their policies in terms of gender ideologies, they draw on private experience as they attempt to shape public culture and to determine national action.

In each of the chapters of this dissertation, I focus on a particular person and discuss his or her private experiences of gender formation as the basis for his or her adult articulations of national masculinity. In the second part of each chapter, I turn to the effects that particular conception of national masculinity had on the policy positions of

\(^{15}\) Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 33.
each figure. But it is often difficult to separate the private from the public. For example, several of the men I discuss here entered manhood when they entered Harvard; their own private experiences of learning to enact adult American masculinity took place in a somewhat public collective institution. Their experiences were both personal and shared.

Further, although the dominant models of masculinity do change over time and there is often a single dominant model, United States culture has never adhered to a single model of masculinity with total unanimity. There are always alternatives. One factor that complicates the structure of the argument presented here is that Woodrow Wilson was born before Teddy Roosevelt, but became president many years after him. Because of his personal history and his experience of boyhood, Wilson’s model of masculinity aligns with the nineteenth century rather than the twentieth; and yet his actual presidency took place after Roosevelt had thoroughly redefined America’s national masculinity.

If this were a history of masculinity, it would begin with a discussion of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about manliness and proceed toward Theodore Roosevelt’s reframing of those ideas; then it would discuss a few of the policy makers whose particular policy decisions enacted Roosevelt’s strenuous masculinity model. Finally, it would turn to John Reed, Jane Addams, and W.E.B. Du Bois, who expanded upon and sought to change the dominant Gilded Age model.

But this is a history of U.S. foreign policy entwined with a history of masculinity. Its narrative follows the twists and turns of actual history, while tracing the progression of cultural concepts. Therefore, we must start with Roosevelt, whose model was dominant in 1901, at the beginning of the twentieth century, and work toward Woodrow
Wilson, whose presidency a decade later was framed around a much earlier idea of masculinity.

If we consider Theodore Roosevelt in light of the performance model of masculinity, certain aspects of his career become easier to understand. Roosevelt structured his personal life and his public life around masculine performance, as the following examples illustrate. When he was young and asthmatic, his father told him that he had to “make his body” work, an exhortation he took to heart, embarking on a rigorous course of body building that transformed him from a sickly, scrawny boy to healthy man with the body of a wrestler. Another transformation occurred after a stint in the New York State Assembly (where he was mocked for his effeminacy and his dandyism) when, in a custom made buckskin suit, he took up ranching in the Dakotas. Dressing like Natty Bumppo became tantamount to being Natty Bumppo, the “deerstalker” of James Fenimore Cooper’s novels. Yet another transformation occurred in 1898, this time at Brooks Brothers, where TR acquired a uniform befitting a Colonel in a volunteer regiment about to fight in Cuba. This costume went a long way toward creating Roosevelt as a “Rough Rider,” the role that helped him to win national office. 16

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16 See Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1979, for an excellent overview of Roosevelt’s life. For the “make your body” speech, see Corinne Roosevelt Robinson, My Brother Theodore Roosevelt, New York: Scribner’s, 1921, p. 50; for descriptions of Roosevelt's dandyism, see Morris, Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 161-162; for an actual image of Roosevelt in his custom made buckskin suit, see the frontispiece of Roosevelt, Hunting Trips of a Ranchman, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1885; for background on the suit itself, see Morris, Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 283; Roosevelt telegraphed the order for the uniform he used in Cuba to Brooks Brothers directly, thus predicting mail order by some 80 years. The telegram is in Elting Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1951, p. 822. p. 613.
Roosevelt is fascinating both because of his personal transformations and because of his masculine ideology. If we think of Roosevelt in terms of his performances, his costumes, his many 'roles,' and his gendered speech help us to understand his political processes and his policies. His role-playing and speeches can be understood as attempts to convince his audience of his place in a particular gender location, and just as importantly, as attempts to structure and to regulate definitions of gender.

Roosevelt's performances were not lost on many of his contemporaries, who could see through them to the individual beneath the role-playing. As Edmund Morris points out, "those who know him well are quick enough to catch the subtle messages Roosevelt sends forth."17 Perhaps most telling is the comment by William Allen White that he saw the "inner shadow of some inner femininity deeply suppressed."18 This comment would bear out Butler's theory – that even in the heart of the most rampantly masculine heterosexual man is a deeper femininity that has been shoved to the bottom. Additional validation of the idea that Roosevelt's masculinity was a (bravura) performance is Henry Adams’ assertion that Roosevelt was "pure act."19 Roosevelt was pure act – he was the creation of his own mind, and a person who loved to perform, a man who, according to his own children, longed to be "the bride at every wedding, and the corpse at every funeral."20 Of course, Roosevelt never put on a big white dress or a

18 William Allen White, St. Louis Censor, December 27, 1906; quoted in Morris, Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 21
shroud, but his buckskin suit is best understood as a similar costume, a prop in a carefully tailored performance of American virility.

Butler’s theory of gender as performance is helpful in making sense of Roosevelt’s personal history, but it works even better as an explanation of the construction of gender on the national plane. Because nations do not have physiological bodies, their gender assignment is the result of performance only; if the nation “acts like a man,” it is, ipso facto, “manly,” a man. If Roosevelt’s analogy is taken as a model, and the man is to the nation as the nation is to the world, then the nation serves as a masculine entity, provided it acts like a man. Nations aren’t men, of course — nations have no sex. Yet because people think of political entities in physical terms (by using terms such as “the body politic” and “governmental bodies,” for example) there is often a conflation of the term with the attribute — because people think of a nation's citizens as a “body politic,” it is an easy move to assign that body with gendered attributes. These gender assignments, of course, come about as a result of evaluations of behavior. Citizens can act “manly,” for example, or “like a bunch of women.” What is more interesting, however, for a discussion of U.S. foreign policy, is that nations themselves become gendered through their performance, their behavior.

As Kristin Hoganson and Amy Kaplan have shown, the Spanish-American War of 1898 (which made Theodore Roosevelt a national figure) was marked by a remarkable combination of masculine discourse and militarism, and created an enduring connection between manliness and foreign policy. The connection persisted in the following decades; indeed, it has persisted ever since. Though many have tried to redefine masculinity itself in order to redefine U.S. foreign policy, no one has been successful in
separating Theodore Roosevelt’s linkage of manly behavior and national action. The most they could do was to offer alternative constructions of manly behavior.

This project considers the enduring dominance of the linkage between manhood and statehood, as well as a variety of attempts to reconstruct masculinity in order to reframe U.S. foreign policy. In sum, I argue that the individuals discussed here made their cases for their visions of foreign policy in terms of national masculinity. Even when they had alternate foreign policy goals or different conceptions of manliness, they all accepted the linkage between national behavior and manly behavior, and they all agreed that the United States should “play the man” on the world stage. The model of national masculinity has shaped U.S. foreign policy visions for more than a century. Further, because the United States has been confined to “playing the man,” the range of foreign policy options has been severely limited, and this has led the United States to act in particularly fateful ways.

A consideration of the challenges to Roosevelt’s model of national masculinity is necessary, for it indicates the strength and persistence of the discourse of masculinity. Though many of the foreign policy alternatives that were presented between the years 1901 and 1920 challenged strenuous Rooseveltian masculinity, none challenged the link between man and nation. Instead, the determinative consensus remained that the U.S. should continue to “play the man.”

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Before focusing on the foreign policy history that structures this dissertation, it is necessary to consider the construction of nineteenth-century masculinity in America. To understand what it meant to be a man in the nineteenth century we must begin with an
earlier ideal of American manliness, namely the minister. Christian ministers had played an important role in the development of American political and cultural life ever since the arrival of the European colonists in the early seventeenth century, but as the influence of churches on American society began to wane, male involvement in the church declined. As a result, by the early nineteenth century many clergymen worked primarily in a world of women. In *The Feminization of American Culture*, Ann Douglas argues that during this period American religion grew feminized, sermons began to lose their sting, and the angry, vengeful god of the Puritans grew softer, gentler, and more womanly. Douglas has quite a bit of evidence to support her argument. For example, she cites Joel Hawes, a Congregational minister, who complained in 1862 that “[t]he sword of the spirit is ... so muffled up and decked out with flowers and ribbons as no longer to show what it is.” No one paid attention to religion “except women and superstitious men.” Henry James, Sr. even pointed out that “Religion in the old virile sense has disappeared, and been replaced by a feeble Unitarian sentimentality.”

In this light it is unsurprising that portrayals of Jesus himself, in paintings and engravings, also become feminized. Michael Kimmel points out that the depictions of Jesus that appeared during the nineteenth century portrayed him as a thin reedy man with long bony fingers and a lean face, with soft doe-like eyes and a beatific countenance – a man who could advise his congregations to turn the other cheek, while gazing dreamily heavenward.

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22 Douglas, *Feminization of American Culture*, p. 113

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This image was embraced by the women who increasingly made up the majority of church congregations, and was thereby passed on to their sons. In this way, the gentle Jesus became the ideal for American manhood in the years before the Civil War.

By the time of the Civil War, religion had become firmly linked to women and femininity, and the restraints that religion placed on male behavior were beginning to chafe. During the second half of the nineteenth century, therefore, there was a push by men and women, ministers and lay-people, to transform the way that religion was marketed to young men. As Michael Kimmel explains, “Religion had been women’s domain, and the sentimental piety and obsessive moralism were experienced by men as a brake on manly exuberance…”

The end of the Civil War, furthermore, marked the beginning of a new America, and the construction of a new ideal of masculinity. After more than 600,000 soldiers had died fighting over Union, the words “United States” had changed their meaning. Earlier American regional and state based identities began to be replaced by a growing sense of the United States as a collective entity. President Abraham Lincoln’s language reflected this shift. Before the war, Lincoln had described the nation in the plural, as befitting a national collective of member states – the United States are – but towards the end of the

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war, he began to use the formulation "the United States is," an indication of his conviction that the war was both creating and defending a single Union.26

In order for the U.S. to become completely unified, however, the animosities and the sectionalism of pre-War American politics needed to be eliminated. The end of Reconstruction went a long way to easing North-South tensions and helped to bring about a rapprochement; in fact, it was the difficulties and frustrations of managing the Reconstruction project that finally led the North to give in to Southern intransigence. With the ending of Federal attempts to legislate African-American equality, the way was clear for a new unity among Americans. Among White American men, that is, for while Northern and Southern unity was achieved through the agreement to drop attempts to force African American political and cultural equality, blacks were not the only groups left out of the political spectrum. In the years between the end of Reconstruction in 1877 and the enfranchisement of women in 1920, American masculinity was defined in terms of opposition to a whole series of others—Native Americans during the Indians wars of the 1870s and 1880s, the decadent Spaniard or the comely Cuban lass, Chinese coolies and Irish immigrants—in addition to the wage slave and the mother.27

As a result of this growing definition through opposition, the idea of American male identity began to change. Before the war, American men had viewed themselves

27 For an extended discussion of the contested nature of American citizenship, and how definitions of patriotism were debated in the post-Civil War United States, see Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary's To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. For an excellent discussion of images of the "other" in
sectionally; during the war they had gone off to fight in regiments organized by state; now, a different organizing principle was required if national unity was to be achieved. What developed in the years after the Civil War was a new definition of American identity that shifted the notion of citizenship from a regional, locational definition, to one rooted in the body, specifically the male body.

The 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, illustrates this connection. While the language of Section 1 of the Amendment grants citizenship to "All persons born or naturalized in the United States," the language of Section 2 of the 14th Amendment refers specifically to "male citizens twenty-one years of age." This language marks the first place in the Constitution where political representation and voting rights are linked to masculinity, and serves as an indication of the increasingly strong linkage between masculinity and national identity.\(^2\)

The Gilded Age code of masculinity grew as a result of a number of factors. The increasing industrialization and urbanization of the United States led to a quickening of American business life, which in turn led to the increasing absence of fathers from the home, the result of long work hours and increasingly longer commutes to rapidly developing business centers. This meant that American boys, for the first time in history, were being raised by women almost exclusively. As a result, American boys, through

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what Anthony Rotundo has called ‘boy culture,’ developed and reinforced a code of masculinity that would serve to separate them from their mothers and sisters.  

The actions which marked boy culture were activities which gave the boy and his comrades ample opportunity to prove their strength, courage and emotional self-control. Football, baseball, and other team sports; hiking, swimming, riding, rowing and general exploring which could be done singly or in small groups; and fighting, wrestling, and “many activities which set [boys] head-to-head in hostile combat.” The elements of boy culture experienced by Theodore Roosevelt and his peers laid the foundations for the new masculinity that came to the fore in the late 19th century.

The first chapter of this dissertation, therefore, focuses on Theodore Roosevelt, while the second examines a few members of his circle who helped to codify the new dominant conception of American masculinity at the beginning of the twentieth century. Roosevelt presented himself as the very example of boy culture grown up, and the chief proponent of what he described as “the Strenuous Life.” He served as a popular incarnation of the new American masculinity, and he will be considered as the ideal of what became a dominant construction of American masculinity. Roosevelt went on from boyhood to become a hero during the Spanish American War and President in 1901.

Roosevelt’s conception of masculinity was widely promoted through his own speeches, writings and actions, but it was also supported by those of many of his colleagues, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Albert Beveridge.

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30 Anthony Rotundo, "Boy Culture," in Mark Carnes and Clyde Griffen, eds., *Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America*, Chicago: Univ. of
who are discussed in the second chapter. The tenets of this masculinity became encoded in the Boy Scouts of America, in the YMCA, in the U.S. Army and other branches of the military, and in the myriad fraternal organizations that flowered during the Gilded Age, such as the Elks, Moose, Eagles, Red Men, and Odd Fellows Lodges that sought to bring American men together in manly fellowship.31

As this upper- and middle-class masculinity found a wide audience and a great number of proponents across the nation (in both the country and the city), and as the bonds of national fellowship were strengthened (through the end of Reconstruction and the end of Northern attempts to assist African Americans), views of American involvement abroad began to shift. Where Americans had earlier seen distractions, they saw opportunity; and where they had seen a corrupt, decadent Europe, they saw competitors who were already bringing vast regions of the globe under their economic and political control.32

Roosevelt, Lodge, Mahan, and others who saw the world in terms of struggle, competition, and "the strenuous life," saw this new era of global competition as an opportunity for the United States, and for American men, to prove their worth. For these

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31 On boys' groups, see David I. Macleod, Building Character in the American Boy: The Boy Scouts, YMCA, and Their Forerunners, 1870-1920, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983; on the military, see, for example, Donald J. Mrozek, "The Habit of Victory: The American Military and the Cult of Manliness", in Mangan and Walvin, eds., Manliness and Morality, pp. 220-239; see Carnes and Griffen's Meanings for Manhood, for an extensive look at fraternal societies and the conceptions of masculinity that provided their foundation, as well as Carnes's own Secret Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991.

men, the United States and American men were one and the same. They all adhered to the logic that Roosevelt had articulated in Minnesota, agreeing that since men entered the world to compete for their livelihoods, "so our nation ... must not shrink from playing its part among the great nations without." 33 The conjunction of masculinity and nation was not linked to the body, but instead the emphasis on collective national masculinity "playing its part among the great nations" makes it clear that a performance model operates here. Roosevelt again expressed it best: "No nation can achieve real greatness if its people are not both essentially moral and essentially manly; both sets of qualities are necessary." 34

By the time Roosevelt had become President in 1901, there was a broad consensus on the connection between the role the United States played in world affairs and the masculinity of American men. Roosevelt's exhortations, such as his comment that "[i]f either man or nation wishes to play a great part in the world, there must be no dallying with the life of lazy ease," 35 made perfect sense; the emphatic combination of the discourse of performance, that is "playing a part," and the need for the rejection of a life of "ease" were common. Adherents of Roosevelt's national masculinity believed that the "strenuous life" applied to nations as well as to men, with the correlation that nations that exhibited laziness rather than the strenuous performance of their masculinity, were doomed to decline and fall.

The popularity of the connection between masculinity and national identity, between “manhood and statehood” as Roosevelt put it, rested not only on its powerful unifying factor (the gender that voters had in common was masculinity, after all\textsuperscript{36}), but also on its lack of specificity. Most members of the foreign policy community might agree that the United States should “act like a man,” but within that consensus, it was very possible to disagree on what manly behavior actually was. It should be no surprise, then, that in the years following Roosevelt’s Presidency, and in particular during the 1910s, the debate concerning a manly foreign policy broke along lines that reflected divergent strands of political thought.

The following chapters trace the opposition to the Rooseveltian construction of a strenuous national masculinity. These differing approaches to domestic and international politics, expressed by individuals such as John Reed, Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Woodrow Wilson, sought to utilize the connection between masculinity and foreign policy, but in a markedly different way than Roosevelt and his colleagues. Examining the views of each of these individuals will serve to delineate the complications inherent in the use of the trope of masculinity.

The third chapter focuses on John Reed, the New York socialist who was later to achieve lasting literary fame as the author of Ten Days that Shook the World (and through the film Reds where he was played by Warren Beatty). As a socialist, Reed

\textsuperscript{36} With the exception of four states that granted women the right to vote before the 19\textsuperscript{th} Amendment passed in 1920: Wyoming, which granted women suffrage in 1890, Colorado in 1893, and Utah and Idaho in 1896. For an overview of the Women’s Suffrage Movement see Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920. New York: W. W. Norton, 1981, pp. 4-5.
believed in international solidarity and "brotherhood," and those beliefs, I argue, shaped his views of how the United States should behave on the international stage.37

Like Roosevelt, Reed was a graduate of Harvard College, and was familiar with the masculine ideals of Roosevelt's milieu. But although robust masculinity was central for Reed, his view of manliness was rooted in a rather romantic view of socialist brotherhood. Reed had become politicized through his reporting for the socialist magazine *The Masses*, and in particular through his experiences covering the labor strikes in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1913. On the basis of his success in New Jersey, Reed was sent to cover the rebellion in Mexico. In his reporting from Mexico, later collected in the book *Insurgent Mexico*, Reed laid stress on the essential manliness of the soldiers he rode with, a unit under the command of Francisco 'Pancho' Villa. These men, through their military socialist brotherhood, were the very example of democracy: fighters for the rule of the people, against the rule of corporations and large land-owners. Reed argued that the United States should fight for true democratic ideals and support other nations through socialist policies.

The U.S. should act like a man, Reed believed, but not necessarily like a Harvard man. Instead, the model for United States national masculinity should come from Pancho Villa's brotherly band. The United States should treat other nations as brothers. Reed's

37 For a good biography of Reed, though there are several, see Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. Page 150. For an interesting, though complementary view of Reed, see Mary Dearborn's Queen of Bohemia: The Life of Louise Bryant, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996, which focuses on Reed's partner Louise Bryant. Another interesting view of Reed is contained in Christine Stansell's American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000, which examines Reed in the context of his Greenwich Village associates.
view of the Mexican Revolution needs to be understood through the lens of masculine development; in Reed’s view, the struggle for Mexican independence was the same as the process by which a boy became a man. As Reed’s biographer points out, “[t]he question raised in [his writing about the unit] is central to his whole experience in Mexico; indeed it had hovered unspoken in his mind for years: how does one become a man?”

The question for Reed, therefore, and the question I examine in the chapter, is how does the U.S. act like a man in a socialist cause? Is it possible for the U.S. to act like a man, without acting out the strenuous masculinity of Roosevelt? These questions gather greater weight and currency as they are picked up and debated by other opponents of Rooseveltian masculinity.

The fourth chapter extends the analysis to Jane Addams and other women of the many groups dedicated to world peace during the years leading up to World War I. Many of the women active in the anti-war movement shaped their arguments against militarism in terms of an ideal masculinity that was very different from the prevailing model. These women hoped to use alternative conceptions of masculinity to combat the Rooseveltian emphasis on combat and struggle. By emphasizing other masculine attributes, Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, Lucia Ames Mead and others sought to instill other masculine qualities into America’s future leaders.

Because most women lacked the vote before 1920, women who wanted to affect public policies staked out political positions for themselves as “women” and “mothers,” arguing that their voices should be heard because of their gender. Consequently, they

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38 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 150.
succeeded in establishing themselves as the conscience of the nation.\textsuperscript{39} Using their combined roles of mothers and political activists, women attempted to change American militarism through directing a change in the American man, thereby redefining the nature of American manhood. By contradicting directly the notion of how a man should behave, women were challenging the powerful militaristic discourse of Theodore Roosevelt, the “muscular Christianity” of Billy Sunday, and the physical fitness regimes of Dudley Sargent (who stated that sports, particularly those which pitted man against man such as boxing and wrestling, were necessary because “they counteract the enervating tendency of the times ... and develop courage, manliness, and self-control”).\textsuperscript{40}

Many women contributed to this challenge to Roosevelt's combination of manliness and national performance. Among them was Jane Addams, a founder of Hull House in Chicago and one of the most prominent and respected women in America. Her experience with Hull House led her to the conclusion that international conflict, and the social problems she was combating in the immigrant neighborhoods of Chicago, had the same root. Both international peace and inner city harmony could be promoted by programs that stressed the essential commonalities of the human experience. Peace and understanding came as a result of education, and conflict, therefore, was the result of a childish ignorance, an ignorance that was essentially male. Education would prove to

\textsuperscript{39} There has been a lot of work done on the U.S. peace movement, and women's role within it. See, for example, Charles DeBenedetti, \textit{The Peace Reform in American History}, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1980; Marie Louise Degen, \textit{A History of the Women's Peace Party}, New York: Garland Press, 1972; and for a study that focuses specifically on WWI, see Barbara J. Steinson, \textit{American Women's Activism in World War I}, New York: Garland, 1982. for an excellent overview of the tactics, ideas, and the people, that shaped the women's suffrage movement, see Aileen Kraditor, \textit{The Ideas of the Women's Suffrage Movement}, New York: W.W. Norton, 1965.

\textsuperscript{40} See Kimmel, \textit{Manhood in America}, p. 137.
young men "that adventure is not only to be found in going forth into new lands and shooting," but can also be found in other, more beneficial activities. Once young men were aware of these alternatives, their "childish notions of power," their "boyish ideas of adventure," and their "conceptions of what pleasure and manliness and courage consist in, will fall away from them as the garments of a child are dropped off from his growing form." 41

Addams, therefore, aimed to disconnect the link between militarism and masculinity. By arguing that military conflict was a "boyish" or "childish" stage, she hoped to convince grown men who had left other childish habits behind, in the same way that they grew out of their clothes, that they should no longer resort to armed conflict as a tool of policy. Addams thereby hoped to shame men into taking the next step in development, that is, in continuing what Addams believed was the next step in the inevitable progression of humanity. In the same way that boys grow into men, Addams believed, societies grew and developed, leaving primitive behavior behind. Though war often called forth the best in people (a sense of selfless duty, national cohesion, and patriotism), these benefits could be called forth by a modern, and more civilized, equivalent of war that, instead of destroying the lives of the combatants, actually transformed American society for the better. Addams would have appreciated the logic behind a "war on poverty," and a "war on drugs," for example (even though she would undoubtedly have had problems with the way these wars have been carried out).

Similarly, Anna Howard Shaw, a prominent member of the women's suffrage movement and a respected and popular lecturer, argued that America, through its rampant militaristic culture, "was teaching the wrong idea of what constitutes manliness." Contradicting the prevailing view that males are genetically inclined to fight, Shaw argued that "nine boys out of ten fight simply because they are cowards...They don't dare not to fight." This point was made often in the years leading up to World War I. As Judith Papachristou points out, "[t]he assertion that real heroes were to be found ... in homes, and not on the battlefields, was a frequent refrain among female speakers and writers at this time."42

After the United States entered the First World War in 1917, the line of argument that attempted to separate masculinity from military performance had dangerous consequences, as a lack of military fervor came to be interpreted as a lack of patriotism. Jane Addams continued to argue against militarism, and vehemently argued against the prevailing idea of patriotism that associated pacifism with cowardice and disloyalty. As a result, Addams was pilloried in the press. Roosevelt himself joined in the attacks, writing that pacifists opposed to the War were "really most influenced by physical cowardice. They fear death, or pain, or discomfort, and like to hide their fear behind high sounding words."43 Addams and her allies found that the conjunction of strenuous masculinity and national identity was too strong to be co-opted, particularly during the War, and it was many years before her reputation as a loyal American recovered.

42 National Council of Women, Fourth Triennial Report, 1902, pp. 52-53. The quotes from Shaw, as well as the argument about her typicality, can be found in Papachristou, "American Women and Foreign Policy," p. 504.
Other attempts to challenge or alter the Rooseveltian conception of a strenuous national masculinity also failed. Chapter Five examines the position of W.E.B. Du Bois, a founder of the NAACP, and the editor of its journal, *The Crisis*. Taking Roosevelt’s construction at face value, Du Bois accepted the challenge and urged his readers to become active in the War effort, and thereby help African Americans to win what he called “the full stature of [their] manhood.”

Du Bois saw the Great War as an opportunity for African American men to prove their “manhood” in the classic Rooseveltian sense, by risking their lives in battle. Du Bois believed in the combination of manly endeavor and national identity, and he had hoped to earn a better place for African Americans in America through service in the War.

This belief grew out of a longstanding concern that Du Bois had with the intersection of masculinity, patriotism and American citizenship. In 1912, his “I Am Resolved” editorial stressed the importance of masculinity in the public sphere. Recalling some of its language, in particular “I am resolved in this New Year to play the man - to stand straight, look the world squarely in the eye,” and “I am resolved to be satisfied with no treatment which ignores my manhood and my right to be counted as one among men,” it is interesting how Du Bois’s vision of masculinity neatly parallels that of Roosevelt, in its conjunction of a personal and an international masculinity. Masculine language that equates political stances with biological stances, the multiple meanings inherent in the resolution to avoid slouching and shuffling, make clear the connection between Roosevelt’s formulation of national masculinity and Du Bois’s editorial argument.

Du Bois had seen the beginning of the First World War as an outgrowth of imperialism, the direct result of the subjugation of Africa in particular. As an African American, Du Bois had a particular interest in the condition of Africa and Africans, and the War, in his eyes, provided African Americans with the opportunity to correct a number of wrongs.

In an editorial in *The Crisis* in September 1916, Du Bois argued that “civilization has met its Waterloo.” Then, turning from Europe to look at the United States, Du Bois wrote that

The civilization by which America insists on measuring us and to which we must conform our natural tastes and inclinations is the daughter of that European civilization which is now rushing furiously to its doom ... Brothers, the war has shown us the cruelty of the civilization of the West. History has taught us the futility of the civilization of the East. Let ours be the civilization of no man, but of all men. This is the truth that sets us free.46

Du Bois believed that through participation in the war, Americans, and African Americans in particular, would strike a blow at the heart of the imperial system; by fighting for Wilson’s 14 Points, in particular the right to self determination, American soldiers would be fighting to free the colonized of the world from their European yokes of oppression.

Even more important, though, was the opportunity that the war provided for African Americans at home. By signing up and fighting in France, Du Bois believed, African Americans would earn the respect of the nation, and finally reach what he called

“the full stature of our manhood.” Du Bois articulated this combination of victory over imperialism abroad with victory over Jim Crow at home as a “double victory.” It is ironic, though, that his belief in the necessity of African American participation in WWI led to involvement in a segregated Army led by a racist and actively segregationist president.

It is clear that Du Bois believed rather too strongly in the Rooseveltian conception of masculinity. Though he turned the constructed link between “manhood and statehood” on its head by arguing that African American men could achieve citizenship through a model that was predicated on the exclusion of women and any one of color, he was unable to make it work. During the Great War, African American men served predominantly in service units, cooking, cleaning, transporting other troops, and performing other non-combat roles. Though those African American units that saw combat did frequently demonstrate exceptional valor, it was not enough. The net result was an increasing bitterness, and an increase in racial tensions when African American soldiers returned home after the war, and were denied the respect that they so richly deserved.

The final chapter turns to Woodrow Wilson, and examines how his older model of masculinity played out in the post-Roosevelt world. This study examines Woodrow

47 Perhaps the best example of African American valor in the First World War is the 369th Infantry, the “Harlem Hellfighters,” which earned 11 citations for bravery. The unit is also credited with introducing jazz to Europe; their regimental band, under the direction of James Reese Europe, became famous for their jazz and ragtime inflected versions of military band music. For more on the 369th, see Bill Harris, The Hellfighters of Harlem, New York: Carrol and Graf, 2002; for their musical influence, see Glenn
Wilson in light of nineteenth-century constructions of masculinity that shaped his own understandings, as well as later Gilded Age ideals. Wilson, who was to become President in 1913, embraced the early nineteenth century masculinity of the minister and the professor, a masculine role that had been provided by his family background. Wilson was born in Virginia in 1856, the son, grandson, and nephew of prominent Presbyterian ministers. At the same time, Wilson was also very close to his mother, and in later years he even described himself as somewhat of a “mamma’s boy.” In a letter to his wife, Ellen Axson Wilson in 1888, Wilson wrote “I remember how I clung to her (a laughed at ‘mamma’s boy’) till I was a great big fellow: but love of the best womanhood came to me and entered my heart through those apron strings.” Still later, while he was President, Wilson stated that “I seem to feel still the touch of her hand, and the sweet steadying influence of her wonderful character. I thank God to have had such a mother!”

Wilson identified with both his mother and his father, and this double identification was not problematic in the context of his own mid nineteenth-century concepts of masculinity. Through his emulation of his ministerial father (the embodiment of the masculine ideal of the previous generation), Wilson maintained his allegiance to the older masculine model, despite the critique of ministerial manliness made by men such as Theodore Roosevelt, Ernest Seton, Daniel Carter Beard and other advocates of the strenuous life. When Sigmund Freud wrote of Wilson that, “his


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masculinity was feeble," Freud was relying on twentieth-century understandings of the masculine, and ignoring Wilson’s historical and cultural position.

I argue that Wilson’s foreign policy model bears the hallmarks of an older masculinity; Wilson’s penchant for constitutions, for collective action, idealistic foreign policy statements, and finally the League of Nations are the result of a belief in a code of manly behavior that was rooted in his belief in the minister as an ideal man. Despite the popularity of many of his ideas, including the League of Nations, Wilson was never able to muster enough support for them because they ran counter to the masculine ethos of independent action championed by Roosevelt and Lodge.

The final chapter expands on this argument by examining developments in the construction of masculinity and their effects on foreign policy. Wilson’s foreign policy ideas, as I trace in detail in the chapter, were marked by the older model of ministerial masculinity, which resulted in a somewhat stunning combination of righteousness and condescension. As a result of what he himself called his “missionary diplomacy,” Wilson was quick to intervene in Latin America, perhaps most prominently in Mexico, when he saw the Mexican upheavals in the 1910s as a threat to American interests. It may seem odd that a sanctimonious parson like Wilson was an active interventionist, but the interventions in Latin America were entirely consistent with his model of masculine

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50 Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study*, New York: Avon Books, 1967. Page 97. Freud himself, of course, had a frame of reference rooted in the Victorian era, and his psychological theories are built upon a dated notion of sexuality; it is true, however, that in the context of those times, that Wilson was out of step, and that the manliness he projected was of a different nature than that of Roosevelt.
endeavor. As Wilson stated at the time, "every nation needs to be drawn into the tutelage of America."\textsuperscript{51}

This attitude can be seen most clearly in what Wilson considered his greatest foreign policy achievement, the Versailles Peace Treaty, with its League of Nations Covenant. The chapter focuses on close readings of the arguments that Wilson made in his swing through the western part of the United States, the exhausting trip that all but killed him. Wilson's discourse, I argue, explicitly counters Rooseveltian masculinity with a clearly stated and defined model of American manhood that replaces armed conflict with the rule of law. There is no "girding of loins" for Wilson, no desire to smite down the wrong and battle for the right. Instead, Wilson proposes to replace the "physical force" of the Rough Rider, with the masculine "moral force" of the minister and the upright law abiding citizen.\textsuperscript{52}

Wilson, then, like Du Bois, Reed, Addams, and others, sought to work within the dominant trope of national masculinity established by Theodore Roosevelt and his circle, but the net result was not a transformation of the dynamic, but a strengthening of its primary characteristics. By accepting the definition of foreign policy as the performance


\textsuperscript{52} The "physical force" vs. "moral force" argument was made in a speech at the Coliseum, in Sioux Falls, SD, on September 8, 1919. Somewhat contradictorily, he goes on to point out that despite the "barbarous" nature of guns, no-one ever hangs a ledger or a yardstick or a spade over the mantle "because they do not represent self-sacrifice. They do not glorify you." Wilson would rather have men who sacrifice themselves in a manly fashion (ie with a musket in hand) than men who are only interested in making a profit for themselves. His masculine model is not that different from Roosevelt's, in other words, though it plays out in very different ways. The speech is in \textit{Addresses of}
of national masculinity, these diverse leaders of American society at the turn of the previous century found themselves arguing against the popular model of masculinity as defined by Roosevelt and his comrades and limited in their options for an alternative model for American foreign relations.

It was finally the carnage of World War One that appeared to doom the Gilded Age conception of manliness. Out of a longing for the glory that their fathers’ generation had won in the Civil War, the men of Theodore Roosevelt’s generation had admired the military virtues, equated those virtues with ideal manliness, and looked upon those veterans of the Blue and Grey as examplars of American masculinity. Roosevelt himself had taken to the field in 1898 in an attempt “to live up to [his] preaching”; the Spanish-American War, however, served as the demarcation between the old and the new modes of war. While Roosevelt’s “charge” in 1898 was certainly a courageous and dangerous act, that kind of military adventurism was not possible in the fields of Flanders. There, amongst the trenches, tanks, poison gas and wholesale slaughter, the discourse of masculinity that had seemed universally true for so many years began to be seen as a dangerous myth that was used to lure young men to their deaths.

For the individuals upon whom I have focused, the Great War brought great changes as well. Theodore Roosevelt, the aging imperialist, suffered from a depression brought about by the death of his son, Quentin, who was shot down over the German lines shortly before the end of the war. Roosevelt’s friend and biographer, Herman

President Wilson, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919; the quotes are on pp. 88-89.

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Hagedorn, observed of TR that with the death of Quentin, “the boy in him had died.”\textsuperscript{53} His own death, in January of 1919, followed not too long after.

Aware of the major upheavals happening in the fall of 1917, John Reed went to Russia to cover the Russian Revolution. Reed spent the last months of his life urging the rest of the world to “unite with the Russian workers and peasants who overthrew their capitalists,” though he had become increasingly disillusioned by the political machinations of the Comintern. Reed eventually died in Russia in 1920, unable to bring about his vision of international brotherhood.

W.E.B. Du Bois did not see his vision become reality either. The African American soldiers that Du Bois had encouraged to enlist returned from France, filled with pride and confidence, only to face a Jim Crow nation that was not interested in extending them their “full manhood rights.” In fact, the race riots that occurred during the summer of 1919 are some of the worst on record, as African Americans, intent on claiming their rightful position in American society, clashed with whites intent on denying them equal status. Du Bois realized then that citizenship for blacks could not be achieved through a system invented by whites, and his disillusion with white America was complete. Du Bois proceeded to lay the groundwork for what became the civil rights movement, as his determination to take the prize that had been won in France in 1918 embraced a different tactic.

Woodrow Wilson worked himself to exhaustion in an attempt to get the American people, as well as Congress, to accept his brainchild, the Versailles Peace Treaty and the

League of Nations covenant. The League was eventually rejected, and Wilson along with it. The stroke that he suffered in October of 1919 paralyzed Wilson physically, but it was the rejection of the League in March of 1920 that really hurt. Wilson died in 1924 without having recovered spiritually or physically.

For Jane Addams and the women of the various Peace movements opposed to the Great War, there was a happier ending. Women finally gained the vote in 1920, in large measure because they were able to define themselves as representatives of a moral force that would improve the United States. Women did not get the vote because they were perceived to be the same as men; they won the vote because of their “essential” gender difference, through a political femininity that they had proved in part in their opposition to the war, by their patriotic work during the conflict, and through their focus on domestic and social issues.

The social and political changes wrought by the Great War changed the United States greatly. But while much of the most explicit masculine rhetoric slipped from view or moderated, the values that were expressed by that discourse did not. They were perpetuated domestically by Gilded Age institutions such as the American Legion, the Boy Scouts, most fraternal organizations, and by men’s sports such as (American) football and baseball.54

On the global stage, fundamental foreign policy principles such as Roosevelt’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, and Wilson’s use of force in the Caribbean and

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54 For a discussion of the survival of the discourse of masculinity, and its cultivation by the American Legion, see David M. Kennedy’s Over Here: The First World War and American Society. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); pp. 217-218, for example, discusses Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.’s role in the Legion’s creation.
Central America, remain in place. Furthermore, the United States’ reliance on the unilateral use of force, and its related abhorrence of arbitration, negotiation and collective action, has its roots in Gilded Age notions of how men, and nations, should behave. But before we discuss the legacies of the combination of masculinity, foreign policy and manly behavior, we need to begin with the construction and development of the powerful need to “play the man.”
CHAPTER I

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
RECREATION OF AMERICAN MANHOOD

Theodore Roosevelt is an obvious choice for any examination of manliness at the
turn of the twentieth century. Roosevelt played many cultural roles: wealthy easterner,
Dakota rancher, state representative, big game hunter, governor, dashing combat soldier,
Washington bureaucrat, and President of the United States. Not only did he lead an
active life, but he led that life within a larger, self-created ideal of what a man's life
should be; he played an active role in the creation of his own legend. The events which
Teddy Roosevelt are most frequently associated with, the Spanish-American War and the
acquisition of the Panama Canal, have become the stuff of legend and popular
misperception; "the charge up San Juan Hill," for example, made famous by The Rough
Riders, his story of the Spanish-American War, was neither a charge nor on San Juan
Hill. In spite of this, these actions became famous because they were rooted in manly
action; as a result of this manly action TR became an ideal male figure for generations of

American boys. Needless to say, these influential actions grew directly out of Roosevelt's own conceptions of American manliness.

Roosevelt's book *The Rough Riders* (retitled famously, and perhaps not inaccurately, as "Alone in Cubia" by Finlay Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley" ²) was not unique in its promotion of American manly virtues. Roosevelt's writings are peppered with references to manliness, manly virtues and American ideals; he actively and publicly urged the promotion of American manliness. "American Ideals" (1895), "True Americanism" (1894), "The American Boy" (1900), "Manhood and Statehood" (1901), "Brotherhood and the Heroic Virtues" (1901), and "The Manly Virtues and Practical Politics" (1894), all stress the combination of specific attributes and attitudes which together lay the foundation for an ideal American citizen. These qualities, with their mental, physical and spiritual aspects, can be, and should be, taught, Roosevelt argues, for their propagation is of vital concern to the United States.

Roosevelt claimed in his *Autobiography* that the manly lessons he learned as a boy taught me much more than any of my text books ... a teaching in which I now believe as sincerely as ever, for all the laws that the wit of man can devise will never make a man a worthy citizen unless he has within himself the right stuff, unless he has self-reliance, energy, courage, the power of insisting on his own rights and the sympathy that makes him regardful of the rights of others.³

This chapter takes that statement seriously, and examines the education of Theodore Roosevelt in an attempt to come to an understanding of what shaped his conception of

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masculinity, and how he came to believe in a code of manly conduct that broke with the masculinity of the previous generation.

Roosevelt's vision of American manliness was new for its time, one that developed from his own unique experiences, and which was intentionally constructed. Roosevelt's masculinity, shaped by experience and refined through the repeated telling of his story, was representative of a new approach to boyhood that sought to preserve the boisterousness of 'boy culture' and apply it to the modern world. Unlike Woodrow Wilson, who sought continuity with his father's ideal of masculinity, Roosevelt sought to move beyond his father's ideal of masculinity and create a new model of manly behavior, that of the "strenuous life." Roosevelt applied this new masculine model to the realm of foreign policy, and he created a precedent that had serious implications for American foreign policy.

Roosevelt's construction of masculinity was incredibly powerful; as John Milton Cooper has pointed out, "by the time he became President in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt had already begun to enjoy the legend of the most famous childhood in American history." It was a famous childhood; it became the stuff of legend because it was repeated over and over again in speeches, in books, and in stories, and was consciously shaped through retelling and rewriting so as to serve as a model for a new type of masculinity.

An examination of Roosevelt's early experiences reveals a childhood that was very different from that of his contemporaries. His personal experiences in boyhood adventures, travel, struggles with disease and, last and perhaps least, traditional scholastics, all gave Roosevelt a varied and extensive pool of experiences which contributed to the creation of a new system of manly values. This conception of how men should act was firmly in place before he went to Harvard in 1876. By looking at his

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boyhood and his education, then, we can see what created the man that shaped the new standard for American manliness.

In his essay "The American Boy," Theodore Roosevelt wrote

we have a right to expect of the American boy ... that he shall turn out to be a good American man. Now, the chances are strong that he won't be much of a man unless he is a good deal of a boy. He must not be a coward or a weakling, a bully, a shirk, or a prig. He must work hard and play hard. He must be clean-minded and clean-lived, and able to handle his own under all circumstances and against all comers. It is only on these conditions that he will grow into the kind of American man of whom America can really be proud. 5

Roosevelt explicitly linked boyhood, manliness, and American ideals. This powerful combination is what Roosevelt believed was essential to the formation of the character of the American man. What brings about the transformation of males from callow youth to the kind of man "of whom America can really be proud" is education.

The inculcation of American and masculine values, Roosevelt argued, must occur in the classroom and on the playing fields if the boy's education is going to help him and his nation in the larger adult world. Roosevelt's belief in the importance of an education that would prepare boys to become American men grew out of personal experience. His poor health, which led to his removal from the schoolroom, and effectively led to his immersion in what one historian calls 'boy culture,' profoundly shaped Roosevelt's conception of manly behavior, and hence his view of the world.

Roosevelt was born into a wealthy New York family, the second child and eldest son of Theodore and Martha Roosevelt. Roosevelt's mother, a 'Southern Belle' if ever there was one, was renowned for her beauty, her wit, and the fact that she wore only white muslin. Actively involved in her children's lives, 'Mittie' contributed greatly to the warmth and conviviality of the Roosevelt home. Teddy's father managed to combine

great wealth and a sincere and active concern for the poor and less fortunate, concentrating his efforts on helping children. The founder of the Children's Aid Society, Roosevelt Senior would spend Sundays "teaching in mission schools, distributing tracts, and interviewing wayward children. Long after dark he would come after dinner at some such institution as the Newsboys' Lodging House, or Mrs. Sattery's Night School for Little Italians."6

By the time young Teddy Roosevelt developed asthma, his father knew enough about sickly children to know that he must play an active role in his welfare. Theodore Senior closely monitored his children's health, whisking them away to healthier climes if the need arose. He was also tender and gentle, and provided a great deal of physical and emotional contact with his children. As TR recalls in his Autobiography, "I was a sickly, delicate boy, suffered much from asthma, and frequently had to be taken away on trips to find a place where I could breathe. One of my memories is of my father walking up and down the room with me in his arms at night when I was a very small person, and of sitting up in bed gasping, with my father and mother trying to help me."7

Teddy's asthma was problematic, and frequently very severe. Consequently, Teddy suffered a lack of organized schooling and was taken on frequent trips abroad. Accordingly, TR was educated by tutors and through direct experience. The diaries that he kept on his travels reflect the experiences that taught him as much as his tutors did; they detail the growth of a sickly young boy who was observant, curious, and fascinated by the natural world. Roosevelt's biographer points out that the diaries show us a boy much like the man he would become: "[t]he spelling, in these cheap, battered notebooks, is that of a child, but the density of remembered detail would be extraordinary even in an

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adult. Some entries read like miniature museum catalogs. Evidently the [sights] awakened his faculty of near-total recall."

The Roosevelt family's travels to Europe and the Nile were occasions that not only helped Teddy's asthma; they also took Teddy away from his tutors. On the long trips Teddy and his siblings would be tutored by their aunt, Bamie, but this was not quite the same - though she did her best, the young Roosevelt proved a quick learner, reapidly outpacing his aunt's ability to teach him. When they did return home, Theodore's education by tutors was erratic at best, being dependent on the state of his health.

The use of tutors for Teddy's education, though born of necessity, was becoming rarer than it had been in the past. E. Digby Baltzell, in Philadelphia Gentlemen, explains that tutorial education at home, while the norm for sons of the wealthy for many years, was becoming increasingly uncommon as the United States entered the last half of the nineteenth century. The spread of American wealth, and the transformation of American society, led increasing numbers of families to educate their sons at schools such as Groton, Phillips Exeter and St. Paul's, where they were taught Latin, Greek, History and Literature, and made lasting friendships in the dormitories and on the playing fields. Indeed, it was at this time that the idea that a prep school education could determine one's future life became cemented among the upper classes; boarding school connections became increasingly important to members of the social Register and the stewards of the more exclusive club membership rolls.

As more and more social stresses were brought to bear on family through industrialization, the growth of the urban (and suburban) environment, and a more frenetic pace of life, family relationships began to shift, and increasingly, boarding

8 Morris, Rise of TR, p. 50.
schools began to supply a stable family relationship (the idea of the school being *in loco parentis*). Accordingly, school headmasters would frequently stress their married status as a selling point to wealthy parents.\footnote{See Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen*, pp. 296-312.} Baltzell confirms that "the importance of a private school education varies directly with the decline of the strength of the family."\footnote{Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen*, page 294.}

Teddy Roosevelt did not attend a boarding school; because of his health, he did not attend any school at all. Furthermore, Teddy was surrounded by a close and loving family, one which gave him all the support he needed to deal with his asthma and, eventually, to overcome it. The reason to consider the role of the boarding school, or private schools in general, was because of their socializing effect on boys. The role of the boarding school was to prepare boys for college, and to prepare them to be men; this was done was by separating them from their families and, having separated them from their roles within their families, seeking to make them self-reliant. In this way, boarding schools effectively marked the beginning of manhood for many of the sons of America's elite, and it is in this regard that Teddy's lack of a private school education is interesting; unlike the majority of his fellow Harvard students, for example, Roosevelt had not entered manhood in that fashion. He had not made prep school social connections, nor had he distanced himself from his family.

The effect of Roosevelt's family on his development as a boy and a man was great. His father supported him, emotionally and financially, in his drive to improve his health and his physique, encouraging him and purchasing enough equipment to fill a small gymnasium. His father's encouragement, as well as his brother's and cousin's participation, led to the creation of a "Roosevelt Museum of Natural History," where hundreds of animal specimens were identified, stuffed, examined and stored. Brothers and cousins also joined in outdoor adventures such as mock battles, hiking, fishing, hunting and canoe trips, as well as the family trips to Europe and the Middle East.
Though private day and boarding schools were becoming more and more prevalent, and though their social importance was increasing, Teddy Roosevelt did not lose out by not attending an exclusive boarding school. Far from it, argues E. Anthony Rotundo, an historian of manliness and masculinity, and himself a teacher at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. Rotundo argues that prior to the institutionalization of education, with its age-defined hierarchies and grades, boys developed a culture of their own through activities such as outdoor play, team sports and other collective actions.

The historical roots of the 'boy culture' of the late nineteenth century can be found in the "emergence of a commercial society and a middle class culture," Rotundo writes, which resulted in a shift in the interpersonal dynamics of the home. Women, who took on more of the responsibilities of child-rearing as their husbands worked farther from home, came to have a closer relationship with their sons than did their fathers. Simultaneously, "middle-class men, whether urban or rural, became more isolated from their sons both physically and emotionally." 13

As Rotundo explains, "this was a peculiar combination of influences. A boy grew up in one social world that contrasted sharply with the world he would inhabit as an adult. He was raised by a woman to become a man. He lived in an environment of restraint and interdependence, but he was bound for a world of independence and aggression. Some kind of social space - intermediate between the women's world of boyhood and the men's world of manhood - was perhaps inevitable." 14

It is undeniable that Teddy moved in a 'boy culture.' His seemingly endless energy, his love of the outdoors and of physical activity, made him a perfect leader for

14 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," pp. 33-34.
childhood adventures. A biographer of Roosevelt has pointed out that "[d]espite his frail
physique and asthma, he seemed to have an inexhaustable fund of nervous energy. This,
combined with the ability to improvise countless stories about his environment, caused
him to be accepted as an unquestioned leader by [his sister] Corinne and [his brother]
Elliott, and such family friends as came to stay."\textsuperscript{15}

The actions that marked 'boy culture ' were activities that gave the boy and his
comrades ample opportunity to prove their strength, courage and emotional self-control.
Football, baseball, and other team sports; hiking, swimming, riding, rowing and general
exploring which could be done singly or in small groups; and fighting, wrestling, and any
other activities which set the boys against each other in competition or combat. All of
these were activities in which young Teddy loved to lose himself.

Boxing in particular came to play an important part in Teddy's personal
development. On a vacation trip to Moosehead Lake in Maine, Roosevelt was teased by
some boys. Describing the event many years later, it is clear that Roosevelt was still
haunted by the experience.

"They found that I was a foreordained and predestined victim, and industriously
proceeded to make life miserable for me. The worst feature was that when I
finally tried to fight them I discovered that either one singly could not only handle
me with easy contempt, but handle me so as not to hurt me much and yet prevent
my doing any damage whatever in return."\textsuperscript{16}

Having learned a bitter lesson, Roosevelt resolved to do something about it: "[t]he
experience taught me what probably no amount of good advice could have taught me ...
having become quickly and bitterly conscious that I did not have the natural prowess to
hold my own, I decided that I would try to supply its place by training. Accordingly,
with my father's hearty approval, I started to learn to box."\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Morris, Rise of TR. pp. 45-46. See also Miller, TR: A Life, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{16} Roosevelt, An Autobiography, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{17} ibid., p. 28.
Boxing and physical fitness became ingrained in young Teddy's daily life, and, indeed, in his personal character. The two pursuits, though frequently difficult, and often boring, combined to finally dispel the asthma that had plagued him. As his sister Corinne wrote years later, "[f]or many years, one of my most vivid recollections is seeing him between horizontal bars, widening his chest by regular, monotonous motion - drudgery indeed."18 Roosevelt would continue to box his whole life, even sparring with a partner while in the White House. This habit, with its man-to-man, confrontational overtones, is rooted in the 'boy culture' to which Roosevelt belonged. The desire to prove himself in the ring became both a reality and a metaphor; when he declared himself a candidate for President in 1912, Roosevelt crowed "My hat is in the ring!" Though rooted in the wish to stand up to those two boys in Maine, Teddy's development made boxing central to his physical and mental life.

The struggle against asthma, and his effort to make himself as strong as other boys his age, later took on the aspect of myth. Roosevelt "made his struggle against poor health into the equivalent of [Abraham] Lincoln's rise from poverty. The metamorphosis from sickly, scrawny boy into masterful man became a lifelong model and standard of measurement of men, social groups, and nations."19 Roosevelt's boyhood experiences became intertwined with the actions of the adult man, in addition to becoming an experience that would later be enshrined as the model to follow for boys who wanted to become American men.

In addition to boxing and wrestling, playing at war was a frequent pastime, with re-enactments of the Indians Wars a constant. As Rotundo points out “The most popular imitation of war was the struggle between settlers and Indians. Boys even relished the role of the Indian - assumed by them all to be the more barbarous and aggressive ...

19 Miller, TR: A Life, p. 48.
Settler-and-Indian games allowed boys to enter and imagine roles that were played by real adult males. 

"Real adult males" in the late nineteenth century, of course, were involved in conflicts with Native Americans. Little Big Horn was in 1876; the massacre at Wounded Knee occurred in late 1890. Teddy himself was not immune to playing at being an Indian or being a cowboy; as an adult, he spent a great deal of time in the west, part of it as a "ranchman" on a ranch he owned in the Dakota badlands, and he came to identify himself as much as a westerner as an easterner. His western experiences led him to feel a kinship with those Americans who had lived on the frontier earlier. As he wrote in the preface to his four-volume *Winning of the West*, "[t]he men who have shared in the fast vanishing frontier life of the present feel a peculiar sympathy with the already long-vanished frontier life of the past."

Roosevelt's relationship with the west was not unique; Americans were proud of the West, and felt it to be representative of their national culture. More specifically, they believed that American culture was shaped by the Anglo-European frontier experience. Indeed, as Roosevelt's close friend Frederick Jackson Turner wrote, "the wilderness masters the colonist ... It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin." In an interesting confirmation of Turner's thesis, TR had moccasins and a full hunting suit made out of deerskin in the traditional cowboy/Indian manner; as he told the *New York Tribune* in 1884, when he was 26, "It would electrify some of my friends ... if they could see me galloping over the plains, day in and day out, clad in a buckskin shirt..." 

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20 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," p. 18. 
Roosevelt's western experience was clearly linked to his experience as a boy. Indeed, his interest in, and desire to go out west was rooted in the knowledge that his father sent newsboys (from the Newsboy's Lodging House) out west to work on ranches in order to improve their health and get them away from the insalubrious city. After the death of his first wife, Roosevelt also escaped from the unhealthy East (which had just claimed the life of his mother as well), and proceeded to remake himself on a western ranch.24

While out west, Roosevelt continued to transform himself into the man he believed he needed to be, and to act the way he believed men should behave. A good example is a famous fight he had one night in a saloon, a fight that has since been enshrined in countless movies and western novels. Out late after lost horses, Roosevelt stopped in a saloon to get out of the wind. A cowboy, with pistols in each hand, was firing random shots in the bar, aimed primarily at the clock. "But," as Teddy writes, "there was nowhere else to go, and it was a cold night."

As soon as he saw me he hailed me as 'Four Eyes,' in reference to my spectacles, and said 'Four Eyes is going to treat.' I joined in the laugh and got behind the stove and sat down, thinking to escape notice. He followed me, however, and though I tried to pass it off as a jest this merely made him more offensive, and he stood leaning over me, a gun in each hand, using very foul language ... In response to his reiterated command that I should set up the drinks, I said 'Well, if I've got to, I've got to,' and rose, looking past him. As I rose, I struck quick and hard with my right just to one side of the point of his jaw, hitting with my left as I straightened out, and then again with my right... When he went down he struck the corner of the bar with his head ... he was senseless. I took away his guns, and the other people in the room ... hustled him out and put him in the shed. 25

Other sources testify to the veracity of Roosevelt's account26; otherwise, this story would be hard to believe. At the same time, though, the tale clearly illustrates how

24 See Miller, TR: A Life, pp. 41, and 162-182, as well as Morris, Rise of TR, pp. 34.  
26 See Morris, Rise of TR, pp. 283-284 and p. 790, notes 64 and 65. Morris uncovered independent corroboration of the story in an unpublished
Roosevelt altered his character to conform to a specific ideal of masculinity. The combination of boxing, which Roosevelt learned in response to the tauntings of boys from Maine, and the manly aura of the cowboy which marked his western transformation, illustrate how the values of 'boy culture' shaped the adult TR.

Another crucial part of Roosevelt's relationship with the West, as well as a central part of 'boy culture,' is the fascination with hunting. Roosevelt had an abiding interest in natural history; he also had an inordinate fondness for killing animals. The roots of this extend all the way back to his childhood; the "Roosevelt Museum of Natural History," created while Theodore and his siblings were young, was the result of an attempt to master the natural world. Boys like Teddy "who hunted in order to enlarge their animal collections were learning to subordinate nature to their own acquisitive impulses. These collections, common among Victorian boys, served the habit of mastery in still another way. For when a boy named and classified the animals he killed, he was learning to make nature serve the cause of science."27

In fact, at the time Roosevelt started at Harvard, he had determined that he wanted to be a scientist, concentrating primarily on natural history; the "Roosevelt Museum" had become much more than just a pastime. In fact Roosevelt's interest had become so serious, so adult, that his collection numbered in the hundreds, and his biographer writes that

[even] even in these early years, his knowledge of natural history was abnormal ... it was supplemented, every summer, by long hours of observation of the flora and fauna around him. The other children noticed that their leader "also led a life apart from us, seriously studying birds, their habits and their notes."28

autobiography by W. Roy Hoffman in the collections of the Theodore Roosevelt Birthplace. Hoffman was living in the town of Mingusville, now Wibaux, Montana at the time.

28 Morris, Rise of TR, p. 46.
The shift from natural history as amusement to a possible profession was an indication of Roosevelt's growing maturity, and of the fact that he was leaving boyhood behind. By his late teens, Roosevelt had become increasingly focused on the life that lay beyond boyhood, and was prepared for his Harvard entrance exams by a private tutor. Arthur Hamilton Cutler, himself a recent Harvard grad, liked "the alert, vigorous character of young Roosevelt's mind...[t]he young man never seemed to know what idleness was ... every leisure moment would find the last novel, some English classic, or some abstruse book on Natural History in his hand."29

The studying, an intense endeavor that prepared Teddy for examination in eight subjects, naturally cut into the adventures that he and his siblings, cousins and friends would have. This was also part of "boy culture." "The cares and commitments of manhood now loomed up before teenage boys. And at first sight, boys approached manhood eagerly, they were suddenly eager to leave behind them the separate world that they had guarded so jealously."30

It is clear that there was an awareness on the part of Roosevelt that 'boy culture' was evanescent, and that manhood awaited. As Rotundo points out, "boy culture - as viewed in a certain way - provided a course of training for manhood. It aped many activities of adult men, it taught aggressive, self-reliant qualities needed for men's work, and it helped to provide experience at making constant transitions between the gentle restraint of home and the competitive exertions of the all-male world outside."31 This is a clear echo of the argument that Roosevelt made in "The American Boy" – that boyhood activities "taught me much more than any of my text books," and taught him what it meant to be a man.

30 Rotundo, "Boy Culture," p. 31.
In Roosevelt's case this was true quite literally - Roosevelt did not have an education like that of Woodrow Wilson, an education in school that was based on the textbook. Roosevelt mentions the textbook and school experience, however, because he knew that for most young men what finally brought about an end to 'boy culture' was the school. When Roosevelt describes his conception of what the American boy should be, and how the American boy should behave, he is describing his own unique experience to young men who had a completely different relationship to school and to education.

The prescriptions that Teddy Roosevelt makes at the beginning of "The American Boy," then, can be seen as the result of Roosevelt's own experiences - the enduring legacy of what E. Anthony Rotundo has labeled 'boy culture.' His play with brothers, sisters and cousins, his physical struggle and final victory over asthma, as well as the combination of private tutorials and extensive travel combined to give him an education he was eager to have other boys share. In the same way that he combined the wildness of the west with the refinement of the east in his later political life, in his youth and education Theodore Roosevelt was able to maintain the rugged collectivist attributes of 'boy culture' while climbing the "age-graded ladder of ascent." In this combination, the boy and the man, we see the genesis of Theodore Roosevelt.
"To Stand Up Manfully:" Roosevelt And The Monroe Doctrine

The boyhood of Theodore Roosevelt would be of marginal interest if he had not gone on to become a war hero and President of the United States; while interesting, his experiences would have served merely as a slightly anomalous case of late-nineteenth century childhood, a variation on the theme of classic American boyhood.

But Roosevelt did go on to serve as President, and accordingly his boyhood has been scrutinized for information that can shed light on the formation of his policies, both foreign and domestic. Roosevelt is probably most famous for his actions in Cuba during the Spanish American War of 1898, and for his larger-than-life role as politician and President after the "splendid little war" ended. Before he became a household name, however, Roosevelt was equally interested in politics, and passionate about the foreign relations of the United States. Roosevelt understood both politics and foreign affairs in terms of the code of manly behavior that he had developed as a boy; in fact, this ethic of manliness extended beyond the personal for Roosevelt. He believed that nations were like individuals, in their behavior and in their relationships, and should be held accountable for their actions in the same way that men were.

This relationship between the personal and the national, between foreign policy and manly behavior can be seen clearly in his writings on foreign policy, which draw on the same rhetoric of manliness as the essays listed at the beginning of this chapter. Plentiful examples of Roosevelt’s manly policies towards foreign countries can be seen in his arguments about how the US should deal with the nations of the Caribbean. Furthermore, an examination of TR’s Caribbean policies show the lasting impact that
Roosevelt’s use of national masculinity to shape attitudes toward foreign policy have had on American foreign relations.

Roosevelt’s approach to the Monroe Doctrine most clearly illustrates his intersection of masculine performance and foreign policy. Roosevelt’s interest in the Monroe Doctrine as a functional late-nineteenth foreign policy instrument dated back to 1895, when Roosevelt was in the beginning of his term as Police Commissioner of New York City. Roosevelt had taken the position after serving nearly six years as Civil Service Commissioner for the Harrison and Cleveland administrations. During his tenure in Washington, Roosevelt had earned the reputation of a hardworking, honest and capable Commissioner who would do whatever it took to end government graft.32

On December 17, 1895 President Grover Cleveland delivered “a message that ranks as one of the greatest bombshells ever tossed into the halls Congress.”33 Infuriated by British smugness and intransigence regarding a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, Cleveland insisted on the American right to get involved in the dispute, citing the Monroe Doctrine as his authority. In a message sent to the British government on July 20, 1895, Cleveland’s Secretary of State Richard Olney had stated that British refusal to arbitrate the dispute was the same as holding territory illegally and by force, which should be “regarded as amounting, in substance, to an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan Territory.”34 Cleveland had himself insisted on highlighting the

32 For a detailed description of this period, see Morris, The Rise of TR, pp. 395-479; See also Miller, TR: A Life, pp. 203-227.
Monroe Doctrine, in order to have a justification to take to the electorate should a war result and had, prior to its dispatch, copy-edited Olney's message.\(^{35}\)

The British response arrived on December 7, and outraged Cleveland. With an arrogant tone, British Prime Minister Salisbury denied the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, denied its legal standing in international law, and rejected the American demand for arbitration.\(^{36}\) Ten days later, an angry Cleveland sent to Congress a request for authorization to compose his own boundary commission, for America needed "to resist by every means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela."\(^{37}\)

Cleveland's bombshell had immediate repercussions; one of the immediate consequences was a sympathetic explosion of bellicose patriotism from Theodore Roosevelt. Three days after Cleveland's message, TR wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge that

I am very much pleased with the President's or rather with Olney's message; I think the immense majority of our people will back him. I earnestly hope he will receive full support from both houses of Congress ... I do hope there will not be any back down among our people. Let the fight come if it must; I don't care whether our seacoast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.\(^{38}\)

\(^{35}\) Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New*, p. 110.

\(^{36}\) Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New*, p. 111.

\(^{37}\) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, p. 545.

Roosevelt also wrote to his brother-in-law, William Sheffield Cowles, a Captain in the U.S. Navy, who at the time was a naval attaché at the American embassy in London.

We are much interested in the outcome of the Venezuelan matter. I earnestly hope our government do’n’t back down. If there is a muss I shall try to have a hand in it myself! They’ll have to employ a lot of men just as green as I am even for the conquest of Canada; our regular army is’n’t big enough. It seems to me that if England were wise she would fight now; we could’n’t get at Canada until May, and meanwhile she could play havoc with our coast cities and shipping.39

Clearly, Roosevelt’s first analysis of the situation was that it was one that could provoke a war; his immediate response, imperialist that he was, was to try and take Canada. His letter to Cowles is interesting to read, for it was written by Roosevelt, in America, to an American in England. The use of the word “we,” for instance, probably refers to Americans in general, or to the United States. That “we” includes Roosevelt is certain - the thirty-seven year old Roosevelt’s discussion of joining the fray himself is indicative of his enthusiasm for a possible conflict, and foreshadows his own service in the Spanish-American War three years later.

Roosevelt was moved to write to Cowles to thank him for the gift of four volumes by Richard Hakluyt; interestingly enough, Hakluyt, who lived from 1551 to 1616, was the author of The Principal Navigations of the English Nation, a book that was “often enough found to be on private bookshelves years ago when England thought of herself as imperial.”40 The book has a section on the discovery of Guiana, by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1595, three hundred years before the current imbroglio. Roosevelt could have had the

book in mind when he wrote, in both letters, of the British Navy’s presence off the coast of America.

Though Roosevelt’s first response was an immediate and bellicose patriotism, his reaction reflected underlying beliefs that he expressed often, namely the importance of masculine performance. Roosevelt’s anxiety about the government backing down, and his desire for action in Canada is evidence of the importance of manly behavior on the international level in Roosevelt’s view of foreign affairs.

Roosevelt makes this clearer in a letter he wrote to the Harvard Crimson on the same subject. Roosevelt decided to write to the Crimson because of what he perceived to be its lack of support for Olney and Cleveland. Roosevelt had graduated from Harvard in 1880 and was strongly attached to the college; he had, in fact, just attended his 15th reunion with his friend Henry Cabot Lodge.41 The lack of support for the administration from Harvard made Roosevelt anxious for the manliness of the college.

Raising the matter with Lodge, TR wrote, “I am more indignant than I can say at the action of the Harvard people. Do you think there would be any harm in my writing to the Crimson a smashing letter ... giving my views and saying a word for Patriotism and Americanism; unless I hear from you to the contrary I think I shall send this on. I wish to at least do what I can to save Harvard from degradation.”42

41 See, for example, TR to Lodge, June 16, 1895, in Morison, ed. Letters of TR, vol. 1, p. 462.
While he may not have been able to save Harvard from degradation, he certainly gave it the old college try. Arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was applicable to the current political situation, Roosevelt began to describe the Doctrine itself:

The Monroe Doctrine had for its first exponent Washington. In its present shape it was in reality formulated by a Harvard man, afterwards President of the United States, John Quincy Adams. John Quincy Adams did much to earn the gratitude of all Americans. Not the least of his services was his positive refusal to side with the majority of the cultivated people of New England and the Northeast in the period just before the war of 1812, when these cultivated people advised the same spiritless submission to improper English demands that some of their intellectual descendants are now advising. 43

The key, of course, is that Adams was a “Harvard man;” the point of the letter is to reiterate the connections between the Ivy League, and Harvard in particular, and manly action in foreign affairs. In this regard, the fact that John Quincy Adams was a Harvard grad is very much the point – he, at least, knew what it meant to be a man, and he knew what a man’s foreign policy should be.

Roosevelt continued his letter by making clear what actions should be taken in the Venezuela affair:

Nothing will more certainly in the end produce war than to invite European aggressions on American states by abject surrender of our principles ... If Harvard men wish peace with honor they will heartily support the national executive and national legislature in the Venezuela matter; will demand that our representatives insist upon the strictest application of the Monroe Doctrine; and will farther demand that immediate preparation be made to build a really first-class navy. 44

44 ibid, p. 506.
This letter to the *Crimson* shows early versions of principles that Roosevelt held
and acted upon when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy and then President. In
Roosevelt’s estimation, the Monroe Doctrine was the organizing principle of American
foreign policy. Enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine would serve as the means by which
peace and prosperity would be secured for the United States, in Roosevelt’s view, as well
as serving as the basis for American relations with Europe. As Richard Collin has
pointed out, American diplomacy may have carried weight in foreign capitols, but only
with regard its own backyard; the Venezuelan boundary crisis bears this out. The United
States was not a world power when it came to having an influence on intra-European
diplomacy. 45

Another principle Roosevelt stressed in his Monroe Doctrine piece was the need
for a “really first-class navy.” As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt acted, along
with Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan and others, to construct, strengthen and refurbish the
American Navy, in an attempt to develop a tool to aid the achievement of American
policy goals. In this regard Roosevelt was successful, accelerating policies that had
begun the Naval build-up before he took his post, and making sure that they were
continued after he left for Cuba.46

A third recurring theme in TR’s political philosophy, expressed in the Monroe
Doctrine article, was his belief in the importance of American patriotism. Roosevelt was

45 Richard Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe
Doctrine, and the Latin American Context*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University

46 Much has been written about Roosevelt and the US Navy; see, for example, Kenneth

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quite vocal about his disdain for what he called "hyphenated Americans" who maintained a cultural allegiance to the nations they had originally emigrated from. As he wrote in the essay "True Americanism," Roosevelt welcomed immigration, but the immigrant must "become thoroughly Americanized. Moreover, from our standpoint, we have a right to demand it ... He must revere only our flag; not only must it come first, but no other flag should even come second." 47

The initial response to this attempt at expressing his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was evidently not what TR had hoped for; it appeared that Harvard's degeneracy continued unabated. As Roosevelt wrote to Lodge, "The Harvard Graduate's Magazine is now assailing me with the ineffective bitterness proper to beings whose cult is nonvirility."48 Roosevelt believed explicitly in the importance of a vigorous foreign policy; there was a very strong connection between a policy that emphasized the importance of the American Monroe Doctrine and manly behavior; pro-English sympathies, on the other hand grew out of a lack of virility. As an honors classics student at Harvard, Roosevelt was undoubtedly able to make the connection between the words virtue and virility; they both stem from the Latin root for man.

And then, as quickly as it had blown up, the storm passed; on January 11th, 1896, the British agreed to negotiation.49 Even as the crisis began to abate, Roosevelt was still developing his approach to the Monroe Doctrine, and he was as exercised as ever about

49 Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, p. 112
what he perceived to be the importance of the adherence to American foreign policy principles. As he wrote to Cowles on February 11, 1896,

I agree with you about the Venezuela question. The lesson has been taught by us, and I think it has been learned by England. If the Englishmen either accept arbitration or come to a peaceful settlement with Venezuela our point is made, and hereafter European nations will recognize that the Monroe Doctrine is a living entity. ⁵⁰

Roosevelt recognized an important point about the establishment of precedent in international relations. Cleveland's "bombshell" was the result of his irritation at the Old World arrogance of Lord Salisbury; Salisbury had refused to recognize the validity of the Monroe Doctrine in international law, describing it rather as "a novel principle which was never recognized before, and which has not been accepted" by any government. ⁵¹ Roosevelt, however, had perceived accurately that once the Monroe Doctrine was recognized by a European power, a precedent would be established and the United States would have scored a major diplomatic victory.

During the month of February, Roosevelt worked on his argument, refining his articulation of the relationship between manly performance and foreign policy; and in March of 1896 his article "The Monroe Doctrine" ran in the magazine Bachelor of Arts. This lengthier exposition of Roosevelt's views on the Monroe Doctrine bears close examination, for it showed the origins of what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary nearly ten years later.

⁵¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, p. 566.
The article shows the progression of Roosevelt's combination of manliness and foreign policy; in his article there is less bellicose warmongering, and a greater emphasis on individual virtue and responsibility. Roosevelt began the article by stating "[t]he Monroe Doctrine should not be considered from any purely academic standpoint, but as a broad, general principle of living policy." Clearly, Roosevelt saw that the Monroe Doctrine had a great deal of utility for the future, and that its importance was not limited to its history. "If the Monroe Doctrine did not already exist it would be necessary forthwith to create it," Roosevelt continued, for the Doctrine was an essential part of United States foreign policy. It served to preserve American interests as well as preventing European meddling in the affairs of nations in the Western hemisphere. In this sense, Roosevelt served notice that American policy makers should not be bound by traditional interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, and that other nations would do well to take it seriously.

The importance of the policy aspect of the Doctrine is its separation from questions of legal semantics; law and policy, Roosevelt argued, have nothing to do with one another. "The Monroe Doctrine is not a question of law at all. It is a question of policy. It is a question to be considered not only by statesmen, but by all good citizens. Lawyers, as lawyers, have nothing whatever to say about it." In addition to separating the species "lawyer" from "all good citizens," Roosevelt was also responding to Lord Salisbury's comment that the Monroe Doctrine had not been

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53 Ibid., p. 248.
"inscribed by any adequate authority in the code of international law." 54 The separation of law from policy is important, for law is codified and developed, through a legal process, but policy, as Roosevelt wrote, "is based on national self interest." 55 Accordingly, "[t]o argue that [The Monroe Doctrine] can not be recognized as a principle of international law, is a mere waste of breath." 56 International law was secondary to a nation's ability to promote its national interest; Roosevelt believed that the United States had the moral right to state the doctrine as policy, as well as the responsibility to back it up with force, if necessary. This principle would be restated later as "speak softly, but carry a big stick."

Roosevelt believed that "[h]istorically ... the position of our representatives in the Venezuela question is completely justified." The point of the boundary dispute, and the reason for the political emphasis that was being laid on the Monroe Doctrine, was not primarily to establish the Monroe Doctrine as an international code. The establishment of precedent has always been important, but Roosevelt believed that the biggest threat was not the external threat but the internal threat to national security. This threat was posed by the lack of national manliness. Standing up to the British, and putting a stop to their territorial aggrandizement, demonstrated that the United States was able to stand up for itself and was ready to maintain its hemispheric hegemony; in short to act like a man. The political will to prevent the British from acquiring Venezuelan territory rested on the manly patriotism of the American citizen; if that manly resolve and love of country was lacking, the United States was in trouble.

54 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, p. 566.
56 ibid., p. 248.
"A certain limited number of persons," Roosevelt wrote, "are fond of decrying patriotism as a selfish virtue, and strive with all their feeble might to inculcate in its place a kind of milk-and-water cosmopolitanism. These good people are never men of robust character or of imposing personality, and the plea itself is not worth considering." 57 Roosevelt equated patriotism with virtue, and the love of country with a man's love for a woman. Responding to those who argue that patriotism "will become a needless and obsolete virtue," Roosevelt replied that "the man who loves other countries as much as he does his own is quite as noxious a member of society as the man who loves other women as much as he loves his wife." 58

Roosevelt believed that there was a direct relationship between manly behavior and national behavior; if a nation had citizens who were manly, then that nation was bound for greatness in the world. At the same time there was a relationship that can be expressed in terms more like an analogy. The direct relationship rested on Roosevelt's somewhat Puritan views of democracy, that personal virtue translates into national virtue. The analogy, on the other hand, argued that in the same way that the best citizen is a man who is cognizant of his rights and his duty to provide and care for his family, so the best nation is that which "is thoroughly saturated with the national idea," the "most useful member of the brotherhood of nations," and the most responsible to its citizens. 59

The use of masculine and manly imagery in Roosevelt's writing was not there by accident; manliness lay at the heart of his conception of the national mission. The language of masculinity as employed by Roosevelt was centralContinuing his discussion 57 ibid., p. 251. 58 ibid., p. 251. 59 ibid., p. 252.
of the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt stressed the importance of being manly. "No nation can achieve real greatness," he wrote, "if its people are not both essentially moral and essentially manly; both sets of qualities are necessary." Roosevelt continued:

It is an admirable thing to possess refinement and cultivation, but the price is too dear if they must be paid for at the cost of the rugged fighting qualities which make a man able to do a man's work in the world, and which make his heart beat with that kind of love of country which is shown not only in readiness to try to make her civic life better, but also to stand up manfully when her honor and influence are at stake in a dispute with a foreign power. 60

Roosevelt applied this combination of manliness and morality to foreign policy, and to the Monroe Doctrine in particular, when he wrote that

[ t]here are many upright and honorable men who take the wrong side, that is, the anti-American side, of the Monroe Doctrine ... They are generally men who undervalue the great fighting qualities, without which no nation can ever rise to the first rank. 61

Roosevelt's belief in the importance of manly behavior and physical struggle to national security was not just a rhetorical creation to combat the anonymous caricatures, the 'straw men,' that he argued against. He believed in specific manly ideals, ideals that were pushed at colleges such as Harvard, ideals that grew out of the playing fields of Ivy League institutions, but which proved their ultimate worth in rationalizing a vigorous foreign policy. Though he despaired of the timid nature of American manhood, he found it "a relief to remember that the leaders on the side of manliness and of love of country" were Ivy League graduates. As Roosevelt wrote in the last paragraph of his article on the Monroe Doctrine,

60 ibid., p. 259.
61 ibid., p. 260.
every believer in the robust qualities of heart, mind, and body without which cultivation are of no avail, must rejoice to think that, in the present crisis, college men have been prominent among the leaders whose farsighted statesmanship and resolute love of country have made those of us who are really Americans proud of the nation. Secretary Olney is a graduate of Brown; Senator Lodge, who took the lead in the Senate on this matter, is a graduate of Harvard; and no less than three members of the Boundary Commission are graduates of Yale. 62

It is hard to imagine that an article that focused on the importance of the Monroe Doctrine to American foreign policy would conclude with a listing of the Ivy League pedigrees of American diplomats, yet at the turn of the century, at Harvard, Yale and other elite institutions, the academic mission was being revised to include a new stress on manliness, masculinity and virility.

These qualities were stressed because their importance in their application to national service. Kim Townsend argues that in the late nineteenth century a new ideal of manliness came to the fore, an ideal that was refined and promoted at Harvard, and to a lesser extent, at other colleges. In his study Manhood at Harvard, Townsend locates a cadre of men who went on to play an influential role in the development of the cultural and political life of the United States. Among these men is Theodore Roosevelt.

According to Townsend, Roosevelt drank deeply from the well of manliness while he was at Harvard, a code that was expressed by Harvard’s President Eliot: “[t]he real road to success is through scholarship, and the acquisition of the power to work hard, and to endure fatigue and have a steady nerve under intellectual and moral stress.” 63 In fact, the college had just recently constructed a gymnasium for the promotion of scientific

62 ibid., p. 264.
63 Townsend, Manhood at Harvard, p. 22.
physical improvement, but the improvement of the students' physiques was to go hand in hand with intellectual and moral improvements.

Theodore Roosevelt took this advice to heart - literally. Roosevelt's workouts at the new gymnasium were so strenuous that the athletic director, Dudley Sargent warned him of the potential damage to his heart. Roosevelt, however, was trying to make himself a man, a *Harvard* man, with a specific code of values and a specific code of behavior. The legacy of these values can be seen in the manly pronouncements that lie behind his early thinking on the Monroe Doctrine.

For Roosevelt, manly behavior, political leadership and foreign policy were inextricably linked – one led directly to the other. Just as the Harvard Gymnasium would help to make Harvard men more manly, national manly action would make the United States more secure. Harvard reinforced Roosevelt's already strong conviction that physical exertion, in particular combat sports such as boxing, were necessary for the perfection of manliness. On the basis of this education, it makes sense that years later Roosevelt would embrace the Venezuelan crisis as an opportunity to repair the sorry state of American manhood. As Roosevelt explained to Will Cowles, his Monroe Doctrine article "was not aimed at England at all, but at our wretched fellow countrymen who lack patriotism." 64

In Roosevelt's view, the important aspect of the Venezuelan crisis was not the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, and it was not the sudden increase in tensions between the United States and Great Britain; it was the threat posed to

64 TR to Cowles, April 5, 1896, in Morison, ed., *Letters of TR*, vol. 1, p. 630.

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American national security by "feeble," "anæmic" and "unmanly" men. Roosevelt's gendered language (the US is feminine, political leaders are masculine), his use of analogies based on male/female relationships, and his equation of a vigorous foreign policy with manly virtue all embody his preoccupation with newly developed codes of masculine behavior.

Roosevelt was not done with the Monroe Doctrine, though. Years later, after serving in the Spanish-American War and having succeeded William McKinley as President, Roosevelt had the occasion to elaborate in 1904 what became known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, an interpretation that has remained a cornerstone of US foreign policy.

Speaking to Congress on December 6, 1904, Roosevelt denied that the United States had imperialist ambitions in the Caribbean, and stated, "all that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous." Reiterating the themes that he had developed nearly ten years before, Roosevelt described those nations in terms of manly responsibility: "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States." In terms of Roosevelt's conception of manliness, if a nation acts like a man it need not fear American intervention.66

If it does not act like a man should, that is with "decency in social and political matters," if it acts with "chronic wrongdoing," or an "impotence which results in a

general loosening of the ties of civilized society" will bring on American intervention. In fact, Roosevelt stated, American adherence to the Monroe Doctrine dictates that in "flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence" the US might need to exercise an "international police power."67

In sum, the "Roosevelt Corollary" holds that if a nation in the Western Hemisphere does not act the way that Theodore Roosevelt believed a man should act, the United States claimed the right to enforce a code of international masculine behavior, to shore up the unmanly "impotence" of the offending nation, and thereby set international relations on the proper footing again. In short, the United States reserved the right to act as a manly policeman in order to enforce adherence to Roosevelt's conception of national manliness.

The manly performance at stake is identical with the description of manliness that Roosevelt described in his article on the Monroe Doctrine. In 1895, Roosevelt wrote, "No country will accomplish very much unless it elevates itself. The useful member of a community is the man who first and foremost attends to his own rights and his own duties, and who therefore becomes better fitted to do his share in the common duties of all."68

In 1904 he wrote, "every nation ... which desires its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it."69 The two statements, nearly ten years apart, are connected by the exact same logic: nations are like men, and should therefore behave like

67 ibid., p. 19

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men. If they do not behave like men, and act in an “impotent” manner, or engage in "wrongdoing," then the police will need to intervene. The system of international relations based on the performance of national manliness must be upheld.

For Theodore Roosevelt there was no difference between individual manliness and national behavior. Roosevelt had taken his childhood experiences in 'boy culture' to heart, and they had shaped not just his view of manly behavior, but also his view of the world. Roosevelt's construction of international relations as manly action writ large proved to be very powerful. Seductive in its simplicity, its virility, and in its power, the Rooseveltian model of national manhood soon had many adherents. The next chapter will discuss some of these advocates of international manly action.
Theodore Roosevelt was not alone in believing that the time was ripe for the expansion of American economic and political influence, nor in his belief in the importance of combining manly behavior with foreign policy. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Albert Beveridge were among the many influential individuals who saw American opportunities in the late 1800s and early 1900s in the same way. This chapter will examine the views of these men and the ways that they argued for a foreign policy based on a strenuous international masculinity.

Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick have described Roosevelt’s colleagues Lodge, Mahan and Beveridge as “large-policy imperialists.” By this label, these historians meant those individuals who believed that the days of free trade imperialism were over; ... [and] who took the ideology of Social Darwinism literally and seriously... Such men lamented what they perceived to be the drift to a shopkeeper society, primarily acquisitive, and dedicated to the cultivation of the almighty dollar; to a nation that no longer valued martial valor and national honor, or any other higher purposes; to a nation gone soft. To them, imperialism (and if need be war) was the kind of national purpose to which the whole society could commit itself, at once uniting the nation in a common cause and stiffening its backbone. 1

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The acquisition of an American empire, these historians believed, satisfied both the economic and the spiritual, the international and the domestic. Many Americans, Beveridge, Lodge and Mahan among them, thought that American imperialism was good for the world, as well as for the United States, and it was especially good for American manhood. A closer look at the views of these men will show that the belief in imperialism and in American manhood went hand in hand, and that their masculinist approach to United States foreign policy was widespread.

The examination of these three men is based on several factors. First, all three were influential members of the imperialist movement, men who argued passionately and articulately for the expansion of American influence, military power, economic opportunity and civilization. Second, all three argued for imperialism in the language of masculinity; they attempted to persuade their listeners with the rhetoric of manly performance. Finally, the three men have been chosen because they represent different generations and hence afford a look at arguments for a foreign policy based on manly national performance as they change over time.

Alfred Thayer Mahan was born in 1840, and articulated the argument for a powerful U. S. Navy that would enable the creation and maintenance of an American Empire. Henry Cabot Lodge was born ten years later, but was a contemporary of Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson's main opposition during the First World War and the debate over the League of Nations. Albert Jeremiah Beveridge was born in 1862, and was a younger advocate of manly imperialism, and a man who had been influenced by Roosevelt's articulations of national performance.
These three men serve as a representative selection of advocates of a foreign policy based on the performance of national masculinity. Further, their views help to illustrate the breadth of support for the performance model of international relations, and the ways in which arguments for such a foreign policy were developed and articulated. The following chapter will examine the individuals in chronological order.

Alfred Thayer Mahan and the U.S. Navy

Alfred Thayer Mahan was a naval strategist whose rationale for American imperialism was extremely influential. In his early works, Mahan justified United States imperialism using the rhetoric of "civilization." But, as Gail Bederman has shown, late nineteenth-century ideas of civilization were often linked to white masculinity, and in Mahan's influential policy papers this link became more and more explicit. In the last years of the nineteenth century, Mahan's rhetoric was replete with the discourse of national masculinity. Mahan was an ally of Roosevelt's, though he was much older. By tracing out the development of an ever more explicit rhetoric of masculinity in Mahan's otherwise unchanging calls for United States expansion, we also trace the development of the national masculinity that governed twentieth century foreign policy.

Alfred Thayer Mahan was born in 1840 on the campus of West Point. The son of the Dean of Faculty, Professor Dennis Hart Mahan, Alfred grew up in a mixed academic and military environment, and never really left it. After having spent two unhappy years
at Columbia College, Alfred began at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis MD, in 1856 at the age of 16.²

Mahan did not thrive at Annapolis; indeed, he did not thrive in the Navy at all, which is rather remarkable for someone who spent his life within its ranks. Mahan was a dyspeptic individual, given to strong dislikes, mixed with an overbearing arrogance. As biographer Robert Seager points out, this combination made Mahan a difficult person to deal with:

At the heart of Mahan’s problems at the Naval academy, and at the root of his later unpopularity among his service peers, was his ill-concealed vanity. The fact of the matter is that he considered his appearance, his mentality, his morality, and all his own works, ideas, and attitudes to be vastly superior to those of the common run of mankind, particularly that segment of mankind he observed in attendance at the Naval Academy. He could neither understand nor tolerate anyone who disagreed with him.³

This attitude only grew worse following his graduation from Annapolis in 1859, for Mahan did not prove himself to be a normal Naval officer. With the exception of a few anxious minutes at the beginning of the Civil War in April, 1861, Mahan was never involved in a military conflict, and never fired a gun in anger. He was a poor sailor who “grounded, collided, or otherwise embarrassed every ship ... he ever commanded. As

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² Here, and elsewhere, I have relied on Robert Seager's definitive biography. Seager has also edited a three volume collection of his letters. Both are indispensable for anyone wanting to write on Mahan. For the biography, see Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and his Letters, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. See pages 5-12 for his early childhood.
³ Seager, Mahan, page 27.
one of his shipmates in the Chicago later wrote, 'Mahan had one navigational obsession – fear of collision.'"^4

Instead of learning how to sail, Mahan wrote books on the history and strategy of naval affairs. This focus set him apart from the rest of the Navy, and led to the first of many conflicts with higher-ranking officers which were to dog his career for the duration of his tenure in the Navy. Mahan was convinced, however, that his main contribution lay in helping to formulate new ideas and strategies for the US Navy, and in this he was tremendously successful, writing one of the most influential books of the nineteenth century. In Mahan’s case, it was certainly true that the pen was mightier than the sword.

Though he served as a Naval officer, a popular lecturer and pre-eminent advocate of American Naval power, and President of the Naval War College from 1886 to 1889 and 1892 to 1893, Mahan was probably most influential as the author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, which was published in 1890.\(^5\) This book argued in favor of imperialist expansion using the rhetoric of “civilization” rather than that of masculinity. Mahan’s basic argument, illustrated by the actions of the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the United States in the years of empire building that led up to the First World War, was that colonial expansion and a large navy were essential to national prosperity in modern industrial society. Drawing on examples from history, Mahan argued that the continued economic health of the nation required economic expansion and the secure control of commerce. The need to secure commercial lifelines necessitated the acquisition of colonies, from which followed the need for a large national merchant fleet, a large

\(^4\) Seager, Mahan, p. 257.
navy to protect it, and the naval bases and coaling stations which were required to maintain them both.⁶

In many ways, Mahan's arguments were a kind of sea-going "manifest destiny" - and his ideas had their greatest impact in the United States at the very moment when Americans were beginning to become anxious about the "closing of the frontier."

Indeed, Frederick Jackson Turner, at the end of his famous 1893 article, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," wrote that

He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise.⁷

Turner's conclusion meshed perfectly with Mahan's expansionist vision.

Mahan's book created a stir immediately, though it was in Europe, particularly in England and Germany, that it was received most readily. By 1893, Mahan had become celebrated in England, and while posted in Europe as the Captain of the USS Chicago, he was able to make many connections with leading men in the Royal Navy and the British Government. In America, however, Mahan's arguments in favor of American expansion were still controversial, and his argument in favor of the proposed annexation of Hawaii did not win him many supporters within President Cleveland's administration.⁸

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Surveying the international situation in 1893, Mahan perceived that the United States stood on the brink of a major national transformation. The overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, and the subsequent request for annexation by the planter aristocracy, put the United States in a position, Mahan argued, “not unlike, and not less momentous than that required of the Roman Senate” when it decided to abandon “the policy which had confined the expansion of Rome to the Italian peninsula.”

The decision to annex non-contiguous territory would determine the future course of the United States, Mahan believed. “Let it not be overlooked,” he wrote, “that whether we wish or no, we must answer the question, we must make the decision. The issue cannot be dodged. Absolute inaction in such a case is a decision as truly as the most vehement action.” Mahan went on to argue that the decision about the fate of Hawaii will affect the standing of the United States in world affairs: “we can now advance, but, the conditions of the world being what they are, if we do not advance, we recede, for there is involved not so much a particular action as a question of principle, pregnant of great consequence in one direction as another.”

Mahan’s statement “if we do not advance, we recede” encapsulates not only Mahan’s argument, but also the expansionist rhetoric behind American imperialist foreign policy. Along with such luminaries as Albert Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, Mahan was part of a group of men who argued that overseas expansion was crucial for the future of the United States. Not only were American

For tensions with the Cleveland Administration caused by his article on the annexation of Hawaii, see pp. 248- 253, 268.
economic interests at stake, but, Mahan believed, the future of civilization hung in the
balance as well. "Comparative religion," Mahan wrote, "teaches us that creeds which
reject missionary enterprise are foredoomed to decay. May it not be so with nations?"11

This anxiety about national decay was central to Mahan's thought. An
examination of Mahan's "missionary enterprise," reveals that his arguments are based as
much on his anxieties about the future of Anglo-Saxon civilization and American
masculinity, as they are about economic expansion and coaling stations. Because
Mahan's arguments were so influential, a consideration of the masculine, Christian,
Anglo-Saxon roots of Mahan's expansionist argument gives a clearer understanding of
the American imperialist moment of the late nineteenth century.

For Mahan, as for Roosevelt, American civilization, masculinity, Anglo-
Saxonism and imperialism were entwined; each reinforced the other. In the last years of
the nineteenth century, Mahan's writings began to make this connection more and more
explicit. Mahan and his colleagues believed that the strength of the United States rested
upon the strength, or manliness, of its men. As a result, a threat to masculinity (and its
related Anglo-Saxonism and Christianity) was by extension a threat to the future security
of the nation. Mahan believed that an emphasis on the personal virtues promoted by the
military would serve to preserve the Anglo-Saxon, Christian, masculine values that he
saw as fundamental to the survival of the United States. Kristin Hoganson argues that

Mahan and his colleagues "looked to martial policies to shore up the virile character" of American democracy.  

When Mahan looked out at the world in the late nineteenth century, he saw many threats to the future well-being of the United States. Among these threats were the softening of the manly fiber of the nation (what Mahan called the "moral muscle") by the luxuries that industrial civilization produced, as well as the increasingly important political role that American women were playing in American society. Because of these threats, Mahan argued in 1893, the United States needed to "retain the masculine combative virtues ... erected by so many centuries of courageous battling." As Hoganson points out, Mahan believed that naval power was "not only a means to extend the nation's commercial reach, but also a remedy for male degeneracy." 

For Mahan the solution to America's ills was imperialism. Imperial expansion, necessary to maintain the economic status quo, would also serve to strengthen the military, and shore up American masculinity. Correspondingly, any attempt to weaken the military resolve of the United States could be catastrophic. As Mahan explained in 1896, "I consider no greater misfortune could well happen than that civilized nations should abandon their preparations for war and take to arbitration. The outside barbarians are many." 

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Like many of his contemporaries, Mahan saw the expansion of European power in the period after the Civil War as a direct threat to American survival. With the Civil War over, American energies could now be directed to meeting and countering the European threat to American economic expansion. As Michael Hunt points out, in the period after the Civil War, “the extension of European rivalries into the Pacific, East Asia and the Americas began to evoke in the United States both alarm and calls for imitation.” Mahan was one of those individuals who was both alarmed and who desired that the United States expand. More importantly, however, Mahan was able to provide the rationale for many of his fellow imperialists. This rationale was clear and distinct. The similarity between this statement and Roosevelt's expression of "National Duties" a few years later is remarkably striking.

Mahan's arguments concerning the link between masculinity, imperial greatness and naval strength were deemed prescient in the wake of the victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila during the Spanish-American war of 1898. As a result, Mahan was viewed by people such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge as a prophet of American expansion. Mahan considered this perception at the very end of his autobiography, entitled "From Sail to Steam."

In direct result from the line of thought into which I was drawn by my conception of sea power, ... I am frankly an imperialist, in the sense that no nation, certainly no great nation, should henceforth maintain the policy of isolation which fitted our early history; above all, should not on that outlived plea refuse to intervene in events obviously thrust upon its conscience.

When Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power Upon History* was published in 1890, it caught the attention of policy makers and the foreign policy. Though the book was an historical study, politicians, government officials and editors of influential journals, were interested in what Mahan would make of particular contemporary events. When Mahan wrote to *The New York Times* in early 1893 concerning the revolution in Hawaii, then, it was no surprise that the editor of *The Forum* asked him to expand on his ideas concerning American interests in the Pacific. Mahan’s original letter, and his ensuing article, both provide interesting perspectives on the development of a rationale for not only for US control of the Hawaiian Island group, but for American imperialism in general.

Mahan's letter of January 31, 1893 pointed out the importance of Hawaii's position relative to China, and stated that "It is a question for the whole civilized world and not for the United States only, whether the Sandwich Islands, with their geographical and military importance, unrivalled by that of any other position in the North Pacific, shall in future be an outpost of European civilization, or of the comparative barbarism of China." The problem, Mahan pointed out, is that "China may burst her barriers, eastward as well as westward, toward the Pacific as well as toward the European continent. In such a movement it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the Sandwich Islands by a great, civilized, maritime power." 

Mahan repeatedly uses the word civilization; a word, Gail Bederman has pointed out, that had a multiplicity of meanings in the late nineteenth century. "Civilization," she writes, "as turn of the century Americans understood it, simultaneously denoted

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17 Mahan, "Hawaii", p. 31.
attributes of race and gender...Middle and upper class men effectively mobilized 'civilization' in order to maintain their class, gender, and racial authority.'\textsuperscript{19}

In the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth, Anglo-Saxon male preeminence in American society was being challenged by immigration, by industrialization and wage labor, and by the increasing dominance of the urban area relative to the surrounding countryside. These threats to the traditional Jeffersonian ideal of the American man caused upper and middle class American men to reassert their authority through a renewed and energized conception of masculinity.\textsuperscript{20} Simultaneously, in the international arena, the imperial contest was accelerating, as Germany, France, Japan, and Russia were competing with Great Britain and the US for markets and territory.

For members of the US foreign policy elite, who were, in fact, middle and upper class white men, the word "civilization" was used to justify imperialism and international expansion. For Mahan, in fact, the United States itself was the end result of the progress of civilization, and the expansion of the US was its clearest example. Mahan's comparison of the United States with Rome, quoted earlier, was no coincidence; he saw many similarities between the American and Roman republics. As he put it,

\begin{quote}
We have not only occupied our original inheritance, but also, step by step, as Rome incorporated the other nations of the peninsula, we have added to it, spreading and perpetuating the same foundation principles of free and good government...And now, arrested on the south by a race wholly alien to us, and on the north by a body of states of like traditions to our own, ... we have come to the sea. In our infancy we bordered upon the Atlantic only; our youth carried our boundary to the Gulf of Mexico; today maturity sees us upon the Pacific. Have
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} Mahan, "Hawaii," p. 32.
we no right or no call to progress farther in any direction? Are there for us beyond the sea horizon none of those essential interests, of those evident dangers, which impose a policy and confer rights?21

In this passage, written in 1893, Mahan is not explicit about the masculinity of the nation. He does conceive of the United States as man; his tracing out of the infancy, youth and maturity of the nation implies that the U. S. is analogous to a developing man. But masculinity is not a governing metaphor here. Instead, Mahan’s “missionary enterprise” rests upon a rhetoric that is more race-based than gender-based. The US, Mahan argued, could and should expand overseas; it would be good for the United States, and it would be good for those other areas and peoples upon whom the US could bestow “free and good government.” Using Great Britain as an example, Mahan wrote of “the world wide pre-eminence held by English speech, and by institutions sprung from English germs. How much poorer would the world have been had Englishmen heeded the cautious hesitancy that bids us reject every advance beyond our shore-lines!”22

American imperialism for Mahan meant the spread of American civilization, the American political system, and, of course, American economic interests. The benefits to be reaped by this adventure, however, are more than material goods. As Mahan wrote later, “civilization, in final analysis, means not material development in the external environment, but the personal, and through the personal, of national character.”23

What Mahan was getting at becomes clearer as he continues discussing the opportunities that Hawaii provides to the United States. “It is not, therefore, in

negligence of the future [of the peoples of the Pacific] but in consequence to its immense importance to them," that the United States should embark on an expansionist course. Hawaii represented not only an opportunity for the United States to spread its civilization and its government to a new territory, but there is an important reason that the US should engage in this process.

By 1900, when Mahan first drafted "The Problem of Asia," his reliance on tropes of masculinity and virility had replaced his reliance on the language of civilization. His concept of the national masculinity had become explicit:

Nothing more fatal can be devised for the states of our civilization, and that civilization itself, than the habit ... of looking for the solution of doubts and adjustments of interest to a central external authority... The health of the community of states, as of the community of citizens, depends upon the vigor of the individual member ... This virility of national character, born and sustained in conflict, will ... serve to perpetuate the strong contrasts of race temperament and political methods which now exist among us.24

In this passage, Mahan is completely explicit in his valorization of the "virility of national character." The discourse of national masculinity has become indispensable.

Ultimately, Mahan reasons, the spread of western civilization, of which American civilization is the most perfect embodiment, has a beneficial effect domestically because it requires nations to act in a more manly fashion, because it strengthens the political ties at home, and because it maintains the contemporary racial hierarchy. Mahan argues for American imperialism on the grounds that the national "virility" engendered by the conflict will serve to solidify and unify some of the fragmentation that is occurring in the

24 Mahan, The Problem of Asia, p. 95.
American social and political scene in the late nineteenth century. The United States has a manly character, and, when strengthened, that manly character will ensure the nation's continued survival.

As I have discussed in previous chapters, the last years of the twentieth century saw remarkable changes in cultural conceptions of masculinity. When Mahan began to use explicit language of national masculinity in 1900, he was allying himself with Roosevelt and many others, all of whom looked up to him as the “prophet” of expansionism. Together, these men turned their belief in the benefits of manly performance into a political philosophy that would save the nation. Carl Schurz, a German-born politician and Civil War hero, wrote in Harper’s in 1898 that a nation needs a war from time to time to prevent it from becoming effeminate, to shake it up from demoralizing materialism, and to elevate the popular heart by awakening heroic emotions and the spirit of self-sacrifice.²⁵

This belief that the performance of manly acts would revitalize national masculinity was incorporated into arguments for American expansion abroad as well. As Josiah Strong wrote in Our Country,

God, with infinite wisdom and skill, is training the Anglo-Saxon race for an hour sure to come in the world’s future ... Then will the world enter upon a new stage of its history – the final competition of races, for which the Anglo-Saxon is being schooled ... Then, this race of unequaled energy, with all the majesty of numbers and the might of wealth behind it – the representative ... of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization – having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the earth.²⁶

Mahan was perhaps not as strident as Strong and Schurz. Like them, however, he was an imperialist, and like them he saw the United States as the culmination of centuries of progress. Consequently, the United States had the responsibility to help the rest of the world advance along the path of civilization. As Mahan wrote in 1898, "I believe the United States has duties to the world outside, as well as to herself - that in a general way the extension of 'Anglo-Saxon' control is a distinct benefit to the world." 27

In addition, and this is perhaps where Mahan is the most like Strong and Schurz, he saw American men as the ultimate Anglo-Saxons, the preservers and extenders of western civilization. The race of Anglo-Saxons, Mahan wrote,

has proved its vitality and its worth by continuous existence and consistent development ... This type, by its virile power of adaptation, has not only predominated over, but absorbed and assimilated all other social and racial types with which it has been brought into political association ... To the full expression of this political force, great alike in its nobility and its vitality, the United States owes to mankind her due contribution; for in it is one of the greatest hopes - ... the greatest hope of humanity. 28

For Alfred Thayer Mahan, then, an expansionistic foreign policy afforded the virile men of the United States the opportunity to mold and direct the future of the world.

Mahan's view of the world in 1893 led him to advocate an imperialist foreign policy, and his argument for imperialism was based on a belief rooted not only in economic interests, but also in the importance of expanding western civilization. Civilization, Mahan was convinced, would not long continue to exist without virile, manly proponents.

28 Mahan, The Problem of Asia, p. 194.
The transformation of American foreign policy in the years between
Reconstruction and World War One rested upon new conceptions of national mission and
the performance of masculinity on the international stage. Alfred Thayer Mahan and his
expansionist colleagues were successful in shaping the foreign policy that brought the
United States into the twentieth century, and onto the world stage, and this did not
happen by accident, but by plan. As Mahan wrote in 1893, the annexation of Hawaii, and
the principle of expansion that it represented, would be “fruitful of many future acts,” and
“pregnant of great consequences in one direction or the other.” In this, Mahan was more
correct than he could possibly have realized.

Henry Cabot Lodge and the Lessons of History

If Alfred Thayer Mahan was the “prophet” of national masculinity, in whose
policy statements we see the gradual development of an expansionist creed based on
masculine performance, Henry Cabot Lodge was its major proponent in U. S. foreign
policy. Lodge and his friend Theodore Roosevelt shared a similar view of the world and
of the importance of the American role in it. The United States, both believed,
represented the future of civilization, and, as William Widenor points out, Lodge “came
to attach a special significance to international relations and to see reflected therein
forebodings of the very rise and fall of civilizations.”

Lodge was born in 1850, into a famous and prestigious family of Boston
Brahmins. Like Roosevelt, Lodge attended Harvard and excelled at the study of history,
continuing to study with Henry Adams even after earning his BA in 1871. Lodge earned
a law degree in 1875, and his Ph.D. in history in 1876 (after writing a thesis on Anglo-Saxon land law), one of the three first Ph.D.s granted in history in the United States. Though he gained admittance to the Massachusetts bar in 1876, Lodge continued his association with Harvard and Adams after being awarded his doctorate, serving as an instructor of American history. Lodge also served as an editor of the *North American Review*, assisting Adams, during the years 1873-1876.30

American history, for both Adams and Lodge, was the study of the development of the American nation, in particular the spread of American principles from their beachhead at Plimouth. Lodge developed this argument in his *Studies in History*, published in 1884, where he wrote that “We must study the past, and learn from it, and advance from what has been already tried and found good … But we cannot enter upon that … road until we are truly national and independent intellectually, and ready to think for ourselves, and not look to foreigners in order to find out what they think.”31 American history, Lodge believed, was an academic discipline which served as the basis for the continued development of the American national project and hence of American patriotism.

Lodge took his cue in this regard from Francis Parkman, himself a Boston Brahmin, and a patrician historian. Parkman’s histories of the British, French, and Native Americans in North America, among them *The Oregon Trail* (1847, 1849) and *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (1851) stressed the importance of manly performance to those who

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have shaped the course of American history. Indeed, Parkman's focus on native Americans, and on the role they played in early American history, provided Lodge with a similar outlook toward Filipinos and American expansion in the Pacific.

Lodge believed that Parkman “represented all that was virile, natural, clear-thinking, and strong” - attributes that could be derived from what Roosevelt was later to call “the strenuous life.” Lodge made this connection explicit when he dedicated his 1892 book Historical and Political Essays to Parkman, "in token of admiration for his great work as an American historian, and for his character as a man.”32 History and manliness were related for Lodge; Lodge (as well as Roosevelt, who wrote the expansionistic Winning of the West) believed that the study of history not only required a manly resolve, but also served to inculcate manly ideals in others. A good example of this kind of history is the volume he co-wrote with Roosevelt, Hero Tales from American History; the book even has a chapter on Parkman that stresses Parkman’s manly qualities.33

Manly qualities were crucial to the men of Lodge’s generation, because they were afraid that such characteristics were in the process of disappearing. Lodge’s biographer argues that Parkman was important to Lodge because he was “living proof that an aristocracy still had a role to play, and that there survived among some of its members those strong, manly, aggressive, and courageous qualities … which Lodge’s generation

so yearned to resuscitate.”34 Parkman and his histories, Lodge argued, presented an alternative to “that pallid and emasculate scholarship, of which New England has had too many examples.” In a nation that was changing rapidly due to the forces of immigration, urbanization, economic expansion and even the Women’s Suffrage Movement, Parkman’s exclamation that “for the student there is, … no better companion than the rifle or the oar” was decidedly backwards looking, and had great appeal to Lodge.35

Both Lodge and Roosevelt took Parkman’s exhortation to heart, and lived out what TR later called the “strenuous life.” Lodge, for example, kept in shape through active horseback riding, because he believed that “for the development of nerve, energy and courage, so useful in the affairs of life, and so pre-eminently valuable to a people called to arms … no sport can equal riding on horseback.”36 Lodge’s conviction that the American people were “called to arms” led to more than Lodge’s own performance of masculine deeds, however; it led him to embrace what he described as the “savage virtues” that were so necessary for national survival.

It may seem ironic that Lodge, who was so concerned about the survival of American civilization in the face of challenges from those he considered less civilized, should embrace savagery. But, as Lodge explained, “These primary or ‘savage virtues’ make states and nations possible, and in their very nature are the foundations out of

34 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 15; see also Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 4, for family history, and view of Civil War patriotism.
35 Lodge and Roosevelt, Hero Tales, p. 140.

which other virtues have arisen. If they decay, the whole fabric they support will totter and fall."

Lodge, like Mahan and Roosevelt, believed that the rise of the United States was due to the virile nature of Anglo-American men, but was concerned that the primary virtues of strength, determination, and courage were being weakened by the advancement of civilization and its inducements to softness and luxury. The trick then, was to find the proper balance between savagery and civilization within the Anglo-American man; the future of the nation depended on it. Anglo-American men needed to be civilized enough to maintain the future progress of the nation, but also savage enough to perform those masculine acts that would maintain national preeminence. The balance harkens back to the conception of 'boy culture,' in which young men find themselves balancing the genteel world of their mothers, with the violent and anarchic world of boys. In Lodge's case, we can substitute the world of the home and of mother with his fear of the effeminacy brought about by too much education. Similarly, the world of boy culture can be substituted with the much more manly role of empire building. As the long drawn out conflict in the Philippines was to demonstrate, there was no shortage of the savage in the empire builders of 1898.

Lodge, like Roosevelt and Mahan, believed that he understood the lessons that history had to teach him, and was convinced that the study of American history revealed the importance of manliness and masculinity to the advance of the United States. The study of international relations, on the other hand, was the study of the rise and fall of

civilizations. The relationship between the two fields of study, of course, was the notion of manly resolve – as the man is to the nation, so is the nation to the world.

In the book they wrote together, Lodge and Roosevelt lay out what the importance of manliness is for the country. Hero Tales from American History is a collection of brief biographies that were written to serve as examples to young American men. As the introduction to the book explains, Lodge and Roosevelt admired those men “who joined to the stern and manly qualities which are essential to the well-being of a masterful race the virtues of gentleness, of patriotism, and of lofty adherence to an ideal.”

Why are these men heroes? They are heroes because they performed their masculinity.

Lodge is very clear about the importance of the performance of manly acts. Admirable American men had a certain “character” that enabled and encouraged them to do great things. An essential part of character was the drive to action; a man of “character” was not happy to sit still, for character could not be tested by sitting in an armchair. As Lodge explained in his chapter on Charles Russell Lowell (another Bostonian), “better and finer than a mere idealist … was a man of action, eager to put his ideals into practice and bring them to the test of daily life.”

To reiterate, the “man of action,” who performed his role as a man, who put his ideals into practice, was better than a man who merely developed the ideas. It was one thing to think, but true manliness lay in the performance of the act.

Both Lodge and Roosevelt believed that the men of the United States had come to a crossroads in the late 19th century. At the same time that the United States was becoming more economically stable and secure, the frontier and the related westward...
expansion were coming to an end. The result was a generation of men who were content
to relax on their father's laurels, they believed, and who focused more on living the good
life than the strenuous life. The previous generation had risked their lives on the
battlefields of the Civil War to preserve the nation – what was required for the new
generation was a struggle of similar proportions that would distract young men from their
smug materialism and bring out the best of their American manhood. They needed to
perform manliness, and the proper arena for this test of masculinity was all that was
needed.

As a biographer of Lodge has pointed out Lodge and Roosevelt "embraced a
vigoroues foreign policy, and later imperialism, in the hope that it would do an
'incalculable amount' for American character."40 In addition, as Kristin Hoganson has
argued, the issues facing the United States at the turn of the century were not simply
economic, nor even military - they were primarily psychological and emotional.41
Similarly, William Widenor argues that both both Roosevelt and Lodge believed that the
problems that the United States faced "were those of the soul, and both great power status
and imperialism were seen as instruments of salvation."42 Theodore Roosevelt laid this
out clearly in a letter from December, 1899, that he wrote to his close friend Cecil Spring
Rice, who was also the British Ambassador: "I believe in the expansion of great nations.

39 Lodge and Roosevelt, Hero Tales, p. 227.
40 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 83.
41 Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, pp. 8-13, and footnote 14, on pp. 210-
214.
42 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 83-84.
India has done an incalculable amount for the English character. If we do our work well in the Philippines and the West Indies, it will do a great deal for our character.”

Strengthening American masculinity lay at the heart of the imperial project for Roosevelt and Lodge, just as it was for Mahan. More important than the economic incentives so evident in the establishment of colonies were the benefits that imperialism would provide the United States, particularly with regards to its manhood. Lodge, Mahan and Roosevelt “had great plans. They hoped to make of American imperialism a model imperialism, an agent of international reform and a means of elevating the tone of American life.” As Mahan explained to Lodge in 1899 in a letter of congratulation after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American War, American imperialism will prove "beneficial to the world and honorable to ourselves,” by providing American men with a challenge that will force them to shake off their lassitude, and embrace their latent masculinity. "I try to respect, but cannot," Mahan went on, men who try to extend self-government "to people in the childhood stage of race development.”

Training colonized peoples in the art of self-government, however paradoxical that may sound, was a project that Lodge believed could save the United States from becoming a larger version of Holland or Switzerland, a country that hid “a defenceless, feeble body within a huge shell.” What would keep the body politic from becoming flabby, accordingly, was the maintenance of the balance between the civilization that the

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44 Widener, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 113.
United States (and Boston in particular) represented, and the "savage virtues" which were necessary for national health. Taking on the manly role of colonizer, and tempering it with the selfless goal of preparing the colonized for self-government, would allow American men to serve their country in the best possible fashion – by giving them a place to perform their masculine duties, and thereby reinvigorate national energy.

For Lodge, Roosevelt, and Mahan this was a simple equation: American men plus imperial mission equals national greatness. American manliness, in decline due to the softening effects of modern society, held the key to the future prosperity, indeed survival, of the United States. The key to reviving the strain of masculinity which was so important to the founding of the United States, and perhaps even more so during the Civil War, was American imperialism; a virile foreign policy would bring the nation into contact with peoples who would serve as newer versions of the native Americans who had forced the colonists to organize and define themselves.

An imperialistic foreign policy, Lodge believed, was the key to saving the United States from decline, and at the heart of this imperialism was the manliness of action. The performance of American masculinity was the key to the future survival of the United States.

Albert J. Beveridge – “A Young Attila”

Albert Jeremiah Beveridge was a senator from Indiana who was celebrated (and sometimes mocked) for his remarkably bombastic oratory in favor of the ideals of national masculinity. Beveridge saw the issue of the Philippines in much the same way.

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46 Henry Cabot Lodge, editorial in Boston Herald, November 1, 1899. Quoted in
as Lodge and Roosevelt did, and he took every opportunity to express his views. It is important to examine his public speeches because of their notoriety and their persuasive power. At least rhetorically, Beveridge went further than Roosevelt or any of his peers in advocating for a very aggressive version of national masculine performance; his speeches demonstrate the prevalence and the popular success of using national masculinity as a frame for an expansionist United States foreign policy.

Born in Indiana in 1862, Beveridge was part of the generation that admired the men who served in the Civil War without actually having a chance to emulate them. Beveridge later recalled that his first memory was of soldiers returning home from the Civil War, among them his own father; he wrote that those soldiers had “learned on the field of battle the qualities of each other’s character and the purity of each other’s purposes.” Character, for Beveridge as well as Lodge, was evidence of manhood. As Kristin Hoganson points out, “Beveridge regarded soldiers as models of manhood in an age when, he thought, manhood could not be taken for granted.”

Beveridge had come to believe in the traditional masculine virtues through personal experience. He had endured a childhood of poverty, and had put himself through school by working as a hired hand on farms and in logging operations. After graduating from High School, and narrowly losing a commission to West Point, Beveridge was able to begin at Indiana Asbury University only through the intercession of a lumberman for whom he had worked, and who loaned him fifty dollars. Beveridge

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Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 114.
47 Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, p 146.
went on to do well at Indiana Asbury, soon renamed DePauw University, and though he continued to have money problems, he graduated with honors in 1885.48

Beveridge went on to take the Indiana bar exam in 1887 and built a successful law practice in Indianapolis, attracting national attention and offers of partnership in major law firms. Replying that "I don't want to be rich, I have other ambitions," Beveridge made it clear that he was focusing on a career in politics. The law, Beveridge believed, was the precursor to a political career, and while building his practice, Beveridge took every opportunity to campaign for Republican candidates. The Grand Old Party, the party of Lincoln, the party of Union which his father had fought for, represented the ideals that Beveridge held.49

Beveridge saw the GOP as the defender of sound money policies and the upholder of property rights and free enterprise. Beveridge also saw the Republican party as the guarantors and supporters of those personal qualities that had made it possible for his own rapid success. As John Braeman points out, "[t]he swiftness of his own rise had confirmed for Beveridge that any man with the proper qualities could win fortune and that poverty reflected personal faults - idleness, drunkenness and vice - rather than social ills." As he said to the crowd at a campaign stop,

Down with the demagogic cry against wealth - I am in favor of everybody being rich ... And if we cannot all be rich I am in favor of as many being rich as possible.50

49 Braeman, Albert J. Beveridge, p. 9, 20. For Beveridge's law career, see Bowers, Beveridge, pp. 31-44.
50 Braeman, Albert J. Beveridge, p. 20.
Beveridge was a talented public speaker whose powers of oratory made him an important campaigner in Indiana, and he was able to acquire some valuable connections and experience campaigning for GOP candidates. At the same time, Beveridge was finding a platform of his own. Spurred by the economic crisis of 1893, and then even more by the Spanish American War of 1898, Beveridge came to embrace the rhetoric of imperialism and expansion.

Though he was an exponent of manly action, Beveridge did not serve in the Spanish American War; his request for a battlefield commission was turned down. Beveridge wanted to fight. "I do not care to go in at all," he wrote to Washington, "unless I can go in for actual service in the field, for actual out-and-out warfare." Having no desire to serve as a mere "carpetbag soldier," Beveridge pursued government office seeking instead to have a say in how the United States' new empire should be structured and run.51

To that end, Beveridge sought support from the Indiana Republican Party for a run at the Senate, and kicked off his campaign in September of 1898. There was more than mere opportunism, in his timing, however; the political career of Albert Beveridge was, in fact, inextricably linked to the turn-of-the-century conception of American imperialism and expansion.52

A good place to see this link is in the speech that Beveridge gave to declare his candidacy. The speech itself was well received, and helped make the 37 year old Beveridge a well known figure in Indiana. In this speech Beveridge makes the link

51 Bowers, Beveridge, p. 67.
52 Bowers, Beveridge, pp. See also Braeman, Albert J. Beveridge, pp. 26-27.

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between imperialism and Anglo-Saxon masculinity explicit, and he emphasizes, time and again, the role that manly action must play in US foreign policy.

After beginning his speech, “The March of the Flag,” with a description of the glories of American progress, Beveridge asks a question, “an American question. It is a world question. Shall the American people continue their resistless march toward the commercial supremacy of the world?” The answer Beveridge anticipated was, of course, a vehement “yes.” But after taking his argument through the history of American expansion, and touching upon the recent arrival of Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico in the American orbit, Beveridge asked another question.

What does all this mean for every one of us? It means opportunity for all the glorious young manhood of the Republic, - the most virile, ambitious, impatient, militant manhood the world has ever seen. It means that the resources and the commerce of these immensely rich dominions will be increased as much as American energy is greater than Spanish sloth; for Americans henceforth will monopolize those resources and that commerce.

This quote is remarkable in its combination of Anglo-Saxonism, imperialism and masculinity, and yet it is typical Beveridge; there are many such passages in “The March of the Flag,” and indeed it is these sections that resonated with Beveridge’s audience. The speech was reprinted in the Indianapolis Journal on September 17, 1898, and the state Republican party sent 300,000 copies around the mid-west. Beveridge himself found that his particular take on imperialism made a good platform, and he dedicated all his campaign speeches to the subject.

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54 Bowers, Beveridge, p. 73-78.
Beveridge won election narrowly, defeating the candidate of another faction within the Republican party only after 12 ballots in the Indiana General Assembly. Despite the conditions of his election, Beveridge was confident about the future. Taking stock after his election, Beveridge decided to build on the success of his stump speeches, and continue to speak on the topic of imperialism and expansion when he reached the Senate. This tactic would enable him to continue to build on the success he had made before the election, as well as advertising his ability to deal with foreign policy issues to his colleagues in the Senate. There was a vacant seat on the Senate Foreign Relations committee, and Beveridge hoped to get it. Beveridge was incredibly ambitious; having just won election to the Senate, he was already thinking about the White House, and he saw foreign policy formulation as the first step towards winning the renown that would take him there. 55

Before going to Washington, therefore, Beveridge made a trip to the Philippines in May of 1899 in order to acquaint himself with the conditions there, as well as to turn himself into an expert on the topic – expertise that would belie his youth and inexperience in international affairs. Upon his return in August, Beveridge consulted with President McKinley in Washington and made the rounds in the capitol, trying to round up the support necessary to win the committee assignments he hoped for. In the process, Beveridge’s arrogance and strenuous self-promotion became apparent, and he damaged his reputation. McKinley agreed, believing that Beveridge had hurt “his

55 Braeman, Albert J. Beveridge, p. 42, and Bowers, Beveridge, pp. 66-73.

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standing here by his unwise methods of securing recognition," and admitted that Beveridge was “sometimes tiresome.”

Beveridge’s tireless trumpeting of his own abilities backfired; he did not get the seat on the Foreign Relations Committee, though he was assigned to the Committee on the Philippines as compensation. While this was a setback, Beveridge forged ahead with his plan for national political recognition. The key, he believed, was a brilliant speech that would define and clarify the argument over expansion, and bring glory to himself and his ideas. As John Braeman explains,

Statesmen of the past, so Beveridge had been taught, had shaped the nation’s destiny by flights of eloquence on the floor of the Senate. And so he hoped to fulfill his dream of guiding America’s colonial policy by exploiting his trip in a major speech on the Philippines.

Beveridge’s Senate speech, like “The March of the Flag,” was a masterpiece of imperialist rhetoric. Beveridge’s first ever speech in the Senate, it has been widely quoted since and cited in numerous American history textbooks and document readers, including foreign policy textbooks. The speech, given in support of a resolution that Beveridge himself had put forward, was delivered on January 9th, 1900, and served for many as an introduction to the young Senator from Indiana.

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56 Braeman, Albert J. Beveridge, p. 43. For more on the Philippines trip, see Bowers, Beveridge, pp. 97-109.
57 Braeman, Albert J. Beveridge, p. 44.
The speech attracted national attention. "[T]was a gr-reat speech. T'was a speech ye cud waltz to," said Finley Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley";\(^{59}\) while *The Springfield Republican* wrote that Beveridge "talked like a young Attila come out of the West."

Continuing, the paper wrote that "if his Americanism is the true brand, then indeed is the Republic no more." Naturally, Theodore Roosevelt loved the speech, and the Republican National Committee ordered up a million copies to be distributed nationally.\(^{60}\)

Thematically, the oration covered the same ground as "The March of the Flag," and followed the same argument, an argument which Beveridge laid out at the very beginning: "The Philippines are ours forever, 'territory belonging to the United States forever,' as the Constitution calls them. And just beyond them are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either."\(^{61}\)

Beveridge viewed the recent acquisition of the Philippines as the solution to the requirements of the American economy, as well as an opportunity for Americans intent on exploiting the greater wealth of China. But even more important, the American imperial, expansionistic project could solve the problem of what to do about American men. These men, "the most virile, ambitious, impatient, militant manhood the world has ever seen," to quote Beveridge's previous speech, were in the process of becoming weak and effeminate. The stern duties of empire, the "white man's burden" as Kipling warned American policy makers, required men of a certain character.

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\(^{59}\) Finley Peter Dunne, "Young Oratory," in *Mr. Dooley's Philosophy*, New York: R. H. Russel, 1902. Pages 129-133; quote is on p. 131.


\(^{61}\) For the full text of the speech, see *Congressional Record*, 56\(^{th}\) Congress, 1\(^{st}\) Session, pp. 704-712.
The question of the Philippines, Beveridge agreed, was not merely a question of policy, of expansion, or of economics. Rather,

this question is deeper than any question of party politics; deeper than any question of the isolated policy of our country even; deeper even than any question of constitutional power. It is elemental. It is racial.

For Beveridge, the issue of American expansion in general, and the Philippines in particular, was a matter of the westward spread of Anglo-Saxon culture and power. This was a beneficial thing, not merely for the Philippines and other areas that would come under American control, but it was also good for the United States itself, in that the US would be acting out the will of God.

God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples.

These “savage and senile peoples,” were, of course, the Filipinos, who had embarked on their own liberation before the United States intervened in 1898. Led by Emiliano Aguinaldo, a committed Filipino force had struck the first blows for independence long before Admiral Dewey allowed Mr. Gridley to commence firing on the Spanish ships in Manila Bay. Following the collapse of the Spanish military in the Philippines, the United States supplanted the former colonial power and stepped in to administer its new possession. This assumption of control, Beveridge argued, was absolutely essential, not just for the Philippines, but also for the future of the American race:

Were it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race, He has marked the American people as his chosen people to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission
of America, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace. The judgment of the Master is upon us: ‘Ye have been faithful over a few things; I will make you rule over many things.’

It was God’s will, Beveridge believed, that the United States should take control of the Islands in order to continue civilization’s progress. Because the US was chosen by God, it had no choice but to stoop to conquering. American control would be a boon for the Filipinos as well, for American political institutions would help to improve and prepare the effeminate Filipinos for self-government. As Beveridge was to write later, “The purpose of our institutions is to manufacture manhood.” American institutions, exported to the Philippines, would do the same social work for the Filipinos that the American government had done for Americans, that is, make men.

These quotes from Beveridge’s first speech in the Senate show the extent to which Beveridge combined US foreign policy with American masculinity, and how he argued for the performance of manly duties in the service of empire. Like Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Beveridge believed that the US needed to act on the global stage the way a man should act in modern American society.

The only problem with this equation was Beveridge’s fear (shared by Henry Cabot Lodge) that American men were not up to the task. In fact, the irony was that changes in the very American institutions that Beveridge praised may actually be causing the "weakness" the he thought he saw. The "enervation" Beveridge saw was due not only


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Beveridge was also anxious about the increasing influence of women, who were themselves beginning to claim a larger role in American society. This anxiety over the increasing effeminacy of men concerned imperialists, for they saw in male decline the beginnings of the end of American supremacy. Since the nation was dependent upon the manly characters of American men, a weakness, or a faltering, in the manhood of American men would have disastrous consequences for US foreign policy.

The connection between the responsibilities created by American overseas expansion and the fear of male decline led Beveridge to author a thick volume of some 400 pages titled *The Young Man and the World*. In those pages, Beveridge hoped to present the youth of America with some guidelines to live their lives by so that their "character" would be firmed up. The book itself is divided into chapters with titles such as "The Young Man and the Nation," "The World and the Young Man," "Great Things Yet to Be Done," "The Young Lawyer and his Beginnings," and "The Young Man and the Pulpit."

Like Roosevelt's writings aimed at boys and young men, Beveridge's book seeks to inculcate a particular set of virtues. In the preface to the volume, Beveridge points out that the book is actually a collection of articles written for the *Saturday Evening Post*, the first of which was, in fact, "The Young Man and the World." That article, he wrote, was meant "as an addition to a series of articles upon the Philippines and statesmen of..."
contemporaneous eminence." For Beveridge, there was a clear connection between ideals of masculinity and an expansionistic foreign policy.

Ostensibly a guide to developing the character and thought of young American men for future success, the article “The Young Man and the World” lays out qualities that Beveridge believes are indispensable to the young man of 1905. These are sincerity, courage, reserve and intellect. While this list of “qualities” is not very remarkable, Beveridge imbues them with a particular weight. Listing the men of “genius” whom American boys can compare themselves to - “men in whom the energy, the thought, the imagination, the power of hundreds of men are concentrated” – Beveridge generated a list which begins with “Alexander, Cæsar, Richilieu, Napoleon, Bismarck, Washington” and ends with “Peter the Great.”

Beveridge's ideal man of "genius" is revealed to be a military man, an expansionist, and with the exception of Washington (who seems a bit out of place) an imperialist. Lest his readers become overwhelmed, Beveridge provides a handy summation of his argument. “Be a man; that’s the sum of it all – be a man. Be all that we Americans mean by those three words.” The cumulative import of those words, at the end of an article titled “The Young Man and the World,” an article written out of fear for American decline, is that American masculinity can be found in the military heroes and empire builders of the past, empire builders who were famous for action, famous for the performance of military feats of conquest. To be expansionistic, to be an empire

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64 Beveridge, The Young Man and the World, preface (unnumbered page).
65 Beveridge, The Young Man and the World, p. 47.

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builder, in other words to take antique conceptions of masculinity and perform them on
the international stage, was to truly "be a man" in the American meaning of the word.

The key, once again, is performance; it was not enough to be born a male
biologically, and it was not enough to adhere to the socially prescribed role that men were
expected to play. No, Beveridge and his colleagues expected more. They expected that
men perform their masculinity, and that they act out their beliefs and their values on the
world stage.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, through the writings and actions of
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Albert Beveridge, in addition to the
larger than life presence of Theodore Roosevelt, the connection between the performance
of American conceptions of masculinity and an expansionistic foreign policy was forged
and strengthened. Moreover, this connection became the central support for the effort to
save the United States from decline and to maintain international power and prestige. "If
we do not advance, we recede," Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote, and as Henry Cabot Lodge
argued, the key to advancement was the performance of masculine acts based on
historical examples from the past. It is in this context, the context of manly performance
and imperial expansion, that his colleague Albert J. Beveridge spoke, unsurprisingly,
"like a young Attila come out of the West."

While Roosevelt, Mahan, Lodge, and Beveridge, with their like-minded
colleagues, had forged a powerful connection between their conceptions of ideal
masculine performance and foreign policy, their definition of masculinity did not go
unchallenged. The chapters that follow will examine some of the challenges to the
Rooseveltian consensus that argued that the United States must "play the man."
CHAPTER III

"THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN AND NATIONS:"
JOHN REED AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

John Reed was a journalist, poet, Harvard man, and an active member of New York's salon society, but he was also a socialist. As a socialist, Reed objected to hierarchies of class. His socialist vision of foreign policy was explicitly non-hierarchical, which made it very different from the competitive foreign policy of strenuous masculinity discussed in the previous chapters. Where Teddy Roosevelt described the United States as a lone patriarch, leaving home to battle for world supremacy, Reed preferred to use the language of international brotherhood, envisioning the United States as a "brother" to other nations, rather than a father.

Although Reed's concept of brotherhood was rooted in socialist thought and opposed to class distinction and privilege, it was still distinctly masculinist, and it is important to note that the rough-living, hard-drinking socialist brotherhood that Reed describes was decidedly strenuous. John Reed's masculinity of brotherhood differs from TR's strenuous masculinity in that it strives for equality rather than supremacy, but in this chapter I will explore the similarities as well as the differences between Reed and Roosevelt's masculinist politics. The central similarity is that although Reed diverges from the other important figures of the period in many important ways, he never diverges from a fundamentally masculine ethos.

The best place to see Reed's conjunction of socialism, masculinity and international relations is in his writings on the Mexican Revolution. In January of 1914, John Reed was deep in the state of Chihuahua, riding with a unit of Francisco "Pancho" Villa’s army, a
unit named simply 'La Tropa.' During a day’s hard riding, Reed was called to ride by the side of Captain Fernando at the head of the column. Passing him a half-full bottle of the Mexican drink sotol, Fernando ordered him to drink it. “Drink it all. Show you’re a man.” Reed obligingly downed the contents of the bottle.

A howl of laughter and applause went up. Fernando leaned over and gripped my hand. ‘Good for you, companero!’ he bellowed, rolling with mirth... Now you are with the men (los hombres). When we win the revolución it will be a government by the men - not by the rich. We are riding over the lands of the men. They used to belong to the rich, but now they belong to me and to the companeros.¹

This episode serves as a good introduction to John Reed’s view of the Mexican Revolution, and his analysis of the motivations of the men who followed the Constitutionalist Armies of Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza. In Reed’s eyes, the revolutionary movement was equal parts agrarian land reform and masculine camaraderie. Reed’s brotherhood with La Tropa might be considered important only for its story of revolutionary adventure were it not for the fact that Reed’s journalism was influential in shaping of American attitudes and policies towards Mexico, including the thinking of President Woodrow Wilson.

This chapter will examine Reed’s view of the war, the link between Reed and Woodrow Wilson, and the model that Reed’s masculine view of the Mexican Revolution presented to U.S. foreign policy. I argue that Reed understood and experienced the Mexican Revolution as a manly romantic adventure, one which served to unite ‘the people’ under a banner of brotherhood, and which helped to unite them in opposition to the exploitation of the landed and aristocratic elite. Reed’s model of revolutionary socialist brotherhood served as the paradigm for his vision of future U.S.-Mexican relations; the United States and Mexico, Reed believed, should act together as “brothers,” and in a spirit

of brotherhood act to solve their common problems, among them the problems of capitalist exploitation and the dehumanizing forces of modern society.

More than most men, Reed believed in the analogy that joined manly action and foreign policy, the analogy that was expressed so famously by Theodore Roosevelt. In fact, Reed put his personal politics into action even more than Roosevelt himself. The crucial difference, however, is that since Reed was a socialist, he believed more in collective action, than in capitalism and individualism. Reed would have agreed with TR that the United States needed to act like a man; he would have vehemently opposed TR’s definition of how a man should act. This chapter will explore Reed’s definition of how men should behave, and his proposals for U.S. policy towards Mexico.

While Reed’s ideas were ultimately unsuccessful, they did get a hearing at the White House. Woodrow Wilson’s serious consideration and eventual rejection of Reed’s model of international socialist brotherhood sheds light on U.S.-Mexican relations as they developed, and gives an interesting glimpse of what might have been, had Reed’s model been pursued.

Just 26 years old, Reed had been sent to Mexico as a reporter for Metropolitan, The New York World, and The Masses, publications that hoped to find out exactly what was happening in Mexico. Reed’s search for the story of the Revolution had led him to the Constitutionalist army led by Villa. After spending time with Villa, Reed was given permission to follow the Army of General Tomás Urbina, who was in charge of “La Tropa.” It was while he was with “La Tropa” that Reed’s views of Mexico, the Mexican people, and the Revolution were formed.

Reed’s views of the United States, of Americans, and of the capitalist system, had been formed earlier. John Reed was born into a middle-class family in Portland, Oregon in 1887. His father was a Progressive reformer who instilled in Reed a sense of righteousness that would later surface in Reed’s own political views. The younger Reed went to private school and then to Harvard, graduating in 1910. Making his way to New York City to
become a poet, Reed’s romantic tendencies led him to the bohemian artistic circles on Greenwich Village. Getting caught up in the life around Washington Square, he spent time with all manner of individuals with all manner of political views - anarchists, syndicalists, nihilists, socialists, communists, feminists, capitalists, industrialists and artists.

The community that Reed arrived in was a vibrant center for free thinking and new radical ideas. As Christine Stansell points out,

> It was a coherent milieu with distinctly American protagonists – gentlemen at odds with their class, women at odds with their roles, and immigrants seeking conversations outside the ghetto. "It is the best stamping ground for men of talent," [Art Critic James] Huneker went on to boast. "Ideas circulate. Brain tilts with brain. Eccentricity must show cause or be jostled."

As Huneker’s quote indicates, the bohemian milieu of lower Manhattan merely altered the conceptions of masculinity that were relevant in fin-de-siecle America. The notions of manly struggle, of competition, and of the idea that worth was proved through such contests remained. The bohemians, for all their radical beliefs, left their conceptions of gender untouched at the root.

That does not mean, however, that their beliefs and ideas were insincere. On the contrary, the Villagers of Reed’s circle were dedicated to finding a new way, a different approach, to modern American life. Stansell argues that “[t]he turn to Bohemia was one manifestation of gathering revulsion against a society that seemed locked in a stranglehold of bourgeois resolve.”

In the face of major, seemingly systemic, problems in American life, and the increasing evidence that the two major political parties lacked the will or the resolve to do anything about them, young intellectuals and activists in the Village began to look elsewhere for other solutions.

The decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time when the reforming spirit of populism moved toward progressivism, an urban reform movement - in

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fact, many of the bohemians of Reed’s circle can be seen as the furthest outlying members of the Progressive movement, a movement which believed in the use of government instruments and other organizations to bring about change for the common good.  

Writers aligned with the Progressive movement mobilized their pens on behalf of reform, and journals and books dedicated to reforming and cleaning up business, government and the cities proliferated. Many of these ‘muckrakers,’ to use Theodore Roosevelt’s phrase (itself appropriated from Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress), became famous, and their works extremely influential. Writers like Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell and Upton Sinclair took on big business and occasionally won – Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906), for example, led directly to the passage of the Meat Inspection Act of 1906, and provided impetus for the Pure Food and Drug Act which was passed the same day.

Related to the Progressive movement, then, was a rapid growth in magazine publications and their influence, as journals such as McClure’s, Metropolitan, Cosmopolitan, The New Yorker, The New Republic and The Masses all saw the light of day. Of these journals, it was The Masses that fit Reed’s personality and perspectives the best. Having come across a copy of The Masses by chance, Reed found a forum for his literary output and his quasi-radical views, views that espoused the I.W.W., socialism, feminism and free love.

The Masses espoused socialism as the solution to American problems. Socialism in America has an interesting history, one that conflicts with long-held conceptions of masculinity. Perhaps not surprisingly, many American ideas of masculinity are connected

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3 Stansell, American Moderns, p. 14
4 Progressivism was famously described by William Allen White as populism which “shaved its whiskers, washed its shirt, put on a derby, and moved up into the middle class,” and there are indeed similar strains behind each movement. For more on the connections, see Robert Wiebe’s The Search for Order: 1877 – 1920, New York: Hill and Wang, 1967; and Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., New York: Vintage Books, 1955.)

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to the idea of work and the legend of ‘American opportunity.’ In order to understand Reed’s arguments, we need to consider the nature of work in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The United States has long been considered, rightly or wrongly, as a fabled land of opportunity; from the very first settlers to today, the freedom to work and the dream of social and economic advancement have gone hand in hand with the American political project, even as economic independence is linked to political independence. Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men argues that “the concept of ‘free labor’ lay at the heart of the Republican ideology, and expressed a coherent social outlook, a model of the good society.”

The decade before the Civil War there was a growing concern in the North that slavery threatened to do away with the right of men to work where and how they wanted. In many cases, Northern opposition to slavery in the new territories of the west was rooted in the fear that slavery would limit opportunity for Northern men. Foner points out how the North was rooted in a Calvinist work ethic that praised the generation of capital, and saw Southern society, which was dominated by slavery, as a threat to their way of life. Report after report was published in the North. “Republican newspapers carried countless reports from travelers to the slave states and the testimony of southern spokesmen themselves. The burden of this evidence was always the same – the southern economy was backward and stagnant, and slavery was to blame.”

Many northerners believed that work and manliness were related, and that the lack of work led to lassitude, loss of initiative, and a general sense of enervation. In addition, the newspaper accounts of the South that appeared in the papers spoke often of houses being unpainted and fields left untidy, in addition to making frequent comments on the lack of a

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7 Foner, Free Men, p. 41.

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middle class in the Southern economy. Either the whites were rich slave owners who lived off the labor of others, or they were poor, shiftless, workers who would never amount to anything, in part because of the structure of the economy. These workers were also paying the price of an economy that relied too much on unpaid labor.  

Playing off these constructions of Southern identity the Republican Party sought to guarantee the rights of laborers (men, that is) to work, and therefore the Party stressed the need to combat slavery. While Lincoln may not have believed in the essential equality of Blacks and whites, he did see Blacks as human, and therefore as individuals who had the right to enjoy the fruits of their own labor.

Black laborers, however, posed a problem for many whites, and not just Southerners. In the rapidly industrializing North, Black laborers' search for work provoked fear in white workers, and engendered a response with wide reaching consequences. This response was the development of the belief in the importance of 'whiteness,' and the consequent assignment of the social and political benefits that went along with it.

Whiteness, then, was as inextricably linked to ideas of labor and work as was masculinity. This has been investigated by a number of recent studies. David Roediger's The Wages of Whiteness explores the construction of divisions between laborers along the lines of racial differences, and like Noel Ignatiev in How the Irish Became White, Roediger pays particular attention to the attitudes of Irish immigrants in urban areas of the United States in the mid nineteenth century, and their attempts to carve out a rung on the American social ladder. Roediger and Ignatiev point out that their tenuous hold on their position in American society was claimed only at the expense of African American workers, who themselves were in the process of making the transition from slavery to wage labor.

Roediger and Ignatiev point out the ways in which a hierarchical racial identity (that is, the codification of differences between 'blackness' and 'whiteness' ) was one of the

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9 See Foner, Free Men, pp. 40-49 for several accounts.
rewards that ‘white’ workers were ‘paid’ by American society. Recent Irish immigrants may not have had better jobs, better reputations among the American elites, or even a different socio-economic status than African Americans, but their claim of racial superiority, namely that they were ‘white’ and not ‘black,’ gave them enough to go on. As Roediger writes, “status and privileges conferred by race could be used to make up for alienating and exploitive class relationships … White workers could, and did, define and accept their class position as ‘not slaves,’ and ‘not Blacks.’”

The problem, of course, was that Blacks and Whites on the bottom of the economic scale had more in common than they had differences. Discounting actual physical appearance, the situation between recent immigrants (Irish immigrants in particular) and Blacks was similar. Their economic opportunities were circumscribed, the professions that they were allowed to engage in were limited, certain neighborhoods were blocked off from their settlement, their churches were central organizers of social life, while they also came to provide solace and an increasingly strong locus of moral and political power. In fact, as Roediger and Ignatiev point out, the creation of ‘whiteness’ hurt white workers as much, and perhaps more, than it did the Black workers. As Roediger puts it,

Race feeling and the benefits conferred by whiteness made white Southern workers forget their ‘practically identical interests’ with the Black poor and accept stunted lives for themselves and for those more oppressed than themselves … [W]hite supremacy undermined not just working class unity but the very vision of many white workers.

What these workers could not see was the vision of a nation with much greater equality, a nation with fewer (and/or smaller) class divisions, a nation with a successful labor movement, a nation where racism was not the divisive issue it became. Instead, the result of

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10 A great deal has been written on Abraham Lincoln, but a good single volume biography is David Herbert Donald's *Lincoln*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. For Lincoln’s racial views, expressed in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, see pp. 215-224.
12 Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, p. 13

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the belief in ‘whiteness’ was that racial difference became codified, and that American workers remained divided along racial lines rather than uniting to combat the exploitation and the oppression of the nascent American industrial system.

Socialism offered one alternative to unite workers by class across racial lines, but it was not able to succeed in the U.S. Many historians have attempted to answer the question of why the United States, of all the world’s industrial nations, never had a viable socialist movement. Tracing a number of important reasons why socialism never took hold, historians have looked at political, social, economic and historical issues that made the U.S. exceptional in its rejection of the socialist path. Only recently, however, have historians begun to examine socialism as a movement with a strong racial component, a movement that played a large role in the construction of whiteness; this will doubtless prove a valuable tool. As Jacqueline Jones has explained, “[i]n the history of the idea of whiteness … lies a good deal of the reason why socialism failed in America.”

It makes perfect sense that whiteness and American constructions of masculinity lie at the heart of not just the labor movement in the United States, but the socialist movement as well. The conjunction of these ideas needs to be considered when discussing the careers of prominent socialists in the early part of the Twentieth Century, and especially when considering the career of John Reed. Bridging the divide between Blacks and Whites, as well as that between labor unions, was one of the goals of American socialists and labor groups, the IWW in particular. The Wobblies, with their goal of creating “One Big Union,” were active in trying to unite workers, regardless of skill level, racial designation or immigration status. It makes a great deal of sense that in the early twentieth century, and the 1910s in particular, the Wobblies were able to attract the sympathy of New York socialite socialists such as John Reed, even as they were singled out for particular harassment from the established economic and political powers.

Complicating this attempt at unity, however, was the issue of gender, and the ideology of 'manliness' in particular, specifically the way 'whiteness' and 'manliness' were intertwined. Historians have traced the origins of the combination of manliness and the working class to the ideology of the Revolutionary era; "As the working class matured ... within a slaveholding republic" Roediger writes, "the heritage of the Revolution made independence a powerful masculine personal ideal."14 This began to change, however, as the expansion of the United States westward threatened to expand the reach of slavery.

Slavery was intolerable to many laborers not because of opposition to racist policies, but because slaves worked under compulsion, and they did not work for wages. Labor unions may have provided a necessary corrective to the power exercised by industrialists, but they could not do much about slavery. American men had no desire to be either a real slave, or a "wage slave," and acted to make sure that they were guaranteed the ability to shop their work around.15

Work, and the fear of limits on it, was intimately connected to notions of manliness and masculinity, as well as being connected to male provider anxiety. Roosevelt, a Republican, spoke often of the relationship between working and being a man. By the time Reed begins writing, however, the socialist movement had had some success in challenging the connection between manliness and labor. The "Bread and Roses" strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912 successfully challenged industrial power, but this famous strike may be the exception that proves the rule; many of the strikers were "radicals of the worst sort," namely women strikers who transgressed traditional gender, labor, and political hierarchies. Other strikes, including the Silk Strike in Paterson, New Jersey, where Reed

14 Roediger, Wages of Whiteness, p. 13.
was arrested, were failures, in part because the industrialists had learned from Lawrence, and maintained tighter control, not allowing such gender transgression to occur.¹⁶

Reed’s socialism, then, was rooted in a conception of manly action that was often contradictory; his socialist impulses in the direction of brotherhood and solidarity were often tempered by his belief in a rather Rooseveltian strenuous life. Reed’s notion of masculinity, rooted in the romantic ideal of manliness promoted by prep schools and Ivy League colleges like Harvard, was much closer to that of Roosevelt than it was to that of the factory workers that he championed.¹⁷ It is not surprising that his biographer, Robert Rosenstone, describes him as a “Romantic Revolutionary;” Reed, despite his intentions, comes across as a revolutionary dilettante, a man whose class background, education, and essential manly identity separate him from the “people” he wants to be a part of. It is perhaps not surprising that his greatest successes come in describing “others” to Americans, and in such a way that his American identity is given a greater emphasis than his socialism. In *Insurgent Mexico*, *The War in Eastern Europe*, and *Ten Days that Shook the World*, Reed is an expatriate American writing (very well) on important news stories; he is more the reporter than the socialist in this context.

While covering the Paterson Silk Strike for *The Masses*, Reed became radicalized, having seen first hand the link between political institutions and factory management. Reed helped to write and stage a famous pageant at Madison Square Garden in 1913 to raise money for the striking workers, a pageant that featured the workers themselves in a new kind of social-realist mass labor-theater. It was on the basis of the pageant, and on the

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¹⁶ See Ardis Cameron’s *Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1860-1912* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), for an excellent overview of this theme.

¹⁷ Harvard was at this point a bastion of the manly ethos – see Kim Townsend’s *Manhood at Harvard: William James and Others*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996, for an extended discussion.
strength of pieces written for *The Masses*, that Reed was asked to go to Mexico as a correspondent.  

The power of Reed’s writing, which can be seen in all of his successful journalistic pieces, grows out of his identification with his subject, and in his performance of his socialism. As a writer, and the son of a well-to-do family, Reed was not actually a factory worker, nor a Mexican revolutionary; he performed those roles (getting arrested in Paterson, and coming under fire in Mexico, while doing so), and played the part well. That is beside the point, however – Reed’s socialism, like his masculinity, was rooted in the act; that is not to say that his sentiments were not genuine, but Reed believed implicitly in the necessity of involvement, in the need to be involved, to be on the scene, to be arrested and to be shot at – both his socialism and his masculinity require manly performance. It is this belief that shapes his view of foreign policy as well.

In the course of his coverage of the Paterson strike, and the resultant pageant, Reed had come to know the strikers and the goals they fought for, through time spent with them in jail. Though still not one of the workers, the time Reed spent in jail for refusing to leave the picket line allowed him to identify himself with the workers, and write passionately and effectively about their struggle. The key to John Reed, and his writing, is not to be found in his objective reporting; rather, it is the lack of objectivity that makes it interesting.

Reed’s reporting tells us as much about Reed himself as it does about the event under scrutiny. According to Robert Rosenstone, “a fusion of self with historical event occurred because [Reed’s] writing reflected a search for meaning and self-definition. The question raised in [his writing about La Tropa] is central to his whole experience in Mexico; indeed it had hovered unspoken in his mind for years: how does one become a man?”

Reed’s childhood experience as a sickly youth surrounded by Portland’s muscular

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18 Here, and elsewhere, I have relied on Robert Rosenstone’s *Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, and Granville Hicks, *John Reed: The Making of a Revolutionary*, New York: Benjamin Blom, 1968. Rosenstone’s biography is the newest, and at this point the best. For his early life, see particularly pp. 3-159.
lumberjacks, sailors and cowboys, his admiration for his father and his political reforms, in addition to his own desire to prove himself, led Reed to become convinced that manliness was something that was performed through particular activities. "For Reed," Rosenstone explains, "being a man had something to do with drinking, swearing, fighting, enduring hardship and making the kind of principled stand that might lead to destruction." 20 This statement functions as a pretty succinct description of the masculinity Reed found with La Tropa, and which he laid as the foundation for his foreign policy paradigm.

Reed’s dispatches increasingly sympathized with the forces of Villa, and argued that the main goal of the Mexican revolution was land reform. After interviewing Carranza, the leader of the Constitutionalists, Reed described him as less a man than Villa, a man who denounced his enemies in a high pitched, loud and quavering (read: effeminate) voice. Reed tried to picture him as the leader of the revolution, but failed: “I tried to think that here was the voice of aroused Mexico thundering at her enemies; but it seemed like nothing so much as a slightly senile old man, tired and irritated.”21

Reed's view of Carranza follows Roosevelt's classic analogy; as the man is to the nation, so is the nation to the world. Carranza, "a slightly senile old man," did not have the requisite manliness to provide the model for Mexico. Reed "tried to think that here was the voice of aroused Mexico," but he could not equate the "tired and irritated" man with something so manly as a revolution. Reed's political views of the situation were clearly shaped by his view of Carranza's masculinity, a view that was in line with the Rooseveltian view that equated personal masculinity with national performance.

Reed’s writing about Mexico, then, was shaped by two factors. First, Reed identified with the revolutionaries of La Tropa, his affections growing out of a personal connection that he was able to make with the soldiers’ masculinity. Second, this connection, and in fact his entire analysis of the differences between Carranza and Villa, rested on

19 Rosenstone, *Romantic Revolutionary*, p. 150. See also Hicks, *John Reed*, pp. 114-117.
Reed’s evaluation of each individual’s manliness. Further, Reed’s description of Villa and Carranza, rooted in the prevalent conceptions of masculinity, became important because of the influence that Reed’s reporting had on the United States.

Reed was exceptionally lucky in his reporting - by traveling with Villa, and developing a kind of friendship with him, Reed was able to travel places where other reporters were not able to go, in addition to being allowed to travel with the army. He was also able to “scoop” other reporters, as he did in his reporting on the battle of Torreon, because of his proximity to Villa and his army. Reed’s reports, therefore, have an immediacy and a power that other reporters were not able to match. Add to this Reed’s focus on manliness and masculinity, and the result is powerful war reporting, that looks at the human cost of war as well as the political goals of the men who are fighting.

Some have argued that the immediacy, the passion and the involvement of the book comes at the cost of accuracy and balance. While Reed may have elaborated upon the facts, in many ways that is beside the point; despite the poetic license, “there is no doubt [Insurgent Mexico] contains the core of his reaction to Mexico. There, among the ragged troops of revolutionary armies, Jack [Reed] underwent many experiences that could be summed up in the glorious feeling that he was truly one of los hombres.”

Reed left for Mexico in 1913, but the conflict had already been going on for several years. The Mexican revolution had begun in 1910 with Francisco Madero’s campaign to prevent the reelection of Porfirio Diaz, a dictator who had ruled Mexico since 1876. By focusing his attack on Diaz’s abusive dictatorial powers, and by stressing the opportunities that “good government” held for Mexico (much as progressives did in the U.S.), Madero was able to weld disparate political forces into a coalition united by their opposition to Diaz.

21 Reed, Insurgent Mexico, p. 251.
22 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 150.
Though Diaz tried to eliminate this political coalition by force, the opposition was finally able to drive him from power, and he resigned on May 25, 1911. 23

After Diaz’s resignation, a provisional government headed by Diaz’s former minister of former affairs ruled from May to November; but it became rapidly apparent that though Diaz had been driven out of power, the old political system remained. The coalition originally united in opposition to Diaz remained intact. The provisional government tried to split the opposition into factions by attacking one of the most prominent of the reformers, a man named Emiliano Zapata. In addition to his opposition to Diaz, Zapata was in favor of land reform, specifically, the appropriation and redistribution of land that belonged to huge haciendas, or ranches. Many of the haciendas were owned by American companies or absentee owners, and there was strong support for agrarian reform among the peasants who made up a large part of the Zapatista army.24

Many of Madero’s supporters, however, were not in favor of land reform; they were political, and not social, reformers, who sought merely to remove the dictator from the government, not any kind of wholesale political change. When the provisional government attacked Zapata, they were trying to split the agrarian and the political reformers, two groups that had been united only in their opposition to Diaz, and thereby preserve the old, dictatorial, political system. 25

When Madero finally took office in November of 1911, the coalition that had driven out Diaz, and put Madero in power, was fraying, but not yet broken. Zapata and his supporters had maintained their faith in Madero’s revolutionary spirit, and were waiting for the beginning of land reform. Madero, who was more interested in political reform, however, did not see land reform as an urgent problem and put it on the back burner.

24 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 15.
25 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 15-16.
Meanwhile the Federal army (that was loyal to the old order, and therefore beyond Madero’s control) tried to eliminate Zapata and his peasant army from Morelos.  

At this point the coalition broke, and Zapata proclaimed the famous Plan of Ayala on November 28, 1911, a plan that stressed the elimination of the hacendados and the redistribution of land to the villages and peasants. Madero spent the rest of his time in office trying to deal with the agrarian reform movement led by Zapata, in addition to managing the political and constitutional reforms that he was intent upon. He was ultimately unable to do either, and he was forced out of office in February of 1913, and later shot, by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta. Huerta had been able to gain power by playing on the fears that Mexico’s reform movement might go too far; one of the men who was afraid of the reformist turn Mexico was taking was the American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, who had conspired with Huerta in the overthrow of Madero. Wilson had encouraged Huerta because of fears that Madero was going to nationalize American investments; Huerta, of course, promised not to do it. 

The death of Madero, however, restored the coalition that had splintered with the attempts to crush Zapata and his mainly Indian army from Morelos. Zapata was able to find allies in Villa, who came to control Chihuahua and much of Northern Mexico, and Venustiano Carranza, who had been Governor of Coahuila, to the east. Carranza was not an agrarian reformer, but was rather a political and constitutional reformer. As Robert Freeman Smith points out, Carranza’s focus was national from the very beginning, and his goal was to strengthen the Mexican political system. According to Smith, Carranza was “an intense

26 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 16.

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nationalist, [who] desired in his own way to build a Mexico which could deal with the powers of the world on an equal basis." Smith,

With his global view and state building agenda, Carranza differed greatly from both Zapata and Villa, who had primarily local power and allegiances, and whose political goals were focused on agrarian issues. For Zapata and Villa, "the bureaucratic mechanics of administrative reform and the complicated arguments about legislative and judicial processes seemed to be excuses for delay or even denial of reform." Smith,

The differences between Villa and Zapata on the one hand and Carranza on the other grew wider with time, but when Reed crossed the border in December of 1913, the Constitutionalist coalition still held. Reed, though ignorant of many of the facts of the revolution, was drawn to the cause of agrarian reform as embodied by Pancho Villa. As Rosenstone writes,

Reed sensed rather than knew ... that ... the country was undergoing two revolutions simultaneously, one political, the other agrarian ... Without all the facts arranged and neatly categorized, Reed understood enough of the situation to know where his own sympathies lay ... With little knowledge of the land starvation felt by the peon, or the virtual serfdom in which millions lived, he instinctively felt that no Mexican revolution was worth the name if it was being fought merely for a constitution. Realizing that Carranza was more of a politician than an activist, and one who had taken no positive stand on social reform, Reed's heart naturally embraced the Villistas.

After riding with La Tropa for a while, Reed was befriended by Longinos Guereca, who takes him under his care.

"We shall be compadres, eh?" said Longinos Guereca. "We shall sleep in the same blankets, and always be together. And when we get to Cadena I shall take you to my home, and my father will make you my brother ... I will show you the lost mines of the Spaniards, the richest mines in the world ... We'll work them together, we'll be rich, eh?"

This little vignette illustrates succinctly what Reed believes American foreign policy should be. Taking Roosevelt's analogy as his model, Reed sets up Guereca's generous

28 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 19.
29 Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 19.
30 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, pp 154-155.
31 John Reed, Insurgent Mexico, p. 70.
offer of brotherhood as the model for foreign policy. The United States and Mexico should work as brothers, and through cooperation, both nations can become wealthy. The key, of course, is the trope of brotherhood, rooted in a common masculinity, a manliness that shows itself in fighting together, sleeping together, and working together. Equally essential to this idea of brotherhood was that the offer of cooperation comes from Mexico/Guereca first, and was not proposed by the U.S. / Reed; had the offer for cooperation come from the U.S., the power imbalance would have altered the meaning of the offer.

Reed’s *Insurgent Mexico* is replete with examples that stress the masculinity of the common man. Reed’s description of Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa fits squarely into the model of masculinity that Reed espouses, that of the noble peasant who, in spite of adversity, is able to rise to prominence. Villa, as described by Reed, is a kind of Mexican Horatio Alger hero, with the added romance (and manliness) of the bandit. Reed describes Villa as a “bandit,” and “outlaw,” a “man with the naive simplicity of a savage,” “with reckless and romantic bravery.” Reed describes how “in time of famine, he fed whole districts, and took care of entire villages … Everywhere he was known as The Friend of The Poor. He was the Mexican Robin Hood.”

This is the legendary Pancho Villa, the Villa of ballads and stories, and in fact Villa serves a particular literary purpose for Reed, a purpose that is often at odds with factual evidence. This did not prevent the legendary stories from taking hold; in fact Woodrow Wilson, one of Reed’s many readers, took Reed’s descriptions as fact. In conversation with Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador, Wilson stated that Villa “was a sort of Robin Hood and had spent a not uneventful life robbing the rich in order to give to the poor. He had even at one point kept a butcher’s shop for the purpose of distributing to the poor the proceeds of his innumerable cattle raids.”

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32 Reed, *Insurgent Mexico*, pp. 122-123.
As Friederich Katz, author of the definitive biography of Pancho Villa, points out, Villa was a figure in whom the American left found much to admire.

It was an admiration based on Villa’s popular origins, the popular character of his army, his confiscations of the properties of the oligarchy, and his redistribution, as well as the erroneous notion that he had already distributed land from the state’s haciendas to the peasantry of Chihuahua. Katz aptly describes why Reed was drawn to Villa. Reed, in fact, did believe in Villa’s land redistribution as an accomplished fact, rather than as something to be achieved when the fighting is done. The Villa of legend and the Villa that lived in the mind of the socialist journalist John Reed are indistinguishable.

When the reader of Insurgent Mexico encounters Reed’s section on Villa, after more than one hundred pages, Reed’s connection of masculinity, the land and the Mexican Revolution has been stressed repeatedly. Villa embodies the Mexican revolution – he represents the connection between the traditional Mexican peasant, and the masculine ideal.

For example, Reed describes a ceremony in which Villa is given a medal for bravery. Reed mentions the uniformed men, the band playing, the grand staircase of the palace, the balcony over the square where the award was to take place. Then comes the time for Villa to make his acceptance speech.

But as he looked around the room at those brilliant, educated men, who said they would die for Villa, the peon, and meant it, and as he caught sight through the door of the ragged soldiers, who had forgotten their rigidity and were crowding eagerly into the corridor with eyes fixed eagerly on the compañero that they loved, he realized something of what the Revolution signified ... he leaned across the table in front of him and poured out, in a voice so low that people could hardly hear: “There is no word to speak. All I can say is my heart is all to you.” Reed’s description of this moment highlights the manly camaraderie that he saw as the central aspect of the Revolution. Villa’s love for his men and his men’s love for him elide

the class boundaries that are the central political issues of the Revolution itself – manly action, that is, the performance of manly feats of valor on the field of battle, has enabled Villa to create strong bonds of manly love that bridge the gaps of class. Manliness, for Reed, works as a socially leveling factor.

While Friederich Katz argues that in the figure of Villa Reed found what he was looking for, it is also true that the situation in Mexico itself seemed to be creating a new ideal society.

Reed felt that in Chihuahua the foundations of a socialist society as he envisioned it were being laid. The oligarchy had been expelled from the state, every inhabitant who wanted it had the right to a piece of land, and the state assumed responsibility for the welfare of the poor and the unemployed. Reed felt that in Chihuahua the foundations of a socialist society as he envisioned it were being laid. The oligarchy had been expelled from the state, every inhabitant who wanted it had the right to a piece of land, and the state assumed responsibility for the welfare of the poor and the unemployed. Reed felt that in Chihuahua the foundations of a socialist society as he envisioned it were being laid. The oligarchy had been expelled from the state, every inhabitant who wanted it had the right to a piece of land, and the state assumed responsibility for the welfare of the poor and the unemployed.

What was happening in Chihuahua was the creation of a socialism built on the precepts that Reed valued, that of manly brotherhood, which he saw, and created, in the figure of Villa. It was this society, the future of Mexico, which could serve as a model for the rest of the world, that Reed believed the U.S. should protect, rather than the U.S. dominated oligarchical hacienda system that oppressed the peasants.

Reed returned to New York in early April, but while he was traveling the tense relationship between the United States and Mexico flared into violence. Seven American sailors at Tampico, Mexico had apparently wandered into a restricted area, and were arrested. In short order a conflict marked by conceptions of manly honor ensued. The Mexican commander, a Huertista, had the soldiers released, but the American commander insisted that the Mexicans show their respect by means of a military salute to the American flag. The Mexican commander refused to give the salute, but the American naval officer insisted. Woodrow Wilson backed up the Naval officer, as did Congress. The Mexicans continued to refuse, and tensions rose.

The situation grew more complicated when Wilson learned of a shipment of arms and munitions that was due to arrive at Vera Cruz. Fearing the munitions would upset the

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35 Reed, Insurgent Mexico, p. 121
balance of power at a time when he was planning an intervention, Wilson, on April 21, 1914, ordered a naval force to take the town (Vera Cruz). Sailors and Marines went ashore and took the town at the cost of 19 dead, while the Mexican soldiers and townspeople lost more than 200.\footnote{On Tampico and Vera Cruz, see Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, pp. 10-12, and LaFeber, American Age, p. 280.}

Reed followed these events by reading about them in the paper; he was off reporting on another story. Shortly after his arrival in New York, Reed and Max Eastman, the editor of the socialist journal \textit{The Masses}, left for Ludlow, Colorado, to report on the massacre of miners and their families that happened on April 20, 1914. This event, in which members of the Colorado National guard (actually mine guards with salaries paid by John D. Rockefeller) leveled a strikers’ tent colony with machine guns, reminded Reed of the situation he had just left behind in Mexico. In Mexico, Reed had been struck by the class-war aspects of the Mexican revolution; similarly, Ludlow, which was a “virtual feudal domain” of Rockefeller, revealed a similar political and social crisis – namely that of the workers to find a way to keep body and soul together in the face of capitalist oppression. Upon his return to New York, Reed wrote an article for the \textit{New York Times}, dated April 26\textsuperscript{th} 1914, in which he considers the nature of the Mexican revolution from the class-struggle perspective.\footnote{For a good overview of the situation at Ludlow, see Hicks, \textit{John Reed}, pp. 139-144; Rosenstone, \textit{Romantic Revolutionary}, pp. 172-174.}

Reed’s articles and editorials found publication easily – in fact, his articles met with great acclaim. While Reed was still in Mexico, his articles were running in \textit{The Masses}, \textit{The World}, and \textit{Metropolitan}. The \textit{Metropolitan} ran his article on the fall of Torreon under a banner that said “Word pictures of war by an American Kipling ... What Stephen Crane and Richard Harding Davis did for the Spanish American War in 1898, John Reed, 26 years old has done for Mexico.” \footnote{Rosenstone, \textit{Romantic Revolutionary}, p. 166.} Reed’s friend, fellow Greenwich Villager and Harvard
classmate Walter Lippmann, also loved Reed’s pieces. Lippmann wrote Reed, stating that his “articles are undoubtedly the finest reporting that has ever been done.” Lippmann went on to say

I can’t begin to tell you how good the articles are. You have perfect eyes, and your power of telling leaves nothing to be desired. I want to hug you, Jack. If all history had been reported as you are doing this, Lord - I say that with Jack Reed reporting begins.40

Lippmann was not the only one who admired Reed’s writing about Mexico. Reed's popularity translated quickly into influence at the highest level, and had an impact on U. S. foreign policy. President Woodrow Wilson had read some of Reed’s dispatches, and was particularly impressed by the discussion of the situation that Reed wrote for The New York Times. Titled “The Causes Behind Mexico Revolution,” the article promised to focus on the “Effect of An American Occupation Upon Her Future.” Reed argues in the article that despite the confusion there has only been one Mexican revolution, and that “[I]t was, purely and simply, a fight for land.”41 Reed traced the development of the revolution, from the development of revolutionary sentiment under Diaz to Carranza’s attempts to unite the peons with his more middle-class centered movement.

This brought Reed to a discussion of the importance and popularity of Pancho Villa. Reed’s experience with La Tropa fed directly into the article, and he wrote that Villa’s popularity, his nation-wide support, his success as a Governor of the State of Chihuahua, and his success as a general, were all due to the fact that it was only Villa who had grasped that the Revolution was about land reform. As a result of the land redistribution that Villa began, “sixty-two and a half acres to every adult male,” Zapata joined with Villa, and the Revolution took on a new shape. Because of this new cohesion, both ideological and

military, "[t]he old barriers between communities are broken down," Reed wrote, "thought spreads, and every day more Mexicans join the revolution." 42

Reed saw this development as part of a larger progression. As a result of Villa's land distribution, and its popular support, the people of Mexico developed a nascent democratic belief. In the article, Reed argued that

there has also grown up, not only among the soldiers but even among the women and old men in outlying villages and haciendas far removed from the lines of communication, the feeling and the desire for representative government ... the idea is at last thoroughly implanted in the peons — for the first time. 43

There was much of the traditional romantic American belief in Jeffersonian values behind this assessment — the idea that the ownership of land would bring democratic feeling through a natural developmental process.

Reed's support for this idea was, perhaps, at odds with the socialist position, which would, perhaps, have staked out a more communal approach to the ownership of land, but it is entirely consistent with his focus on and interest in masculinity. It is clear from the quote above, for example, that the manliness that representative government engenders had grown so strong that it affected even those whose masculinity was weak, namely old men and women. As Reed recalled in Insurgent Mexico, Captain Fernando of 'La Tropa' described the goal of the Revolution as the creation of a government "by the men," a line spoken even as they were riding over territory described as "the lands of the men." The land, of course, had been appropriated from the rich, but now it belonged to "the men." Clearly, there was a difference for Reed, as well as for Captain Fernando whose words Reed recorded, between being rich and being a "man."

This difference was rooted in the different modes of land ownership. Reed stressed the manly aspects of this when he described what an American intervention in the Revolution would mean. Reed argued in the article that an intervention was inimical to the Revolution by its very nature. Because the Revolution was rooted in the expropriation and

42 ibid.
redistribution of land, the U.S. was against that policy as a matter of principle, and the net result of the conflict would be the installation of a repressive government, and the wholesale revocation of the right to vote. Reed argued that this was inevitable "because the people's choice for President will take the lands away from the rich who stole them and return them to the people to whom they rightfully belong."\textsuperscript{44}

As a result of this fundamental conflict of interest, Reed argued that it was not the Mexican Army that would be the most determined American foe, it would be the peasants themselves. Because the peasants had already shown that they would take to the streets during the Vera Cruz incident, Reed argued that it would only get worse if the conflict was made national in scope. After comparing the peasants of Mexico to the farmers of Lexington and Concord, Reed concluded his article by making the connection between American intervention and the emasculation of Mexico clear. An American reordering of the Mexican government and society will leave things worse than they were before – an exploiting class firmly entrenched in the places of power, the foreign interests stronger, because we supported them, the great estates securely reestablished, and the peons taught that wage slavery and not individual freedom is the desirable thing in life.\textsuperscript{45}

Wage slavery, as we discussed earlier, was one of the greatest threats to masculinity; slavery itself was greater, but wage slavery also implies the loss of autonomy, the complete dependence on the wage provider, and therefore the loss of independence that is central to being a Man. Wage slavery is not only associated with the agricultural context that Reed uses here in the context of the Mexican Revolution, but is linked even more with the threat industrialization posed to the Jeffersonian ideal.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43} ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} For a discussion of the connections between the republican ideal as articulated by Jefferson and other founders and that of labor leaders, see Leon Fink, \textit{Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics}, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983.
Reed’s understanding of the Mexican Revolution, then, was rooted in the turn of the century conception of masculinity, and his solution was the manhood affirming solution of the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer. When the Mexican peasant took control of his own plot of land, Reed believed, he began a democratic process rooted in the manly ideal of politics, an ideal that reached back through time, past Locke and Hobbes, all the way to Cincinnatus, the legendary Roman citizen/farmer who left his plow to fight for the preservation and safety of the republic.

In the same way as the Roman, the Mexican peasant proved his political worth, as well as his essential manliness, by fighting for the land that granted him nobility. This is Reed’s vision of masculine performance, and it is not that far removed from the ideals of Theodore Roosevelt; the difference here, however, is Reed’s socialist leanings towards brotherhood with the revolutionary, something that Roosevelt would never have considered.

In foreign policy terms, then, though Reed viewed an intervention in Mexico as being in line with economic interests and with American views of international law, he still viewed such a policy as a bad idea. The United States, he observed, is “opposed to the distribution of lands” as undertaken by Villa, but that should not be the decisive factor against American intervention. An intervention, Reed argued, would kill the Revolution – “It will be done forever. And the United States will have quenched an awakening race that might have loomed great in the world’s history.” The connection between an American intervention and the “quenching” of the race is the issue of manliness – because the Revolution is about the creation of men through the working of land, an intervention by the United States prevents the development of the manliness that Reed finds so important. Consequently, Reed’s opposition would help to promote a foreign policy that strengthens the masculinity that he holds as ideal.

In the *Times* article, Reed argued that the revolution was agrarian in nature, and the result of a peasant movement to reclaim land that they had lost during the Diaz years. Reed argued that the political aims of the revolution came about as a secondary result of the
attempt to reclaim their land; the peasants needed to consider the political tools that would help bring about land reform. Reed went on to praise Villa and Zapata, and to question Carranza's commitment to agrarian reform.

Wilson thought enough of the article to clip it and send to his Ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page. With the clipping he wrote that Reed's article

sums up as well as they could be summed up my own conclusions with regard to the issues and the personnel of the pending contest in Mexico. I can verify it from a hundred different sources, most of them sources not in the least touched by predilections for such men as our friends in London have supposed Carranza and Villa to be. 47

Thus, Reed and Wilson share similar thoughts about the Mexican revolution to the extent that Wilson adopted Reed's words, as an expression of his own policy.

Reed returned from Mexico to find that he had become a celebrity. "Publicity in the press had spread his fame far beyond the confines of the village. Besieged with more lecture invitations than he could accept and interviewed by reporters, he was listened to attentively, often quoted in print, and made the object of more than the usual number of inviting glances from women." 48 Reed found that his celebrity gave him more prestige, and that he could use this prestige to argue for American support for the peasant-based class struggle that he saw the Mexican Revolution to be. In fact, Reed soon had the opportunity to argue his case in the Oval Office itself.

In late May of 1914, Reed read in an interview that President Wilson had granted to the *Saturday Evening Post* that he favored a Mexican government that was interested in pursuing agrarian reform. Reed was intrigued, and writing from Provincetown on June 4th, Reed asked Wilson's secretary William Phillips for an interview. Mentioning the forthcoming publication of *Insurgent Mexico*, Reed hoped to get an interview with Wilson where Wilson would tell him the "inside story of the non-recognition of Huerta and the occupation of Vera Cruz, and to indicate, if possible, in what way our Mexican policy has been consistent from first to last." In addition, Reed wanted Wilson to tell him "the

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history of the secret pressure brought to bear upon him by foreign nations whose citizens were heavily interested in the Republic."49

Reed was clearly taking the tack that he would later take during the First World War and the Russian Revolution, that capitalist interests sought to force governments to enact policies on their behalf, and to the detriment of the common people, in this case the "peons" of Mexico. These policies forced the peasants of less developed nations into a situation of dependence, or worse, slavery, and made a brotherhood of equals, Reed's socialist goal, impossible. By standing up for peasants and for workers, Reed believed that he was defending the possibility for a future brotherhood of men.

Reed was unsure, of course, if there was any policy at all at work behind Wilson's dealings with Huerta and the Constitutionalists (as were most Americans), but Reed used that uncertainty as another reason for Wilson to grant the interview. Making his case to Phillips, Reed wrote that "newspapers favorable to the President's policy have, in their bewilderment, failed to convey anything but the impression that the whole business is a series of lucky blunders based on an unworldly idealism. I have an idea that it is a pretty careful, well-thought-out plan. It seems to me it would be of value to present the whole thing to the world." The flattery, plus the chance for Wilson to lay out his geo-strategic plan, got Reed the interview with Wilson, in addition to one with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan.50

Reed's first impression of Wilson was positive; as with his meetings with Carranza and Villa, Reed sees a connection between the man and the government, the man and the nation. In his unpublished manuscript "Presidential Interview," Reed describes Wilson, in his white flannel suit, as "very American," the manly embodiment of the ideal. Wilson, Reed writes, "almost perfectly describes the American theory of government at the point at which it has arrived in the feelings of the great mass of our people." This was because,

48 Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary, p. 172.
according to Reed, Wilson “believes still in the fundamental principles upon which this
government was founded; and in the power of the people peaceably to remedy evils by their
common will.” This impressed Reed – “I never met a man who gave such an impression
of quietness inside. Deep within him is a principle, or a religion, or something, upon which
his whole life rests.” Reed argued that this guiding principle of Wilson’s was an
unswerving loyalty to ‘the will of the people,’ a will that was expressed in events such as the
American Revolutionary War.

These impressions of Wilson's masculinity and his American principles must have
left Reed a bit stunned – as he wrote at the very beginning of “Presidential Interview,”

I remember there were so many things I wanted to ask him, and I thought I had
asked and been answered them all. But after I left the Executive Office, I suddenly
realized that he had only answered what he had wanted to answer, and that some of
the questions I thought had been answered had not been. I don’t yet know how it
happened.

Because he had been managed so handily, Reed had forgotten to discuss the goal of
his article, and writing from Union Station at midnight, Reed asked Wilson for his approval:

I forgot, when I was with you, to ask if you would allow me to write my own
Interpretation of your Mexican policy in an article. It would, of course, be entirely
mine, but I should write it in the light of what you told me, and would not say or
imply that you had told me anything.

Asserting once again that “people don’t know what you’re doing or why,” Reed promised
to allow the President to approve his article before submission.

Wilson replied, with gratitude, that he was “perfectly willing” that Reed “should
use our interview of the other day in the way you suggest for an article of your own written
in the light of what I told you but not bringing me in at all.” This Reed set out to do, and

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51 John Reed, “Presidential Interview,” contained in Woodrow Wilson Papers, vol. 30,
pp. 231-238. This quote is on page 232
in a letter to Wilson he wrote from Provincetown, Reed tried to explain once more his goals for the article.

Quoting from an article he had read in the *English Review* by Sydney Brooks titled "President Wilson," Reed stressed the problems that the President was having making his case. Brooks wrote that

The country has never quite understood, and has therefore never quite subscribed to, the principles which have guided Mr. Wilson throughout the Mexican entanglement or the end he has been pursuing ... His whole Mexican policy, indeed – the problem of how such a man could act in such a way – only becomes comprehensible when the guess is hazarded that his conscience rather than his intellect dictated it.  

Adding his own critique, Reed goes on to say that

Everybody I have talked to seems hopelessly at sea, both as to what was meant by the occupation of Vera Cruz and the consistent policy which I see clearly now you have always maintained in the Mexican question. Nobody knows anything about it, Mr. President.

Reed wanted Wilson to stand up and make it clear that he was on the side of the peasants who were rebelling, the common people who, like the Americans of 1775, were fighting for their liberty. Reed urged Wilson once again, that "[I]f you allow this to be made public, I think that a child might understand the developments which may come hereafter. And it seems to me that by taking the country into your confidence on a question like this a blow could be dealt the "secret diplomacy" of the world's governments, and an easy way opened for the coming of international peace."

Reed clearly believed that he and Wilson saw the situation in Mexico the same way, that is, as a revolution of the people against the wealthy and landed classes. The meeting in the White House had no doubt convinced him of that fact, and while we cannot be sure, it is likely that Wilson expressed his admiration for Reed's summation of the Mexican situation.

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which he sent to Page. Unfortunately Reed was mistaken in his assumption of unanimity with Wilson.

As promised, Reed had forwarded his draft of the article that was going to *The Metropolitan* to Wilson to have it OK'd before submitting for publication. Wilson’s secretary Joseph Patrick Tumulty urged Wilson to reject it because “it contains various statements which might prove very embarrassing and which should be eliminated.”58 Reed worked on it some more, and on June 27th, submitted another draft, with a note that stated:

I don’t want to publish it unless I know that it is in line with your real thoughts about Mexico. You know, of course, that I am in no way violating your confidence, and that no mention will be made of my talk with you, or any inference that these are your sentiments – if they are – expressed in a talk to me.59

Once again, however, Wilson felt he needed to distance himself from Reed’s views. Writing to Tumulty two days later, Wilson wrote that “I admire the man and the work he has done, but clearly it would not be possible to authorize the publication of the article he has sent us. I opened my mind to him completely and with the understanding he was not to quote me.” Going on, Wilson suggested that “[I]f he were to recast the article so as to leave out all quotes or all intimation … I think it would be possible to authorize its publication.” Wilson then suggests a couple of lines for Reed to adopt: “Talking with so frank a man, it was possible to get very clear impressions of what his attitude was in regard to the important matters we discussed. I got the impression, for example, that with regard to * * * he would be pretty certain to decide that, etc.”60

Wilson was being less than frank, of course, for he was in the process of moving away from the position that Reed thought they shared. Wilson must have been convinced by Tumulty’s analysis of Reed’s “embarrassing” statements; it is likely Tumulty reminded Wilson that he could not support a socialist revolution that threatened American

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investments and economic interests. In any case, Tumulty sent Reed a letter denying authorization of the draft Reed had sent. Reed replied the same day with a final, amended draft which he hoped would finally gain approval. Arthur Link, the editor of the Woodrow Wilson Papers believes that Tumulty must have rejected this draft as well, because it was never published;61 Robert Rosenstone, Reed's biographer, argues that "[b]y the time the piece was safe from the White House point of view, it was worthless as an article."62

In terms of understanding Reed's view of the Mexican Revolution and his argument for American foreign policy, it does not matter if it was published or not. In fact, comparing the final paper with the piece published in the New York Times, we can get a pretty good sense of what Reed believed the U.S. should be doing, even if the rewrites and the circumlocutionary tips from Wilson gave Reed the idea that he and the President did not actually see the situation the same way.

Having begun the article by describing Wilson, Reed began to discuss the actual situation in Mexico. "The startling thing about President Wilson's Mexican policy," Reed wrote, "is that it is so obvious." Arguing that Wilson had expressed his ideas many times before, Reed lays out the essentials of Wilson's approach to the Mexican situation, beginning with an evaluation of its historical roots.

It is quite in character that Mr. Wilson ... returns to the attitude that this nation once took toward the world. We boast still that the Revolution of 1775 gave impetus and encouragement to revolutionary democracy all over Europe. We are proud that this nation was dedicated as a refuge for the oppressed of the world: that American sympathy has always been on the side of a people in revolt. 63

Reed clearly believed that Wilson was in full support of the peasants' revolution in Mexico, and that he was following a tradition of American support for revolution: "The dominant note of the President's words, - the point to which he returned again and again,

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was that as long as he was there the United States would not give its support to tyrannies." The Huerta regime, Wilson told Reed, was not worthy of recognition because it was based upon assassination; "That it was a government based upon assassination was secondary; the important thing was that it was not a government of the people." 64

A government of the people, in Reed's mind, was not merely an echo of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, nor was it an abstract American political principle. Government of the people, Reed believed, meant a Mexican government made up of the peasants, the common people who rode with Villa, and the revolutionaries whom Reed encountered while reporting for the New York papers.

Given this perspective, it was relatively optimistic of Reed to believe that the United States was going to back a Revolution that focused on the creation of such a government – particularly in light of American support for the previous repressive Mexican governments. In retrospect it was also optimistic of Reed to believe that Wilson would be the guarantor of such a shift in Mexico. But Reed did believe in it, as we can see. Reed wrote:

It is important to bear in mind the closeness of the relationship of the United States and the Latin-American countries. No revolution down there has ever got anywhere without the sympathy of the United States ... What [Wilson] meant is perfectly plain. The United States did not intend to lend its support, directly or indirectly, to the looting of the people of Central and South America. 65

Having explained the purpose of Wilson's policy of non-recognition, Reed expanded the argument. Utilizing the circumlocutionary phrasing that Wilson himself had recommended, Reed wrote that "[t]alking to so frank a man, it was possible to get a very clear idea of what his attitude had been toward Huerta at this time." Wilson, Reed believed, had taken the right approach when he decided to use "non-recognition" as the core of American policy towards the new government in Mexico. Non-recognition, Reed wrote, is a powerful weapon and a new one in the hands of the world's great States for International Peace. President Wilson is one of the new generation of Peace

64 Reed to Tumulty, "Enclosure," Woodrow Wilson Papers, vol. 30, p. 234

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Advocates - the kind that believes that war is objectionable not primarily because it is bloody or cruel, but because it no longer accomplishes its purpose.66

The advantage of non-recognition is that it is an option to armed conflict, and Reed wrote that Wilson believed “that the whole fabric of civilization rests, not upon force, but upon the convention between human beings that they shall appeal to reason and not to coercion for the settlement of their differences.” Reed went on to make his argument by pointing out that “reason,” and not “coercion” plays itself out in American society everyday, through the American legal system; “That is why we have courts and policemen.”

We have agreed, in theory at least, that in a difference between two men the stronger shall not be allowed to get a club and beat the other to death; and we have created impartial tribunals to settle the case according to its merits. There is no difference between men and nations. The honor, interest and beliefs of two men are just as sacred as those of two nations. The President did not use the army and navy to coerce Huerta. He used them as policemen ... 67

“There is no difference between men and nations,” Reed argued, and there is no inherent difference between men, either, according to Reed’s socialist vision. Rather, there was a difference in class or in social status that was the result of fundamental structural inequities in the economic system. Reed’s argument for socialist brotherhood, the kind that he shared with Longinos Guereca, and his vision of international relations, the kind he hoped to develop with Mexico, were rooted in the same logic. Namely, that “the stronger should not beat the weaker to death,” and that the United States and Mexico should resolve their issues in a court of law, and then get on with their interdependent lives. Returning to Guereca’s language, the U.S. and Mexico “share the same blanket,” and together, they should become wealthy and prosper.

Reed believed that this would only be possible if Wilson recognized the true nature of the Revolution, respected the will of the peasants, and disregarded the pressure of the American business elite who were pushing for intervention in order to preserve their own ill-

gotten gains. At the time of writing, Reed was optimistic: "It is clearly the President’s purpose that no one shall take advantage of Mexico - in any way; neither military dictators, citizens of this country, citizens of foreign countries, nor foreign governments." 68

From this description, it is evident that Reed viewed Wilson as a professor, or a priest, someone who was above the fray, someone who was aloof.

Despite this sense of Wilson's remove, Reed concluded his draft of the interview article with a certain cautious optimism:

According to the evidence of his words and acts, the president is fighting everywhere the small predatory minorities which balk the People’s struggle for intelligence and life. But often the very conditions which gave rise to these minorities were established peaceably, with the consent of the people they oppress; and in that case if possible the conditions must be changed by the people peaceably, for upon the principle of government without coercion rests our civilization. 69

That is an impressive line - “upon the principle of government without coercion rests our civilization.” While it may be true in an ideal world, it was not true in the world that John Reed inhabited, the world of Paterson, of Ludlow, and of Tampico and Vera Cruz. It is, however, the ideal world of Rousseau’s Social Contract, of Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, and other idealized political theorizes that hypothesize a government of men brought together in a shared desire to create a safer and more equable world; one in which limits on liberty were accepted in order to bring about an increase in security. It is in this canon that Reed’s romantic view of an American brotherhood with Mexico belongs.

Unfortunately, U.S./Mexican relations did not play out the way Reed believed they would. Instead of the brotherhood that Reed hoped for, the United States, beginning with Wilson (and continuing to the present day) pursued a foreign policy based upon the use of military and economic power; it was not the brotherhood of equality that the United States

was interested in, but rather the position of the 'big brother' who could have his way by force.

Speaking in 1918, after years of frustration with Mexican policies, and after the failure of the “Punitive Expedition” which had been sent after Pancho Villa, following his March, 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico, Wilson described the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico in sorrowful terms. Speaking to a group of Mexican newspaper editors, Wilson stated that it was unfortunate that the Monroe Doctrine “was adopted without your consent.” Continuing, Wilson added that “We did not ask if it was agreeable to you that we should be your big brother.”

Wilson’s comment is worth thinking about for it illustrates the similarities to, and the distance from, Reed’s vision of socialist brotherhood, and is illustrative of the intellectual connection between the two men. Reed, in his articles and in his book *Insurgent Mexico*, constructed a version of masculine international relations that was defined in terms of brotherhood. Reed was able to discuss this vision in person with Wilson who, though agreeing initially (as indicated by his enthusiasm for Reed’s article), eventually disassociated himself from Reed’s ideas. The vision of fellowship, of “sleeping under the same blanket,” was replaced with the brotherhood of the Monroe Doctrine and the use of force.

This difference in conceptions of a foreign policy of manly performance can also be discerned at the end of Reed's interview. What emerged at the end of the tortuous process was a weak paper that was more Wilson than Reed; this can be plainly seen in Reed’s actual adoption of Wilson’s suggested language. At the same time, though, Reed’s very clear enunciation of the connection between the conception of “nation” and the conception of “man” was preserved. If Reed had been writing for himself, it is doubtful that he developed the idea of the United States as a “policeman,” having seen first hand the connection between law enforcement and big business in places like Paterson and Ludlow.
Rather, it is his desire to connect with, and thereby influence, Wilson that leads Reed to promote the President's words uncritically.

"[A]fter I had left the Executive Office," Reed wrote at the beginning of the piece, "I suddenly realized that he had answered only what he had wanted to answer ... I don't know yet how it happened." What had happened was that Reed had been managed handily by Wilson, and that his ideas of "brotherhood" in foreign policy had been transformed and replaced by Wilson's conception of international affairs as a constitutional, law-and-order interaction.

It is unfortunate that Reed's vision of international "brotherhood" lost out to Wilson's vision of Courts and Policemen. Had Reed's ideas been followed, U.S. foreign policy may have moved to a new level of internationalism, one that focused on the similarities and commonalities between nations, rather than on the conflicts that bring nations together in an entirely different way. John Reed's vision of a U.S. foreign policy based on the idea that nations, like men, are brothers, never had a chance to be put into play; on the other hand, Woodrow Wilson's vision has become famous as much for its grand failure as for its optimistic idealism. This will become clear in the final chapter, where we will explore the trajectory of Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy.

Now we will turn to Jane Addams, and then to W. E. B. Du Bois, as we explore their alternative masculinities and their alternative foreign policy visions.

CHAPTER IV

MANHOOD AS “ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT:”
JANE ADDAMS, PEACE, AND FOREIGN POLICY

On the evening of April 30, 1899, the founder of Hull House, the famous reformer and one of America’s most famous women, Jane Addams, stood up to address the Chicago Liberty Meeting. Taking as her subject “Democracy or Militarism,” Addams addressed the recent attempts by the United States to pacify the Philippines. Arguing that political ideals needed to be adjusted to fit actual situations, she stated that “we may make a mistake in politics as well as in morals by forgetting that new conditions are ever demanding of a new morality.” International peace, Addams claimed, had taken on a new meaning; peace, she argued, “has come to be a rising tide of moral feeling, which is slowly engulfing all pride of conquest and making war impossible.” Warming to her subject, Addams urged her audience to act in the name of peace: “Let us not glorify the brutality [of war]. The same strenuous endeavor, the same heroic self-sacrifice, the same fine courage and readiness to meet death, may be displayed without the accompaniment of killing our fellow men.”

Jane Addams, on that night in Chicago, was trying to claim the high ground in the battle for American masculinity, but she was attempting to do so in terms defined by Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues, who had forged a connection between the performance of masculinity and US foreign policy.

This chapter will examine the degree to which Addams and her colleagues, mainly peace activists and women, were successful in their attempt to disconnect manliness from militarism, and to reconnect it with peace activism. During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, many activists, primarily women, fought against the masculinization of American foreign policy and against militarism. These activists used several strategies to develop new approaches to international relations. One approach was to separate masculinity from international action, and to conceive of a world that was not constructed according to a male model. Another tactic was to redefine what American masculinity should be. Both failed. I argue that the reason for this failure was that it had become impossible for US foreign policy to be conceived in terms that did not equate foreign policy with manly action.

As I have discussed in the previous chapters, at the end of the nineteenth century the concept of masculinity became central to public debate. Vociferous individuals such as Theodore Roosevelt argued that American men needed to return to a more “Strenuous Life,” and engage with the world in a much more physical manner. Drawing on a potent blend of social Darwinism, popular psychology, and imagined history, advocates of the new masculinity promoted all manner of activities and pursuits such as the new games of football, baseball and basketball, the newly organized Scouting movement, and camping in the outdoors as the means of eradicating “the woman within” and recovering some of the traditional strengths of American manhood.

During this period, fears for the fragile economy, and the slow growth of America’s overseas territories, were linked to anxieties regarding the flabby physical bodies of American men. The push to strengthen the economy and expand America’s overseas possessions gave rise to societal pressures for men to strengthen their own bodies. Eventually the two became conflated in an analogy that Theodore Roosevelt described in his famous speech “National Duties,” which held that as men played their part in the life of the nation, so must the United States play a manly role in the affairs of the world.

1 Jane Addams, "Democracy or Militarism" in The Chicago Liberty Meeting, Liberty Tract No. 1 (Chicago: Central Anti-Imperialist League, 1899).
2 Rotundo, American Manhood, pp. 262-274; Kimmel, Manhood in America, pp. 118-155.
As a result, foreign policy took its place at the center of a national debate that equated national character with personal manly character, and the pursuit of the “strenuous life” with the pursuit of empire.

The popular support for the Spanish-American War is a striking example of this combination of resurgent masculinity and American expansionism.\(^3\) This combination was not limited merely to jingoistic outbursts during wartime, however, for the foreign policy debate in the years following the Spanish-American War was also circumscribed by the popular conception of masculinity that Roosevelt espoused. Appalled by the bloodthirsty support for the war, and driven by the Progressive belief in social progress through political action, opponents of American militarism organized themselves into effective proponents for international peace.

Many of the prominent peace groups were initially led by men; this soon caused difficulties for many of the organization’s female members, who felt that the problematic equation of masculinity and national identity was not being addressed. Noted suffragist Carrie Chapman Catt found that that most of these groups had a “very masculine point of view.” In fact, she was forced to conclude after a series of conflicts with the male leadership of various international peace organizations that the movement as a whole was “over-masculinized.”\(^4\) Catt, and other women who had had the same experience, including Jane Addams of Hull House fame, called for the formation of women-led peace advocacy groups. These groups, led by “a handful of determined women, attempted to create a foreign policy constituency out of an existing network of more than a million women who belonged to the popular women’s clubs and organizations of the time.”\(^5\)

This network existed in large part because women did not have the right to vote.

The Women’s Peace Party, the American Union against Militarism, and other, related

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3 Kristin Hoganson’s book, Fighting for American Manhood, is an excellent exploration of this linkage.

groups formed between the Spanish-American War and the end of World War I, followed the model of the Women's Christian Temperance Union and other influential women's groups, as they attempted to influence policy through means other than voting. Acting within the political context of Gilded Age America meant that women were working within a framework dominated by men; in order to be effective, they needed to develop a political strategy that broadened, but did not challenge, the conventional gender order. Women active in the peace movement argued, therefore, that their concern for world affairs was an extension and a continuation of their "social housekeeping," their work on issues such as temperance, the abolition of slavery, and other related social problems where they had exerted influence earlier. As Judith Papachristou explains, these women saw their organizations as "an extension of their domestic responsibilities and described their political activities in the Gilded Age as 'home protection' and as a way to extend the superior morality of the home into public life."  

In this way, women peace activists saw themselves as inherently different from men; men were concerned with the hurly-burly of modern industrial life, and saw the world in terms of politics and business, where profit, competition, and success and failure were the norm. Many women, however, viewed the world in a much more caring, giving and unselfish manner because of a domestic routine that revolved around the home and the family. Because of this difference in experience, activist women frequently rejected the male

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6 The year which marks the end of my period of study, 1920, is also the year in which women won the vote. This is not a coincidence; women were able to gain the support of leaders such as Woodrow Wilson through their support for the war effort. Wilson went so far as to tell Congress in the fall of 1918 that female suffrage was "vital to the winning of the war." See Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) for an analysis of the relationship between women's groups and Wilson's policies. For a study of the women's suffrage movement, see Aileen Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman's Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920*, New York: Norton, 1965.


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world-view of people such as Theodore Roosevelt, as well as the manly view of what the role of government should be.8

Similarly, they found foreign policy to be flawed in its very conception. Progressive politicians tended to view the nation and its government along the classical "rational actor" lines, where policy was the outcome of a rational, considered and deliberate decision making process. Women did not see the extant foreign policy as a rational product at all; in fact it was flawed the same way men were flawed. In fact, women peace activists "regarded foreign policy as an expression and reflection of the men in power, men whose values they saw as inimical to their own precisely because they were male values." 9

As a result, one of the tactics that women chose to utilize to change American foreign policy behavior was to replace American foreign policy's male values with female values. These "female" values, however, reflected not so much the unified views of all women in America, but rather the views of a particular, self-selected group of motivated and determined women. As Sara Evans points out in Born for Liberty, "Those 'female values' really represented the politicized domesticity of middle-class women with its associated prejudices towards blacks, immigrants and the working class."10 Because of this, the goals of female foreign policy advocates did not militate against political, economic, or cultural imperialism nearly as much as they lobbied against war and for international cooperation.

8 For discussions of gendered conceptions on the role of the state, see Linda Gordon, ed., Women, The State, and Welfare, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991) which collects a number of important articles (including Paula Baker's "Domestication of Politics") which examine the role of gender in the formulation of government policies; similarly, Robyn Muncy's Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 1890-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) describes the efforts by women reformers to create a "female dominion," a governmental structure based on female (rather than male) principles, and the way that this organizational structure shaped welfare policy. Muncy's first chapter, "Origins of the Dominion," focuses on Jane Addams and Hull House; in addition, Theda Skocpol's Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) describes the origins, and limitations, of social policies in the U.S. as a result of gendered conceptions of the state.

9 Papachristou, “American Women and Foreign Policy,” p. 495.

Female activists concerned with American foreign policy began, therefore, to focus on issues of international peace. They determined that America's militaristic foreign policy rested on the analogy that linked masculine action with foreign policy. Addams, for instance, argued in her pamphlet "Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time" that the United States, because it had transcended not only the nationalistic feelings that immigrants brought to the US, but also the sectional feelings of the individual states, would be the perfect model to create for a global federalism without nationalism.11 Lucia Ames Mead of Boston urged women to challenge the "pernicious notion ... that patriotism is somehow necessarily connected with the idea of killing." Real patriotism, she argued in "Patriotism and the New Nationalism," meant "study and understanding of the great issues of the time, not dying young or watching loved ones die without opposition."12

Similarly, Anna Howard Shaw attempted to counter the prevailing definition of manliness, albeit from a different angle. Shaw, a woman's suffrage leader, argued that America, through its rampant militaristic culture, "was teaching the wrong idea of what constitutes manliness." Contradicting the prevailing view that males are genetically inclined to fight, Shaw argued that "nine boys out of ten fight simply because they are cowards...They don’t dare not to fight." This point was made often in the years leading up to World War I. As one historian points out, "[t]he assertion that real heroes were to be found ... in homes, and not on the battlefields, was a frequent refrain among female speakers and writers at this time."13

Turning to the education of young men as a means of eliminating the desire for combat, women peace activists opposed the popularity of boy's brigades, among which the most enduring and popular is the Boy Scouts. At the turn of the last century, however,

11 See Jane Addams, Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time, New York: Garland, 1972, especially pp. 6-7
13 National Council of Women, Fourth Triennial Report, 1902, pp. 52-53; for comments on Shaw and the typicality of her arguments, see Papachristou, "American Women and Foreign Policy," p. 504.
pseudo-military parades, uniform and drilling were everywhere, in the church, in the YMCA, in after-school programs like the Scouting movement, as well as in the school itself.\textsuperscript{14} Members of the Grand Army of the Republic, a Civil War veterans' group, argued that the performance of military-style drills in school was essential to the future of the nation. As Cecilia O'Leary points out, these veterans argued that "there could be no 'land of the free' if the United States was not also the 'home of the brave.'"\textsuperscript{15}

The attempt to militarize schools met with a lot of opposition, from parents, teachers, pacifists, and women's groups. The frustration of many women was voiced by Hannah Bailey of the Women's Christian Temperance Union when she wrote in the 1893 Annual report that "We seek to inspire children with a love of peace by making everything of a military nature distasteful to them, but the sham parades, sham battles, sham drills, and sham brigadeism tend to undo our work."\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately for Bailey, worse was yet to come.

While women may have agreed that the goal of international peace was of paramount concern, and that the performance of masculinity was linked to militarism, they did not agree on the means of bringing about a peaceful world. Some women argued that their particular natures could improve the world situation through the moderation of the traditional male love of conflict. One of many who took this approach was Charlotte Perkins Gilman, author of "The Yellow Wallpaper," and a charter member of the Woman's Peace Party. Though described by one of her contemporaries as "perhaps the leading theorist of the extreme American feminist movement,"\textsuperscript{17} Gilman was a respected speaker with views on everything "from child-care to architecture; from feminism to

\textsuperscript{14} For an excellent overview of this movement, see David I. MacLeod, \textit{Building Character in the American Boy: The Boy Scouts, YMCA, and Their Forerunners, 1870-1920.} Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.


\textsuperscript{16} Woman's Christian Temperance Union, \textit{Minutes of the Annual Meeting, 1893,} p. 429. Quoted in Papachristou, "American Women and Foreign Policy," p. 504. For a good overview of the debate over militarism in schools at the turn of the century, see O'Leary, \textit{To Die For,} pp. 181-186.

physiology; from fashion to international relations.”18 Her book The Man Made World, one of 2,168 items published by Gilman, directed her outrage against “androcentric culture,” and blamed men for the concept of war. Gilman attacked militarism head-on, and did it in terms of the gendered roles that were so familiar to followers of Roosevelt. Where someone like TR found glory and exaltation in combat, Gilman wrote that “[i]n warfare, per se, we find maleness in its absurdest extremes. Here is to be studied the whole gamut of basic masculinity, from the initial instinct of combat, through every form of glorious ostentation, with the loudest possible accompaniment of noise.”19

While there were many people active in the peace movement, the most prominent architect of the American peace movement was the noted social activist Jane Addams. Well known and highly respected because of her work with Hull House in Chicago, Addams brought her intellect, her social concerns and her practical knowledge of organizing and lobbying to the peace movement, with impressive results.

Jane Addams was born in 1860 in Cedarville, Illinois, the fifth child of John and Sarah Addams. Her mother died when she was three, and Jane developed a close relationship with her father, who was the wealthiest and most influential man in Cedarville. John Huy Addams had made his money through investments in the railroad, and had served as a Republican State Senator in Illinois from 1854 to 1870. Jane Addams, therefore, grew up as a child of privilege, with a secure economic background that her father had provided. This economic stability, Victoria Bissell Brown points out, had a great influence on Addams’ life: “In the privileged world that Jane Addams inhabited as a child, there was little conflict between doing well and doing good.”20

Addams attended Rockford Female Seminary, where she graduated as valedictorian in 1881. Rockford was led by Anna Peck Sill, who guided the school in its mission of

"turning out Christian wives, mothers and missionaries." Addams was impressed by Sill; though Addams rejected the school's prevailing message of Christian submission, she embraced the model Sill provided: that of a driven and assertive woman who was in control of her career and who was working hard to be a positive influence in her community.

Addams' privilege and sense of social responsibility, combined with her rejection of the traditional notion of a "woman's place," positioned her right in the heart of the Progressive reform movement. Progressives, predominantly white, educated, middle and upper class urbanites, were beginning to press for reforms in government in order to improve American society at large. The movement often embodied contradictions such as those experienced by Addams, as the wealthy worked to improve the lot of the poor, as old-stock Americans sought to aid new immigrants, and as women, unable to vote, sought to effect change in the US political system.

Addams sought to effect change through her work at Hull House in Chicago. Having been moved by a visit to Toynbee Hall in London, Addams and her good friend Ellen Gates Starr decided to create a similar 'settlement house' in Chicago. Beginning in September of 1899, Addams and her colleagues lived at Hull House and worked hard to make it a center of education and community life for the diverse neighborhood of the Nineteenth Ward. Addams' social activism attracted considerable attention in Chicago, and through public speaking, writing and political action, Addams became well known nationally as well. Her first book, Democracy and Social Ethics, published in 1902, was a collection of essays on various topics that grew out of her experience in negotiating political and social change.21

Her next book, Newer Ideals of Peace, was published in 1906, and extended her vision from Chicago to the rest of the world. Chicago, however, still remained at the center of her thought – the city served as an analogy of what she hoped international relations could become. The book itself is dedicated "To Hull House and its Neighbors," and in a

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prefatory note, Addams writes that the book's studies of "the moral substitutes for war have been made in the industrial quarter of a cosmopolitan city where the morality exhibits marked social and international aspects." Addams hoped that Hull House could serve as a means to bridge the growing class and societal divides brought about by industrialization, immigration, and urbanization in domestic American society; similarly, she hoped that her experience with the diverse population of Hull House and its environs could serve as a model for behavior on the international plane. As Anne Firor Scott argues, the book "is an extension and expansion of Democracy and Social Ethics, with the difference that it projects the ideal of social morality upon the world scene."

Addams uses the phrase "moral substitute for war" in her prefatory note; Scott traces the term to William James, and argues that her Newer Ideals of Peace is the result of James' idea. In fact, Jane Addams and William James shared a stage in 1904, where they first broached these ideas together. Speaking at the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress in Boston in early October, Addams declared that it was necessary to "discover a moral substitute for war, something that will appeal to the courage, the capacity of men, something that will develop their finest powers without deteriorating their moral nature, as war constantly does." When this new substitute was discovered, Addams believed that "the childish notions of power" held by the militarists would begin to change, and that their "boyish ideas of adventure," and their "rabble conceptions of what pleasure and manliness and courage consist in, will fall away from them as the garments of a child are dropped off from his growing form."

Addams was clearly trying to break the connection between US foreign policy and manly behavior. Similarly, Henry James declared that it was important that the idea of war

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be transformed to something more socially productive, though he believed that the idea and appeal of war would never disappear from the human character. This indelible human characteristic could be contained and controlled, however – “let the general possibility of war be left open … for the imagination to dally with. Let the soldiers dream of killing, as the old maids dream of marrying.”

As Linda Schott has pointed out, Addams and James may have shared a similar belief in the benefits that war provided to American society (social cohesion, and rise in selflessness, for example), but they were divided in their approach to war’s negative aspects. Addams saw the need for “a moral substitute for war,” a social force that would bring men and women together in common cause – in other words, a means to bring men around to the view already held by women. James, however, saw a solution that maintained the same gendered divisions – men, as soldiers, would continue to dream of killing, while women, fixated with marriage, would be occupied with their own separate sphere.

Addams elaborated her views on peace in Newer Ideals Of Peace, first published in 1906. In the first sentence of the book, Addams presents “the claims of the newer, more aggressive ideals of peace, as over against the older dovelike ideal. These newer ideals are active and dynamic, and it is believed that if their forces were really made operative upon society, they would, in the end, quite as a natural process, do away with war.” In Newer Ideals, Addams articulated a new approach to international peace that has internalized, and adopted, the linkage between masculinity and foreign policy. In doing so, Addams and her colleagues hoped to promote international peace in a way that directly challenged the masculinist-imperialist policies promoted by Roosevelt, Lodge, Mahan and others. The problem with Addams’ logic, however, was that it continued the very connection that gave rise to the increase in militarism, namely the linkage between masculinity and international affairs. Though Addams may have disagreed with TR on what ideal ‘manly’ behavior was,

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she was still working within the analogy that TR constructed, namely that nations and international conduct could be understood as extensions of men and manly conduct.

Addams extended her analysis of these "aggressive ideals of peace" through eight chapters that trace the "Survivals of Militarism in City Government," "Militarism and Industrial Legislation," before ending with the "Passing of the War Virtues." It is here that Addams grapples with James directly. While both James and Addams sought a substitute for war that would give rise to the same social cohesion, but without the accompanying death and destruction of war, they differed on the means and tactics.

Addams' tactic was to imbue pacifism with the stirring force that militarism had in American society at the turn of the century; an example of this can be found in her description of how "the international effort to rid the earth of tuberculosis" had "discoverers and veterans, also its decorations and rewards for bravery. Its discipline is severe; it requires self-control, endurance, self-sacrifice and constant watchfulness."29 This adoption of the language of militarism for the purposes of international peace and cooperation continues through the book, and is quite refreshingly optimistic. "We may predict," Addams writes, "that each nation quite as a natural process will reach the moment when virile good-will will be substituted for the spirit of warfare."30 Virile good-will becomes defined through the book as the inversion of the masculine imperialism as defined by Roosevelt and his colleagues; the last chapter of the book even describes the "Passing of the War Virtues."

In this chapter, Addams described the change that she believed would occur with the same kind of analogy that TR used to set up his original analogy at the Minnesota State Fair. Beginning with a description of a young boy, Addams wrote that

[The little lad who stoutly defends himself on the schoolground may be worthy of much admiration, but if we find him, a dozen years later, the bullying leader of a street-gang who bases his prestige on the fact that "no one can whip him," our

29 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 25.
admiration cools amazingly, and we say that the carrying over of those puerile instincts into manhood shows arrested development which is mainly responsible for filling our prisons.31

This serves as a clear statement of Addams’ take on the Rooseveltian analogy that equates manly action with national action, for Addams viewed TR’s manly performance model as an example of “arrested development.” Though Addams may have seen much that was valuable in the “war virtues,” she, as opposed to Roosevelt, saw the progress of civilization as dependent on their passing; Roosevelt, remember, saw the survival of civilization in the preservation of the rugged (and militaristic) masculinity. As Addams explained, “We may admire much that is admirable in this past life of courageous warfare, while at the same time we accord it no right to dominate the present, which has traveled out of its reach into a land of new desires.”32

Continuing in this vein, she argued “Let us by all means acknowledge and preserve that which has been good in warfare, and in the spirit of warfare; let us gather it together and incorporate it into our national fibre.” The purpose, though, is not to glorify combat, or the traditional masculine/warrior virtues, but rather to build on, and to progress beyond them. As Addams explained,

The task that is really before us is first to see to it, that the old virtues bequeathed by war are not retained after they have become a social deterrent and that social progress is not checked by a certain contempt for human nature which is but the inherited result of conquest. Second, we must act upon the assumption that spontaneous and fraternal action as virile and widespread as war itself is the only method by which substitutes for the war virtues may be discovered.33

For Addams, it was an inescapable fact that masculine ideals and international action are linked; history has its roots in the masculine “war virtues,” and as she explains in the chapter “Militarism in City Government,” these military virtues have defined American political action – even the right to vote was limited to those who could carry a gun. Though this link between men, militarism, and international affairs appeared solid, Addams saw the

31 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 211
32 Addams, Newer Ideals, p. 210-211.
solution in changing, or altering the form of masculinity — substituting virile and fraternal action, in a cooperative international context, for the rugged individualism of Roosevelt.

Addams' solution to TR's model of American foreign policy thus mirrored some of the predominate strains of the Gilded Age in America. The historian Alan Trachtenberg, for example, has described the Gilded Age as the age of incorporation; similarly, Jason Kaufman has described the years between the end of the Civil War and the end of the Great War as "The Golden Age of Fraternity." It is not surprising that Addams, like John Reed, looks to brotherhood, cooperation and fraternal connections as the solution to Roosevelt's rampant rugged individualism.\(^\text{34}\)

The problem however, is that Addams is unable to alter the source of the problem, namely that international affairs had become inextricably linked to conceptions of masculine performance. The best that Addams could do was to try to alter the definition of masculinity that defined the process of international relations. A shift from the manly and rugged individualism that played itself out as unilateral economic imperialism to a model of fraternal (albeit virile) cooperation, that would play itself out as a League of Nations (for example), would be a step in the direction of peace and international stability. It would, however, mean that the root connection between manliness and US foreign policy remained untouched.

Following the publication of *Newer Ideals of Peace*, (which Teddy Roosevelt described as a "bad book, a very bad book")\(^\text{35}\) Addams remained involved with the growing peace movement, and felt rather optimistic about the success that the international peace movement was enjoying. This optimism was shattered in August of 1914 as Europe went to war, but the events gave Addams the opportunity to put her ideas into action. In the fall of 1914 she helped to organize the Union Against Militarism with her colleague Lillian

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\(^{33}\) Addams, *Newer Ideals*, p. 211.

Wald of the Henry Street Settlement in New York, and Paul Kellogg, the editor of Survey, and journal that focused on social work.\textsuperscript{36}

This organization did not entirely satisfy Addams, however. She had been active in the woman suffrage movement for years, and her work on behalf of women had led her to believe in the importance of women's contributions to society. She had also come to believe that women, as women, were naturally suited to the solving of social ills. Foremost of the ills plaguing modern society was war.

As a result of this belief, and influenced by similar developments in the European Peace movements, Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt (the "general of the suffrage movement")\textsuperscript{37} called a conference in January of 1915 to help found a Woman's Peace Party. The platform stated that:

\begin{quote}
Equally with men pacifists, we understand that planned for, legalized, wholesale, human slaughter is today the sum of all villainies.
As Women, we feel a particular moral passion of revolt against both the cruelty and the waste of war.
As Women, we are especially the custodian of the life of the ages. We will not longer consent to its reckless destruction …
We demand that women be given a share in deciding between war and peace in all the courts of high debate - within the home, the school, the church, the industrial order, and the state.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

This argument constructs women as a counterweight to men, and posits that women, as mothers and nurturers, have the right, and the obligation, to be included in debates that settle "questions concerning not alone the life of individuals but of nations" as well. This construction, which challenged the traditional masculinist belief that war is the sole province of men, could also be perceived as a challenge to the "androcentric culture" of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Reminding ourselves of her famous lines, we read again that

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{35} Quoted in Degen, History of the Woman’s Peace Party, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{36} Degen, History of the Woman’s Peace Party, pp. 21-24.
\textsuperscript{38} Degen, History of the Woman’s Peace Party, p. 40.
\end{quote}

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In warfare, per se, we find maleness in its absurdest extremes. Here is to be studied the whole gamut of basic masculinity, from the initial instinct of combat, through every form of glorious ostentation, with the loudest possible accompaniment of noise.\(^{39}\)

The patriotic rush to war which marked the capitals of Europe in August of 1914 illustrates what Gilman is getting at – the uniforms, the marching bands, the parades and the enthusiasm of public performed patriotism. Within this rush to war, it was apparent to many observers that “the outbreak of the World War, the apparent result of the accumulating stupidities and sins of men as rulers, should bring the disillusionment of feminists with a man-run world to a climax.” Though Addams was not as radical a feminist as Gilman, she shared some of the same irritation with excessive displays of masculinity; as one historian explained, “[e]ven in Miss Addams, certainly no man-hater, there is distinct evidence” of this mode of thought.\(^{40}\)

Addams's concern with destructive masculinity can be seen in her earlier writing, particularly in *The Spirit of Youth*, a book that looks at the problems of young people growing up in the modern city. In particular she looks at how young men, with no real outlet for their energies, wind up committing pointless crimes as a pastime (breaking windows, stealing fruit, stealing bicycles for joyrides, etc), which lead them into worse company and progressively more serious crime. Addams urged her readers to recognize that the young need proper outlets for their natural energies; “This stupid experiment of organizing work and failing to organize play” has resulted in young men who are increasingly disrupting American society.\(^{41}\)

The solution, Addams believed, was to do more than just control the problem through the courts – for by the time young men are in court, the problem was already out of hand. Instead, Addams argued, there should be room for young men and their interests in


modern society, but they should also be taught to control their behavior. Young men needed to be free – indeed freedom was at the root of the American experience, but that freedom needed to be tempered with responsibility and self-control. "The path to freedom open to all in America could not be denied to the young, Addams understood, but that path was 'made safe only through their self-control.'" This self-control was to be inculcated in young men by their integration into the community, and their initiation into adulthood. 

Similarly, on the international plane, nations that were caught up in the masculine pageant of militarism needed to be led to channel their masculine energies in a different way; these nations needed to find a substitute for war, such as those we have already discussed. But because the rampant militarism was rooted in a masculine performance model, the best way to counter the national masculinity of militarism was through a concerted action by women.

This idea was originally suggested to Addams by the British suffragist Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, who, along with her Hungarian colleague Rosika Schwimmer, had made a speaking tour of the United States in 1914. As Addams wrote in Peace and Bread in Time of War, Pethick-Lawrence "hoped to arouse American women to join their European sisters in a general protest against war."

Pethick-Lawrence argued for the involvement of women as women; as she wrote in 1914,

"It is vital to the deepest interests of the human race that the mother half of humanity should now be admitted into the ranks of the articulate democracies of the world, in order to strengthen them and enable them to combine more effectively in their own defense against the deadly machinery of organized destruction that threatens in the future to crush the white races and to overwhelm civilization."

In a similar vein, Rosika Schwimmer, winner of the World Peace Prize in 1937, also decried the excessive militarism of the era, arguing that women needed to get involved to

42 Elshtain, Jane Addams, p. 134, 135.
stop it. Women were naturally more inclined toward peace, and they needed to become involved in the peace process because any peace that did not include women would be of short duration. As the World Peace Prize Award statement put it, Schwimmer was motivated to act because “a war ended by militarists meant a peace dictated by militarism, with new causes for future action.”

In the same vein, Pethick-Lawrence, arguing for women's involvement in foreign relations, explained that “the bed-rock of humanity is motherhood.” Because women bore children, raised them, and maintained the family and the home, they were uniquely qualified to mediate the conflict in Europe. While this attitude may seem dated and essentialist today, it was a perception that was shared by many:

Women, it was said, might well stand aghast at the contemporary spectacle of ruin in Europe, for they had no responsibility for the cataclysm. [The War] was solely the doing of male government, which had disregarded the warnings of women and had arrogantly denied them the vote.

In this context, it is entirely logical that Pithick-Lawrence should write that “[t]oday, it is for men to stand down and for the women whom they have belittled to take the seat of judgement.” The point that Pithick-Lawrence and the WPP were making is that the war came about as the direct result of unchecked masculinity. Their solution was to introduce women to the political mix – to counteract the previous trend of male dominated politics and foreign policy. This end would be achieved by woman's suffrage, and by the mediation of women in the conflict; negotiating, resolving, making connections and bringing about peace.

The problem, however, is that Addams, Pithick-Lawrence and Schwimmer were not attacking the root of the problem, for substituting women for men does not challenge the association of foreign policy with masculinity. Rather, it affirms it by acknowledging that masculinity and militarism are linked. The famous adage of Carl von Clausewitz, that war is

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45 Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party, p. 34.
46 Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party, p. 34.
foreign policy by other means, is another expression of the same idea. Ultimately, the
inability of the Woman's Peace Party to check the excessive militarism of the United States
was a direct result of their inability to disengage foreign policy from the conception of
manly behavior.

During the period from 1914 to 1917, the Woman's Peace Party continued to
pursue attempts to mediate and negotiate an end to the conflict in Europe, but they met with
little success. Despite having meetings with various heads of state, belligerents as well as
neutrals, Addams, Catt and Emily Balch were unable to get a commitment for peace. With
the American entry in April of 1917, Addams was left in the cold, as public sentiment swung
toward the ultra-patriotic, in a manner identical to that sentiment that rushed through Paris,
Berlin and London in 1914.

In her address, "Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time," given in many places
around the country, Addams continued to argue the same line that she had laid out earlier,
namely that "that war, although exhibiting some of the noblest qualities of the human spirit,
yet affords no solution for vexed international problems." Addams also attempted to
counter the "blind admiration for the soldier" and the "unspeakable contempt for him who
... declares that fighting is unnecessary." While she states that she does not find it
surprising that pacifists in war time are called "traitors and cowards," she organized her
address to counter the allegation.48

Arguing that pacifists are not traitors because they are loyal to the values that the
United States embraced before the declaration of war, and stressing the courage inherent in
any action that goes so completely against popular sentiment as pacifism in war-time,
Addams attempted to disconnect US foreign policy from the powerful belief in the
redeeming power of manly performance. Towards the end of her talk, Addams stressed the
internationalism of the peace movement, and the example that the United States could

47 Emmeline Pithick-Lawrence, "National Efforts Crystalizing for Peace," Survey, 1915,
XXXIII, p. 393-394. Quoted in Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party, p.36.
provide to Europe, with its multiethnic makeup, and its system of constitutional law. It is only pacifists, Addams argued, “who will at last create a political organization enabling nations to secure without war, those high ends which they now gallantly seek to obtain upon the battlefield.”

In effect, Addams was claiming for the pacifist the same essential masculinity that the militarists such as Theodore Roosevelt had already claimed for themselves. Addams asked

> can the pacifists of today be accused of selfishness when they urge upon the United States not isolation, not indifference to moral issues and to the fate of liberty and democracy, but a strenuous endeavor to lead all nations of the earth into an organized international life worthy of civilized men?

Addams believed that the answer was no, but she found that there were few that agreed with her. In fact, despite her claim for the “strenuous endeavor” of pacifism, she was pilloried in the press for cowardice and treason, and many of her Woman’s Peace Party colleagues broke with her.

The press was vituperative in its assessment of Addams’ argument, and she was inundated with articles, editorials and letters that criticized her position. *The New York Herald* wrote

> It may not be cowardice for an American to oppose a war in which the United States is engaged, but it is something infinitely more despicable. It is bordering on treason ... America is fighting because she was forced to fight or become a nation of Jane Addamses, and the sooner the Chicago pacifist lets that fact infiltrate into her brain the sooner will she understand why this nation is going to fight for a righteous peace.

In a similar vein, *The Cleveland News*, linking Addams with Jeanette Rankin, who voted against the war, wrote that

> to accept a couple of foolish virgins as accurately typifying the attitude of a whole sex toward war would be to do hideous injustice to thousands of noble women who,

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51 Degen, *History of Woman’s Peace Party*, p. 200
in this as in other wars, were quick to perceive what it all was about and to lend their aid with splendid discrimination and devotion.52

In both these quotes, we see that the linkage between pacifism and “strenuous endeavor,” or manliness, that Addams had been trying to construct had been shrugged off by the editorialists. In fact, the writers had made exactly the opposite connection – they had linked Addams with cowardice (there could be nothing worse than “a nation of Jane Addamses,” according to the Herald), and with a lack of sexuality. Being a virgin is clearly the same as being an idiot, according to the Cleveland News. In addition, being a virgin is not at all the same as being a “woman.”

Womanhood, it is clear, was as connected to performance as was manhood; where men’s performance needed to be performed outside the home, a woman’s performance happened in the home. Real women, clearly, embraced what Roosevelt had urged in “National Duties;” they had sex, and they had children. “The willfully barren woman has no place in a sane, healthy, and vigorous community,” as Roosevelt put it.53 Sex, the actual sex act, is an important issue here; we must remember, that masculinity and virility are two sides of the same coin; both are necessary to American foreign policy according to the construction of the Rooseveltian model of ‘national duties’, and as expressed by men such as Albert Beveridge. Women who had not had sex threatened the established order and posed a threat to American global preeminence.

Addams’s belief that she could alter the linkage between masculinity and foreign policy by linking manliness to pacifism was misplaced. Not only was she unable to make that connection believable, but she failed to the extent that her own reputation and character were irreparably damaged. As late as 1934, the year before her death, Addams was being accused of treasonous acts. Elizabeth Dilling, the author of The Red Network: A Who’s Who and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots described Addams as one of “reds” that

52 Degen, History of Woman’s Peace Party, p. 201
patriots must avoid. Dilling has grudging admiration for Addams, the communist agent: “One knowing of her consistent aid to the Red movement can only marvel at the smooth and charming way she ... disguises this aid, and reigns as ‘queen’ on both sides of the fence.”

Leaving aside the fact that neither “reds” nor “patriots” have any monarchical inclinations, it is evident that Addams’ character, her bearing and her consistent approach to the problems of world peace, like her approach to the people of the neighborhood around Hull House, is really what is at issue. Addams was simply not man enough to disengage militant masculinity from US foreign policy.

These attempts to separate the conventional conception of masculinity that included militarism and violence from feelings of nationalism ultimately failed, as the United States plunged into the First World War. The wartime experience, in fact, marked a real high-water mark of intolerance, as anything less than “100% Americanism” was deemed unpatriotic. Newspapers were shut down by the government, anti-war activists were jailed, and women such as Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt and Lucia Ames Mead were pilloried in the press as the coalition of progressives that had elected Woodrow Wilson in 1916 was jettisoned in a rush of patriotism.

This patriotism, unsurprisingly, took the traditional conflation of masculine militaristic ideals and reinforced them, making them all the more explicit. The nation relied on men to fill the ranks of the armed services, and employed classic rhetorical means to achieve that end. Recruiting posters played on the gender stereotypes with great effect. One of the more famous showed a uniform draped over a chair with the words: “It takes a man to fill it.” This continued reliance on the linkage between masculinity and patriotism was an indication that the attempts of women peace activists had failed to separate the two, as well as failing to redefine the American national personality as anything other than manly.

54 Quoted in Elshtain, Jane Addams, p. 19.
The reason for this failure lies in the fact that women could not challenge the original gender definitions that gained them a hearing on the national stage. Since the women spoke as women, they had trouble arguing with men who were not only national leaders, but who also had the privilege of speaking as Americans. The attempt to shift the terms of the debate was doomed because the women were playing the game according to male rules. As one historian has pointed out, "in politicizing women, the leadership (of women’s peace groups) called upon them to play a role in a male arena, but to do so as women." In this way, they were naturally unable to challenge the rhetoric of manliness promoted by Theodore Roosevelt and other militarists precisely because they were locked into a gendered social position defined by men as well.

It was not until much later that women were able to begin to shape foreign policy, as well as national identity, in a way that was less pernicious. Despite the lack of success, however, women’s involvement with, and concern for, the direction of United States foreign policy never disappeared. In Madeleine Albright’s tenure as Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration, and Condoleeza Rice’s position as National Security Advisor (as well as her more recent appointment as Secretary of State), women can be seen to have reached their apogee of influence.

Rice, in particular, is an interesting example of the change in gendered conceptions of foreign policy influence; many of the critiques of her policy positions have focused on her "toughness", not on her pacifism . In this way she adheres more closely to the ideal espoused by Roosevelt, than that espoused by any of the women policy activists that argued with him. We must not forget, however, that the seeds for Rice’s success were sown in the years between 1898 and 1920, when women first explicitly challenged the conjunction of the performance of manly acts and American international action.

CHAPTER V

"PLAY THE MAN:"
W. E. B. DU BOIS, WORLD WAR ONE, AND THE "COLOR LINE"

In January of 1912, William Edgar Burghardt Du Bois published an editorial that listed his New Year's resolutions. "I am resolved in this new year," Du Bois wrote, "to play the man - to stand straight, look the world squarely in the eye, and walk to my work with no shuffle or slouch ... I am resolved to be satisfied with no treatment which ignores my manhood and my right to be counted as one among men."1 W. E. B. Du Bois was the editor of the NAACP's journal The Crisis and an influential leader of the African American community, in part because of his important book The Souls of Black Folk.2 As an African American activist, Du Bois was well aware of how hard it could be for an African American male to "play the man," much less to be "counted as one among men." He was personally familiar with the slurs, slights and indignities of the everyday life of African Americans in America in the early twentieth century.

The key to Du Bois's New Year's declaration is that he framed his determination to meet these slights head-on as a resolution "to play the man." Du Bois saw the indignities of the African American experience in the first decades of the twentieth

century as an insult to his status as an American citizen, and also as “treatment which ignore[d his] manhood.” Countering this treatment required the assertion of his own manliness. Every time someone called him “boy, “ Du Bois would respond with the carriage and actions that proved he was a man. The performance of masculinity was an assertion of American citizenship. In this respect, Du Bois’s words are a clear example of the cultural link between manhood and American citizenship that prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century.

It is also notable that Du Bois framed his discussion of masculinity in terms of performance; when he resolved to “play the man” in 1912, he implied that in earlier years he had played some other role. For Du Bois, manliness was a choice, even an aspiration. It was not a simple matter of physiology. Du Bois’s comments were directed to a primarily African American audience that included many male persons whose social position had prevented them from playing the man, as citizens, as economic providers, as combat soldiers, and even as members of fraternal organizations. In 1912, his African American audience would have understood Du Bois’s sentiments as a clarion call for change; for an African American male to “play the man” would have meant taking on a new social role.

W.E.B. Du Bois believed in TR’s analogy, and hoped to use it to raise African Americans from “boys” to “men.” In making this transition, African Americans would then win what Du Bois called their “full-manhood rights.” The assertion of masculinity, then, became the same as an assertion of membership in American society; manliness and Americanness became intertwined in Du Bois’ pursuit of equality.
The central part of "play[ing] the man" for Du Bois was the requirement that he "look the world in the eye." The assertion of masculinity that proves his rightful place in the American polity cannot be achieved unless it be done in view of the world; when Du Bois looked "the world squarely in the eye," he was doing more than staring down American bigots on his way to work "with no shuffle or slouch;" he was proving his masculinity not merely in an American context, but in the eyes of the world.

Through his manly gaze, Du Bois hoped to win recognition from the rest of the world, which in turn would guarantee the political equality he so rightfully deserved. In this way, the achievement of national political rights was predicated by a masculinity justified by international, or world, recognition.3

This chapter will discuss the attempts by W.E.B. Du Bois to challenge and alter the construction of a foreign policy based on manly national performance, so as to include a masculinity based on that of African American men. Like John Reed and Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois attempted to alter the Rooseveltian construction of national masculinity. Where Reed attempted to incorporate the masculinity of socialist brotherhood, and Addams hoped to engender a new definition of masculinity, Du Bois

hoped to include African American men in the Rooseveltian national masculinity model, and thereby secure their place in American society. Focusing on the idea of performance, I will argue that Du Bois believed that the best way to achieve full citizenship rights for African Americans was through manly action. While Roosevelt may have constructed the analogy that a man needs to act in the nation in the same way that the nation needs to act towards the world, Du Bois sought to utilize and co-opt that structure.

This came to a fine point during the First World War, when the United States was trying to “make the world safe for democracy.” Since the US was acting in Europe to save democracy, Du Bois believed that it made perfect sense for African Americans to serve the nation in Europe. In terms of Roosevelt's analogy, as Black men fight for democracy in their nation, so the United States fights for democracy in the world. In this way, African American men would achieve the benefits of democracy at home, and win a victory for international peace abroad. Essential to achieving these goals was the performance of feats of masculinity; in other words, African Americans needed to “play the man.”

Ever since he was young, Du Bois had been concerned with the intersection of masculinity, patriotism and American citizenship. William Edgar Burghardt Du Bois was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, in February of 1868, the son of a Haitian immigrant named Alfred Du Bois, and Mary Silvina Burghardt, a free black woman whose family had lived in western Massachusetts for generations. The young Du Bois quickly made an impression at school, where he excelled, and attracted the attention of Frank Hosmer, the Principal of Great Barrington High School. Hosmer, a progressive man for his times, helped to make it possible for the young Du Bois to attend Fisk
University, in Nashville, Tennessee. Du Bois himself had been hoping to attend Harvard, but the expense and concerns about his preparation made it unfeasible. Du Bois traveled south to Fisk in 1885, therefore, and spent the next few years in Tennessee, graduating from Fisk in 1888. Du Bois then reapplied to Harvard, and was accepted as a junior.⁴

At Harvard, Du Bois came under the influence of William James, who had been teaching there since 1872. James, the famous and influential philosopher and psychologist, reigned at the center of a University that stressed and rewarded manliness above all else. As Kim Townsend explains in Manhood at Harvard: William James and Others, James was a proponent of a particular Gilded Age Anglo-Saxon construction of manly behavior and a social critic whose philosophical and psychological solutions to the anxieties of turn-of-the-century America were rooted in a belief in the redeeming qualities of masculinity. Addressing the doubt and indecision many men experienced in the increasingly fast pace of modern American society, James advised them to “Hang your sensibilities! Stop your sniveling complaints, and your equally sniveling raptures! Leave off your general emotional tomfoolery, and get to WORK like men!”⁵

Du Bois, class of 1890, like Theodore Roosevelt (class of 1880) and John Reed (class of 1910), was greatly influenced by the ethos of manliness that was central to Harvard. Many of his undergraduate papers reveal his wrestling with the idea of the “Harvard Man,” and indicate that while he approved of and encouraged manliness, he challenged the race and class divisions that actually made “whiteness” possible. In fact,

Du Bois saw a clear connection between the cultivation of Anglo Saxon conceptions of manly behavior and national tragedies such as the Civil War.

This connection was made most clear in his commencement address, “Jefferson Davis as a Representative of Civilization,” a speech Du Bois was asked to deliver because of his stellar academic record. Du Bois began the speech with the line that “Jefferson Davis was a typical Teutonic hero; the history of civilization during the last millenium has been the development of the Strong Man of which he was the embodiment. The Anglo-Saxon loves a soldier – Jefferson Davis was an Anglo-Saxon, Jefferson Davis was a soldier.”

Du Bois argued that he “wished to consider not the man, but the type of civilization which he represented: its foundation is the idea of the strong man – Individualism coupled with the rule of might…” His analysis led him to see Davis, and the civilization he represented, in a very clear manner: “The Strong Man and his mighty Right Arm has become the Strong Nation with its armies. Under whatever guise, however a Jefferson Davis might appear, as man, as race, or as nation, his life can only mean this: the advance of a part of the world at the expense of the whole.” This connection is fascinating, and it is important as an early explication of Du Bois’ version of the connection between manliness and national identity. The US during the antebellum era had nurtured the Jefferson Davis type, and the result was the Civil War; as manly ideals went, so went the nation, Du Bois believed, and while the Civil War was a

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tragic outcome of masculinist thinking, Du Bois still believed in the positive connection between national citizenship and manliness.\(^7\)

Looking at the situation of the United States in 1890, Du Bois saw an opportunity for a change in the manly type. While Jefferson Davis may have been the embodiment of the “Strong Man”, African Americans represented “Submissive Man,” Du Bois argued, and it is the melding of the two that would mark the future of civilization. In a kind of Hegelian synthesis, Du Bois argues that the combination of both doctrines, that of the Strong Man and of the Submissive Man guarantees a shift in the use of power.

What then is the change made in the conception of civilization, by adding to the conception of the Strong Man, that of the Submissive Man? It is this: the submission of the strength of the Strong to the advance of all…\(^8\)

The national synthesis of African American and Southern (or Anglo-Saxon) conceptions of masculinity leads, in Du Bois' analogy, to a check on the excesses of Anglo Saxon masculinity, as well as on the extremes of African American submission. As Anglo Saxon masculinity is limited, the corollary is that African American masculinity must be improved. The result, therefore is the construction of a new paradigm of national masculinity, in which strength (in cultural and economic, as well as physical terms) is brought to bear not for individual gain, but for the benefit of society as a whole. African Americans, in Du Bois' analogy, are the key component in what he calls the “round and full development” of American manhood.

This early address, delivered in 1890 in Harvard’s Memorial Hall (a building dedicated to Harvard men who fell in the Civil War), lays out several key arguments that

\(^8\) Du Bois, “Jefferson Davis,” p. 813.
Du Bois would continue to make for the rest of life. First, Du Bois believed in the importance of personal manliness – his writings consistently refer to the importance of manly carriage, and he conceived of political struggle in terms of the need for “full manhood rights.” In addition, Du Bois, like Roosevelt and others, saw the United States as a man writ large. The nation itself had the attributes of a man, and international behavior could be conceived in the same way as interactions among men. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Du Bois saw African Americans as the key to transforming the nature of American society, through their character. In many ways, as the “Jefferson Davis” address demonstrates, Du Bois saw this character as essentially masculine, and therefore, in its masculine qualities it was a different example of what masculinity could be.

Du Bois continued to examine the connection between American civilization and masculinity during the years following his commencement address. Following his undergraduate years at Harvard, Du Bois stayed on to complete an MA in history, and proceeded to Germany to study at Friedrich Wilhelm University. Returning to the US, Du Bois received his Ph. D. from Harvard in 1895, the first African American to do so. Between 1895 and 1910, Du Bois made a name for himself as a writer, researcher and teacher, in addition to being an organizer of various meetings and conferences whose aim was to help bring about full equality for African Americans. Du Bois' classic work *The Souls of Black Folk* was published in 1903, bringing him to national prominence, while also highlighting the debate between himself and Booker T. Washington. On the basis of his national recognition, Du Bois was one of the prominent leaders invited to help put together the new National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples.
(NAACP). In addition, Du Bois was hired as Director of Publications and research, with his primary responsibility being editing and writing for the NAACP’s journal The Crisis.

Du Bois' editorials for The Crisis make fascinating reading for it is in these columns that he develops and articulates his program for African American advancement and full participation in American society. These editorials included critical commentaries on major events of the day, with frequent discussions on foreign policy issues. In fact, it is these foreign policy editorials in particular that provide the clearest insight into Du Bois' conflation of masculinity and national identity.

This linkage between masculinity, foreign policy and military service can be found in a number of Du Bois's editorials. Du Bois believed that military service in the Great War would demonstrate the superior qualities of African American “manhood,” and that once that manliness was demonstrated, the United States could no longer prevent African Americans from playing an equal role in their country’s future. Furthermore, once African American manhood was demonstrated, the linkage between Victorian constructions of manliness and whiteness would forever be broken. In short, Du Bois proposed to replace the manliness through whiteness model with manliness through warfare.9

Du Bois' argument is revealed in the editorials that he wrote for The Crisis, the magazine he ran and helped to found as the official journal of the NAACP, between 1914 and 1918. Du Bois' linkage of manly action can also be found in some of his other writings from the same time period, including essays and letters. These documents,

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9 For a discussion of African American soldiers and the debate over participation in World War One, see Cecilia O'Leary, To Die For, pp. 208-219; for African American soldiers and the Spanish American War, see p. 143.
though outside the realm of official US foreign policy, are important attempts to influence policy, for they shed light on a strategy aimed at developing African American support for the war in Europe, and they articulate an argument that had consequences for domestic as well as international affairs.\textsuperscript{10}

These documents need to be considered in both their historical and social contexts; they are important not only for their presentation of the war as a potential liberating force for African Americans, but are also important as expressions of masculinity and manly ideals. As historians such as Kristin Hoganson and Nicoletta Gullace have pointed out, foreign and military policies and socialized constructions of gender often go hand in hand; in addition, as Thomas Borstelmann has demonstrated, foreign policy objectives abroad are often complicated by racial inequities at home.\textsuperscript{11}

Race and gender approaches to the study of diplomatic history are important if we are to fully understand a nation’s foreign policy. The formulation of foreign policy traditionally excluded women and minorities, and as Emily Rosenberg pointed out in “Walking the Borders,” the very language that policy is written with often betrays “gendered overtones.” The analysis of this language, she argues, “can provide fresh,\

\textsuperscript{10} In addition, as David Levering Lewis points out, there is reason to believe that Du Bois’ wartime editorials were part of what Lewis describes as a “deal” with the War Department “to use the enormous influence of his magazine toward rallying African Americans behind the war in return for” a commission as an officer in Military intelligence that never materialized. See Lewis, \textit{W. E. B. Du Bois}, p. 555.

provocative insight into the wellsprings of policy formulation and public legitimation.” Rosenberg continues by pointing out that in certain time periods, “cultural definitions of masculinity and bellicose assertions of national power appear to be linked. There have likewise been historical ties between feminism and pacifism.” Du Bois’ decision to promote African American participation in the World War is an important example of this combination of masculinity and foreign policy, as well illustrating how the intersection of racial division in the domestic context can influence the development of foreign policy approaches.

Du Bois’ original position on the war was expressed in his editorial “World War and the Color Line,” which appeared in the November 1914 issue of the Crisis. Tracing the roots of the war to imperialism in Africa and Asia, Du Bois’ perspective on the Great War is in line with the writings of J. A. Hobson, whose 1902 book Imperialism blamed the war on the disruptive forces of European capital. Du Bois argued that it was “not merely national jealousy” that led to the war, but “rather the wild quest for imperial expansion among colored races between Germany, England and France primarily, and Belgium, Italy, Russia and Austria Hungary in a lesser degree...Today civilized nations are fighting like mad dogs over the right to own and exploit these darker peoples.”

Elegantly inverting the trope of savagery and civilization, Du Bois makes clear his

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opposition to an imperialist foreign policy, while staking his own claim to the high
ground of civilization.

By linking European imperialism with slavery, Du Bois was able to make a case
for African American concern about the events in Europe. But if all Europe is equally
guilty of the crime of “white imperialism,” why choose sides? Why is any side better
than the other? Du Bois argues that “[a]s colored Americans, then, and as Americans
who fear race prejudice as the greatest of warmakers, our sympathies in the awful conflict
should be with France and England; not that they have conquered race prejudice, but they
have at least begun to realize its cost and evil, while Germany exalts it.”

Du Bois and *The Crisis* urged African Americans to support those nations that
were working to moderate their racist and colonialisat excesses, and to punish those
nations which are guilty of the worst racist and imperialist crimes. Du Bois prophesied
that the war would become “much wilder and wider ... when black and brown and yellow
stand up together and demand recognition as men!” This combination of international
relations and manliness is indicative of Du Bois’ approach not just to the First World
War, but to his approach to the plight of African Americans in the United States in
general; the reality of Jim Crow, racism and lynch law in early twentieth century
America, or “life behind the veil,” as Du Bois put it, served to limit African Americans'
participation in the political and social fabric of the United States, and hence the ability of
African Americans to lead their lives as “men.”

As Gail Bederman has pointed out in *Manliness and Civilization*, the social
construction of white male manliness was developed in opposition to commonly held

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ideas of African American masculinity. "In the face of social and cultural change," she writes,

middle class men had become fearful that their manhood was at risk. In order to strengthen faltering constructs of traditional manliness, they turned to race. By envisioning themselves as "the white man," whose superior manliness set them apart from more primitive dark-skinned races, middle-class men reassured themselves that manliness remained as strong as ever.16

This articulation of a racist definition through opposition model of manliness is in line with what Du Bois himself wrote in an essay titled "The Souls of White Folk." Published in his book Darkwater in 1920, Du Bois’ essay makes clear the connection between "whiteness" and imperialism and world war. "The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing – a nineteenth and twentieth century matter indeed." The reason for the development, Du Bois argues, is the competition for global dominance, a competition that took European powers to parts of the world populated by peoples with skin of a different hue. "I ask soberly: ‘What on earth is whiteness that one should so desire it?’ Then always, somehow, some way, silently but clearly, I am given to understand that whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever, Amen!”17 World War One was itself the end result of this process of whiteness: “Let me say this again and emphasize it and leave no room for mistaken meaning: The World War was primarily the jealous and avaricious struggle for the largest

share in exploiting darker races.”18 The United States, Du Bois believed, was at least as
bad as the European colonial powers, for the US had its legacy of slavery, and its
continuing racial conflict, particularly lynching. In Du Bois’ words,

It is curious to see America, the United States, looking on herself, first, as a sort
of natural peacemaker, then as a moral protagonist in this terrible time. No nation
is less fitted for this rôle. For two or more centuries America has marched
proudly in the van of human hatred – making bonfires of human flesh and
laughing at them hideously, and making the insulting of millions more than a
matter of dislike – rather a great religion, a world war-cry: Up white, down
black… 19

Bederman agrees with Du Bois that the central defining issue in the development
of whiteness was lynching. Portrayed in the Northern press in gruesome detail, lynching
narratives and photographs enabled Northern white men to pride themselves on their
relative level of "civilization" and righteousness. As Bederman explains, “Southern
lynching encouraged Northern white men to see themselves as manly and powerful, and
gave them a rich ground on which issues of gender, sexuality and racial dominance could
be attractively combined and recombined to depict the overwhelming power of their
civilized white manliness.”20

In her discussion of Ida B. Wells’ anti-lynching campaign in Great Britain in 1893
and 1894, Bederman explains the tactic behind Wells’ trip to England. Because
Americans during the Victorian period looked to Britain as the arbiter of civilization,
Wells took her campaign to end lynching in America to England. By portraying white
Southerners as uncivilized and unmanly, Wells was able to enlist English help in
publicizing the horrors of the crime. Americans might not listen to the outrage of African

Americans, but they would certainly respond to any British indictments. As Bederman explains, “[b]y enlisting ‘Anglo-Saxons’ as her allies, Wells recruited precisely the spokesmen most able to disrupt the linkages between manliness and whiteness which kept white Americans tolerant of lynching.”

Du Bois was well aware of Wells’ work, for they had both worked hard to create the NAACP, the parent organization that published *The Crisis*. Du Bois extended Wells’ discourse of savagery and civilization to the war that was currently raging in Europe and through African American participation in the war, hoped to generate the same kind of global support for African Americans that Wells had been able to generate in her anti-lynching campaign.

Du Bois brought the question of the linkage between white men and “civilization” to the fore in a September, 1916 editorial in *The Crisis*. In the wake of reports of the gassing and bombing of civilian targets, Du Bois argued that “civilization has met its Waterloo.” Then, turning from Europe to look at the United States, Du Bois wrote that

> The civilization by which America insists on measuring us and to which we must conform our natural tastes and inclinations is the daughter of that European civilization which is now rushing furiously to its doom ... Brothers, the war has shown us the cruelty of the civilization of the West. History has taught us the futility of the civilization of the East. Let ours be the civilization of no man, but of *all men*. This is the truth that sets us free.

By arguing for a civilization of “all men,” Du Bois hoped to disconnect the racial aspects of the American definition of civilization; rather, civilization would be determined by the “reassembling of old ideals,” particularly those of Victorian

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masculinity, among which honor is paramount. It was in this context that Du Bois expressed some of his ideals in the editorial titled “I Am Resolved.” It is worth remembering the language:

I am resolved in this New Year to play the man - to stand straight, look the world squarely in the eye, and walk to my work with no shuffle or slouch ... I am resolved to be satisfied with no treatment which ignores my manhood and my right to be counted as one among men.2

Du Bois believed that the performance of masculinity would help to create a new civilization, an American civilization that has the hallmarks of neither East nor West. Rather, it will be brand new, and will include African Americans as equal partners.

This is a bold move by Du Bois, for he is using a construction of masculinity that was originally predicated on the American imperial project, a project that did not see men of color as equal partners at all. In fact, white male masculinity as proposed by TR and seconded by Albert J. Beveridge, and as learned at Harvard by Du Bois, owed its existence, and its survival, to the continual subjection of darker skinned men.

Du Bois' decision to "play the man" is rooted in long held beliefs. In fact, as Kim Townsend points out in Manhood at Harvard, "manhood was the goal toward which Du Bois strove in much of his writing." In his classic work The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois described the situation of African Americans as a "double consciousness," where African Americans perceive themselves as part American and part African. This is a justly famous phrase, yet the following paragraph is often forgotten. Du Bois writes that “[t]he history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, - this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this
merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost ... He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American..."24

That was the key to the entire problem – how can African American men achieve "self-conscious manhood" in a nation where men of color were called “boy,” where harassment and intimidation prevented their voting, and where lynch mobs punished those men who had the temerity to claim the “full manhood rights?” How can an African American “play the man” if it will get him killed?

Du Bois had these questions in mind when he wrote the editorial “Awake, America,” that appeared in the September 1917 issue of The Crisis. Arguing that the United States needs to enter the “war for liberty with clean hands,” Du Bois goes on to say that “We cannot lynch 2,867 untried black men and women in thirty-one years and pose successfully as leaders of civilization. Rather, let us ... raise our hands to heaven and pledge our sacred honor to make our own America a real land of the free ... [and] To insist that individual dessert and ability shall be the test of real American manhood and not adventitious differences of race or color or descent.”25

Du Bois’ formulation of a new idea of civilization, one that emphasizes an American manliness that is built not on spurious conceptions of masculinity defined through lynching, but rather through ability was continually juxtaposed with the European war. Du Bois extended his idea of the “real land of the free” for African Americans when he wrote of “The Black Soldier” in the June 1918 issue of The Crisis.

This war is an End and, also, a Beginning. Never again will darker people of the world occupy just the place they had before. Out of this war will rise, soon or late, an independent China, a self-governing India, an Egypt with representative institutions, an Africa for the Africans and not merely for business exploitation. Out of this war will rise, too, an American Negro with the right to vote and the right to work and the right to live without insult.\footnote{W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Black Soldier,” The Crisis, No. 16, Jun. 1918, p. 60}

Du Bois was remarkably prescient. One of the major consequences of the end of the First World War was the loosening of colonial bonds and the rise of Asian nationalism, particularly in China and India, with events in Turkey, Persia and French Indo-China also proceeding rapidly. In the contemporary American context, however, as David Levering Lewis explains, Du Bois' prediction of “the undermining of European dominion over darker races and the radical redrawing of the color line in the United States invited a federal indictment.”\footnote{Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, p. 505.} The world may have been ready for Revolution, but with the recently passed Sedition Act of May, 1918, the United States did not want to hear about it.

It was in this dangerous domestic context that Du Bois' most provocative editorial appeared. “Close Ranks,” from the July, 1918 issue of The Crisis, urged all African Americans to come together and support the American effort in the First World War:

This is the crisis of the world ... We of the colored race have no ordinary interest in the outcome. That which the German power represents today spells death to the aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for equality, freedom and democracy. Let us not hesitate. Let us, while this war lasts, forget our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our white fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy. We make no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it gladly and willingly, with our eyes lifted to the hills.\footnote{W. E. B. Du Bois, “Close Ranks,” The Crisis, No. 16, Jul. 1918, p. 111.}
Du Bois' editorial was immediately controversial. For one thing he embraced American involvement in a European war, a war which marked a radical break with American foreign policy precedent. But even more controversially, Du Bois recommended that African Americans' "special grievances" should be set aside for the sake of the war.

Du Bois' position was particularly controversial because the second decade of the twentieth century had in fact brought African Americans extraordinary grievances; President Woodrow Wilson had courted the African American vote during the 1912 election, but once in office had refused to do anything to repay their support. Wilson had, on the other hand pushed for segregation in the Federal Government where none had existed before, refused point blank to condemn lynching which had reached epidemic proportions, and had even gone so far as to praise D.W. Griffith's infamous movie "The Birth of a Nation," which he compared to "writing history with lightning," and had described its vicious racist characterizations of African Americans as "all so terribly true."

The war itself had only added to African American grievances; the Army planned to have African American soldiers serve primarily in support units, working with pick and shovel rather than fighting with guns and grenades. Originally there was to be no training or recruitment of African American officers; finally, after intense lobbying by The Crisis, and others, a training camp was provided, but even then none of the

candidates were to be commissioned above the rank of Captain, and those that held a higher rank were removed or retired.\textsuperscript{31}

So the question that readers of \textit{The Crisis} asked themselves in July of 1918 was how can someone as adamant about the injustice done to African Americans as W. E. B. Du Bois come out in favor of participation in a European war led by a segregationist President where fighting would be done in a Jim Crow army?

The answer was that Du Bois believed that the Great War provided an opportunity for African American men to perform their masculinity, and thereby claim their citizenship at home. Holding firmly to Roosevelt's analogy, Du Bois believed that victory abroad would lead inexorably to victory at home; that with a victory over the Kaiser behind them, African American men would be welcomed back to the US as full citizens, and as \textit{men}.

Following "Close Ranks," Du Bois ran an editorial that elaborated on the ideas of racial solidarity and the postponement of African American civil rights activism. Titled "A Philosophy of War," the editorial lays out Du Bois' reasons for African American participation in the war in Europe, and is worth quoting at length.

\begin{quote}
First: This is OUR country. We have worked for it, we have suffered for it, we have fought for it; we have made its music, we have tinged its ideals, its poetry, its religion, its dreams; we have reached in this land our highest modern development, and nothing, humanly speaking, can prevent us from eventually reaching here the full stature of our manhood ...

Second. Our country is not perfect. Few countries are ... We must fight, then, for the survival of the Best against the threats of the Worst ...

Third. But what of our wrongs? cry a million voices with strained faces and bitter eyes. Our wrongs are still wrong. War does not excuse disfranchisement, "Jim-Crow" cars or social injustices, but it does make our first
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duty clear. It does say deep to the heart of every Negro American: We shall not bargain with our loyalty. We shall not profiteer with our country's blood ... Our duty lies inexorable and splendid before us, and we shall not shirk.

Fourth. Calm and with soul serene, unflurried and unafraid, we send a hundred thousand black sons and husbands and fathers to the Western Front, and behind them, rank on rank, stand hundreds of thousands more ...

Fifth. Protest, my brother, and grumble. I have seen the vision and it shall not fade. We want victory for ourselves - dear God, how we want it - but it must not be cheap bargaining, it must be clean and glorious, won by our own manliness, and not by the threat of the footpad ...32

The vision that Du Bois describes is full equality for African Americans, and his method of attaining this goal is typical for Du Bois. No "cheap bargaining" (a dig at those who hoped to use the war as a means to push for greater civil rights), but rather the attainment of equality through "manliness," in a "clean and glorious" fashion.

Statements of this sort did little to stem the tide of disapproval stemming from Du Bois' "Close Ranks" editorial of the month before.

The fall out from "Close Ranks" was bad enough that Du Bois had to publish an editorial response that addressed the issue. Readers had been incensed by the editorial, and some accused Du Bois of "crass moral cowardice," as well as arguing that he had "seldom packed more error into a single sentence." Du Bois was compelled to respond, and in the September, 1918 issue published an editorial titled "Our Special Grievances" that attempted to address the controversy.

The leading editorial in the July Crisis, called "Close Ranks," Du Bois wrote, "has been the subject of much comment. To a few it seemed to indicate a change of position on the part of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and The Crisis. It is needless to say that it indicates nothing of the sort. This Association and this magazine stand today exactly where they have

stood during the eight years of their work; viz., for the full manhood rights of the American Negro.33

Du Bois was being disingenuous; though he wrote that "it is needless to say" that there was no change of course (as if shifting from castigating Wilson for his implementation of segretationist policies in the federal government to wholesale collaboration with his largest project was consistent), Du Bois clearly needed to write something. If a large proportion of the magazine's readership believed that a shift in policy had occurred, a shift in the central defining mission of the organization as well as in the editorial direction of the magazine, then the issue did need to be addressed, protests to the contrary notwithstanding. On the other hand, Du Bois was being consistent in his devotion to the development of African American manhood, and with the articulation of the underlying Victorian ideals of civilization that needed to go along with it.

Du Bois remained determined to forge a connection between military service, full participation in American political, economic and social life, and his vision of the future of civilization. In "Returning Soldiers," published as an editorial in the May 1919 issue, Du Bois pushed towards this goal by attempting to break the cultural association of white men with civilization, and to connect it to African American veterans.

We are returning from war. The Crisis and tens of thousands of black men were drafted into a great struggle. For bleeding France and what she means and has meant and will mean to us and humanity, and against the threat of German race arrogance, we fought gladly and to the last drop of blood; for America and her highest ideals, we fought in far off hope; for the dominant Southern oligarchy entrenched in Washington, we fought in bitter resignation.34

It is immediately clear that not only are America’s African American soldiers returning home, but also that Du Bois himself was returning to the fray. "Returning Soldiers" concludes with the lines:

We return.
We return from fighting.
We return fighting.
Make way for democracy.35

Du Bois's writing is extremely powerful; “Bleeding France” echoes “bleeding Kansas,” site of bloody battles over the issue of slavery and freedom. Furthermore, Du Bois’ writing declares that though one war has ended, another is just beginning.

Though African Americans served their country in France, Du Bois argued that the fight was not over. As Du Bois put it, “by the God of Heaven, we are cowards and jackasses if, now that the war is over, we do not marshal every ounce of our brain and brawn to fight a sterner, longer, and more unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own land.”36

Du Bois was right; the battle would take much longer, and now, more than eighty years later, it is still not entirely won. The returning African American soldiers were not welcomed as citizens, nor were they granted their "full manhood rights." In the summer of 1919, known to U.S. history as Red Summer, race riots and lynching rose to new heights, as African Americans were forcibly pushed into the second-class citizenship that participation in the War was supposed to get them out of.37

35 Du Bois, “Returning Soldiers,” p. 197

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But the connections that Du Bois was able to make between African American manhood and American civilization have proved durable and strong. Those connections also helped to place the situation of the African American in a global context; it became impossible to assert that an individual such as Martin Luther King was somehow less a man, or uncivilized, when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.

Another important contribution was Du Bois’ vision of international relations as a force for domestic change. In this case, we have seen how Du Bois was able to view the First World War not only in terms of imperialism and international conflict, but also as an opportunity for individual struggle within an individual nation, whether it was the United States, or India, China or colonial Africa, as he so presciently observed.

While he may have seen the link between domestic and international affairs, and even understood that the performance of masculinity was at the heart of both, he was unable to effect change by claiming manhood for African Americans through the performance of manly acts of heroism on the fields of France. The manhood that he sought was constructed as an ideal by white men who gained their manhood through the oppression of others; it should come as no surprise, therefore, that Du Bois’ attempts to “play the man” would be met with opposition, and even violence, by the white men whose identity was defined in opposition to his own. Clearly, W. E. B. Du Bois’ struggle to achieve his “full manhood rights” would have continue by other means than through the use of US foreign policy.

CHAPTER VI

"ACTING LIKE A MAN ... LIKE A WOODROW WILSON:"
WOODROW WILSON AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Thomas Woodrow Wilson is often contrasted with Theodore Roosevelt, because of his policies as well as his personal demeanor. Wilson, a Democrat with Southern roots, came across as dry, academic, ministerial, and removed when compared with Roosevelt, a Republican with a Northern (and Western) background, who was energetic, spontaneous, and vivacious. But when it comes to discussing issues of masculinity, and the combination of manly action and foreign policy in particular, the two Presidents shared many similarities.

The common perception is that Theodore Roosevelt was the embodiment of manhood, while Woodrow Wilson was not. This is not only unfair, but also inaccurate. The truth is that Wilson was just as concerned with demonstrating manly behavior and performing his masculinity as Roosevelt was. He also agreed with Roosevelt’s equation of manhood with statehood, and sought to shape policies that would enact a national masculinity. But Wilson followed an older model of masculinity, one that predated the manliness that Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues promoted.

Nonetheless, Wilson deserves the same attention as Roosevelt for his foreign policy had just as great an impact as TR’s. While Roosevelt’s vision of masculinity shaped American foreign policy and pushed it in a particular direction (with specific consequences), Wilson’s own take on American manliness played an equally strong role
in shaping what some have considered to be a dominant strain in American foreign policy – that of liberal internationalism.

Wilson's reputation as a foreign policy president rests, to a large extent, on what George Kennan called the "association of legalistic ideas with moralistic ones: the carrying-over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment." His belief in the efficacy of international organizations, his decision to involve the US in World War I as an "associated" but not "allied" power, and his obsession with the League of Nations are cited as evidence to support Kennan's view.

This reputation sets Wilson apart from that of other Presidents, notably Theodore Roosevelt, who has been widely perceived as an aggressive, boisterous and militaristic leader, more inclined to use power than reason to further state policy. Roosevelt's role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the beginning of the Spanish-American War, his adventures as a Rough Rider, his advice to "carry a big stick," his advocacy of gunboat diplomacy, and his seizure of the Panama Canal all lend weight to this view.

There are a number of problems, however, with a portrayal of the idealistic, legalistic and moralistic Wilson in sharp contrast to the realistic, imperialistic and militaristic Roosevelt. Indeed, a case can be made that the two men are more similar than dissimilar, and that any of the adjectives used above to describe one man can be applied to the other.

For example, Woodrow Wilson was not the first President to believe in the importance of international organizations. Theodore Roosevelt brokered the Portsmouth
Naval Treaty, thereby bringing an end to the Russo-Japanese War, and won himself a Nobel Peace Prize in the process. His reputation as a peacemaker was such that he was asked to help resolve the Moroccan 'open door' crisis of 1905 - 1906. The successful result of the ensuing conference at Algeciras was widely seen as having prevented a European war.\(^2\) In addition, the Pan-American Conferences of 1902 and 1906 sought to establish legal instruments for the improvement of Latin American sovereignty and commerce.\(^3\) Even more telling was Roosevelt's submission of the Alaskan boundary dispute to arbitration. Though historians debate the extent to which Roosevelt would have submitted to the judgment had it not been in America's favor, nonetheless, Roosevelt did moderate his position in the dispute, and ceded two of the four islands at stake in the issue, thereby allowing Britain and Canada to save face.\(^4\)

It appears that the image of the Rough Rider has obscured the reality. Richard Collin writes that "[i]gnored in the convenient imagery of the big stick and the slogan of imperialism is Theodore Roosevelt's close work with the Hague Convention of 1907 and the World Court for arbitration of international disputes, ...[and his] diplomacy in moving Latin American countries to full participation in international law tribunals." In addition, it can be argued that Roosevelt was not an imperialist; though American troops

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intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1905 and in Cuba in 1906, the interventions helped to restore order and, once order and stability were achieved, the troops were withdrawn as soon as possible. As Richard Collin has argued, Roosevelt's Caribbean diplomacy was "an example of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism at its best." 5

Similarly, the "realist" school of thought, as exemplified by George Kennan, that views Woodrow Wilson as legalistic and disinclined to foreign involvement, should be revised. In fact, it can be argued that Wilson was more like Roosevelt than Roosevelt was, swinging the big stick frequently. Wilson sent warships to Vera Cruz in 1914, and sent the U.S. Army under General Pershing into northern Mexico in 1916 in an attempt to capture Pancho Villa. He sent troops to Haiti in 1915, and to the Dominican Republic in 1916, and refused to pull out the troops that his Republican predecessor had sent to Nicaragua. These interventions were all done in the name of maintaining order, a central principle in Roosevelt's Caribbean Policy. 6

While the common perception of Wilson is that he was an anti-imperialist, William Appleman Williams argued that Wilson was trying to create a system that would "establish conditions under which America's preponderant economic power would extend the American system throughout the world without the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism." 7 In Velvet on Iron, Frederick Marks argues that Wilson

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5 Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 188-189.
6 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order, Princeton: Princeton, NJ, 1992, p. 84.
“believed that power was of primary importance in the search for peace.”8 Wilson was clearly very comfortable with the use of force.

In many ways, then, the two men were more similar than dissimilar in their approach to U.S. foreign policy; what was most similar was their strong belief in the importance of national masculinity. While Roosevelt believed in “the essential manliness of the American character,”9 and equated "man" with "nation," likewise Wilson stated that “there is no difference between men and nations” when it comes to questions of honor and modes of behavior. Nations, both Roosevelt and Wilson believed, should act like men.

Though they shared a belief in the importance of manliness, Roosevelt and Wilson had differing opinions of what constituted manly behavior. Their conceptions of manliness, shaped by different backgrounds, rooted in different regions of the nation, and representing an older, gentler view of masculinity on the one hand, and a newer, strenuous masculinity on the other, prove to be a defining difference between the two men. The result was that Wilson and Roosevelt saw national masculine performance, and the United States' role in the world, in very different ways.

Having discussed Roosevelt earlier, as well as his comrades-in-arms Alfred Thayer Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge, it is necessary to consider Woodrow Wilson's opposing foreign policy ideas. By tracing Wilson’s foreign policy prescriptions back to the source, and considering his definitions of manly behavior, we will get a much more accurate understanding of his foreign policy ideas than if we were

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8 See Marks, Velvet on Iron, pp. 135-136.
to focus, for example, on the differences and tensions between idealism and realism. Wilson, we will see, believed that a nation, just like a man, should incorporate both values; the nation, as well as American men, should focus on heaven while living in the world.

In order to make sense of Woodrow Wilson’s conception of manly behavior, and hence his foreign policy, we must begin with a look at Wilson’s childhood and upbringing; for as Wilson said himself, “a boy never gets over his boyhood, and never can change those subtle influences which have become a part of him.”

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born in Virginia on December 28, 1856, the son, grandson and nephew of prominent Presbyterian ministers. The years of young Tommy’s childhood were those that built up to the conflagration of the Civil War, and Wilson had indelible memories of the conflict. While his parents were ostensibly northerners, his father and his uncle James both embraced the Southern cause, his uncle even heading the Confederate Chemical Laboratory during the Civil War.

While young Tommy did have early memories of the War Between the States, his childhood was marked more by religion than by conflict, and, unsurprisingly, his father took center stage. Tommy's father Joseph Ruggles Wilson was an imposing man, a success in his profession, a professor of theology and of rhetoric at Columbia Theological Seminary, who also served as pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Columbia, South Carolina. Young Tommy literally looked up to his father, the leader of the congregation, the minister in the pulpit on Sunday mornings. As father, preacher, and professor, Joseph

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Wilson served as the center of Tommy’s religious and scholastic world, combining religion with an education that laid particular stress on reinforcing his son’s development in his own subject of rhetoric.

Given the influence of his father, and his family background, it is perhaps surprising that Tommy Wilson did not become a minister himself. While there may have some expectation that he would follow his father and grandfather’s profession, Wilson biographer John Mulder points out that that course may have lost its appeal following a dispute that his father had with his superiors in South Carolina; the result of the conflict was that Rev. Wilson moved his family to a better paying, and easier, position in Wilmington, North Carolina as a result.12

Though he did not become a minister, Tommy did embrace his father’s Presbyterian covenant tradition. Thomas Knock and John Mulder both point out the importance that covenant theology had on the young Tommy Wilson. In a Christian context, “covenant” is synonymous with the relationship between God and the people he created; God agrees not to punish or destroy His progeny, while humanity agrees to follow His commandments. The covenant, then, provides a structure around which believers organize their actions here on earth.

There is a strong history of the covenant tradition in American history. Early puritan divines in New England, for example, saw the success of the new settlements as a function of the ability of their flock to adhere to God’s wishes; the frequent jeremiads directed by Jonathan Edwards and Cotton Mather at their flocks are testimony to the

importance of the maintenance of this covenant. John Winthrop’s sermon aboard the 
_Arbella_, for instance, that described the soon to be formed Massachusetts Bay colony as a 
“city upon a hill,” used that term specifically in the context of reinforcing the covenant. 
The colony would be an example to the rest of the world and would prosper if the 
covenant with God were kept. God, in bringing the colonists safely across the Atlantic, 
had done His part, and now the colonists must keep their part of the bargain.\(^{13}\)

Wilson believed strongly in the covenant tradition, as both Knock and Mulder 
explain, though the word covenant did not have exclusively religious connotations. 
Wilson was proud of the “stern, Covenanter tradition that [was] behind [him],”\(^{14}\) and 
showed an interest in covenants, constitutions, and agreements of various forms at an 
early age. John Mulder sees in Wilson’s penchant for covenants the root of his future 
political life, and Thomas Knock agrees: “In his father’s well-ordered philosophy of life 
and politics, Wilson apparently found both intellectual and emotional self assurance.”\(^{15}\) 
This can be seen in his use of covenants with his college friends, his description of his 
mariage as a “compact,” the writing of a constitution for the Liberal Debating Club, and 
his frequent reshaping of debating clubs, including those at the University of Virginia, 
Johns Hopkins and Wesleyan. Wilson clearly found this work interesting and satisfying; 
as Thomas Knock writes,

> Writing constitutions, or covenants, served a number of functions: they brought 
order and rationality to anarchic conditions; they promoted the duty to perform

\(^{13}\) For an examination of the covenant theology and American history, as well as an 
exploration of jeremiad tradition in American history and culture, see Sacvan Bercovitch, 
\(^{14}\) Link, _Wilson: The Road to the White House_, p. 1. 
\(^{15}\) Knock, _To End All Wars_, p. 4. 

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good works, and they could be applied to virtually any sphere of human endeavor – even to affairs of the heart or to the setting of goals for a career in politics.\textsuperscript{16}

One of Wilson’s early covenants, an agreement that he made with his Princeton classmate Charlie Talcott, bears close examination in this regard. This pledge, written as they were preparing to leave school, indicates the degree to which Wilson had taken covenant theology to heart. Remembering the event several years later in a letter to his fiancée Ellen Axson, Wilson explained that

\begin{quote}
I had then, as I have still, a very earnest political creed and very pronounced political ambitions. I remember forming with Charlie Talcott (a class-mate and very intimate friend of mine) a solemn covenant that we would school all our powers and passions for the work of establishing the principles we held in common; that we would acquire knowledge that we might have power; and that we would drill ourselves in all the arts of persuasion, but especially in oratory … that we might have facility in leading others into our ways of thinking and enlisting them in our purposes.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

This is classic Wilson; the “solemn covenant,” the devotion to “principles,” and the determination that he would lead others into his way of thinking, and “enlist them in our purposes.” What is also important to realize is the similarity of Wilson’s plan to the role of a minister; the devotion to principles, as well as the desire to lead people to a particular perspective, but perhaps most of all, Wilson’s focus on oratory. Oratory and rhetoric, of course, were his father’s specialty, and it is telling that Wilson focuses on it in this early outline of his life plan. Wilson, it appears, wanted to emulate his father, to become like his father, only in the political arena. This model, of the politician with the ministerial approach, would define Wilson for the rest of his life.

\textsuperscript{16} Knock, \textit{To End All Wars}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Woodrow Wilson to Ellen Louise Axson, October 30, 1883, in \textit{Papers of Woodrow Wilson}, vol. 2, p. 500.
It is clear that Wilson’s fondness for covenants was rooted in his father's Christian teachings, and in his attachment to his father. Wilson spoke often to friends and acquaintances of “incomparable father” and the two were indeed very close; “the letters between the two,” Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson’s official biographer wrote, “can be called nothing but love letters.” Their relationship was so enduring that even after he was married, Wilson consulted his father in everything he did: “Until he was forty years old” Baker writes, “Wilson never made an important decision of any kind without first seeking his father’s advice.” 18

By every indication, this relationship was intensely close, meaning a great deal to both father and son. Joseph Wilson took an active part in guiding his son in his life choices, steering him towards a career as a lawyer; the law would provide an excellent opportunity to do good, while the profession itself would require the use of rhetoric and the development of clear thought.

Young Tommy, however, began a process of redefinition. While he had always been “Tommy” as a child, at Princeton the future President had begun to sign his name T. Woodrow Wilson, and eventually, shortly after he graduated in 1879, simply as Woodrow Wilson. This is an interesting transformation, as Cooper and others have pointed out, for it illustrates in a very literal fashion the youth’s desire to combine both his maternal and his paternal sides in his future persona. Wilson explains the shift in a

letter to his friend Robert Bridges by stating that he was doing it “at my mother’s special request, because this signature embodies all my family name”\textsuperscript{19}

The shift in identification is also eloquent of Wilson’s connection to his mother. While Wilson received a great deal of affection from his parents, John Mulder points out that “Wilson’s mother, in particular, tried to shield her son from the world of violence and war by lavishing love and affection on him.”\textsuperscript{20} Wilson, as pointed out in the Introduction, described himself as a “mamma’s boy,” and it was his mother’s character that Wilson sought in women as an adult. Fortunately, he found a very near facsimile in his first wife, Ellen Louise Axson. As John Mulder points out, “Wilson craved and sought the same supportive love and tried to create the same sense of intimacy and privacy in his own family.”\textsuperscript{21} Wilson’s marriage to Ellen Axson seemed to provide him with the steady, uncritical and supportive female companionship that he required.

The change of his name, from Tommy to T. Woodrow to Woodrow, illustrates an attempt to increase his identification with his mother. This shift was given particular emphasis by Sigmund Freud in a biography of Wilson that the psychoanalyst wrote with William Bullitt, a diplomat who had served on the Versailles Peace commission. Freud, like Cooper and Mulder, saw a strong link between Wilson’s attachment to his mother, and his love for his wife.\textsuperscript{22}

Freud’s view of Wilson hinges on his approach to sexuality; Freud believed that all people are bi-sexual, and as a result there exists a tension between the masculine

aspect and the feminine aspect within each individual. Freud believed that because Wilson believed so strongly in his father, he wound up identifying with his mother. His name change, where he begins to emphasize “Woodrow,” is an example of this. Freud goes on to argue that through this identification with his mother, Wilson could actually become closer to his father – that in fact as a “Woodrow Wilson” he could win his father’s love, and love him safely in return.  

Wilson’s father sent Wilson a letter that illustrates the connection between Wilson's personal, masculine, identity, and his relationship to his father. The letter was sent while Woodrow Wilson was at law school, during a period when he was having difficulty dealing with the faculty – he had in fact skipped some classes, and Woodrow had informed his father of the fact that he was in trouble. His father wrote to assure him of his continued affections, and to praise him for handling the whole situation “like a man:”

I desire that you and I should look the whole matter squarely in the face – I say ‘you and I’ – for believe me, we are as truly identified ... as if we were one and the same person ... Truly thankful I am that you have not sought to conceal aught from me, or to minify the evil, - but that you have, like a man (may I add, like a Woodrow-Wilson?) fully set it all forth..."  

This letter is interesting for the light it sheds on Wilson’s relationship with his father, and on the significance of the name change. First, Wilson and his father were

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close—his father addresses him as "dearest," for example—but it is interesting that the elder Wilson has the same sense of connection, the feeling of being "one and the same person" that the younger Wilson also felt.

His father's mention of the name change is also fascinating, because his father uses a hyphen between the two names—thereby giving them equal weight as identifiers of who Wilson really was. He was not only a Wilson, in other words, he was a Woodrow-Wilson, and more the man because of it, something which his manly facing up to adversity indicated.

The letter also ends in a fascinating way. After admonishing his son not to err again, he ends by writing the following:

My own precious son, I love you and believe in you. God bless you now and ever: and that He may do so, seek more and more His guidance who is yr. supreme father
Your affc. (earthly) father25

This letter is fascinating—it appears that the line between reality and religion is beginning to blur in Wilson's family relationship. The connection between Wilson's father and God is made explicit, as is the idea of faith—"I believe in you," he writes. Woodrow has faith as well—he already relied on his father to mediate between himself and the Lord through his position as minister—but here it becomes unclear as to whether there really is much of a separation at all. The elder Wilson feels it necessary, after all, to put in a parenthetical reminder to his son that it is his "earthly" father that is writing to him, and not God.

Freud picks up on this; indeed, it would have been surprising if he had not. Arguing that most young boys are in awe of their fathers, Freud extended his analysis to Wilson in particular. Building on Wilson's desire to emulate, and his identification with, his father, Freud wrote that Wilson “could scarcely have avoided identifying his father with the Almighty.” This is rather powerful stuff, but the consequences of this identification are stronger still. As Freud put it, “if his father was God, he himself was God’s Only Beloved Son, Jesus Christ.”

Freud was not the only person who saw in Wilson the persona of the Messiah. When Wilson toured Europe on his way to the Versailles Peace conference in 1919, he was met with banners that referred to him as “The Savior of Humanity,” “The God of Peace,” and “The Moses from Across the Atlantic.” Similarly, Lloyd George, Britain’s Prime Minister who was seated between Wilson and Georges Clemenceau of France at the Peace conference, remarked that he sometime felt that he was seated between Jesus and Napoleon. Clemenceau himself said that “talking to Wilson is something like talking to Jesus Christ.” These comments, sarcastic though they may be, say much about Wilson's demeanor, bearing, and approach to foreign policy problems. Indeed, there is much in Wilson’s later life that indicates that thoughts of being a modern day Savior were not entirely foreign to Wilson himself.

Woodrow Wilson's identification with Jesus was understandable. For Wilson, the son of a minister, it made sense to emulate Jesus. Jesus was a man, in fact the ideal man, and had been so for nineteen hundred years. The whole Christian project, to a large extent, is rooted in the attempt to live life like the man that was Jesus; to be Christian, a

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26 Freud, Wilson, p. 87.
follower of Christ, meant living according to his model – the model of a particular kind of manliness. In this way, to be Christian was to be manly. And Woodrow Wilson was a Christian – he lived his life secure in the knowledge that God was guiding him, and that his successes were ordained by the Almighty.

Wilson was not the only man who saw Jesus as the ideal man; in fact, after the Civil War, the manly nature of Jesus Christ was used as an example of the new strenuous masculinity. While Wilson’s manliness was rooted in an older, antebellum version of Christian manliness, there were increasingly successful attempts to link Christianity with new constructions of masculinity.

During the late nineteenth century, there was a push to transform the way that religion was marketed to young men. Just a few decades earlier, during the years leading up to the Civil War, religion had become firmly linked to women and femininity, and accordingly religion came to place new restraints on male behavior. As Michael Kimmel explains,

> Religion had been women’s domain, and the sentimental piety and obsessive moralism were experienced by men as a brake on manly exuberance, and a constraining critique of marketplace competition.²⁸

As a result, ministers found themselves increasingly in a world of women, for as the nineteenth century progressed, male involvement in the church declined.

As religion became increasingly feminized, the message and content of sermons began to change as well. The result was the promotion of a new and different ideal of Christian male behavior. This new ideal emphasized the gentle, loving, and caring

²⁷ Knock, To End All Wars, p. 199.
aspects of the Biblical Jesus and the Christian God, and minimized the terrible aspects of
the Puritan God of Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards. In some ways the new
Christian ideal was seen as a simple antidote to the brutal, un-churched masculinity of the
nineteenth century. One Methodist minister wrote of the beneficial changes that occurred
when men accepted Jesus:

It is wonderful to see a great burly man, mostly animal, who has lived under the
domination of his lower nature and given rein to his natural tendencies, when he
is born of God and begins to grow in an upward and better direction. His
affections begin to lap over his passion … The strong man becomes patient as a
lamb, gentle as the mother, artless as the little child.29

This was the Christian manliness that Wilson embraced, the Christianity that took the
animal, base passions, and elevated them, softened them, controlled them, until the
formerly “mostly animal” man has become as “gentle as the mother.” This approach to
religion may appear womanly or feminized now, but we must remember that it was
considered manly then.30

Woodrow Wilson was out of step with his times. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the interpretation of religion had begun to change, and constructions of
manliness along with it. By that time, the inherent femininity of religion had become
established in American culture, and men were deserting the church in droves. The
relationship between religion and the claustrophobic combination of femininity and
cloying civilization had become so commonplace by the late 1800s that Mark Twain was

29 Kimmel, Manhood in America, p. 176.
30 See Ann Douglas, Feminization of American Culture, New York: Knopf, 1977, for an
in-depth explanation of this Nineteenth Century gender construction.
able to set the plots of both The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, and The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn into action by confronting the young boy protagonists with the threat of church.

Huck expresses the tension between boyhood and church well. After various humorous descriptions of church experiences ("I hate them ornery sermons! I can’t catch a fly in there, I can’t chaw, I got to wear shoes all Sunday"), and of the differences between heaven and hell ("[Aunt Sally] was going to live as so as to go to the good place. Well, I couldn’t see no advantage in going where she was going, so I made up my mind I wouldn’t try for it"), Huck ends his narrative by stating that he was going to light out for the territories because he can’t stand it when Aunt Sally tries to "sivilize" him.31

By the turn of the century, boyhood and religion were understood to be mutually opposed. Expressions of the rebellion against the constraints that religion placed on boyhood and masculinity appeared not only in popular "boy’s books" of the time (Thomas Bailey Aldrich’s Story of a Bad Boy, for instance), but also in magazine articles and essays that appeared in Harper’s and The Atlantic, among others. The femininity of American religion got to the point that prominent men began to look for an alternative view of Christianity. As Howard Alan Bridgman asked in 1890, “Have we a Religion for Men?”32

The answer was yes. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a movement arose which sought to redefine religion, particularly protestant Christianity, in a way that would stress religious teachings while emphasizing a new masculinity. This

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31 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, in Mississippi Writings, New York: Modern Library, 1982, page 212; Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, also in Mississippi Writings, page 912.
new Christian masculinity defined itself by its distance from women, as well its
opposition to earlier models of Christian manliness. The movement became known as
Muscular Christianity in part because of the importance placed on Jesus’ artisanal roots;
proponents of this Christianity held that since Jesus and Joseph worked as carpenters,
they were muscular and powerful. As Billy Sunday put it, Jesus was “no dough faced,
lick-spittle proposition. Jesus was the greatest scrapper that ever lived.”33 Books such as
The Manhood of the Master, The Manliness of Christ, The Manly Christ, and The
Masculine Power of Christ testified not only to the popularity of the vision of a Jesus
with biceps, but also the desire to reclaim the church from effeminacy. 34

Muscular Christianity, which aimed to change established views of manliness as
well as Christianity, was not embraced at the higher social and ecclesiastical levels. The
appeal of Muscular Christianity lay in its valorization of the working class roots of Jesus,
and in the value of toil and hard work. At a time when industrialization was increasing
social stratification, and it was becoming increasingly possible for the upper classes to
enjoy a life of comparative leisure, Muscular Christianity valorized labor, sweat and
muscles, as well as decrying weakness, wealth and an academic approach to the Bible.
As Sunday himself said, biblical scholars were “anemic rank sceptics” who could
“dissolve the atoning blood of Jesus into mist and vapor.”35

32 Douglas, Feminization of American Culture, p. 98.
33 Douglas, Feminization of American Culture, p. 327.
34 For an extended discussion of muscular Christianity and the manly Jesus, see Clifford
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001; see also Kimmel, Manhood in America, pp.
177-179.
35 Quoted in Kimmell, Manhood in America, p. 179

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Woodrow Wilson’s father, though not actually a theologian, certainly fit Sunday’s description of an academic Christian. As a professor of rhetoric, and pastor of a socially prominent Presbyterian church, the elder Wilson did not fit into this new, dynamic, working-class paradigm. Neither did his son. The younger Wilson identified with his mother, and emulated his ministerial father, the embodiment of the masculine ideal of the previous generation. The younger Wilson was not a member of the men’s club as represented by Theodore Roosevelt, Ernest Seton, Daniel Carter Beard and other advocates of the strenuous life.

Sigmund Freud would likely have agreed with Roosevelt and his colleagues; Freud wrote in his study of Wilson that “his masculinity was feeble.”36 Freud's judgement rests on a particular construction of manhood, though Wilson’s masculinity belonged to an earlier era; Wilson modeled himself on his father, and he upheld the ideals of the mid-nineteenth century. Though Wilson may have been out of step with his times, and Freud's, he was just as much an advocate of masculinity as TR.

Wilson's earlier model of masculinity had different values than those espoused by Theodore Roosevelt and his friends. This earlier masculine mode of thinking stressed the collective over the individual, and emphasized social justice, high moral purpose, and the power of institutions. All of these aspects can be seen in Wilson’s construction of masculine action, and all can be seen in his foreign policy.37

The meaning of masculinity is constantly shifting. Though manliness is a concept with incredible power that has been used to justify many things, including the foreign

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36 Freud, Wilson, p. 97
policies and actions of both Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, it is an amazingly elusive term that is nearly impossible to define. An action that Wilson would have described as inherently manly, would have been described by others as weak and effeminate. Because the definition of manliness began to change, evaluations of conduct shifted in their emphasis, and the rules of manly behavior were transformed.

It is an irony of fate that Wilson, who was born before Roosevelt, and who embodied an earlier code of conduct and an increasingly dated construction of masculinity, had to serve as President after him. By the time Wilson reached national prominence, he was forced to contend with a new paradigm of manly behavior that had been established by advocates of strenuous masculinity, most notably Theodore Roosevelt.

Though Wilson believed himself every bit the man that TR was, due to irreversible changes in American culture and society, Wilson was unable to make his model of manliness stick. As a result, his foreign policy ideas have been handed down to us with the taint of weakness and misplaced idealism.38 This appraisal of Wilson and his

37 The League of Nations is the most obvious example of the way that this mode of thought became reflected in Wilson's conception of international relations, but there numerous other examples.

38 Wilson has suffered particularly at the hands of the "realist" school, historians and political scientists who see in Wilson a naive idealism that got in the way of a "realistic" assessment of the global situation, and an effective use of American power. See, from among many examples, George Kennan, American Diplomacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 55-73; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Touchstone, 1995, pp. 225-227; Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998, pp. 129-146, 158-161. By the end of the Cold War, Wilson had become the example to be avoided for many policy makers; Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, wrote that "Carter seemed to resent my efforts to make him into a successful Truman rather than a Wilson." Brzezinski's implication is that Carter would have been more successful had he been Trumanesque rather than Wilsonian; if he had been "realistic" rather than "idealistic,"

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foreign policy has a lot to do with the ascendancy of Theodore Roosevelt and his model of strenuous masculinity; but it is important to understand that Wilson’s choice to rely on an earlier model of masculinity offers one of the most successful of the challenges to Roosevelt’s model. Throughout the twentieth century, Americans have often returned to Wilson’s internationalism, and as often, they have rejected it in favor of a more Rooseveltian model.

“Nations Must Unite as Men Unite:” Wilson and the League of Nations

Perhaps the best example of Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism, and its rejection by proponents of Rooseveltian national masculinity, can be found in the debate over the Versailles Peace Treaty and the League of Nations following the end of the First World War. While both sides in the debate prized manly performance, at the heart of the disagreement were competing ideas of what US foreign policy should be, and how the United States should approach relationships with other nations. These relationships, as discussed earlier, have been conceived, articulated, and debated in the language of American masculinity. While both sides, represented most clearly by Woodrow Wilson on the one hand and Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge on the other, believed in the importance of manly performance, and both viewed the nation as a man, because of their different beliefs in ideal masculinity, their beliefs, policies and approaches were radically different.

The previous chapters have discussed some of these different beliefs and approaches. We have already examined Woodrow Wilson’s background, and considered how Roosevelt’s manly ethos became the paradigm for US foreign policy in the hands of Mahan, Beveridge and Lodge. In addition, we have examined critiques of Rooseveltian manliness by John Reed, Jane Addams and W.E.B. Du Bois. We now turn to examine some examples of Wilsonian masculinity, as enacted in US foreign policy.

Following a successful teaching career at Princeton, which was capped by his presidency of the University (1902-1910), Wilson was elected Governor of New Jersey in 1910, serving from 1911 to 1913. Having acquired a reputation as a reformer during his time at Princeton, as well as during his two years as Governor, Wilson was approached by Democrats who asked him to consider a run for the White House. Wilson accepted the challenge. Running for President in 1912, in an election that focused almost exclusively on domestic affairs, Wilson defeated both the incumbent William Howard Taft and Roosevelt to take the White House. Elected in November, Wilson took office in March of 1913. Shortly before taking office he confided that “[I]t would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs.” Ironic or not, foreign affairs pressed themselves upon him from the very beginning of his term.39

Wilson’s campaign for the White House had focused primarily on promoting his “New Freedom” platform, a platform that articulated a more progressive social and economic agenda than either Taft or Roosevelt (who ran as a Progressive), and foreign policy had not been much of a topic. In fact, during the first few months of his

39 For Wilson’s pre-Presidential career, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. For description of his
Presidency, Wilson focused on achieving his domestic agenda and breaking down what he called the “triple wall of privilege” – the high tariff rates, the banking system, and the proliferation of trusts that Wilson argued were creating class divisions in the United States.  

While Wilson was thus occupied, the Revolution in Mexico which John Reed had been covering was developing. Huerta’s counter-revolutionary coup against Francisco Madero in February of 1913 sparked a Constitutionalist opposition that quickly took up arms against him. Huerta had been encouraged to overthrow Madero by European and American diplomats, and the European powers were quick to recognize the new regime. Then, in October of 1913, Huerta proclaimed a dictatorship. This act thrust the Mexican situation onto the agenda, and Wilson was compelled to deliver his first foreign policy speech as President.

Speaking in Mobile, Alabama, Wilson denounced European imperialism in Mexico, and made a direct connection between the effect of powerful economic interests in domestic politics and the effect of international economic interests on Mexico. “We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States,” Wilson declared. “Therefore, we will now know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers, not only from within their borders, but from outside their borders also.” Wilson went on to explain that American “sympathy”

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40 \text{ For a detailed examination of Wilson's campaign, see Link, The Road to the White House, pp. 467-528.}
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41 \text{ For the situation that led to Wilson's Mobile speech, see Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992, pp. 24-27.}
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should take the form of a new foreign policy, which was based on "terms of equality, "would help to create a "family of mankind devoted to the development of true constitutional liberty." 42

Wilson's speech staked out new territory for US foreign policy, and served notice that Roosevelt's "Big Stick" and the "Dollar Diplomacy" of the Taft years would be laid to rest. As Thomas Knock points out, "[t]he Mobile Address was the first indication that Wilson might seek a potentially radical departure in American foreign policy." 43

Though Wilson may have believed in the idea of "family," it was a family where Wilson/the United States was the father figure, and where the Latin American nations were expected to mind their manners, and listen to what Professor Wilson, if not Uncle Sam, had to teach. Wilson had made this clear on an earlier occasion, stating that "he was going to teach the South American Republics to elect good men;" 44 the definition of 'good men,' of course, varies according to the individual; manliness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.

Professor Wilson must have been a harsh grader, for as father figure, he was a stern paterfamilias – under his direction the United States felt it necessary to school Mexico in appropriate behavior. Two key incidents illustrate Wilson's professorial national masculinity in action. First, in Tampico in early April of 1914, a group of sailors was detained by the local military commander who was loyal to Huerta. When he realized that the sailors were Americans, and not Constitutionalists, they were released

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43 Knock, To End All Wars, p. 26.
with apologies. Admiral Mayo, of the squadron that the sailors were attached to, insisted on a 21-gun salute, which the local commander refused to give. Wilson backed up his Admiral, and the issue quickly became a sticky affair of honor for both sides.

Before it could be resolved, however, Wilson ordered the squadron to occupy the city of Veracruz to prevent a large delivery of weapons from Germany from being delivered to Huerta’s forces. This occupation came at a high price, however – before it was completed, more than two hundred Mexicans, soldiers as well as civilians, had died, as had nineteen American marines.

Wilson’s actions caused an immediate reaction, both at home and abroad. In Mexico, Venustiano Carranza denounced the action, not just because of the affront to Mexican sovereignty and the loss of life, but also because the American action helped to portray Huerta as the defender of Mexico. At home, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt saw Wilson as a bumbling idiot who either did too much or nothing at all. Lodge and Roosevelt were not alone in their criticism of Wilson’s attempts to take Mexico to school. As Thomas Knock points out, “to most contemporaries and historians, his entire approach was arrogant, contradictory and imperialistic.”45 Wilson’s first attempt to impose order on the classroom was not much of a success.

Though the Tampico and Veracruz incidents were failures, Wilson learned from his experience dealing with the warring sides of the Mexican Revolution. The lesson that Wilson took from Veracruz was that military intervention, at least unilateral military intervention, was not the answer. There were both domestic and foreign political risks, in

45 Knock, To End All Wars, p. 27.
addition to the military costs. This experience was to prove decisive and led him to consider the idea of collective action in international affairs.

As a result of his experiences with Mexico, Wilson became more interested in the idea of collective security, which had often been put forward by individuals and groups that have been described as “progressive internationalists.” Among these groups were organizations such as the Woman’s Peace Party and the American Union Against Militarism. Both of these organizations, discussed briefly in the chapter on Jane Addams, sought to solve contentious international relations problems through collective action; the WPP’s Platform, for example, called for a “Concert of Nations” to supersede ‘Balance of Power.”

This idea influenced Wilson a great deal; in a meeting with Jane Addams, Wilson stated that the WPP’s ideas were “by far the best formulation which up to the moment has been put out by anybody.” As Thomas Knock explains, “[t]he fact was that the Woman’s Peace Party had furnished Wilson with a pioneering American synthesis of the New Diplomacy during the critical year in which his own thinking acquired a definite shape.”

It should also be stressed that this synthesis was the product of a committed group of women who had come together specifically to promote women’s perspective on international conflict. This synthesis, which sought to create a “concert of nations,” was the direct result of a new approach to world peace through collective security.

Wilson’s new, woman-inspired direction was appreciated by members of the American left, but among manly conservatives such as Roosevelt and Lodge, Wilson’s

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47 Knock, *To End All Wars*, p. 52.
move to repudiate a foreign policy based on the manly national performance model, and
replace it with a feminine collective action model was foolish and naïve. They became
even more incensed when Wilson argued that the United States should not act to protect
American interests in Mexico, but should rather let the Revolution take its course.

Wilson made his case for this new policy in a speech in Philadelphia on the 4th of
July, 1914. Wilson stated that he was “willing to get anything for an American that
money and expertise can obtain, except the suppression of the rights of other men.”
While Americans might lose property in the upheaval, that needed to be understood as
beneficial in the long run, for “back of it all is the struggle of a people to come into its
own.”

Wilson’s new approach as indicative of a deeper difference between Wilson and
Roosevelt. The situation in Mexico, one historian argues, “prompted the virtually
inevitable contrast between [Wilson’s] behavior and conduct of the nation’s foreign
relations and those of Roosevelt.” Wilson’s handling of the Mexican crisis made it clear
that it was not merely approaches to foreign policy that separated the two men, it was
also their personal conduct, their codes of masculinity.

This is an important point because Wilson’s foreign policy was close to what
socialists such as John Reed (who met with Wilson in June) were hoping for. As we saw
earlier, Reed and Wilson had a number of similarities in approach, but where Reed was
looking to create a foreign policy of international brotherhood, Wilson’s model was
different. The United States did not look at Mexico fraternally but paternally – the way a

49 William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign
father looks at a child, the way a professor looks at a student, the way a minister looks at a member of the congregation; that is with a mixture of concern for their ignorance and a sense of responsibility for their future development.

Less than a month after Wilson’s speech in Philadelphia, war broke out in Europe. Wilson was quick to declare American neutrality, on August 4th, 1914, immediately following Britain's declaration of war on Germany. Wilson’s goal was to keep the United States from becoming involved in the conflict. That would take some doing; many recent immigrants still had strong connections to the various combatants in Europe. Many German and Irish immigrants, for example, felt strong sympathy for the Central Powers, while many Americans with connections to Britain and France favored the Allies.  

Another threat to American neutrality was trade. The United States saw an opportunity to trade with the nations of Europe, which had discovered that the war would not end quickly; they needed supplies, such as armaments, raw materials and food, which the United States was happy to supply – for a price. Eventually this policy of arms sales led to greater problems.

The first problem was paying for the armaments. To begin with, the warring nations paid for their materiel with the gains from American securities and investments that they sold off, but soon that money ran out as well. The financier J.P. Morgan was approached, and despite administration qualms about neutrality, in late 1915 Morgan established a line of credit for the Allies. The central powers were effectively denied

assistance; by the end of the war, the Allies had borrowed more than $2 billion, while Germany had received only $27 million. 51

This inequity in trade and finance made it difficult for Germany to fight, and with Great Britain receiving substantial aid from the United States, Germany believed that it needed to do something to redress the inequality. The German solution was to use submarines in an attempt to pare down the trade advantages that England enjoyed, and thereby even the military balance.

This tactic had fateful consequences, for it was the German submarine warfare that ultimately served to bring the United States into the war. Despite the questionable nature of American neutrality, the German U-boat war prompted public outrage. The sinking of the Falaba in March of 1915, in which one American was drowned, and the loss of the Gulflight on May 1st, were only the prelude to the crisis provoked by the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7th.

The loss of 128 Americans out of the total of 1200 passengers that the Lusitania carried came as a shock, and both Roosevelt and Wilson acted characteristically, and according to their deep-seated beliefs in ideal manly behavior. Wilson continued to argue for American neutrality, stating that the United States must hold itself above the fray:

The example of America must be a special example; the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and the elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right. 52

Roosevelt, of course, saw things differently. Having described German submarine warfare as "piracy, pure and simple," he continued in the same vein, but made it clear that "none of those old time pirates committed murder on so vast a scale as in the case of the Lusitania."\(^5\) Following the loss of the Arabic, in which a further two Americans lost their lives in August, Roosevelt was apoplectic: "It is our own attitude of culpable weakness and timidity – an attitude assumed under pressure of the ultra-pacifists – which is primarily responsible for this dreadful loss of life and for our national humiliation."\(^5\)

The masculine models of foreign policy could not be more clearly opposed than this. Wilson believed in the manliness of self-control, of restraint, and in the use of the intellect to solve problems rather than the use of physical force. There is no need to use force to "convince," he argued. In addition, the use of force has limitations; it is peace that is "the elevating influence of the world." For Professor Wilson, concerned about the progress of his class, it is peace that will raise the students, peace that will serve to educate them in the means to a better life.

Roosevelt, however, was the product of a different culture, a boy culture, that believed in drawing the line and standing up to bullies. Roosevelt saw the root cause of the sinkings as American weakness, not German militarism, and not global war. If the US acted more like a man, and not with "weakness and timidity," the situation would never have been created. Roosevelt had no patience with weaklings – particularly those who believed that strength showed through restraint. By virtue of their weakness,

weaklings begged to be abused. It enraged Roosevelt to see the United States, the nation he had led, the nation he had provided with a 'big stick,' wind up in such a predicament.

Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and others who were concerned about American 'weakness' began to push to make sure that the United States was 'prepared' for the conflict in Europe which they saw as inevitable. Not surprisingly, it was the Republicans, the party of Roosevelt, Lodge and Beveridge, that took the lead in the preparedness issue. Lodge, for example, argued that

> Armies and navies organized to maintain peace serve the ends of peace because there is no such incentive to war as a rich, undefended, and helpless country, which by its condition invites aggression.\(^5\)

From the very beginning, Lodge had just one view of the conflict. Where Wilson had staked out a position of neutrality, Lodge was an Anglophile, with many close friends who were British, including the British Ambassador Cecil Spring Rice, who was also an intimate of Theodore Roosevelt. While Lodge realized that American sentiment was strongly behind Wilson and neutrality, he believed that the United States and the Allies were engaged in a battle to save 'civilization' from a militaristic threat; as Lodge wrote to Professor J.J. McCook of Harvard, "The issue to me is very simple. It is whether democratic government, as it exists in England, France, and the United States, can survive Prussian militarism." In a similar vein, Lodge, in a letter to George Otto Trevelyan, described the war as "the last great struggle of democracy and freedom"


against autocracy and militarism, and it will succeed, I firmly believe, as the North
fighting in the same cause succeeded against the South." 56

Lodge realized that though he could not swing popular opinion in favor of the
Allied cause without a great deal of effort, he could work to bring the United States more
in line with his way of thinking. This he did by reiterating the need for manly behavior in
international affairs. As Lodge said in a speech at the unveiling of The Soldier’s
Monument in Brookline, MA, in 1915:

The one dominant question is whether we believe … that there are rights and
duties and faiths in defense of which men should be prepared to fight and give up
their lives in battle.57

The debate, then, boiled down to the question of whether there was such a thing as a
“man” that was too proud to fight, or whether that decision immediately meant that that
person was no longer a “man” at all but a coward.

It was this line that Lodge followed in the preparedness debate. Lodge had no
great desire to rush the United States into armed combat; he believed, rather, that
American security relied on its military strength, a strength that could keep the United
States from actually entering into any conflict. This was a very similar view to that of
Theodore Roosevelt, who, famously, urged the United States “to speak softly and carry a
big stick.”58 Lodge had been appalled by Wilson’s handling of the Mexican crisis; he
saw Wilson as trying to use a ‘stick’ that he didn’t have, and Lodge interpreted Huerta’s
intransigence with Wilson as a result of the Mexican’s realization that Wilson was

56 Quoted in Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 217.
57 Lodge, War Addresses, p. 54.
bluffing. A stronger military, however, would provide the muscle to back up American diplomacy – Mexican as well as European. The military, after all, was the stick behind the softly spoken language.\textsuperscript{59}

Wilson’s response to the \textit{Lusitania} sinking, that there were times when a nation or a man was “too proud to fight,” came therefore as the final confirmation for Lodge that Wilson was “the most dangerous man that ever sat in the White House.” As Lodge wrote to Roosevelt in March of 1915, he “never expected to hate anyone in politics with the hatred I feel towards Wilson.”\textsuperscript{60} The idea of being “too proud to fight” went against everything that masculinist and imperialistic men like Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt believed in. As William Widenor points out, “[Lodge] and Roosevelt were convinced that Wilson and [Secretary of State] Bryan ‘were temperamentally incapable of conducting an honorable policy toward the war,’ that their course of conduct made a mockery of the ‘whole international code of gentlemanly behavior’ which had been the essence” of Roosevelt’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{61}

Wilson did not do much to change Lodge’s perceptions. His demeanor, always righteous and ministerial, was particularly so in terms of foreign policy, and this particularly irked Lodge, who viewed Wilson’s policies as inept and fumbling. The combination of Wilson’s arrogance and his inability to recognize the validity of other perspectives, led Lodge to declare on the floor of the Senate that

\begin{quote}
when the President is approaching a new subject, the first thing he does is make up his mind, and when his mind is made up the thoughts which in more ordinary
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{59} For a discussion of this, see Widenor, \textit{Henry Cabot Lodge}, pp. 215-216.
\textsuperscript{60} Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 1, 1915, in \textit{Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918}, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925.
\textsuperscript{61} Widenor, \textit{Henry Cabot Lodge}, p. 195
mortal are apt to precede the decision or determination of a great question are excluded; information upon the new subject is looked on as a mere impertinence.62

Despite Wilson’s ministerial performance, Lodge and TR were also unwilling to concede Wilson the moral high ground. As Widenor points out,

Roosevelt and Lodge believed that Wilson, in his preoccupation with keeping the country out of war and in assuming a morally neutral position was destroying the American public’s rather tenuous sense of duty and obligation toward the international community.63

This choice of a “morally neutral” position was the key to the dispute; Lodge and Roosevelt had a different sense of morality, one that was rooted in their very different conceptions of how men (and nations) ought to behave. At the bottom of their conflict was the question of which model of masculinity should be used as the basis for foreign policy.

Roosevelt and Lodge used the issue of preparedness as the means to promote their model of masculinity. The Republican Party was looking to the election of 1916 as a means of taking back the momentum in the political debate, and the issue of preparedness seemed to be the perfect platform. Lodge, Roosevelt and others portrayed Wilson and the Democrats as the party of weakness, or rather as “the party of submission.”64

Wilson needed to counter this political threat, and co-opting their preparedness line, Wilson called for “reasonable” preparedness, hoping thereby to neutralize the Republican threat while not alienating the progressive internationalists and the socialists

63 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 211  
64 Knock, To End All Wars, p. 62.
who had enabled him to win election in the first place. He was not entirely successful, in part because this half-way position went against the manly ethos that he had staked out before.

Though Wilson was able to counter the Republicans effectively, his choice to compromise on the preparedness issue by meeting the Republicans halfway created additional opposition within his own constituency. Jane Addams warned him of the loss of credibility that a military build-up would have in Europe, while Lillian Wald helped found an "Anti-Militarism Committee," which later developed into the American Union Against Militarism. More importantly, however, was the resignation of William Jennings Bryan, Wilson's Secretary of State.

Bryan’s break with Wilson came in June of 1915, as the result of Wilson’s admonishment of the Germans following the sinking of the Arabic; Bryan wanted the President to take a less confrontational tone with the German government, and state that any ships that sailed into the war zone did so at their own risk. Bryan’s resignation could have caused real political trouble; Bryan had been the Democratic nominee for President three times, spoke for the American mid-West on a number of important issues, and most importantly now, spoke for prominent American pacifists groups such as the Woman’s Peace Party and the AUAM when he protested actions that he believed would bring the US closer to war.

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65 For an extended discussion of the response to Wilson, and the creation AUAM, see Knock, To End All Wars, p. 63.
66 For perspectives on Bryan, there are several biographies. Paolo Coletta's three volume William Jennings Bryan, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969, is excellent. The best one volume biography is Louis W. Koenig, Bryan: A Political Biography of William Jennings Bryan, New York: G. P. Putnam, 1971. For his resignation, see Coletta's second
Bryan’s resignation encouraged the anti-war movement, which was already growing rapidly. Despite the resignation of his Secretary of State, there were many who continued to view Wilson as an ally; part of this was due to the fact that the Republicans were perceived to be worse. Eugene Debs, the prominent socialist and candidate for president, spoke for many when he warned that if the United States was drawn into the European conflict, Roosevelt, Lodge and others would “transform the American nation into the most powerful and odious military despotism on the face of the earth.” Max Eastman, editor of The Masses, and a member of the AUAM, met with Wilson, and came away with the impression that Wilson was on his side. Wilson, Eastman wrote, “always referred to the Union Against Militarism as though he were a member of it ... I believe that he sincerely hates his preparedness policies.”

Wilson’s “reasonable” preparedness played out well during his re-election campaign in 1916. Wilson ran on a platform of continued progressive legislation, neutrality in the European war and “reasonable preparedness.” The slogan of the campaign, which summed up the ultimate reason for Wilson’s re-election, was “He kept us out of war.”

Wilson did believe in the importance of beefing up American defense capabilities; in fact, Wilson was moving towards a vision for collective security, and part of his plan required the use of American power. The centrality of collective security, and the importance of American power to that plan, was made clear in a speech Wilson made to the Senate on January 22, 1917. Setting the stage for the speech, Wilson announced that

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67 Quotes in Knock, To End All Wars, pp. 64, 67.

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the warring powers of Europe had agreed to an American request for a statement of their war aims, and since they were willing to state their terms for peace, it made sense that the US do so as well.

Wilson stated that the creation of a body that would guarantee the collective security of nations was essential:

In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again.

Furthermore, despite American neutrality,

it was inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise … No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war.

The power behind this collective security would grow out of the efforts for preparedness that Wilson was pushing.

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation … that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it.68

Because an eventual peace must be a collective peace, Wilson argued, the outcome of the war must not be punitive or humiliating. “Only a peace between equals can last," Wilson claimed, and so the peace must be a “peace without victory.”

This speech is important for a number of reasons. First, it makes clear the central importance of collective security to Wilson’s view of international relations. From this point on, the concept of a “concert of power,” or a league of nations, was central in Wilson’s view of the post-war world. Second, it was clear that Wilson had taken the step
and codified his vision of the manly ideal in foreign policy, and embodied it in the web of security that the “concert of power” was going to create. Wilson found security in the collective, and danger in the lone-wolf masculine ideal favored by Roosevelt and Lodge.

Needless to say, Roosevelt, Lodge and Beveridge disagreed; while Wilson’s speech met with a great deal of acclaim outside of the Republican party, the defenders of rampant masculinity saw Wilson’s conception of “peace without victory” as another indication of weakness and cowardice. As Theodore Roosevelt sneered, “Peace without victory is the natural ideal of the man too proud to fight.”

The “Peace Without Victory” speech highlights the opposition of the two conflicting paradigms of manliness. Wilson sought to promote the manliness of restraint, of law and order, the manliness of the Covenant and the Constitution. Men, Wilson believed, belonged in society, where checks upon their free will contributed to their security. Similarly, a nation belonged in a similar society, where collective security would ensure peace. Roosevelt and Lodge, on the other hand, wanted to preserve independent action, beef up the muscularity of the US, and swing the big stick to guarantee American rights.

Wilson, at this point, seemed to be winning the argument. His re-election in November said as much. With the support of Progressives, and with the Republican challenger, Charles Evans Hughes, distancing himself from Roosevelt and his attacks on the Kaiser, it was clear that Wilson controlled the debate. Furthermore, by combining progressivism and peace, Wilson was able to position himself as a modern "man of  

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68 Knock, To End All Wars, p. 112.
69 Knock, To End All Wars, p. 113.
peace," and embody, through his performance on the election trail, a ministerial masculinity that meshed well with his political message.

Wilson may have won re-election by running as the man “who has kept us out of war,” but this did not last for long. On January 31st, Germany announced that it would begin unrestricted submarine warfare the next day, which meant that any ship, neutral or belligerent, found in the war zone, was liable to be sunk without warning. Wilson responded with the breaking of relations with Germany on February 3rd. While a debate raged over the arming of American merchantmen, a series of events brought the crisis to a head.

The first event was the news of the Zimmermann Telegram, which became public on March 1st. The telegram was itself a message sent by the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur Zimmermann to the German Embassy in Mexico. The message had been intercepted by the British government, and passed (with a certain amount of glee, no doubt) on to Wilson. The message instructed the German diplomats to offer assistance to Mexico in the case of a war between the US and Germany, and to promise German aid, including armaments, so that Mexico could “recover the lost territories of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.”

Following shortly after the telegram were the sinkings of five more American merchant ships. Wilson was now forced to act; his Cabinet voted unanimously to support a declaration of war. As a result, Wilson called a special session of Congress. When Congress met on April 2, 1917, Wilson asked that they recognize that a state of war

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For more on this moment, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 342-346
already existed between the United States and Germany. Describing the German U-boat campaign as a “cruel and unmanly business,” Wilson went on to state that this is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken … but the ships of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way … The challenge is to all mankind.\textsuperscript{71}

Having laid out the threat, Wilson proceeded to discuss the remedy. "We are glad," Wilson stated, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples … The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve.\textsuperscript{72}

Wilson’s goal of making the world “safe for democracy” became one of his career defining sentences, and as such is worth considering alongside his ‘peace without victory’ speech of January 22. Both speeches go against the prevailing Rooseveltian construction of masculinity; the idea of fighting, not to win, but to bring about a condition of equality and balance went against the boy culture of Roosevelt and others. As Roosevelt explained in his essay titled “The American Boy,” “every good boy should have it in him to thrash the objectionable boy as the need arises.” Similarly, Germany needed to be thrashed, and “peace without victory” would not suffice as a thrashing.\textsuperscript{73}

But making the world “safe for democracy” was not really the solution either. Lodge and Roosevelt saw American involvement in the war as the result of German militarism on the one hand, and American weakness on the other. Now that the US was

\textsuperscript{71} Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 65th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 55, Part I, pp. 102-104.
\textsuperscript{72} ibid.

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involved, both men wanted to see the US crush their opponents. As William Widenor points out, Lodge “never once considered the possibility of a war of limited objectives.”

Roosevelt and Lodge, looking back to the days of the Civil War, saw conflict in terms of what Widenor calls a “holy war.” The end of the Civil War, which repudiated the planter elite that had caused the war, was a good model for Lodge. Lodge believed, for example, that his party stood “for unconditional surrender and complete victory just as Grant stood.” Making the “world safe for democracy,” or restoring the balance of power in Europe was not a clear enough goal, and would not justify the loss of American life. Despite their objections, however, both Lodge and Roosevelt supported Wilson’s declaration of war, and on April 6th, 1917, it became official: the United States had committed itself to a war in Europe for the first time.

With the nation at war, Wilson needed to define American war aims. In a speech to Congress on January 8th, 1918, Wilson presented Congress with what became known as the "14 Points." A further development of the ideas he had expressed previously, such as the “concert of powers” and the concept of “peace without victory,” the 14 Points codified Wilson’s view of the post-war world, and made central his hope for an enduring collective security apparatus.

The first of the 14 Points called for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at,” which would prevent the type of secret diplomacy that had created a world war from a single shot. The second point called for “absolute freedom of the seas,” and in doing so addressed the American casus belli. The third point required “the removal, so far as
possible, of all economic barriers,” and the establishment of free trade; the goal here was to create economic bonds that would facilitate international cooperation. The fourth point called for a reduction of armaments “to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety,” and the fifth “a free, open minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,” based on the principle of self-determination. This would help promote international security and spell the end of colonialism and hence great-power rivalry.\textsuperscript{76}

The next eight points dealt with specific land and boundary issues, namely the negotiation of borders in central Europe and the Middle East, and how they should be determined after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire after the war. But the final point, and the most important part of Wilson’s program read as follows: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”\textsuperscript{77}

The idea for a League of Nations had been in the back of Woodrow Wilson’s mind for many years. He had worked on the idea in terms of the Pan-American Pact, and he had been influenced in his goal by groups such as the Woman’s Peace Party, and the American Union Against Militarism, which had sought to institute a permanent body which could mediate between warring nations.\textsuperscript{78}

The 14 Points served as Wilson’s centerpiece, and he was able to use them as an incentive for peace; when published, the document gave incentive to the warring nations to lay down their weapons. The Germans, in particular, faced with a renewed Allied

\textsuperscript{76} Address to Congress, \textit{Papers of Woodrow Wilson}, vol.45, pp. 534-539.  
\textsuperscript{77} ibid.
assault, saw possibility in a Peace settlement based on the 14 Points; in fact, they made that one of the conditions for the armistice. Assured that the document would serve as the basis for any peace, the Germans agreed to lay down their arms. The war ended at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918.

November of 1918 also brought the mid-term elections for Congress. During the course of the past two years, Wilson had not handled the political aspect well. He had managed to alienate his former supporters, such as the pacifists and the socialists, by means of repressive prosecutions for disloyalty under the Espionage act, and through the harassment of their journals (such as *The Masses*) by the Postmaster General. He had also given strength and determination to his adversaries by refusing to consult with or include any of their number in his thoughts or negotiations. The mid-term elections of November 1918 were therefore catastrophic for Wilson; he had called for a referendum on his policies, and he was met with an apparent rejection. The result of the mid-term election was the loss of Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate. Wilson was going to have to submit his vision for a lasting peace, a peace based on his particular construction of masculinity, to men who were convinced that international affairs were rooted in a different model.

Before that could happen, though, the Peace Treaty needed to be composed. Wilson decided to attend the Peace conference in Paris in person so as to supervise the transformation of the 14 Points into an instrument for lasting peace. Wilson made a tactical and political mistake by not including any prominent Republicans in the

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78 Thomas Knock’s book, *To End All Wars*, from which I have quoted widely, is the definitive source for the development of Wilson’s collective security thought.
79 Knock, *To End All Wars*, p. 166.
American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Wilson was certainly not going to make things easy for himself, or for the treaty that he put so much faith in.

Wilson was received by the people of Europe like a savior; the other members of the “Big Four,” George Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Orlando Vittorio, were not quite so enthusiastic. Leery of Wilson’s idealism, the leaders of the European powers were not convinced that they should give up on the balance of power system that had kept the peace for so long. Clemenceau in particular was dubious. Mocking Wilson’s saintly persona, he said “God gave us the Ten Commandments and we broke them. Wilson gave us the 14 Points – we shall see.” Despite many compromises, Wilson’s 14th point, the section that had originally called for the creation of a “general association of nations,” eventually became the central part of the League of Nations covenant, and was codified in the very first section of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which was signed on June 28, 1919. The first 26 articles of the Peace Treaty were the 26 articles of the League Covenant.

The peace that Wilson had worked for in Paris was one that required nations to act as individuals within an agreement similar to those that he had developed in many different circumstances since his youth. This agreement, though guaranteeing the individual freedom, also bound the members to act for the common good. This idea is classic Wilson – it goes back as far as his childhood.

The use of the word ‘covenant’ in the “Covenant of the League of Nations,” for example, automatically puts the document into the tradition that Wilson began when he drew up a covenant with his friend Charles Talcott. In that “solemn covenant,” Wilson

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80 See Knock, To End All Wars, p. 167-187

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and his friend agreed to direct “all their powers and passions for the work of establishing the principles we held in common.” 81

While there is an interesting continuity in Wilson’s thinking, the problem was that Wilson’s principles were not actually held “in common;” there were many who did not agree with Wilson’s dream of a League of Nations. Henry Cabot Lodge was one of these people. Lodge’s objections to the League of Nations were many, and profound, but it is not an oversimplification to state that they were rooted in the issue of national sovereignty; he objected to the possibility of the United States becoming involved in foreign wars through no choice of its own.

Wilson’s goal of an enduring peace was dependent on nations giving up certain individual actions and submitting themselves to the authority of the collective. In urging this kind of approach, Wilson was flying in the face of recent developments in American culture. It was all well and good to be part of a collective, but the American rhetoric of struggle and competition held that the American man should do what was necessary to rise to the top, to become the leader of that collective. 82

We can take one example from popular sports. At the turn of the century, football was being urged as a sport in which men at elite educational institutions (Harvard and Yale, West Point and Annapolis) could demonstrate their worth through leadership; the football game had become a metaphor for life in an increasingly competitive society, and the quarterback was the equivalent of a general, a business leader, a president. If the

81 Mulder, The Years of Preparation, p. 56.
82 There are so many examples, but the stories of Horatio Alger, Jr. are as good as any. One of Alger’s most famous stories, Struggling Upward, or Luke Larkin’s Luck, (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1890) illustrated how hard work and manly qualities,
League of Nations were a team, as Wilson argued, then Henry Cabot Lodge wanted to be the quarterback.\footnote{For football as metaphor for American life at this time, see Kim Townsend, \textit{Manhood at Harvard}, p. 102-103. For an excellent look at the role of football in turn of the century America, see Michael Oriard's \textit{Reading Football: How the Popular Press Created An American Spectacle}, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.}

There were major differences between Lodge and Wilson on the issue of manliness and foreign policy, so it was no surprise that when Woodrow Wilson returned from Europe, on July 8, 1919, with the completed Covenant, he came back to a political stand-off with the Republican party. The opposition to the League of Nations Covenant was led by Lodge, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Wilson and Lodge had clashed often regarding foreign policy, and the debate over the League of Nations was only the latest installment of an ongoing battle of wills. Lodge had originally begun to despise Wilson through his handling of the crisis in Mexico, originally over the issue of recognizing Huerta, and later over the occupation of Veracruz.\footnote{For an excellent extended discussion of Lodge's views of Wilson and the peace process, including the League of Nations Covenant, see Widenor, \textit{Henry Cabot Lodge}, p. 266-348.}

Lodge had begun his opposition to Wilson early, beginning to rally the troops at home while Wilson was still in Paris negotiating the Treaty. Lodge had been one of the thirty-nine senators who had signed a letter in February rejecting the League “in its present form,” and his opposition had not softened. Wilson submitted the Treaty, which contained the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the Senate two days after his return, and Lodge, promptly locked the treaty up in the committee.
Lodge had serious ‘reservations’ about the treaty. While he did not want the United States to withdraw from the world (Lodge was too much of an imperialist for that), he did want the US to maintain freedom of independent action, and not be in the position of having its international affairs dictated by the other members of the League. Lodge’s opposition to the Treaty rested primarily on his interpretation of Article X, which stated that

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

This guarantee, which was backed by the threat of collective action, was the heart of Wilson’s plan for the future of world peace, but it was also the central objection for Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge saw a loss of sovereignty and a blow to Congress’s power, defined in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, to declare war. Lodge was also aware of the Foreign Relation Committee’s power to delay passage of the Treaty, and he convened endless discussions and debates on the problems inherent in the Treaty and the Covenant itself.

Frustrated and enraged by Lodge’s tactics, Wilson decided to take his case directly to the American people, so as to avoid compromises with Lodge, and so as to increase the pressure of the electorate on their elected representatives. Wilson embarked on a speaking tour of the American West, traveling more than nine thousand miles by train, and delivering thirty-seven speeches in twenty-two days. The texts of these speeches on the Western Tour, as it came to be known, are worth studying closely, for they indicate the way that Wilson saw the League, and his extended explications of the
reasoning behind the Covenant and the Treaty are eloquent of his world view. This view, the speeches show, was rooted in a particular kind of masculine paternalism, and indicate how Wilson's own conception of manliness, rooted in the ministerial model that his father had provided to him, shaped his view of leadership, and his view of how the world should best be reorganized. In fact, Wilson collapsed at the end of the tour; hence it makes sense to think of the Western Tour as the beginning of the end of his life, and of his political power. The tour, then, shows Wilson at his zenith, the moment where he was able to combine politics and morality to the greatest effect. It also provides us with an example of Wilson at his most righteous – the most like his father.

One of the speeches that highlights Wilson's particular combination of ministerial masculinity and political morality is the one he gave September 8, 1919 at the Coliseum in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. In the speech he advocated acceptance of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant, but the language that he used indicates an underlying concern with masculinity and American morality.

Wilson began his speech by discussing the nature of the men who had fought the war in Europe, and how they had arrived in France with the look of America in their eyes... the feeling that penetrates every American, that there is a great future, that a man can handle his own fortunes, that it is his right to have his place in the world, and that no man that he does not choose is his master.
These men, Wilson continued, had fought to bring about a new Europe, “not merely ... to
defeat Germany; [America] was seeking to defeat everything that Germany’s action
represented, and to see to it that there never happened such a thing again.”

What American men had been trying to do, Wilson argued, was to redeem
civilization, to make sure that physical force would be replaced by moral force, and
thereby make armed conflict obsolete:

That is exactly what is attempted in this treaty. I can not understand the
psychology of the men who are resisting it. I can not understand what they are
afraid of, unless it is that they know physical force and do not understand moral
force. Moral force is a great deal more powerful than physical. Govern the
sentiments of mankind, and you govern mankind. Govern their fears, govern their
hopes ... and the whole thing sways like a team.

The team metaphor was a popular one in the early twentieth century, as sports
teams were seen as models of the new masculinity. Here, in Wilson’s construction, the
team is brought together by the rule of law; law replaces combat, as moral force replaces
physical force, but this important transformation happens under the rubric of a masculine
identity.

That does not mean that there is no room for physical force; Wilson explained the
importance of this in an interesting anecdote:

Did you ever see a family that hung its son’s yardstick or ledger or spade up over
the mantelpiece? But how many of you have seen the lad’s rifle, his musket, hung
up! Well, why? A musket is a barbarous thing. The spade and the yardstick and
the ledger are the symbols of peace and of steady business; why not hang them
up? Because they do not represent self-sacrifice. They do not glorify you. They
do not dignify you in the same sense as the musket...

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Office, 1919. p. 82.
86 ibid., p. 88.
Wilson, ever eager to spread the lessons of Christianity, was emphasizing the value of self-sacrifice. The musket belonged over the mantel because it represented the service that men needed to do to bring about a new and better world. The sacrifice that Wilson was describing here, though, was not the sacrifice of Christian meekness, of turning the other cheek. Rather it was a sacrifice made to the stirring strains of “Onward Christian Soldiers.”

A week later, in Portland, Oregon on September 15, 1919, Wilson had the opportunity to elaborate even more on his construction of international masculinity. He did this, interestingly, by quoting Henry Cabot Lodge:

Nations must unite as men unite in order to preserve peace and order. The great nations must be so united as to be able to say to a particular country, ‘you must not go to war,’ and they can say that effectively when the country desiring war knows that the force which the united nations place behind peace is irresistible.88

Nations are like men - the analogy here is one with which we are very familiar. It is the same analogy that Roosevelt described in his famous “National Duties” speech eighteen years earlier; namely that as a man acts within the nation, so must the nation act in the world. Wilson must certainly have quoted Lodge with relish; Wilson must have loved the opportunity to have Lodge speak for him, and in praise of the League of Nations.

Wilson claimed Lodge’s words for his own because Wilson believed, just like Lodge, that “nations must unite as men.” In fact, Wilson believed that nations behave as men not merely in unity, but in every possible instance; it was because of this conviction that Wilson believed that a group of nations (such as the League) would be able to

87 ibid., p. 89
enforce peace in much the same way that men do, with the Wilsonian caveat that the collective be backed up by a force behind peace which is "irresistible."

Wrapping up his speech in Portland, Wilson called upon the audience to make a covenant with him, so that the Promise of the League will be redeemed, and "so that men shall always say that American soldiers saved Europe and American citizens saved the world."89

Once again, Wilson reiterated the masculinity of Christian sacrifice, the use of force as a means to a higher purpose; but more importantly, Wilson constructed national action as manly behavior. This trope of national manhood was a constant on Wilson's Western Tour, as it had been throughout his career, and was, as we have seen, indicative of his mode of thought. Wilson, like Lodge (whom he quotes) and Roosevelt (who set up the earlier analogy), saw foreign policy in the guise of manly interaction. The limits of Wilson's vision are the limits of how men actually behave.

But Wilson was an optimist. Eight days before he forced to give up his tour on account of poor health, on September 17th in San Francisco, Wilson concluded his talk with the following words:

My fellow citizens, I believe in Divine Providence. If I did not, I would go crazy. If I thought the direction of the disordered affairs of this world depended on our finite intelligence, I should not know how to reason my way to sanity, and I do not believe that there is any body of men, however they concert their power or their influence, that they can defeat this great enterprise of divine mercy and peace and good will.90

88 ibid., p. 208.
89 ibid., p. 217.
90 ibid., p. 252.
Despite his faith in providence, Wilson was unable to win the argument for the League of Nations. It seems that there was “a body of men” who were able to “concert their power” in such a way that Wilson’s argument did not carry the day. These men, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, were able to carry the day in large measure because their alternate, competing vision of the conjunction of masculinity and US foreign policy was stronger and more compelling than that of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson may have tried to co-opt Lodge’s construction of masculinity and apply it to support his view of the League of Nations Covenant, but he was not successful.

For all his talk of Divine Providence, and the manly sacrifice of Christian soldiers who fought for a higher ideal and a League of Nations, Wilson was not able to make a convincing case that his mid-nineteenth century construction of American manliness would work as a model for how men and nations should behave at the beginning of the 1920s.

But after the Great War ended in 1918, there was an opportunity for American commitment to collective security. American resources and military power had proved to be the decisive power in the European war, and this was recognized at the time. While American diplomatic tradition, in the form of Washington’s Farewell Address, argued against the commitment, the reality, recognized by many Americans, was that the United States had already been drawn into one European conflict, and could be again.

Though tradition was a powerful argument, Wilson was ultimately unable to convince the American people of his vision for the League of Nations because Lodge and Roosevelt were able to control the terms of the debate; Wilson, operating under a
previous generation’s masculine ideal, was unable to convince the population at large that collective security was the answer to America’s foreign policy needs.

The debate over the Versailles Peace treaty illustrates in the clearest possible fashion the difference between the Wilsonian ethos of masculinity and that of Rooseveltian manliness as articulated in the code of the “strenuous life.” Wilson, as we have discussed, hoped to bring the world together in a League of Nations, an organization that would function to control and guide individual nations in the same way that a congregation or a classroom would function; bullies and sinners would be dealt with, and the collective would stay secure. The success of the organization would depend on the ability of the collective to channel its behavior in a particular way; for Wilson, the example to follow was that of a man who had self-control, who could restrain himself and his passions, and who could lead and/or educate the rest of the world in how to achieve peace, an era of no more wars. Wilson believed that nations behaved just as men behaved; accordingly, “nations must unite as men unite,” and through this new unity create a “world safe for democracy.”

Lodge, the carrier of the Rooseveltian banner after TR’s death in January of 1919, saw the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations covenant in essentially manly terms as well, only he saw it as a threat to the independence of the United States. Lodge described his opposition to the League in a letter to William E. Borah, Senator from Idaho, and explained that his plan was to "emasculate [the League] as much as possible."91

Lodge, like Wilson, clearly saw the League in manly guise; the nature of international relations was identical to that of manly interpersonal relations, and conduct
of those relations was dependent on men acting like men. The emasculation men makes it impossible for them to perform manly duties such as fatherhood; similarly, the "emasculation" of the League would make it impotent, weak, unmanly, and not worthy of respect, nor even able to command the respect, of strong American men.

By pursuing the "emasculation" of the League, Lodge was striking a blow at a construction of international masculine performance that was at odds with his own. By attacking a treaty that embraced collective security, a treaty based on a brotherhood of nations, Lodge believed that he was preserving the opportunity for independent action by the United States; he was acting in accordance with the Rooseveltian construct of "the strenuous life" which preached the values of manly struggle and competition, as opposed to the ideals of communality and brotherhood that were Wilson's ideal national masculinity.

While Lodge may have succeeded in defeating the League, it was a pyrrhic victory; history has not been kind to Lodge, and the words that Oswald Garrison Villard are expressive of the attitudes of many:

> Men will read his books, a few his speeches; ... [N]ever will it be truthfully claimed for him that he broadened the range of American idealism, or brought the achievement of our ideals an hour nearer, or advanced in any way the brotherhood of man.  

A concern for the "brotherhood of man" was not Lodge's model, however; it was Wilson's. Perhaps it is fitting that Lodge be measured according to Wilson's model of national masculinity, since Wilson was found wanting according to Lodge's.

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Similarly, it is fitting that Wilson quoted the words of Henry Cabot Lodge in one of his final speeches of the tour, for the two men shared a central key belief, namely that nations behaved like men, and that manly action was the key to a successful foreign policy. When Wilson quoted Lodge’s statement “that nations must unite as men unite,” it is the perfect example of the two men’s similar approach to foreign affairs.

Where they differed, though, was in the decision of which construction of manliness to adhere to. Lodge’s and Roosevelt’s construction won out in the end, and Wilson’s belief in the masculinity of collective security, self restraint, and Christian moralism, like the League of Nations which it produced, went down in defeat.

Yet Wilson’s belief in collective security, rooted as it was in the mid-nineteenth century masculinity that he learned from his father, returned many years later in the form of the United Nations. It seems, then, that Woodrow Wilson was born both forty years too late and forty years too early.

CONCLUSION

"REAL MEN WANT TO GO TO TEHERAN:"
THE PERSEVERANCE OF MANLY FOREIGN POLICY

The Great War was an entirely new experience, a radically different kind of war than the Spanish-American War of 1898. Though Roosevelt demonstrated genuine courage in his Cuban "charge," that kind of independent military adventurism was not possible in France in 1917. The mechanized, impersonal violence of trench warfare transformed men into cannon fodder and killing machines. The industrial approach to combat made wholesale slaughter possible, with the result being tragedies such as the Battle of the Somme, where the British Army suffered nearly 60,000 casualties in a single day.¹ While men like Theodore Roosevelt had agitated for American involvement in the Great War, when his own son died following an air battle, he went into a depression from which he never recovered.²

World War One was a decisive event for all of the individuals in this study. Woodrow Wilson had a stroke, and died trying to impose his peace on the world, a peace that the United States ultimately wanted to have nothing to do with, shocked as it was over the intransigence and unwillingness of Europe to turn its back on the kind of politics that started the war to begin with. John Reed went to Russia in 1917 to cover the Russian

Revolution, and eventually died there, unable to bring about his vision of international brotherhood.

American women finally won the vote in 1920, a victory that was in large measure due to the end of their opposition to the war, and their patriotic work during the conflict. As Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones pointed out, women's suffrage leaders, most notably Carrie Chapman Catt, had proposed a deal to Woodrow Wilson: "if he would support votes for women, they would drop their pacifist principles and support the American war effort." This deal finally enabled the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. The logic that traded pacifism for women's suffrage made perfect sense with regard to the perspective on foreign policy offered by Jane Addams and others discussed earlier. Women won the vote not because they were the same as men, but because they were different, and therefore able to provide government with a different perspective on social and political issues than that provided by men.3

W.E.B. Du Bois, however, saw no victory at home, despite victory abroad, and grew increasingly concerned over African Americans' chance for full equality in the United States. Du Bois came to realize that "playing the man" had not worked for African-Americans in WWI any better than it had worked in Cuba or in the Philippines; Blacks were no more respected, or welcomed as citizens, after the Armistice than they were before the war.

For many, the title of Ernest Hemingway's novel A Farewell to Arms sums up the response of the United States to the Great War. The First World War generated a sense of

exhaustion among a 'lost generation' whose rejection of idealism and militarism was driven by a revulsion for the waste of human life that the Gilded Age conception of national masculine performance had wrought. Yet the connection between masculine performance and foreign policy was never broken; even Hemingway rearticulated it in For Whom the Bell Tolls and To Have and Have Not, works that feature protagonists who find themselves drawn into larger global conflicts as a result of their ethos of manly performance.4

While the myth of an American 'farewell to arms' was established, the connection between manliness and nationalism articulated so well by Theodore Roosevelt was perpetuated by such Gilded Age institutions as the Boy Scouts and patriotic organizations. As Cecilia O'Leary has pointed out, "[a]fter World War One, right wing organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion promoted a 'virile Christian nationalism,' each claiming to be the exclusive arbiter of true Americanism."5 The connection between masculinity and strenuous national performance remained linked.

While the carnage of World War I may have led to a "farewell to arms" for some men, the connection between the manly ideal and national duty was merely downplayed during the 1920s and 30s. In reality, the connection between manly action and foreign

4 Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms, New York: Scribner, 1929; To Have and Have Not, New York: Scribner, 1937; For Whom the Bell Tolls, New York: Scribner, 1940. To Have and Have Not, and For Whom the Bell Tolls were made into films, starring Humphrey Bogart and Gary Cooper respectively, which widened their impact, and made their masculine message more powerful, shaping masculine ideals of performance through the allegory of national masculinity. See To Have and Have Not, Howard Hawks, Director, Warner Brothers, 1944; and For Whom the Bell Tolls, Sam Wood, Director, Paramount, 1943.
5 O'Leary, To Die For, p. 244.
policy was not broken; it was more subdued, but resurfaced later among another
generation of American men.

Similarly, fundamental US foreign policy doctrines that had their origins in the
masculinity of the Gilded Age remained in effect. These policies include such
cornerstones of American foreign policy as Roosevelt’s interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine, and the use of force in the Caribbean and Central America in the manner
pioneered by Wilson. As the 20th Century wore on, it became clear that the precedents
created by the masculinist policies of these two men continued to shape US foreign
policy.

Immediately after the Great War, though, the United States tried to achieve its
goals without conflict. Warren Cohen has described the foreign policy of the 1920s as a
time of "empire without tears;" an era of American economic growth and global empire,
but without the conflict that had marked the previous decade. The Caribbean
interventions and troop landings that marked the inter-war years (U. S. troops were
dispatched to the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua) were rooted
equally in the traditions of masculine nation performance and economic imperialism;
both policies, as discussed earlier, are rooted in the "gilded age" construction of
masculinity.6

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6 Warren I Cohen, Empire Without Tears: America's Foreign Relations, 1921-1933, New
America, and the attitudes and goals that lay behind the frequent American interventions,
See Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America,
The decade's foreign policy approach, which has also been called "independent internationalism," speaks to the conception of the masculine foreign policy of the era: men, like nations, should (in this American construction) remain independent, but in times of crisis, should be free to bind together to face a common threat. In this way, independent internationalism is the odd combination of the opposing national masculine policies of Wilson and Roosevelt; the right to independent action preserved, even as the freedom to join in collective action is secured.

Warren Cohen explains that "[i]n the 1920s the United States attempted to pursue an independent policy, compromising frequently to cooperate with other nations for specific purposes." While Cohen admits that the American hesitation to bind itself to international organizations may seem "timid" now, "what is really striking is the increased participation of the United States in major developments around the world, compared with the role the nation played in 1917." What struck Cohen as "timid" was actually the downplaying of the masculinist rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy, rather than any hesitance in the pursuit of American economic expansion.

But this rhetoric of masculine national performance became explicit with the beginnings of U.S. involvement of the Second World War. As the situation in Europe began to appear more threatening, many American intellectuals began to fear for American interests. Among these were Lewis Mumford, a well-known writer and cultural critic, who in 1939 published a book with the title *Men Must Act*. The title lays

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7 "Independent Internationalism" is Joan Hoff’s term, used to describe the policies of Herbert Hoover. See her *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., pp. 168-179.

8 Cohen, *Empire Without Tears*, page 17.

out Mumford's argument succinctly. Mumford sought to reach across the decades to connect with Theodore Roosevelt's preparedness argument, and the construction of American manliness that justified US involvement with the First World War. "Time changes nothing: men must act." 10

It becomes clear that the "Men" in Mumford's title and argument are interchangeable with "the United States." In the preface Mumford writes, "The United States must be ready to act alone," while in his concluding chapter, "Democracy Must Dare!" he reiterates a Rooseveltian sense of national duty:

That which the soldier gives with quiet desperation on the field of battle must become the commonplace gift of the day: every mechanic, every clerk, every farmer, every housewife, writer, scientist, artist, inventor, industrialist, business man must dedicate himself to the larger task of upholding our democratic civilization … The goal cannot be countermanded; but the conditions for achieving it are inexorable: men must act.11

It is worth noting that in his equating men with the nation, he also includes the "housewife" as a member of the larger category "men;" women, Mumford argues, need to play the same manly role that men do in the fight against fascism and totalitarianism. The performance of masculinity is essential for Mumford; men and women, and clearly nations as well, become manly through the performance of particular actions. Lewis Mumford is reiterating the Rooseveltian masculine analogy of "as man is to nation, so is the nation to the world."

The end of the Second World War did not mean the end of the masculinist trope of national manhood. During the Cold War, the “containment” policy dedicated the United States to a “long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian

10 Mumford, Men Must Act, p. 8.
expansive tendencies."\textsuperscript{12} The result of this long term dedication was a focus on maintaining that policy; accordingly there was a great deal of rhetoric on the need for the United States to stand tough – to be firm – in short, to act like a man. Frank Costigliola argues that George Kennan's "Long Telegram," a document that served as a blueprint for Cold War foreign policy, was rooted in Kennan's gendered view of the US-Soviet contest. As Costigliola explains, the "Long Telegram" reveals Kennan's "linkage of virility with involvement with Russia," a connection "in which he casts himself as the male lover and Russia or the Russian people as the feminine beloved." With his portrayals of the Soviet government as a "jealous lover" who keeps the Russian people captive, it is not surprising the Kennan's writings "fostered feelings that delegitimated cooperation with the Soviets."\textsuperscript{13}

The Cold War argument as articulated in the foundational writings of Kennan and other policy makers shaped the national debate over Vietnam. American action in Vietnam was rooted in the classic definition of manly national performance. As Robert Dean argues in Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy, many of the most important policy makers during the Vietnam era shared a common conception of manly behavior, as well as a belief in the importance of exercising American power abroad. Dean argues that

The men who came to power in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been formed by a series of institutions which glorified empire while officially denying its existence. Boarding schools, Ivy League universities, elite men's

\textsuperscript{11} Mumford, \textit{Men Must Act}, pp. 172-173.
clubs, and volunteer military service provided explicit lessons in the performance of a class-based "manliness" as means to and justification for power.\textsuperscript{14}

The best example of the "performance of class based manliness" had been set by Theodore Roosevelt some sixty years earlier. The problem was that Roosevelt's Gilded Age masculine code was untenable in the Vietnam era, as it had proved to be in the trenches of the Great War. As Dean points out, this foreign policy of masculine performance was responsible for the debacle in Southeast Asia, for "[t]he politics of manhood crucially shaped the tragedy of Vietnam."\textsuperscript{15}

Furthermore, the cultural debate within the United States during the Vietnam War reflected the gendered discourse which underlay it. The discourse of masculinity can be seen in the tension between films such as The Green Berets and The Deer Hunter, which portrayed manliness in diametrically opposite ways. Revisionist post-Vietnam films such as Rambo: First Blood, Part II continued this connection by articulating the argument that American defeat in Vietnam was due to a lack of manly effort. Sylvester Stallone's portrayal of Rambo illustrates the popular connections between military duty, American identity, foreign policy and strenuous masculinity. It can be heard in the different arguments for masculinity made in songs such as "Fortunate Son" by Creedence Clearwater Revival and "The Ballad of the Green Berets" by Staff Sgt. Barry Sadler.

Cinematic and musical critiques of the Vietnam War were but a part of the upheaval of the late 1960s and early 1970s, for this was also an important time for advances in Civil Rights for African and Hispanic and Native Americans, as well as for

\textsuperscript{15} Dean, \textit{Imperial Brotherhood}, p. 243.

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women and gay men. But despite the challenges to Cold War constructions of gender represented by Stonewall and national debate over the ERA, masculine approaches to foreign affairs survived the Vietnam War, and the 1970s. Carol Cohn has described how nuclear deterrence theory during the 1980s was conceived and expressed in gendered terminology. The arms race, she suggests, was rooted in "missile envy;" the language used to discuss the strategy of deterrence as well as the weapons themselves is redolent of masculine imagery. Citing lectures on nuclear weapons, she lists the sexualized language of nuclear strategy, which included such terms as

vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks - or what one military adviser to the National Security council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump."\(^{16}\)

This kind of language, Cohn has argued, "can be construed as a deadly serious display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race." This language, of course, is similar to the masculinist language of Roosevelt and his colleagues from earlier in the century. Cohn made this connection as well; writing in 1987, Cohn viewed the gendered language of nuclear strategy as the result of a foreign policy tension between the United States and the Soviet Union which had ultimately become a "competition for manhood."\(^{17}\)

Cohn's discussion of the language used during the Reagan-era indicates the continued viability of the conception of foreign policy as masculine performance, even as the Cold War itself came to an end. The legacy of the Cold War "competition for

\(^{16}\) Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, Signs 12 (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718.

\(^{17}\) ibid., page 696.
"masculinity" can be seen in foreign actions undertaken by the United States during the Bush and Clinton administrations. At a time when the policy of containment was no longer quite applicable, yet had not been replaced by a similarly coherent foreign policy logic, masculine competition served as a basis for international action. While the Bush administration's decision to commit the United States to force invading Iraqi troops out of Kuwait in 1990-91 ("Operation Desert Shield" and "Operation Desert Storm") was couched in the terms of liberation, and the Clinton administration's continuation of the intervention in Somalia in 1992 ("Operation Restore Hope") was conceived as a humanitarian action, both were articulated using the rhetoric of masculinity.

During the conflict in Kuwait and Iraq, the focus of American ire was the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. In a speech made at the Pentagon on August 15, 1990, President George Bush spent much of what was supposed to a policy speech attacking Hussein's character, and listing his evil deeds: Saddam is

the man who has used poison gas against the men, women and children of his own country; who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Moslems; and who now plunders Kuwait. 18

Saddam Hussein was not individually killing men women or children, or invading or plundering Kuwait, but in Bush's language and in his rhetoric Saddam Hussein and Iraq had become synonymous, with the man standing in for the nation. The initial reaction of Bush's Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was that "it was far too personal an attack, harsh and overdone, ratcheting up the rhetoric too much." But it was personal for

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Bush; in a meeting between the President and Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, Bush stated that "I give my word of honor" that the United States would "see this through." 

Clearly, while Bush conflated Hussein with Iraq, he also saw himself as the United States, or at least as its manly champion. The idea of a President giving his "personal word of honor" to commit hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, and billions of dollars from the treasury is outrageous - foreign policy should not come down to personal animosity and the anthropomorphizing of international relations. But for President George Bush, the US needed to act like a man, and in a warrior's guise.

For the Clinton administration, the foreign policy of manly competition was performed in the costume of the humanitarian, though not without conflict. "Operation Restore Hope" was a mission to bring stability to the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, in the wake of decades of chaos and Civil War. Clinton found himself needing to articulate US policy aims, and focused on Somali "warlords" as the creators of the crisis.

The language of the Somali conflict, particularly the use of the term "warlord," reiterates the dialectic of savagery and civilization that was so common during the turn of the previous century, the era of Theodore Roosevelt. In fact, the tensions between the US and Somali tribal chieftains is redolent of a famous episode in Morocco that occurred during Roosevelt's presidency. The seizure of Ion Perdicaris and his stepson Cromwell Varley by a local Moroccan warlord named Ahmed ben Mohammed el Raisuli was but

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one move in what was a larger play by Raisuli for power and prestige. Roosevelt sent a cable that cut through what had begun to seem like extended hostage negotiations: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." While Roosevelt was dealing with a kidnapping, and Clinton was attempting to deal with a humanitarian crisis, the sense of personal outrage and frustration are similar, and grow out of the same belief in a manly code of foreign policy.21

And now, most recently, the debates and the anxiety that marked the lead-up to the Second Iraq War have illustrated the continued existence of the belief in the importance of masculine performance in US foreign policy. The tensions between the United States and the volatile area of the Middle East increased tremendously as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and recent foreign policy has been aimed at dealing with terrorist threats, and the nations that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups. Among the nations targeted by the United States were Afghanistan and Iraq, while North Korea and Libya were also subjects of concern.

Not surprisingly, the model for the interventionist anti-terrorist policy of the Bush administration is manly performance. As Newsweek magazine reported in August of 2002, "[w]hile still wrangling over how to overthrow Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration is already looking for other targets." While the search for terrorist targets can be rationalized as national security, the rationalization put forward by an official

close to the administration explained that "[e]veryone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men want to go to Tehran."2

The implication is that an American intervention in Iraq would not be anything remarkable, not an action that would prove national manhood. An invasion or other military action against Iran, a nation which many people have a lingering feeling of resentment towards because of the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-80, however, would be an action that would showcase American manly resolve and "muscle." Similarly, the decision makers, those responsible for launching such an action, would also be proving their masculinity, their own status as "real men" by directing the United States into a hazardous foreign policy area.

That a belief in masculine performance underlies the Bush administration's foreign policy has been noticed by critics and allies alike. Furthermore, there have been frequent analyses that have linked the Bush administration's foreign policy to the imperialist drive of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In a *New York Times Magazine* cover story from January 2003, titled "The Burden," Michael Ignatieff, of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, argues that the United States is a modern day imperial power, with particular responsibilities. In his conclusion, Ignatieff argues that "[t]he case for empire is that [the United States] has become, in a place like Iraq, the last hope for democracy and stability alike." Ignatieff's argument in favor of American intervention echoes the American exceptionalist logic of Roosevelt and Beveridge, while the very title of the piece, "The Burden," is a direct quote from Rudyard Kipling's "White Man's Burden," written as a warning to the United States following the Spanish American

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War. The Times' cover is even more blunt: "The American Empire," it screams in red, white, and blue, "Get Used to It." Contemporary foreign policy is firmly rooted in the era of Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{23}

The historian Jackson Lears sees parallels between the foreign policy of today and that of Roosevelt and Beveridge as well. Discussing Bush's use of the word "crusade" to describe the war on terrorism, Lears connects Bush's crusade to Albert Beveridge's foreign policy, specifically the conception of "manifest destiny." While many listeners, particularly in Arab nations, were appalled by the use of the term "crusade," Lears argues that religious foreign policy language has a long tradition. At the end of the nineteenth century, Lears points out, "Senator Albert Beveridge and other imperialists had made Manifest Destiny a global project, insisting that had 'marked' the American people to lead in "the redemption of the world."\textsuperscript{24}

As I pointed out earlier, this language is rooted in a gendered and class-based power structure, and reflects a particular set of upper class white male gilded age beliefs, among them the belief in independent manly action. The columnist Maureen Dowd, writing the day before the invasion of Iraq, saw in George Bush's foreign policy the triumph of what she has called "the foreign policy of I." Contrasting the coalition built by the first President Bush for the first Iraq war with the second Bush's determination to engage in unilateral action, Dowd argues that Bush and his advisers "have no interest in

working within a military coalition: "They see the international 'we' as an impediment to … destiny. The Bush doctrine is dominated by 'the big I.'"25

The masculinity and the individualism of American foreign policies have been noticed by allies of the United States. Member nations of NATO, Norway for example, have found that they need to tailor their policies to the masculine performance model. In a *New York Times* article, Norwegian Minister of Defense Kristin Krohn Devold explained why she has adjusted Norwegian military planning to American needs: "Hey, it's not much fun if you are the last one picked to play on the team." By remodeling Norway's defense capabilities to fit into the United States' international operations, Devold argues, Norway "can play with the big boys." It is masculine language such as this, particularly the language of the masculine playing field, indicative of a particular value system and thought process, that has made Devold a favorite of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and a leading contender for the role of NATO's secretary general.26

Devold is clearly making a wise tactical choice, for the United States views other nations through the lens of gender, and assigns value based on the masculine performance of its foreign policy. Where tiny Norway, with a defense minister that the *Times* refers to as "GI Jane," has been able to play the masculine role convincingly, France and Germany have been having a harder time.

Recent tensions between the United States on the one hand and Germany and France on the other are rooted in the European opposition to the war in Iraq, but this

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opposition is understood in terms of gender. Though both France and Germany opposed the intervention, it was France that received the majority of American disapprobation, while Germany was able to maintain civil relations with Bush administration. Why the difference? Because, as Irwin Wall argues, Americans have "this stereotype that France is a feminine country." 27

What is so remarkable about this discussion about the relative masculinity of particular nations is how common and open such views are. A New York Times article titled "For Americans, It's French Sissies Versus German He-Men" sums up the perception succinctly. France is viewed as a woman, "La Belle France," the producer of luxury goods such as wine and perfume which American have long viewed as feminine. Germany, on the other hand, "is the fatherland, its spike helmets retooled into the sleek insignia of cars like the Mercedes and BMW." 28

The gendering of Germany and France as male and female is the result of US foreign policy, and is rooted in a belief in the importance of "playing the man." Depicting France as a woman, Robert Paxton, an historian at Columbia University argues, is "an American stereotype and an American strategy. There are elements in our culture that the Bush [administration] can play on in stereotyping France as feminine." Frank Costigliola agrees, arguing that by describing France as feminine, it becomes easier for the United States, as a masculine power, to "delegitimize French points of view." 29

28 ibid.
29 ibid.
The linkage between masculine performance and foreign policy appears to be getting stronger, then, rather than weaker as 2004 draws to an end. 2004 was an election year, and once again foreign policy was a major election issue, and the debate about American international relations was frequently couched in terms of manliness. The Republican incumbent, George W. Bush, was able to win re-election in large measure because he was able to convince the electorate that he would do a better job promoting national security than his opponent, Democratic candidate John Kerry.30

That George Bush, who successfully avoided serving in Vietnam, could convince the American electorate that he was better suited to handle defense issues than John Kerry, who was a decorated Vietnam veteran, is remarkable. That Bush could be perceived as the better foreign policy president, in the face of daily reminders that the conflict was going badly, is almost hard to believe. What was the factor that convinced the American electorate to look past poor results in managing the military conflict, and re-elect the President?

The key to Bush’s electoral success rested on his performance of military manhood. Bush’s linkage of masculine performance and foreign policy rhetoric mimicked Theodore Roosevelt, who changed costume as he was preparing to do manly deeds, such as his buckskin suit which he used in the Dakotas, and his Brooks Brothers uniform in Cuban campaign. For Bush, the sartorial shift happened aboard the USS

30 While the election is a recent event, and a definitive history of the election has yet to be written, and increasing number of articles are being published in newspapers and journals that illustrate the decisive importance of national security issues to voters. See, for example, Louis Menand, “Permanent Fatal Errors, The New Yorker, December 6, 2004, pp. 54-60.
Lincoln, where he donned a flight suit to proclaim victory (prematurely, it turns out) in Iraq.31

This performance of masculinity, though controversial, indicated the length that President Bush was willing to go to prove that he was the right man for the White House. The election very quickly became a contest that rested on different constructions of masculinity. Additionally, because the election took place during a war, the connection between masculinity and foreign policy became central to both the Democratic and Republican campaigns.

In the campaign for the Presidency, the Democratic Party needed to prove that it could be as manly as the Republicans. Democratic candidate Howard Dean tried to change the perception that Republicans "are the party of strength and we're the party of weakness." As James Traub points out, Democrats are exchanging "'mushy multilateralism' in John Kerry's phrase for what Senator Joe Lieberman calls 'muscular multilateralism.'" 32

This attempt at re-branding was challenged from the other side of the political divide, as the Republican party worked to prevent the Democrats from becoming more manly. Conservative commentators breathed new life into Christopher Matthews' 1991 article for The New Republic that famously described the Democratic Party as the "Mommy Party," as opposed to the Republican "Daddy Party."33 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, star of many macho action movies, chimed in by describing

Democrats opposed to Republican economic policies as “girlie men.”34 The Fox News
web site went so far as to post a falsified news story about John Kerry’s masculinity; the
article, posted on Fox News campaign trail page titled “Trail Tales,” featured a quote,
supposedly by Kerry but actually written by Carl Cameron, that had the Democratic
candidate explaining “I’m metrosexual – he’s a cowboy.” The article went on to explain
that a “metrosexual is defined as an urbane male with a strong aesthetic sense who spends
a lot of time and money on his appearance.”35

What was at stake in this political positioning, of course, was both candidates' ability to
convince the electorate that they had the necessary qualities to conduct an
effective foreign policy. The tenor of this manly foreign policy debate was even noticed
across the Atlantic. In The Economist, a weekly published in London, the editorialist
Lexington published an article titled “It’s Man’s World.” “Let’s call it the testosterone
election,” Lexington begins, before continuing with a discussion of both parties attempts
to claim the manly high ground, including a mention of Schwarzenegger’s “girlie man”
quote and Kerry’s accusation that Bush was “playing dress-up” on the deck of the
Lincoln.36

But what follows next in Lexington’s article is a point missed by many political
pundits during the campaign – the candidates’ positions on the conflict in Iraq are more

33 Christopher J. Matthews, “Parenthood: The Mommy Party and the Daddy Party,” The
34 John M. Broder, “Schwarzenegger Calls Budget Opponents “Girlie Men,” Los Angeles
35 The original story was posted at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,134166,00.html on
October 1, 2004. The site has since been modified, and in the place of the story is an
apology. Quotes are from the website before it was altered.
8387), p. 42.
similar than dissimilar. As Lexington explains, "the macho posturing is not just posturing; it also says something about both candidates and America's state of mind."

What it says is that Americans want a man in the White House who will exercise a manly foreign policy. Both men, Lexington continues, "are vying for leadership of a country that, for all the quibbles, is reconciled to the use of 'hard' military power." Accordingly, both men and both parties agree on the essential importance of masculine foreign policy.

What became clear during the election was that United States foreign policy will continue to be marked by constructions of masculinity that have their roots in the era of Theodore Roosevelt. In fact, the foreign policy debate shows signs of being dominated more by the gender performance than by national security concerns; acting manly has become more important than achieving policy goals. "Americans prefer a message that is 'strong and wrong' to one that is 'weak and right,"' former President Bill Clinton has argued.37 Until the linkage between masculine performance and foreign policy, articulated so convincingly by Theodore Roosevelt and his colleagues at the beginning of the twentieth century is broken, the United States will be limited in its foreign policy options, and will be forced to continue to "play the man."

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