Fall 2004

Intercultural contact and the creation of Albany's new diplomatic landscape, 1647--1680

Holly Anne Rine

University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation

Recommended Citation

Rine, Holly Anne, "Intercultural contact and the creation of Albany's new diplomatic landscape, 1647--1680" (2004). Doctoral Dissertations, 236.
https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/236

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
INTERCULTURAL CONTACT AND THE CREATION OF ALBANY'S NEW
DIPLOMATIC LANDSCAPE, 1647-1680

BY

Holly Anne Rine
B.A. Berea College, 1992
M.A. Middle Tennessee State University, 1997

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
History

September, 2004
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank the individuals and organizations whose generous financial support made it possible to complete this dissertation. The History Department at the University of New Hampshire provided valuable funding and experience through a Teaching Assistantship. I am also grateful to the Department and to the Rutman family for supporting my work with the Darrett and Anita Rutman Dissertation Fellowship. The Graduate School at the University of New Hampshire provided my work with generous support through Summer Teaching Assistant Fellowships and a Dissertation Year Fellowship, which allowed me the time to complete my dissertation. The Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American History also provided me with a dissertation fellowship that supported valuable research at the New-York Historical Society.

I also wish to thank the many institutions and individuals that assisted in the research and writing of this project. I am indebted to the staffs of the New-York Historical Society library, the National Archives of Canada, the New York State Archives and Library, and the Inter-Library Loan Department at the University of New Hampshire’s Dimond Library for their knowledge and assistance. I wish to express my gratitude to Fredrika Teute who offered comments on my work at the Eighth Annual Conference of the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at the University of Maryland and Richard Haan who did the same at the Researching New York: Perspectives on Empire State History in Albany, New York.
The History Department at the University of New Hampshire not only provided me with needed financial support, but its members also provided much appreciated encouragement and guidance. I particularly wish to thank my adviser, Cynthia J. Van Zandt, for her time and effort in support of this project and my career. Her insights helped me shape this project and her encouragement of my work allowed me to see it through. Her support went beyond this dissertation. I have become a better teacher as a result of her mentoring, and I look forward to implementing the knowledge I gained from her in my future work. Thanks also to Eliga H. Gould and W. Jeffery Bolster for their efforts in guiding this dissertation as well as for their contributions of their time and knowledge as teachers. I also thank Kurk Dorsey and Lucy Salyer for the gracious contributions of their time and insightful comments to improve the final project. While this project could not have been completed without their assistance, I alone am responsible for any errors and shortcomings in this dissertation.

I must also acknowledge the support, encouragement and, most of all, friendship of so many who have made this process worthwhile. My former roommate, Kimberly Jarvis, completed her dissertation before me, but continued to offer much appreciated assistance, encouragement and friendship via email and telephone. John and Deborah Beagle, Paula Rioux, Erica Brown, Stephanie Trombley and Jeffrey Fortin could always be counted on to lend an ear, to offer support and ideas, and to make me laugh. I am grateful to them all.

The deepest debt of gratitude I owe is to my family. My parents Robert and Marlene Rine instilled in me a love of learning and stood as my strongest supporters through this entire process. My Aunts Lillian Macey and Joyce Hannan offered such
gracious and generous encouragement and support of my graduate studies— I cannot thank them sufficiently. I thank my sisters and brothers-in-law, Mary Beth and Frank Maccagnano, Karen and Greg Dolzonek, and Amy and Gary Wake, for their love, encouragement and friendship. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to Andrew Maccagnano, Nathan, Allison and Nicholas Dolzonek, and Marley and Robert Wake, and I thank them for giving me hope, happiness and inspiration.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................iv
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................................ix
ABSTRACT..............................................................................................................................x

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historiography</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Outlines</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. OUTSIDE THREATS AND INSIDE RUMORS .......</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat to the East</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat to the South</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat to the North</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Incursions into New Netherland ......</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Threats</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Forts to Dutch Goals ..........</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655 as a Turning Point</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumors</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. OUTSIDE OF TOWNS</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Experiences Outside of the Towns of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Experiences Outside of the Towns of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Orange and the Surrounding Lands</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Dutch Control of Water.........................................................................................................89
Post Peach War Provisions....................................................................................................92
Separation Between Settlements..........................................................................................97
Esopus Settlement and the First Esopus War.................................................................104
3. STRUGGLES INSIDE TOWNS.....................................................................................127
Focus on the Fort..................................................................................................................128
Regulations on Morals and Movements............................................................................133
Religion Inside New Netherland........................................................................................136
Indians Inside Towns..........................................................................................................144
Indians use of the Fort and Court.......................................................................................152
4. THE ESOPUS REGION IN BETWEEN CENTERS..................................................178
Indian Relations................................................................................................................182
Fighting the War in the Country........................................................................................189
Shifting Geography of Dutch and Indian Relations.........................................................195
5. "A VERRY DANGEROUS JUNCTURE OF TIME" ALBANY AT THE CENTER........208
Third Anglo-Dutch War....................................................................................................210
Indian Affairs and the Second New Netherland.............................................................218
Metacom’s War, Bacon’s Rebellion and the Five Nations’s War with the Susquehannocks..................................................................................................................221
Indians within the Town Walls........................................................................................233
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................239
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................251
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Map of Hudson River Valley</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Map of Upper Hudson Valley &amp; Iroquoia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Van der Donck Map</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 <em>Nouvelle France</em> Map</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 <em>Cartre des grands Laca Ontario et autre</em></td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

INTERCULTURAL CONTACT AND THE CREATION OF ALBANY'S NEW DIPLOMATIC LANDSCAPE, 1647-1680

by

Holly Anne Rine

University of New Hampshire, September, 2004

This dissertation analyzes the process of Albany's rise to the center of American Indian-European relations on the northeast coast of North America between the years 1647-1680. By the year 1677 the Albany courthouse served as the meeting place for the negotiations that formed the Covenant Chain between the Five Nations of the Iroquois and the English colonies of North America. To reach this important development, however, took years of political, military, economic and cultural struggle. Moreover, these struggles were not merely between the Iroquois and the English who would eventually negotiate the Covenant Chain, but within them as well.

Moreover, this dissertation focuses on analyzing how the actions of the Dutch and smaller Indian tribes such as the Esopus, Wappingers, and Hackensacks were imperative in establishing Albany as the center of the new diplomatic landscape of Indian and European affairs in northeast North America. In analyzing these developments this study explores how knowledge of specific lands and spaces such as woods, rivers, towns, forts and courthouses led to greater control of those places and spaces. As knowledge and control of these areas changed, new places would serve as centers of power and others
would fall from their positions of power. Eventually, the seemingly constant shifts of control over certain regions would stabilize, allowing fewer groups to utilize their knowledge and control of the area around Albany, which allowed the city to serve as the site of future negotiations among Indians and Europeans after the 1670s.

Other events such as the Peach and Esopus Wars altered power relations between European and Indian residents of the Hudson River Valley and also led to shifts in the geography of those relations for almost all of English North America. Furthermore, far ranging events such as Bacon’s Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Five Nations’ war with the Susquehannocks and the Third Anglo-Dutch War contributed to Albany’s rise to prominence in the 1670s. This study argues that it was the combination of all these events that created Albany as the new diplomatic landscape in northeast North America.
INTRODUCTION

"Yea ar com heir to Speake wth us off good thinges & wee will give you ane good Ansr."¹ Thus began the meeting between the Cayuga and Susquehannock Indians and Col. Henry Coursy, representative of Charles Lord Baron of Baltimore, at the Albany courthouse on August 22, 1677. This meeting ended a busy season of propositions, accusations, discussions and negotiations, which began in April of that year. During those few months, representatives of the Mahicans, Mohawks, Cayugas, Oneidas, Onondagas, Senecas, Susquehannocks and smaller tribes along the Hudson River met with representatives of the colonies of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York.² These meetings were part of the beginning of the Covenant Chain of alliance between the English and the Iroquois. In the next few years, representatives from Virginia would also journey to the Albany courthouse for more negotiations with members of the Iroquois Confederacy.

To get to this point in the late 1670s, however, took years of political, military, economic and cultural struggle. Moreover, the struggles were not merely between the Iroquois and the English, but among them as well. Furthermore, the actions of the Dutch and smaller Indian tribes such as the Esopus, Wappingers, and Hackensack to name only


² Ibid., 39-49. Prior to the 1664 English takeover of New Netherland, Albany was the Dutch community of Fort Orange and Beverwyck. Fort Orange was a Dutch military and trading post and Beverwyck was the community attached to the fort. Also prior to 1664, New York City on Manhattan Island was known as New Amsterdam and was served by the fort of Fort Amsterdam.
a few were imperative in bringing about the Covenant Chain. Events such as the Peach War and the Esopus Wars not only altered power relations among both the European and Indian residents of the Hudson Valley, they also led to a shift in the geography of Indian and European relations in the Hudson Valley as well as the entirety of English North America. The events that brought about these changes of power and geography were not limited to those that took place around Albany or in the Hudson River Valley such as the Peach War and the Esopus War. Far ranging events such as Bacon's Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Five Nations’ war with the Susquehannocks and the Third Anglo-Dutch War also contributed to the change of geography of European and Indian relations, from one that was fractured and took place in various locations, to one that was centered in the Hudson River Valley. This study argues that it was the combination of the larger, more well known colonial events with the more overlooked events such as the Peach War and Esopus Wars that led to Albany’s rise to prominence as the center of Indian and European relations in seventeenth-century.

Scholars have thoroughly studied the role of the Covenant Chain in the history of Iroquois and English relations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, they have not thoroughly explored the origins of how the Covenant Chain came to be or how Albany came to be the geographic focus of these relations. This study ends with

---

what scholars hold up as the beginning of the Covenant Chain. It argues that Albany became the center of Indian and European relations along the northeastern seaboard of North America as a result of decades of conflict between and among the various European and American Indian groups in the Hudson River Valley prior to the English takeover of the colony in 1664. Individuals such as the English Governor Edmund Andros and the Onondaga sachem Garakontie are often the central focus of the establishment of the Covenant Chain. However, it is my assertion that the actions of various understudied individuals such as Jacob Jansen Stoll as well as groups such as the Esopus Indians and Fort Orange commissioners that created the conditions for both the Covenant Chain and the establishment of Albany as the center of the proceedings.

In making this argument, this study develops three main points. First, it shows the process of how and why Albany became the center of Indian and European relations by the end of the 1670s. Location played a large role. The valley’s value for fur trade, agriculture and political and military power made the region significant on both local and international levels. The geographic attributes of the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys were directly linked to their economic and political importance for both European and American Indian powers (Figure 1). Economically the interior of what would become New York was the source of furs and potentially agricultural production that would both fuel and feed European colonial enterprises, and, of course, the Hudson River served as a direct link between the Atlantic Ocean and the interior lands. Yet to reap the benefits of such economic potential, Europeans needed the cooperation of the numerous Indian groups who occupied the land.

Figure 1  Hudson River Valley
Politically the Hudson and Mohawk River valleys served as the meeting point of Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and Algonquian powers and control of this region would allow for greater control over the diverse populations of the area (Figure 2). New Netherland, which claimed the region, was faced with endless threats to its already tenuous hold on the land. Due to these constant threats, New Netherland authorities, particularly Director General Petrus Stuyvesant, were forced to place restrictions on individuals', both Indian and European, movements on the land in order to retain control of the land and its small population. Also due to these various threats on the stable existence of New Netherland, which came from all sides of the colony, Dutch authority was spread quite thin, and smaller, decentralized authorities developed throughout the colony. This decentralized fracturing of the colony, would also lead to Fort Orange’s development as a center for Indian and European affairs by the end of the 1670s.

The area was home to the Mohawks, one of the five nations of the Iroquois League and one of the most influential Indian groups in the seventeenth-century. Numerous smaller Algonquian groups such as the Mahicans, Wappingers and Esopus also lived in the region, and, as will be shown, their actions also contributed significantly to the changing diplomatic landscape of North America. Because American Indian

---

Figure 2 Upper Hudson River Valley & Iroquoia
societies were in physical possession of much of the land of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, they were in a strong position in their dealings with the various European groups who wished to take possession of the region for their own economic, military and political gain. The ensuing struggles, political, cultural and martial, that took place among the diverse population of the area for control of the land created significant shifts in power among people and places.

The second goal of this study is to explore how knowledge of specific lands and spaces such as woods, rivers, towns, forts and courthouses led to both greater access and control of those areas. As knowledge and control of these areas waxed and waned, new places would serve as centers of power and others would fall from positions of power. After the Peach War of 1655, the Dutch were able to claim greater control over the lower Hudson River. However, instead of Manhattan becoming the center of power for Indian and Dutch affairs, that center shifted up-river to the Esopus region and Fort Orange because of the ability of independent Indian powers to assert their authority on relations between themselves and the Dutch. By the time the English took over the colony, this constant shift of knowledge and control of specific lands and spaces had created the conditions for Albany's rise as the center of Indian and European relations in North America north of Carolina.

With the numerous ethnic groups occupying the region, no one group maintained enough power to assert their authority over the entire area. Therefore, although the Dutch West India Company (hereafter referred to as WIC) claimed control of the entire Hudson River Valley between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, different groups would maintain control over several smaller locations in what was identified as New Netherland. Control
of all the lands and spaces within the region held great significance because there were so many different cultural and ethnic groups struggling for power in the region. As that control shifted between several groups, so did power relations throughout the entire valley. Eventually, the constant shifts in control over certain regions in the area would stabilize somewhat, thereby allowing for fewer groups to utilize their knowledge and control of Albany so that it would serve as the center for future negotiations among Indians and Europeans after the 1670s.

The third goal of this dissertation is to show how multi-ethnic interactions in war, diplomacy, trade and religion were integral to Albany taking its place of prominence in Indian and European relations. Historians have analyzed these events and interactions in greater detail than they will be here, but often the studies of these events are in isolation from one another. This dissertation illustrates how the interplay between all of these events, as Europeans and Indians struggled against each other and among themselves,

---

altered the cultural landscapes of Indian and European affairs on the eastern North American seaboard through the seventeenth-century. It also explains how Albany would stand at the center of the newly formed diplomatic landscape that these struggles created.

In working towards these goals, this study focuses on the period 1647-1680. The year 1647 marked the arrival of Petrus Stuyvesant in New Netherland as the Director General of the WIC colony. Upon his arrival Stuyvesant made a concerted effort to establish the authority of the WIC among other colonizing countries such as England, France and Sweden, spread the authority of the WIC over the colony from a centralized location at New Amsterdam and tried to establish WIC authority among the numerous Indian peoples within the claimed boundaries of the colony. The remainder of Stuyvesant’s tenure as Director General in New Netherland was filled with examples of these efforts including establishing a boundary with New England in 1650, removing New Sweden from claimed New Netherland territory in 1655, and establishing new communities, such as Esopus, and new courts in Fort Orange and Beverwyck in 1652. The period also included events outside of his control including the Indian attack on New Amsterdam in 1655, the Esopus Wars of 1658 and 1663, and the interactions between and among Indian groups and Dutch communities, such as the Iroquois and the residents of Fort Orange.

Because many of the events that led up to Albany taking its place as the center of European/Indian affairs were, in fact, outside of the control of Stuyvesant or any other single European authority, the study does not end with the English takeover of New Netherland in 1664. Albany’s rise to prominence was a process, and although 1664 is often an ending or beginning point for studies dealing with New Netherland or colonial
New York, the year does not hold the same significance here. In this study, 1664 is more significant as a turning point as a result of the end of the second Esopus War and not as the year England established authority over the once Dutch possession.

The study ends at the close of the decade of the 1670s because it is in that decade that the process of Albany's rise is complete. It is during the 1670s when major events occurred outside of the boundaries of New York, but which led to the establishment of Albany as the center of Indian/European affairs on the eastern seaboard of North America north of Carolina. The end of the study does not coincide with other more common dates such as the Glorious Revolutions of 1688, because, while significant in the history of New York, the years of 1680-1688 do not add to the significance of Indian/European relations in Albany.

**Historiography**

The scholarly literature of seventeenth-century European colonization of the Americas often has centered on European desires of domination over land and people. As James Merrell discussed as late as 1989, many historians of European colonization would, at most, pay lip service to the presence of American Indians in their studies and continue to present North America as empty or a wilderness to be claimed by European

---

civility. Merrell also noted that there was, however, good news for the field, as more historians became more intent on placing American Indians back into the story of European Colonization. Recent studies by historians, such as Karen Kupperman’s *Indian’s and English: Facing Off in Early America*, Michael Oberg’s *Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 1585-1685* and Jose Antonio Brandao’s “*Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*”: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701 have gone beyond merely adding Indians to the narrative of colonial American history. Indians have been placed as central figures instead of victims or as players who were merely acted upon instead of acting in their own interest. These scholars have also challenged the accepted narrative by discussing Indian motivation, strength and power within the colonial context.⁸

Another of the most influential studies to come after Merrell’s call for greater inclusion of Indians in the narrative of colonial American history was Richard White’s work *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815.*⁹ White argued that because the French were unable to exert their authority

---

⁷ James H. Merrell, “Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 46, no. 1 (1989): 94-119. Along with the many monographs that have come out in the 1990s and into the 2000s, the *William and Mary Quarterly* itself has increased their focus on American Indians within their pages with numerous articles and most notably, an entire issue in July 1996 devoted to “Indians and others in early America.”

⁸ Colin Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans and the Remaking of Early America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1997); James Merrell, *The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact Through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988); and Daniel H. Usner, *Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1992). These authors have shown how interactions between Europeans and Indians actually created new communities for all groups involved including Indians, Europeans and Africans.

over the Indian population of the Great Lakes, they instead became mediators helping to broker mutual alliances between themselves and local Indian groups based on a shared need of survival and protection. This study, however, is not that of a Middle Ground located on the Hudson River. Unlike White’s emphasis on the creation of mutual alliances in a specific geographic region, this study depicts an environment of contestation for land, power and influence.

It also illustrates how local contests over land and space moved beyond a parochial stage into the Atlantic World. For example, Dutch wars with the Esopus Indians, located between Forts Orange and Amsterdam, in the 1660s drew WIC attention and resources away from maintaining and strengthening their New Netherland possessions against English incursions. The Dutch called upon the Mohawks to intervene and bring the Esopus to the negotiating table. While the Mohawks did intervene on behalf of the Dutch, they were unsuccessful. The ensuing hostilities, which would not end until late spring 1664, then contributed to the Dutch surrender of their North American possessions to England in 1664. With the English establishment of New York, the Dutch were eliminated as a power from North America, and England claimed control of the North American seaboard from Maine to Carolina, thereby strengthening English colonial power in the north Atlantic.

While this dissertation is not arguing for the creation of a Middle Ground along the Hudson River, it does add to the body of scholarly literature on Indian and European relations, particularly with the Dutch and English, in the Hudson Valley.10

---

10 William A. Starna, “Assessing American Indian-Dutch Studies: Missed and Missing Opportunities,” New York History, no. Winter (2003): 5-31. In this article, Starna laments the state of American Indian-Dutch studies. On page 31, he concluded that apart from a few notable examples, such as Brandao’s “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More”, “the history of Indian-Dutch relations, in spite of forty years of effort, is presently
Trelease's study *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, The Seventeenth Century* stands as the most extensive study and comprehensive narrative of Indian-European relations in New Netherland and New York. While he thoroughly mines the primary sources and reconstructs events between Europeans and Indians in New York in vivid detail, he often does not give enough emphasis to the power and significance of smaller tribes in the area. For example, the Iroquois are shown to have great influence, while the Esopus Indians are described as "too shy in the presence of [Dutch] soldiers," and as having "begged the director not to start a war," and also that they "dutifully promised" that they would sell their land to the Dutch.\(^1\) Contrary to Trelease's depiction of their shyness, begging and dutiful fealty, this dissertation argues that the Esopus Indians were an independent power and integral to the events that would elevate Albany to its place of prominence in the 1670s. The Esopus Indians were involved in several conflicts with the Dutch in the 1650s and 1660s. As a result of these conflicts, the Esopus were instrumental in bringing about two fundamental changes to the intercultural landscape of the Hudson River Valley: the end to New Netherland, and a shift of the geography of Indian-European

\(^1\) Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York*, 149-150.
relations in North America. This is not to argue that the smaller Algonquian groups, such as the Esopus, located along the Hudson River, had the power or ability to sway Indian-European relations in the same way that the Mohawks did. Still, they played a critical role in shaping European imperial policy concerning relations with Indians in North America. By exploring the contributions of previously neglected groups and events, we can answer the questions of how and why the Covenant Chain was able to be forged in Albany in the 1670s thereby altering the power relations among Indians and Europeans on the Atlantic seaboard of North America through the colonial period.

With its geographic focus on Albany and the Hudson River Valley, this dissertation further adds to the study of the middle colonies and the quite extensive body of literature on Albany itself. Much of this scholarship has focused on trade, politics, and ethnic and religious diversity.12 As Merrell argued, little of the literature on the history of New York, which does not deal specifically with Indians, such as Trelease's work, incorporates the significance of Indians into their narrative or analysis.13 For example, Donna Merwick's Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences rightly argues that Albany was continually remade as each group and generation,


13 Literature that deals with the trade in New Netherland does not deal with Indians outside of their roles as fur suppliers, such as informants, couriers and diplomats, and often subscribes to the argument of Indians working to gain power as middle men in the fur trade.
“understood Albany at different layers of time.” She uncovered first how the Dutch and then the English worked, competed, and compromised in order to recreate the landscape according to their own ideas, beliefs and understandings of society and order. However, she introduced Indians only as minor actors who caused the major players to react in particular, distinctly European ways. This dissertation also explores how different ethnic groups tried to impose meaning and order on the land of what will become New York. However, it also tries to insert the motives and significance of the Indian groups who were a part of the continual recreation of Albany and the colony as a whole.

While this study focuses on a specific colony, New Netherland/New York, and a specific community, Fort Orange/Albany, it also moves beyond the traditional boundary lines drawn for seventeenth-century North America. By showing the constant shifts in control of specific lands and spaces during this period, a map of 17th century North American political boundaries would be in constant flux with areas moving in and out of European and Indian control. At the same time this study works to show the connections between and among different colonies and Indians groups, which expands Albany’s area of influence beyond the borders of New Netherland and New York to incorporate New England, Virginia, Maryland and New France.

14 Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, 1630-1710. 2.

15 Colin Calloway, New Worlds for All. Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy; and Mechal Sobel, The World They Made Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth Century Virginia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1987). All these authors stress the interaction of different cultural groups to create wholly new communities instead of mere transferences of culture from one region to the next.

16 See Cynthia J. Van Zandt, “Negotiating Settlement: Colonialism, Cultural Exchange and Conflict in Early Colonial Atlantic North America, 1580-1660” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1998). She argues for a more inclusive geographical approach to the study of colonial North America in an Atlantic context instead of focusing so narrowly on single colonies or regions as has been done traditionally. Scholars such as Ira Berlin, “From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American Society in Mainland North America,” William and Mary Quarterly 53, no 2 (April
William Cronon's 1983 environmental history monograph *Changes in the Land* was one of the first studies to deal with how European and Indian contact affected the North American landscape, thus combining historical geography and the study of history.\(^{17}\) In the twenty-one years since the publication of Cronon's work, few historians have looked at how the different cultural groups that occupied the land, the Dutch, English, French and Indians, defined and utilized the land and space they fought to gain or defend. Moreover, few studies take into account the changing meanings and uses of land and space as several groups occupied a common area, or as possession of a region shifted among groups. This study explores these issues as they relate to cross-cultural contests and negotiations in commercial and diplomatic terms in the seventeenth-century Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys.

Because there is a central focus on how different groups tried to impose their own authority on how people moved and worked on the land, this study also adds to the fields of historical geography. This dissertation is greatly influenced by the ideas of geographers D.W. Meinig and John Stilgoe. In his 1982 study, Stilgoe differentiates the meanings of the terms *landscape* and *wilderness* as they are used in this study. The terms are the antithesis of one another. Landscape is not scenery, but "is essentially rural, the product of traditional agriculture interrupted here and thereby traditional artifice, a mix of

---

natural and man-made form.” By this definition, a landscape must be a place affected by the touch of human activity. According to the perspective of many European colonists, if land had not been touched by human existence and activity, a region was not a landscape but a wilderness. The idea of wilderness as the absence of human activity, according to Stilgoe, came from a combination of pre-Christian beliefs of trees with souls and spirits living within the forests and Christian teachings of wilderness as the home of demons. This antithesis was one that European settlers had to deal with in New Netherland, but was not one that Indians had to confront when Europeans arrived.

Many Europeans viewed North America as a wilderness, as defined by Stilgoe, although there was the presence of numerous Indian cultures putting their marks on the land. However, many Europeans did not consider Indians’ use of the land as “proper use” and therefore considered the land, in their Christian understanding, a wilderness. Moreover, as Europeans and American Indians both continued to put their marks on the land of the Hudson River Valley, they did indeed create new cultural landscapes of Indian and European interaction that were neither fully European nor fully American.

18 John R. Stilgoe, *Common Landscape of America, 1580-1845* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982). Stilgoe looks at landscape primarily from a European perspective arising from the idea of *landschaft*. *Landschaft*, he explains, showed the interconnectedness between humans and the land and included both human dwellings and human constructed structures crowded together and surrounded by fields, meadows and pastures, all of which had been worked by human hands. Although the term comes from a medieval European perspective, it fits very well into a discussion of American Indian landscapes. A significant difference however, is that Indian landscapes did not end at their fields’ edge, but extended into the woods and into European landscapes as well. For a discussion of landscape and world-view from an Iroquois perspective see Roger Merle Carpenter, “The Renewed, the Destroyed, and the Remade: The Three Thought Worlds of the Iroquois and the Huron, 1609-1650” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1999).

19 John R. Stilgoe, *Common Landscape of America, 1580-1845*, 1-12. Stilgoe argues that it was the retention of pagan beliefs and understandings of wild lands and wildness that informed European understanding of Christianity.
The new cultural landscapes would include contests and compromises over how Indians and Europeans shared common spaces, such as towns, farms and woods. Merwick's study is valuable in learning how the Dutch and then the English worked to create copies of their home cultures in Fort Orange and Albany, however, this dissertation explores how all the different ethnic and cultural groups compromised to create truly unique landscapes, particularly in Albany.

As Indians and Europeans created new cultural landscapes through conflicts and compromises over who had access to certain spaces and how these spaces were utilized, they would eventually create the new diplomatic landscape that was centered at Albany. This process of creating a new diplomatic landscape along the Hudson River was also assisted in 1652 when Fort Orange was established as a political center of New Netherland with its own court. This particular event allowed Indians and Dutch in Fort Orange to move beyond merely an economic relationship. With the establishment of the court, Indians, particularly Mohawks, were also able to negotiate for their presence in the courthouse. This was indeed the creation of a new cultural landscape, which developed into a new diplomatic landscape that placed Albany at the center of Indian and European diplomacy by the end of the 1670s.

Chapter Outlines

The chapters are arranged to first explain New Netherland's relationship with its neighbors and how these relations created conditions for the independent development of Fort Orange as a political center within the colony. The dissertation then moves to explore events and issues that both Europeans and Indians faced within the claimed borders of New Netherland and New York. These events, such as the Peach War and Esopus Wars brought Indian participation into the realm of New Netherland politics and diplomacy in a way that they had not prior to the establishment of the Fort Orange court in 1652. Finally, the dissertation once again explores New York, and specifically Albany's, relationship with other colonies and American Indian powers; however, at this point, Albany's position as a colonial center of Indian and European affairs had been firmly established.

Chapter one explores the threats that the newly appointed Director-General of the WIC's colony of New Netherland, Petrus Stuyvesant, faced from outside forces, both European and Indian. By utilizing official WIC correspondence from and to Stuyvesant as well as council minutes and maps, this chapter demonstrates several points. First, with Stuyvesant having to remain so focused on outside threats from New England, New Sweden and New France, Fort Orange, as the secondary seat of power within New Netherland, was able to develop independently from the authority located in New Amsterdam. Secondly, as New Netherland authorities worked to establish their authority over the land it claimed, they were forced to shift their approach to claiming legitimate control of the land. As a result, New Netherland utilized the presence of forts on the land as their main symbol of authority, and embarked on a strategy of land purchases and fort
construction to bolster their claim to lands in the Hudson River Valley. Lastly, it introduces the Peach War of 1655, and the rumors leading up to that war, as a major turning point in New Netherland's efforts to establish authority over the Indian population as well as the beginning of Fort Orange's rise as an independent center of Indian and European relations.

Chapter two explores issues of control over the lands within the claimed borders of New Netherland, but outside of the actual Dutch settlements. This chapter focuses on two major ideas. First, it explores how knowledge of certain areas, such as woods, villages and rivers, was related to the ability of particular groups to control those areas. Because of Dutch lack of knowledge of the land within its claimed borders, Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam remained isolated from one another allowing the former to develop somewhat independently from the latter, especially in regard to Indian policy. As Fort Orange authorities tried to establish control outside of its walls, they did so out of concern for trade with Indians. Fort Amsterdam officials did the same, but they did so out of concern for safety from Indians. Furthermore, the attempts of both to gain control outside of their town walls were affected by issues of religion and European conceptualizations about "wildness". Secondly, this isolation led Dutch officials to attempt to lessen the physical and political gap between the two settlements by aggressively working to settle what was known as the Esopus. The conflict that arose from this policy, between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians in the 1650s, would both expose the split relations between the two Dutch centers as well as begin the shift of power from Fort Amsterdam to Fort Orange in Dutch and Indian relations.
Chapter three then moves inside Dutch settlements to explore the successes and failures of several groups including Mohawks, Mahicans, Lutherans, WIC officials, and residents of Fort Orange and Beverwyck and Rensselaerswyck to assert their authority within town walls. The central argument of this chapter is that as the WIC worked to assert its authority in Dutch settlements, particularly Fort Orange and Beverwyck, through legal, religious and military means, Indians, especially the Mohawks, began asserting their own authority over spaces in the town, particularly the fort and the court, the latter of which was established in 1652. During this period, the Dutch courts of Fort Orange and Beverwyck met within the confines of the fort. With Indians able to gain access to the court and the fort to advance their own agendas, they became the primary force behind the creation of a new diplomatic landscape in Fort Orange, and then Albany. This new diplomatic landscape was then established as the center of relations between the American Indians and the Europeans in North America.

Chapter four moves back to the Esopus region in the 1660s, after the first Esopus War, which is covered in chapter two. This chapter argues that the Dutch actions to establish a stable interior to New Netherland, specifically the erection of a fort in the Esopus, led to further hostilities with the Esopus Indian population. More significantly, these hostilities created a shift in the geography of Indian and Dutch relations. Whereas prior to the second Esopus War, Indian relations were split between the two Dutch centers, Fort Amsterdam and Fort Orange, after this war, Fort Orange became the center for such relationships. It was also after the second Esopus War that the Dutch created a

---

21 Beverwyck was established by the WIC directors in 1652 and was the community that Fort Orange served. Rensselaerswyck was the name of the Patroonship established by Killiaen van Rensselaer, and which surrounded both Fort Orange and Beverwyck.
stable community between Forts Orange and Amsterdam, just in time for the English to come in and continue to expand the settlements.

The final chapter looks at the region after the English takeover and the establishment of the colony of New York. While the wars, trade and diplomacy between the Dutch and the Indians of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys allowed Fort Orange to rise as the center of Dutch and Indian relations, events after 1664 that took place outside of New York, such as Bacon’s Rebellion, Metacom’s War, the Third Anglo-Dutch War and the Five Nations’ War with the Susquehannocks led to the solidification of what was then known as Albany as the colonial center of Indian and European relations. Furthermore, relations were taken out of the fort and into the courthouse. However, by the 1670s, Albany was not just a center for New York, but the eastern seaboard of North American north of Carolina.

Moreover, the true significance in Albany’s establishment at the center for European and Indian relations was the fact that it happened as a result of the cooperation and contests of both European and Indian populations. These populations consisted of more well known groups and individuals, such as the Mohawks and Governor Andros, and lesser known peoples such as the Esopus Indians and Jacob Jansen Stoll, a Dutch settler. The interactions of these peoples that led to Albany’s role in the new diplomatic landscape of North America also consisted of more well known events such as Metacom’s War and lesser known confrontations such as the Esopus Wars. It is by studying the combination of all the populations and events where we gain an understanding of the dynamics of seventeenth-century Indian and European relations, and how they could create a new and unique context for cross-cultural diplomacy.
CHAPTER 1

OUTSIDE THREATS AND INSIDE RUMORS

When Petrus Stuyvesant arrived in New Netherland in 1647, he was immediately confronted with the task of dealing with various threats, both Indian and European, to the stability of the colony. Stuyvesant worked diligently on dealing with the various threats from New England, New Sweden and New France. However, because Stuyvesant’s attention was often drawn to the various borders of New Netherland to fend off one challenge to New Netherland’s stability after another, Fort Orange, as a secondary seat of power within the colony, was able to develop independently from the authority located in New Amsterdam. This fractured nature of the colony of New Netherland challenged the stability of the colony, by having different communities act independently from one another and the central authority of the WIC in New Amsterdam. Moreover, Stuyvesant’s constant shifting from one problem to the next, and Fort Orange’s independence, created a fluid enough situation to allow for the creation of a new cultural landscape at Fort Orange, which would not exist in other New Netherland communities.

As a part of the creation of new cultural landscapes resulting from the multiple threats, the Dutch residents of the Hudson River Valley were forced to alter their justification of rightful ownership of the land they claimed. As a result, New Netherland utilized the presence of forts on the land as their main symbol of authority. Eventually, the Mohawk Indians would be able to utilize this symbol of Dutch authority and
manipulate it to their own ends, thus helping to bring about a new diplomatic landscape at
Fort Orange and then Albany.

As part of the creation of a new diplomatic landscape amongst a multitude of threats, the reliance on information provided by Indians and disseminated by Indian couriers played an important role. While the Dutch were dependent on Indian information and Indian messengers to provide intelligence and routes of communication between the physically separated settlements of New Netherland, that information was disseminated in what Europeans considered rumor, or unsubstantiated or unverified information. Yet it would be these “rumors” that the Dutch, and eventually the English, would have to take into consideration when making decisions or forming official policy. Dutch dependence on Indian information and “Indian intelligence”, especially in the isolated region of Fort Orange would also contribute to the creation of the new diplomatic landscape in Fort Orange as the Mohawks would provide their information to the Dutch in the court at the fort. Such Indian intelligence could be both the source of threats and the source to their solutions.

The Threat to the East

The initial threats were posed by English and Swedish colonial settlements moving into territory claimed by the Dutch Republic. Soon, Stuyvesant would also grasp the urgency of the threats posed by the Algonquian and Iroquoian residents in what he believed to be the rightful possession of the Dutch, especially along the Hudson River Valley. While the Dutch had claimed the region from the Connecticut River to Delaware Bay (although Stuyvesant would also at times claim Dutch jurisdiction from Cape Cod to Cape Henlopen), their hold on the territory was tenuous, and it was threatened from all
sides. These threats were both real and perceived. No matter the origin or the form of
the threat, the High Council of New Netherland located on Manhattan Island, Director-
General Stuyvesant and the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam, found themselves
scrambling to maintain their grip on the colony and especially for control along the
Hudson River.

Upon his arrival in Manhattan, Stuyvesant was immediately confronted by New
Englanders exerting pressure on the border between New Netherland and New England.
Actually, part of the problem was a lack of an agreed upon border. The first letter sent
from the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam to Stuyvesant and the Council of New
Netherland expressed interest and concern over England’s activity to the east. The main
issue was a dispute over control of the Connecticut River, referred to as the Fresh River
by the Dutch. The Directors were particularly concerned about the presence of a new
English trading house on the Connecticut River at present day Springfield,
Massachusetts. In this letter they specifically addressed the issue of the new trading
house posing a direct threat to Fort Orange; as they noted, the two were separated by only
ten leagues.\(^1\) They also specifically mentioned their concern over the fact that the
Indians, not naming which Indians, claimed a right to sell the land for the new trading
house to the English, because, according to the Directors, “it is within our boundaries,”
they also warned that “we must prevent their [English] locating there by all means.” The
Directors did qualify their “by all means” declaration by directing the New Netherland
officials that the Englishmen’s “doings and arrangements must be carefully
watched…and invasions or trespasses by them as well as by others must be prevented, if

\(^1\) However, these miles were over quite hilly terrain that neither the English or Dutch could traverse or
defend very easily.
possible."2 The issue of New England's activities to the east of New Netherland was the focus of Stuyvesant's early activities as director general of New Netherland.

Stuyvesant actually took the initiative in facing the English challenge to Dutch territory before he received the somewhat tentative instructions from the Netherlands. On June 25, 1647, Stuyvesant sent a letter to Governor John Winthrop in Massachusetts.3 This would be the beginning of a long and involved correspondence with the New England governors. Like the majority of Stuyvesant's official letters, the tone was cordial even when the message was not. Stuyvesant offered pleasantries and informed Winthrop that he would be at the latter's service, "always provided it may not intrench upon the right of my Lords & Masters, the Estates-Generall, or West Indie Company, whose indubitable right is to all that land betwixt that riuver called Conneticut & that by the English named Deleware."4 With his statement, Stuyvesant not only staked his claim, but also let Winthrop know that Christian cooperation would only go so far.

By August of 1647, the New Englanders responded to Director Stuyvesant in a united front. In their letter they congratulated the new Director General on his safe arrival in Manhattan. They also made it clear that they would not back down and concede disputed areas to the Dutch. The Englishmen placed their statements within the context of concern over the Dutch selling arms and ammunition to the Indians, "at long

---

2 Gehring, Charles T. ed. & trans., Correspondence, 1647-1653. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000, 5. This letter was not dated, but was sent from Amsterdam in April of 1647 and arrived in New Amsterdam on June 28.

3 This is the first extant letter from Stuyvesant. He wrote to Governor Eaton at New Haven prior to his correspondence with Gov. Winthrop, this letter no longer exists. New Haven was the most immediate threat to the stability of New Amsterdam as it was located within Dutch claims.

4 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 7.
Island within the River of Connecticut at the Narragansetts and other places within the English Jurisdictions." Now that it was clear that neither side had any intention to concede its claim on the Connecticut River, relations between the Dutch and the English, especially those at New Haven, declined rapidly.

New Haven Governor Theophilus Eaton wrote to Stuyvesant in June 1647 to acknowledge the new Director’s arrival and to propose an “equally proposition of a neighbourlie correspndencie, that justice may haue a full & free passage in all occasions betwixt us.” By the time Eaton wrote his second letter in August of that year, his goals had changed to “witnes against your vnneighbourlie & iniurious course.” Eaton abandoned attempts at diplomacy as he argued vehemently against Dutch claims on land that he and the residents of New Haven colony had occupied under the authority of King James and by purchase of the land from the Indians “who were the true proprietours of the land.” Stuyvesant’s actions against New Haven colony caused Eaton to accuse the former of “disturbing the peace betwixt the Engl: & Dutch in these partes, which hath bynne [soe long & so hapilie] maintained betwixt the two nations in Europe.”

But this was not Europe and relations between countries on one continent did not always transfer so clearly to relations between the same countries on another continent.

The dispute over the boundary between New Netherland and New England dominated Stuyvesant’s activity for several years. He initially tested the waters to see if the New Englanders would back down. He discovered they would not. While continuing...
to lay claim to the area along the Connecticut River, he also asked for a meeting between New Netherland and New England authorities in order to establish a stable and secure eastern border with New England. Stuyvesant would then be able to turn his attention to controlling the land and the people in other areas of New Netherland.

The correspondence between Eaton and Stuyvesant continued in a less than cordial manner. Governor Eaton, with his thriving settlement at New Haven, was particularly offended at the audacity that New Netherland, a place that he refused to recognize as a colony, but only as a mere plantation, was making claims on his colony.9 By reducing the Dutch presence in North America to the status of a plantation, Governor Eaton tried to establish English dominance in the region based on what he viewed was the success of the various settlements. Furthermore, with the colony of New Haven, as well as Connecticut, being within the disputed area, Governor Eaton had greater incentive to prove the validity of the English claim on the land.

During this correspondence Stuyvesant and his New England counterparts illustrated the ideas behind what constituted a legal claim on North American land. As Jaap Jacobs has pointed out in his article on the border conflict, the two European powers had different criteria for claiming land. The legal basis for English land claim was the right of first occupation. The Dutch WIC however, required effective use of land by at

---

9 Ibid., 14, 15, 47. As Warren Hofstra explained in his book on New Virginia, “The term plantation customarily applies to the designs that English policy-makers in early-seventeenth-century London developed to impart both impetus and form to the movement of Scottish, English, and some German and French Protestants into the north of Ireland in an effort to wrest the region from the native Irish and reduce the threat of Catholic power to the security of England. The term was never employed so explicitly to describe efforts to occupy the margins of the English colonial world of the eighteenth century with white, Protestant, yeoman farm families amidst a war with French and Spanish colonists, Native Americans, Native Americans, and enslaved Africans.” Page 4. This also seems to apply for seventeenth-century English North America. Eaton only used the term plantation in reference to New Netherland, while the other English settlements were referred to as colonies.
least fifty colonists.\textsuperscript{10} It is important to point out that Jacobs’s analysis of the
negotiations was from a European perspective looking at how matters of sovereignty
were defined in Europe. He noted that with expanding colonial empires, these definitions
were in a state of flux during the mid-seventeenth century, especially with England in the
midst of a civil war. With no mutually accepted terms concerning land possession,
Jacobs points out that, “there was neither right nor wrong in this situation; it was rather a
matter of opposing points of view.”\textsuperscript{11} With no accepted standard, the colonists would
have to contest for the right to utilize their own terms concerning claiming land.\textsuperscript{12}

However, the correspondence between the Dutch and English governors seems to
indicate that the colonists’ definitions of who controlled lands did not necessarily agree
with that of their rulers at home. It would seem counterproductive for Stuyvesant to
argue that the Dutch retained control of the Connecticut River Valley based on the WIC’s
demand that the land be under effective use by at least fifty colonists. Dutch presence on
the Connecticut River was limited to a few men posted at Fort Good Hope, a place that
was quickly being surrounded by English settlers in the town of Hartford, Connecticut.
The Dutch did not meet their own criteria for laying claim to the Connecticut River.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 75.

\textsuperscript{12} See Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for a discussion on the varying cultural and political
methods European powers utilized to claim dominion over territory. See also James Muldoon, “Discover,
Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the Legal Basis for English Possession of North
America,” in \textit{The Many Legalities of Early America}, ed. Christopher L. Tomlins; Bruce H. Mann (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture,
2001), 25-46. Muldoon argues that debates over the international nature of land claims does not come into
its own in Britain and British North America until the eve of the American Revolution. At this point in the
seventeenth century, the nature of land claims remained a very local issue with wider implications.
Due to the difficulty in getting settlers to occupy New Netherland, the Dutch changed their requirements for legal land holdings in North America. The Dutch claimed they owned the land because they had purchased the land outright from the Indians. This allowed Stuyvesant to assert to Gov. Winthrop that, “my Lords & Masters, the Estates-General, or West Indie Company, whose indubitable right is to all the land betwixt that riuer called Conneticut, & that by the English named Deleware.” Stuyvesant did not argue about land occupation. According to him, the Dutch held the claim to the land based purely on its legal purchase.

In the letters of the New England governors to Petrus Stuyvesant, it continued to be Governor Eaton of New Haven who described and defended England’s claim on the Connecticut River. Eaton upheld the idea of right of first occupation in his arguments with Stuyvesant. However, Eaton went a step further and used Dutch reasoning in his arguments against Stuyvesant. He claimed rightful ownership “by lycence & auntient patent from King James, of famous memorie, since confirmed by his Maiestie that now is, first came into these ptes, & vppon due purchase from the Indians, who were the true proprietours of the land (for we fownd it not a vacuum) haue built, planted, & for many yeares quietlie, & without any claime or disturbance, from the Dutch or others, possessed the same.” Jacobs points out that such an argument was actually rejected by English authorities in Europe because the Indians were not bona fide possessors of the land. However, it appears that the situation on the ground called for new reasoning beyond what was deemed acceptable in Europe.

13 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 7.

14 Ibid., 13.
Stuyvesant, knowing his situation called for a peaceful settlement of the boundary, continued to press for a meeting between New Netherland and the New England colonies to resolve the border issue. New England had a greater population than the colony of New Netherland thereby allowing the former to create a much larger military force than the latter. Furthermore, many settlers in New Netherland did not feel it necessary to provide military service to the colony since the WIC maintained a military presence in the colony, although it was also not sufficient to protect the colony from the numerous threats it faced. Not only was New Netherland not in a position to fight its English neighbors, but Stuyvesant’s attention was needed throughout the colony. The meeting was continually pushed back and rescheduled for one reason or another.

Furthermore, the location of the meeting was a particular sticking point. Stuyvesant wanted a meeting at Hartford, in the disputed territory and near the Dutch Fort Good Hope. The New Englanders wished to have the conference in Boston. The meeting was finally held in Hartford in September 1650. By dictating the location of the meeting near the site of the Dutch Fort Good Hope, Stuyvesant was able to illustrate the Dutch presence and, although minimal, the Dutch power in the region and negotiate for a more favorable boundary line for New Netherland than if the meeting took place in Boston or even New Haven. This was one of the earliest examples of how the competing powers of the region tried to exert their influence over the diplomatic landscape of the area. Although Stuyvesant had much weaker military support to back up his claim, he was able to mitigate this apparent weakness by including an important symbol of Dutch power on the landscape, Fort Good Hope, to establish an element of control during the negotiations.
The 1650 Hartford Treaty did help to stabilize New Netherland by removing a significant threat coming from outside the colony. With the treaty, the border between New England and New Netherland was finalized. New Netherland lost its claim to the Connecticut River, although they were allowed to retain control over Fort Good Hope. However, the Dutch really had no realistic claim on the Connecticut River as it was populated by the English. The Dutch retention of Fort Good Hope was merely a symbolic gesture, and the fort was soon abandoned. However, forts were very important elements of the Dutch presence in North America, as we will see, and the existence of Dutch at Fort Good Hope allowed the Dutch to negotiate from a more powerful position, than if Stuyvesant conceded Good Hope’s loss prior to the meeting. Furthermore, although the treaty would not be ratified in Europe for several years, it appeared to be sufficient for the purposes of the colonists in North America. Stuyvesant and the Council at New Amsterdam could then turn their attention to other areas of the colony where Dutch, and particularly WIC, control of land and people was in doubt.

**The Threat to the South**

With concerns of a direct attack of the English on New Netherland at least temporarily allayed, Stuyvesant and the Council still had to contend with the loss of Dutch authority along the South or Delaware River. The WIC was adamant concerning its claim to land from the Connecticut River to the Delaware River. However, it was also willing to give up claim to some of that territory in return for a certain amount of peace of mind. The WIC directors indicated that they would be happy to agree on a boundary with the Swedes as well as with the English, but they saw little hope in that occurring.15

15 Ibid., 58, 107, 154.
In 1654 the Swedes did take over the inadequately defended Fort Casimir on the Delaware River without having to fire a shot. With the Swedish capture of the fort, the Dutch had no real presence on the Delaware River. The Directors in Amsterdam adamantly held to the ideas that the Delaware was Dutch territory and that they had the strength to defend it. They therefore instructed Stuyvesant to retake the territory from the Swedes. Stuyvesant decided that the winter of 1654-1655 was not a good time to retake the Delaware; he, therefore, set sail to retake Fort Casimir in September 1655. It was an extremely quick expedition and the Dutch retook Fort Casimir and then expelled the Swedes from their Fort Christina before the end of the month. However, this victory would come at a very costly price as events unfolded in New Amsterdam during Stuyvesant’s absence. These events will be discussed below.

The Swedes did not pose the only European threat to New Netherland’s south. The authorities in New Amsterdam were also concerned over relations with the English in Virginia as well as those in New England. While the WIC authorities in New Amsterdam did not foresee a possible threat to their territory by the Virginians, they did view the Englishmen to their south as a possible economic threat and acted accordingly. On December 16, 1653 New Netherland sent Reverend Drisius to Virginia to conclude an “alliance, correspondence and commerce” between the two colonies.

He was also to propose and ask for a provisional continuation of the commerce and intercourse between the two places, a free pass or safeguard, signed by the Honorable Governor for some of their merchants and yachts, to pay and collect debts among the inhabitants of Virginia; as we on our side have given and are still willing to give, passes to come and go, to ships and yachts coming to us from Virginia.16

---

Whereas Stuyvesant was able to negotiate a boundary with the New England authorities from an advantageous position at Hartford, where a WIC fort was located, he held no such advantage with the Virginians. Without a previous presence on the landscape, and without any power within the colony of Virginia, he was forced to send a representative to Virginia in hopes of gaining favorable trading conditions.

In 1659, Stuyvesant became alarmed again that the Swedes were purchasing Indian land around Fort Nassau. He ordered the Dutch on the Delaware to buy the land around the fort to prevent Swedish acquisition. He was particularly concerned that the Swedes, through the continual purchase of land would be able to cut off communication between Fort Nassau and Fort Orange. Similarly, he was concerned that the Swedes had designs on the Hudson River. These threats did not come to fruition, but they nevertheless caused Stuyvesant to keep a very wary eye on events to his south and especially along the Delaware River. These activities continue to illustrate the fractured nature of Indian and European relations in the mid-seventeenth century. There was no central location for dealings with Indians and Europeans. Interactions between Indians and Europeans continued to take place in many locales as the situation warranted.

**The Threat to North**

The Dutch in New Netherland did not have to contend with threats just from the English and the Swedish; they also had to guard their northern holdings from the French in Canada. In the 1650s, wars between the Mohawks and the Canadian Algonquians threatened to cut off Fort Orange’s fur supply from the north. As a result, much official

---

Dutch attention was drawn to the immediate needs of the trading enterprise around Fort Orange.

On March 21, 1651 the Amsterdam Directors commented on the Mohawks’ attack on Canada where they captured eight or nine Christians whom they were threatening with torture if they did not receive a large ransom. The Directors conceded that to assist is the duty of all Christians, but every one is bound to care for himself and his own people; your Honor cannot be ignorant, that some time ago men of this nation have been ransomed at the expense of the Company and by the contribution of the community, for which we have never been repaid; so that we think, that when the complaints reach France, they will take care of their own countrymen.  

While the Dutch were not directly involved in this war, the residents of Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck could not avoid the repercussions of such a war. Furthermore, the Fort Orange authorities would tend to ignore the advice of the WIC Directors to let France take care of their own countrymen. By ransoming captured Frenchmen from the Mohawks the Dutch at Fort Orange placated both Mohawks and French in order to keep a peaceful border to their direct north. The Dutch may not have liked ransoming captured Frenchmen, but they saw it as necessary. These actions also contributed to the constant evolution of a new cultural landscape as Dutch, Mohawks and French remained in contact from these interactions. By the summer of 1653, war between the Iroquois and the French eliminated peaceful relations along the northern borders of New Netherland, and drew much of New Netherland’s attention north as well.

---

18 Berthold Fernow, ed., *Documents Relative to the History and settlements of the towns along the Hudson and Mohawk River (with the exception of Albany) from 1630-1684, and also illustrating the relations of the settlers with the Indians* (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, 1881), 27. Hereafter cited as Fernow, *DRCHNY* 13
English Incursions into New Netherland

One of the most significant barriers to maintaining control of the territory claimed by the Netherlands was lack of population. Although the Dutch believed that purchasing land from its rightful Indian owners guaranteed their legal claim to the territory, without a human presence on the land, it was vulnerable to take over, particularly by the larger English population to their east. Stuyvesant harbored much resentment towards non-Dutch residents within the colony. However, members of the WIC in Europe did not share this sentiment. The WIC Directors usually supported English settlement within the boundaries of their colony as long as the groups were in manageable numbers and swore to uphold the laws and rights of the company. These individuals and groups were not necessarily seen as threats by the Directors of the WIC in Amsterdam, because they did not challenge the WIC’s dominance in the beaver trade.

However, when a group of Englishmen expressed their desire to settle and trade in New Netherland, the WIC Directors vehemently objected to the presence of an “English tradinghouse ten leagues from Fort Orange.” Not only did the Directors wish to keep the English traders away from Fort Orange, but they also indicated that they must prevent “by all means” the Indians selling land to the English within New Netherland boundaries. As long as the Englishmen were not challenging WIC authority they were welcomed by those in Amsterdam. However, Stuyvesant did not share the Directors’ opinion on English settlements within New Netherland. He would argue against English

19 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 4.

20 Ibid., 5. All land within New Netherland had to be purchased from the Indians by the WIC and then granted to individuals. It was acceptable, according to some WIC officials, for English settlers to occupy and farm land that they acquired from the WIC after the WIC acquired it from the Indians. Direct purchase of land by anyone, regardless of nationality, that bypassed the WIC was not considered legitimate.
presence within the WIC colony on economic, political, and religious grounds, with much of his arguments focused on the use and control of land.

The WIC recognized their vulnerability from lack of population. In March 1650, the Committee of the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC contracted a charter to transport 200 settlers to New Netherland. One half of the compliment were to be farmers and farm laborers, the other half were to be “conversant with agriculture” and the WIC would furnish them with the necessary supplies for the voyage. In this way the Dutch would be better able to defend their territory and to illustrate to English settlers that the Dutch possessed the land by both legal purchase and by proper occupation and use of the land. These terms satisfied both Dutch and English definitions of land possession. The need to populate New Netherland, especially the most vulnerable area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange, would be an issue throughout the colony’s existence. Unfortunately, there is no record that the requested settlers ever arrived in the colony.

Even with limited but growing Dutch population and military force in the region, the English governments in New England and Maryland did not directly invade the Dutch colony. However, the influx of individual and small groups of English settlers into the colony created its own set of problems for the WIC. The Dutch authorities’ insistence on a boundary between the English and Dutch colonies underscored their desire to keep the English contained in New England and Maryland. Throughout 1650, the WIC was concerned with continued reports of a possible war between the English to the east of New Netherland and the Wappinger Indians, a Munsee speaking group along the Hudson River. An English victory over the Wappinger Indians would allow the English to

occupy the land by the right of conquest. According to his official writings, Stuyvesant did not see this as an imminent threat, however, he feared the possibility enough to reach out to the English he wished to keep out of New Netherland.\textsuperscript{22}

In order to prevent English incursion as a result of a war between them and the Wappingers, New Netherland proposed a joint Anglo-Dutch alliance in order to avert war with the Wappinger Indians altogether. The reasoning behind such an alliance was that the Dutch and Wappingers already had signed a treaty after Kieft's War, and a Dutch alliance with the English could help to bring about a peace between the Wappingers and the English before a war ever started.\textsuperscript{23} Such a course of action would then eliminate the possibility of the English moving into the Wappingers' land along the North River as part of a right of conquest. Furthermore, such an alliance would allow the Dutch to keep a wary eye on their English neighbors and their military capabilities. While this arrangement made sense to Stuyvesant, the New Englanders saw little advantage for them in an alliance with their Dutch neighbors, and the alliance never came about. Moreover, these events continued to illustrate the fractured nature of Indian and European interactions at this time. Without a single, coherent policy, the Dutch, as well as the New Englanders, were forced to react to controversies with the different Indian groups, whenever and wherever they happened to present themselves.

Although the threatened war between the English and the Wappingers never came about, WIC authorities continued to fear the usurpation of what they considered to be

\begin{footnotes}
\item[22] Fernow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 27.
\item[23] Kieft was the Director of New Netherland before Stuyvesant. The colony experienced a devastating war with Indians in the 1640s.
\end{footnotes}
Company land. In March 1651 the WIC directors warned Stuyvesant not to grant land to anyone without properly acknowledging the authority of the WIC. He was also forbidden to grant land to anyone who could not prove that he had the means to populate and cultivate the land. This statement reflects the precarious nature of Dutch land claims. The WIC claimed land based on the supposed legal purchase of it from the rightful owners, the Indians. They also controlled the distribution of that land to individuals who were able to make right and proper use of the land. Proper use of the land in this instance was agricultural use, which would not threaten Dutch fur trading enterprises in the region. However, those who were able to meet the WIC’s requirements of populating and working the land often found themselves at odds with the Company concerning land use. This was the case with foreign settlers (meaning both non-Dutch and non-Dutch Reformed) as well as Dutch landholders such as the Rensselaers around Fort Orange.

On December 11, 1653 George Baxter and several Dutchmen petitioned Director-General Stuyvesant concerning the legitimacy of the settlements on Long Island that were populated by both Dutch and English. Baxter was an Englishmen who cultivated land on western Long Island. He started his petition by stating, “first of all, we acknowledge a paternal government which God (in nature) has established in the world for the maintenance and preservation of peace and the good of mankind.... We therefore humbly conceive our privileges to be the same, harmonizing in every respect with those of the Netherlands, being a member dependent on that state and not a conquered or subjugated people.” Baxter’s petition for privileges and protections under the WIC, based on fealty

---


to the Dutch authority, was met with derision by Petrus Stuyvesant and members of the Council. According to the Directors of the WIC, Baxter met the conditions for land ownership in the colony. He and his neighbors pledged their willingness to obey the laws of New Netherland and also settled and cultivated the land. Therefore there should have been no issues regarding Baxter's and his neighbors' rights to live peacefully in the borders of New Netherland.

Stuyvesant, however, did not see the situation quite in those terms. He was primarily concerned with the fact that the petition was written in English and translated into Dutch. The idea that "a foreigner or Englishman has to tell them what to remonstrate and demand" was an insult to Stuyvesant. In his reply, Stuyvesant noted that other New Netherland jurisdictions were "unaware of such a remonstrance and should be considered too careful to sign what an Englishman has drafted, as if there was no one of Dutch origin intelligent enough and capable to draft a petition to the Director General and Council."26 The other jurisdictions that he mentioned consisted of populations of Dutch majority that did not have to prove themselves as loyal to the WIC to the same extent as the communities on Long Island and other communities made up of large numbers of non-Dutch, and particularly, large numbers of English. Furthermore, the fact that an Englishman was speaking for an otherwise Dutch community showed Stuyvesant's discomfort with the creation of new cultural landscapes where non-Dutch played a significant role. Stuyvesant was trying to create an extension of the Dutch Republic in North America, and he wished to do so with no English interference. However, in the atmosphere in which he lived, one of constant challenges and negotiations for power, he

26 Ibid., 90-97.
was unable to stop the formation of new cultural landscapes which incorporated significant non-Dutch elements.

Despite Stuyvesant’s personal feelings towards the English presence within New Netherland, by 1654 greater numbers of English settlers were moving into what the Dutch called Vreedlandt and the English called Westchester, as well as other areas along the Hudson River. Like the English settlers on Long Island, this community had been in existence north of Manhattan well prior to Stuyvesant’s arrival in the colony, and they also pledged fidelity to the WIC. They had also established farms and continued to populate the land. Again, the community lived up to the requirements on legal settlements set forth by the WIC. However, WIC representatives in the colony perceived the majority English community between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange as a threat to the internal stability of New Netherland. Therefore, those WIC representatives who made up the Council in New Amsterdam ordered the group in Westchester to leave. Officially they were accused of “usurping” WIC land.27

The concerns of the people of New Netherland surrounding the infiltration of the English into Dutch territory were compounded early in 1654. In February of that year, the Council took up a discussion on the scarcity of lead and powder among the Mohawk nation. They, and the residents of Fort Orange, were concerned that if munitions were cut off completely to the Mohawks, the trade at Fort Orange and Beverwyck would come to an end. The council minutes show that their concern was not that the Indians would be unable to hunt beaver for the international trade, but “that the aforesaid nation might seek the munitions from our neighbors the English and be successful therein, which in these

27 Fernow, DRCHNY 13: 36-38.
dangerous times might bring more and greater misfortunes to this province."28 That greater misfortune was seen as the possible end of the Dutch alliance with the Mohawks. The members of the Council reasoned that should the Mohawks turn to the English for trading purposes, then the Mohawks would in turn switch their friendship to the English at which time New Netherland would be completely isolated.29 Although the colony was short on lead and powder for their own supply, the Council deemed it necessary to provide the Mohawks with what they could. With the Council taking the lead on these negotiations, it shows that Indian policy was not only being driven from New Amsterdam, even though the Mohawks were located just west of Fort Orange, but also continued to be a part of Dutch policy with their European rivals.

With their elevated concern that the Mohawks would ally themselves with the English, the New Netherland authorities proceeded with extra urgency to try to remove the English from the Hudson River valley. On April 19, 1655 the Council of New Netherland once more warned Thomas Pell and others against settling on the lands of the Vreedlandt. Again, to the Dutch the land was clearly theirs because Gov. Kieft purchased it years earlier from the Indian residents of the area who they believed to be the rightful owners of the land. The English, however, believed that their occupation was the critical factor in establishing ownership of the land, not to mention that they had earlier been given permission to settle the land and continued to pledge loyalty to the company. The council warned them “not to proceed with building, clearing, pasturing cattle or cutting hay or whatever else may be necessary for the cultivation of the soil upon

29 Fenow, DRCHNY 13: 35.
the aforesaid purchased and long possessed lands contrary to the agreement made at Hartford and to remove within fifteen days” or risk persecution according to law. Like the Council’s directive of a year earlier for the residents of Vredelandt/Westchester to leave the land, the English settlers also ignored this order, thereby illustrating Dutch inability to actually control much of the land they claimed under the jurisdiction of New Netherland. Furthermore, WIC inability to control this particular area and the people who occupied the land served as another example of how different regions within New Netherland continued to develop independently of one another, despite governmental efforts otherwise.

Furthermore, the Westchester residents’ resistance to the Council’s orders for them to leave the land further illustrates how English settlers were able to form a new cultural landscape within New Netherland. This new cultural landscape was based on English colonial understanding of rightful land use and ownership. Stuyvesant and the Council continued to resist, in vain, the creation of these new non-Dutch landscapes within the border of what they claimed as New Netherland.

**Indian Threats**

The English were able to ignore the directives of Stuyvesant and the Council with impunity due to the numerous threats the colony then faced. A small group of English farmers, no matter how strategically located, did not pose the same threat as a large English attack, Swedish usurpation of land, or Indian attack. However, this small group of English farmers did expose the lack of control that the WIC maintained over the land and the people who occupied it. WIC representatives in the colony were unable to respond to multiple threats at the same time. Furthermore, we see that the authorities in

---

30 Ibid., 38.
New Amsterdam were often less concerned with events to the north of Fort Orange than with those to their east and south. These events were often left to the residents of Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck to deal with. This was true in dealings with both the French in Canada, including the "Canadian Indians," and the Iroquois. This early differentiation between the concerns and responsibilities of the settlements would contribute to the formation of Fort Orange and eventually Albany as an independent colonial center.

This separation of responsibilities would become even more pronounced during and after 1655. With the growing threat of the Swedes on the Delaware River and then the Peach War attacks on Manhattan Island, Stuyvesant's attention was needed elsewhere and the residents of Fort Orange were left to deal with affairs in their region. Furthermore, it is during and after 1655 that the Mohawks begin to expand their own political activities into Fort Orange.

While Stuyvesant was concerned with Swedish activity on the Delaware River, the Mohawks' war with the Canadian Algonquians in the 1650s got the attention of the WIC Directors in Amsterdam. In April of 1652 Directors in Amsterdam expressed their concern over the Mohawks' war with the Canadian Indians. They were particularly concerned by a request of the Canadian Indians to go into the Mohawks' country. This would require them to pass over the North River, and they asked for permission to do so. The directors understood that granting the Canadian Indians permission to travel over the North River and over New Netherland territory would cause great trouble with the Mohawks. Since the Dutch were dependent on the Indians, especially the Mohawks, to
maintain their fur trading industry, the last thing they could afford was to allow the Mohawks’ enemies to travel through Mohawk territory.

Although the WIC directors continued to hope to entice the northern Indians to come down to New Netherland to trade their beaver pelts, they also understood the necessity of maintaining their alliance with the Mohawks. In order not to jeopardize any future relations with the Canadian Indians, the Directors also wanted to make sure that Stuyvesant refused the Indians’ request “politely.”31 It is interesting to note that according to the communication from the WIC officials in Amsterdam, the Canadian Indians asked for permission to cross over the North River, not Dutch land.32 Such emphasis on the river was not unique. It was the river more than the land that the Dutch knew and possessed.33

In the Mohawks’ invasion of French Canada when they had taken several prisoners, Algonquians from Canada were said to be traveling down into the Hudson River Valley to wage war on the Mohawks.34 To face this threat the Dutch continued to propose a mutual defense against the Indians, which they initially brought up during the concern over a war between the English and the Wappingers. By proposing this mutual defense plan, the Dutch would benefit from the English military power that outnumbered

31 Ibid., 34; and Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 153.

32 The Gehring translation states that the Indians requested “passage to the North River.” In both Gehring’s and Fernow’s translations the emphasis is placed on the River itself, and not the land.

33 See Merwick, Possessing Albany, 4, 107-114 where she discusses the importance of water and specifically the Hudson River to the Dutch in New Netherland. She stated on pages 107-109 that, “Water was the *sine qua non* of the trading system. The rivers and kills were essential sources of energy and transport. They were also sources of imagination and self-referentiality. They were full of power and meaning.” They were filled with power and meaning particularly because they linked the sources of Dutch control, the forts, and they were one of the few geographic regions where the Dutch were able to assert their authority, especially over Indian populations.

the Dutch two to one. At the same time the Dutch would be protecting their own interests from the same military threat by keeping their friends close and their enemies closer. The English, seeing no advantage for themselves in such an alliance, politely declined. Luckily for New Netherland, their failed attempt at solving these particular problems was neutralized by the fact that the Dutch did not become immersed in hostilities between the Mohawks and the Canadian Algonquians.

Possible threats from Indian sources were not restricted to the Iroquois’ wars with the Canadian Indians. Although many tribes signed a treaty with the Dutch after Governor Kieft’s war in 1645 the potential for violence continued. In George Baxter’s 1653 petition to Governor Stuyvesant, he stated that the settlers on Long Island continued to expect another war with the Indians. Baxter predicted such an event because the Indians committed several murders under the supposed pretext that they had not been paid for their lands. Stuyvesant, already upset that this petition was originally written in English by an Englishman, replied to Baxter “the assertion and allegation of the remonstrants that murders had been committed by the Indians, under the pretense of not having been paid for their land, is made entirely without foundation and in bad faith.” According to the Dutch, they had bought the land from the Indians, and therefore, it was the Dutch under the authority of the WIC who had legal deed to the land. Baxter claimed that he and his fellow petitioners purchased the land from the Indians.

Stuyvesant did not accept that Baxter and his associates had a legitimate claim to protection from the WIC if they did not gain title to their land through the WIC, since all land purchased from Indians had to be approved by the WIC. Stuyvesant made his
feelings concerning Baxter’s claim to the land known in his somewhat hostile reply. He stated, that

if we accept the assertion of the remonstrants that the murders were committed under the pretext of not having been paid for the land and compare it with their statement in the preamble that they themselves had bought the land from the Indians, would not the lack of payment then be their fault as buyers, and therefore would not they themselves be the cause of this claim by virtue of their default? 35

Whether Baxter was stealing land from the Dutch or the Indians, Stuyvesant did not recognize Baxter’s claim to it. Stuyvesant wanted the WIC to dictate the process of creating new communities and thereby the creation of Dutch landscapes in New Netherland.

Nor did Stuyvesant accept Baxter’s explanation for the growing Indian threat on Long Island. According to Stuyvesant the reasons were much more of a spiritual nature. Stuyvesant admonished Baxter for not taking the time to investigate the reasons behind the recent murders committed by the Indians. Stuyvesant explained that Indians on Staten Island killed some settlers because they claimed that Cornelius Melyn was a sorcerer who poisoned them and sold them bad powder. The Indians in the area swore to kill him and all the people on Staten Island to protect themselves from the sorcery of the Christians. 36

35 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 97.
36 Ibid., 97.
Importance of Forts to Dutch Goals

The WIC claimed the land on the Delaware, like the land along the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers, based on purchase of the land from the Indians.37 As shown above, however, the Dutch colony was constantly faced with threats from outside factions. So while the WIC could claim land based on legal purchase from the Indians and in some cases through settlement and use of the land, the WIC’s practical efforts to maintain control of the land was through the presence of forts on the land. Forts Orange and Amsterdam on the Hudson allowed the Dutch to claim control of that river, while Fort Good Hope was the Dutch symbol of authority on the Connecticut River. On the Delaware River the Dutch maintained at first Fort Nassau and then Fort Casimir. It was in the presence of these forts that the WIC placed its hope of maintaining control over their lands.

The Dutch had to rely on forts as a military presence in North America partly because it could not rely on numbers as the English could, especially in New England. While New England experienced an influx of colonists during the Great Migration, New Netherland was never so fortunate as to attract many willing Dutch men and women to settle in the colony. With the forts, they were able to establish an authoritative presence and protect New Netherland’s most valuable areas, the rivers that supported the fur trade. Furthermore, while the Iroquois had fortified towns, Europeans had little access to them, and when Europeans did access Iroquois “castles”, as they were called, it was usually either as captives or under highly controlled circumstances. Fort Orange, however, played a most significant role in the history of the region. Its use as a place of

37 See above for discussion of Dutch shifting from land claims based on proper use to land claims based on purchase from Indians.
intercultural exchange, whether through trade or diplomacy, allowed it to develop as a colonial center of European and Indian affairs.

The importance of the forts was apparent in a 1647 letter from the WIC Directors to Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam that discussed the boundary disputes with both the English and the Swedes. There was confusion as to exactly what Stuyvesant was trying to claim as New Netherland territory. Stuyvesant had argued for different boundaries with the separate English authorities. With some he claimed land from the Connecticut River to the Delaware River. With others he claimed land from the Connecticut River to Cape Henlopen, and finally at other times he claimed territory from Cape Henlopen all the way to Cape Cod. Due to the confusion, the Amsterdam Directors wrote:

Now your Honor says in your last letter, (that the) Directors...did not claim our ju(risdiction) farther, than from (the) Southriver in the South to the (Freshwater) river in the North, which your honor thinks it (ought to be beyond) question, because the (country, the) streams and rivers, (situate) between the two, are lined (with) our forts, but that in the protests against the English, your honor pretended a little more, namely from Cape Malabare, (called) Cape Cot by our people, to Cape Hinloopen: Yet your honor says if we might have the first mentioned in peace, it would be the best to be satisfied with it.38

It seems that Stuyvesant, by making grand claims to territory, was giving himself room to negotiate in order to maintain what he saw as New Netherland's legal territory "beyond question" because it was "lined with our forts." The Dutch forts were the symbol of Dutch authority, even though militarily they were neither well armed nor sufficiently manned. However, the forts were erected to protect the main land use of the colony, trade, and were, therefore, a physical manifestation of Dutch power and control over the

38 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 68.
land the forts occupied. Stuyvesant could not claim that the territory the WIC claimed was lined by their settlements and farms, so the presence of the forts stood as the evidence of Dutch power and control over a certain area, as tenuous as that control may have been.

On the Delaware, Stuyvesant took it upon himself to replace the original Dutch fort on that river, Fort Nassau, which was located on the east side of the river, with Fort Casimir, which was built on the west side of the river. As was discussed above, the Swedes and Dutch had rival forts on the Delaware, and the two nations traded claims to the river by taking over one another's forts. The populations were quite minimal. It was, therefore, the possession and presence of forts on the river that allowed the nations to claim control of the river itself and allowed a small force to control trade and access to the interior lands. Moreover, the presence of a garrisoned fort could force competing powers, such as Maryland and Virginia, to pay required duties in order to sail and trade up the Delaware River. Unfortunately, these claims of power and control were seldom backed up with the actual ability to assert real authority over the areas surrounding them.

Fort Orange, as the WIC's fort located furthest inland, played a unique role in defining the borders and function of New Netherland. Fort Orange did not control entry to the Hudson River, but allowed the Dutch to assert some authority over the interior lands beyond the Hudson River. Fort Orange was the one Dutch fort located closest to lands contested by Dutch, Indian, English and French powers. After the fall of Fort Good Hope in the 1650s, Fort Orange defined the northern limits of New Netherland and stood as a bulwark against encroaching English interests in the area. With the presence of Fort Orange on the upper reaches of the Hudson and near the mouth of the Mohawk River and
the interior hunting grounds, New Netherland was able to exert its authority over access to those lands.

Because of Fort Orange's important position, WIC authorities found it quite necessary to protect it. In the same 1647 letter that discussed New Netherland's boundaries as "beyond question" due to the presence of the forts, the WIC directors expressed concern over a desire by the Swedes to establish their own fort north of Fort Orange. The Directors indicated that such an event would be "very injurious for us."39 This statement was quite odd seeing that the Swedes really had no access to the lands north of New Netherland. However, it stood as an additional perceived threat from the north, in addition to the actually threat from France in Canada.

In response to the Mohawks' war with the Canadian Algonquians in 1653, the WIC suggested establishing a post eighteen to twenty miles north of Fort Orange to allow the Canadian Indians to trade more easily with the Dutch. However, such a move was not to the Dutch advantage.40 By building a post outside of the perimeter of forts constructed by the Dutch, the WIC risked increasing the vulnerability of Fort Orange, which was already isolated from other Dutch settlements. Furthermore, the Dutch could ill afford to alienate the Mohawks with a futile attempt at enticing the Canadian Indians south. Armed with the knowledge of the situation on the ground, the New Netherland Council rejected the WIC's suggestion and moved to appease the Mohawks and to prevent them from becoming allied to the English. The Dutch in New Netherland were fully aware the English had more to offer the Mohawks in material aid, therefore, the

39 Ibid., 69.
40 Fernow, _DRCHNY_ 13: 35; and Gehring, _Correspondence 1647-1653_, 211.
New Netherland council resolved to supply the Mohawks with a moderate amount of powder and lead. Supplying the Mohawks with powder and lead was a practice that would continue throughout the existence of New Netherland. Furthermore, building a new fort north of Fort Orange would place it beyond the limits of Dutch shipping and Dutch ability to control the river. However, the rejection of the plan and the appeasement of the Mohawks also allowed Fort Orange to develop its importance as a center of European/Indian relations in a region that had no defined political boundaries, and where no power was capable of imposing defined boundaries that other groups would accept.

The WIC’s forts on the Delaware River allowed them to maintain a presence where they had few actual settlers. In the correspondence between the WIC directors in Amsterdam and Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam, the main focus in discussion of Dutch territory on the Delaware River was on the forts as the Dutch worked to retain possession of the area. In April of 1652 the Directors of the WIC wrote to Stuyvesant and the Council that they did not see much hope in arranging a boundary with the Swedish government. The letter continued with a discussion of Dutch forts in the area, the possible need to build additional forts, and the necessity of preventing “people who have been so bold to stir up the Indians against us” from erecting strongholds on islands around Manhattan. While these actions seem quite obvious and of little consequence in such a context, the maintenance of forts was crucial in retaining a presence on the land and attempting to control the people of New Netherland and the Hudson River Valley in particular.


42 Gehring, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, 155.
The importance of forts in New Netherland was expressed not just through correspondence between WIC officials in Amsterdam and those in New Amsterdam. The significance of forts on the land was also expressed through Dutch maps. One of the most widely used maps in works on New Netherland is the 1656 van der Donck map (Figure 3). This map depicts *Nova Belgica Neiuw Nederlandt* as encompassing the area just east of the Fresh or Connecticut River to the area just west of the Delaware River. The map shows fairly detailed knowledge of the rivers, streams and coastlines of the colony. The Connecticut, Hudson and Delaware Rivers appear quite accurate up to the limit of travel by European vessels. However, the map depicts the Great Esopus Kill as connecting with the Susquehanna River and eventually emptying into the Delaware.43 Along the banks of the main rivers, the map identifies the forts of the region. The Dutch Forts of Orange and Amsterdam on the Hudson River, and Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River were identified on the map. The Delaware River forts of Nassau, Christina and Elsenburg (the latter was a Swedish fort) were all identified as well.

The landed areas in between the rivers were not as well documented. These areas were filled with the names of Indian groups whose further presence is often noted by the use of small houses indicating their general whereabouts. Names of islands in the Hudson River are listed mainly along the east bank of the river and fill in an otherwise blank area of land. This is especially noted in the land opposite the Esopus. Other areas that lacked European settlements were filled in with drawings of small hills and trees. The area of land between the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers was left virtually empty.

---

43 Although it was an error, this connection actually gave greater significance to settling the Esopus region as it would, according to the map, give the Dutch an inland water connection between the Hudson and Delaware Rivers.
Figure 3. Van der Donck Map. Courtesy of the New-York Historical Society Map Collection
filled only by the names of a few tribes, with no corresponding houses. The “LANDT” from the words proclaiming the region “New Nederlandt” also fills this area of the map, along with a few groupings of trees. Actually one of the few signs of human occupation of this region between the two rivers is the designation of “Mr Pinsers handel huys” or the trading post of Pynchon at Springfield, which posed a relatively serious threat to trading activities at Fort Orange.

The most significant symbol of European occupation, and thereby European control, of this area was the fort. Van der Donck used both words and a four-pointed symbol to mark the locations of Fort Orange on the Hudson River as well as Forts Nassau, Christina and Elsenburg on the Delaware River. It is also interesting to note that Fort Orange is identified with a different typeface than the others, thereby indicating a certain differentiation from other New Netherland forts. The typeface is larger and less resembles script writing thereby making it stand out. In contrast to Fort Orange, the Rensselaerswyck settlement of Greenbos is identified with smaller italicized type. The community of Greenbos, which was part of the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, was established on the east side of the Hudson River to keep residents away from the fur trade; it had not been a viable community for several years at this point. Most residents of Rensselaerswyck preferred to reside on the west side of the Hudson River, closer to what they saw as the vast Iroquois beaver hunting grounds north and west of Fort Orange.

New Amsterdam’s presence at the southern tip of Manhattan Island was identified with the same fort symbol as the smaller Dutch settlements, including that of Fort Good Hope. Additionally, the van der Donck map includes a straight-on view of New Amsterdam, as one would approach the town from the sea. In this depiction of New
Amsterdam, there are two dominant features. The first is a device to load and unload ships, which is in the center foreground of the drawing and stands as a prominent symbol of the importance of trade in the area, especially in New Amsterdam. The second dominant feature is the fort, included therein was the church and the statehouse. All of these features of the landscape of New Amsterdam stood as the dominant symbols of the authority of the WIC in New Netherland. The residences of the town are in small clusters outside of the fort and are also lined all along the outside of the edifice.

This particular map also shows the locations of two Dutch forts without actually identifying them by name. These forts include Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River and Fort Casimir on the Delaware River. The former had been rendered obsolete for several years by the time the van der Donck map was published in 1656. It is still important to note that even though by the time the English and Dutch finally came to an agreement concerning the boundary between their respective colonies in 1650, the English had already established themselves as the dominant European force around the then Connecticut River. The 1650 Hartford Treaty placed the Connecticut River on the English side of the boundary, but allowed for the Dutch to maintain Fort Good Hope along the river. However, it was not as if the fort posed any threat to the English presence in the area, especially once William Pynchon established his trading house well north of Fort Good Hope and cut it off from any Indian trading activity. 44 Although the English then claimed the Connecticut River and Fort Good Hope was no longer a productive Dutch outpost, it nevertheless stood as a symbol of Dutch presence in the region. Furthermore, van der Donck's inclusion of the fort maintained the symbolism of

44 Pynchon will be discussed further in chapter five.
Dutch presence on the land and its symbolism of the power of New Netherland for Europeans who would acquire knowledge of the region solely through stories and maps.

The van der Donck map stands as evidence of the importance of forts for the Dutch in laying claim to the territory they called New Netherland. Forts stood as the most visible sign of Dutch power in the area, not merely on maps, but on the landscape. And as Fort Orange was uniquely depicted in van der Donck’s map, it maintained a unique position within New Netherland. It helped to fend off threats from English interests in the area and it aided in maintaining peaceful relations with area Indians whom the Dutch depended on for trade. In the years after 1655, Fort Orange would play an even more important role as Indians, particularly Mohawks, would begin to utilize the fort to achieve their own political and military ends.

1655 as a Turning Point

In 1655, New Netherland faced a series of calamities that threatened the stability of the colony. New Sweden’s establishment of Fort Christina and conquest of the Dutch Fort Casimir gave rise to the possibility of New Netherland losing the southern half of its colony. This possibility was averted when Stuyvesant led a Dutch expedition that removed the Swedes from the Delaware River. However, while fighting the Swedes, the Dutch faced an Indian war known as the Peach War in the heart of New Netherland, which offered the potential of ripping the colony in two.

Events of 1655 illustrate how complicated and tenuous relations were among Europeans and between the European and Indian powers in the mid-Atlantic region. While Petrus Stuyvesant was busy defending the southern edges of New Netherland from the Swedish encroachment on WIC lands, several bands of Indians led a raid on New
Amsterdam. Included in this group were the Wappingers and Esopus Indians, both of whom played significant roles in European/Dutch relations. Prior to the raid word was circulating that Indians were going to attack the Dutch throughout Long Island, being careful to pick them out from the English inhabitants of the area.\textsuperscript{45}

The Peach War itself offers a look at the possible importance of the geographic interior of New Netherland in European/Indian relations. On the morning of September 15, 1655 several hundred Indians arrived in New Amsterdam, entered the city and began searching through houses of European residents of the Island. They broke into the house of Isaac Allerton, an English trader who was also a member of the New Amsterdam community, and supposedly searched Allerton's Manhattan home because he had traded with rival Indians, the Narragansetts.\textsuperscript{46} In the course of the day the invading Indians informed the New Netherland council that they were only looking for their "Northern Indian" enemies and would soon be leaving the island. Also during this time, the Indians exacted their revenge on Hendrick van Dyck, a local resident who had killed an Indian he accused of stealing peaches from his orchard. Thus the conflict received its name, the Peach War. Eventually, the Dutch authorities who remained in Stuyvesant's absence took action and retaliated against the Indians. The Indians spent the next three days destroying both farms and people and taking over 100 settlers prisoner. Staten Island and Pavonia bore the brunt of the attack and residents lost all of their homes in the attack.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45}Fernow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 39. This initial discussion and rumors circulating about this possibility will be discussed below.

\textsuperscript{46}Paul Andrew Otto, \textit{New Netherland Frontier}, 216

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., chapter 5. Otto's emphasis in his work is on Dutch relations with the Munsee speaking Lenape Indians of the Lower Hudson River. It was the Munsee speaking Lenape Indians who were the main participants in the Peach War. It was the Munsee speaking Esopus Indians who will be the subject of discussion later in this dissertation. Otto argues that the Peach War was an event that got out of hand with
In his study of Indians in seventeenth-century New York, Allen Trelease notes that another explanation for the Peach War was that the Swedes bribed the Indians to attack New Amsterdam while the Dutch were attacking New Sweden to the south. This explanation is supported by a report indicating that the chief sachem of the Susquehannocks was seen with the attackers. Trelease, however, discounts the idea that the Susquehannocks and other Indians could have been somehow involved with the Swedes because attacking New Amsterdam would not be as effective as a direct attack on the Dutch at New Sweden.48

In response to the war, Stuyvesant and the Council tried to prevent further damage by trying to control the movements of both Dutch and Indians upon the land. Prior to the end of hostilities, the Council in New Amsterdam released, in 1655, an order prohibiting individuals from traveling on or even gathering near the Hudson River in Manhattan. The New Netherland council knew that they were unable to control Indian activity on the river and did not relish the idea of having to ransom individuals who opted to conduct any sort of business with the Indians on the west bank of the Hudson. In hopes of preventing further loss and another Indian attack on Dutch settlements the Burgomasters and the Council in New Amsterdam tried to impose their will on this dangerous landscape by restricting Indian movements within towns. These new regulations included prohibiting Indians from coming into the city, except to specifically designated places in order to trade. In addition, all Dutch settlers were forbidden to bring Indians

---

48 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 139.
into their houses or shelter them overnight.\textsuperscript{49} This way, the WIC authorities could, in theory, control the development of the cross-cultural space of the town, and keep elements of the wilderness, namely the Indians, out of Dutch spaces. These issues will be discussed in greater length below.

After the Peach War, the main groups of people Stuyvesant had to deal with were the Indian tribes of the region. On October 18, 1655 Pennekech, chief of the Hackensack Indians sent fourteen Dutch men, women and children who his people had captured back to New Amsterdam. With the release of the captives, Pennekech also requested that the New Netherland officials show their good faith by sending the Hackensacks powder and lead. Stuyvesant and the Council responded to this by not only sending Pennekech the powder and lead, but also releasing both a Wappinger and an Esopus captive from the war. The Council found out about a week later when Pennekech requested additional lead and powder that the remaining Dutch captives were separated among several Indian groups who were moving into the interior.\textsuperscript{50} The interior lands were still very much Indian dominated landscapes. Although the Indian nations in the immediate vicinity of New Amsterdam negotiated for a peace, they still held power outside of Dutch settlements, and the Dutch were forced to respond to this continued Indian power where the Dutch held no influence.

\textsuperscript{49} These same restrictions were put into place in Fort Orange and later in Esopus as well, and residents of both settlements proved unwilling and/or unable to comply with these restrictions on trade with the local Indian populations.

\textsuperscript{50} Gehring, \textit{Council Minutes 1655-1656}, 102-104, 119, 132, 299. Dutch prisoners were held by Wiequaskeckse Indians also referred to as Westchester Indians, and Highland Indians who were located north of Westchester on the east side of the Hudson River. The Council continued to work for the release of captives, particularly children, through early 1656.
However, the resulting peace brought a halt to hostilities between the Dutch and Indians of the lower Hudson River Valley. With the end of major Indian resistance around New Amsterdam, it is at this point that Indian relations begin to shift north. Independent Indian power and therefore Indian control of land lay outside the immediate vicinity of Manhattan Island, including the lands between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. As New Amsterdam became more of a Dutch landscape than an inter-cultural one, Indian influence on the land would be felt further to the north of Manhattan and would eventually settle in Fort Orange. As we will see, post 1655 policy changed how people, both Europeans and Indians moved and lived on the land as many more regulations and actual attempts to enforce these regulation came about as a result of the Peach War. One of the problems Stuyvesant wished to gain control of was the proliferation of rumors throughout the colony.

Rumors

Rumors were a threat to the stability of New Netherland under Stuyvesant right from the beginning. As he started his negotiations with the New England colonies, and especially the colony of New Haven, concerning a boundary between the two, he received a letter from Deputy Governor Goodyear from New Haven warning the Dutch governor that, “many vaine rumours may arise whereby iealousies & discontents may be fomented.”51 Soon after Goodyear’s warning, Stuyvesant received a letter from New Haven’s Governor Eaton filled with jealousies and discontents. He wrote,

I heare allsoe you threaten to bume or beate downe our trading howse, built vppon our owne purchased land, within our owne limmits, . . . and which is yett worse, it is reported to us by several persons and from severall places, that your secretarie hath indeauoured by a slanderous

51 Gehring, Correspondence 1647-1653, 19.
report to incense the Long Isl: Indians, and your selfe att Aurania fort, have attempted to trye other companies of Indians against the English.\textsuperscript{52}

Stuyvesant and the New England governors discussed this particular rumor from November 1647 through May 1648. It is interesting to note, however, that Stuyvesant seldom discussed this rumor directly with Eaton, who originally brought it to light; instead he dealt with Deputy Governor Goodyear or Governor John Winthrop in Boston. Stuyvesant directly denied the veracity of the rumor that the Dutch were arming the Indians at Fort Orange and hoped to attack and "beate downe" the English trading house at Springfield. He referred to the said rumors as "scandalous reportes" and "soe farre from the rules and principles of Christianitie and Charitie."\textsuperscript{53}

Stuyvesant did not necessarily speak directly to Eaton, nor did Eaton directly speak to Stuyvesant. In response to Stuyvesant's letter denying the rumor, Winthrop wrote that Governor Eaton had informed Winthrop the story was "Indian intelligence and did gaine but little Credit with him."\textsuperscript{54} However, the issue of "Indian intelligence" was a crucial factor in communications in seventeenth-century New Netherland, as much of their information came from Indian sources.\textsuperscript{55} Where Easton may have discounted

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 23. The trading house Eaton referred to was Springfield and "Aurania fort" was Fort Orange.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 27.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 29. Here Gov. Eaton equates the idea of Indian intelligence with rumor. Eaton did not put much credence into information derived from Indian sources, thereby equating them with the European concept of rumor. The Dutch, however, including Stuyvesant but particularly the residents of Fort Orange, were dependent on "Indian intelligence" for information concerning the further reaches of the colony which could often only be accessed by Indians. The Dutch, therefore, saw much value in Indian intelligence and often treated rumors, or false intelligence, as truth for lack of other viable sources of information.

\textsuperscript{55} Marion A. Cail, "The Dissemination of Rumor Among the Cherokees and Their Neighbors in the Eighteenth Century" (Masters Thesis, College of William and Mary, 2000); and Gregory Evans Dowd, "The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumors on the South Carolina-Cherokee Frontier," \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly} 53, no. 3 (1996): 527-560. Both these works discuss the importance rumor played on both Indian and European societies on the eighteenth century southern frontier where reliable information was indeed scarce. With the constant rumor of attacks coming from both sides, both Indians and Europeans

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"Indian intelligence," Indian information continued to gain greater credence in European relations, not only with Indians, but also with one another. Due to a lack of safe and reliable communication routes, the Dutch remained dependent on Indian intelligence, which often was rumor, or at least considered a rumor. Moreover, the information provided by Indians would drive Dutch decision making and policy towards Indians and other Europeans.

The next significant threat of the period came in 1650 with the rumor of a war between the English in New England and the Wappinger Indians. The Wappinger Indians were located between present day Kingston to the north and Westchester to the south and between the Hudson River to the west and the Housatonic River to the east. This position placed them on either side of the Hartford Treaty line of 1650 that demarcated the boundary between Dutch possessions to the west and English possession to the east. The Wappingers were, from the European perspective at least, an international threat. Depending on the outcome of such a war, either the Dutch or the English could make significant inroads into the other’s territory, thereby disrupting the stability of either New Netherland or the New England colonies.

The Wappingers were one of several Indian bands to sign a treaty with the Dutch in August 1645 at the conclusion of Governor Kieft’s war. The terms of this agreement called for both sides to refrain from war and that all grievances would be resolved through negotiations and not through revenge. This agreement opened the way for

---

abandoned settlements and prepared for war. Gregory Evans Dowd, "The French King Wakes up in Detroit: "Pontiac's War" in Rumor and History," *Ethnohistory* 37, no. 3 (1990): 254-278 argues that during Pontiac’s War, Indians used rumors in order to influence French policy to return to New France after their defeat in the Seven Year’s War. This is a departure of the idea that France influenced Indian policy at the time, and, instead, illustrates both Indian motivations and Indian power.

---

63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
greater cooperation between the Wappingers and Dutch in the form of formal
negotiations, which were at first centered at Fort Amsterdam. These negotiations moved
Dutch and Wappinger relations into a new realm that went beyond mere economics into
diplomacy. Furthermore, the elimination of revenge killings would eliminate the
constant threat of violence breaking out between Wappingers and the small, scattered
Dutch settlements along the Hudson River. Unfortunately, many individuals, both Dutch
and Wappingers, did not necessarily abide by these agreements, as we will see later,
thereby further illustrating a lack of control by either Indians or Dutch in certain areas in
the Hudson River Valley.

From the Dutch perspective, the Wappingers, while not necessarily allies, were at
least not enemies. The same did not hold true for the English, who had no such treaty
with the Wappingers. New Netherland officials did not want to see violence break out in
the territory after five years of relative peace, especially if that violence originated with
the English. More importantly the New Netherland officials recognized that an English
victory in such a war with the Wappingers would lead to the English trying to move into
the sparsely populated area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. The English
would claim right of conquest, although the Dutch claimed the land. Furthermore, an
English settlement mid-way between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam would cut the
northern part of colony in two through the crucial highway of the Hudson River, thereby
eliminating Fort Orange’s free access to the Atlantic Ocean and would irreparably
damage Dutch participation in the Atlantic World fur trade. The directors of the WIC in
Amsterdam were particularly concerned by this possibility.
With an influx of English settlers into the lands north of Manhattan Island in the 1640s, the Dutch under Petrus Stuyvesant were not prepared to allow the English to disrupt the peace and dominate the Hudson River valley. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council tried, with little success, to remove some of the more significant English settlements in the Hudson Valley. While this threat of war between the English and the Wappingers remained merely a threat, it would encourage the Dutch to try to stave off such a scenario from taking place. The Directors of the WIC remained concerned with the colony's vulnerability to English incursion and recognized that an English presence within the colony was coming from different sources, not just as a result of war.

The rumors leading up to the Peach War began as early as 1652. At this time Reverend Wilhelmus Grasmeer, former minister in New Netherland, testified in Amsterdam concerning one Cornelis Melyn, a resident of Staten Island. Grasmeer claimed that he

had heard the Manhattans Indians of New Netherland, living at Nayack, a place on Long Island directly opposite Staten Island, frequently say, that the said Cornelis Melyn had made them believe and declared to them, Director Petrus Stuyvesant would, as soon as he had built a wall around Fort Amsterdam, come to kill them, namely the savages, whereupon the said savages fled and came armed to Gravesend.

Cornelis Melyn was also the individual whom the Staten Island Indians believed to be a sorcerer, which led them to threaten to kill Melyn and all the Dutch on Staten Island.

---

Fernow, *DRCHNY* 13: 10, 14, 17, 18, 27; and Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, 8. Trelease identifies several bands of Algonquian Indians as Wappinger. These bands known individually as the Rechgawawans or Manhattanians, the Wequaquesgeeks or Westchester Indians, the Sintsinks, the Kitchawanks, the Nochpeems, the Siwanoys, the Tankiteke or Pachamis, and the Wappinger proper. These groups were often referred to collectively as the Highland Indians and occupied the lands surrounding the Hudson River south of present-day Albany.

Corwin, *Ecclesiastical Records* 1: 303. Indians on Staten Island also claimed that Melyn was a sorcerer who poisoned them and sold them bad powder. The Indians in the area swore to kill him and all the people on Staten Island.
While nothing of consequence came out of the rumors surrounding Comelis Melyn, the rumors themselves caused great concern with Stuyvesant and the High Council. In July 1654 the Council met to discuss the continued spreading of rumor of attacks. The minutes read:

Whereas we have been reliable informed that some among our subjects once again, as last year, have taken up and circulated false, spurious and self-contrived rumors, dishonoring the high administration of this province and the Netherlandic nation; namely that some members of the high council together with some Dutch inhabitants were to have hired and incited some Frenchmen and Indians to massacre and plunder the English people residing among us; which circulated rumor, although false, unchristian and completely without foundation, was, nevertheless, disseminated so obstinately and impudently by some (mostly English refugees from New England) in order to incite greater turmoil among the good inhabitants; and in order to give more credence to their lies, they abandoned their houses and plantations, most of them going to the village of Gravesend, where some robbers, bandits and pirates have banded together and quartered themselves for some time now. 58

The council determined to pursue and prosecute any and all who took any part in the rumors and deny them their rights of citizenship and their rights to their land. New Netherland could not afford to maintain such a dissenting population within their borders. This was especially true when that dissenting population consisted of untrustworthy Englishmen.

Of course, the rumors persisted. In January 1655, George Baxter was again the subject of discussion with the Council. This time he spread a rumor that England would soon be moving to take over Long Island and bring it under the jurisdiction of the New England colonies. According to the rumors, this event was to occur by May of 1655 at the latest. The Council stated in this session that they knew the reports to be false, but

58 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1652-1654, 155.
they also took the opportunity to protest continued English movement into lands the Dutch purchased from the Indians.\textsuperscript{59} English control of these lands could easily cut Dutch settlements off from one another. Stuyvesant was also hindered from any further investigation of the rumors as they were forced to wait until the ice and snow melted to pursue his inquiry. Due to the fact that New Netherland was held together by rivers, the harsh winters of the Hudson River Valley made holding and defending the colony even more difficult. The fact that Fort Orange was often cut off from New Amsterdam for several months of the year served as a threat to the colony's stability. Moreover, the isolation of Fort Orange from the rest of the colony due to the weather assisted in the community's independent development from the political center of New Amsterdam. Because Fort Orange was often physically isolated, its residents were forced to act politically independent at times, which aided in Albany's eventual rise as a colonial center of power among Europeans and Indians.

By early September 1655 the rumors kept circulating. A letter to the Council from the residents of Gravesend reported that they daily heard stories that the Indians intended to destroy the Dutch residents of Long Island, and that the Indians had warned the English to separate themselves from the Dutch or fear suffering the same fate. The Dutch inhabitants of Gravesend though it would be best to pick up and move to Manhattan to avoid such a fate, especially since, it was "reported that the Indians of the north and of the neighboring places are making great preparations to carry out their plans quickly."\textsuperscript{60} The council had sympathy for their situation, but concluded that there was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} Gehring, \textit{Council Minutes}, 1655-1656, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 85.
\end{itemize}
insufficient evidence to justify a removal from Long Island. Furthermore, such an act would only serve to leave the land firmly in the hands of the English.

The officials remained concerned as rumors continued through October 1655. This time the Council concluded that the cause of these new rumors was the continual contact between the European settlers of Manhattan Island and the Indians as well as contact between different Indian nations. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council ordered, “that no one, whatever his capacity may be with boat, canoe or any other vessel, however, it may be called, shall cross over, or in any way communicate or speak with the Indians.” They went on to order the Indians, “in case anyone crosses over without showing the sign and token of the honorable general or goes to the Indians that they are to detain and subject to ransom such boat, canoe or persons.”61 The Council and Stuyvesant went so far as to order people to stay away from boats used in official communication between the Council and the Indians. The Dutch officials had witnessed the “swarming and unseemly clamor” of their fellow Dutch settlers looking for information from the Indians concerning activities beyond the confines of Manhattan Island. Not only were these crowds unseemly, but they also alarmed the Indians and discouraged them from coming and offering what information and assistance they could to WIC officials in new Amsterdam. Such swarming of colonists at the river also helped lead to increased rumors.

Indian intelligence, whether true or what many perceived as rumor, created a need for WIC authorities in New Amsterdam to attempt to further control peoples’ movements on the land. They were especially concerned with the movements of the Dutch colonists who were often starved for information on other areas of the colony brought in by
traveling Indians and Indian messengers sent from other settlements. However, the continued dependence on Indian messenger and Indian information, especially for communication between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam, caused New Netherland to remain susceptible to reacting to bad information. Furthermore, Fort Orange’s relative isolation within New Netherland and their dependence on the Mohawks for their fur trade created an atmosphere where Dutch officials in Fort Orange relied heavily upon Mohawk information. This, in turn, led to the eventual presence of Mohawks into the Fort Orange court as informants, witnesses and diplomats.

---

Ibid., 86
CHAPTER 2

OUTSIDE OF TOWNS

With the external threats to New Netherland alleviated, at least temporarily, with the Hartford Treaty of 1650 and the removal of the Swedes from the Delaware River, the internal weakness of the colony was exposed by the Peach War of 1655 and the continued and contentious English presence within the colony. The next step for Petrus Stuyvesant and other representatives of the WIC was to gain control of the colony by establishing a greater Dutch presence in the areas outside of the few settlements. The creation of a settlement at Esopus could also have lessened the dependence on Indian intelligence and Indian messengers as the New Netherland towns would be more closely connected physically. Significant efforts were put into gaining greater control of areas along the Hudson River in order to connect the trade center at Fort Orange and the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck to New Netherland’s political center at Manhattan.

Through these efforts, such as the settling of the Esopus region, and the results of these efforts, namely the Esopus Wars, Fort Orange’s position as a center for not just trade, but diplomacy among Indians and Europeans, was rapidly developing. In fact, Fort Orange’s importance to growing diplomatic involvement between the Dutch and surrounding Indian groups expanded to the point that it set itself apart from New Amsterdam as the location for Dutch negotiations with Indians. Furthermore, much of this alteration in the role of Fort Orange as a diplomatic center came about, not as a result
of WIC policy, but as the result of Mohawk influence both among other Indian tribes and within the court of Fort Orange.

Fort Orange's centrality in the fur trade remained the colony's most significant source of potential revenue, yet it remained quite isolated from New Amsterdam to the south. In fact, the Dutch had little influence, and indeed, little knowledge of lands inside their claimed boundaries but outside of their town walls, although they were quite familiar with the waterways that linked them. Their forts stood as their symbol of power, and their power existed almost solely within those forts. Except for the waterways, Dutch knowledge of areas outside of their settlements was quite limited.

**Dutch Experiences Outside of the Towns in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys**

From the time of Fort Orange's establishment in 1624 until New Netherland's surrender to the English in 1664, there were few documented Dutch forays into the area outside of the fort's protection. It was through the accounts of these infrequent journeys that the Dutch of New Netherland gained some of their direct intelligence of the area. Otherwise, they had to rely on "Indian intelligence." However, the Iroquois Indians remained in control of how and where the Dutch received their information during these trips beyond the towns. It is also important to note that most of the documentation of land to the west of the Hudson River and the Dutch settlements on it was actually written by Frenchmen, including many Jesuits who traveled in the area. Both the French and the Dutch were interested in the region to the west of Fort Orange for its significance in harvesting furs. The French, however, were also interested in the region for its potential in harvesting souls. As a result, the French had a much greater knowledge of the
Mohawk River Valley, which the Dutch saw as their greatest source of revenue in New Netherland due to its use as hunting grounds for beaver furs.

Prior to the reports of the more extensive French travels in the area; Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert kept a diary of his trip to the territory of the Oneidas in the winter of 1634-1635. The purpose of this trip was to inquire as to the extent of French incursions into hunting grounds around Oneida Lake, west of Fort Orange. As William Starna explained, the Dutch feared that a French truce and trading agreement with the Iroquois would divert the fur trade north to Montreal and render Fort Orange obsolete thereby ending the Dutch colonial enterprise of New Netherland. 1 Van den Bogaert traveled with two Dutch companions for six weeks through eastern Iroquoia, and his account stands as the earliest known written record of Europeans in the interior lands west of the Hudson River.

Van den Bogaert's account is highly valuable for its ethnographic information. It is also useful for gaining insight into who was traveling in this highly coveted land. On December 21, 1634 the group's guide Sqorhea led them to a small village called Osquage where they met the sachem, whom they referred to as Oquoho, meaning wolf. 2 In this meeting Oquoho informed the European travelers that yes indeed Indians allied with the

1 Charles T. Gehring trans. and William A. Starna eds., A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-1635: The Journal of Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988, xix; and in Dean Snow, Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna eds., In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives about a Native People, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996, 1. A version of this diary was also included in the 1909 collection entitled Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664 edited by J. Franklin Jameson. However, all references to the van den Bogaert diary will be from the Gehring and Starna translation.

2 Gehring and Starna clarify that the chief's name was most likely not Oquoho, and that the term probably identified the chief's clan affiliation. In addition to the wolf clan, Mohawks also include members of the turtle and bear clans. A Journey, 7 and note 56 on page 37.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
French had been traveling in the area near the Sinnekenes.³ The Iroquois chief also informed the Dutchmen that in his own overland travels he had encountered an Englishman coming from the land of the Susquehannocks in order to learn their language for the trade. It is unfortunate that he could give no other information as to the English man’s destination or place of origin, which could have provided insight into the source of threats to Dutch economic interests.

On December 30 the men approached an Oneida village near Oneida Lake. The Oneidas explained to the Dutch, that yes, the French had been there. The French entered the lake and traveled down in order to trade with the Indians there. The French had easy water access to the area by traveling up the St. Lawrence River from Montreal into Lake Ontario, and then using the Oswego River that flows into Oneida Lake. The Dutch traders were informed that six Frenchmen had been trading in the village in August, and the presence of French goods in the village appeared to confirm the statement. The Oneidas went on to chastise the Dutch comparing their paltry payments for furs with the generosity of the French traders.⁴

The following day Arenias, whom the Dutch identified as the sachem of the “castle” or fortified town, returned to the Oneida village from their travels among the French Indians. While discussing the location of additional Iroquois villages over a makeshift map consisting of corn kernels and stones, the Oneida Indians informed the

³ Sinnekenes, or Senecas is a term often used by Europeans to describe Iroquois Indians who are not members of the Mohawk tribe. Therefore, when encountering the term “Seneca” or some variation, one does not necessarily know if the reference is to a member of the Seneca tribe, or to a member of the other three members of the Iroquois, the Cayugas, the Onondagas or the Oneidas. As the Dutch became more familiar with the Iroquois tribes there were more references to the individual tribes and less use of the term “Seneca” as all-inclusive for non-Mohawk Iroquois.

⁴ Gehring and Starna, Journey, 12-13.
Dutchmen that in the high country near the Oneida Lake lived a people with horns. They further explained that while there were many beaver beyond the Oneida village, they should not travel that far because of the presence of French Indians. It is not clear if the Oneidas were associating the French Indians with the “people with horns”, or exactly what was meant by the description. It does appear that the Oneidas were trying to discourage the Dutchmen from traveling beyond the Oneida village. Starna and Gehring state that by telling the Dutchmen of the people with horns, the Oneida were trying to frighten the Dutch in order to prevent them from exploring the region. This in fact does appear to be the reasoning behind the story of the people with horns. However, Starna and Gehring argue that preventing further Dutch exploration of the region would “thereby prevent expansion of trade. Such an expansion would have eroded a middleman position already held or anticipated by some of the Five Nations Iroquois.” However, instead of protecting their supposed economic interest in the fur trade, as Starna and Gehring propose, it appears that the Oneidas were trying to discourage the Dutchmen from traveling into, and thereby protecting, the traditional seat of authority among the Iroquois tribes held by the Onondagas. The Iroquois maintained the position of Onondaga as the center of their power and authority even when the Mohawks were actively establishing Fort Orange as the center for Indian/European trade.

---

5 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 14. Also see Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (New York: Methuen, 1986). Hulme discusses Native populations of the Caribbean informing Europeans of the presence of cannibals and other threatening populations who were always located on the next island, or just beyond their present locations. Such information could serve to either discourage further European exploration or to paint neighbors, and often enemies, as a threat to the lives of both Indian and European and worthy of fighting to destroy.

6 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 44 note 97. This economic interpretation of Iroquois participation in the fur trade continues to be challenged by historians. The most convincing argument against this interpretation is Jose Antonio Brandao’s “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More”.

74

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
relations. The Iroquois often talked of having to return to Onondaga to decide on matters discussed with Europeans in Albany. It appears that even in 1635 the Oneidas were trying to protect the importance of Onondaga from penetration by the Dutch instead of trying to protect their interest in the fur trade.

The Onondagas’ villages would be the next encountered had van den Bogaert and his companions continued to travel into the interior. Instead of guiding the Dutchmen further into the interior, the Oneidas sent word to the Onondagas to the west, and a group of Onondagas arrived in the Oneida village on January 9. The Dutchmen met with the Onondagas who brought gifts of beaver pelts for the Europeans. The Onondaga named Canastogeera then told van den Bogaert and his party to return in the summer and offered to show them the lake and where the French came to trade. Two days after this meeting in the Oneida village, van den Bogaert and his companions returned to Fort Orange, accompanied part of the way by the sachem Arenias. Dutch movements in Iroquoia were highly controlled by members of the various Iroquois tribes. While they were guided to many Iroquois villages and met with many Iroquois sachems, the Iroquois with whom the Dutch traders met made sure access to their communities was on their terms. This was similar to what the Dutch were trying to do, especially after 1655, in controlling and limiting Indian access to Dutch towns. However, due to the Dutch lack of knowledge and power outside of their own towns, as well as Dutch dependence on Indian trade which forced the Dutch to allow Indians into their towns, the Iroquois were much more successful at controlling European movements within their communities. Furthermore, with the Iroquois able to keep the Dutch out of their centers of power, they

7 Gehring and Starna, Journey, 18-21.
were the driving force behind Fort Orange’s development as a new center of power for Indian and European relations.

French Experiences Outside of the Towns in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys

Although there are few records regarding Dutch travels into the interior lands of the Mohawk River Valley, there was more written documentation concerning French movements in the lands of the Iroquois beyond Fort Orange. However, these documents consist primarily of captivity narratives of Jesuit missionaries written to bring attention to the Fathers’ dangerous work among the “barbarians.” These Jesuit Relations described the torments and tortures the Iroquois inflicted on the Jesuits as they worked to try to baptize the American Indians and claim their souls for Christ.8 Because they were captives, the French Jesuits’ movements in Iroquoia were highly controlled by their captors. And while their accounts were intended for a religious purpose, they are still able to give an idea of both Indian and European movements on the land. All of the accounts described the ease of Indian movement upon both the land and the water and in several kinds of weather conditions. The Relations also described Indians’ access to European villages, especially Fort Orange.

The most famous of the Jesuit Relations that refers to both the Dutch in New Netherland and the Iroquois was that of Father Isaac Jogues who was captured by Mohawks in 1643 and eventually made his way to Fort Orange with his captors. While in the Dutch settlement he escaped with the assistance of several Dutch settlers. He wrote several accounts of his experiences as an Iroquois captive in the vicinity of the Dutch settlements on the Hudson River. He traveled with several of his Iroquois captors

to trade with the Dutch and then to fish “seven to eight leagues below the settlement of the Dutch.” Jogues’s group traveled with ease through the area and consisted of both men and women participating in the fishing expedition. Although traveling in the territory claimed as and labeled on maps as New Netherland, Jogues gave no account of encountering a Dutch man or woman until his actual arrival in the Dutch settlement of Fort Orange. Jogues arrived in Fort Orange, again accompanied by a large group of Iroquois who were traveling through the settlement on their way back to their own village. Jogues’s movements while in the company of the Dutch will be dealt with in the following chapter. However, while he was in the custody of the Dutch he made several observations of the area comprising New Netherland.

Jogues wrote of Fort Orange’s proximity to the Mohawks’ settlement less than twenty leagues distant, and noted that it could be accessed by either land or water. He did not, however, give any indication of who traveled these routes or how often they were utilized. In describing the area between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, he merely stated the distance between the two at 100 or 120 miles and used the rest of the paragraph to give details of the Indian populations who lived between the two European settlements. He particularly wrote about the Mahicans, and the troubles that had recently occurred between and among the Indians and the Europeans. His picture was not a favorable one for the Dutch, stressing the isolation and limitations of the Europeans in their own

---

9 Barthelemy Vimont “Of the Deliverance of Father Isaac Jogues, and His Arrival in France, 1643-1644” in In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives about a Native People eds. Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 22-28. While Vimont is listed as the author of this account, the editors explain that he was responsible only for introductory and connecting material, while the majority of the text was taken from Jogues’s own letters.
settlements. Perhaps most significantly, Jogues’s account showed the important presence of Indians within the colony of New Netherland, especially between the settlements of Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.

Jogues was not the only Jesuit to write of New Netherland and the surrounding lands. Jerome Lalemant was superior of the Jesuits in New France from 1645-1650 and again from 1659-1665. During this time he wrote Relations based on the letters and testimony of the Jesuit missionaries under his authority. In 1646 he wrote a report describing the trip of Isaac Jogues and Jean Bourdon to Mohawk territory in order to establish a mission among the Iroquois. The Frenchmen left New France accompanied by four Iroquois and two Algonquian Indians. They traveled to the Mohawks’ settlements via Lake Champlain and then into Lake George, which Jogues named the Lake of the Blessed Sacrament. From there they traveled by land, crossing the Hudson River above Fort Orange. The group then descended the Hudson River and encountered no other Europeans until they arrived at Fort Orange, where they, Iroquois, Algonquian and Frenchmen alike, were well received and stayed freely in the confines of the town. After several days they traveled into the Mohawk villages. Once they left Fort Orange, they provided no reports of any encounters with Dutch settlers outside of the walls of Fort Orange.


11 Isaac Jogues escaped his initial capture by the Mohawks in 1643 and returned to France for a short time before returning to the Jesuit missions in New France. After his trip to establish a mission among the Mohawks he returned to Trois Rivieres only to be reassigned to the Huron mission. He and his Jesuit companion Jean de la Lande were captured again by Mohawks as they traveled to Huronia. Jogues was killed in October, 1646 in captivity.

While in the Mohawks' land, Jogues and le Lande met with an assembly of Mohawks that also included a contingent of Onondagas. Jogues gave the Onondagas a gift of wampum to establish relations and open up their villages to the Jesuits as well. He then informed the Onondagas that the French could travel into the Onondagas’ lands by three roads. One path was through the Annieronnons or Mohawks, another was by way of Lake Ontario and the Oswego River, or finally through the lands of the Hurons. The Onondaga elders were taken aback at such a proposal. The Onondagas’ response was recorded as “It is necessary to take the road which Onontio has opened; the others are too dangerous; one meets in them only people of war, men with painted and figured faces, with clubs and war hatchets, who seek only to kill”—adding that the way which leads into their country was excellent, entirely cleared, and very secure.”

In other words, the Onondagas were telling the French Jesuits that there was one way to enter the lands of the Iroquois and that was through either door of the longhouse that represented the Five Nations. In this case the French were told to enter through the eastern door of the longhouse that the Mohawks guarded. The Onondagas made it clear to the French that this path was already cleared and should be the one they used to come to Iroquoia. Furthermore, the use of warnings about war-like people was quite similar to the warnings of “people with horns” the Oneidas gave van den Bogaert and his companions a decade earlier in order to discourage them from exploring the land beyond the Oneidas. With this warning, the Onondagas were trying to restrict both French and

---

13 Ibid., 59-60. The word “Onontio” was used by all Iroquois to describe the French Governors. Onontio was a literal translation of the first French governor who they had regular contact with, Montmagny or “great mountain.” This use of Onontio was similar to the use of “Corlaer” in reference to the governors of New Netherland and New York.
Dutch access to the eastern door of the Five Nations’ longhouse, which was guarded by the Mohawks. Furthermore, this would restrict European access to just the eastern tribes of the Mohawks, Oneidas and Onondagas. Of course, by taking the path to the eastern door, it also meant that the Frenchmen would travel through or near Fort Orange. As late as 1700, a map by William Wolfgang Romer depicting the territory of the Five Nations of Iroquois showed a path leading from the lands north of then New York. It started at Lake Champlain (identified as Corlaer’s Lake) and Lake George (still identified as Lac des Sacrament) through Albany. The path then traveled west along the Mohawk River. This path maintained the eastern door of the Five Nations longhouse as the primary route into Iroquoia, thereby allowing for the Iroquois and particularly the Mohawks to control Europeans’ movements into their lands.14

While traveling throughout northeast North American Indian territory in search of souls ready for baptism, the French Jesuits also created maps in order to assist other missionaries who would venture into the Indian settlements. A map depicting Jesuit travels among the Hurons and Iroquois in the 1640s is one such document. The map is dedicated to the location of particular villages the Jesuits visited in their travels. The only prominent geographical features on this map are the waterways, with Lakes Champlain and Sacrament shown much larger than they actually are. Along with these two lakes, the Dutch settlements of Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam are depicted. The Dutch settlements stand on the eastern door to the Iroquois nation and, as the written documents have shown, the settlements played an important role in the lives of Jesuit missionaries to the Iroquois. It is interesting to note that not a single English settlement is identified on

this map, indicating that for these Frenchmen, English colonial settlements were of little significance in comparison to the Dutch. Another French map from the 1640s seems to have utilized some of the information from the Jesuits’ compilation map (Figure 4). Here the cartographer identified the names and locations of many Indian tribes and the many waterways throughout New France. He identified the general location of New England, but the only European settlements included in his work were Trois Rivieres and the Dutch settlement of Fort Orange, just east of the “trois villages d’Iroquois” and just south of Lac Sacrament.

Fort Orange and the Surrounding Lands

The largest population center in New Netherland was New Amsterdam, but Fort Orange, being the center of the fur trade, was of vital economic importance in the 1640s. Fort Orange was New Netherland’s most inland settlement, the center of the colony’s fur enterprise, and was already becoming a cross-cultural center in North America. Furthermore, after the Hartford Treaty of 1650 and the abandonment of Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River, Fort Orange was the colony’s only inland settlement, and closest to the Indian traders on whom the colony depended.


17 This is especially true after the abandonment of Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River following the Treaty of Hartford in 1650.
Figure 4 *Nouvelle France, 1646.* Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada, National Map Collection, Map #44351

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Regardless of Fort Orange’s growing importance in the 1640s, prior to the establishment of a court in Fort Orange in 1652, all legal matters for the community were decided in New Amsterdam. Laws came from New Amsterdam, and the local schout or sheriff was instructed with the responsibility of enforcing all laws. Of course, with the main function of Fort Orange being to serve the fur trade for the WIC, many of the laws imposed on them dealt with the issue of controlling people’s participation in that trade. The issue of controlling trade included - indeed was built around - controlling peoples’ movements on the land. The WIC’s goal of regulating the trade and protecting their interests did not change once the court was established in Fort Orange in 1652. However, both before and after 1652, the WIC had enough troubles enforcing laws that controlled peoples’ movements and activities in town, and trying to control peoples’ movements outside of the town gates proved more difficult.

One of the largest concerns that the WIC and the magistrates of Fort Orange dealt with was “runners in the woods.” This practice allowed individuals to leave the confines of the town in order to meet Indians in the woods to conduct their fur trade. The practice, however, often led to complaints of Indians accosted by overly aggressive Dutchmen eager to get a good deal. The Indians’ complained primarily of physical abuse and, once accosted in the woods, the inability to move freely about the town to trade their goods. In June of 1655, when the trading season was getting underway on the upper reaches of the Hudson River, the WIC granted its permission for the Fort Orange and Beverwyck representatives to establish and publish an ordinance concerning running into the woods.\textsuperscript{18} The WIC stated that running in the woods should be regulated and “shall find

---

\textsuperscript{18} The WIC established the town of Beverwyck in 1652 when it established courts both there and at Fort Orange.
most proper and necessary for the best of the community and the prevention of evil."\textsuperscript{19}

The concern of traders running in the woods was not only about protecting their trade; Dutch men and women traveling in the woods also presented the colony with a spiritual dilemma.

The idea that the woods were home to Indians, who, while providing the livelihood for many Dutch traders, were equated with ideas of evil, remained a concern for many New Netherland leaders. Religious leader Domine Johannes Megapolensis wrote a *Short Account* of the Mohawk Indians in the 1640s during his time in Rensselaerswyck. In this short description he made three references linking the Mohawks to the devil. One reference related to the Mohawks' appearance with face paint, another described how the Mohawks referred to themselves "Ihy Othkon ("I am the devil")", and he also stated that "They worship and present offerings to the Devil."\textsuperscript{20}

Although Megapolensis wrote that Christians met with Indians and Indians slept in the houses of the Dutch, and they "think no more about it than as if we met with a Christian," his basic distrust of the Mohawks' spiritual connection with the devil worried him as well as other leaders of the WIC in New Netherland.\textsuperscript{21}

Megapolensis’ observations concerning relations between the Mohawks and the residents of Rensselaerswyck is illustrative of how the area around Fort Orange

\textsuperscript{19} Fernow, *DRCHNY* 13:39.

\textsuperscript{20} Johannes Megapolensis, "A Short Account of the Mohawk Indians, 1644" in *In Mohawk Country*, eds. Snow et al., 38-46.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 43. Megapolensis, in this account, seems also to have a fairly low opinion of his fellow Europeans. He wrote, "The inhabitants of this country are of two kinds: first, Christians—at least so called; second, Indians." His and Petrus Stuyvesant’s concern over the spiritual well being of the colony played a great role in regulating peoples’ movements through New Netherland.
developed independently from official WIC desires. Megapolensis made it clear that according to the religious tradition he shared with Stuyvesant, the Mohawks were considered evil denizens of the wilderness. However, his statement that Christians of the upper reaches of the Hudson River invited the Mohawks to sleep in their homes shows how both Christians and Indians were creating new cultural landscapes contrary to the traditional Dutch beliefs of civil Christian landscapes and Indians as part of the wilderness.

Megapolensis' connection between the Indians and ideas of the devil was not a new one. It came out of a tradition of associating wilderness and those who dwelled in the wilderness as outside the bounds of civil existence. Roderick Nash, in his influential book, *Wilderness and the American Mind* wrote of the roots of European Christians' ideas on wilderness. He stated, "In early medieval Christianity, wilderness kept its significance as the earthly realm of the powers of evil that the Church had to overcome.... wilderness represented the Christian conception of the situation man faced on earth. It was a compound of his natural inclination to sin, the temptation of the material world, and the forces of evil themselves." Truly these ideas continued to hold sway over the population of New Netherland.

George Baxter, who Stuyvesant saw as an English threat to the stability of the colony of New Netherland, even used this idea of Christianity overcoming and taming the wilderness in his 1653 petition to Stuyvesant. As part of his petition he argued that he and his neighbors, "transformed from a wilderness of woods and erected into a few small villages." He also claimed that "being in a wilderness" they were "unable to promote the

---

good of the country.\textsuperscript{23} His argument presented the idea that transforming the wilderness as a Christian took precedence over the fact that he was an Englishman, therefore, Stuyvesant should assist him and his neighbors in their endeavor to continue transforming the wilderness. Unfortunately for Baxter, Stuyvesant did not agree with his assessment that Baxter was providing a benefit for the cause of Christianity.

The WIC found it a challenge to balance the need to tame what they saw as the wilderness, or a land untouched by Christian activity, and the need to control those who ventured into the woods. A week after the original June 1655 call to regulate running in the woods, the Council at New Amsterdam was still citing the need for "a strong ordinance for up here [Fort Orange] concerning the going into the woods of the Dutch."\textsuperscript{24}

Not only did the council want to prevent the Dutch settlers from heading into the woods, but they also wanted to prevent them from sending signals to the Indians as well as to make sure they did "not call from the houses standing at the hill where the Indians have to pass through."\textsuperscript{25} Such activity was seen as unseemly and quite undignified. Moreover, such actions also threatened the colony by breaking down the order the WIC officials was trying to impose.

Curiously enough, the Council, in working diligently to prevent the Europeans from heading into the woods, used language in their call for this ordinance that would allow the Indian traders to "go freely where they want" upon entering the Dutch town. Later the Council stated that incoming traders "whether they be Christians or their Indian

\textsuperscript{23} Gehring, \emph{Council Minutes 1655-56}, 91.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 58.
brokers, ...to let them go where they see fit.” This attitude towards the Indians in the Dutch settlements stands in contrast to Indians working to control European movements within Indian lands. Although it appears that captives were actually given quite a bit of freedom to move about the Mohawk villages when they were not bound, Europeans did not travel to or between Indian villages without guides, and as shown above, without warnings.26 With this the Indians, particularly members of the Iroquois nation, were quite successful at protecting their settlements from uninvited interlopers. Captives were given more freedom because many were to be adopted into the Indian community so were not seen as a threat the way uninvited Europeans were. Such freedom of movement for Indians within Dutch town limits would soon be changed in the face of events of 1655 and will be discussed in the next chapter.

By the end of July in 1655, the New Amsterdam Council was pleased to learn of Fort Orange’s ordinance against the Dutch traveling into the woods to intercept Indian traders. Donna Merwick discussed this topic in detail in Possessing Albany while paying particular attention to activities in the year 1660.27 At this point, the community of Beverwyck that surrounded Fort Orange had its own court. It was during the trading season of that year that the Beverwyck court took on the question whether the fur trade should be conducted solely within the confines of the fort and thereby be more easily regulated by the WIC. According to Merwick, “Townsmen were being asked what they wished to make of the marginal, and always dangerous, area just outside the palisade. They were being asked whether they wished to diminish the role of the town by moving

26 Many captives would eventually be adopted into the Iroquois communities, so were not necessarily considered to be or treated as captives.

vital action outside its walls.\textsuperscript{28} But would moving vital trade activity outside of the walls actually diminish the town? The land outside the walls was often dangerous, but moving further outside of the walls would also help lead to the Europeans extending their limited influence beyond the town walls. Moving outside the walls would extend their Christian influence into the "wilderness." After much debate between townsmen who wished to maintain the tradition and the order that came with trade being restricted to the fort and those who wished to branch into the woods and away from the prying eyes of the WIC, Fort Orange representatives of the WIC, decided that trade would remain confined to the town. However, a new provision allowed for individuals to beckon Indians from "on the hill" as they approached the town with their furs. Such a compromise allowed the Dutch traders to extend their trade practices from a safe distance.\textsuperscript{29}

However, the compromise of calling Indians from "on the hill" exemplifies WIC officials' unwillingness or inability to extend their authority into what they perceived as a wilderness. They continued to perceive the woods as a place outside of the realm of Christian civility and law. By compromising and allowing the Indians to travel freely where they pleased within the town, the WIC officials in Fort Orange created conditions where the Indians who came into Fort Orange and the Dutch residents of the town could create new cultural landscapes within the walls of Fort Orange. Furthermore, once legal proceedings began to prosecute Dutch traders who continued to venture into the woods, it opened the door for Indians, and the information they could provide, to enter the Dutch court system. From that point, a new diplomatic landscape was being forged.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 89.

\textsuperscript{29} There will be more on this subject in chapter 3.
Dutch Control of Water

Whereas the Dutch had little control or even knowledge of the land outside of their settlements, their authority increased somewhat when the topic of control and knowledge turned to the water. Seventeenth-century Dutch maps depicted very little detail of landscape features, although the van der Donck map covers a very large area. What was emphasized, however, were the waterways and coastlines. These are shown in great detail although the accuracy of the watercourses decreases the further into the interior they are located.\(^{30}\) In 1660, a cartographer made a copy of a map originally created circa 1630. This map covered an even larger area of land than the van der Donck map, including the St. Lawrence River south to the James River, and it emphasized the rivers to an even greater extent than van der Donck. Particular emphasis was given to the rivers that New Netherland then, or at one time, claimed, including the Connecticut, Hudson, Delaware and the Susquehanna Rivers, the latter of which was especially highlighted. This was done possibly to fill in knowledge of land the Dutch claimed but neither had control of nor knew well. Finally another 1660 copy of a circa 1630 map depicted nothing but the Hudson River with detailed notations of river depth soundings.\(^{31}\) These maps illustrated the tentative hold the Dutch maintained on the lands of New Netherland, while at the same time displayed Dutch knowledge and control over the waterways connecting their forts. As long as the Dutch could control the rivers with the use of forts, they were able to lay claim over the surrounding lands. Of course, Fort

---

\(^{30}\) For example, the map shows the Esopus Creek connecting the Delaware and Hudson Rivers.

\(^{31}\) New-York Historical Society Map Collection. Other maps included illustrations of depth soundings in the Long Island Sound, also claimed by New Netherland.
Orange, in its unique interior position, played the key role of allowing the Dutch to lay claim to the valuable, fur bearing lands of the Mohawk River Valley to the Great Lakes.

Knowledge of the Hudson River was crucial because it served as the only true connection between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, since the European settlers had neither the knowledge nor ability to travel overland. Even Fr. Jogues had to make his escape to a ship where he was hidden for several days from his Mohawk captors. In fact when he left the ship, members of the crew told him his safety would no longer be guaranteed when he went back to land. Dutch traders knew that their advantage over Indians, especially in the contested region around Fort Orange, was greater on the water. Jogues could not be hidden on land, even within Fort Orange, due to the Mohawks’ greater access to that area, and the Dutch authorities’ inability to control Indian movements, even within the Dutch town. When Jogues left the ship, the crew no longer felt a responsibility for him and left without him. For his final escape Jogues returned to a different ship and sailed down the river to safety in New Amsterdam. Because goods, as well as Dutch people and Dutch information all traveled via water, it was important for the WIC to regulate peoples’ movements there as well. Early ordinances restricting travel on water included a 1647 order that no one could leave the colony on a ship or bark without a pass from the Director General and Council. Because that was really the only feasible way of traveling through or out of the colony, such a provision was designed to control almost all European movement in New Netherland.


Water travel also provided the opportunity for smuggling, which Stuyvesant and the Council worked to curb. All ships had to load, unload or be inspected in New Amsterdam prior to continuing their journeys, whether up to Fort Orange or out to the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{34} Of course, the continual reissue of such ordinances through the 1650s and a 1654 directive for all residents of New Netherland to be on the look out for and report all activities of smuggling and piracy suggests that although the Dutch traveled with more ease and had a stronger knowledge of waterways, they still had a difficult time enforcing their will.\textsuperscript{35}

One of the most important issues affected by water travel was communication. Once the upper reaches of the Hudson around Fort Orange froze over, communications between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam were totally dependent on Indian messengers. The Dutch found the dependability of this form of communication to be less than ideal because once the messenger left the settlements, European official had little control of what course or how long the messenger took to get to his destination. And although the Dutch may have been able to chastise the Indian couriers, not much occurred beyond that.

Dutch inability to control the Indian messengers was a reflection on their dependence on the service that the couriers provided. It was necessary for the Dutch to communicate between their settlements and across the lands that they held little control over. Because they had such little knowledge of the lands outside of their settlements and were unable to travel over those lands effectively, the Indian messengers were a crucial communication tool within New Netherland. Dutch dependence on these Indian couriers

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 6, 10, 11.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 39, 86, 87.
placed the couriers in control of the flow of information that had to go overland. In turn, the Dutch had to make policies and decisions based on the information received via the couriers. Because of this, the Indians who served as messengers for the Dutch had significant sway over what information was disseminated through the colony, and how quickly. This relates back to the importance of “Indian intelligence” and rumor in Dutch decision making. Much of the time the Dutch could not differentiate between rumor and true intelligence. That inability to tell truth from rumor and Dutch inability to take responsibility for their own communication of information made it easier for rumor to be taken as truth and forced the Dutch to compromise their positions, whether it was abandoning land or proposing an alliance with England due to rumors of war. In this manner, Indian information, whether truth or not, influenced the continual creation of new cultural landscapes. This would be particularly significant when the Mohawks and their information and testimony made its way into the court at Fort Orange.

**Post-Peach War Provisions**

While the WIC tried to control the lands outside of their settlements by controlling peoples’ access to those lands, they also experienced what they viewed as the evils of the wilderness invading their settlements. 1655 proved to be a pivotal year for New Netherland and how its officials approached both Indian and European movements on the land. As rumors of an Indian attack on the Dutch on Long Island and Manhattan circulated through the colony, residents, especially in outlying regions, became concerned for their own safety. During the actual war in September 1655, many residents living along the Hudson River but outside of the fortified communities of New Amsterdam and Fort Orange abandoned their lands. The settlers of the Esopus
abandoned the region for fear of attack by Indians such as the Wappingers and Esopus. Both tribes lived in the area, and both participated in the attack on Manhattan Island. However, abandoning the lands of the Esopus area was not looked upon favorably by the WIC officials since such action left yet another area vulnerable to continued English incursion into the lands between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam.

Fearing further loss and increased English expansion into the colony, Stuyvesant ordered the removal of leading Englishmen from Westchester to eliminate them as a threat to the heart of New Netherland's trade route along the Hudson River. At the same time he ordered stringent restrictions on Dutch colonists' movements outside of the settlements to keep them from being taken captive by Indians and held for ransom that the Dutch could not afford to pay.

Stuyvesant came up with ideas not only on how to prevent future attacks by both Indians and English, but also with ideas on why the Peach War came about, which again reflected the spiritual dilemma of a colony in the "wilderness." The Director-General proclaimed that it was,

*evident that general sins are the cause of general punishments. Therefore, in my opinion, that common and public sins such as drunkenness, profanation of the Lord's name and Sabbath, the public and common cursing even by children along the streets, the gatherings of sectarians and other disorderly groups, be countered and promptly prosecuted by the renewal of good regulations and laws.*

To Stuyvesant, as a committed Calvinist, it was obvious that a general lack of piety allowed for the evil that resided outside the town walls in the woods to invade the

---


37 Ibid., 69.

sanctity of a Christian settlement. As Megapolensis cast doubt on the Christian
commitment of the residents of Fort Orange in the 1640s, Stuyvesant saw that same lack
of commitment as the leading cause of New Netherland’s struggle to survive and prosper.
To Stuyvesant, something obviously had to be done to rectify this situation. The
Christians had to be watched more closely and regulated more sufficiently. With new
regulations and establishing a public school to keep the youngsters of the streets, it was
hoped that New Netherland could avoid such divine punishments in the future.

Changes in how people moved on the land outside of the Dutch settlements came
quickly after the Peach War hostilities ended. In October 1655, the Council became
increasingly wary “that in these dangerous times some Christians do not hesitate to go
into the country in small parties or when going out in stronger force, to separate from
each other, or are not as they ought to be, on their guard, nor do they mind their guns, but
which carelessness and negligence it has already happened, more than once, that some
Christians have been taken prisoner by the Indians and others killed.” 39 In response the
council forbade anyone from going into the countryside without first obtaining consent
from the Director General and Council. Once outside of the confines of New Amsterdam
and Fort Orange, Dutch settlers were outside of the reach of what protection New
Netherland officials could offer. Unfortunately for the Director General and the Council,
individuals and small parties continued to travel outside the protective walls of the Dutch
settlements.

39 Gehring, Council Minutes. 1655-1656, 95-98. This came after a group of thirty Indians attacked and
captured a group of only six Dutch settlers traveling in the woods. The Indians demanded a ransom of
cloth, weapons and tools which the Council refused to pay because they believed it would only encourage
more captures with higher ransom demands.
The officials remained concerned as rumors of additional Indian attacks continued through October 1655. This time the Council concluded that the cause of these new rumors was the continual contact between the settlers and the Indians as well as contact between different Indian nations. In response, Stuyvesant and the Council ordered, “that no one, whatever his capacity may be with boat, canoe or any other vessel, however, it may be called, shall cross over, or in any way communicate or speak with the Indians.” They went on to order the Indians, that “in case anyone crosses over without showing the sign and token of the honorable general or goes to the Indians that they are to detain and subject to ransom such boat, canoe or persons.” The Council and Stuyvesant went so far as to order people to stay away from boats used in official communication between the Council and the Indians. The Dutch officials had witnessed the “swarming and unseemly clamor” of their fellow Dutch settlers looking for information from the Indians. Not only were these crowds unseemly, but they also alarmed the Indians and discouraged them from coming and offering what information and assistance they could. Such swarming and clamor also led to increased rumors. This also illustrated how the river served as a border, beyond which the WIC held little sway.

In November 1655, the Council also promulgated their new restrictions on Dutch settlements, especially in the outlying regions. One new tenet forbade the establishment of separate farms or plantations, and any new settlement had to consist of at least ten households. Those who refused to form concentrated settlements did so at their own risk and were to be fined an annual sum of twenty-five guilders. The WIC remained adamant that they control how Dutch colonists would convert what they saw as wilderness to a

40 Ibid., 101.
productive, Dutch landscape. The Council also called for the erection of two blockhouses. One would be built near present-day Hackensack and the other near the Wiequaskeck Indians in Vreedlandt, or Westchester, “Where the best and most suitable land lies.” The land in the vicinity of the Wiequaskeck Indians also happened to be the home of the English settlement that Stuyvesant was trying desperately to drive from New Netherland. A new blockhouse would be a convenient location to watch, not only Indians, but also untrustworthy Englishmen in the midst of New Netherland. A new blockhouse would also add to the Dutch military presence on the landscape, no matter how poorly defended that blockhouse may have been.

At this time the council refocused its energy on removing the English presence in the area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. The Council and Stuyvesant ordered the Dutch military to go to Vreedlandt to forcibly evict the English settlers, as described in the previous chapter. Their instructions included the destruction of the houses, except a handful to shelter the soldiers. When the soldiers arrived, most English settlers refused to leave and twenty-three were taken as prisoners, only to be released soon after. The settlers of the area petitioned immediately to continue to submit themselves to the government of New Netherland. This petition was eventually granted because the Dutch did not have the strength to eliminate all the English settlements within their borders. Yet, the WIC continued to work to gain control of outlying areas in order to create greater stability within the colony.

41 Ibid., 134, 186, 256. After his expulsion by the Dutch in January 1656, Pell tried to repurchase Vreedlandt/Westchester from the Indians in March 1656, although, according to Dutch understanding, the Dutch had already purchased the land from the Wiequaskeck Indians. See Documents 62, 65.
Separation between Settlements

Although the fighting in the Peach War was limited to the southern reaches of the colony and in New Amsterdam, the colony of New Netherland as a whole was being threatened. In Rensselaerswyck and Fort Orange, officials and settlers were concerned that these settlements might also be affected by the war. However, there was also the belief that due to the Dutch alliance with the Mohawks, the threat was minimal for the settlements on the northern reaches of the Hudson River. In October of 1655 Jan Baptista van Rensselaer wrote from Beverwyck to his brother Jeremias that,

up here we have made an alliance with [the Mohawks], so that I trust that with God's help we need not expect any trouble. If the war with the Indians continues, I fear that we shall suffer great distress through the destruction [of buildings] by fire and those who started this business will deserve more blame than thanks and in the end get their deserts for plunging the whole country into blood for some trifling cause.42

He then went on to discuss the business of the colony and the economic consequences of the Indian wars, such as the halt put on merchant ships sailing from New Netherland which caused several merchants, including van Rensselaer, to declare that the Council was responsible for all lost profits. He, and other merchants, would eventually be fined for their protests.

However, van Rensselaer's words indicate the fragmented nature of the Dutch North American settlements. First it is important to note that van Rensselaer was the head of his own colony, or Patroonship, of Rensselaerswyck, so his interests were often separate from that of the WIC settlements anyway. In the matter of Indian affairs, he did not consider New Amsterdam's problems with the several Algonquian groups to directly

affect his own situation, until he was forbidden to send any ships from the colony. The separation of settlements was more pronounced on the upper reaches of the Hudson River for two reasons. First, the WIC settlement of Fort Orange and Beverwyck were physically separated from the center of power at New Amsterdam by over 100 miles of Indian held land connected only by river, which was sometimes frozen. This isolation, especially in the winter, created the ever-present need of Dutch dependence on Indian messengers who were able to move over the land. Second the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, which was comprised of land surrounding Fort Orange, was separate from the WIC settlements of Fort Orange and New Amsterdam and operated under its own jurisdiction. Such conflicts surrounding the separation of the settlements would be present through the remaining existence of New Netherland. However, the idea that residents of the northern reaches of the Hudson could remain separate from Indian issues elsewhere in the colony would soon come to an end.

The best way for the Dutch WIC to counter this separation between settlements was to continue to purchase land, and more importantly to occupy that land to gain control of the area. According to Dutch practice, the clearest ways to protect the colony was to continue purchasing land that would give them what they perceived as legal rights to the territory. The WIC continued to purchase land from the Indians, as did the colony of Rensselaerswyck. These purchases allowed them to argue against English movements into the region because the Dutch authorities would hold legal title from the original occupants of the land.43

43 N-YHS Indians collection, Folder 1; N-YHS Albany Co. Land Patents lists several land transactions between the Dutch and Indians during the 1650s and up. It is difficult to trace or locate these purchases with any accuracy due to obscure and moveable reference points such as trees and rocks. Often times the transaction would be described as follows: “April 29, 1651 colony of Rensselaerswyck purchased from
Although the Dutch continued to purchase land and expand their legal claim and boundaries, they also continued to try to lessen their disadvantage by populating the colony, particularly the area between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange. Of course, this is something they had been trying to accomplish for some time with little success. However, in 1652, the Dutch established a settlement at the mouth of what was called the Great Esopus Kill, centered at present day Kingston. A new settlement between Forts Orange and Amsterdam at this time would help to increase the population of the land between these two important centers and counter the threat the English had recently presented with their rumored war with the Wappingers. Furthermore, in 1652 Fort Orange and the adjoining town of Beverwyck were established as independent communities with their own courts. The Esopus region was placed under the jurisdiction of the court of Fort Orange. With the Esopus settlements under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, the Fort continued to grow in power as a political center along the upper half of the Hudson River.

The Esopus settlement would be most significant because it was located between the two trade centers and would thereby help ease the isolation of Fort Orange at the same time, as it would stave off English movement into the area. The Esopus settlements would also prove to be a stumbling block to stability, however, as relations between the two Indians, Naenkipquiek and Naenemari, sole owners and proprietors of a certain parcel of land and two kills laying on the west shore of the North River." The records became a bit more detailed with greater information throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries. These early transactions do continue to give proof of the WIC’s commitment to obtaining legal title to land in order to show outright ownership. They also continue to provide evidence of Dutch lack of knowledge of the land they claimed. As Dutch and then English knowledge of and ability to control the land they claimed in the Hudson River Valley increased, so did their ability to document land they purchased from Indians. For additional information concerning Dutch land purchases from Indians see Shirley W. Dunn, *The Mohicans and Their Land 1609-1730*, Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 1994, especially chapter 8 and appendix A. Also see Charles T. Gehring, *Land Papers, 1630-1664*. New York Historical Manuscript Series. Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1980.

99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians created greater tensions within New Netherland that would finally lead to a devastating war. This war would weaken the Dutch forces in New Netherland and help contribute to England’s speedy takeover of New Netherland in 1664. Moreover, these tensions between the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians would be a key event that would help solidify Fort Orange’s (soon to be Albany) place as the center of Indian and European diplomacy on the eastern seaboard of North America.

Even as the WIC continued to expand their holdings by settling the lands between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam, more obstacles continued to present themselves. One of the largest obstacles to a stable New Netherland, as Stuyvesant saw it, was the alcohol trade. He was concerned with the many problems alcohol caused in the colony among both the Dutch colonists and the Indians.

The alcohol trade that took place in the woods was of particular concern for Stuyvesant.44 An early case from the Fort Orange court illustrated several issues concerning Dutch movements of alcohol outside of towns. In June 1653 an extraordinary session of the Fort Orange court was called to deal in part with Jacob Symansz Clomp who was accused of selling brandy to Indians in the Esopus and Catskill. Although Europeans had settled these areas, they were still quite rural and very isolated. As fledgling communities, they were placed under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange. However, their distance from their legal center made it difficult for the members of the court to hold much sway over their southern neighbors.

44Peter C. Mancall, *Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1995). Mancall discusses the built in conflict in trying to restrict sale of alcohol to Indians at the same time colonial success hinged on the sale of European commodities, such as alcohol, to Indians. Chapter 3 will discuss Stuyvesant and the WIC’s attempts to control the Indian alcohol trade within the Dutch communities.
Clomp was a bark skipper, and therefore had complete access to the main thoroughfare of the colony, the Hudson River. His ease of access to the Hudson River combined with the weakness of Dutch authority over the lands where he sold the alcohol, probably led Clomp to believe the risk of being caught was minimal. But the WIC’s desire to control illegal river trafficking and alcohol distribution to Indians led to Clomp being brought to trial. Clomp eventually confessed to selling the alcohol after Jan Dirrixsz van Bremen and Jacob Theunisz van Naerden each testified under oath to Clomp’s actions. Yet Clomp’s role as a bark skipper proved too valuable for the WIC representatives in Fort Orange to punish him to the full extent of the law. After Willem Fredrickson posted a significant bond for his release, Clomp was granted permission to take his bark back to Manhattan, as long as he filled his vessel to capacity with grain.45

The lack of enthusiasm in punishing Clomp for an offense deemed critical to maintaining the safety of the colony was then contrasted in October 1654 when Clomp’s sail and rudder were taken from him as punishment for selling hogs promised to Eldert Gerbertsz to other people.46 From Clomp’s experience, we see that the priority of WIC officials in New Amsterdam may have been in protecting against the illegal alcohol trade, but the WIC officials in Fort Orange were more interested in protecting the livelihood of its settlers. Clomp’s cases continued to reveal the continuing conflict of priorities among the WIC settlements. While Stuyvesant remained concerned over the illicit alcohol trade with Indians and the potential threat such actions could cause, leaders in Fort Orange

45 Charles T. Gehring ed. Fort Orange Court Minutes, 1632-1660 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 59. Hereafter, cited as Gehring, FOCM.

46 Ibid., 157-158.
only acted against Clomp’s illegal activity when it threatened the livelihood of a resident of Fort Orange.

Joannes Dijckman and members of the Fort Orange Court investigated accusations and suspicions of alcohol sales to Indians in the lands between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam, and again with tepid enthusiasm for actual prosecution. In December 1653, the court questioned Lourens Jansz of Beverwyck concerning Christoffel Davits’ alleged activities in selling alcohol to the Esopus Indians in the Esopus region. His testimony indicated not only that Davits sold the alcohol, but also did so against the pleadings of local sachems not to.47 In February 1654, more questioning occurred surrounding Christoffel Davits’ participation in the alcohol trade. In the interrogation of Marcelis Jansz van Bommel, the court received testimony that “trouble among the Christians and Indians had resulted” from Davits’ alcohol trade.48

In May of 1654, the authorities in Fort Orange opted to post notices restricting river travel in hopes of curtailing the alcohol trade in the more remote areas of the colony, such as Catskill and Esopus. The notices declared that no one from the jurisdiction “Shall be allowed to sail hither from here in any rowboats, canoes or other vessels without having the same inspected here... and without having obtained proper consent to go thither.”49 Immediately after the new notice was read in court, Rutger Jacobsz was fined for having sold alcohol to some Indians.50

47 Ibid., 75. There are many examples of sachems from various tribes asking for the intervention of the Dutch authorities to stop Europeans from selling alcohol trade. In these exchanges the sachems were then told to instruct their people not to buy the alcohol and the Europeans would stop selling it. It became quite a Catch-22.

48 Ibid., 91. The trouble indicated had to do with the loss of property of Thomas Chambers in the Esopus. Chambers himself would create some of his own problems brought about by Indians and alcohol.

49 Ibid., 127.
It was another two years until the next case surrounding selling alcohol to Indians took place in Fort Orange. During this two years free of alcohol-related court action the Peach War took place, which may have renewed interest in preventing hostilities between Dutch colonists and Indians due to the alcohol trade. In 1656 Willem Hoffmeyer confessed to “once with two half barrels in a canoe and afterwards with five half barrels of good small beer mixed together, sailed up the river and sold and peddled beer among Indians (notwithstanding the strict prohibition of the director-general and council).” Hoffmeyer was indeed punished for his acts, and interrogation concerning the selling of alcohol to Indians along the river and outside of the towns continued in the Fort Orange court, but with little being done in the way of punishment for such acts. While the interest to bring a stop to the alcohol trade may have grown out of the events of 1655, the ability of the WIC officials in Fort Orange, or in New Amsterdam, to enforce their regulations outside of their communities remained weak.

Selling alcohol to Indians was a large source of contention between the settlers in Esopus and those in Fort Orange. The former were often accusing the latter of providing

50 Ibid., 128.
51 Ibid., 253. N-YHS Beekman Letter Book contains a correspondence between Beekman and Stuyvesant that illustrates the problem of alcohol was present throughout the colony. Beekman complained of the actions of John Becker who, in 1659 and 1660, sold alcohol to both Dutch soldiers on the Delaware and Indians. Intoxicated soldiers burned an Indian canoe and Beekman was forced to generously compensate the Indians to prevent retaliations. When an Indian died as a result of his drinking, his companions, “placed the dead savage on a board, which they fastened with four crotchets and placed it opposite the door of John Becker, in the underwood, some of them said because he did drink himself dead... he must bewail the house where he purchased the liquor.” Beekman was wary of punishing Becker, however, because Becker was a very popular individual who also read the sermons on Sundays. So while Stuyvesant tried to legislate morality, the farther from the center of authority in New Amsterdam, the less leverage he had. The case of Hoffmeyer will also be discussed in chapter 3.

52 Ibid., 255, 186-187, 345-348, 387-389. Paulus Jansen was found guilty of selling alcohol to Indians in the summer of 1658, and received a sentence of six years banishment from the colony. However, he showed up again in court records less than two years later. See FOCM, 484.
the Esopus Indians with alcohol much to the danger of the Esopus settlers. They also often wrote to Director-General Stuyvesant expressing their concerns in this matter. While the Fort Orange settlers could not claim innocence in this matter, it would be the Esopus region’s Dutch residents’ actions selling and distributing alcohol that would precipitate a crisis with the Esopus Indians.

**Esopus Settlement and the First Esopus War**

When the Peach War broke out, the young settlement at the Esopus disbanded for fear that the Indian attacks may have moved northward. After the fighting ended, a certain sense of normality resumed throughout the colony, and the residents of the Esopus moved back to continue their farming. However, the Esopus settlers did not believe it necessary to adhere to the new policy set forth by the Council calling for concentrated settlements. The fighting after all did not occur in the Esopus, and therefore they continued in their practice of establishing separate farms. Such independent and defiant actions showed the continuation of the fractured nature of the colony, and the limited authority of the WIC outside of the settlements. Furthermore, though Esopus was under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, due to their physical separation from Fort Orange, the Esopus residents could not count on their neighbors to the north for protection. Although the Esopus settlers defied the Council and Stuyvesant by not farming in a concentrated settlement, the Directors of the WIC believed the area was worth defending. In September of 1657, the Directors informed Stuyvesant that he and the Council should consider erecting a blockhouse on the boundaries of the Esopus and New England. The
Directors considered this measure “not only useful, but also necessary” although there was not any money for the company to pay for it.\(^5^3\)

The Esopus region was seen as worthy of such attention for both its agricultural importance and its strategic location. The area was settled as an agricultural community, not a trading post, and since so few New Netherlanders were engaged in agriculture, it was important to protect the colony’s most promising grain producing region. In a letter to Stuyvesant in May of 1658, Thomas Chambers, one of the leading residents of the area, claimed that the land of the Esopus could feed the entire colony of New Netherland, and that “it would be a sin which could be avoided if we should have to leave such splendid country.”\(^5^4\) Lending both credence and hope to this claim was the fact that the harvest of 1657 was particularly good. Records from 1658 indicate a significant amount of agricultural goods, such as wheat, oats and peas, traveling down the North River from Esopus to New Amsterdam as well. The combination of a good harvest and the hopes of developing new agricultural lands was welcome news. Jeremias van Rensselaer explained that there was still a great need of opening farmland quickly in order to support the colony. He stated, “the burgomasters of Amsterdam have sent many people to the South River [Delaware River] and there is as yet not much farming done, as the land is still full of trees, which must first be rooted up.”\(^5^5\) This need for food throughout the entire colony coupled with Chambers’ claim of the Esopus region’s ability to feed the

---

\(^5^3\) Femow, *DRCHNY* 13: 73.

\(^5^4\) Ibid., Ibid., 77-78.

\(^5^5\) Van Laer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 64.
colony supported the WIC's desire to protect the region in 1657 by erecting a blockhouse.

Furthermore, the Dutch settlement in the Esopus, between New Amsterdam and Fort Orange, helped to link the principal trading centers of the colony. At the same time, the Dutch presence in the Esopus region helped to offset the ever-present threat of a new English settlement taking root along the North River. Most importantly in the eyes of many New Netherland traders and merchants, and to the WIC, the Esopus settlements did not threaten trade at Fort Orange as Schenectady would in the 1660s.56

However, there was a definite competitiveness between the people of Fort Orange and the settlers of Esopus. The latter tried, with little success, to make sure that they received proper attention and resources and were not overlooked in favor of the more populated and lucrative Fort Orange. Jacob Jansen Stoll, another leading burgher in the Esopus, inquired of Stuyvesant if the residents of Fort Orange were allowed to openly sell alcohol to the Indians. He reported that all the Dutch residents of the Esopus had seen the Esopus Indians drinking daily and the latter claimed they received the alcohol from Fort Orange. Stoll concluded his letter warning, "no good can come from it, but it must tend to the ruin of the whole country."57 It was three weeks later when Thomas Chambers wrote his letter to Stuyvesant in which he claimed that the Esopus was capable of feeding the entire colony of New Netherland. In this letter he included his concern that the whole area would be lost due to problems with the Indians caused by alcohol.


57 Femow, DRCHNY 13: 77. Stoll's personal experience in Fort Orange will be explained in the next chapter. By 1658 he had developed a less than favorable record with the court at Fort Orange.
Chambers reported that intoxicated Indians fired at and killed Harmen Jacopsen and also set fire to the house of Jacop Andrijansen.

As residents of the Esopus and of Fort Orange continued to accuse each other of supplying potentially hostile Indians with alcohol, they continued to add to the fractured nature of the colony. Although the Esopus was under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, its residents continued to appeal to New Amsterdam for assistance, while accusing residents of Fort Orange of trying to undermine the success of the new settlement. Also, while Dutch colonists of the Esopus continued to form tense to hostile relations with the neighboring Esopus Indians, the Dutch colonists at Fort Orange, together with the neighboring Mohawks and the Mahicans, were forming a new cultural landscape within the walls of Fort Orange and its court. As problems between the Dutch settlers of the Esopus and the Esopus Indians escalated, the Mohawks were able to take advantage of the situation to increase their own influence on the new cultural and developing diplomatic landscape of Fort Orange.

**Problems with Indians**

The importance of the fledgling community along the Hudson River was again made evident in the spring of 1658 when the Esopus Indians murdered a Dutch settler and, as van Rensselaer put it, “greatly annoy[ed] the farmers there.” On May 18, 1658 Thomas Chambers again wrote to Stuyvesant, this time to inform him of the settlers’ precarious situation, which again involved alcohol sold to Indians. The European settlers were unable to compel the Esopus Indians to turn over the individual who murdered Andrijansen. Chambers explained to Stuyvesant that the Indians, “use great violence everyday which we are not capable to relate to your honors and derisively say, that if they
kill a Christian or more, they can pay for it in wampum and we have so far been obliged
to carry out their wishes.”

He continued his plea for help by reminding Stuyvesant and the Council that in “this fine country...there are 990 scheppels of seed-grain in the ground.” Chambers’ less than subtle reminder concerning the agricultural importance of the Esopus reinforced the idea that agricultural production would help to stabilize the colony as a whole, at the same time the alcohol trade threatened to rip it apart.

Not only did Chambers appeal to the evident threat to the Esopus’ agricultural production, but he also argued that the community deserved assistance on religious grounds. He pleaded that, “between 60 and 70 Christian people live here and attend divine service on all the proper days and that we maintain our reader at our own expense; therefore we believe, that your honors would regret sincerely, if so many innocent souls should be so wretchedly murdered and driven away by the cruel barbarians.”

Chambers pointed out that the community was not guilty of the general sins that supposedly led to the Peach War. Furthermore, although they had no church building they were, according to Chambers, maintaining their piety thereby making them deserving of the protection of both God and the WIC. Chambers and his fellow Esopus settlers were, according to his understanding, moving out as Christians into the wilderness in order to wrest the land from the control of the devilish Indians and into the control of worthy Christian souls. In Chambers’ letter for help it is evident that the Esopus Indians had the upper hand in their relations with the sixty to seventy Dutch settlers in this important area. Director-General

58 Ibid., 78-79.

59 Ibid., 78.
Stuyvesant agreed that this threat in the Esopus was well worth his time and attention and quickly traveled to the settlement there accompanied by approximately seventy soldiers.

Residents north of the Esopus also took note of the development of events down river. Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote home to the Netherlands on June 3, 1658 that,

As to the condition of the country it is so so, for the Indians in the Esopus have set fire to a house and shot dead a Dutchman and they greatly annoy the farmers there, so that the General has gone there with 70 soldiers. How it will end time will show. If war is started there, our colony will hardly remain exempt, for the places are but 13 or 14 Dutch miles apart. The best reason I have for hoping that it will not happen is that it is another nation of Indians than those who dwell among us. Otherwise, everything in the colony is flourishing and the good Lord grant that it may long continue.60

His response illustrates the importance of the Esopus region to the overall safety of the Dutch along the Hudson River Valley. The colony remained under constant threat of English incursion and hostilities with Indians in places besides Esopus. Yet, Stuyvesant believed that the location of Esopus between Fort Orange and Manhattan Island, along with its function as an agricultural community, was important to the survival of the colony. The settlement linked the two New Netherland settlements and presented the potential to provide the colony with significant agricultural products. These two advantages of the community gave Stuyvesant the incentive to protect the region with the few soldiers available to him. Van Rensselaer’s response also provides evidence that the residents of Rensselaerswyck believed themselves to be removed from the events in Esopus, just as they had with the Peach War, as most of their dealings remained with the Mohawks and the Mahicans, who were not allied with the Esopus.61 Of course van

---

60 Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 98-100.

61 Femow, DRCHNY 13: 42. Describes a renewal of peaceful relations and cooperation between the Mohawks and the Dutch in 1657.
Rensselaer's response can be justified as Rensselaerswyck and Esopus had no official relations. However, there remained tensions between residents of Fort Orange and Esopus, although the latter was under legal jurisdiction of the former.

In the late 1650s, the Esopus Indians were in quite a unique situation compared to most of the other smaller tribes located along the Hudson. They had participated in the Peach War three years earlier, but were not included in the subsequent peace treaties. Indian groups south of the Esopus and in the vicinity of more densely populated New Amsterdam, such as the Hackensacks and Tappan Indians, along with the Long Island tribes, agreed to peace terms with the Dutch. The areas around New Amsterdam were never seriously threatened by major Indian attack afterwards. The Esopus Indians, however, were located further up river and the Dutch were not able to maintain any type of dominance over them as Thomas Chambers' letter, mentioned above, illustrated. The Esopus Indians were also not under the control of any other Indian group, thereby allowing them to stand as an independent force in the region. Furthermore, though southern Indians were no longer in a position to render aid to the Esopus, the Dutch kept a watchful eye. They remained aware of both old Indian alliances and Indian independent power, and to counter these threats, the Dutch required the southern Indians to declare their neutrality on several occasions during what came to be known as the Esopus War.

Prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, Stuyvesant, as previously mentioned, traveled to the region in hopes of avoiding another conflict so close on the heels of both the Peach War and the war with New Sweden. His troops were spread throughout the colony and the Dutch were in no position to engage in a new fight with
the Esopus Indians. When Stuyvesant arrived in the Esopus he informed the settlers that
the only way he would help them militarily would be if they settled in a compact
settlement to avoid attack.\(^{62}\) Of course, this was something he had required of them three
years earlier. Stuyvesant noted how the English had been forming such settlements and
they had been thriving. The settlers reluctantly agreed, and then Stuyvesant and the
Esopus settlers met with the Esopus Indians at the home of Jacob Jansen Stoll whose
house was located closest to the Indian settlements. Stoll's home held significance in the
Esopus community. Not only did he live closest to the Indian settlements, but his home
was also used for church services, thereby bringing the Dutch Calvinist tradition right to
the edge of the forest, or as many of the Dutch would have perceived it, the edge of the
wilderness.\(^{63}\) Such a meeting would have definitely created a new cultural landscape as
Dutch and Esopus Indians both contributed their understanding of the meetings' significance and could have forged a new space for negotiations between the two cultures.

However the meeting did not take place in a timely enough manner to please
Stuyvesant. The Esopus sachems failed to show for several days and often practiced
stalling tactics. They would return to the woods to confer about topics and not return
when they had agreed to. Often only one sachem would return and state that he could not
make decisions without the others' consent. The Esopus utilized the woods beyond the
Dutch settlement in order to retain control of the process of dealing with the Dutch, and

---

\(^{62}\) Prior to actually landing, Stuyvesant utilized his boat as his point of operations. He felt more secure of his position on the water than on the land, even though there were no actual hostilities at this time. When they did leave the ships, Stuyvesant and his men stayed at the farm closest to the water.

\(^{63}\) Fernow, *DRCHNY* 13: 82-87.
the Dutch were unable to alter the approach. The Esopus had access to the Dutch settlements during negotiations, but the Dutch were unwilling to venture into the woods in order to speak with the Esopus Indians. The Dutch position of power remained in their settlement, as close to the water as possible. Once they ventured into the woods, Stuyvesant and the soldiers would become much weaker and much more vulnerable.

When the Esopus were present and Stuyvesant had his chance to speak, the account indicates that Stuyvesant first attempted to get the Indians to turn over the murderer of the Dutch settler, which he failed to do because the Esopus sachems claimed the individual had fled their jurisdiction. Even if the murderer was still within the Esopus settlements, the Dutch were unable to travel into the woods to claim him. Stuyvesant, out of possible frustration, then challenged the Esopus in attendance by boasting, “that if any of the young men present had a great desire to fight, they might come forward now.”\(^6^4\) No one met his challenge at the time, although it appears that there were not many young men at the meeting as most were out hunting and did not return for some time. However, upon the return of the younger Esopus Indians, many were ready to meet Stuyvesant’s challenge and the group was reported to be about 500 warriors strong.\(^6^5\) These young men represented what was known as the Bareback faction of the Esopus Indians who were opposed to acquiescing to any Dutch demand or desire. However, all parties managed to avoid open conflict at this time.

---

\(^6^4\) Ibid., 80-86.

\(^6^5\) The validity of this statement of 500 Esopus warriors should be questioned. If they did indeed show with 500 warriors, it is most likely many were in fact not from the Esopus nation, but possibly disgruntled allies from the Peach War.
Stuyvesant continued to work to avoid a costly war, and at the same time saw for himself the value of the region to the future of the Company and the colony. As settlers reluctantly began creating a concentrated settlement, Stuyvesant himself purchased several tracts in the Esopus region. He also recruited carpenters from Fort Orange to help with both the settlement and his own buildings. Unfortunately, due to the distractions of the Indian threat and trying to build a settlement, their crops were not doing well.66 Stuyvesant returned to the Esopus in October 1658 for a meeting between himself, the Dutch settlers and the Esopus sachems Pappequaken, Preuwamackan and Nachchamat. The meeting was to bring about a temporary agreement of coexistence between the settlers and the Esopus Indians.67

This meeting was held at the home of Thomas Chambers instead of that of Jacob Jansen Stoll. Chambers’ home was located closest to the water and provided Stuyvesant quick access to his position of power, the river. It also brought the Indians further into the settlement and away from the woods, which they used so adeptly in the previous meeting to avoid making agreements with the Dutch. The location change did not seem to work to the advantage of the Dutch, however. After discussing concessions to be made by both sides, the Esopus sachems informed Stuyvesant that the other sachems Poenap and Calcop were not present and they could do nothing without their input. They informed Stuyvesant that they would go back to their villages and return with Poenap and Calcop the following day. Stuyvesant wrote that he thought the move was “to be a

67 Ibid., 88-98.
subterfuge only, to gain time either until my departure or until the arrival of other savages, yet to give them full measure, I allowed them this delay until tomorrow."^68

While Stuyvesant’s agreement may appear quite magnanimous, he did not really have much ability to detain the Indians without causing more problems. He was, however, correct and the sachems did not return as promised. Stuyvesant sent Jacob Jansen Stoll and Marten Metselaer into the woods to the Esopus village to find out what had happened. The men returned with the news that “the chiefs had made game of them and had plainly said, they had no intention of giving satisfaction as they considered what they had done of no consequence."^69 At this point, Stuyvesant opted to leave the region and ordered Ensign Dirck Smith and fifty soldiers in the community with the instructions to keep all Indians out of the settlement, except with the permission of Chambers or Stoll, to attack Indians only in defense, and to protect the settlers while they commenced their farming.

Throughout the winter and into the spring open hostilities were avoided. Stuyvesant, who was in the Esopus early in 1659, was in communication with Jeremias van Rensselaer in March and April of that year concerning acquiring matching horses to use before his carriage, thus indicating at least some semblance of normalcy in the region as well as the WIC’s renewed commitment to the region.^70 Throughout the winter, spring and summer the residents and Stuyvesant also worked to acquire a minister for the

---

^68 Ibid., 95.

^69 Ibid., 95. However, the fact that not all the sachems were present at the meeting to conclude the negotiations did make the meeting of no consequence for the Esopus.

^70 Van Rensselaer kept livestock, including horses and cattle, in the Esopus region, and the Director General wished to pick up horses from him in the Esopus region. See Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 157.
Esopus settlement, and in August of 1659 the WIC sent Domine Harmanus Bloem to the region. The WIC Directors in Holland agreed to this to combat “the bad condition of the public church service in the open country.” Although there were some signs of life as usual in the region, there were increasing signs of tension as well. First, there was growing concern of an English settlement south of the Esopus and north of New Amsterdam. Stuyvesant wrote to the Directors in Holland that the Dutch should resist by sending not only more Dutch families, but also “homeless Polish, Lithuanian, Prussian, Jutlandish or Flemish families” to counteract the English presence along the Hudson. Stuyvesant and the WIC were unable to get many Dutch families to emigrate to New Netherland because economic and living conditions in the Dutch Republic were good and few Dutch families wished to leave thriving conditions to gamble their livelihoods on an overseas colony. Therefore, Stuyvesant was forced to ask the WIC in Amsterdam to recruit families from much less prosperous areas of Europe to populate New Netherland. Second, due to continued threats from the Esopus Indians, the settlers were unable to bring in a crop for a second year, although reports from Rensselaerswyck state that its wheat crop was very good for 1659.

In late summer 1659, tensions and suspicions started rising. In August the Esopus settlers indicated that their suspicions against the Esopus Indians were raised by the fact that they heard through their informants, a Mohawk Indian, a “southern savage,” Wappinger Indians, and Highland Indians, that the Esopus Indians were preparing for

---

72 Ibid., 107.
By the end of the month, Sergeant Andries Laurensen informed Stuyvesant that the Esopus Indians had been quiet. However, he also said that Christoffel Davits was continuing to sell alcohol to the Indians, and that an Esopus Indian named Poenap, who was named earlier as a sachem, was found intoxicated near the Dutch village.

In September Laurensen wrote that he was informed by “a certain savage” that the Esopus Indians were preparing for war. Furthermore, the alcohol distributor Davits also informed Laurensen that the Esopus Sachem Calcop told him, “he should move away for the savages not only the barebacks but also the sachems had resolved to beat us.”

While Laurensen was concerned, he questioned the veracity of the information, mostly due to its source, Christoffel Davits. A few days later some Esopus Indians, including women and children as a sign of their peaceful intentions, arrived in the Dutch village. According to the report, two Mohawk sachems, along with “Sinnekins and southern Indians,” accompanied the Esopus Indians and advised, “that they should reconcile themselves again with the Christians, for which purpose they had now come.”

The Esopus Indians inquired of the Dutch why they were not out plowing, and grew wary of Dutch activities. They also indicated that the Bareback faction was still strong and also displeased with some of the restrictions placed on Esopus Indian movements in the area, particularly with farmers blocking of a path commonly used by the Esopus Indians. Even with the presence of allied Indians encouraging peace, the double threat of increased

---

73 Ibid., 104. This also illustrates the Dutch dependence on intelligence from Indians outside of towns, where the Dutch had little authority and freedom of movement, except in individual cases.

74 Ibid., 105.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., 106.
numbers of English combined with the displeasure of the Bareback Esopus made the Dutch nervous.

The tensions finally broke later that same month when Jacob Jansen Stoll led some of his neighbors into the nearby woods and fired on a group of Indians who were intoxicated on the alcohol they received as pay for working in Thomas Chambers’ fields. The Indians were, according to Stoll, disorderly and in a drunken rage. Ensign Smith wrote to Stuyvesant informing him of the events in the Esopus and also to inform Stuyvesant that he did not order the attack, but that Jacob Jansen Stoll led it. When Stoll returned to the village “abusing the ensign violently” and said “I know very well what orders [Smith] had from the Honorable General and how [Smith] sat there all in the fort for eight days.” The fault for this event seems to lie with the Dutch settlers. The fact that Thomas Chambers gave brandy to several Indians as pay after he had complained to Stuyvesant about Fort Orange residents selling alcohol to the Esopus Indians seems to indicate he was looking for a fight. Furthermore, Stoll’s quick actions to leave the fort and attack the Indians against the wishes of Stuyvesant and against the authority of Ensign Smith also indicate that his actions were offensive.

Many other residents of New Netherland did not support the Esopus settlers’ actions and believed that Stoll and Chambers had brought trouble upon themselves. Jeremias van Rensselaer ignored Stuyvesant’s requests for help for the Esopus settlers, because he believed it was the fault of the Dutchmen there. Although the Esopus

---

77 Fernow, *DRCHNY* 13: 88-90, 119; and Van Laer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 171-173. A group of Catskill Indians corroborated the story to vice-director La Montagne at Fort Orange, and placed the blame squarely with the Dutch.


79 Van Laer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 179.
region was under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, relations continued to remain fractured and Fort Orange authorities would not support their neighbors in the Esopus. At this point, it remained up to Stuyvesant to try to protect the Esopus region from New Amsterdam, and, he hoped, protect the colony from collapse. Unfortunately for Stuyvesant few individuals and communities throughout New Netherland were interested in assisting the colonists in the Esopus. He did not have the authority to force residents of New Netherland to militarily support the people of the Esopus, and his requests for volunteers was able to raise only a small group from Long Island. Stuyvesant even reported that some, “even dared to say, that they were bound only to defend their own place.”

The fractured nature of New Netherland remained quite evident as different communities continued to form their own cultural landscapes independent of one another and independent from the directives of the WIC authorities.

By the first week of October 1659, the Dutch village in the Esopus was “besieged by 500 to 600” Indians, and no one could go near the village, at least ten villagers were taken captive and at least four villagers were dead, including Jacob Jansen Stoll. Later in the month, while some Esopus Indians taunted the Dutch soldiers and settlers that they would come with 400 men to fight the Dutch, Highland Indians were informing Ensign Smith that the Esopus Indians were deliberating and needed more time. With these crossed signals, Smith found it safest to keep everyone in the village. Also, while Fort

---

80 Fernow, _DRCHNY_ 13: 123.

81 Ibid., 119. Lourensen sent the letter via an Indian messenger to Stuyvesant on October 3, but Stuyvesant did not receive it until nine days later. Stuyvesant was upset at the length of time the message took to reach him, but besides expressing anger, there was not much else he could do because of Dutch dependence on Indians for communication. The numbers of Indians remains questionable, unless they were joined by members of other tribes, which Stuyvesant suspected.
Orange and Rensselaerswyck did not send any aid themselves, they did recruit the assistance of two Mohawk sachems and a Mahican sachem to travel to the Esopus to help bring about an armistice. The Mohawks, Mahicans, and some Catskill Indians were able to negotiate an armistice between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch by the end of October.

The Dutch were powerless to end the outbreak of hostilities, which could only be brought about by the intervention of the still powerful tribes of the Mohawks and Mahicans. These tribes had been establishing relations with Fort Orange for many years at this point. As they took the lead in the diplomatic relations between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians, they, especially the Mohawks, were able to insert themselves further into areas of Dutch diplomacy with the Indians. At the same time, as will be discussed later, the Mohawks were gaining greater access to Dutch courts in Fort Orange. Through growing Mohawk influence in both areas, they were able to greatly influence the rise of Fort Orange as the new colonial center of Indian and European affairs, even though Fort Orange officials were trying to remain independent from the tensions between the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians.

The Esopus settlers and Dutch leaders in New Amsterdam, however much they may have wanted to retaliate and eliminate the Esopus Indians, were still not in a position to fight a truly offensive war and Stuyvesant continued to delay such an event until the Dutch were strong enough to fight. In November of 1659 Stuyvesant wrote to Jeremias van Rensselaer and remarked that any peace with the Esopus could hardly be lasting

---

82 Femow, *DRCNY* 13: 123.

83 Ibid., 126; and Van Laer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 186.
unless they were to leave the land and join another tribe altogether, a fate that the Esopus, especially the Bareback faction, would rather avoid. Of course such action would allow the spread of Dutch Christianity, give the Dutch productive farmland and increase the Dutch influence between the settlements at Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam. Furthermore, the distractions from the fighting would help bring about a bread shortage in the colony, which also threatened the colony.

For the remainder of 1659, Stuyvesant urged extreme caution in dealings with the Indians and gave instructions for limited contact between the Esopus Indians and the Esopus settlers. It was not until February of 1660 that Stuyvesant offered the Directors in Amsterdam a moral reasoning for military action. He stated that,

in consideration of the suffered injuries and the restoration of the almost ruined Batavian reputation (as one savage considers himself now as good as two Dutchmen) and on account of the fertility of the lands (directly ready for the plough without ridding of trees or brushes and settled with two or three villages each of 20-24 families, which according to the convenience of the place are able and capable each to produce every year as much grain as all the Dutch and English villages of New Netherland together are as yet able to produce) that it is necessary to make war on the Esopus Indians.

Throughout 1659, Stuyvesant remained focused on the Esopus region although he still recognized that the Dutch were not strong enough to fight a full-scale war with the Esopus Indians without leaving the southern settlements open to attack from Maryland and their northern settlements vulnerable to New England. He also knew that at that
point, both the bad winter weather and the lack of bread kept the Dutch from waging war, while they were sure the Esopus Indians were preparing for war themselves.88

Stuyvesant knew that without stabilizing the interior of the colony, New Netherland could be split in two. The Dutch could not afford to ignore such a fate and needed to establish an agricultural presence and to prevent the total isolation of Fort Orange. Stuyvesant and the Council, recalling the Peach War, decided that a new war was necessary, but opted to wait until the fall of 1660 to carry out their offensive war in the Esopus, the protection of which was deemed necessary for the survival of the colony.89 In the meantime, Stuyvesant proclaimed March 24, 1660 as a day of fasting and prayer to prepare for the military action. He explained that,

> with rumors of war and its immediate consequences, murder and arson by the savage barbarous natives committed here as well as principally on our friends, countrymen and fellow-inhabitants of the Esopus, which though the righteous but not less merciful God has mitigated and so directed that it did not happen, against our expectation, in the worst manner and according to the evil intentions of the barbarians and has made it cease for the present desiring doubtless our penitence and turning away from our crying and God irritating sins, as the abominable desecration of His Sabbath and his name.90

As Stuyvesant saw it, while the residents apparently forgot the lessons taught to them through their sufferings in the Peach War, God was giving them a reprieve to turn away

---

88 Femow, *DRCH NY* 13: 130, 132. All sharing of information during the winter of 1659-1660 was based on both Indian sources and Indian messengers, primarily Mohawks although Catskills were also mentioned, as well. The use of Mohawk information and messengers illustrated further the Dutch dependence on the Indians for their correspondence in the winter especially. Furthermore, the Dutch trusted, although possibly not fully, Mohawk messengers not to give false information or provide the Esopus with information against the Dutch. In January 1660, Ensign Smith was unable to get any information out of the Esopus because no Indian would agree to carry the message due to the weather.

89 Ibid., 135, 137-138, 142; and Van Laer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 179-180. With such a small population, Stuyvesant was faced with the problem of raising enough troops to fight such a war. In response he requested that several slaves be sent from Curacao to assist in the fight against the Esopus.

from their continued evil and God irritating ways. In this light, the Esopus War was seen as a continuation of the Peach War, brought about by the sins of the community.

Not only did Stuyvesant call for a day of prayer to avoid God’s punishment for the sins of the colony, as they had been punished in 1655, Stuyvesant also worked to maintain the peace made with Indians after the Peach War. In his negotiations with the Indians who signed a peace with the Dutch in 1655, Stuyvesant was making sure that they did not try to assist their former allies, the Esopus Indians, who fought with them during the Peach War, but who never participated in the peace negotiations. On March 6, 1660, Stuyvesant and sachems from the Hackensack, Nyack, Tappan and Long Island tribes met at Fort Amsterdam to renew their peace from the Peach War. One of their first orders of business was for the southern Indians to pledge to have nothing to do with the Esopus Indians.91

Another concern the Dutch voiced to the Indians was their desire to end wars for the purpose of avenging murders and to cooperate in bringing murderers to justice. This, as mentioned above, was one of the events that led to hostilities between the Esopus Indians and the settlers and threatened other areas in New Netherland as well. A week after this meeting, the non-Bareback faction of Esopus Indians requested a meeting with Stuyvesant at Fort Amsterdam through Coetheas, chief of the Wappinger Indians, to discuss a permanent peace.92 The Bareback faction of the Esopus were the young warriors who were always willing to meet a challenge from the Dutch. However, the non-Barebacks, at this point, did not see an advantage to continuing the hostilities and

---

91 Ibid., 147.
92 Ibid., 150.
wished it to come to an end. Since the Wappingers already had a treaty with the Dutch, the Esopus were able to utilize the Wappingers as mediators between themselves and the Dutch in New Amsterdam.

Unfortunately, before a peace could be brought about, hostilities once again broke out in the Esopus and the armistice was broken. Furthermore, Stuyvesant did not want to establish a peace with the Esopus Indians unless it included both the Bareback and non-Bareback factions of the tribe. Otherwise, he would not trust that a peace could be maintained and that the Esopus would vacate the lands that Stuyvesant wished to acquire.

In March 1660, Ensign Smith went out into the countryside on an expedition to locate the Esopus Indians, and about three miles inland from the river came across a camp with about sixty Indians who fled upon seeing the Ensign and his men. The Dutch force killed at least three Indians and captured twelve, the rest were able to flee to the security of the woods.  

With this event Stuyvesant and the Council declared war “after having suffered many massacres, affronts and unbearable injuries from time to time by the Esopus Indians.”

Apparently God could not stay his wrath any longer, and the colony was again placed under alert.

In an attempt to bring about an end to the fighting, it was once again the Mohawks and Mahicans from the Fort Orange area who traveled to the Esopus and dealt directly with the Indians there. However, this was the extent of Fort Orange’s

---

93 Ibid., 151, 152. Furthermore, the river was opened enough at this point to allow Smith to utilize Dutch water travel to inform Stuyvesant, instead of having to depend on an Indian messenger.

94 Ibid., 152. The Dutch actually experienced much difficulty trying to execute the war due to bad spring weather and due to their lack of knowledge of the inland area. They had to cut off pursuit of Esopus Indians because they were unable to cross streams and travel through the woods. They did, however, manage to keep the Esopus Indians from being able to remain in one spot very long. Fernow, DRCHNY 13: 170.
involvement in the war and peace proceedings. Although the Esopus was actually under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange, all negotiations occurred either in the Esopus itself or in Fort Amsterdam. As stated above, in many ways Stuyvesant saw this conflict as an extension of the Peach War. The Esopus Indians had fought in that war, but never participated in the negotiations to end it. Stuyvesant also feared that old alliances would be rekindled and those tribes who had agreed to terms with the Dutch would join the Esopus. Therefore, Stuyvesant took charge of the negotiations and it was Fort Amsterdam that served as the location of the negotiations. Stuyvesant would not travel to the Esopus to treat with the Esopus Indians, especially after his earlier experiences there.

In May 1660, several Sachems of tribes who had surrendered to the Dutch at the end of the Peach War appeared at Fort Amsterdam and declared that the Wappingers, who had also not participated in the Peach War negotiations, would “not injure the Dutch to the extent of a straw.” With this meeting and others at Fort Amsterdam, the tribes of the southern Hudson River Valley pledged to either maintain their neutrality or try to bring about a peace with the Esopus. Later in May, three Mahican leaders came to Fort Amsterdam on behalf of the Esopus sachems who wished for peace. The Mahicans were told that if the Esopus Indians wanted peace, they would have to come to Fort Amsterdam, or at least Fort Orange to do so. It was clear that while Stuyvesant would accept the use of Fort Orange to conclude a peace, any negotiations would have to be in Dutch territory. He would not accept anything less than an actual appearance by the Esopus sachems in a Dutch fort. Authorities in Fort Orange, however, showed little

95 Ibid., 166, 171, 172.
inclination to become too involved in the Esopus troubles, and the negotiations continued to occur at Fort Amsterdam.\(^{96}\)

In July 1660 a peace was negotiated between the Esopus and the Dutch in Fort Amsterdam. Present at the proceedings were representatives of the Mohawks, Mahicans, Catskills, Susquehannocks, Wappingers, and Hackensacks. The Esopus sachems Calcop, Seewackemamo, Neskahewan and Paniyruways agreed to end all hostilities, give up their land and move away never to return, not to kill livestock, and "whereas the last war was caused by Drunken people, no savage shall be allowed to drink brandy or strong liquor in or near the Dutch plantation houses or settlements, but he must go with it to his land or to some distant place in the woods."\(^{97}\) The Esopus Indians were also forbidden to enter Dutch houses armed, and lastly, eleven Esopus warriors were sent to Curacao to work as slaves as an example to others. While the Dutch won this particular war and were able to dictate the terms within the confines of their own fort, the Mohawk sachems Onderishoghe and Adoghwatque admonished the Dutch for starting the war at the same time they warned the Esopus to avoid war with the Dutch.

The next chapter will further explore how the Mohawks were able to use the Dutch base of power in the forts to advance their own authority among both the Europeans and other Indians. After the peace negotiations in Fort Amsterdam, the Mohawks would concentrate their efforts at Fort Orange, thus increasing the significance of that fort in relations between Indians and Europeans. Stuyvesant and the Mohawks utilized Fort Amsterdam in this instance because of Fort Orange’s lack of interest in

\(^{96}\) See Gehring, *Correspondence, 1654-1658*, 205, 227. This will be explored more in chapter 4.

events in the Esopus, again illustrating the lack of cohesion among the WIC settlements along the Hudson River. Soon after this event, however, Fort Orange would be unable to avoid dealing with Esopus affairs, and furthermore, the continued admonishments of the Mohawks would leave Fort Orange authorities with little choice but to get involved in the Esopus.

The Mohawk admonishment aside, the Dutch were able to secure, at least for the moment, the strategic Esopus region and shorten the gap between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam. The Dutch settlers returned to the land and farming recommenced, much to the pleasure of Stuyvesant, the Council and the Amsterdam Directors. The community’s importance grew and they would also be granted their own court in 1661, thus releasing it from the jurisdiction of Fort Orange. However, they would soon learn that their troubles were far from over.

When war would break out again in the Esopus, the region would actually serve to further separate the Dutch settlements at Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. This separation and Fort Orange’s continued isolation would increase Fort Orange’s reliance on Indian intelligence and Indian couriers. This would, in turn, provide a significant opportunity for the Mohawks, who provided the majority of the intelligence, to establish their presence in the Fort Orange court.
CHAPTER 3

STRUGGLES INSIDE TOWNS

In 1653, Dutch settlers Volkert Jansen, Willem Brouwer and Jan van Aken were brought into court at Beverwyck for violating New Netherland laws that forbade Dutch settlers from entering Indian lands to conduct trade and from inviting Indians into private homes and taverns for trade. Each man was accused both of entering Indian space and of allowing Indians into private Dutch space. They were all convicted and forced to pay a fine for violating regulations on access to particular spaces that the Dutch WIC had deemed off limits for trade. The actions of these men caused Dutch officials to declare that, "God the Lord would punish such a place." Such a declaration reflected their Calvinist sensibilities that dictated that God would not stand for the continual violations of regulations on access to particular spaces by Christians and non-Christians alike. However, the convictions and declarations of the New Netherland court did not deter others from violating regulations against entering certain spaces.

As seen in the preceding chapter, European movements outside of their established communities was highly restricted. Their limited ability to move on the lands outside of their towns was the result of their lack of knowledge of these lands. This was in direct opposition to the Indians who controlled knowledge and access to the lands outside of European settlements. Furthermore, as a result of events outside of Dutch control, such as the tensions in the Esopus region and Mohawk wars with Algonquian tribes in New England, the Mohawks would also manage to gain more knowledge and
access to the spaces within Fort Orange. The most significant space that the Mohawks would penetrate was the use of the fort, but not just for trade purposes. Through the 1650s and 1660s, the Mohawks were able to gain greater access to the fort and its use by the Dutch court. In this way, the actions of the Mohawks increased the significance of Fort Orange as a new political center for both Dutch and Indians.

Focus on the Fort

Stuyvesant’s arrival in New Netherland in 1647 was followed by the arrival of Brant van Slichtenhorst the following year. Whereas Stuyvesant was the Director-General of all of New Netherland, and was the primary representative of the WIC in North America, Slichtenhorst came as the director of the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. Soon after Slichtenhorst took up his post in Rensselaerswyck, he quickly found himself in conflict with Stuyvesant and the WIC as he began issuing building lots just north of Fort Orange to the residents of the patroonship. Slichtenhorst’s instructions as director of the patroonship no longer exist. However, his actions trying to bring order to construction along the river as well as his attempts at consolidation of the dwellings of non-farmers near the fort, was an extension of overall Dutch policy of trying to form compact and less vulnerable settlements. Stuyvesant vigorously pursued such a policy throughout the colony to increase the safety of the settlements and, in turn, increase the stability of the colony as a whole. In Slichtenhorst’s case, he already had the advantage of a fort in the midst of his patroonship, and it made sense to utilize that advantage and consolidate his settlers under his direction in the shadow of the fort.

1 Much of this information can be found in Charles Gehring’s introduction to his edited volume, Fort Orange Court Minutes 1652-1660.
However, the fort stood as the symbol of the WIC’s authority in the land, and while Stuyvesant would encourage other communities to settle close together and to build fortification for their protection, he did not view Slichtenhorst’s activities as beneficial to the WIC. In fact, Stuyvesant saw Slichtenhorst as an interloper trespassing on WIC land and authority. As Charles T. Gehring observed, this event touched off a controversy lasting thirty-five years.² It also illustrated the ever-present competition and separation between Dutch settlements. In this case, the tensions were between the WIC settlement at Fort Orange and Beverwyck and the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. The competition between the two Dutch colonies would end in favor of the WIC and would continue to strengthen Fort Orange’s power in the region. In response to Slichtenhorst’s restructuring Rensselaerswyck’s settlements, Stuyvesant ordered that no structures could be built within a cannon shot of the fort, or about 3000 feet. This provision, if enforced, would allow for the growth of Fort Orange’s influence beyond its walls.

To make matters worse, Slichtenhorst further polarized Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck by refusing to assist in repairs to the fort by forbidding WIC laborers to freely quarry stone and cut wood on patroonship land. In the ensuing years as Stuyvesant’s attention was drawn to the threats coming from outside the colony, particularly from New England, Slichtenhorst continued consolidating his own hold on the land around the fort. He granted new building lots within cannon shot of the fort and actually guaranteed settlers against their losses if the WIC were to tear down their property.

² Gehring, FOCM, xxi.
Also during the time of Slichtenhorst’s tenure as director of Rensselaerswyck, there was no separate court in Fort Orange representing the rule of the WIC and all direction had to come from Fort Amsterdam. This continued to put Slichtenhorst and Stuyvesant in direct conflict with one another. Furthermore, since weather closed down river access to Fort Orange in the winter and lack of authority outside of towns and lack of ability to move effectively over land greatly limited land access between the two settlements, the colonists of Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were left to their own devices a good part of the time. When the WIC and Stuyvesant attempted to assert their authority over the land, Slichtenhorst openly resisted. He refused to allow the company to post their ordinances within Rensselaerswyck jurisdiction. He also threatened retribution against patroonship farmers who assisted in the repairs to the fort by helping to haul logs or stone.

By the time Stuyvesant had negotiated the Treaty of Hartford in 1650, thereby securing the colony’s eastern boundary, he had also received permission from the directors in Amsterdam to exert his authority over the entire colony, including the area around Fort Orange. Even so, Slichtenhorst continued to grant lots in the disputed area and continued to refuse the WIC the right to post ordinances in the patroonship. The rivalry turned violent when on New Years Eve 1651, soldiers from the fort fired burning fuses onto Slichtenhorst’s home, which was located within cannon shot and north of the fort. The house was set on fire, but the family escaped without injury. Slichtenhorst’s son Gerritt was not so lucky the next day when he ventured a bit too close to the fort and

3 Charles Gehring also explained that Slichtenhorst had little support from the owners of the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck back in the Netherlands. They were well aware that the survival of the patroonship depended on good relations with the colony, and such heavy-handed tactics by Slichtenhorst did not help their cause, or their bottom line.
was beaten by the same soldiers who fired on his family’s home. This beating was witnessed by Fort Orange commissary Johannes Dijckman, who was soon to become the first president of the Fort Orange court. Dijckman refused to interfere and actually threatened swift action with his sword against anyone who tried to intervene.

The last straw in this power struggle, which was threatening to descend into utter chaos, came in the spring with the breaking of the ice in the river, which then opened the line of communication between Fort Orange and Fort Amsterdam. Stuyvesant sent orders up river proclaiming the WIC’s authority over the land surrounding the fort and gave instructions to erect boundary markers displaying the company’s territory. Slichtenhorst refused to post the ordinance and went further by tearing down the boundary markers. In response, Dijckman arrived at Slichtenhorst’s home accompanied by eight armed soldiers. The group took down the patroons’s flag, announced the authority of the newly formed Fort Orange Court, arrested Slichtenhorst and sent him to Fort Amsterdam where he served out the remainder of his directorship under arrest. Those people who were granted lots within 3000 feet of the fort were then required to swear allegiance to the WIC thereby renouncing their allegiance and obligations to the patroonship. Moreover, this move once again established authority of the WIC along the northern reaches of the Hudson and established Fort Orange as the foremost symbol of that authority.

Once the court’s authority was established in 1652, its members quickly began working to try to impose the authority of the WIC on the settlement and its inhabitants. The opening meeting of the court on April 15, 1652, immediately took into consideration issues surrounding the land around the fort. Abraham Pietersz Vosburgh had begun
erecting a house within the 3000-foot radius of the fort and requested permission to continue to do so. The court granted their approval because they deemed the house’s location behind the once targeted home of Brant van Slichtenhorst to be far enough so it did “not greatly crowd or obstruct the fort.” The court also did not want to contribute to the financial ruin of Vosburgh by forcing him to relocate a house he had already begun to build. The court then appointed Dirrick Jansz and Vosburgh to make a survey of other lots where people had requested permission to build. It must have given Dijckman much pleasure to allow continuation of home construction begun under Slichtenhorst, then under the authority of the WIC.

The WIC continued to assert its authority over the land once dominated by Slichtenhorst. In April 1653 the court held an extraordinary session to announce that the appointed surveyors would lay out an additional eight lots of forty Rhineland feet wide on Beverwyck land, “for the accommodation of the good inhabitants here.” The court strengthened the influence of the WIC on this land by giving the first lot to Commissary Dijckman, the second to the Domine Gideon Schaets, and the third to Abraham Staets, Captain of the burgher guard, all WIC officials.

Along with taking charge of the land that Slichtenhorst tried to consolidate under the authority of the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, the WIC also commenced with repairs to the fort, another past point of contention between Slichtenhorst and the WIC.

---

4 Gehring, *FOCM*, 3.

5 The controversy over who controlled the land, the WIC or the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck would continue for years, and the van Rensselaer’s authority over their land would not be reinstated until after the English took over New Netherland and formed New York. While the van Rensselaers would not have the authority of their own colony, they were deemed rightful owners of the land.

Repairs to the fort would strengthen both the community's defenses and the WIC's physical presence on the land. The Company then had access to Rensselaerswyck's quarries, woodlands and livestock to assist in the repairs. The WIC made the community responsible for the finances of the repairs by instituting a tax on homeowners, renters and landowners.7

**Regulations on Morals and Movements**

Part of the WIC asserting control of the lands and the people on it included laws and ordinances regulating movements of individuals and their access to particular places and spaces. Furthermore, it is important to note that even after the establishment of the court at Fort Orange and Beverwyck in 1652, laws that came from the Council in Manhattan were applicable throughout the colony unless specifically designed for particular communities. However, because of Fort Orange's distance from New Amsterdam and the presence of an independent court, all laws were not enforced the same way in Fort Orange as they may have been in New Amsterdam.

With Stuyvesant's arrival in 1647, he worked very hard to centralize the WIC's authority over the people of New Netherland. In doing so, Stuyvesant and the Council established laws and ordinances that regulated business and trade, which of course was the central activity of the colony. However, they also issued laws and ordinances regulating social morality, religious observances, as well as the physical movements of, both Europeans and Indians.

According to Petrus Stuyvesant's Dutch Reformed perspective, social morality and religious observance were intricately intertwined. As was illustrated in chapter two

---

7 Ibid., 96.
how well a community adhered to the prescribed social morality and/or the religious observances was seen as directly related to events, either good or bad, that took place in the colony. Therefore, one of the first ordinances issued by Stuyvesant upon his arrival in the colony was one against “tapping and brawling during divine service.”

He opened the ordinance by preaching against the colonists’ general habit to “indulge in excessive drinking, quarreling, fighting and brawling even on the Lord’s day of rest… to the disparagement, indeed contempt of God’s divine laws and ordinances, which command us to sanctify this His Sabbath and day of rest.” While indulging in excessive drinking and fighting was bad enough, the issue was that these events were occurring contrary to God’s own laws and ordinances concerning the Sabbath, and thereby brought a greater chance of incurring God’s wrath. In order “to prevent the curse instead of the blessing of God from falling” on the colony, the ordinance forbade the tapping and serving of alcohol of any kind before two o’clock on Sundays with no sermon and four o’clock on Sundays that included a sermon on the word of God. Furthermore, all tapping and serving was to cease every day of the week at the ringing of the bell, which took place around nine o’clock at night. It was hoped that controlling alcohol consumption would lead to an increase in the community’s morals, which of course would lead to God’s blessing and prosperity, instead of God’s curse and suffering. The fact that the Council at Fort Amsterdam renewed these ordinances at least two more times.

---

8 Gehring, Laws & Writs of Appeal, 6-7.
9 Ibid., 7.
10 Ibid., 8.
times, in 1656 and 1657, illustrated that not everyone in the colony was necessarily concerned about such divine consequences.

In fact, it was not even a year later when Stuyvesant and the Council promulgated another ordinance concerning Sabbath observation. Again, it stated that, “in order to avert, as much as possible, from themselves and their subjects, God’s wrath and punishment, which is to be feared from these and other misdeeds, do hereby renew and amplify their previous proclamations and ordinances.” As part of the renewal and amplification, the ordinance called for, but did not explicitly require, attendance at both morning and afternoon prayers on Sundays. The restrictions on alcohol remained and other restrictions were added on such activities as “fishing, hunting and other avocations, crafts and trades, whether it be in houses, cellars, shops, ships, yachts or on the streets and in markets.” It appears that people made some interesting excuses as to why they failed to observe the Sabbath to Stuyvesant’s standards.

Problems arising from Sabbath day drunkards were not restricted to the southern reaches of the Hudson River. The ordinance was binding for the entire colony, and Fort Orange had its share of problems. In January 1653, Pieter Adriaensen was brought into the Fort Orange Court for having tapped after the nine o’clock bell. And while this incident did not lead to violence in the way the ordinance related the two, Adriaensen was further cited for using abusive language when he was fined. Such was another sign of moral decline related to breaking alcohol regulations.

---

11 Ibid., 18.
12 Ibid.
13 Gehring, FOCM, 39. See Peter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America. In chapter one he discusses the pervasiveness of alcohol in the early modern period, including colonial North America. Although he concentrates on the eighteenth century, he also displayed a seventeenth century map.
Violence and alcohol continued to be a problem in Fort Orange. In February of 1654 an inquiry was begun regarding the actions of Jacob Jansen Stoll from the previous summer. Stoll had apparently approached the town guards when “drunk, intoxicated, or at least quite befuddled,” he drew his sword and threatened the members of the guard, especially Adriaen Jansen van Ilpendam, who was singled out. On another drunken or befuddled occasion, Stoll also apparently approached the guardhouse with a loaded gun, which he discharged.14

Religion in New Netherland

The presence of the officially sanctioned Dutch Reformed Church and other religions in the daily life of New Netherland, including Fort Orange, was not limited to ordinances enforcing Christian morality. Four years prior to Stuyvesant’s arrival in 1647, Father Isaac Jogues spent time in New Netherland after having escaped his Mohawk captors. He wrote down his experiences in the colony in 1646 while awaiting to depart for a winter mission among the Hurons. He also wrote a description of his captivity and escape soon after his safe delivery in 1643.

Jogues’ original account of his time in Fort Orange gives very little information on the settlement. He noted that prior to his escape he met with the Dutch Governor in the colony who instructed the crew of a ship to carry the missionary to Europe once he made his escape from the Mohawks. Jogues went on to tell that once he made his escape from Maryland that depicts the town tavern next to the courthouse. See also William J. Rorabaugh, *The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) and Mark Lender and James K. Martin, *Drinking in America: A History* (New York: Collier Macmillian, 1987).

14 Gehring, *FOCM*, 88-96. Stoll was also involved in altercations when apparently sober. He fought with Lourens Jansz at the house of Hendrick Jochems. In February 1656 he was brought to court and confessed to beating and drawing blood from his wife Geertryt Andriessen, although, in this case, because it occurred in a domestic and not a public situation, the court found it could not punish Stoll.
he spent two days concealed in the hold of the ship. After those two days he traveled by
night to the Governor's home where he continued to hide from his Mohawk captors who
continued to look for him. With his limited movements in town, and in addition to the
fact that his movements actually took place at night, it is interesting that he was able to
give a description of the town at all.

However, the description he gave seems to reflect his overall experience in the
community. Jogues found two features in the community of Rensselaerswyck worth
noting. "First is a wretched little fort, named Fort Orange which the Company of the
West Indies has reserved for itself, and which it maintains."\textsuperscript{15} In 1643, at least in the case
of Jogues, the appearance of forts on maps was much more impressive than the
appearance of the forts on the land. The second feature Jogues found worth mentioning
consisted of the homes themselves. He described, "24 or 30 houses built along the River,
as each has found convenient."\textsuperscript{16} He pointed out that the houses lacked masonry, except
the chimneys, and were made of no more than boards and thatch. His impressions of the
town do seem to reflect his limited and less than pleasant stay in the settlement. He also
seems to confirm the disorganized situation that Slichtenhorst would try to change in
1648, when he would try to bring order to the patroonship and develop a concentrated
settlement. Another part of Jogues’ account noted that while "there is no exercise of
Religion except the Calvinist and orders declare that none but Calvinists be admitted;

\textsuperscript{15} Gehring, et al., \textit{In Mohawk Country}, 31.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 32.
nevertheless, that point is not observed, for besides the Calvinists, there are in this settlement Catholics, English Puritans, Lutherans, Anabaptists, etc.”\(^{17}\)

This was the same diverse population that Father Joseph Poncet found during his own stay in Fort Orange as a captive of the Mohawks in 1653. Poncet’s experience greatly differed from Jogues’ because Poncet was actually being escorted back to Three Rivers when he arrived in Fort Orange. His Mohawk escort took him there so he could get clothing for his return trip to New France. Because his situation was not that of an escaped captive, but of a man who had actually been adopted by the Mohawks and was being returned to a French settlement, he had much more freedom of movement in the town than Jogues had.

While Poncet did not receive much hospitality from Dijckman, he did receive much kindness from a variety of other residents. Dijckman, as the official representative of the WIC court in Fort Orange may have been threatened by Poncet’s presence because he was both French and Catholic and taking away resources from the Dutch colony. He was treated so poorly by the Dutch representative that Poncet’s Mohawk escort removed him from Dijckman’s home to another where the French priest received much better treatment. Poncet also encountered a young Frenchman who served as an Indian interpreter in the colony. The young man sought Poncet out to hear his confession. Poncet also received welcome from a Scots woman “who has shown herself on all occasions very charitable toward the French,” and a “Brussels Merchant, a good Catholic.”\(^{18}\) The Dutch Reformed WIC officials in New Netherland frowned upon what

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 31.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 99-100: Ecclesiastical Records 1: 315.
they saw as Catholic behavior. For example, Abraham Stevensen was fined by the court for having walked the streets of Beverwyck on Shrove Tuesday, the day before the beginning of Lent, in women’s clothes. He escaped harsher punishment because it was the first time he did it and he did not believe he was doing anything wrong.\(^\text{19}\) The practice was a holdover of pre-Lenten revelry in Europe and seen as yet another challenge to the Dutch Reformed authority of the town.

Except for the occasional pre-Lenten celebration, the Catholic presence in Fort Orange tended to remain fairly quiet and out of conflict with the Calvinist WIC officials. Lutherans, however, were a source of much more contention in the town, and the colony as a whole. Until 1653, there was very little discussion of Lutherans in the colony. Their presence was known, but like the Catholics, they generally kept their religious matters to themselves. This way they were able to blend into and contribute to the evolving cross-cultural landscape of Fort Orange. The Lutherans’ standing in the community was challenged in the years after Stuyvesant’s arrival.

In October 1653, Lutherans in New Netherland presented Stuyvesant with a request to allow them to send for a Lutheran minister and “to organize separately and publicly a congregation and church.”\(^\text{20}\) At this time the Lutheran community claimed 150 families in the colony and wanted the church to flourish in New Netherland as they said it did in the Netherlands. The writers of the petition also pledged their loyalty to the

---


WIC. The Dutch Reformed ministers Drisius and Megapolensis saw the haughty behavior of the Lutherans as leading to "the injury of our church, the diminution of hearers of the Word of God, and the increase of dissension, of which we have had sufficiency for years past. It would also pave the way for other sects, so that in time our place would become a receptacle for all sorts of heretics and fanatics." The colony was already home for other sects, whether heretical or not. It was truly the idea of a public congregation that was much more scandalous in the eyes of the ministers and Stuyvesant, than merely the idea of a separate congregation that already existed. In other words, this was yet another battle of who would control the development of the cultural identity of the colony. In this instance, although the Lutherans were Dutch, they still remained outside WIC norms to the extent that Stuyvesant tried to exclude them from the public life of the community.

When the Dutch Lutherans finally succeeded in bringing a minister to New Netherland, one Johannes Ernestus Goetwasser in 1657, he arrived without a certificate of approval from the WIC Directors and was therefore denied permission to preach. At this point the matter was a highly public religious conflict that Domine Drisius, Domine Megapolensis and Stuyvesant wanted to avoid. Even if Goetwasser preached in a private setting, it was not going to be tolerated. Therefore, the Lutherans in New Amsterdam spirited him out of Manhattan to a settlement "six or eight miles away, under the jurisdiction of the English." Truly this was seen as a double offence to not only run

---


22 Corwin, Ecclesiastical Records 1:317.

23 Ibid., 343-344; and Van Laer, Records of the Lutheran Church, 32.
from the authority of the WIC, but to run to the protection of the English who were a threat in and of themselves. Goetwasser finally departed the colony in 1659 and through this time period the Lutheran Consistory of Amsterdam continued to advocate “that if the friends would keep quiet and be moderate, the exercise of their religion would no doubt by connivance be allowed.”24 Although the Consistory continued to point out that it was the same quietness and moderation that allowed them to continue to practice their religion in the Netherlands, the New Netherland Lutherans would have none of it.

Fort Orange apparently had a larger Lutheran population than New Amsterdam, but the majority of the drama occurred in the area around Manhattan. Fort Orange’s legal actions proceeded much differently. On February 1, 1656 Tierck Claesen was brought before the court for fighting with Willem Teller on a Sunday, a definite violation of the ordinance against brawling on Sundays. Teller had been brought in the week earlier for the same offence. Yet, after Claesen was fined for fighting on the Sabbath, he was charged with, confessed to and was fined for, “having been found last Sunday in the company of Lutherans performing divine service, contrary to the ordinance issued against it.”25 In connection with this same unlawful assembly of Lutherans, Aelbert Andriesssen, also known as Aelbert de Noorman, was fined for attending the same separate Lutheran service that Tierck Claesen was fined for attending.26

Although there were supposedly seventy to eighty Lutheran families living in Fort Orange Claesen and Andriesssen were the only two who were brought in front of the court

24 Van Laer, Records of the Lutheran Church, 36
25 Gehring, FOCM, 214, 216.
26 Ibid., 220.
for partaking in illegal Lutheran liturgies. Furthermore, it seems that the only reason either man was fined was because he was brought into court for other violations, Claesen for fighting and Andriessen for a real estate case. It did not appear to be worth the effort of bringing the other Lutherans into court. From this limited action against the Fort Orange Lutherans, it appears that distance from the more vehemently anti-Lutheran voices in Manhattan helped prevent the drama and dissension that Manhattan experienced over this issue. Fort Orange continued to develop separately from New Amsterdam. Whereas the latter worked to suppress Lutherans from participating in the community's growth, the former maintained few barriers to Lutherans in the community.

Even the Dutch Reformed ministers were known to rock the boat and challenge the authority of the WIC. The Dutch Reformed Minister Gideon Schaets was appointed minister for the Patroonship of Rensselaerswyck in May of 1652. At this same time Johan van Rensselaer issued instruction for the Patroonship concerning religious activities. They generally fell in line with those of the WIC, calling for attendance of divine services and preventing labor on the Sabbath. He was also particularly concerned with preventing scandal when “Christians should mingle themselves unlawfully with the wives and daughters of Heathens” and established an ordinance against such unseemly behavior. Furthermore, van Rensselaer wanted his minister Schaets to “use all Christian zeal there to bring up both Heathen and their children in the Christian Religion.” However, there is no evidence illustrating Schaets’ Christian zeal with Indians or against Dutch who mingled unlawfully with Indian women.

Schaets did however insert himself into the controversy between Dijckman and Slichtenhorst, at least after the arrest of Slichtenhorst in 1652. This intervention served as yet another example of the tension between the different settlements in New Netherland. On January 25, 1654 Domine Gideon Schaets announced from the pulpit to his Rensselaerswyck congregation that if anyone had any charges to bring against Brant van Slichtenhorst before he was returned to the Netherlands, he or she should come forward to the court of Rensselaerswyck or forever keep his or her silence.28

No one actually came forward to the court of Rensselaerswyck, much to the relief of the van Rensselaers. However, the action created such a stir with Joannes Dijckman that he called an extraordinary session of the Fort Orange court on that same day, which was, in fact a Sunday. He apparently believed Schaet’s affront was serious enough to call court on the Sabbath. Furthermore, the court actually convened in the church itself in order to draw up a protest against Domine Schaets’ announcements. Although Schaets viewed this announcement as an inner matter of the Patroonship, as both he and Slichtenhorst were in the employ of the van Rensselaers, Dijckman saw this as an example of usurpation of WIC authority to say who could bring a complaint against Slichtenhorst and placing a time limit on such actions. Not only did Schaets challenge WIC authority, but according to Dijckman, “such means also tend to make the good inhabitants disobedient and rebellious to their lawful superiors.”29 Dijckman used this event to build up the authority of the Fort Orange court, while further reducing the

28 Gehring, FOCM, 84; and Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 19.
29 Gehring, FOCM, 86.
authority of Rensselaerswyck.\textsuperscript{30} The tensions between Schaets and the WIC officials in Fort Orange were short-lived however. In 1657, Schaets became the minister for Fort Orange, leaving the patroonship without a spiritual leader.\textsuperscript{31} This event is yet another example of the fractured nature of the Dutch settlements in North America. It also serves as an example of how Fort Orange continued to develop its own significance as a center of power within New Netherland.

**Indians Inside Towns**

Along with trying to control how other Europeans moved through and lived in towns, Dutch authorities also worked to try to control how Europeans and Indians dealt with one another, and to control Indian access to towns. While the ultimate goal in regulating the relations between Indians and Europeans was to control the Indian populations, it was often the Europeans who faced the consequences of breaking those regulations, thereby further illustrating the relative power and freedom of Indians within the Dutch communities. As discussed in chapter two, the alcohol trade with Indians proved particularly difficult to keep track of outside of towns. It was no less of a problem within towns. Excessive alcohol consumption among Europeans was feared as a moral problem. Drunkenness led to unacceptable behavior, which, according to Stuyvesant and the Council, led to God’s wrath and punishment for the offenders. Alcohol consumption among Indians was viewed as dangerous, but instead of being the cause of God’s wrath it

\textsuperscript{30} Gehring, *FOCM*, 106-107.

\textsuperscript{31} While letters between members of the van Rensselaer family indicate their commitment to upholding the Dutch Reformed Church in their Patroonship, they also illustrate that the matriarch of the family was not heartbroken with Schaets moving from their jurisdiction to that of Fort Orange. She was actually quite pleased at the money the Patroonship would save with his absence.
could instead be viewed as an instrument of it. Therefore, curtailing the alcohol trade with Indians was of vital importance to the safety of the colony.

Prohibitions on the sale of alcohol to Indians were issued as early as 1643 then again in 1645. Stuyvesant reissued an ordinance against the selling of alcohol to Indians in July 1647. The wording of the 1647 ordinance illustrated that this regulation was not one of morality, but one of safety. It noted that alcohol was sold daily to Indians, thereby causing "serious difficulties" within the colony. Furthermore, those found guilty of selling alcohol to Indians would be fined and were "to be responsible for the calamities that might arise therefrom." However, Stuyvesant was forced, less than a year later, to reissue the ordinance with the additional deterrent of "arbitrary corporal punishment, because it is better that such ill-willed people be punished than that a whole country and community should suffer through their deeds." He also warned that from the alcohol trade, "new misfortunes and wars are to be feared."

By 1654 the problem persisted to the point that the WIC took new steps. In order to catch the individuals selling alcohol to the Indians, officers of the court would arrest intoxicated Indians and keep them confined until, in a sober state, they could inform authorities of their supplier's identity. The ordinance stated further that "such confessions and declarations of theirs shall... be accepted and believed on that point, and the violators here of shall, on the declaration of the Indians, be punished according to the ordinance." Of course, in order to prevent a supposedly respected member of the community from being punished in case he or she was named, the ordinance also made it

---

32 Gehring, Laws & Writs of Appeal, 3, 9.

33 Ibid., 18-19.
clear that the accusations would be accepted, “according to the circumstances of the case and the person.” Nevertheless, Indian voices were given significant legal weight in this instance in matters involving Europeans as their words would be taken as a sworn legal statement. However, at the same time, their movements were greatly curtailed, given that they could be arrested for being drunk, although it was not illegal for Indians to consume alcohol. Moreover, New Netherland officials actually did not have much ability to stop Indians from drinking. The illicit alcohol trade outside of town walls was difficult to stop, especially when there were so many buyers and sellers willing to make deals.

Fort Orange did have its own problems with Indians and alcohol, and as noted earlier, all ordinances passed in Manhattan were applicable throughout the colony. However, Fort Orange did not appear to go so far as to try to arrest intoxicated Indians in order to learn the identity of European alcohol peddlers. The Fort Orange community was dependent on the trade of Indians who would come into town, and the act of arresting a visiting Mohawk, no matter how intoxicated, would have had repercussions with Dutch and Indian relations that outweighed the urgency of apprehending alcohol peddlers. The first time the Fort Orange court dealt with the matter of intoxicated Indians inside the town was in May 1654. This court hearing also happened to coincide with a visit to the community from Director-General Stuyvesant. The evening before Stuyvesant was scheduled to arrive, a group of intoxicated Indians was in the home of Jan van Hoesem after obtaining beer from the house of Willem Bout.

34 Ibid., 48.
35 Gehring, FOCM, 122-123.
A month after the court action concerning van Hoesem and Bout, which apparently brought with it no legal action, Jochem Becker was brought before the court to testify against Elmerheysen Kleyn and Gerritt van Slichtenhorst concerning the latter two selling brandy to Indians in their house. Becker testified that not only did he see intoxicated Indians emerge from the house, but that he witnessed Kleyn and Slichtenhorst giving “a sound thrashing” to a Mahican named Pimp, who had been drinking brandy sold by the two Dutchmen. Like with Bout and van Hoesem, there was no record of action taken against Kleyn and Slichtenhorst, but one cannot help but wonder if Commissary Dijckman’s actions were personal and an extension of allowing Gerritt van Slichtenhorst to be beaten by WIC soldiers on New Years Day 1652.

The next court action against anyone for selling alcohol to Indians in Fort Orange came over two years later in October 1656. Again, this legal action coincided with a visit by Director-General Stuyvesant, who was present at the session, and had the memories of the Peach War from the preceding year still with him. In this court proceeding Willem Hofmeyer was caught selling alcohol to Indians and admitting intoxicated Indians into his residence. In this case as in the two noted above, although the court was trying to restrict the presence of intoxicated Indians in town, it was not the Indians who were prosecuted, but the Europeans who provided them with alcohol or with shelter. Furthermore, in the first 1654 case, the violation occurred the day before a visit from Stuyvesant, but he was not present for the interrogation. The fact that there appeared to be no punishment for the accused seems to indicate a lack of dedication in dealing with this issue by the Fort

36 Ibid., 141.
37 Ibid., 144.
Orange magistrates. However, when Stuyvesant was present at the court hearing, the transgressor was not only found guilty, and charged a fine, but was declared banished from the country for three years.\(^{38}\)

On the same day Hofmeyer was brought into court, Dirckie Hermense and Egbertjen Egberts, female innkeepers in Beverwyck, both admitted to selling Indians beer in their establishments. In both instances the women avoided banishment and corporal punishment. Each was fined, less than Hofmeyer was, and placed under civil detention. The women were established members of the Beverwyck community and may have received less punishment than Hofmeyer for that reason. Furthermore, Hofmeyer had been in front of the court before for selling alcohol out of his boat, making him a more significant threat, especially since he, unlike the tavern keepers, traveled outside of the borders of the towns, and therefore, outside of WIC authority.

Throughout the rest of the 1650s, Dutch authorities in Fort Orange continued to bring legal action against Europeans for violating laws concerning the prohibition of alcohol for Indians, but with limited zeal. The lack of enthusiasm in prosecuting alcohol peddlers continued to illustrate the separation between the WIC settlements of Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. The laws and ordinances came from the High Council in New Amsterdam, who were motivated to prevent another attack such as the Peach War and believed that halting the flow of alcohol to the Indians was one way of doing that. However, authorities in Fort Orange, who had not experienced such Indian troubles, were less concerned with stopping a lucrative trade.

\(^{38}\) Gehring, *FOCM*, 253.
In January 1658, Jan Teunissen, Jan Anderiessen and Pieter Jacobsen Bosboom were all charged at Fort Orange with selling alcohol to Indians; all denied the charges and demanded proof against them. Proof was provided four days later and presented in an extraordinary session of court. The proof came in the form of “three irreproachable” but unnamed witnesses. Three days later the three men were found guilty, ordered to pay a fine and declared banished for three years. Furthermore, in the 1658 cases, there was the inclusion of Indian testimony against a Dutchman, although there was no indication that this Indian was ever arrested and held for his testimony. It was a 1654 ordinance, mentioned earlier, that allowed the use of Indian testimony against sellers of alcohol, but this was the first time it occurred in Fort Orange. In the case against Gijsbert van Loenen, an unnamed Mohawk Indian “declared in the presence of three credible witnesses” that he had bought brandy from the defendant, “which declaration, according to the ordinance, must be accepted as complete evidence.”

Although there was no indication that alcohol played any part in initiating the Peach War, the war itself served as a significant turning point in the issue of Indians in towns. Prior to the Peach War, the most significant regulation on Indians in towns revolved around the issue of alcohol, as discussed above. Even that regulation was of greater concern outside of the main settlements where the Dutch had significantly less control over any population, Indian or European. In fact, prior to 1655 in Fort Orange,

---

39 At this point, there was more concern and accusation about intoxicated Indians in the Esopus region. With greater fear of tragedy occurring as a result, more interest was taken as to the source of alcohol for Indians. Of course, later in 1658, Jacob Jansen Stoll and his companions would attack a group of intoxicated Esopus Indians, thereby sparking the first Esopus War.


41 Ibid., 347-348.
the only discussion surrounding Indians in towns actually stressed the idea of freedom of movement for trade purposes. Fort Orange’s goals continued to develop separately from that of the rest of New Netherland, and they would not enforce laws that would be detrimental to their fur trade enterprise. Moreover, it was this freedom of movement for trade purposes that would allow the Mohawks to eventually move into the Dutch legal system and begin to utilize the Dutch, and then English, court systems for their own diplomatic purposes.

Only three months prior to the Peach War, the Council in New Amsterdam sent directions to officials in Fort Orange for the opening of that year’s trading season. The Council was very supportive of restricting settlers’ movements in the woods or outside of town, even of not allowing Dutch traders to stand on the hill and call to the approaching Indians. Authorities seemed to believe that as long as activities occurred in the town, then they had a certain amount of control over events. However, once activities passed beyond that border, almost all control was lost. So while the Council agreed to restrict the Dutch movements out of town, Indians were actually able to “go freely where they want.” Accommodating trading Indians and keeping them happy took precedence over issues such as concern for safety.

After the Peach War, instead of permitting Indians to go freely where they wished, Stuyvesant recommended that Indians be forbidden entirely from the island of Manhattan, but in particular, “the city and especially the fort and all inhabitants must be interdicted to give them lodging and, by penalty of the gallows, to sell or give them brandy, but that a trading place should be appointed for them, the Indians outside or in

42 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 58.
the outskirts of the city, where it may be considered more suitable." While Stuyvesant would back off from banishing Indians from the entire island and from demanding the gallows for those who sold Indians brandy, it was with the Peach War that he became much more concerned about the construction of homes. At that point he then ordered that houses not be covered with straw or reed in order to prevent the easy burning by nature or an Indian torch. Again, he shifted responsibility for control of Indians in towns to the European settlers, not the Indians.

After he retreated from his call for the gallows for those who sold alcohol to Indians, Stuyvesant and the Council established their new regulations on Indian relations in town. They deemed it "advisable and necessary, that no Indians shall be allowed to come to any bouwery or plantation, except three or four sachems without arms and that nobody shall give them lodgings for the night, nor carry on any trade, neither directly nor indirectly, with them except upon certain specified places." These restrictions were greeted with varying degrees of enthusiasm throughout New Netherland. Residents of New Amsterdam supported a stricter enforcement of laws prohibiting Indians from coming into the city, except to a designated place or unless they were chiefs. After the "suffering by murder and mayhem" the residents of New Amsterdam were willing to suffer, "a loss of ordinary freedom," if "our nation shall live in more security; provided always good watch be kept, especially on Sunday during

43 Femow, DRCHNY 13:54.
44 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 186.
45 Femow, DRCHNY 13: 59.
46 Gehring, Council Minutes, 1655-1656, 256.
It appears that New Amsterdam residents did agree with Stuyvesant that "general sins are the cause of general punishments" and that not following the laws led to God's wrath in the form of the Peach War. Immediately after the new restrictions were agreed to Sander Toursen and his wife were banished from the colony to return to Europe for selling alcohol to some Indians.

The new restrictions were not greeted with uniform enthusiasm. At Fort Orange, which was not immediately affected by the "murder and mayhem" of the Peach War, colonists did not appear to be willing to suffer a loss of ordinary freedoms as their New Amsterdam counterparts vowed. Officials at Fort Orange continued to accommodate Indians and tolerate otherwise questionable behavior to maintain their trade. This accommodation in trade would then lead to greater Indian influence in other areas of Fort Orange life, particularly the court.

**Indians' Use of the Fort and Court**

The first real example of Indians having access to the Dutch court in Fort Orange was in an extraordinary session held on December 24, 1653, a year after the court was established as a separate jurisdiction. After disposing of a financial dispute, the court turned to a Mohawk proposition requesting Dutch assistance in their relations with French Canada. Although this appears to be the Mohawks' first actual foray into Fort Orange's judicial process, the propositions were made by one Stig Stiggery, "and others in the name and on the part of the Maquas." The Mohawks' propositions did not call

---

47 Ibid., 256.
48 Ibid.
49 Gehring, *FOCM*, 77.
for any new negotiations concerning themselves or any other party. The Mohawks and the French had previously concluded a peace between themselves so no new negotiations were necessary. What the Mohawks were requesting was Dutch acknowledgment of this peace and, in so doing, Dutch expression of support of the Mohawks' position with the French. The Mohawks proposed that the Fort Orange court write to the French governor declaring Dutch approval of the peace between the French and Mohawks. The Mohawks also requested that the Dutch court at Fort Orange write to the French governor asking that the French remain neutral in any future hostilities between the Mohawks and "the French Indians."

Joannes Dijckman and the court wrote letters to both the French governor Jean de Lausen and Pierre Boucher, commander of the fort at Three Rivers. The letters stated what the Mohawks requested even if the language did not emphasize Dutch support of the Mohawks. Dijckman referred to the Mohawks as "cruel savages" while still connecting the Dutch to the French under the banner of Christianity. However, in taking on the role of intermediary on behalf of the Mohawks, the court of Fort Orange set the precedent of being the Dutch authority in dealings with the Mohawks. The Fort Orange court heard the Mohawks' propositions and acted on them without the consent of Stuyvesant in Fort Amsterdam. In fact, Dijckman told both the Mohawks' representative and the French governor that he would inform the Director General of these proceedings after they were concluded. This was truly a new form of interaction taking place within Fort Orange. By the Mohawks asking the Dutch to intervene on their behalf with the French, the Mohawks introduced a new diplomatic dimension in their dealings with Europeans, even though they were speaking through a mediator.
The next time Indians appeared in the Fort Orange court records they were not so much participants as the subject of discussion. On July 17, 1654 the commissaries of the court called an extraordinary session to discuss what the court perceived as the necessary disbursement of gifts to the Mohawks. While the Mohawks were not actually present during these proceedings, the court declared that in order to maintain the Mohawks’ friendship, to compensate for the high price of scarce Dutch goods and to prevent the Mohawks from killing Dutch cattle, it was necessary to make a gift to the Mohawks. As a result, eleven of “the most favorable disposed citizens” donated a total of four kettles, eleven axes, nine pounds of powder and forty-four fathoms of sewant, or wampum, to present to the Mohawks.50

A month later, on August 11, 1654, a group of Mohawks and “Sinneken” made a present to the court.51 In return the members of the court thought it proper and prudent to give the Indians twenty-five pounds of powder, among other things, from the WIC’s powder supply. Again, while the Mohawks and other Iroquois did not have full access to the Dutch court at Fort Orange, they were gaining access and a certain amount of acceptance in the Dutch legal process. Moreover, the Mohawks, in particular, would continue to cultivate and expand this access to serve their own ends and work to their advantage. And by focusing their efforts in the judicial system in Fort Orange, the Mohawks truly began to establish Fort Orange as the center of European/Indian relations.

According to Fort Orange court minutes, Indians did not appear in the court during or immediately following the Peach War of 1655. It was not until June 16, 1657

50 Ibid., 146-147.

51 In this instance, it appears that the term “Sinneken” does not apply to the Seneca tribe but to one of the other non-Mohawk members of the Iroquois.
that Indians, and again it was the Mohawks, were present in the court at Fort Orange. At this time the sachems of the three Mohawk villages sent a chief named Sasiadego to vice-director La Montagne to request a meeting. The latter convened the court, where three Mohawk sachems representing the three villages came to make some propositions to the Dutch. Now the Mohawks were not speaking through a third party, but were directly representing themselves within the judicial system of Fort Orange.

At this meeting, the Mohawks were asking for more direct intervention and assistance from the Dutch in possible hostilities between themselves and the “Sinnekens”, in this case the western tribe of the Five Nations, the Senecas, with whom they were at war. The Mohawks were becoming more adept at their use of the Dutch court at Fort Orange. They sent a messenger ahead to request a meeting prior to the sachems’ arrival in the court. Their influence within the community of Fort Orange was reflected in the fact that this request was honored immediately, and the meeting was arranged. In this meeting they asked directly for aid from the Dutch in the form of horses to haul logs to repair the Mohawks’ fortresses, and a cannon for each village to be used as a warning signal between the villages. They also requested that the Dutch “should protect their wives and children here in the village in case they should be involved in a war with the Sinnekes.”52 This appears to be the first instance of the Mohawks doing two things in the Dutch court. First, they were requesting protection for Mohawk women and children in Fort Orange, and second they were setting themselves up against another member of the Five Nations. However, while both instances represented a first, neither would be the last.

52 Gehring, FOCM, 304.
Unfortunately, no record seems to have survived describing the Dutch response to these requests, although it would be safe to assume that the Mohawks did not receive any cannons. But in the period after the Peach War, the Mohawks were working diligently to increase their power among both Indians and Europeans in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, and they were beginning to adeptly utilize the Dutch judicial system at Fort Orange to achieve those ends.

The Mohawks did not return to the Fort Orange court in an official or proactive capacity for over a year. On August 13, 1658 the Fort Orange court held an extraordinary session for the arrival of fifteen Mohawk sachems.\textsuperscript{53} This meeting between the Mohawk sachems and the court was similar to the first in 1653 in the respect that the Mohawks were requesting Dutch assistance in their dealings with the French. However, instead of having the Dutch show support of a peace between the French and Mohawks, the Mohawks now requested that the Dutch help in a prisoner exchange between the French and Mohawks by sending a resident of Fort Orange who could speak French with the Mohawks to Montreal. The Mohawks were told that there might not be any Dutchman in the region willing to take such a journey. The Mohawks’ response was to remind the Dutch that since the Mohawks had traveled to Fort Amsterdam to help end the Peach War, it was now New Netherland’s responsibility to help the Mohawks bring peace to their nation.

Here we see how the Mohawks were able to create the shift from Fort Amsterdam as the center of Indian and Dutch relations during the Peach War to using Fort Orange for such purposes. The Indian tribes around Manhattan no longer serving a threat, New

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 400-402; Femow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 88.
Amsterdam was no longer a site for Indian and Dutch negotiation, beyond the occasional renewal of the peace made after the Peach War. Furthermore, since New Amsterdam was not dependent on the direct trade with the Indians, they were able to maintain more restrictions on Indian access to Manhattan Island. Fort Orange presented a very different situation. The Mohawks retained their independence and, in fact, the Dutch at Fort Orange were dependent on the Mohawks for the fur trade. This allowed the Mohawks to have much more influence over the workings of Fort Orange, including the judicial system.

Moreover, the Mohawks were utilizing the Dutch courts in order to force the Dutch to assist them in an issue that the Dutch had no significant interest in. The Mohawks were able to wield enough authority, and had the ability to back up their authoritative statements, to get the Dutch to respond to the Mohawks' request. Since their problem was with the French in Montreal, it made much more sense to deal with the Dutch in Fort Orange instead of going down river to Fort Amsterdam, where the fighting during the Peach War took place. Although the Dutch in and around Fort Orange did not necessarily see the Peach War as their problem, the Mohawks recognized the Dutch as a single entity, although, the different Dutch communities worked to achieve their own best ends, similar to the Mohawks working against the "Sinnekens." The Mohawks also stated that they promised, "in the future to do their best between us and other Indians." With this statement, "the court immediately summoned the public crier and had him

---

54 Gehring, FOCM, 400. Jeremias van Rensselaer, in particular, expressed that the people of Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were not a part of this war because they had no relations with the Indians of the lower Hudson River Valley. Residents of the upper reaches of the river also gave no aid to those affected by the war on Manhattan or Staten Island. Their good relations with the Mohawks allowed the Dutch in Fort Orange to consider themselves as being separate from the Indian troubles to their south.
announce that if anyone cared to undertake such a journey, he would receive one hundred guilders for his trouble.”

It was another full year before the Mohawks once again came to Fort Orange for a meeting with the court. On September 6, 1659 some Mohawks arrived at Fort Orange for a meeting, and upon their entrance into the town, they were led to the fort. The members of the courts of both Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck were likewise summoned to the fort. In this meeting the Mohawks came to make very specific demands of the Dutch, who, the Mohawks pointed out, called the Mohawks brothers, “but that lasts only as long as we have beavers. After that we are no longer thought of.” There was a definite shift in the way the Mohawks approached the Dutch officials in the Fort Orange court with this particular meeting. Prior to this session, the Mohawks had been somewhat pleading in their requests of the Dutch. At this point, they became much more demanding of the Dutch. It is difficult to ascertain if this shift was due to a change in Mohawks’ attitudes or if it was due to a change in Dutch perceptions and translations. With the inclusion of officials from both Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck it appears that as the Mohawks’ approach to the Dutch had changed, so too did the Dutch approach to the Mohawks.

For example, during the June 1657 meeting between three Mohawk sachems and the court at Fort Orange the Mohawks are recorded as saying “as old friends that we [the Dutch] should accommodate them with some horses to haul logs out of the woods.” However, in the 1659 meeting that language changed from declaring the Dutch “old

55 Ibid.

56 Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 217.

57 Gehring, FOCM, 453.

58 Ibid., 304.
friends” to accusing the Dutch of abandoning that friendship when the Mohawks no longer meet the needs of the Dutch. Also in the 1659 meeting the Mohawks’ request for men and horses changed from asking for accommodation as old friends to stating, “Look at the French and see what they do for their Indians when they need them. Do the same for us and help us repair our castles.” The conciliatory tone of 1657 was abandoned by summer of 1659. With the Mohawks’ active involvement in mediating an end to the Dutch hostilities with the Esopus, they were arguing from a new position of power. Furthermore, the Mohawks were no longer looking for Dutch assistance in their dealings with the French, but were using the French to strengthen their position with the Dutch by showing the Dutch what accommodating friends the French were.

In the record of the 1659 meeting the Mohawks also made demands that the Dutch smiths repair the Mohawks’ guns regardless of whether or not the Mohawks were able to pay for the repairs. The Mohawks also made the argument that guns were worthless without powder, so the Dutch should also provide the Mohawks with powder as well. Another example that illustrates shifting Dutch perceptions of Mohawks’ motives was the record of the Mohawks’ request for men and horses to haul wood to help them repair their fortifications, “for they are too lazy to work.” It is hard to believe that the Mohawks used such an argument to persuade the Dutch to render assistance, but it is less of a stretch to see how the Dutch could interpret the Mohawks’ growing demands as a sign that they wished too much from the Dutch. However, the Mohawk demands

\[59\text{ Ibid., 454.}\]

\[60\text{ Ibid.}\]

159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
served as a sign of the Mohawks' understanding of their own position of power among the Dutch of Fort Orange.

With the Mohawks making so many material demands of the Dutch in this 1659 meeting, the Dutch answered that they continued in their feelings of brotherly union with the Mohawks. However, they also informed the Mohawks that any specific answer to their demands would have to wait for the arrival of Petrus Stuyvesant. But Stuyvesant was not able to come to Fort Orange, and on September 24 seventeen representatives from Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck traveled to the Mohawks' easternmost settlement called Kaghnuwage to answer their propositions. The actual answers the Dutch gave stressed the ideas of brotherhood and friendship between the two peoples, but they also emphasized Dutch inability to grant the Mohawks their material demands such as free gunsmith services and use of Dutch livestock. They did, however, bring gifts of axes, powder and lead for the Mohawks.61

More significant than the gifts the Dutch brought to the Mohawks was the fact that the Dutch went to the Mohawks at all in order to conduct official business. The trip appears to have been for the purpose of a good will gesture. In a letter written a year later, Jeremias van Rensselaer told his brother that the Mohawks asked the Dutchmen to come to their country to make their response to previous Mohawk proposals. He wrote that they "unanimously resolved to make a little trip, with the help of God, we did."62 The Dutch officials, including Jeremias van Rensselaer, informed the Mohawks that they

61 Gehring, FOCM, 456-458; and Fernow, DRCHNY 13: 112.
62 Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 217.
From the description of the proceedings at Kaghnuwage, the Dutch representatives were uncomfortable in their surroundings. While they did bring gifts, they also informed the Mohawks that they brought no cloth for them, “for we could not get men to carry it.” Additionally, the Dutch representatives expressed their discomfort in the area outside of their own settlement by telling the Mohawks that “we cannot come here every day, as the roads are so bad to travel over.” In response to the Mohawks’ request for horses and men to help them repair their fortifications, the Dutch declared, “that is not feasible for horses because the hills are so high and steep, and the Dutch cannot carry it out as they become sick merely from marching to this place, as you may see by looking at our people; how then could they in addition carry palisades?”

While probably not the best way to earn the respect of the Mohawks, the Dutch statements clearly pointed out their discomfort in the woods. Therefore, instead of offering horses and men, they gave the Mohawks fifteen axes. They also helped solidify the use of Fort Orange court as the official setting of meetings and negotiations between the Dutch and Mohawks by making it clear that they did not like to go to the Mohawks’ villages to conduct business. The Dutch court members would not again venture into the woods for a meeting with the Mohawks. The woods were definitely a wilderness or foreign landscape for the Dutch representatives. However, at the same time, the Mohawks were becoming much more adept at utilizing Fort Orange and its court to their

---

64 Gehring, *FOCM*, 457.
65 Ibid., 458.
advantage. In this manner, the Mohawks were protecting the inner relations of the Five
Nations, except when revealing such matters worked to their advantage. They were also
actively constructing a new diplomatic landscape centered at Fort Orange.

In September 1659 war broke out in the Esopus region. This war was the reason
for the Mohawks’ next visit to the Fort Orange court, and the court called an
extraordinary session to hear the Mohawks speak. In this meeting, a mere month after
the meeting at Kaghnuwage, two Mohawk Sachems spoke for not only the Mohawks, but
also for the Mahicans and Catskill Indians. They spoke out against the Esopus Indians,
but said the Dutch should live as brothers with the Mohawks, Mahicans and Catskills.
The Mohawks also expressed impatience and dismay with the Dutch and actually
reprimanded the Dutch in their own court. The Mohawks deferred to the Dutch on
whether they should go to war with the Esopus Indians and gave a string of sewant.
However, in their next point the record states “‘You say you are not at war and that you
do not wish to go to war against any Indians.’ About which the Indians were very angry
and [asked] why we said that, [saying], ‘For you and the Manhatans are one. Suppose the
Esopus Indians came now or in the spring to kill the country people, what would you do
then? You make no sense.’ ”66 At that point the Mohawks demanded the return of the
sewant that they gave as negotiation gifts, and dispatched a Mahican sachem to the
Esopus to attain the release of Dutch prisoners.

With this meeting the Mohawks illustrated several points. First, they had become
much more emboldened and comfortable with the Dutch in the court at Fort Orange, by

66 Ibid., 463.
openly criticizing the position of the Dutch at Fort Orange. Secondly, they exposed the general lack of unity of the separate Dutch settlements. The Mohawks believed that since the Dutch were of one nation, they would come to each other’s aide. The idea of mutual aide was one that the Mohawks espoused when, in 1657, they requested cannons in order to warn the different Mohawk villages in case of an attack. Their request stated, “as all three castles belong to the same nation and they are bound to help each other in time of need.” Fort Orange’s lack of assistance to the Dutch in Esopus truly made no sense to the Mohawks, and at the same time it also revealed the fractured nature of the Hudson River settlements. The third point illustrated in this meeting was the growing authority of the Mohawks over other Indians. The Mohawk sachems spoke for all the Mohawk villages as well as the Catskill Indians and the Mahicans.

Although the Mohawks were quite active in mediating an end to the fighting between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians, they did not return to the Fort Orange court until June 26, 1660. This meeting, however, did not deal with Indian wars or issues with the French. The Mohawks approached the court at this time to request that the Dutch officials gain greater control over the Dutch traders during the trading season. The Mohawks requested the members of the court “to forbid the Dutch to molest the Indians as heretofore by kicking, beating, and assaulting them, in order that we may not break the old friendship, which we have enjoyed for more than thirty years, and if it is not

67 Of course, the Dutch probably did not help their own position by referring to themselves as too weak to assist the Mohawks in moving palisades or by their complaint of the harshness of their travels to the Mohawk villages.

68 Gehring, *FOCM*, 304.

69 See in particular Donna Merwick, *Possessing Albany*, chapter 2 where she discusses the importance of the trading season in Fort Orange. She deals with the 1660 trading season specifically in pages 88-99.
 prevented they will go away and not be seen by us anymore. In reply, the Dutch court officials promised the Mohawks that they would forbid Dutch traders from entering the woods to seek out Indians who traveled to Fort Orange to trade their beaver skins.

The Mohawks’ complaint in court set off a summer of the Dutch authorities bringing before the court traders who traveled into the woods or were accused of so doing. Moreover, the Mohawks’ course of action was again a first and quite unique. One may ask why did not the Mohawks merely retaliate against offending Dutchmen while the alleged abuse was occurring? It has been established that the Indians were in firm control of activities outside of European settlements, and it would seem hard to believe that the Mohawks merely stood helplessly by while Dutchmen “beat them severely with fists and drive them out of the woods.” It would be unlikely that the Dutch would be able to retrieve and bring to justice an Indian who retaliated against an abusive Dutch trader and then retreated into the woods. Yet, the Mohawks also understood that any retaliation against the Dutch, no matter how justified, could lead to greater violence in the region. However, the Mohawks did make another statement in this meeting before the court, “that it might develop into the same trouble as between the Dutch and the Indians in the Esopus.” Not a particularly veiled threat, but an effective one.

70 Gehring, *FOCM*, 503.

71 Of course this activity was already forbidden and eleven days prior to the Mohawks appearance in the court, Jan Harmesen, Volkert Jansen, Willem Brouwer, Jan van Aken, Daniel Jansen, Jurriaen Jansen, Jan Thomassen, and Jacob Thijsen were all brought before the court to face chargers of going themselves or sending others into the woods to conduct trade for them. All but Harmesen “purged themselves under oath.” Harmesen was fined three hundred guilders and his trading rights were suspended for two months.

72 Gehring, *FOCM*, 503.

73 Ibid.
With this meeting, the Mohawks were now able to utilize the Dutch courts in order to try to gain greater control over Dutch traders. The residents of Fort Orange could ill afford either the loss of Mohawk trade or large scale Mohawk retaliation against the Dutch due to a few offending traders. As a result of this single court appearance by the Mohawks, all members of the court advised to forbid the Dutch from going into the woods in search of Mohawk traders. On July 15, 1660, an extraordinary session was held in Fort Orange to deal with individuals who violated the law by entering the woods.

Poulis Jansen admitted to entering the woods, but claimed he did so to collect blueberries, while Cornelis Fijnhoudt claimed to be in the woods to look for hogs. Rutger Jacobsen was accused of sending his servant into the woods to attract Indians; he denied the charge. Philip Pietersen was also accused of sending his servant into the woods to trade with the Indians, but he denied to the court that "he sent his servant into the woods for such a purpose, but [says that he sent him] only to see what sort of Dutchmen were in the woods and what they did there."\(^7\)\(^4\) All together there were ten men who were either accused of traveling into the woods or sending a servant into the woods to trade with the arriving Mohawks.

In response to these denials, creative or otherwise, the court issued the following statement. "The honorable director general of New Netherland and the magistrates, having heard and examined the complaints respecting going into the woods and outrages resulting there from, have been as yet unable to discover any better expedient than to renew and maintain the ordinances heretofore enacted on that subject."\(^7\)\(^5\) The court

---

\(^7\)\(^4\) Ibid., 513.

\(^7\)\(^5\) Ibid., 514.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
minutes give no indication if the defendants were in any way punished. Nor is there any indication of any Mohawk traders bringing specific accusations against individual Dutch traders. It also is not known if the Mohawks who brought these issues to the attention of the court were satisfied with the proceedings against the Dutchmen or if they were even present for or aware of them. However, the court's response did at least show the influence the Mohawks had in the court system as the Fort Orange authorities attempted to respond to the Dutch actions against the Mohawks. This incident also exposed the continued weakness of WIC authority outside of the walls of the community. Once people entered the woods, even if their activities were expressly forbidden, they continued to remain outside the control of the WIC. As the Mohawks retained their authority outside of the walls of Fort Orange, their authority within the town and the court system continued to increase. With this, the importance of Fort Orange, not just as an economic center, but as the center of Indian and Dutch legal and diplomatic relations, also grew.

While the controversy surrounding Dutch traders in the woods was being played out in the countryside and in the court, the next group of Indians to speak in front of the court, were the Sinnekens.76 On July 25, 1660 the Sinnekens presented several propositions covering their displeasure with their treatment in matters of trade and diplomacy with both the Dutch and other Indian groups. Some of their propositions included pleas to keep the Dutch from beating the Indians, and also keeping the Dutch

76 In this particular meeting it appears that the term Sinnekens does indeed refer to the Senecas, who were at this time at war with the Susquehannocks. This war complicated events in New Netherland because while both the Senecas and Mohawks were members of the Five Nations, the Mohawks were actually sympathetic with and assisting the Susquehannocks. This war would also have greater consequences in the 1670s when the Susquehannocks fall under the influence of the Mohawks.
brokers out of the woods, much like the Mohawks' propositions from a month earlier. The Sinnekens opened their statements by reminding the Dutch officials who were present, which included Petrus Stuyvesant, that several years earlier they had traveled to Manhattan to conduct trade and to establish their own trading house closer to Fort Amsterdam, thereby circumventing Fort Orange as the main trading post. This proposition was ultimately rejected by the WIC. This move established Fort Orange as the center of the fur trade for New Netherland, thereby requiring Indians who wished to participate in trade with the Dutch to travel to Fort Orange as well.77

More significantly in this meeting was the Dutch response to the Sinnekens' propositions in matters of diplomacy between the Sinnekens and other Indian groups. The Sinnekens requested powder and lead for "their difficult war." Although the Sinnekens did not state whom exactly they were at war with, the reference was most likely of their war with the Susquehannocks and possibly their war with the French Indians.78 They also expressed their pleasure in the end of the Esopus War and requested a return of the captured Esopus Indians to their people.79 Finally, they warned that, "The French Indians will visit the Mahikanders at the Cahous [Cohoes Falls, north of Fort Orange on the Mohawk River]. They greatly bewail this. And as you are bound to them with a chain, you ought to be sad also."80

---

77 Gehring, FOCM, 515-518.
78 See Charles Gehring's note on pg. 516, FOCM.
79 As a form of deterrence for future aggressive acts, Stuyvesant sent eleven Esopus Indian captives to work on the Dutch plantations in Curacao. Two of the Indians would eventually be returned as a sign of good will.
80 Gehring, FOCM, 517.
In answer to these propositions the Dutch responded that since they made peace with the Esopus, “we now, in turn, request them to make and keep peace with the Maquas.”

They then gave the Sinnekens a keg of powder, but admonished them that “they must not use it against our brothers, the Maquas, but against their enemies, who dwell far away, where they must fetch their beavers.”

The western Iroquois tribes were not at war with the Mohawks, but the Mohawks did support the Susquehannocks in their war with the Sinnekens. The Dutch statements made it very clear that their favor was with the Mohawks, and they again expressed this in an official setting within the fort. The lack of an official Dutch statement concerning the Sinnekens’ warning of a meeting between the French Indians and the Mahicans at the Cohoes Falls also speaks of their favor of the Mahicans to the point that they would not discuss such matters with the visiting Sinnekens. The Mohawks may have been able to get away with chastising the Dutch within the confines of the Dutch court, but the other Iroquois tribes could not.

By the end of a fairly tumultuous trading season, matters between the Indians and Dutch at Fort Orange turned again to diplomatic matters. In early November 1660, Stuyvesant met with some Mohawk sachems in Fort Orange, in an attempt to dissuade them from traveling to New England in an expedition against the Kennebec Indians. Stuyvesant held this meeting with the Mohawks at the request of the English Governor in Boston. The Mohawks were again in Fort Orange in January 1661 informing the Dutch

---

81 Ibid., 518.
82 Ibid.
courts that they would be traveling to the Delaware River in order to bring about a peace between the Sinnekens and the Susquehannocks.\textsuperscript{83}

While the Mohawks continued to develop their utilization of Fort Orange for purposes of negotiations between themselves and the Dutch and English, they very much continued to avoid the fort for their direct negotiations with other Indian groups. In July 1662, Governor Endicott of Massachusetts and Governor Bredon of Nova Scotia both wrote to Dutch authorities protesting a Mohawk attack on an English trading house in May of that year. In the attack several Indians who were allied with the English were killed. According to the English governors this attack was “contrary to the treaty of peace made between the maquas and the Northern savages at Fort Orange last year.”\textsuperscript{84} Yet according to the Mohawks, they did not make a peace with the Northern Indians at Fort Orange in 1661 as the English claimed. The Mohawks asserted that they made a peace only with the English.\textsuperscript{85}

This controversy carried over into the next year, when, in the summer of 1663, English officers in Nova Scotia wrote to Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam to request their intervention to stop Mohawk attacks on “Northern savages.” They requested that New Netherland authorities bring about a “permanent peace” between the Mohawks and the Northern Algonquians. The Dutch council in New Amsterdam then contacted the court in Fort Orange and stated, “should your honors see any hopes to bring about a desirable result, then we leave it to your Honors’ own deliberation.”\textsuperscript{86} Dutch

\textsuperscript{83} Femow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 189, 191.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 224; and Van Laer, \textit{Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer}, 297.

\textsuperscript{85} Femow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 225.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
officials recognized the role of Fort Orange in dealings with the Mohawks, but they did not recognize that the Mohawks did not utilize Fort Orange in their relations with other Indian groups.

A week later, the letter was read to the Mohawks at Fort Orange. The Mohawk representative in the court replied for "Col. Temple to leave him and his people alone and not trouble himself about the war between them and the Northern Indians."\(^{87}\) The Mohawks continued to make it clear that while they would remain at peace with the English, their dealings with the so-called "English Indians" remained their own business. Actually, the Mohawks worked to keep their direct dealings with other Indians groups outside of the realm of the European courts almost all the way to the end of the colony of New Netherland. With this statement, the Mohawks appear to be protecting their negotiation with other tribes from European influence. In this light the Mohawks avoidance of Fort Orange and insistence of New England to stay out of these matters can be seen as a continuation of the Mohawks protecting their inner workings as was discussed in chapter two with the Iroquois trying to keep both Dutch and French from traveling to Onondaga, the center of the Five Nations, without proper authorization.

In their relations with the "English Indians" in New England, the Mohawks were particularly incensed by the English request, because the Mohawks saw themselves as victims of attacks by New England tribes. In fact, a month after the meeting where the Mohawks expressed their desire for the English to stay out of their business, a message from several Connecticut River tribes was read at Fort Orange. The tribes who sent the message denied that they continued hostilities toward the Mohawks and singled out the

\(^{87}\) Ibid., 298.
Sowaquackicks as the aggressors that the Mohawks had mentioned to the Dutch. The message read that, "The Sowquackicks live at the head of the river of Canticot and they are the ones, who fell upon the maquaas and the Indians beyond them to the North and Northeast, but the Southern Indians of Pacomuck and Agawam and farther South assure, that they will remain friends with the maquaas and hope, that they will live in peace with them."88

The Connecticut River Indians were not actually present at this meeting but spoke through a Mohawk interpreter. Adogodquo answered for the Mohawks and was pleased with the Agawam and Pacomtuck Indians. The 1663 meetings was really one of the first instances of Fort Orange being used as a site to negotiate between different Indian groups. However, the Connecticut Algonquians were not in attendance and no settlement was actually made. Yet the Mohawks were still able to use the meeting at Fort Orange to advance their own ends. With this action, the Mohawks’ use of Fort Orange evolved from economic purposes, to diplomacy between the Dutch and other Indians, to diplomacy between the Mohawks and the French, and then to diplomacy between Indian groups and mediated by the Mohawks. The Dutch really had little say in how the Mohawks utilized the court in Fort Orange once the Mohawks began to assert their authority over both the surrounding lands and the town itself.

At the same time that the Mohawks were dealing with the New England Indians, the Second Esopus War had begun. At this point, the village of Wiltwyck in the Esopus was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Fort Orange court. Therefore, there was little activity in Fort Orange concerning the Esopus War. Since at this point, the Mohawks

88 Ibid., 308.
continued to utilize the Fort Orange court primarily for their relations with Europeans and not necessarily for other Indians, there was little activity recorded as having taken place in Fort Orange. Furthermore, since the residents of Fort Orange did not want to be involved in the first Esopus war, there was no reason to believe that they wanted to be involved in the second, even if the Mohawks continued to chastise them. The town received word on activities in the war, but most of the official proceedings occurred in the Esopus or at Fort Amsterdam.

A couple of weeks after the outbreak of the second war with the Esopus Indians, vice-director La Montagne wrote a letter to Stuyvesant concerning a meeting he had with several Mohawks and Mahicans. The courts of Beverwyck and Rensselaerswyck were meeting to figure out a way to procure the release of several Dutch prisoners from the Esopus, when “there appeared suddenly Smits Jan, a chief of the said Maquas, with three others of his people and two Mahicans.” While this meeting did not appear planned, it was timely. The Mohawks and Mahicans were dispatched to recover the prisoners. The letter also informed Stuyvesant that the Mohawks kept an Esopus captive in a Dutchman’s house in Beverwyck and that they had cut off two of his fingers.

After this initial event concerning the Esopus War, the remainder of Mohawk activity in Fort Orange dealt primarily with their relations with the Kennebec and Connecticut River Indians as described above. Since the Mohawks were not directly involved in the Esopus War, their attention was devoted to their own conflicts, and they

89 Ibid., 264.

90 The fact that the Mohawks moved the very ritualistic event of torture of a captive outside of their village and into a Dutch man’s private home is quite interesting. Descriptions of Mohawk torture of captives usually stresses the communal nature of the event, whereas this incident seems to have occurred for the benefit of the Dutch, instead of as a part of ritualistic torture.
concentrated their use of Fort Orange for their immediate needs. The next time there was
discussion of the Esopus War in the Fort Orange court records was in October 1663, less
than two weeks after the Connecticut River Indians’ message was read to the Mohawks in
the same court. This meeting was called in response to a rumor that within two or three
days the Esopus were going to attack the people in the area surrounding Fort Orange.
The members of the court asked some Mahicans about the rumor, again showing Dutch
reliance on Indian intelligence. Their reply was that they thought the Dutch had known
the information. They then informed the Dutch that more than two weeks earlier, some
Esopus had been among the Catskill Indians and wanted to attack Fort Orange, but “had
been prevented at this time.”91 The Dutch officials then sent some Indians to bring some
Catskill leaders to Fort Orange to give additional information.

The minutes do not specify if the Mahicans who gave the initial information were
actually in the presence of the court, or if their message was relayed. However, we see
that the Mahicans who gave the information, whether true or a false rumor, were still
very much in control of the spread of information. Furthermore, the Dutch requested
three specific Catskill Indians, Macsachnimanau, Saşpagood and Keesien Wey to come to
Fort Orange to give additional information unavailable to the Dutch in hopes of clarifying
the situation.

A month later on November 22, 1663 the court at Fort Orange held an
extraordinary session. At this session the Catskill Indians Macsachnimanau, Saşsamoès,
Keesien Wey and Sechano, and the Mahican Aepje were present. Eldert Gerbertsen
Cruuf said that he had sent word several times requesting that the Catskills come to Fort

Orange to appear in court. However, the Catskills countered that they “excused themselves” from appearing because they had to go out hunting. The court obviously held little power over the movements of the Catskills. Commissary Jan Thomassen then asked the leader Keesien Wey about the Esopus Indians. He replied, “that he has prevented the Esopus five times, who wanted to do harm at Katskil and further up to the bouweries dissuading them every time and making them presents of wampum.” Kessien Wey also protested that “when he comes here, the Dutch pull him by the ears and call him an Esopus rascal.”

With the Catskills in control of the dissemination of information in this particular court meeting, Keesien Wey and his companions took full advantage of the situation. When the rumor first surfaced in October that the Esopus would attack to the north at Fort Orange, the Dutch were told that the Catskills had prevented it “this time” with the implication of a solitary event. Yet in the November meeting, in the presence of both courts Keesien Wey made it known that he had prevented such an attack on five separate occasions. Whether true or not such information in such a setting should at least have illustrated to the court that preventing the Dutch from verbally and physically abusing the Catskills was the least the Dutch could do in appreciation of preventing an Esopus attack on them.

In the next extraordinary session held a few days later, the members of the combined court replied to Keesien Wey, in the presence of two chiefs of the Mohawks and Mahicans that the Catskills should call the Dutch “brothers.” Keesien Wey appeared quite satisfied with the Dutch response and expressed his gladness that the Catskills could

---

92 Ibid.
come to Fort Orange without fear. He then turned to the Mohawks and Mahicans who were present and gave ten strings of wampum to representatives of each tribe in testimony of the proceedings. There was no report of an exchange of gifts between the Catskills and Dutch however. The Mohawk representative Adogodquo then answered, "I shall bring this present to the Maquas, my brothers, and inform them of what has been concluded and confirmed here by handshaking."93 So while the meeting took place in the Dutch court, the Catskills, Mohawks and Mahicans also utilized the court proceedings for their own negotiations and exchange of gifts. In this particular instance, the Dutch were not even actors, but passive observers. The Indian groups had taken over Fort Orange’s court strictly for their own purposes. Furthermore, the fact that only the Mohawk sachem, Adogodquo spoke in the meetings while the Mahican who were present remained silent, or at least their words were not recorded, continues to illustrate the growing power of the Mohawks within the setting of the Dutch court.

Although the Mohawks actually utilized the Dutch court meeting to strengthen their relationship with the Catskills, their main focus remained on their war with the Kennebecs. In a letter from La Montagne to Stuyvesant in January 1664, the former described the news from an Iroquois war party returning from raids on the Kennebecs. They reported that the Kennebecs and Mohawks had attempted to make a separate peace without the knowledge or consent of the other Iroquois involved, the Onondagas and Sinnekins. Although the Onondagas and Sinnekins persuaded the Mohawks to rejoin them in their fight with the Kennebecs, this even provided yet another example of the

93 Ibid., 310.
Mohawks acting independently from the other Iroquois tribes, an independence that would only continue to grow.94

By May of 1664 as the Esopus War continued the Mohawks again exhibited their desire to end their war with the Northern Indians. In yet another extraordinary court session at Fort Orange, the Mohawks for the first time asked for direct Dutch assistance in bringing about a peace between them and another Indian tribe.95 Of course, the Dutch had been hoping for peace between the Iroquois and Northern Indians, who were allied with the New England colonies, in order to retain peace with the New Englanders. The Mohawks warned the English, who tried to intervene on behalf of their allied Indians, to basically stay out of it. But at this point, the Mohawks declared, “war is now inconvenient to them and they prefer to live in peace.”96 In response the Dutch court dispatched Jacob Leckermans and interpreter Jan Dareth as mediators between the Indians, although the negotiations did not occur in Fort Orange. Regardless of the location of the negotiations, this event does illustrate the Mohawks’ ever increasing influence over the Dutch at Fort Orange. Furthermore, because an end to the hostilities between the Northern Indians and the Mohawks worked to Dutch advantage, they were willing to bring about its end by whatever means possible.

The last extraordinary meeting between the Dutch and Mohawks in Fort Orange occurred on July 12, 1664. The information that came out of this meeting provided quite

94 Ibid., 355. Furthermore, the Iroquois war party reported that they lost twenty warriors in their attack on the Kennebecs. However, Stuyvesant replied to the report, in a letter from January 26, 1664, that he had heard a rumor that the Iroquois had actually lost two or three hundred. He advised that La Montagne find out the truth. Either way, this stands as another example of how the American Indians were able to control information passed on to Europeans.

95 While there are records of this session, much of the information is missing.

96 Femow, DRCHNY 13: 378.
a taste of things to come. The Pocumtuck Indians were recorded as having said that the
English had ordered them to carry on their war with the Mohawks and told them to fight
and kill the Dutch as well. They also warned that the English had informed them that,
"forty ships shall come across the sea to make war here and ask for the surrender of this
country."97

By 1664 the Mohawks had firmly established their authority within the court at
Fort Orange. They were able to do this through their previously important role in the
town’s fur trade, and also because of the fractured nature of New Netherland that allowed
Fort Orange to develop independently of the center of power at New Amsterdam. These
factors created an atmosphere that allowed for the creation of new cultural landscapes as
many groups, Indians, French, Catholics, and Lutherans as well as supporters of the
Dutch WIC were able to negotiate their influence and presence in the community.
Furthermore, after the Peach War of 1655, Indian influence along the lower reaches of
the Hudson River had come to an end. The Mohawks, however, retained their
independence with the Dutch and began to speak for many more Indian nations in the
region. With the continued troubles in the Esopus region, the Mohawks were able to
increase their authority among the Dutch and other Indian groups, and continued to
utilize Fort Orange’s legal system to assert their power among their neighbors.

97 Ibid., 389.
CHAPTER 4

THE ESOPUS REGION IN BETWEEN THE CENTERS

While the Mohawks would continue to establish their authority in Fort Orange, it was the Esopus region that proved to be the continual battleground over the creation of new cultural landscapes. The Esopus Indians conceded the land for the town of Wiltwyck in the Esopus region. However, as the Dutch continued to expand their influence out of Wiltwyck and into the surrounding “wilderness,” the Esopus Indians fought to bring this to an end. The ensuing violence would negate the role of the Esopus settlement as a way to connect the political and economic centers of Fort Orange and New Amsterdam and thereby strengthen the colony as a whole. Instead the violence drove a deeper wedge between the Dutch centers on either end of the Hudson River. Furthermore, the violence in the Esopus region provided an opening for other Indian tribes, such as the Catskills, to assert their own influence in the court at Fort Orange. This was possible because the Catskills were under the protection of the Mohawks, and instead of the Mohawks speaking for the Catskills in court, the Mohawks had to deal with their own wars with Indians in New England. With the addition of other Indian groups to the Fort Orange legal system during the time of the Second Esopus War, Indian groups were able to assert more influence within the Fort Orange court. As a result of this Indian influence, the court's role as a new diplomatic center in America Indian and European relations continued to grow.
As with the end of the Peach War, after the peace was negotiated at the end of the First Esopus War in 1660, a sense of normality quickly descended on the Esopus region. As more people returned to or moved into the area, the more they helped strengthen the colony as a whole. Now the Dutch were able to lay claim to a larger area of land, thereby extending their authority further out from the river alone. Of course, the Dutch had claimed this land for decades prior to the 1660 treaty. However, now they believed they held claim by right of conquest and by a growing proper use of the land.

In the spring of 1661 more and more people were moving into the newly named town of Wiltwyck. In response, Stuyvesant traveled to Wiltwyck in April and May in order to distribute parcels of land in the enlarged settlement. The lots were distributed under the agreement that all land would be surveyed and marked within six months. Furthermore, to protect against the possibility of future Indian attack, the expanded settlement had to be pallisaded.\footnote{Fernow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 195.} Also due to the increased population, Stuyvesant established a court in Wiltwyck in May of 1661. Prior to this time the community fell under the jurisdiction of Fort Orange. The new court was mandated to administer justice in civil suits dealing with less than fifty guilders. Criminal cases, however, were to be referred to Stuyvesant and the Council. Court was to be held in Wiltwyck every two weeks, except during harvest time.\footnote{Ibid., 196. This exception illustrates the agricultural importance of the Esopus region.} The presence of a court at Wiltwyck was a truly significant event in extending control of the WIC. In November 1661 several ordinances were passed in Wiltwyck further expanding the WIC’s authority over daily life including a new land tax to defray the cost of constructing the minister’s house, and an ordinance
for observing the Sabbath. In this way, the WIC under the authority of Stuyvesant continued to assert its influence over the much-coveted land of the Esopus.

Growth in the area continued. However, in the summer of 1661 Stuyvesant lamented to the Directors in Holland that, “your Honors’ colonies in New Netherland are only gradually and slowly peopled by the scrapings of all sorts of nationalities (few excepted) who consequently have the least interest in the welfare and maintenance of the commonwealth.” He was especially concerned with the colony’s reliance on its inhabitants for military support, particularly in light of the lack of assistance offered to the Esopus community during the first war. Even with Stuyvesant’s concern of the pace and make-up of the growth of New Netherland, it was indeed growing, especially in the Esopus region.

At this point, the Esopus region could have taken after Fort Orange in its development as a new cross-cultural landscape of Indian and European diplomacy. However, Dutch desire that the Esopus serve as an agricultural center instead of a trading center, like Fort Orange, would prevent a stable new landscape from being formed. Whereas Fort Orange residents depended on trade and therefore Indians, they had to be more open to allowing Indians into Dutch space. However, the Dutch at Esopus needed land and wished to spread further into the woods, thereby creating a predominantly Dutch agricultural landscape. The Dutch authorities at Fort Orange wished to remain in town

3 Ibid., 211.
4 Ibid., 205.
5 While the community was growing and many considered this region to be potentially profitable, expenses continued to outpace income, see Femow, DRCHNY 13: 229.
and out of the woods. This created the need for the presence of Indians in Fort Orange, followed by the creation of a new cultural landscape.

In April 1662, five residents of Beverwyck submitted a petition to Stuyvesant and the Council to establish a new village in the Esopus. They argued that, “it was evident that the prosperity of this province of New Netherland rests principally on agriculture and commerce” and that many people wished to establish farms on the uncultivated lands of the “Great Esopus.” The petition was granted and the WIC was quick to begin the establishment of the new town. Likewise in 1662, thirty-one new lots were laid out to add to the original sixteen. One of the new lots was to be reserved for the new church, which would be another addition of the physical representation of the authority of the WIC on the land. The presence of the church along with the presence of Harmanus Blom, who arrived in September 1660 as the permanent pastor of the local Dutch Reformed congregation, were not only symbols of the authority of the WIC, but symbols of the presence of Christianity on what was considered a wild landscape. With these changes, the Esopus Dutch were attempting to build a new Dutch landscape out of the Esopus Indians’ “wilderness.”

Even with the growing presence of Dutch authority on the land with the establishment of the court, the plans for a new church and a new minister, the new settlement was not without its problems. Where Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck clashed over authority as discussed in the preceding chapter, Wiltwyck’s court, although established by the WIC, was also challenged. In the winter of 1662-1663 a small conflict developed between the court magistrates under Everet Pels and the militia under Thomas

---

Chambers. Chambers wrote to Stuyvesant to complain that the court magistrates tore
down an ordinance posted by the militia. The ordinance was a plan of action devised in
response to repeated gatherings of Indians in the area. Even after a meeting between the
court magistrates and the militia officers, the former refused to post the ordinance.
Whereas the court believed that its authority was threatened by the militia’s act,
Chambers believed the court’s action weakened the security of Wiltwyck. The incident
was relatively small in light of the events the region recently experienced, but it still
represented an illustration of the increasing power of the court, as a representative of the
WIC, over the landscape along the Hudson. It also shows the continued tensions between
the WIC authority and the Dutch colonists who lived and worked the land.

**Indian Relations**

For almost a year after the peace was settled with the Esopus Indians at Fort
Amsterdam, relations between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch in the area remained
relatively quiet. Although the Esopus Indians agreed to the terms of the treaty to remove
far from the settlements and cede their land to the Dutch, they remained close by and the
Dutch were powerless to really do anything about it. While the Dutch expanded their
authority over some territory, that area was still limited to lands adjacent to the Hudson
River. In April 1661, to show his pleasure with the peaceful situation in the Esopus,
Stuyvesant honored a request from the Esopus Indians. With the support of other area
tribes, the Esopus requested a return of their eleven tribemen who were sent to Curacao
as punishment for their hostility against New Netherland. Stuyvesant sent to Curacao for
the return of two Esopus Indians who had been exiled into slavery on the island.

---

7 Ibid., 235, 237. Chambers became a court magistrate in April of 1663 thereby consolidating his influence
in both the court and militia.
Stuyvesant hoped that this gesture would show the Esopus Indians and the Indians who supported them, that good behavior could win the release of other Esopus Indians from the island. If all worked out, it would also prevent any future hostilities between the Esopus and the Dutch.  

By June of that year, Dutch officials were becoming more anxious concerning Esopus behavior. Claes Jansen Ruyter reported to Stuyvesant that although he had been sent to the Esopus village to ascertain how they were living and their behavior, he was denied access to the Esopus village. Instead of allowing him to enter their community, some left the village in order to meet with him in the open. The Esopus Indians were not overtly aggressive in this meeting, and they informed the Dutch that they wanted their freed compatriots to be delivered to the Hackensack chief Oratam upon their arrival from Curacao. Although this was not an aggressive act on the part of the Esopus, refusing Ruyter access to the town continued to show Indians’ desire and ability to restrict Dutch movements in Indian territory. It was also consistent with Iroquois’ actions that restricted the movements of Europeans within their towns, and which forbade Dutch and French entry into the center of Five Nations’ authority at Onondaga.  

In the summer of 1661 Stuyvesant’s anxiety concerning the safety of the colony had continued to grow. He was fully aware of New Netherland’s weak military position. In an attempt to get more support from the WIC Directors and States-General he warned them that, “although the aforesaid Esopus, as well as the Raritan and Nevesink savages have since that time kept quiet, we are nevertheless not without fear and anxiety, that

---

8 Ibid., 194.
9 Ibid., 202.
when they see an opportunity they will take advantage of it to strike a blow and revenge themselves." Even more telling of Stuyvesant’s desire for military help from Holland was his plea that “the gracious God may grant, that the maquas will not begin with us after they have destroyed and finished with the French.” By painting a picture of France’s imminent defeat by the Mohawks due to the formers’ military weakness, Stuyvesant was able to lay the future of the colony in the hands of both a gracious God and the Company Directors who could provide the colony with more military assistance. Being an ocean away also allowed Stuyvesant to make this point, although there was never any indication that the Mohawks intended to attack the Dutch settlements.

By the end of the summer of 1661, more information was reaching Dutch authorities in New Netherland to cause concern. The Mohawks continued to be the greatest source of information for the Dutch. A Mohawk companion apparently traveled with Claes Jansen Ruyter to the Esopus on at least one occasion. This Mohawk individual then traveled to the Esopus village on his own in order to gather additional information. It was during this solitary trip that he reported having heard of aggressive words and action from a Catskill Indian who referred to the Dutch as dogs. Nothing specific came of this issue except the continued wariness of the Dutch, and the continued influence of the Mohawks. However, this example provides additional evidence of the importance of the Mohawks to retrieve and report information valuable to the Dutch.

10 Ibid., 204.
11 Ibid., 205.
12 Ibid., 207. This information implied a relationship between the Catskills and Esopus. The Catskill man was married to an Esopus woman. While the Dutch suspected the Catskills of aggression toward them, or at least sympathy for the Esopus, the Mohawks always worked to protect the Catskills. After this incident, the Catskill leaders would work to show how they held the Esopus back from attacking the Dutch.
Continued evidence of Dutch lack of control outside of their expanding area of influence, particularly with the continued trade in alcohol, exposed concerns in relations between the Dutch and the Indians. In the spring of 1662, the Dutch council gave Oratam, sachem of the Hackensack Indians, permission to seize alcohol brought into his land. He was also given permission to arrest those who were selling the alcohol and bring them to Fort Amsterdam for punishment. The Dutch gave Oratam greater powers over certain Europeans in his own lands, but the Dutch still claimed the authority to punish them in Fort Amsterdam within a Dutch court. The situation in the Esopus was a bit more tenuous. The community schout, or sheriff, Roloff Swartout wrote to Stuyvesant in September 1662 that, “the situation here is such that if no precautions are taken we are in great danger of drawing upon us a new war. The cause will be the selling of liquor to the savages, which, God better it! begins to increase.” Apparently the main culprits were the soldiers stationed to protect the village. One particular individual, Jonas Ranstou, traveled to the newly formed Esopus Indian village accompanied by an Indian and was admitted to the village. However, this event did not end with a transaction over alcohol but of accusations of spying and inflamed tensions. The Esopus Indians refused to tolerate European interlopers in their village.

---

13 Ibid., 218.

14 The Hackensacks under Oratam were weakened and held under Dutch influence after the Peach War of 1655. However, Oratam continued to play an influential role in relations between the Dutch and other Indian groups, including the Esopus. He was a respected leader in the eyes of both the Dutch and the Indians of the lower Hudson River.

15 Femow, _DRCHNY_ 13: 228.

16 The Indians allowed Ranstou into their village merely to interrogate him as to his purpose there and to accuse him of spying. He was then expelled from the Esopus village.
The Esopus, expecting an attack from the Dutch, strengthened their own town walls and sent out messengers to the Highland Indians, the Minisinck Indians and the Catskills supposedly to inform them that “they had put more reliance into the negotiations, which the savages had had with the Director-General at the house of Dom. Blom, when the peace was renewed and a present promised to them to be given next year.”\textsuperscript{17} The last meeting that took place between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch outside of Fort Amsterdam was at the home of Jacob Jansen Stoll, as discussed in chapter two. The fact that he was one of the leaders of the Esopus community also meant that his home was probably quite large in comparison to his neighbors, thereby giving it a more impressive presence on the landscape.

The 1661 meeting to renew the peace was then moved further into the village, away from the edge of the woods and into the seat of Dutch civility, the pastor’s home. Regardless of the growing presence of Dutch authority on the land of the Esopus, they were unable to control the flow of information among the Indian tribes of the Hudson River valley. Indeed, they remained at the mercy of Indian messengers to both retrieve and deliver information between Dutch settlements. Moreover, the Dutch blamed the fact that bad information was spreading at all on the “contraband traders who swallow up this place and sell a pint of brandy for a schepel of wheat.”\textsuperscript{18} With this declaration, Dutch authorities revealed the double threat of smugglers. The first threat was the illicit alcohol trade, and the second was their role in the spreading of rumors.

\textsuperscript{17} Femow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 229.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
The magistrates of Wiltwyck continued to observe a deterioration of their situation due to the sale of alcohol to the Indians. While in September 1662 the complaint dealt with soldiers from Wiltwyck traveling into the woods to the Indian villages to sell their alcohol, by January of 1663 the problem was identified as residents of the newly created town in the Esopus region. They particularly mentioned Louis Dubois, a Walloon, who possessed alcohol that he had not reported to the Wiltwyck authorities.19

The new village quickly became the source of more problems for the Wiltwyck magistrates and the WIC. Stuyvesant and other Europeans truly wanted to continue to expand their authority on the land and bring what they perceived as order and prosperity to a “wilderness.” Furthermore, they believed that their peace negotiations at Fort Amsterdam, and their subsequent renewal at the home of Domine Blom at Wiltwyck, which produced a surrender of the Esopus land, gave the Dutch the legal right to build upon the land. The Esopus Indians, however, saw it otherwise. In the spring of 1663, as building in the new Esopus settlement continued, the Esopus Indians spoke out against aspects of the Dutch activity. They informed the Dutch that they could erect buildings on the land, but that they could not build a fortification, “which, if it should be done, would show that [the Dutch] had evil intentions.”20 The Esopus Indians further told the Wiltwyck residents that a second piece of land the Dutch claimed near the new town was not a part of the 1660 Fort Amsterdam treaty and that the Dutch should not plough it or use it for cattle. The Esopus Indians were threatened by what they saw as not only the

19 Ibid., 237.
20 Ibid., 242.
expansion of Dutch ways of life into their territory, but also the expansion of Dutch families into their territory. Moreover, the Esopus Indians saw as the real threat the key symbols of Dutch control of the landscape: a fort and agriculture.

In order to placate the Esopus Indians, Stuyvesant and the Council decided to offer them the gifts they were owed a year earlier. These gifts were to include cloth, muskets and lead. According to a report of the magistrates at Wiltwyck, Thomas Chambers traveled to the Esopus village on June 5th to tell the Esopus Indians that Stuyvesant would soon be arriving in Wiltwyck to give gifts and renew the peace. The Esopus Indians replied to this that, if the Director-General wished to renew the peace, he “should with some unarmed persons, sit with them in the open field without the gate, as it was their own custom to meet unarmed when renewing peace or in other negotiations.”

Apparently there was much distrust on both sides. Stuyvesant had no intention of having any negotiations outside of the Dutch community. The last renewal of the peace was at Domine Blom’s house and allowed the Dutch to negotiate, not only as victors, but surrounded by the symbols of their power, as limited as it was. The Esopus Indians did not want to allow the Dutch into their village, but wanted to make sure that the site was at the least away from the very symbols of Dutch power that Stuyvesant worked within. In the meantime, authorities in Fort Orange did not want to jeopardize their own peaceful situations and continued to try to stay out of the fray.

However, the gifts and the peace were not the issue, and apparently the gifts were not exchanged before trouble began. On June 7, 1663 the Esopus Indians attacked the

---

21 Ibid., 243.
22 Ibid., 256.
Dutch villages of the Esopus region. The attack began in the new village. The Esopus Indians were particularly upset about Dutch activities in this area and it was the new village where the Esopus Indians had warned the Dutch against building any fortifications. When the Indians attacked Wiltwyck later in the morning, the Indians first entered the town under the claim that they were selling food. Soon after the Esopus Indians arrival in Wiltwyck, the alarm was issued about the attack on the new village, and the attack on the older town began. Most of the damages were inflicted in the new village and most of the captives were also taken from the new village, which was situated on contested land between Dutch and Esopus Indian territory. The new village had become such a point of contention because while it expanded Dutch authority over a larger expanse of land, it directly challenged Esopus authority over land that they still claimed as their own. The Second Esopus War broke out because of the tension created as both groups tried to assert their authority over this particular landscape.

**Fighting the War in the Country**

The Dutch were immediately faced with difficulties in pursuing the Esopus because of their lack of knowledge of the area. They did not know where the Esopus had fled or what to expect if they were to find the Indians. The Dutch authorities received their first break through information from Rachel La Montagne, the wife of Gysbert van Imborgh of Esopus, and daughter of WIC vice-director La Montagne at Fort Orange. Rachel La Montagne had been taken captive and was released with the intervention of Mohawks. With her release from captivity she informed the Dutch military officials that the Esopus Indians had retreated to a place about eight hours march south of Wiltwyck on a footpath. The Dutch believed they could reach the Esopus village by wagon in one or
two hours, although there were “one or two bad hills” and “three or four little creeks” along the road. Through the information of La Montagne, the Dutch also learned that the Esopus village was palisaded and defended by about thirty men. The Esopus women and children did not remain in the village but continued to utilize the relative safety of the surrounding woods, where they stayed with the Dutch prisoners.23

In fact, Stuyvesant learned “by good authority” that the Esopus were living near and among the Catskill Indians, which continued to complicate matters for the Dutch. The Mohawks and the Catskills continued to assert that the Catskills were friends of the Dutch. However, Stuyvesant saw the Catskills “if not our declared enemies, at least as protectors of our enemies.”24 Captain Creiger, who was in charge of the military forces in Wiltwyck, understood that the fight against the Esopus was centered in the woods. He knew that taking the Esopus village would accomplish nothing since the Indians would escape to the woods upon first sight of the Dutch soldiers. He recommended allowing the Mohawks to intervene for the release of the forty captives held by the Esopus. In the meantime, he vowed to take his fight into the Esopus territory of the woods to inflict as much injury as he could.25

The Esopus Indians continued to stand by their assertion that the reason for the attack was the additional land they claimed the Dutch confiscated without treaty or payment. The Mohawks informed the Dutch that the Esopus Indians did not care so much about securing the release of the captured Indians as they did about the large tract

23 Ibid., 271, 275.
24 Ibid., 275.
25 Ibid., 273.
of land of the new village. According to the Mohawks, Dutch payment for this land would bring about the “release of the prisoners in a sensible manner.” In response to the Mohawk proposition, Thomas Chambers, member of the court of Wiltwyck, “engaged himself, to refute promptly all the propositions which the Esopus have made to the Maquaes and Mahicanders, if it should be required by any court.” Instead of working out a payment for the land claimed by both the Dutch and the Esopus, Stuyvesant also vowed to pursue the Esopus in the woods, although in late July 1663, the Dutch still did not know the location of the Esopus Indians or if the Esopus fort was still occupied.

When the Dutch were able to get to the Esopus village to mount an attack, in the words of Captain Crieeger, it “has not had the result, which we wished and hoped for, but it was God’s pleasure, that it should be so.” In this expedition against the Esopus, the Dutch also tried to enlist the assistance of the Marsepingh Indians, with little success. The problem supposedly arose due to the Indians’ lack of cooperation and wanting “to have everything their own way” despite the reported Dutch efforts to have “humored them.” The Dutch were also hampered by the landscape itself, which came as a surprise to them because the conditions contradicted earlier intelligence. They were slowed by rocky land and hills. They were forced to spend long amounts of time trying to figure out ways to get through swamps and over creeks that were thought to be dry. They encountered some hills so steep that they had to haul the wagons and cannons up and down them with ropes. Within a mile of the Esopus village the way was so impassable that the cannons had to be abandoned. This was supposed to be a one to two hour trip by

26 Ibid., 275.
27 Ibid., 286.
wagon. However, by having to rely on information from other sources, in this case Rachel La Montagne, the soldiers were unable to have the proper information to plan adequately. While this may have been an easier trip by foot, the same did not apply for men with wagons and cannons.

In the meantime, the Esopus continued to scatter among the various Indian tribes of the Hudson River Valley. With the Esopus increasingly moving into the territory and protection of other tribes, the efforts against them became more difficult for the Dutch, who did not want to attack other tribes and bring more nations into the war against them. Although the Dutch were particularly concerned with the role of the Catskills in protecting the Esopus Indians, the Mohawks continued to speak for the Catskills as their friends and that they should do no harm to the Dutch and the Dutch should do no harm to them. This action by the Mohawks tied the hands of the Dutch who recognized the power of the Mohawks and their reliance on the Mohawks to try to win the release of the captives.

In response to this dilemma, the “council of war” at Wiltwyck decided to dispatch several men into the woods in order to attain any information that may be useful in their fight against the Esopus. However, since most of the soldiers did not have any knowledge of the surrounding lands in which they would be searching for information, the council decided to send for Christoffel Davits to serve as a guide in the territory. Davits was known to have been “well acquainted with the localities of the Esopus savages.” Of course he gained most of this knowledge of the territory of the Esopus in

---

28 Ibid., 328.
29 Ibid., 287.
his illegal alcohol trade with the Indians. Nevertheless, the military knew that “without him little or nothing could be accomplished.”

The need for action against the Esopus Indians was becoming more imperative as the harvest approached. By the end of August, Stuyvesant gave thanks, honor and praise to the Lord God when he received a report of the Dutch troops’ surprise attack on a newly constructed village of the Esopus Indians. In the attack they were able to free twenty-two European captives, while taking nineteen Indians captive and killing another twenty-seven. Yet the Dutch were still desperate for information. Stuyvesant sent out instructions for the military to go to the Wappinger and Highland Indians to “make every effort to get information” from Indians there. At the same time he was using his influence with the Indians in the lower Hudson Valley to acquire information regarding the Esopus Indians from them as well. Stuyvesant also established a patrol of the river to prevent Indians from descending the river as well as to question any Indians they encounter about the Esopus Indians. The Dutch really only had some control over the river and decided to utilize that control to gain the information they lacked.

Yet the Dutch, who continued to actively pursue information, also continued to fall prey to rumors and false information. In November 1663 Stuyvesant wrote to Captain Creiger to give him the latest intelligence. Stuyvesant had been informed that Lt. Pieter Wophertsen van Couwenhoven was captured, with his yacht, when traveling to the

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 287; and Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias Van Rensselaer, 329, 336.

32 Fernow, DRCNY 13: 301. The Indians of the lower Hudson River Valley who had negotiated a peace with the Dutch after the Peach War generally stayed out of the conflict. In order to maintain good relations with some of these Indians, the Dutch gave out cards with the seal of the WIC to show to the Dutch as proof that they were not Esopus Indians. These cards were given to Indians specifically who were moving and working on the water near New Haerlem.
Wappingers for a prearranged prisoner exchange, which was scheduled a week after the
Wappingers and the Dutch had renewed their peace. According to the report, the
Wappingers surprised the Dutch party, captured and burned the yacht, murdered the six
or eight men with Couwenhoven who was held prisoner in the Wappingers' village.
The Dutch were then hoping for "a chance in consequence of good information, to gain
an advantage over the said Wappings." This event was seen as a true blow to the
strength of the Dutch military forces, which held an advantage on the water. In the next
days and weeks the only "good information" regarding the incident with the Wappingers
was that it was completely false. Stuyvesant had to quickly inform Creiger before the
latter attacked the Wappingers and escalated the war by directly involving other Indian
tribes.

By the spring of 1664 both the Dutch and the Esopus were experiencing losses in
their war with one another. The winter brought a very heavy snowfall that created heavy
spring flooding. Since water in creeks impaired Dutch movements in July, the flooding
caused by spring run-off proved to be an insurmountable obstacle in pursuing the Indians
in the woods. Small groups of soldiers went out into the woods in pursuit of the Esopus
Indians or for information to lead them to the Esopus, with no success. During this time
as well, the Esopus Indians were apparently making overtures for peace through the
Mohawks and the Mahicans, although the Dutch tended to discount them. The war was
also costing the colony in revenues from the beaver trade. Even more damaging was the
growing conflict between the Iroquois and the Canadian Algonquians. The fur traders
were upset because the Iroquois were off fighting instead of hunting, but diplomatically,

with the Mohawks becoming more involved in issues to the north, they had less time and resources to deal with issues to their south, such as the Esopus War. In response to all these events, Harmanus Blom called for June 7th of every year to be set aside and observed as a day of prayer and remembrance. This time, however, the day of prayer was not to be one of repentance, as Stuyvesant established nine years earlier with the Peach War. Instead this call for a day of prayer and remembrance was to serve as a day of thanksgiving to praise God for leading the survivors through the death and suffering.

**Shifting Geography in Dutch-Indian Relations**

As with the first Esopus War, most of the diplomatic and military efforts to end the war came out of Fort Amsterdam, even though, during the first war, the Esopus was considered part of Fort Orange's jurisdiction. As the reports of the Esopus' attack on Wiltwyck and the new town became known, it was once again Fort Amsterdam that took the initial steps. While Fort Orange would benefit in the long run from a stable Esopus region dominated by the Dutch, its officials still considered themselves outside of the fight. Mostly they feared the immediate destabilization of their trade and relations with the Mohawks.

The High Council sent out warnings to other towns around New Amsterdam of the attack and also tried to assure those settlers that the neighboring Indians had nothing to do with the attacks. These were the same Indians who negotiated a peace settlement after the Peach War and who either maintained their neutrality or worked as mediators during the first Esopus War. Also similar to the first war, Stuyvesant traveled to Wiltwyck to deal with the issue first hand. However, whereas during the earlier crisis,

---

34 Ibid., 373.
Stuyvesant came ashore with a show of force, met with the Esopus Indians on the edge of the woods and challenged them to a fight on the spot, during this trip, Stuyvesant did not leave the safety of his boat. When he arrived in Wiltwyck, the boat that was to precede him to the town was not there, so he took refuge on the river until he could assess the situation. Also unlike the first war, Stuyvesant immediately called on Fort Orange for action and assistance. Along with turning to Fort Orange, the Dutch turned immediately to the Mohawks for their assistance. Stuyvesant’s goal was to eliminate the Esopus Indians and he knew this could not be accomplished without greater cooperation throughout the colony. Furthermore, he knew the Dutch would need the assistance of people who had knowledge of the woods and could travel efficiently within the woods.

Days after the attack of the Esopus Indians on Wiltwyck the New Netherland authorities decided on a plan to attain the release of the captives that would be run out of Fort Orange. The main focus of that plan was to induce the Iroquois, and particularly the Mohawks, to travel into the woods and liberate the Dutch captives. The Dutch, at this point, were not interested in establishing a new peace with the Esopus. They clearly stated that they did not want the Mohawks to mediate a peace, but either to get the release of the Dutch captives, or at least take a few Esopus as captives to make a prisoner exchange. The Dutch were again relying on the Iroquois, and again they turned to the Mohawks to acquire information on the Esopus Indians’ strength, location, and condition of the prisoners. Moreover, the Council also wanted, but failed to persuade, twelve Mohawks to enter into the service of the WIC for up to three months to participate in

35 Ibid., 250, 251. Of course the fact that Vice-Director LaMontagne’s daughter was taken captive during this war gave the authorities at Fort Orange greater incentive to get involved.

196
expeditions against the Esopus Indians. By June 26, 1663 a few Mohawks and a Mahican traveled to the Esopus Indians with Jan Dirck to see about getting the prisoners back. Another Mohawk Indian was sent to the Mohawk villages to call the sachems to Fort Orange to enlist their help.

While the Dutch called on the assistance of the Mohawks and Mahicans in Fort Orange, the Hackensacks, led by the sachem Oratam, and Staten Island Indians were called to Fort Amsterdam. However, instead of immediately asking for assistance from these tribes, the Dutch authorities asked if they wished to maintain the peace with the Dutch and if so to stay away from the Esopus Indians and to forbid any Esopus Indian from seeking refuge with them. At the end of these talks at Fort Amsterdam, the Dutch finally asked for some assistance in releasing the captives from the Esopus. However, the main goal of this meeting was to get assurances of the non-interference of the tribes who had settled a peace with New Netherland after the Peach War. Approximately two weeks after this meeting, Oratam summoned other sachems from neighboring tribes to appear at Fort Amsterdam to agree to neither aid nor shelter the Esopus Indians. The Indians present agreed, but were not able to give any significant information or further assistance at that time.

The Dutch would have to continually turn to their Mohawk allies for information. Although the tribes of the southern Hudson valley had been subdued, they were not able to provide the same type of significant assistance as the independent Mohawks to the

36 Ibid., 254-255.
37 Ibid., 261.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 275, 280.
north, who were not beholden to the Dutch for any reason. This is especially true since Stuyvesant was not interested in negotiating a peace as much as he wanted the military defeat of the Esopus in order to force them from their land. While the southern tribes could help with the former, the independent strength of the Mohawks could, in the eyes of Stuyvesant, help bring about the latter.

Oratam continued to be the spokesman for the tribes south of the Esopus, although during the time of the war the southern tribes did not lend much aid. In late July 1663, Oratam returned to Fort Amsterdam and informed the Council that the Esopus Indians had been unsuccessful in bringing other tribes into the fight against the Dutch. In August he appeared again in Fort Amsterdam and spoke for the Menissinck Indians who continued to claim that they had no connection with the Esopus Indians and wished to live in peace with the Dutch. The Dutch were pleased with this news, and what they really wanted next from the Indians was information. Oratam told the Council that the Menissincks were not in possession of any prisoners. In fact, the Menissincks would not give any information to the Dutch as to the whereabouts of the Esopus and the prisoners, but said that they would first try to ransom the captives with kindness or gifts. If they were not successful, they would then give the Dutch information as to the whereabouts of the Esopus.\(^{40}\) The Menissincks did not appear in the records again until March 1664.

However, Oratam remained active by appearing at Fort Amsterdam. He served as a trusted source of information, and was really the only Indian leader south of the Esopus who was treated in such a manner. He sent messengers out from his own tribe, and other tribes for whom he spoke, to gain information and bring it back to the authorities at Fort

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 289.
Amsterdam. He also sent representatives out to relay messages for the Dutch. In December 1663, he sent messengers out to the Esopus Indians to discuss terms of an armistice between the Dutch and the Esopus. Later that month he spoke for the Esopus sachem Seweckenamo who had gone to speak to Oratam. According to Oratam’s report, Seweckenamo did not want to appear in Fort Amsterdam because he was unable to bring any Dutch prisoners to the meeting because they were scattered among hunting parties. Oratam then requested an extension of an armistice in order to allow Seweckenamo to bring in some of the Dutch prisoners. The Dutch authorities respected Oratam’s efforts, but informed him that if Seweckenamo wished for peace, he would have to come to Fort Amsterdam in person.41 His efforts continued throughout the winter of 1663-1664 and right up until the peace negotiations in May 1664.

While Oratam served as a negotiator and the main intermediary for all the Indians in the lower Hudson River Valley, separate negotiations were occurring in Fort Orange involving the Esopus Indians and the Mohawks. The Mohawks, like Oratam, sent delegates into the woods to talk with the Esopus Indians to try to gain the release of the prisoners, although Stuyvesant continued to insist that no peace be made in those first few months after the June attack. The Mohawk delegates who first traveled to the Esopus in July 1663 reported that the Esopus “were willing to keep at peace with the people of Catskill, of Fort Orange and the Mahicanders and Maquas, but not by any means with the Esopus people.”42 The Esopus Indians told the Mohawks that if the Dutch did not

41 Ibid., 314, 320, 321, 361.
42 Ibid., 273.
abandon the new town they would spread out over the land with the captives, thereby using their natural advantage of living in small groups in the woods.

At this point the Mohawk known as Smits Jan proposed taking forty-four Mohawks into the Esopus and having each take one of the then forty-four prisoners by the hand and bring them back to Fort Orange. Stuyvesant was excited about this idea, but soon expressed his displeasure on the Mohawks' delay in the plan. Vice-Director LaMontagne in Fort Orange finally informed Stuyvesant that the plan to send Smits Jan to the Esopus with the forty-four Mohawks was abandoned because they saw it as too dangerous. First, Smits Jan was "tipsy" at the time he made the proposition, and second, he made the proposition without the knowledge of the older Mohawk sachems with whom they usually dealt. Indian relations in Fort Orange had developed so independently from New Amsterdam that Stuyvesant had little knowledge of their inner workings.

As discussed in the last chapter, after these initial meetings, the Mohawks primarily were concerned with their dealings with their enemies to the north and did not want to spend so much time on the Esopus. Nonetheless, with the second Esopus War there was much more involvement on the part of Fort Orange as a whole, both from the Dutch and the Mohawk and Mahican residents of the area, than occurred in the first Esopus War. In August 1663 there was even discussion that the Esopus would be willing to make a peace with representatives from Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck, including Vice-Director LaMontagne, Arent van Curler and Jeremias van Rensselaer. However,
Stuyvesant was adamant that no one, Indian and Dutch alike, pursue a peace with the Esopus.

With the final surrender of the Esopus Indians at Fort Amsterdam in May 1664, came the last major diplomatic event between Indians and Europeans on Manhattan. The final negotiation happened at Fort Amsterdam in May of 1664. After Stuyvesant’s frustrating experience of trying to negotiate with the Esopus in their own territory, he wanted to assure his own dominance in the final negotiation. The Esopus could no longer use the woods to their advantage. Although the Mahicans and Mohawks played important roles in keeping other nations out of the war and containing the war in general, representatives of neither group were present during the final negotiations at Fort Amsterdam. Their attentions were turned to what they perceived were the real threats to their power, northern Indians who were allied with the English. With the Mohawks’ focus beyond Esopus, they held little interest in the peace talks. Furthermore, since Stuyvesant had been so adamant about eliminating the Esopus Indians, he wanted negotiations in his center of power at New Amsterdam to be able to fully direct the terms of peace.

Representatives of tribes defeated in the Peach War, Oratam of the Hackensack and Tappan Indians, and Matteno chief of the Nayacks were present. The Mohawks did not travel to Fort Amsterdam for treaty negotiations, but later the same month, they requested that the authorities at Fort Orange help them arrange a peace with the Pacamtekocks who lived on the Connecticut River. Such moves on the part of the Mohawks continued to illustrate the importance of Fort Orange as the site of legitimate negotiations for their people. Furthermore, after the treaty was negotiated in Fort
Amsterdam, whenever the peace was renewed, the Esopus representative returned to Fort Orange to do so.

Only a few months after the peace between the Esopus and the Dutch was negotiated, the Dutch surrendered the colony of New Netherland to the English. However, during the Esopus War there was much discussion of intrigues outside the colony especially with the English and non-allied Indians. Jeremias van Rensselaer gave voice to the confusion in the colony in an August 1663 letter to his brother. He wrote that,

everything looks so bad here that I see little chance of getting together as much as I owe you, for the trade ceases so suddenly that one hardly sees a single Indian and this because the path is not safe for Indians, for one says that the French Indians are coming and another that the English are coming with the Indians so that the Maquas are quite in a pinch. The Sinnekes are hard at war with the Minquas, so that they do not come except in troops, like one troop which has been here, which was so large that we had to keep watch night and day... as many as eighteen families had fled to my house.45

The threat coming from New England and the English dominated communities within New Netherland was actually the deciding factor in Stuyvesant agreeing to an armistice with the Esopus Indians in late 1663 and the eventual peace in 1664. He was particularly concerned with the English forming alliances with the Esopus and other non-allied Indian groups. By the beginning of 1664, the English, both in New England and within New Netherland, were growing bolder in their advances to gain control of Dutch lands, particularly along the Hudson River.

In July 1664, the pressure from the English grew even more intense. The Mahicans came to Fort Orange and announced that the English on the Connecticut River

had requested to buy some Mahcian land on the Hudson River. The Mahicans first offered to sell the land to the Dutch if they wanted it, before they dealt with the English. At this point, the WIC Council in New Amsterdam approved this purchase of land along with several other purchases in order to claim proper right to the land and keep the English away from New Netherland, and the Hudson River in particular. Later that month a Dutch farmer’s house was burned near Catskill with him inside, and his wife and son were taken captive. According to two Mohawks who knew the unnamed Indians responsible for the act, the order came from the English to rid the area of the Dutch.

More information came in from Mohawk and Hackensack Indian sources, the two generally most trusted sources of information, linking the English with Indian attacks on New Netherland. The Mohawks claimed that the English attacked and killed some of their messengers. A Hackensack Indian, although not Oratam the leader of the tribe, told the WIC Council that he heard from a Mohawk who was on the west side of the Hudson River that some Englishmen went to the Esopus Indians and said “as the Dutch have so beaten you, what will you give us, if we kill the Dutch. Thereupon the savages handed to the English a bag with wampum and promised the land of the Esopus.” Stuyvesant discounted this intelligence as a ploy on the part of the Mohawks to bring the Dutch into a war with their northern Indian enemies. He also wanted to avoid such a confrontation because it would be detrimental to the fur trade, which was already suffering due to the various Indian conflicts about which Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote. Stuyvesant also

47 Van Laer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 356.
continued to hold to the idea that well established boundaries, which would have to be renegotiated, between New Netherland and New England would bring an end to such stories. He wrote to the Directors in Holland that,

The daily quarrels, bickerings, jealousies and claims shall be avoided from either side and a good understanding and correspondence established; these pernicious wars between the Maquaes and the Northern savages would then soon be settled and brought to an end and all the savages could be made to submit or at least to deliberate, when they see the Christians united and drawing a line, to keep the barbarians in submission or at least quiet. 49

Unfortunately for Stuyvesant, his dream of a unified Christian front against the power of the Indians would come to an end only weeks after he wrote these words, when an English fleet appeared in the Hudson River demanding the surrender of the colony.

After the Esopus Indians were defeated and they scattered to live among other groups of Indians in the area, the English were able to walk into a relatively easy situation in the Esopus region, at least in regards to their relations with the Esopus Indians. Furthermore, the English already had a foothold in the Hudson River Valley from the English settlements in Westchester. In October 1665, a year after the English takeover, Gov. Richard Nicolls, with Dutch leaders such as Peter Schuyler and Jeremias van Rensselaer present, and the Sachems of the Esopus Indians signed an agreement. This agreement included bringing murderers to justice instead of seeking revenge, a concession Stuyvesant was not able to achieve prior to the war. The agreement also called for the creation of a “convenient house” for Indians to lodge in and leave their weapons when they came to the town. The Esopus Indians also agreed, yet again, to cede their land in the region to the Europeans, this time to the English instead of the Dutch.

49 Ibid., 390.
Finally, all acts of animosity between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians were to be forgotten, and the English were able to reap the benefit.\textsuperscript{50}

Unfortunately for the English, it would not be so easy to reap the benefits of the ill-fated Dutch victory over the Esopus Indians. The next obstacles in settling this land were the relations between the English soldiers sent to protect the newly acquired territory and some of the Dutch and French settlers. In particular the difficulty came between a handful of Dutch colonists and a few English soldiers. The Esopus continued to prove to be a difficult area in which to develop new cross-cultural landscapes. After the physical and legal controversies surrounding the soldiers' treatment of the Dutch colonists, the situation was solved by segregating the population as much as possible according to ethnicity. The Dutch dominated the villages of Kingston and Hurley (the newly renamed communities of Wiltwyck and New Dorp, or the new village). The English soldiers were then given grants to land in the newly formed community of Marbleton.\textsuperscript{51}

However, once the issues between the soldiers and settlers were dealt with, the English were able to eventually accomplish what Petrus Stuyvesant desired to do in 1658, which was to create a few concentrated settlements in the Esopus region and then to exploit the land for its agricultural potential. Throughout the fall and early winter of 1668, Gov. Francis Lovelace focused on establishing these settlements and he spent a considerable amount of time in the region at the estate of Thomas Chambers doing just that. Furthermore, on September 23, 1668, Gov. Lovelace met with three of the Esopus

\textsuperscript{50} Peter R. Christoph, ed., \textit{Administrative Papers of Governors Richard Nicolls and Francis Lovelace, 1664-1673} (Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Pub. co., 1980), 3-4.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 40-50.
Sachems who established a peace agreement with Gov. Nicolls in 1665. This agreement was endorsed yet again in April of 1670 between the Esopus Sachem Calcop and Gov. Lovelace. The sachems were accompanied by "diverse other Indians...desiring to Continue Friendship." With this continued peace between the Esopus Indians and the English, the English government was able to establish the towns of Kingston, Hurley and Marbleton.

Furthermore, the peace with the Esopus Indians allowed the English to continue negotiations with the Mohawks, Senecas and Mahicans who occupied the land on the fringes of English settlement. This was especially true when the Mohawks made peace with the Esopus Indians in July 1669 thereby placing the remnants of the Esopus tribe under the control of the Mohawks, a fate the Esopus Indians, especially the Bareback factions, fought to avoid. From that time, there were no significant conflicts between the New York colonial government, the Esopus settlers and the Esopus Indians.\textsuperscript{52} Moreover, the Iroquois remained the only independent Indian group near the claimed boundaries of the now English colony of New York. Therefore, the remainder of Indian and English relations, whether diplomatic, military or economic, took place in the fort in the renamed town of Albany, the old Dutch outpost of Fort Orange.

The switch from a Dutch colony to an English one did not matter all that much for the Mohawks and the other Indians of the Hudson River Valley. They continued to work toward their own advantages, and they continued to do so in the same way they had under the Dutch at Fort Orange, now Albany. Furthermore, they continued to deal with many of the same people in Fort Albany. They were still counted on for information, although

the English responded to Indian intelligence with much more skepticism than the Dutch had. Moreover, now that the Mohawks stood as the dominant Indian power in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys after the Esopus were subdued by the Dutch, they were even more capable of asserting their authority among the Dutch at Fort Orange. In the years after New York was established, the Mohawks would speak for some Indian groups within the judicial system of Fort Albany, and would also work to eliminate the voices of others within Fort Albany.
CHAPTER 5

A "VERRY DANGEROUS JUNCTURE OF TIME" ALBANY AT THE CENTER

In 1666 two French cartographers created a map depicting French holdings in northeast North America as well as along the coast of New England (Figure 5). What makes this map so noteworthy is that the cartographers prominently displayed the settlement at Albany and the nearby Iroquois settlements, while they failed even to note the location of any other English communities along the Atlantic seaboard.¹ This 1666 map is consistent with earlier French maps that also prominently displayed Albany while virtually ignoring the more often studied English settlements such as Boston and Jamestown. The French map depicted a view of a political and cultural landscape that would not be widely shared until the next decade. However, in the 1670s the effects of four major colonial wars combined to give Albany a much broader inter-cultural significance. By the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Metacom’s War, Bacon’s Rebellion, and the Five Nations war with the Susquehannocks, Albany became a new colonial center for both Europeans and Indians and dramatically altered the colonial landscape of the Atlantic seaboard. As a result of this dramatic alteration, English understanding of the position of Albany came into line with the French perspective from decades earlier. Furthermore, as the English attempted to gain control of Albany and the

¹ Carte des grands Laca Ontario et autrea, et des Costes de la nouvelle Angletter et des paya treiser par M de Crary et Courelles, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; National Map Collection, Map #1825. Albany was still identified as the Dutch village of Orange on this map.
Figure 5 Carte des grands Lacs Ontario et de Costes de la nouvelle Angletter et des paya treuerser par M de Cracy et Courelles, Courtesy of the National Archives of Canada: National Map Collection, Map #1825
surrounding regions, they were continually challenged by groups such as the Mohawks and Mahicans who also tried to establish their authority over the region and its people.

Many noted scholars have discussed the events of the 1670s; however, what we have not focused on enough is how these events affected the landscape of colonial North America, including the movements of displaced peoples and the creation of new colonial centers of power.\(^2\) As a result of these events, which took place in the short span of five years, both English and Indian leaders dramatically altered the landscape of the East Coast of America with Albany at its center. Moreover, it must be stressed that Albany’s rise to prominence was not solely the result of the work of English officials such as Edmund Andros. On the contrary, events outside of English imperial control, such as the strategies of the Iroquois and Algonquians, as well as the interests of the French and Dutch, were crucial in creating this new colonial landscape.

**Third-Anglo Dutch War**

The first major, and often overlooked, event of the 1670s was the Third Anglo-Dutch War in which the Netherlands, however briefly, re-established control over New Netherland in the summer of 1673. The quick negotiations that returned New Netherland to England illustrated that New Netherland was not a crucial part of the States-General’s imperial plan, which expanded in other parts of the world. As Jonathan Israel has noted, despite the loss of Netherlands Brazil in 1654, Taiwan in 1662 and New Netherland in 1664, the Dutch colonial empire was at its height during the

second half of the seventeenth century and first quarter of the eighteenth. During this period Dutch commerce and shipping expanded in both the eastern and western hemispheres and the contribution of colonial enterprise to the functioning of the Dutch trading system, as a whole, steadily increased.3

Although the States-General showed little interest in re-building New Netherland, Dutch settlers of the Hudson Valley argued their case to maintain a Dutch North American empire. The Dutch inhabitants of the Hudson Valley asserted that families who were ruined by the French invasion of the Dutch Republic could come to New Netherland to make a fresh start and to help populate the area. They argued that the villages of the Hudson Valley produced enough grain to provision the Dutch colonies at Curacao and Surinam with needed wheat, thereby illustrating their importance to the Dutch Empire. Furthermore, the burghers of New Orange recognized New Netherland’s geographic advantage in intercepting and capturing English ships. However, the New Netherland burghers’ plea for reinforcements to protect their fragile colony from their French and English neighbors did not reach the States-General until March 5, 1674. By this time, the States-General already had negotiated for the return of the colony to England.4


4 For an explanation of England’s interest in acquiring New Netherland in 1664 see Ritchie, The Duke’s Province, chapter 1. Corwin, Ecclesiastical Records I, 635-636; O’Callaghan, DRCHNY II: 526, 538, 538. It is doubtful that the pleas of the Dutch colonists would have done much good, even had they been delivered into the hands of the States-General any sooner. Through December and January of 1673-1674 the States-General skillfully used New Netherland in their negotiations with the English crown. In a December 15 Secret Resolution, the States-General turned over the supervision of New Netherland to the Board of Admiralty who were to send military forces to the colony and establish Joris Andringa, Secretary of the Provincial fleet as its Governor. However, on December 19, 1673, the States-General dispatched a letter to King Charles II in which they did “hereby also offer the restitution of New Netherland and of all other places and Colonies which have been won by our arms during the present war. Firmly convinced that your Majesty will be unwilling to refuse a reciprocal engagement to restore to us such lands and forts as your subjects may have taken from us.” O’Callaghan, DRCHNY II 530-532, 535-541.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Although the States-General did not include New Netherland in its imperial scheme, the Third Anglo-Dutch war added a new dimension to local concerns over events with international significance. The frequent Dutch and English fears of a French attack on Albany illustrate how local tensions between nations remained independent of larger Atlantic world events and concerns. It is well known that Albany was Montreal’s greatest rival in the fur trade. A French takeover of Albany would provide the French with control over interior lands. A French-controlled Albany could possibly also provide the French with access to New York Harbor which, unlike the St. Lawrence, did not freeze. Due to Albany’s isolated position in the interior, local residents, both Dutch and English, feared a French attack on Albany, which was the subject of many rumors throughout the 1660s. However, there was an increase in these rumors beginning with the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch War. The effect of these local rumors and the outcome of the Anglo-Dutch war are a particularly clear example of Albany’s shift from an isolated settlement to a colonial center that played a significant role in international politics and conflicts.

Prior to Albany’s establishment as a colonial center in the 1670s, English authorities in New York City paid little heed to rumors of French attack, thereby leaving the issue to be handled locally. In June 1671 a rumor surfaced that the French were preparing to attack Albany. In response, Albany magistrates sent a delegation into the Mohawks’ land “to remain there for seven or eight days and to make a diligent inspection of everything and with the consent of the sachems to send some Indians from there out on the roads to spy out all condition and designs.”

Frenchman living in Albany. Several Mohawk Indians who were also in Albany substantiated his story. In response to this threat, which Albany residents took quite seriously, the local magistrates ordered all free men in Albany, Rensselaerswyck and Schenectady to report to the Fort in Albany fully armed and ready to march.\(^6\)

English Governor Francis Lovelace, however, upon hearing both the rumor and the Albany magistrates’ reaction to it, quickly expressed his disbelief concerning such French designs. Lovelace not only dismissed the rumor but also reprimanded the Albany officials, stating that the French would not attack Albany because “there is now peace between the two crownes, and the Concernes of those poore parts of the World cannot be an introduction to make a breach between either.”\(^7\) Although Lovelace seems to have had little regard for the safety and security of either the land or the people he governed over, his statement illustrates that he understood colonial events as mere extensions of relations in Europe. However, the reaction of the local residents suggests that they placed much more credence in information and intelligence gathered from the Mohawks than they did from European sources such as Lovelace. Lovelace’s lack of understanding of how international events often played out differently on a local level is similar to the States-General utilization of the newly recaptured New Netherland merely as a bargaining chip with no real importance in the larger Dutch imperial plan.

According to Lovelace’s reasoning concerning these local developments, as long as England and France remained on peaceful terms in Europe, it obviously would follow that those nations’ colonies also remained on peaceful terms. Residents of the region,

\(^6\) Ibid., 255, 259

\(^7\) Peter Christoph, ed., *The Andros Papers volume 1* (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1989), 430.
however, viewed colonial relations on more local and regional levels. For colonists in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, the fact that the English and French crowns declared that the two nations were then at peace did not necessarily ease their concerns of a French attack. In fact, the increase in rumors indicates that the residents of the Hudson Valley saw the tensions between the English and the Dutch as primarily an opportunity for the French to pursue their interests in North America regardless of whether it was an English or a Dutch colony at the time. While Lovelace was right in his belief that the French would not attack the English at Albany, he failed to win the residents of Albany over to his belief that the French would continue to stay away because of the peace between the crowns. This incident also illustrates that Lovelace was not any more successful at ending the fractional nature of the settlements within the colony than was Stuyvesant.

Eighteen months after the 1671 rumor of French attack on Albany, a Frenchman by the name of Antony les Pinsard was arrested in Albany for writing a letter to the French Jesuit Father Bruyas. In this letter he stated that “peace has been concluded between the king of England and Holland and that the Dutch here are much afraid of the French in Canada.”\(^8\) The residents of the Hudson River Valley continued to take these warnings and rumors much more to heart than did Governor Lovelace residing in New York City. The defendant’s words in this case were considered serious enough for the Albany court to call an extraordinary session, where they voiced Albany residents’

---

\(^8\) Van Laer, *Minutes* 1: 323. Father Bruyas’s activities continued to be perceived as suspicious and were monitored by the English authorities throughout the seventeenth century. In 1700 Earl of Bellomont wrote several times to the Lords of Trade in London complaining of Bruyas’s activities among the Mohawks and Onondagas. Later that year, Bellomont complained of New York’s position in maintaining good relations with the Mohawks while they hosted Bruyas. In this letter to the Lords of Trade he stated that “Jesuit Brouyas and De La Valliered that were sent to me last year on pretence of a complement by the Governour of Canada, were rather intended as spies to look into the condition of our Forts and Garrisons.” O’Callaghan, *D R C H N Y* 4: 607, 645.
concerns over such “plots and treason.” The court fined the defendant, released him into the custody of Jan Frees and Omy La Grand, and proceeded to keep both les Pisnard and his correspondence under close observation.9

The fear of French attack became worse for those who resided in the upper Hudson Valley when the area once again reverted to Dutch control in 1673. In November of 1673, Jeremias van Rensselaer expressed his concern of Rensselaerswyck’s fragile geographic location surrounded by its enemies, New France and New England. He wrote to his brother Jan Baptist van Rensselaer that “We have now and then tidings that the French from Canada intend to attack us. What there is of it, time will show. We are surrounded by enemies, but hope that the Lord God will preserve us.”10 However, van Rensselaer’s concerns continued throughout the period of Dutch control so that in July of 1674 he again noted that the French were rumored to be on their way to the Hudson Valley. He saw the only way for this threat to end would be for the area to revert back to English rule and English protection. This was not because of the current Anglo-French alliance, but because of England’s greater resources to ward off the French in America. Van Rensselaer believed that the danger was so real that he would not leave his wife alone in their home.11 This fear arose due to New Netherland’s lack of military

9 Van Laer, Minutes I: 323.

10 Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 453. John Pynchon in Massachusetts also received word that the French were marching toward Albany to which he replied, “I suppose it is a mere story; and find no ground to credit it.” Being that he lived on the opposite side of Albany from the Mohawks and the French, Pynchon may have been less concerned with the possibility of a surprise French attack. Bridenbaugh, The Pynchon Papers, 120.

11 Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 451, 488.
resources. Once Albany was established as a new colonial center in 1677 under English colonial authority, the rumors of French attack died down.\(^\text{12}\)

The rumors of French attack that circulated in the 1670s were often related to larger international events, such as the opportunity presented to the French to attack a vulnerable Albany during the Anglo-Dutch war. It is significant that the rumors that caused the colonists to react with fear and sometimes arms were connected somehow to the Mohawks. The rumor of French attack that resulted in a call to arms among the residents of Albany, Schenectady and Rensselaerswyck in 1671 was supported initially by a Frenchmen residing in Albany, de la Rose. However it was not until several Mohawks present in the area corroborated de la Rose’s story that the threat was taken seriously. After several Frenchmen and Mohawks present in the area were interrogated, the Albany magistrates decided to send a delegation to the Mohawks’ country in order to ascertain the veracity of the information.\(^\text{13}\) Whether under Dutch of English authority, the residents of Albany continued to rely heavily on Mohawk intelligence.

Not only did the Albany residents depend on the Mohawks to determine the truth behind the rumors, but the Mohawks also appear to be the source of many of these stories of French attack. Records indicate that as early as 1666 Mohawk Sachems were warning the magistrates in Albany that the French were on the way.\(^\text{14}\) Even when the talk of

\(^\text{12}\) Most of these rumors seem to originate with the Mohawks. This appears to illustrate the Mohawks ability to gain accommodations from the Dutch and English in the form of arms and ammunition in order to help guard against the ever-present French threat. Once Albany was established as a colonial center, however, the Mohawks gain greater concessions from the English and do not have to use the French threat in order to achieve their ends. Brindenbaugh, _Pynchon Papers_, 120

\(^\text{13}\) Van Laer, _Minutes_ 1: 255, 259.

\(^\text{14}\) Leder, _The Livingston Indian Records_, 29-30. This exchange between the Mohawks and the Albany magistrates was in response to 200 troops which were actually sent out from Canada, but who were recalled before they made it down to New York or Mohawk territory. The Albany magistrates’ reply does, however, indicate a grave concern for their own safety at the report of the French troop movements and use
French attack did not come directly from the mouths of Mohawks, they continued to play a central role in dissemination of the threat from the north. In his November 9, 1673 letter to Oloff Stevensen van Cortlandt Jeremias van Rensselaer stated that the French Jesuit Bruyas brought the news “from the Maquas country” that the French had sent ships to Canada. He did not describe the French Jesuits’ tidings as news from Europe but was clear that the news came from the Mohawks’ country. Less than a week after this letter, van Rensselaer declared in another letter that, “the French from Canada intend to attack us.”\textsuperscript{15} This example depicts the importance of the Mohawks and the Mohawk territory to the north and west of Albany as being a crucial link in relations and communications, whether real or rumor, between the French and the English. The territory beyond Albany remained relatively unknown to the Dutch and now English residents of Albany. Because the Mohawks were still in firm control of that area, they remained in full control of what information traveled through the region. They also controlled where and when information was delivered, keeping the Albany residents fully dependent on their services.

It is well known that Indians were quite adept at playing one European power off of another in order to gain advantages for themselves, and the Mohawks were no exception. However, the fact that the men and women of Albany looked to the Mohawks for accurate information concerning French movements in the 1670s is indicative of the

\textsuperscript{15} Van Laer, \textit{Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer}, 451, 453.
crucial role the Iroquois played in these international struggles beyond that of mere opportunists. The reality of the residents in the somewhat isolated town of Albany caused them to look north and west for information concerning both their livelihoods and their lives. While the attention of colonial officials in New York City focused on Europe during the early 1670s, the Mohawks continued to play a greater role in the dissemination of information and intelligence for European inhabitants of the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys. These events were also indicative of growing complexity of relations between the French, Mohawks, English and Dutch in North America.

The rumored French attacks did not materialize. The constant threat of attacks, however, and the Albany residents' concern over them, illustrated the vulnerability and the fear that the settlers in this outlying region of New Netherland and New York continued to face. Governor Lovelace's lack of interest in the rumors prior to the retaking of the colony by the Netherlands added to the settlers' sense of vulnerability, leading them to raise their own militia in order to fend off any attack. The Dutch takeover in 1673, as noted above, did nothing to alleviate the fears of the northern settlers, and in fact, added to those fears as the settlers knew very well the lack of resources available from New Amsterdam.16

**Indian Affairs and the Second New Netherland**

Rumors of French attack aside, the States-General was not interested in rebuilding their North American Empire. However, local New Netherland authorities, understanding the importance of favorable relations with neighboring Indians, began to

---

16 For an analysis of the effect of rumor on frontier colonial societies see Dowd, "The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumors on the South Carolina Frontier."
re-establish their former relationships with area Indian populations. Moreover, the Indians who populated the Hudson River Valley also understood the changing power relationships brought about by the Third Anglo-Dutch War and worked to strengthen their own position in the region between Willemstadt (Albany) and Montreal. In the spring of 1674, a Mohawk delegation visited Governor Colve in Fort Willem Hendrick in Manhattan to renew their relationship with the Dutch. During this meeting the Mohawks made it clear that they would be willing to march against the French who, it was rumored, were prepared to move against the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys. The Mohawk delegation then requested that Governor Colve secure a yacht to transport them back to Willemstadt. The Mohawk delegation took its request one step further and requested that Colve also order the burghers of Willemstadt to lodge the delegation within the town walls overnight upon their arrival. Colve met the requests of the Mohawk sachems, and the officials up river were requested to lodge the sachems within the town walls and to treat them “with all possible favor.”

The significance of Colve’s action lies in the fact that he conceded to the Mohawks’ desire to lodge overnight within Albany’s walls, when Albany’s official town policy forbade Indian presence within the town after a certain hour. This was the first example of colonial officials advocating the extended and overnight presence of any Indians within the town walls of Albany. This sudden change in policy represents a significant shift by accommodating the Mohawks, whose presence in between the

17 In the autumn of 1673, the Hackensacks and other lower Hudson Valley Indian groups came to Fort Willem Hendrick in Manhattan to renew their peace with the Dutch, which was originally made in 1655.

18 Femow, DRCNY 13: 476, 479. This rumor seems to have originated at this meeting.

19 Ibid., 480. Colve’s request for Albany’s authorities to show this delegation “all possible favor” may have included shot and lead, as the Mohawks requested, for their use against this new supposed French threat.
Hudson Valley and French Canada was much needed as a buffer. Even though the Mohawks’ presence served an important function in separating the Dutch and the French in North America, many colonists preferred that the Mohawks maintained lodgings away from Europeans. Previous colonial leaders, both Dutch and English, worked diligently to prevent Indians from being lodged within town walls. When England regained control of New York, the new governor, Edmund Andros, also began accommodating Indians within town walls in the Hudson Valley.

In September of 1675, Governor Andros issued a proclamation that called for the building of stockaded blockhouses, “in the most convenient place in each respective town for a Retreat to the women & children; Into which our Indyan women and children, to bee also received and Protected if they desire it; and that all our Indyans bee friendly treated, and have equal justice according to law.” While Indian women and children were offered protection within town walls prior to this date, this is the first statement that combined the idea of protecting Indians both within walls and within the law. In regards to European-Indian relations in the Hudson and Mohawk River valleys, this combination occurred first in Albany as the English made accommodations for the protection of Indians not only within a military context, but also within a legal context. This new idea put forth by Andros would later be manifested on the physical landscape by moving Indian-European negotiations from the fort to the courthouse. Andros’s words expanded

---

20 This concern became particularly acute after the Esopus Wars between the Esopus Indians and the Dutch in the early 1660s. The second Esopus War began with Indians who were lodged in the town attacking settlers. Court Records of Albany, Rensselaerswyck and Schenectady show that up through May of 1672 the magistrates “expressly forbid every one to lodge hereafter any savages...” Although the directive was given, it is not known if Albany officials acquiesced to Colve’s directive and allowed the Mohawks to lodge within the walls overnight.

21 Fernow, DRCHNY 13: 484.
the role of Mohawks in the legal system by specifically including them, not just as witnesses against Europeans who broke laws against illegal fur and alcohol trade. Andros’s actions also went beyond how the Mohawks inserted themselves in the European legal process. Andros was now introducing the Mohawks as equal players in the courthouse, although the Mohawks’ actions over the past decades had been imbedding themselves deeper into the European legal system located at Fort Orange and then Fort Albany.

**Metacom’s War, Bacon’s Rebellion and the Five Nations’ War with the Susquehannocks**

With the end of the Anglo-Dutch war and the re-establishment of the colony of New York, the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys would once again experience significant change as a result of larger events outside of their borders and immediate control. This time, however, it was conflicts among and against various Indian populations and not European wars that created the significant changes. Beginning in 1675, as Metacom’s War broke out in New England, and Bacon’s Rebellion began in Virginia, and as the fighting continued between the Susquehannocks and the Five Nations, Governor Andros began negotiations that would further affect the position of Albany in North America. Andros, however, did not create this environment on his own. He was responding to events outside of his control. Moreover, he was also forced to deal with the widely diverse desires and motivations of the different Indian groups with whom he dealt.

Through late 1675 and early 1676, Andros met with numerous Indian groups from outlying regions in New England and the Chesapeake in order to offer them refuge in the
Hudson Valley. These Indians included such groups as the Susquehannocks and New England Algonquians. For his plan to work however, Andros had first to negotiate with the Five Nations (primarily Mohawks) and the Mahicans. Both tribes remained the dominant Indian peoples in the Hudson River Valley at this time, in order to ensure the safety of the refugee Indians who would be coming into the area. These meetings occurred in various locations from Albany to New York City to the head of the Chesapeake Bay, but by the end of the hostilities it was Albany alone that served as the major theater of Indian/English relations.

The immediate results of Metacom's War, Bacon's Rebellion and the Five Nations war with the Susquehannocks was the movement of defeated Indian populations from both New England and the Chesapeake into New York territory. Twenty New England Indians settled about twenty miles northeast of Albany, and these were followed by about two hundred more over the next two years, forming a new nation known as the Scaticook Indians, who fell under the authority of the Mahicans. As early as February 1675 Mahican Indians illustrated the changes in both European and Indian relations in the Hudson River Valley. In a meeting between the Albany magistrates and the Chiefs of the Mahicans, the latter were recorded as stating "the English and the Dutch are now one and the Dutch are now English. Thus we Mahikanders, the Highland Indians, and the 'western corner' Indians are now one also." Although the outbreak of Metacom's War

22 The Senecas' were still opposed to the idea of ending the war with the Susquehannocks, although the Mohawks were receptive to the idea of the Susquehannocks moving into the area. The Susquehannock war with the Five Nations was primarily with the Senecas, Onondagas and Cayugas. The Mohawks actually supported the Susquehannocks over the other members of the Five Nations in this war. For more information see Francis Jennings, "Glory, Death and Transfiguration," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 112:1 (1968): 15-53.

23 Leder, *The Livingston Indian Records*, 37. These Highland Indians were New England Algonquians who came under the authority of the Mahicans during early stages of Metacom's War. Highland Indians was a
and the destruction that it brought to the New England Indians was the primary cause of New England Algonquian migrations to the west, John Pynchon wrote to Governor John Winthrop in April of 1674 that “our Indians at Woronoco and Pojassick are generall all of them removed to Albany; what the matter is they make so universal and general a remove I know not.”

While the reasons for the Woronoco and Pojassick Indians’ migration were not known, their arrival in the Hudson River Valley added to the continuing shifts in peoples and power in the region.

The Susquehannocks, who were involved in Bacon’s Rebellion while also at war with the Five Nations, came under the authority of the Five Nations. With this large movement of Indian populations to New York, Albany emerged as the center of Anglo-Indian relations. The migrations of New England Algonquian and Susquehannocks to New York occurred not only because Governor Andros offered them the protection of the colony of New York, but also because the Mohawks and Mahicans were willing to take in these refugees. Without the consent of the Indians in the region, Andros’ offer would have been rendered irrelevant. Mohawks and Mahicans encouraged the migrations of Indian refugees for their own purposes. Iroquois and Algonquian populations between French Canada and English New York were reinforced by the influx of Indian refugees, which strengthened the position of the Mohawks and Mahicans. This was especially true

---

24 Brindenbaugh, Pynchon Papers, 120.

25 See Jennings, “Glory”; Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, chapters 7 & 8; and Jose Antonio Brandao, “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More”, 75-113.
because many Iroquois were also leaving the region at this time to live in Canada. The growth of the Indian population in New York also helped to alleviate the threat of French attack as the buffer zone between the French and English was strengthened. Moreover, the influx of Indians into New York not only altered relations between New France and New York, but from 1677 on, New England and Chesapeake authorities were forced to shift their negotiations with Indians to Albany.

John Pynchon’s correspondence concerning Indian affairs offers a clear example of this geographical shift in Indian policy. Prior to Metacom’s War, Pynchon tried to establish his trade into the Hudson Valley from his home in Springfield, Massachusetts, but the majority of his correspondence concerning Indian relations was directed to Governor Winthrop in Hartford and to Governor John Leverett in Boston. However, in 1677 Pynchon’s correspondence concerning Indians shifted almost exclusively to Albany. Similarly, as New Englanders were forced to conduct their Indian relations west of their homes, Virginia and Maryland officials also had to shift their Indian policy to Albany. As they did so, they encountered the consequences of the shift in Indian populations and authority as well as Edmund Andros’s attempt to control interactions between Indians and Europeans.

Andros began his attempts to gain control over Indian populations during the colonial crises. He was in communication with Maryland and Virginia authorities as well as with Susquehannock sachems to negotiate the Susquehannocks’ move to New York. Similarly, he negotiated with New England Algonquians to offer them refuge as well. In

---

26 See Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 116-136 where he describes the migration of “Francophile” Iroquois to Catholic settlements in Canada and the reaction of the “anglophiles” who remained in Iroquoia.
both instances, he offended officials from the New England and Chesapeake colonies by meddling with "their Indians."\textsuperscript{28} In doing so, Andros attempted to control other colonies' access to the Iroquois and Mahicans. By establishing the Covenant Chain, under which the participating Indians were protected by the English crown, officials from the other colonies had to respect the position of the New York governor over the Indians of New York.

Although the colony of New York increased its power by controlling access to the new location for Indian/English meetings, this change did not occur solely as a result of New York's planning. The change occurred primarily due to shifts in Indian populations as a result of the conflicts of the 1670s, and more importantly these shifts occurred through negotiations with the Five Nations and Mahicans who continued to pursue their own interests outside of those of New York. This process had begun under the Dutch as the Mohawks continued to introduce new issues that concerned them into the court at Fort Orange. John Pynchon's letter to Governor John Winthrop in April prior to the outbreak of Metacom's War indicates that New England Indians were moving into Mahican and Mohawk land without prior consultation with any European authority. Furthermore, Edmund Andros, who is generally given credit as the architect of the Covenant Chain, had no hand in the movement because Albany was then known as Willemstadt and under the control of the Dutch.

While Andros did wield exceptional authority in Indian/English relations when he became governor of New York in the summer of 1674, he was still forced to concede to


\textsuperscript{28} Fernow, \textit{DRCHNY} 13: 497; and Christoph, \textit{Andros Papers}, 1: 444.
the will of the Indians in many instances. If Andros truly had power and authority over the Indians of the Hudson and Mohawk valleys, it would have made more sense to establish New York City as the center for Indian/English relations. However, the Mohawks retained their authority in the region by dictating where meetings would take place. Their status as an independent and formidable power in the region forced the English to acquiesce to Mohawk demands of retaining Albany as their negotiating center with both Europeans and other Indians. Albany’s location north of New York City was crucial because it served as a buffer zone between the French in Montreal and New York City. Moreover, because the Iroquois and Mahicans still maintained their power, and since Albany had become the traditional place for Iroquois and Mahicans to pursue their negotiations with the Europeans, Indian motivations played a crucial role in Albany’s rise as the new center of Anglo-Indian relations.29

Furthermore, the colony of New York still had to work in order to establish its power and authority over the other colonies. In order to accomplish this goal, New York officials changed the venue for meetings between Indians and colonial authorities. Until 1677 meetings between Indians and New York authorities took place within the confines of the forts located in Albany and Manhattan. These locations reflected the military and contentious nature of European and Indian affairs in the first half of the 1670s. The use of forts as the site of European negotiations with the Indians also illustrated a

29 The Mohawks were also able to dictate the location of negotiations in relations with New France in 1645. In this instance, the Mohawks were able to force a treaty meeting to be held at Three Rivers instead of Montreal, thus making it further away from the Onondagas. By dictating the location of the treaty negotiations, the Mohawks were able not only to display their supremacy in their struggle for power with the Onondagas, but also to maintain their power in their relations with the French. Francis Jennings, “Multiple Intrigues, The Earliest Recorded Description: The Mohawk Treaty with New France at Three Rivers, 1645,” in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, for D’Arcy McNickle Center for the History of the American Indians, The Newberry Library, 1985), 131-132
continuation of Dutch policy when the WIC maintained control over the forts as well as Indian negotiations. The use of the State House was reserved for resolving conflicts between colonists. The Dutch magistrates of Albany continued this practice throughout the English administrations of Governors Nicolls and Lovelace, as well as during the administration of Governor Colve during the Dutch re-occupation in 1673-1674. However, by the spring of 1677 with the end of the colonial crises all meetings between Indians, primarily Iroquois and Mahicans, and officials from any English colony were transferred to the Albany courthouse. This change was significant as the courthouse stood as a symbol of English imperial authority on the colonial landscape of North America.

By changing the venue for official interaction between colonial governments and Indian political representatives, New York authorities increased their own power in these affairs by controlling access to western Indians. However, at the same time the New York government offered the Iroquois and Mahicans who participated in these meetings greater political protection and increased ability to carry out their own policies. It is during these meetings at the courthouse where time and again, officials from other

---

30 See Merwick, Possessing Albany, 94,104-107, 143-147. Merwick also gives an in depth analysis of the significance of the town hall (stadthuis) to the Dutch residents of New York during Leisler’s Rebellion.

31 Leder, Livingston Indian Records. Records indicated that the last meeting held at the Fort took place between the Albany officials and the Mahicans on February 14, 1675 (new style). The next meeting recorded in Livingston’s account was between Major John Pynchon and James Richards representing Massachusetts and Connecticut respectively and the Mahican and “other River Indians” whom the Mahicans now represented. This latter meeting took place in the courthouse at Albany, where both groups agreed on a continuation of friendship. At this meeting the Mahicans were recorded as promising to keep the rivers clear down to New York. The two-year gap in the records reflects the fact that Andros met with Indian representatives primarily in Manhattan during the time of Metacom’s War and Bacon’s Rebellion.

32 It is also important to note that in using the courthouse as the symbol for English imperial power, the English were imposing their new meaning on a primarily Dutch landscape. For more on this see Bonomi, 39-58 which discusses Albany’s existence as a “city-state” somewhat independent from central authority
colonies, especially Virginia and Maryland, were forced to concede to Indians’ positions. The fact that these proceedings occurred in the courthouse at Albany reflected the idea that the Indians and English were participating in legally sanctioned negotiations and that the results of these negotiations were legally binding. For example, in 1677 and 1679 Virginia representatives traveled to the Albany courthouse in order to negotiate a peace with the Iroquois as well as demand punishment of Iroquois who were raiding English settlements in the Chesapeake. However, in these meetings they were forced to settle for Indians’ apologies for these incursions into Virginia. In fact, during the 1679 meeting, Virginia delegate Colonel William Kendall, after being forced to accept an apology from a group of Oneidas, stated, “Thogh your Actions already done, are Sufficient Reasons to Induce us to a Violent war against you which might Engage all our confederatt English neighbours, subjects to our great king Charles, yet ... we are therefore willing and have and doe forgive all the Dammages you have done our People (though very great).”

Although he believed the Oneidas’ raids into Virginia were grounds for war, he did not have the power to initiate revenge or demand stronger punishment. He lacked this power both because the Five Nations had the protection of New York, and because New York needed the Five Nations to help the colony economically and to serve as a buffer against the ever-present French threat to the north.

Moreover, this change in Indians’ legal standing among the English in New York occurred at the same time that Indians in New England and the Chesapeake Bay lost their political independence in their home regions. As Susquehannocks and New England located in New York City; Joyce Goodfriend, *Before the Melting Pot*, 103 where she discusses the adherence to Dutch cultural practices in Albany; and Merwick, *Possessing Albany*, 144.
Algonquians moved into New York territory, English officials simultaneously legitimized Five Nations and Mahicans' political and military authority within the established English legal structure in the courthouse. For example, in May of 1678 Albany resident William Teller was on trial for killing a New England Algonquian refugee woman.\(^\text{34}\) The death was ruled accidental, but during the trial itself Mahican sachems were present in the court with the jury. The sachems served as representatives of the Algonquian victim and three Algonquian witnesses to the shooting.\(^\text{35}\) This example illustrates two points. First, we can see the Mahicans' new role over the Algonquian newcomers to the Hudson River Valley, and second, we can see the new role of Mahicans on the diplomatic landscape of the colonial city as they gained greater access to English legal protection.\(^\text{36}\)

While the Mahicans gained control over the refugee tribes of New England, the Mohawks also utilized the meetings in the courthouse to gain authority within the Five Nations. During Coursy's 1677 conference at the Albany courthouse, he proposed peace to all the Five Nations tribes. All five of the Iroquois tribes responded to Coursy over a period of one month. Onondaga and the Oneida Sachems were the first to speak, and both groups spoke in the courthouse on the same day, July 21, 1677. The first to speak was the Onondaga Sachem Carachkondie. He agreed to peaceful relations between the Onondagas and the colonies of Maryland and Virginia, as well as the Indians under the

\(^{33}\) Leder, *Livingston Indian Records*, 53. In 1677 Col. Henry Coursy was forced to accept an Onondaga apology for their forays into Virginia territory in 1677 after the Iroquois tribe promised to avoid English settlements while raiding their Indian enemies in the area.

\(^{34}\) The term used was actually "North Indian". These Indians were New England Algonquians who, during Metacom's War, fell under the authority of the Mahicans.

\(^{35}\) Court Records indicate that trials involving Indians before 1677 also took place in the fort instead of the courthouse.

protection of those two colonies. However, he was also recorded as stating “Wee doe Let you Know that ther is of our four Castelles of the Senikars out a fighting against the Susquahannas you may therefor waren yor Indians That thar may be no Injuryes or damages done hereafter and so to continue the peace and doe give two Beavers.”37 While the Onondagas agreed to the peace, they also indicated that factions remained who were continuing their war with the Susquehannocks. After Carachkondie finished speaking, the Oneida sachems (who spoke for the Oneidas was not recorded) said that “wee doe absolutely approve of that wich the Onndagoes haith now Said.”38 The rest of their speech did, in fact, absolutely approve of what the Onondagas said earlier that day.

A month later, on August 22, 1677, the Senecas’ and the Cayugas’ representatives each gave a speech in the Albany courthouse concerning their relationship with Virginia and Maryland. Like the Onondagas and the Oneidas before them, the Senecas and Cayugas agreed to peace with the two colonies and the Indians under their protections, but also indicated that there are warriors currently down in the area continuing their hostilities with the Susquehannocks. They promised to end the hostilities when they returned to their homes.39 Their speeches were short, there was no indication of which individuals spoke for either tribe, and their recorded words were very similar to the Oneidas and Onondagas who spoke a month earlier.

The Mohawks, however, being the closest in proximity and with the strongest ties to Albany had a day all to themselves. They had already been able to keep meetings between the Iroquois and the English in Albany, they now managed to display their own

37 Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 44.
38 Ibid.
power within the Five Nations during those meetings.\textsuperscript{40} The Mohawks sent eight Sachems to the Albany courthouse. In comparison both the Onondagas and the Oneidas sent four apiece, and there was no record of how many representatives the Senecas and Cayugas sent to Albany. The Mohawks' Sachem Cannondacgoo spoke to Coursy on August 6, 1677. In his speech he gave several indications of the Mohawks' authority over the other members of the Five Nations and over the colonies of Maryland and Virginia. In his opening words, Cannondacgoo was recorded as saying to Coursy, "Thankes, Especially that his honnor hath bein pleased to Grant you the Priviledge for to Speak with us heir Seing that the Govr: Genii: & wee are one, and one hart and one head."\textsuperscript{41} Cannondacgoo's words indicated both the higher authority of Andros over Coursy as the former granted the latter the privilege of speaking with the Mohawks, and by tying the Mohawks to Andros, the Mohawks also established their dominance over Coursy and those he represented.

Cannondacgoo went on to speak against the Senecas also indicating the Mohawks' dominance within the Five Nations, at least in the eyes of the English. The Mohawk Sachem built up their authority over the Senecas by stating, "that the Seneks war upon thar Jorney to com hither with six hunderd Men Bot ffor fear Turned back agane Bot wee ware not affrayed to Com heir."\textsuperscript{42} With these words Cannondacgoo

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 47-48.

\textsuperscript{40} As stated earlier, in the Five Nations 1645 treaty negotiations with the French, the Mohawks were able to dictate that the meeting be held in Three Rivers instead of Montreal in order to put more space between the Onondagas and the French officials. This move helped to isolate the Onondagas and increase the Mohawks' power within the Five Nations.

\textsuperscript{41} Leder, \textit{Livingston Indian Records}, 45.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 46.
mocked the Senecas' weakness. Even with six hundred men, the Senecas, according to the Mohawks, were afraid to travel to Albany to meet with the English. Cannondacgoo proceeded to further isolate the Senecas from the English. He admonished Coursy to:

be allwyes myndfull of what is done in ye house ordeined to that end by the gov: genll and if ye Senekes now or any time herefter, should appoynt any oyr place for to Speake wth you In ther own cuntry or else wher Wee desyre yt it may not be accepted off bot that this be & remane the only appoynted & preffixed place.... And if you have a mynd hereafter to Speak wth us, we desyre yt it may bee heir and no wher else. 43

The Mohawks gave no warning of their warriors moving against the Susquehannocks, as the Mohawks were sympathetic to the Susquehannocks in their war with the other members of the Five Nations. With this speech and with his authority to dictate the meeting place, Cannondacgoo was able to assert the Mohawks' authority in relations between the Five Nations and the English as well as in relations among the Five Nations themselves. By the time the Senecas and Cayugas appeared in Albany on August 22, the English authorities did not find it necessary to indicate the names of the Sachems representing the tribes, nor were the two tribes given separate days on which to speak. The Mohawks had succeeded in marginalizing the authority of the other members of the Five Nations in relations with the English. 44

The Mohawks, however, did not merely align themselves with Andros and his government. Andros wrote a letter to the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck and Schenectady in June of 1677 that expressed his displeasure with the Mohawks taking it upon themselves to bring Indians under the protection of New York into their land. He

43 Ibid., 46-47.

44 In September 1679, Col. William Kendell traveled from Virginia to the Albany courthouse to meet with the Mohawks because the Senecas broke the 1677 negotiated peace with Virginia. It appears that the Mohawks instructions for the Virginians to deal with the Senecas through the Mohawks and in Albany was well heeded. Ibid., 49.
voiced his disapproval of the Mohawks' independent action, but Andros was forced to "consign this to oblivion" because there was not much he could do. Andros did, however, include a warning, that if the Mohawks "or any others forget themselves and presume to receive any others who are in our district, I shall take it as if it were done to Christians and to myself and expect full satisfaction therefor." With these strong words being read, there was no indication that any Mohawks were present to hear them.

**Indians within the Town Walls**

As the Mohawks in particular gained greater access and authority with their presence in the Albany courthouse, Indians were also gaining access to other spaces around the city. One of the new alterations to the European/Indian landscape of Albany after 1677 was the approval and construction of Indian houses outside the gates of the city. As mentioned earlier both Dutch and English authorities worked to keep all Indians outside of European settlements during the night. In order to provide Indians acceptable overnight accommodations, a petition to build Indian housing outside of the city walls of Albany was put before the court magistrates in 1672. However, the actual construction of the houses was put off while a committee decided where best to build them. Like many tasks given to committees the work was not completed.

It was not until May 1676, as New England was experiencing the ravages of Metacom's War, that the Albany magistrates ordered "the burghers and inhabitants of Albany to contribute, each pro rata, toward the erection of the Indian or Hansioos house

---


233

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
outside the gate...within the space of fourteen days.” The residents chosen to fund the house were the leading merchants in the town. A few weeks later the magistrates decided to build two more Indian houses. This time, the entire town was to be held responsible for financing, constructing and maintaining the houses. After Indians tore down and burned fences in January 1677, traders who resided in the city were also made responsible for supplying the Indian houses with firewood.

Houses were built in two locations, outside the south gate and on the plain in an attempt to control both Indian movements and the area around the gates. With the Indian houses in these locations, their movements could be easily monitored because these areas were relatively cleared compared to the west and north sides of the town, allowing for an unimpeded view of activities. Furthermore, by building the houses in these locations, the Indians would, it was hoped, enter the city through the south gate and the first thing they would see would be the courthouse, the new center of all Indian/English negotiations.

However, as the English authorities began to impose order and control over the residents of the area, both European and Indian, their efforts had mixed results, as Indians continued to gain increased access to the city and colonists ignored rules they did not necessarily like. Andros tried, like many before him, to end the presence of drunk Indians within the town walls by imposing heavy fines and suspending trading privileges.

---

47 Van Laer, Minutes, 2:106-107. This order to build the Indian houses came six months after Andros ordered blockhouses to be built to protect both European as well as Indians. Fernow, DRCHNY 13: 464.


49 There are several seventeenth-century maps of the layout of Albany including, Colonel Romer’s “Plan de la Ville d’Albanie, 1698” and the plan of “Albany” that appeared in John Miller’s New York Considered and Improved (they are held by the Public Record Office and the British Museum respectively but can be seen in Merwick, Possessing Albany, 108-109). Both maps show several structures outside of the south gate of the city, but there is no indication of their function or identity.
to any resident guilty of having drunk Indians in his or her home. An entire street would be punished if it could not be ascertained in whose house the Indians procured and consumed the alcohol. And like his predecessors, Andros’ attempt at curbing Indians’ consumption of alcohol failed. Many Albany residents also refused to do their part in maintaining the Indians’ houses, such as Gabriel Thomson, who was taken to court and ordered to pay his share for the Indian houses. The hoped for results of controlling Indian movements around Albany by building Indian houses outside of the gates was also less than a success. Indeed, Indian activities remained outside of colonial control and colonists’ activities remained outside of the courts’ control. Indians continued to move throughout the city after the ringing of the bell, and to lodge in the houses of traders although such activities continued to be expressly forbidden.

However, it was not just the movements of the Indians that Andros and the English authorities hoped to control. In 1676, Governor Andros issued an ordinance in Albany forbidding any new streets to be laid out or houses to be built until all the vacant lots then in the city were built on and completely occupied. He took his ordinance further by demanding that no houses were to be built on a street until the corner lots were occupied. Andros also dictated the size of the house as well as the building material. The houses were to be no less than two rooms deep and no less than eighteen feet wide, with the front façade constructed with brick or quarry stone and covered with tiles. These restrictions were “to be strictly observed.” As Andros attempted to bring order to the city of Albany, English authorities also persisted in trying to bring order to the land

50 Van Laer, Minutes 2: 123, 244.
51 Ibid., 193, 261.
outside of the town by forbidding trade outside of Albany, as the Dutch had done before them.

The English, like the Dutch before them, often considered the land outside of the gates of the city to be a wild, disordered landscape. Donna Merwick has shown that the area outside of the town walls was becoming more attractive in the 1670s as fewer people were able to make a living at the fur trade. However, as Merwick also noted, English visitors and residents of the area viewed Dutch agricultural land use patterns as disorderly, with ill defined lots and lands left unimproved. After 1677, the English colonial government tried to impose its own understanding of what an ordered colonial landscape was supposed to be on both the Indian and European inhabitants of the area. It did this by forcing residents to pay for the upkeep of the Indian houses and by trying to force the Indians to reside in them. In this way, the English attempted to bring order and control to the area outside the gates and at the same time tried to expand their influence over the land. The houses were built in order to maintain order and control. However, as the English were trying to bring order to relations among the various Indian tribes and Europeans in the Hudson Valley by building the houses, illicit trade continued outside of the Albany gates. In April 1676, a month before the magistrates committed to building the Indian houses outside of the city, Governor Andros issued an ordinance forbidding

---

52 Ibid., 135-136.
53 Merwick, Possessing Albany, 196-205; also see John Stilgoe, Common Landscape of America, 10, and pages 43-58 for his discussion on New England landscapes, and pages 58-77 for his discussion of Tidewater and Piedmont landscapes. Stilgoe, however, offers no discussion of landscapes of the seventeenth-century Middle Colonies.
54 Miller’s and Romer’s maps both depict an ordered, improved landscape outside of the gates, with its layout being quite similar to that of the appearance inside the gates.
any inhabitant of Albany, “be his capacity what it may,” to conduct any trade with the Indians outside of the city gates.\textsuperscript{55}

It was not only merchants and traders who were difficult to control. In August 1677, several women and girls were brought before the court and fined for having been seen in the vicinity of the Indian houses. Mews Hoogeboom, the father of several of these girls, was brought into the court again in March of 1680 “because the defendant continually lets his children go to the Indian houses on the hill with all sorts of trinket, knives, paints, etc. to sell to the Indians, having caught them at it on July 12 and 22, August 17 and February 20 last.” Hoogeboom denied the charges, but was nevertheless condemned to pay a fine.\textsuperscript{56}

The Hoogeboom daughters were part of a larger threat to the authorities’ control over trade between Europeans and Indians. While Andros continued to issue ordinances forbidding trade with Indians outside the city of Albany, the practice continued on both small and large scales. Ordinances were written for the benefit of Albany residents who traveled outside the gates to conduct their illicit trade, and ordinances were “written for the benefit of the town of Schenectady” whose residents often posed the greatest threat to Albany’s advantageous position with the Indians. Of course Andros’s attempts to control trade outside of the city of Albany were another example in a long line of ordinances that were similarly ignored. However, the illicit trade that took place in the woods in the 1670s led the court to state that such trade outside of Albany continued “at peril to all at

\textsuperscript{55} Van Laer, \textit{Minutes}, 2: 91.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 473.
this verrry dangerous Juncture of time” as the English and Indians were embarking on new forms of negotiations, shifting alliances and power struggles.\textsuperscript{57}

From 1672 to 1677 the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys experienced drastic change as Albany’s continually changing cultural landscape was transformed into a new diplomatic landscape that served as the center of Anglo-Indian relations between Carolina and Canada. The real significance of this change however is that Albany rose to its prominence as a new diplomatic landscape not as the result of a single person or colonial policy, but as the result of negotiations and conflicts between diverse groups including English, Dutch, French, Iroquois and Algonquian. Moreover these negotiations would not have happened without the four colonial conflicts that took place in the 1670s. As a result of these negotiations and conflicts, which took place in the span of five, short years, European and Indian leaders dramatically altered the landscape of the East Coast of America. By 1677 Albany truly took its place as a prominent feature on the colonial diplomatic landscape.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 91, 245-246, 361-362.
CONCLUSION

"Brethren of Virginia, Wee are come here in the Prefixed house where we are used to make Propositions, and have understood that which is by you Represented." ¹ This statement was made by the Onondaga Sachems Caratchkondie, Otrewachte, Cachisuhtoe, and Onuerachton to Colonel William Kendall agent for Virginia in the Albany courthouse on November 1, 1679. The meeting between the Iroquois tribe and the English colony was the last to be held during the decade of the 1670s, and Carachkondie's statement clearly illustrates the long-standing importance of the Albany courthouse, which was both a prefixed place and the place where the Onondagas were used to making propositions. This meeting was also the culmination of decades of cross-cultural trade, information exchange and warfare that established Albany as the colonial center of European and Indian relations.

Although not often mentioned with the other European colonial centers of power in the seventeenth-century like Boston, Montreal or Jamestown, by 1680 Albany stood alone as the new diplomatic center for English and Indian affairs in North America north of Carolina. English representatives from New England, Virginia and Maryland had to travel to Albany to conduct business with, primarily, the Iroquois Indians who by the end of the 1670s spoke for many of the surrounding Indians who were now under their

¹ Leder, Livingston Indian Records, 60.
protection. Albany would serve as the home of the Covenant Chain between the Iroquois and English until the formation of the United States over a century later.

The creation of this new diplomatic landscape was the result of decades of struggle and compromise between and among Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and Algonquian peoples both inside and outside of the Hudson River Valley. The struggle over the control of land led to new understandings of how individuals and groups of different ethnic and cultural origins defined proper land use and proper land ownership. Each group came into the situation with preconceived ideas of what it meant to occupy and control land and spaces, whether it was through occupation by individuals, legal land titles, placing the land under agricultural production or having the power to keep others out. All of these notions were challenged as the different cultures encountered one another and worked to establish their own understandings of power and control of land. Because of the challenges to each other's authority over the land no one power, either European or Indian, was able to fully establish its own authority over all of the land of the Hudson River Valley at this time. As a result of this fluid situation new definitions of proper land use and ownership of certain lands and spaces were constantly being created. This was particularly true for the region of Fort Orange/Albany, which held a unique position in colonial North America.

Albany's location as an interior settlement at the intersection of lands claimed and contested by several ethnic groups, including the Dutch, English, French, Iroquois and Algonquian made it an ideal location for its formation as a new diplomatic landscape.

2 After 1664, whenever such tribes as the Esopus or Catskills needed to speak with the English, it not only occurred at the Albany courthouse, but the Mohawks or the Mahicans were present to speak for the other tribes. However, when it came time to renew the peace made between the Dutch and the Esopus prior to
Albany's relative isolation from the larger centers of Montreal, Boston and New York City also allowed its residents, both Indian and European, the freedom and independence to chart their own path that led to Albany's unique position among the English centers of power in North America. This isolation was particularly important in the Dutch period, and it caused communication between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam to be difficult at best. As Stuyvesant spent a good deal of his time fending off threats from English and Swedish sources, especially from 1647-1655, residents in Fort Orange and Rensselaerswyck set a precedent for independent actions, especially in their dealings with the local Indian population.

Once Stuyvesant turned greater attention to issues dealing with Indians, such as running in the woods, illegal alcohol sales to Indians and Indians within town walls, Fort Orange residents continued to pursue an Indian policy to their benefit. Sometimes officials at Fort Orange worked in conjunction with Stuyvesant and the Council in New Amsterdam. WIC officials in both communities worked to control the problem with runners in the woods. This issue was of particular importance for the leaders of Fort Orange to retain control over the fur trade in the area. However, the leaders at New Amsterdam and those at Fort Orange differed on many other matters, especially those that would restrict Indian movements within the town of Fort Orange, which would, in turn, restrict the fur trade of the community. Moreover, the Indian populations also wished to retain the influence that they were gaining within the town and would not be pleased with restrictions to their movements. The Iroquois were particularly interested in expanding their access to the court system of Fort Orange, and because the Dutch

the English takeover of the colony, the Esopus Sachem, typically Calcop and his son, would speak for their own people within the courthouse.

241
depended on the Indians, particularly the Mohawks, for furs. All parties involved at Fort
Orange worked to maintain the site for open European/Indian trade and diplomatic
negotiations.

Fort Orange’s isolation also provided ample opportunity for the non-Iroquois
Indian groups who lived between these two centers to assert their own influence on how
Indian and European relations would develop. While Albany’s new diplomatic landscape
would primarily serve the English and Iroquois, the process that created that landscape
included the participation of many more groups and individuals. These often-overlooked
players included the Indian groups of the Esopus, Catskills, Wappingers and
Hackensacks. Of course, other non-English European colonists, such as the French and
particularly the Dutch, also contributed to the creation of a new landscape at Albany.
Each of these cultural groups actively participated through wars, threats of wars, trade,
religion expression, exchange of information and diplomacy to create a new diplomatic
landscape in the Hudson River Valley. This landscape was neither purely Indian nor
purely European, but a combination of elements from all these groups. In this way the
new landscape was navigable by all groups involved.

The process of how this new diplomatic landscape came to be has shed light on
the critical role of Indians in seventeenth-century North America. While it would be the
Iroquois who would dominate much of Indian affairs through the last quarter of the
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century in this region, this was not a foregone
conclusion in the mid-seventeenth century. The actions of and events surrounding many
other Indian groups created the environment for the Iroquois to rise to their own
dominant position in seventeenth-century North America.
Wars between the Dutch and Indian tribes of the lower Hudson River Valley in the 1650s, particularly the Peach War of 1655, ended the resistance of those tribes to the Dutch presence in the area. As a result, there remained no truly independent Indian power near Manhattan Island after 1655. In this respect the year 1655 stands out as a significant turning point in European-Indian relations in general and the rise of Albany at its center in particular. In response to the war Stuyvesant changed his tactics in trying to gain control over the movements and morals of Indians and European residents of the Hudson River Valley. He tried to restrict Indian movements within Dutch towns and Dutch movements outside of towns in order to keep individuals from invading the space of other ethnic groups. This way, in Stuyvesant’s Calvinist informed view, the wilderness of the Indians and the ordered landscape of the Dutch would remain separate, until the Dutch could bring order to the wilderness outside of the towns. The Esopus region proved to be the most significant area where Stuyvesant actively pursued the creation of a Dutch landscape through the takeover of an Indian landscape. This, of course, led to the Second Esopus War of 1663-1664.

Stuyvesant’s exclusive reactions to the Peach War of 1655 added to the already fractured nature of relations between the Dutch settlements of Fort Orange and New Amsterdam, as Fort Orange less than enthusiastically implemented these new tactics. The residents of Fort Orange were not interested in eliminating Indian power in the region as their livelihoods depended on the Indian participation in the fur trade. They resisted Stuyvesant’s restrictions on the merging of Indian and Dutch landscapes, thereby allowing for the creation of a new landscape that would eventually result in a new diplomatic landscape.
Furthermore, with the elimination of the Lower Hudson River tribes as independent powers, Stuyvesant was forced to move north first to the Esopus and then to Fort Orange to conduct relations with remaining independent Indian powers, namely the Esopus and the Mohawks. While he tried to conduct Indian policy out of New Amsterdam, the Esopus Indians, prior to 1664, and the Indians of the upper Hudson Valley, including the Iroquois and Mahicans continued to wield enough power to make Stuyvesant shift his negotiations closer to their territories. However, at the same time, the Indians were successful at keeping the Dutch, and then the English, out of their villages and political spaces, allowing them to retain their traditional landscapes. This forced the creation of new diplomatic spaces within Dutch settlements, particularly within Fort Orange.

In the few years after 1655, hostile activity between the Dutch and Indians occurred in the Esopus region located between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. These hostile actions, known as the Esopus Wars, were the result of the struggle between the Dutch and the Indians to control the development of the landscape. As the Dutch worked to create a Dutch, agricultural landscape, the Esopus worked to keep this Dutch influence to a minimum. With no room to compromise because the two groups maintained opposing and exclusive goals concerning how the land would be occupied and by whom, the end of the Esopus Wars would result in the elimination of one group from the region. It was the Esopus Indians who were eliminated as an independent Indian power along the Hudson. With the elimination of the Esopus Indians as an independent power, it opened the way for the Dutch, and then the English to dictate how the landscape would be developed. This was not the case further to the north.
During these wars between the Dutch and the Indian tribes below Fort Orange, the Mohawks were able to take advantage of the situation and start to impose their authority on the landscape of the Hudson River Valley, and particularly on the diplomatic landscape of Fort Orange. With Fort Orange’s natural physical isolation, and the Esopus and Peach Wars, which further served to isolate Fort Orange from the political center of New Netherland on Manhattan Island, the Dutch WIC authorities had to rely on Indians as their source of communication and information. While the Dutch did have easy access and greater control over the waterways of the colony, Indians, particularly the Mohawks and the Mahicans, controlled the flow of information over land. With the Dutch highly dependent on Indian intelligence and Indian couriers for information, all Indian groups were able to wield a certain amount of power by controlling European access to information.

Indian groups and individuals placed themselves in advantageous positions by informing the Dutch how they stopped an attack on a certain settlement or how they heard of an imminent attack on Dutch settlements. In return for much of this information, the Indians often received material goods, but more importantly, they received access to European leaders and towns and eventually into the Dutch and then English legal systems. In this way American Indians played a prominent role in the creation of a new diplomatic landscape on which they asserted significant authority.

During the Esopus Wars, particularly the second one from 1663 to 1664, the Dutch authorities continually turned to the Mohawks to find out the location and intentions of the Esopus Indians. They also became dependent on information from the Catskill Indians. Stuyvesant distrusted the Catskills, but since they were under the
authority of the Mohawks, Stuyvesant and other WIC officials were forced to accept Catskill intelligence as they would Mohawk information. The Dutch WIC also asked the Mohawks to become actively involved in their war with the Esopus Indians because of the Mohawks knowledge of the land in which the Esopus were hiding and their ability to travel with ease upon that land. While the Mohawks were busy with their own wars with Algonquian Indians in New England, the events that took place in the late 1650s and early 1660s allowed the Mohawks to increase their already valuable position within New Netherland as the Dutch came to rely on them for information and diplomacy.

The WIC also relied upon the Mohawks to provide the company with the highly valuable beaver pelts, the trade of which was centered at Fort Orange. Because of this Dutch dependence on the Mohawks, the Mohawks and Dutch created a very different landscape in Fort Orange than elsewhere in the colony. In the Esopus region, the Dutch and Indians fought for control of the land with the Dutch calling for the elimination of the Esopus Indians in order to establish a Dutch, agricultural landscape in the region. However, Fort Orange’s dependence on trade with the Indians required the presence of Indians in the town and required good relations with those Indians. As theMohawks were the closest to the Dutch outpost, it was they who were able to wield the most influence within its walls.

With the welcome, indeed necessary, presence of Indians within the Dutch town at Fort Orange, the two groups had to find ways to coexist. However, their compromises were often contrary to official WIC policy as directed from New Amsterdam. The leaders at Fort Orange had always displayed an independence from New Amsterdam that was also reflected in how they dealt with European residents of the community. The leaders
and residents in Fort Orange were more lenient with individuals guilty of selling and smuggling alcohol to Indians, as well as individuals who acted contrary to the moral regulations put in place by Stuyvesant and the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church such as Lutherans and Catholics. Yet because of Fort Orange’s isolation and different circumstances in regards to their relations with New Amsterdam and with the Indians of the upper Hudson River Valley, both Indians and the Dutch created a new cultural landscape that was significantly different from any other in the colony. The continued presence of the Indians within the town walls of Fort Orange for trade purposes would allow the relations between the Dutch and Mohawks to evolve beyond their trade relations.

Because the Dutch were so dependent on the Mohawks for their economic survival and gave the Mohawks concessions to maintain good relations, the latter became more aggressive in their dealings with the Dutch and eventually began making requests then demands from the Dutch. Moreover, they did this within the Dutch legal system located in the fort at Fort Orange. By requesting Dutch assistance in their relations with the French, the Mohawk began involving the Dutch at Fort Orange with Mohawk goals. The Mohawks soon began using Fort Orange for meetings with other Indian groups. Soon, the Mohawks established diplomatic precedents within the Fort Orange court system and continued to build on them. This Dutch dependence and accommodation of Indians did not occur anywhere else within New Netherland. Dutch and Indian relations in the Esopus region were almost purely contentious and there was little to no room for compromise. Dutch economic dependence and lack of desire to take over Mohawks’
lands near Fort Orange provided an atmosphere to allow the Mohawks access to the town.

Furthermore, while doing this the Mohawks also restricted Dutch access to their own territory. This practice had been going on for decades as Iroquois as well as Esopus Indians worked diligently to keep Europeans from having free access to their villages and centers of power. Therefore the Indians of the Hudson River Valley, not just the Mohawks were fully in charge of the woods and their villages beyond Fort Orange and other Dutch settlements such as Esopus. Moreover, at the same time the Mohawks were increasing their influence over the landscape within Fort Orange.

By 1664, when the English took over New Netherland, the Mohawks had established themselves as the dominant Indian power in the region as a result of the Peach War, Esopus Wars and Dutch dependence on them for communication. The date of 1664 in this context is not as relevant for relations between Europeans and Indians in the Hudson River Valley. However, 1664 is quite significant in this context as the year that the Mohawks stood as the most influential independent Indian power in the region. With the surrender and break up of the Esopus Indians in 1664, all dealings with independent Indian power shifted to the Iroquois and to their base of operations with Europeans at Fort Orange.

In this respect, 1664 becomes a crucial turning point along with 1655. Events in both dates created a significant shift in the geography of Indian and European negotiations in this region northward toward Fort Orange, and then in 1664, to Albany. While in 1664 the European powers changed from Dutch to English, it was the Mohawks who retained and increased their control of Indian and European interactions in the area.
The Mohawks, and the English, would continue to utilize the same negotiating systems and locations as had been present during the Dutch period. The meetings were still held within the confines of the fort, now renamed Fort Albany, and the Mohawks continued to dominate those meetings.

After the English established New York, the Mohawks and the English took advantage of events outside of the immediate area to increase the importance of Albany as a meeting place for European and Indian diplomacy. The Five Nations’ War with the Susquehannocks, the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Bacon’s Rebellion and Metacom’s War all allowed for the influx of new Indian populations under the control of the Mohawks and for the continued use of Albany as a site for meetings between Indians and English. These events all took place in the 1670s and were the next significant turning point for Indian and English relations because they helped to extend Albany’s influence beyond the Hudson and Mohawk River Valleys. Now Indians from the Chesapeake and New England had moved into the region to live under the authority of the Mohawks. Additionally, English officials from Virginia, Maryland and New England all had to travel to Albany in order conduct any type of diplomatic meeting with these Indians.

It was also during this period that the meeting place changed from the fort, which stood as the symbol of Dutch authority on the landscape, to the Albany courthouse, which stood as the symbol of English power on the land. The presence of the Mohawks in either venue was significant because in both places the Mohawks were able to use the European legal proceedings to further their own ends within the legal authority of European powers. These actions by European powers gave greater validity and value to
Mohawk actions and allowed the Mohawks to provide significant and dominant contributions to the creation of the new diplomatic landscape at Albany.

By the time the Onondaga Sachem Carachkondie addressed Colonel Kendall of Virginia in Albany's courthouse on November 1, 1679 years of trade, rumors, wars, negotiations and compromises between Europeans and Indians allowed for the creation of a unique diplomatic landscape centered in Albany. While Indians and Europeans were able to establish dominance of certain areas within the Hudson River Valley and thereby dictate how that landscape was to be used, the space within Albany became a space utilized effectively by both Europeans and Indians.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript Sources

National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
National Map Collection

New-York Historical Society
   Albany County Land Patents
   Beekman Letter Book
   Indian Collection
   Miller Papers
   N-YHS Map Collection
   New York town and county records:
      Ulster County
      Albany County

Published Sources


Fernow, Berthold, ed. Documents Relative to the History and settlements of the towns along the Hudson and Mohawk River (with the exception of Albany) from 1630-1684, and also illustrating the relations of the settlers with the Indians. Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, 1881.


. *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, being the letters of Kiliaen Van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and other documents relating to the colony of Rensselaerswyck*. Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SECONDARY SOURCES

Unpublished Sources


Published Sources


255

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


Hermes, Katherine. “‘Justice Will Be Done Us’: Algonquian Demands for Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers.” In *The Many Legalities of Early America*, edited by Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, 123-149. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2001


