Nationalism, the anti-conquest norm, and Lockean cultures of anarchy

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Abstract
This thesis explores the structural effects of nationalism on the international state system using Alexander Wendt’s "cultures of anarchy" typology. The quantitative portion employs a logistic regression model to determine whether states with "stronger" national identities are less likely to pursue territorial conquest as a goal of using force. Because of the problematic nature of measuring nationalism quantitatively, case studies in US foreign policy towards the Dominican Republic are used to highlight the ways that appeals to the anti-conquest norm are often justified on the basis of national self-determination. Leaving open the issue of whether the anti-conquest norm is a causal factor in explaining the relative paucity of territorial conquest since 1945, I find that the anti-conquest itself is largely constituted by ideas about the legitimacy of national self-determination.

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NATIONALISM, THE ANTI-CONQUEST NORM, AND LOCKEAN CULTURES OF ANARCHY

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the structural effects of nationalism on the international state system using Alexander Wendt’s “cultures of anarchy” typology. The quantitative portion employs a logistic regression model to determine whether states with “stronger” national identities are less likely to pursue territorial conquest as a goal of using force. Because of the problematic nature of measuring nationalism quantitatively, case studies in US foreign policy towards the Dominican Republic are used to highlight the ways that appeals to the anti-conquest norm are often justified on the basis of national self-determination. Leaving open the issue of whether the anti-conquest norm is a causal factor in explaining the relative paucity of territorial conquest since 1945, I find that the anti-conquest itself is largely constituted by ideas about the legitimacy of national self-determination.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Second World War, territorial conquest has been almost entirely absent from world politics (Fazal, 2007; Zacher, 2001; Malesevic, 2008). This change in behavior is consistent with the longer trend in decreased frequency of international conflict over territory, though it is somewhat puzzling given that international politics is often said to occur in a hostile, anarchic environment (Holsti, 1991). Wendt (1999) problematizes the concept of anarchy by positing the possibility of at least three types of anarchical international orders: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. These orders are respectively characterized by unrestrained conflict, restrained rivalry, and friendship. Consistent with the decreased incidence in territorial conflict, Wendt argues that the current international order is for the most part a Lockean system, though he maintains that many instances of state-to-state interaction can fairly be described as either situations of unrestrained conflict or friendship. In describing the transition from a Hobbesian system to a Lockean system, Wendt argues that states’ perceptions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ evolve to accommodate toleration of the existence of other sovereign states, though he offers no explanation of how this change may occur other than to say that iterated interaction eventually yields a sort of restrained rivalry where states decline to expand territorially. A key question thus remains unresolved: if the lack of territorial conquest in the international system marks a change in the “culture” of international
politics, what accounts for this change in behavior? In other words, how can the international system transition from the Hobbesian to the Lockean culture?

One manner in which states might transition to restrained rivalry (the Lockean culture) from a state of enmity (the Hobbesian culture) is the dissemination of norms. The literature on norms in international relations offers convincing evidence that normative principles can have significant effects on the priorities that states set, as well as the ways that they interact with each other (Katzenstein, 1996; O’Neill, Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2004). In security studies, “normative” theoretical frameworks have been applied to state-to-state dynamics related to nuclear deterrence (Price & Tannenwald, 1996), weapons proliferation (Eyre & Suchman, 1996), and alliance politics (Barnett, 1996). Not surprisingly, some have pointed to the importance of a “norm against conquest” – specifically against permanent, territorial conquest – to explain the state of restrained rivalry corresponding to Wendt’s Lockean culture of anarchy (Fazal, 2007; Zacher, 2001). The League of Nations and the United Nations are two historical examples of attempts to institutionalize this anti-conquest norm. Though this norm can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established sovereign statehood as the legitimate organizing principle of international politics, it is only relatively recently that states have seemingly begun to respect each other’s sovereignty by (for the most part)

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1 Finnemore (1996) demonstrates how individuals and international organizations have played important roles in promoting the widespread adoption of scientific bureaucracies, establishing rules for humanitarian aid in times of war, and reorienting development efforts towards poverty alleviation. Each of these changes has occurred largely as the result of concerted efforts to promote certain ideas about what types of behavior and organization are appropriate in international politics.
refraining from taking each other’s territory. Again, this pattern of behavior is consistent with Wendt’s Lockean culture.

Even if norms are respected most of the time, they need not necessarily be respected all the time. The argument here is that although norms may be contested and eventually discarded, the norm against conquest is more firmly ingrained than Fazal would expect because it is largely constituted by another highly legitimate norm in international politics – national self-determination.

The historic shift toward the Lockean culture roughly coincides with the spread of the modern principle of national self-determination. This paper argues that norms related to national self-determination largely constitute the emerging anti-conquest norm, which in turn creates an environment indistinguishable from Wendt’s Lockean culture of anarchy. In other words, the “content” of Lockean culture is partially determined by the relatively recent historical development of modern nationalism, the linking of nationality to territory, and the promulgation of a norm against territorial conquest based on national self-determination. The qualitative difference in how nations are constructed as opposed to other forms of political identity has direct implications for Wendt’s concept of cultures of anarchy. Since nations’ identities are partially defined by relational differences to “Others” (i.e. other nations), the process of excluding Others might lead to foreign policies that at least limit the scope of conflict in the sense that territorial conquest is no

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2 Fazal (2007) expresses skepticism about the resilience of this norm, arguing that, “even if the norm against conquest is fairly deeply internalized on a global level today, internalization is no guarantee of permanence” (p. 238). In fact, some have argued that there was once a norm legitimizing territorial conquest (Zacher, 2001). Fazal sees the enforcement of this norm by the United States as a decisive factor in states’ abiding by it.

3 In the language of the regime literature, national self-determination is “embedded” in the anti-conquest norm (See Finnemore, 1996, p. 16). This does not mean that there cannot be other pathways to the Lockean culture.
longer seen as necessary or even desirable for ensuring the existence of the nation. While other forms of political identity may entail a certain amount of proselytizing (some religious identities, for example), nationhood is built largely on exclusion.

The paper hypothesizes that as the “nation” is championed as the most legitimate boundary of political organization for sovereign states, it alters states’ perceptions of one another and influences the range of goals pursued by states in international politics. Specifically, states with stronger national identities should be less inclined to seek territorial conquest as a specific goal of using force because of the exclusionary, territorial nature of nationalism. It is in this regard that nationalism is being offered as an alternative pathway through which the Lockean culture may be achieved. This hypothesis, referred to as the “nationalist-restraint” hypothesis throughout the paper, serves as the overarching framework for the study. One of the competing explanations for the relative lack of territorial conquest tested by Fazal is the “nationalist-resistance” hypothesis, which proposes that states will refrain from conquering populations with strong national consciousness because of the promise of sustained resistance by nationals unwilling to live under the control of a foreign power. Though she does find a very limited amount of support for this hypothesis, she concludes that overall the nationalist-resistance argument is unconvincing. In an attempt to engage this research agenda, the opposite side of the nationalist-resistance hypothesis is tested, hence the name “nationalist-restraint.”

The paper is concerned primarily with two specific questions. First, to what extent does nationalism constitute the norm against conquest? To answer this question, two case studies in American foreign policy toward the Dominican Republic are used to assess the
normative relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm. The first case is
the near-annexation of the Dominican Republic by the United States circa 1870. The
second is the US occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. Both of these
cases are used by Fazal to test hypotheses about “state death” and are revisited here in
order to establish a common point of departure.\(^4\) The case study section uses analysis of
public speeches made by American policy makers in order to qualitatively assess the
relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm. The primary finding of the
case study section is that the anti-conquest norm, at least as expressed by American
policy makers, is often based on the principle of national self-determination. This initial
finding is important for the broader argument about nationalism and Lockean cultures in
that it establishes a link between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm.

This finding leads to the second major question asked in this study: how, if at all,
does nationalism actually impact whether or not a state pursues territorial conquest as a
goal of foreign policy? Where the case study section is concerned with exploring the
constitutive relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm, the quantitative
section builds on this finding by attempting to establish whether or not a causal
relationship exists between nationalism and disinclination toward territorial conquest. In
other words, even if nationalism “constitutes” the anti-conquest norm, does this have any
practical effect in world politics? A quantitative analysis of the nationalist-restraint
hypothesis using data from the Correlates of War and Polity IV projects is conducted in

\(^4\) The purpose of using two of Fazal’s case studies is not to present a revisionist account of her work.
Instead, the paper seeks to highlight the ways that nationalism influences arguments made in debates
among policymakers in the United States over whether annexation and occupation were appropriate ends of
foreign policy. The questions asked here are entirely different from those asked by Fazal. The nationalist-
resistance hypothesis tested by Fazal essentially presumes that policy makers include the prospect of
resistance in cost-benefit analyses, while the intent of the case studies here is to explore what the beliefs
and ideas about nationalism held by policymakers were, how those ideas were related to ideas about the
anti-conquest norm, and how these ideas influenced arguments about the appropriate course of action.
order to provide a preliminary answer to this question. The primary assumption is that more nationalistic states will be more inclined to abide by the anti-conquest norm (as measured by whether or not a state chooses territorial revision as a goal of foreign policy) because of the close relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm. The logistic regression model used indicates that increases in levels of nationalism (as measured by democracy, industrialization, and time since independence) do in fact decrease the odds of a state being territorially revisionist relative to other types of revisionists.

This research agenda has implications for both mainstream and critical theories of international relations. A focus on how identity influences foreign policy behavior contrasts with theoretical approaches that attribute actors’ behavior to anarchy, which is assumed to generate consistent behavioral traits among the states of the international system. Fazal (2007) convincingly argues that it is in fact the anti-conquest norm, rather than some other dynamic of the international system, that is responsible for the observed change in state behavior since about 1945. Taking this claim as a starting point, the argument here is that part of the reason states act in a way consistent with the state of restrained rivalry described by Wendt is the development of concrete national identities rooted in popular sovereignty, the correspondence of these identities to defined state territories, and the dissemination of an anti-conquest norm based on national self-determination.

The thesis is composed of six chapters (including this introduction) divided into two main parts. The first part of the paper (chapters two and three) establishes the
theoretical and empirical foundations of the hypotheses to be tested in part two. Part two (chapters four and five) sets out and tests a total of seven hypotheses.

Chapter two begins by establishing some working definitions of nationalism and reviewing the relationship between major theories of international relations and nationalism. Next, the empirical literature on nationalism in world politics is reviewed. The question of how the nation is constructed as a distinct political identity is addressed by reviewing major theoretical works by scholars of nationalism. The chapter concludes with a review of the literature on the relationship between nationalism and territoriality.

Chapter three begins with a discussion of the anti-conquest norm and a brief overview of its historical origins. This discussion leads into Wendt’s “culture of anarchy” framework.

The fourth chapter develops a quantitative research design based on Fazal’s (2007) quantitative test of the nationalist-resistance hypothesis. The paper uses a logistic regression model to test whether or not states that are more nationalistic are less likely to pursue territorial conquest. Chapter five analyzes two case studies in American foreign policy towards the Dominican Republic, testing three additional hypotheses. Here the focus is on the relationship between nationalism and the norm against conquest. Chapter six concludes by interpreting the findings of the quantitative and qualitative chapters, pointing out major limitations of the study and identifying avenues for future research.

It may be helpful to make clear what is not being argued here. It is not being argued that nationalism in itself (or the formation of national or ethnic identities) is a cause for peace in international politics. Nor is it being hypothesized that the development of defensible “communal” territories actually decreases the likelihood of war. Rather than seeking to determine the conditions under which nationalism causes
peace or war, this paper relaxes the emphasis on peace to instead study restrained territorial goals in war.

Figure 1. Three Possible Cultural Pathways

- Nationalism (more rigid state identity) → Lockean culture
- Hobbesian culture → No nationalism/No interaction → Hobbesian culture persists
- Iterated interaction (states learn to live with each other) → Lockean culture

What is being hypothesized is that the formation of national identities and the correspondence of these distinctly ‘national’ identities to territorial boundaries may change the culture of state interaction by legitimizing static boundaries on the basis of the identity of the inhabitants of a given territory. The arrow diagram (Figure 1) above illustrates the pathways of interest to this study. These are not intended to illustrate causal relationships, and there are certainly other plausible pathways. The bottom pathway illustrates the transition from the Hobbesian culture to the Lockean culture as described by Wendt, while the top pathway illustrates the thesis of this study. Again, it is not being argued that nationalism or the formation of national identity directly causes war or cements peace, but that nationalism may cause a shift in international “culture” as a result of the principle of national self-determination gaining legitimacy and that this has important implications for the resilience of the international system of sovereign states.5

The next chapter reviews the major literature on nationalism in an effort to highlight the ways that it is compatible with Wendt’s Lockean culture.

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5 It is also possible that anarchy and national identity act as co-constitutive forces, though this aspect of the relationship between these phenomena is not explored here.
CHAPTER II

NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION

Nations and Nationalism

References to “nations” are made all throughout history, yet the origins of nationalism as we think of it today are generally traced back to the French Revolution (Hobsbawm, 1991; Keitner, 2007; Miller, 2009; Schama, 1989). As Schama (1989, p. xv) notes, feelings of what would come to be called “nationalism” existed prior to the onset of the French Revolution. Thus, while nationalism may have partially caused the revolution, the revolution itself helped “to enshrine nationhood as a central platform for articulating and contesting claims to political power and territorial control” (Keitner, 2007, p. 12).

The concept of the “nation” can be analytically unclear. Benedict Anderson (1983, pp.3-4) notes with consternation the difficulty scholars of nationalism have had in defining the term. Still, some basic features of nationalism can and have been discerned by others. Moisio (2008) argues that, “national identity refers not only to a sense of belonging in a given territory but also to a wide range of traits, manners and visual symbols associated with that identity” (Moisio, 2008, p. 81). Anderson speaks of the nation as an “imagined community” – imagined in the sense that we can never know all or even most of the members of a presumed national community despite the affinity we feel for these faceless countrymen. Since the “nation” can encompass so many different
features, it is difficult to offer a more decisive definition. The important point to make for the sake of this paper is that the nation is an identity that, in practice, may be actively cultivated by the state but is simultaneously thought to exist independently of the state.

Given these definitions of the “nation,” what is “nationalism”? Gellner (1983) defines nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Smith (1971) gives a more nuanced definition: “an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ like others” (Smith, 1971, p. 171).

Thus, according to Smith, nationalism may exist even if there is only a “potential” nation, and nations may exist without expressing nationalism.

Taking into consideration the definitions of nationalism offered above, this study defines a nation as any group of people that define themselves as a nation, and nationalism as the political doctrine that says that nations should be sovereign and self-governing. Here, nationalism does not necessarily indicate that one believes one’s own nation is superior to others. It is merely used to describe a belief in the doctrine of national self-determination – that nations in general are or should be the appropriate boundaries of political organization. The question of how peoples develop a national “consciousness,” an important part of the operational definition of nationalism in the quantitative section, is addressed below.
Nationalism in International Relations Theory

The hypothesized effects of nationalism vary according to one’s theoretical perspective on international relations (IR). This section gives a brief overview of these major theoretical perspectives as they pertain to the impacts of nationalism.

Since nationalist sentiment, by definition, falls within the category of domestic politics, structural realists discount nationalism as a significant variable in international relations. What matters to structural realists is that states are “like units” in that they perform the common function of ensuring their own survival (Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1959; Grieco, 1993). Analyzing domestic political systems is unnecessary since “the states that are the units of international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform” within that anarchic system (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). To understand and predict international interactions, we must focus on the nature of the anarchic system and the constraints it places on states. If anything, egoistic nationalism is seen as a reflection of the anarchic system in that it is assumed to consistently prioritize the survival needs of the nation-state. Egoistic nations are merely the best suited to survive in international politics.

For neoliberals, analyzing the domestic character of states can yield fruitful insights about international relations. In the tradition of Immanuel Kant, neoliberals emphasize the peaceful effects generated by democratic institutions, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations. Empirical studies have provided support for this hypothesis (See Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003), though the significance of the findings remains contested by others (See Layne, 1994). Neoliberals agree with the basic description of international politics as set out by neorealists, though
they maintain that cooperation is possible under the right conditions. From the neoliberal perspective, realist theories “need to be supplemented, though not replaced, by theories stressing the importance of international institutions” (Keohane, 1984, p. 14). Like neorealism, neoliberalism does not emphasize nationalism as an important variable, though not for the same reasons as neorealism. Nationalism is by no means excluded from the list of phenomena worthy of study, it is just that institutional and economic arrangements carry a great deal more weight for neoliberals. Indeed, much of the literature that reviews the empirical impacts of nationalism on world politics below would fit the neoliberal tradition. For neoliberals (generally), nationalism is an important variable insofar as it influences whether or not a country adopts nationalistic economic policies, which has implications for states’ abilities to sustain cooperation.

In spite of their numerous differences, many of the basic assumptions about anarchy made by neorealists and neoliberals are compatible with each other. Both perspectives make similar arguments about the nature of the international system and the roots of international conflict while diverging on the issue of whether and how states can overcome tension and conflict. Different arrangements and opportunities for cooperation might arise under anarchy, but anarchy itself is not problematized.

Constructivist theorists depart from their neorealist and neoliberal peers in insisting that the dynamics and structure of the international system are not natural consequences of anarchy, but are instead constituted by ideas and culture. In other words, the self-help world described by Waltz is but one possible manifestation of anarchy based on a specific understanding of how states ought to behave. In fact, constructivist critics of realism have argued that a great deal of the theory’s explanatory logic rests on

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6 For a thorough overview of the debate between neorealists and neoliberals, see Baldwin (1993).
assumptions about social behavior (Hadfield-Amkhan, 2010; Wendt, 1999; Wendt, 2003). Constructivist theorists do not dispute the realist observation that states often act in their own self-interest, though they do argue that the subjective “interests” of states are subject to change as states change their ideas about themselves and other states. Where neorealists would emphasize the importance of the distribution of power in an anarchic system, many constructivists would maintain that, “the most fundamental factor in international politics is the ‘distribution of ideas’ in the system” (Wendt, 1999, p. 96). And while constructivists would applaud neoliberals’ nuanced study of domestic political arrangements, they chide them for adopting the neorealists’ assumptions about anarchy.

With regard to nationalism, constructivist theorists maintain that “how nationalism affects state interests should be treated as an open, empirical issue, not assumed a priori to produce egoism inevitably” (Wendt, 1994, p. 387). Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan (2010) sees “[i]ncluding national identity as a key variable affecting both the internal construction and external orientation of state units” as an avenue of research that could potentially “shake up the overall realist research program” (Hadfield-Amkhan, 2010, p. 26).

Nationalism itself is a concept for which it is nearly impossible to explain except through constructivist analysis. Whether or not the constructivist mode of analysis it is acknowledged explicitly, theories of nationalism focus on how individuals’ identities and definitions of “self” change much in the same way that constructivist IR theorists speak of states’ interests and identities changing (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1991; Smith, 1971).

7 The exception would be theories of nationalism that treat nations as “primordial” entities that have always existed and are unchanging.
Nationalism in World Politics

As Van Evera (1994) points out, most work on nationalism and war focuses on the ways in which national and ethnic loyalties spark or exacerbate conflicts, whether domestic or international (See Brown et al., 2001; Brown, 2001; Woodwell, 2007; Johnson, 2008). Nationalism as a political force has clear implications for the state system in that “[n]ationalism is probably the most powerful political ideology in the world, and it glorifies the state” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 365). A large body of research on nationalism focuses on the effects of nationalism and national identity within states, yet nationalism has undoubtedly impacted international politics as well (Mayall, 1990).

Much of the historic debate about nationalism in international politics has been between “liberal nationalists” who insist that nationalism is a force for peace in the world and those who view nationalism as only negatively impacting world politics (See Herrman et al., 2009). These lines of argument have intersected with and engaged the debate over democratic peace theory (Braumoeller, 1997). Herrman, Isernia, and Segatti (2009), in their study of American and Italian nationalist attitudes, find that feelings of “attachment” to the nation are not correlated with “militarist and conflictive dispositions,” though feelings of national superiority and exclusivity are (pp. 746-47). They also find that attachment to nation is not correlated with inclinations for more cooperative behavior. The findings of Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti would thus be consistent with the view that nationalism can change the “culture” of state interaction without any clear implications for the likelihood of war or peace, depending on the content of nationalist ideologies. States might maintain competitive behavior with other
states, at times even resorting to war, though in Lockean cultures of anarchy we expect that states will at the very least respect other states’ right to exist most of the time and will refrain from “killing” one another by forcibly (and permanently) taking territory.

Other studies clearly demonstrate that national identity can serve as an organizing principle around which opportunistic leaders can rally mass support for militaristic policies (Levy & Ballentine, 1996; Lyon, 2005). There is also some evidence that partition can be an effective policy solution to ethnic conflict (Johnson, 2008). Of course, this only pertains to situations where ethnicity and nationality are congruent. Woodwell (2007) argues that nationalism has played a seriously destabilizing role in instances where borders do not coincide with national groups.

In sum, the debate over the effects of nationalism in world politics remains open. Nationalism on its own does not necessarily generate aggressive behavior, but nor does it foster cooperation. In many of the studies reviewed here, nationalism is treated as an intervening variable. Likewise, here nationalism is treated as an intervening variable, though one that is said to explain change at the structural-cultural level.

**Constructing the Nation**

Despite its power, nationalism is not a natural means of categorizing populations (Gellner, 1983). As noted above, its power is not inherent but constructed. That the nation-state is seen as the appropriate and legitimate form of political organization in the modern world largely accounts for its power to alter the behavior of states toward one another. Previous conceptions of states include ideas about territoriality, but the nation-state links the requirement of defined territory to a seemingly natural set of inhabitants.
The borders of the state are often the borders of the nation, though one does not always come before the other (White, 2007).

From the constructivist perspective, “national identities are considered as inescapably relational, based on a specific social interplay between the Self and the Other” (Moisio, 2008, p. 83). In other words, nations are constituted partially by their relationships to groups different from themselves. To some extent, nations are what they are because what they are not in relation to other nations. In international politics, states seek to establish national identities, and they do so in relation to other sovereign states (White, 2007).

But where did the “nation” come from? Anderson (2006) emphasizes the combination of printing technology and capitalism in tracing the origins of national identity (pp. 37-46). According the Anderson, the ability to print and distribute massive amounts of literature, helped along by capitalist booksellers, led to the consumption of a vast body of literature in common print-languages. Consequently, nationhood could have only begun with populations that were literate and shared a language.8

Anderson argues that just as the nation evolved into a form of political identity as a result of shared print-language, so too can religious political identities be traced to a common language of symbols (Anderson, 2006, pp. 12-13). The distinction made between religious identities and secular national identities is important because of their different meanings. Unlike nation-states, religious empires held that the “fundamental conceptions about ‘social groups’ were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal” (p. 15). Anderson notes that

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8 Yet language does not determine nation – American colonies shared languages with their imperialist home countries, yet distinct national identities developed in North America.
All the great classical communities conceived of themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power. Accordingly, the stretch of written Latin, Pali, Arabic, or Chinese was, in theory, unlimited. (In fact the deader the written language – the farther it was from speech – the better: in principle everyone has access to a pure world of signs.) (p. 13)

In other words, most major religions were (or are) potentially universal in their membership (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 68).

[In the older imagining, where states were defined by centres, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another. Hence, paradoxically enough, the ease with which pre-modern empires and kingdoms were able to sustain their rule over immensely heterogeneous, and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of time (Anderson, 2006, p. 19)

Gellner argues that, “it also seems to be the case that nationalism emerges only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted” (Gellner, 1983, p. 4). Indeed, the shift to industrialism occurred within the borders of sovereign states. Today we may think of a number of stateless nations (the Palestinians and the Kurds, for example), though Gellner insists that modern nationalism was originally inseparable from the state. This is an important point. The subsequent development of various national identities was necessarily preceded by nationalism as a force linked directly to the state (Keitner, 2007).

The connection to the state alone is not enough to change the culture of state interaction, though when combined with popular sovereignty, national identity might be expected to limit territorial goals. Indeed, the effects of nationalism are in many ways bound up with the development of democracy, representative government, and liberalism. National identities can incorporate and become defined by these latter phenomena. Nationalism “was spurred by the French Revolution and Napoleon’s support for popular sovereignty and national self-determination,” and “began to alter peoples’ views
concerning the legitimacy of territorial conquests” (Zacher, 2001, p. 217). It “supported the precept that a territory belonged to a national grouping and it was wrong to take the land from a nation” (Zacher, 2001, p. 217). At the same time, democracies “locate” their citizens based on nation. In other words, “democracy came to be practiced (and only practicable) in a territorial entity with definite borders wrapped around a people who constituted a nation” (Saward, 2009, pp. 402-403). It is difficult to imagine a type of government better suited to match the ideal of self-determination than democracy. Thus a type of reciprocal relationship between democracy and nation exists.

**Territorial Dimensions of Nationhood**

A final point about nationalism is important to make, and that is the connection between nation and territory. The theories of nationalism discussed above highlight the unique roles of shared languages (both print and spoken), political systems, economic systems, and common political heritage. Recognizing these constitutive components of nationality, White (2007) argues that “sense of territory and emotional attachment to place are integral components of national identity,” and “that place and territory are as much a part of national identity as language, religion, and shared history” (White, 2007, p. 251). Ruggie (1993) argues that “disjoint, mutually exclusive, and fixed territoriality most distinctively defines modernity in international politics and that changes in few other factors can so powerfully transform the modern international polity” (Ruggie, 1993, p. 174). In other words, taking territoriality for granted in analyzing international politics masks important features of the international system.

White (2007) argues that territory partially constitutes national identity in two ways. First, the distribution of natural resources may determine whether or not certain
forms of social organization are tenable. Resources do not determine identity, but human beings “can create material cultures only from the possibilities that particular natural environments offer in each place and territory” (White, 2007, p. 38). Second, the cultural landscape, which might include public monuments, names of streets, and parks (among other things), lends a sense of reality and immediacy to cultural and historical narratives passed down through generations (White, 2007, p. 41). Cultural narratives and myths are perpetuated in public institutions like museums (Anderson, 2006). The importance of these symbols should not be underestimated; White (2007) points out that economic maladies did not prevent Soviet successor states from setting as their first priorities the replacement of Soviet-era public monuments with new, more “legitimate” (from the national perspective of the state) cultural artifacts. In many cases, territory “evokes sentiments of national pride and prestige, and often symbolizes the spatial foundations of the national society” (Holsti, 1991, p. 308). In sum, peoples’ environments carry great symbolic meaning and constitute part of their national identities. Nations are thus more exclusionary and spatially rigid than most other forms of identity.

Conclusion

A few points from the discussion above are worth reiterating. First, the nation is not a “natural” entity. Most scholars of nationalism agree that nations are not “primordial” entities but are instead “constructed.” This process can be either active or passive. For example, in the wake of the French Revolution and movements for democratization, states have actively tried to instill subjects with feelings of loyalty toward the state. In other cases, this process is a more gradual “bottom-up” process.
Second, the origin of national identity as we think of it today is inseparable from the state. All major theories of nationalism note that the means through which national sentiment is hypothesized to have originally been generated were subdivided on the basis of territorial sovereign states. Whether nationalism originally arose because of print technology or industrialization, those developments occurred largely within sovereign borders. Where printing technology was adopted, it was used to distribute literature within state borders. As noted above, there remain a number of stateless nations today. The goal of national self-determination may legitimately be adopted by stateless groups claiming to be nations, though nationalism as an ideology originated within states.

Third, national identity serves as the organizing principle of international relations and unlike many other forms of identity, national identity is based largely on exclusion. This is perhaps an obvious point but one that is worth restating. Again, this is not to say that the nation is not disputed as the most appropriate means to organize states.

Fourth, territory is an integral part of national identity. Without the connection between territory and nation it is likely that nations would be more fluid in their membership. Territorialism is a large part of what makes the nation an exclusionary form of identity. The connection between nation and state is also evident in this relationship – because states were established as sovereign territorial entities, it makes sense that nations developing within states would incorporate territorialism into their identities.

Finally, the literature on nationalism and international relations does not offer any concrete answers to the question of how nationalism impacts international relations. Accordingly, the intent of this paper is to hone in on one type of increasingly rare behavior in international politics (territorial conquest) to explore how nationalism might
impact that behavior. Wendt’s “cultures of anarchy” typology is well suited to frame this
discussion because it allows for the possibility that states will face insecurity while at
least allowing others to exist. Nationalism specifically, as an exclusionary and territorial
ideology, is a form of self-identification that we would expect to produce conditions
analogous to Wendt’s Lockean culture. The next section focuses on the “norm against
conquest” and its relation to Wendt’s framework.
Within the norm literature, the anti-conquest norm would be categorized along with a subset of norms labeled “prohibitionist” (Nadelmann, 1990). Well-known activities subject to prohibitionist norms include “piracy, slavery, trafficking in slaves, counterfeiting of national currencies, hijacking of aircraft, trafficking in women and children for purposes of prostitution, and trafficking in controlled psychoactive substance” (Nadelmann, 1990, p. 479; See also Ray, 1989; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Axelrod, 1986). While there are norms prohibiting these types of behavior, they are violated routinely. It is fair to add to this list a norm against territorial conquest (Zacher, 2001; Fazal, 2007). The dissemination of and adherence to this norm by states is the closest approximation of Wendt’s theoretical exposition of the Lockean culture of anarchy in the real world. The next section briefly traces the institutional origins of this norm.

**The Anti-Conquest Norm and Its Origins**

Malesevic (2008) notes that since the end of World War II, “traditional geopolitical goals of nation-states such as territorial expansion, colonial domination, or imperial conquest have lost their legitimacy, both at the national and especially at the international level” (Malesevic, 2008, p. 109). In the period leading up to 1814, territorial issues were the most pervasive cause of war between states, though since the end of the
Napoleonic Wars war over territory has become considerably less frequent (Holsti, 1991). Mayall (1990) notes that “Not only has conquest been ruled out as a means of acquiring prescriptive rights over either territory or people, but no government… will openly advance its forces against those of another country unless it can claim that it has been attacked” (p. 30). A brief (and far from exhaustive) history of this norm as it has been expressed in major documents and treaties is helpful in framing this study’s case studies.

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is an important precursor to the norm against territorial conquest because it marks the beginning of the modern system of sovereign states. The treaty establishes that sovereign authority is to be held by the rulers of individual states rather than by the church. While the treaty does not make specific reference to territorial conquest, it does deny that the sovereign states to which it grants legitimacy “ever ought to usurp, nor so much as pretend any Right and Power over” other sovereign states.⁹

As mentioned above, the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) revolutionized the concept of state sovereignty by declaring that “principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation” and that “No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.” In other words, sovereignty should indeed be granted to states, but it is the inhabitants of those states a group who may legitimately claim sovereignty.¹⁰

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⁹ Quotes from the Treaty of Westphalia and other international treaties are from The Avalon Project hosted by Yale University Law School unless otherwise noted, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp

¹⁰ The emerging “responsibility to protect” norm might be seen as an evolution of this concept, though such an exploration is beyond the scope of this project.
In the 20th century the norm against territorial conquest has been famously institutionalized in the League of Nations and the United Nations. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1924) states that “Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” Interestingly, the Covenant of the League of Nations makes no reference to self-determination, while Chapter 1 Article 1 of the United Nations Charter (1945) stipulates that one of the main purposes of the treaty is “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”11 Chapter 1 Article 2 states that, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The anti-conquest norm underpins part of Fazal’s (2007) work on “state death.” Fazal is primarily concerned with demonstrating that “buffer” states between strategic rivals are historically those most likely to die. Her argument is well-supported up until 1945, though after that point there are so few cases of state death that it is impossible to test her theory robustly. Not only does state death decrease dramatically after 1945, but “[t]he incidence of coercive territorial change also seems to have decreased markedly” (Fazal, 2007, p. 169; Zacher, 2001). As noted above, Fazal attributes the relative lack of

11 Quotes from the United Nations charter are from The Avalon Project hosted by Yale University Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/unchart.asp. The absence of any reference to national self-determination in the League of Nations is discussed in the second case study below.
territorial seizure to a norm against conquest enforced by the United States, though she spends little time discussing the origins of the norm.\footnote{12}{The norm is not enforced in all cases, however, as the Israeli-Palestinian case clearly demonstrates. For a theoretical exposition of when greater powers do and do not intervene in cases of territorial transgression, see van der Maat (2011).}

It is important to note that this argument attributes the changing nature of war to a loss of legitimacy for specific strategies and goals. It is thus consistent with a perspective that emphasizes the tendency for states to aggrandize their power, though with reservations about the acceptable pathways through which power may be enhanced. Nor would it be inconsistent with a view that maintained that states feel intensely insecure among their peers. Regardless of one’s theoretical perspective on international politics, the fact remains that “[n]o state, democratic or autocratic, huge or small, developed or underdeveloped will ever give up lightly even a tiny stretch of its territory” (Malesevic, 2008, p. 106). As noted, the frequency of territorial conflict decreased precipitously since the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Holsti, 1991). The next section situates this observed change in state behavior within Wendt’s theoretical “cultures of anarchy” framework.

\textbf{Wendt’s Cultures of Anarchy}

As mentioned above, Wendt (1999) offers new ways for one to think about the concept of anarchy by exploring the idea that different “cultures” of anarchy are possible. These cultures correspond to different “role structures” which define “the configuration of subject positions that shared ideas make available to [their] holders” (Wendt, 1999, p. 257). In IR, states would be the “holders” of these subject positions. Wendt employs the concepts of “Self” and “Other” in describing these subject positions. Put simply, inter-state culture is defined by the ways that states perceive other states (Others), which in turn influences perceptions of acceptable and appropriate behavior for the Self. While
other cultures are conceivable, Wendt proposes three: Hobbesian ("enemy"), Lockean ("rival"), and Kantian ("friend") (pp. 257-58). Because this paper is concerned with the transition from Hobbesian cultures to Lockean cultures, it is unnecessary to go into the details of the Kantian culture.13

In Hobbesian cultures of anarchy, enemies "are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self" (p. 260). States must assume the worst when inferring the goals and motives of other states and plan accordingly. Failure to develop overwhelming military power means subjugation at the hands of greedy and insecure neighbors.

In a world where states are unable to communicate and interact with one another, we would expect the Hobbesian culture to persist indefinitely. But where states can interact on a repeated basis, they may come to an understanding that they need not see one another as existential threats. Wendt argues that it is when states enter this mode of understanding that the Lockean culture of anarchy is possible. States remain competitive with one another, and they may even go to war with each other when their interests are opposed. The difference between this state of affairs and the Hobbesian culture is that states will not be out to "kill" but to "defeat" the enemy in war.

Wendt does not offer a detailed theory of how the international system can transition from one culture of anarchy to another, though he does offer three degrees of

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13 The entire international system need not be characterized by a single culture. While Wendt argues that most of the system is defined in terms of rivalry, there may be regions and bilateral relationships that exhibit tendencies toward enmity or friendship (See Wendt, 1999, pp. 261-307; Thies, 2010). It is also possible to conceive of relationships different from Wendt's three types. One well-known example would be Keohane and Nye's (1977) state of "complex interdependence," which would seem to fit somewhere between Wendt's "rivalry" and "friendship."
internalization through which these cultures can be adopted by states (Wendt, 1999, pp. 266-68).\textsuperscript{14} The first is the realist pathway, whereby states adopt norms fitting to one of the cultures due to external pressure from other states. In this scenario, a given norm is “internalized” only to the extent that outside pressures force states to adopt the behavior in question. Left to their own devices, states would not choose to adopt that behavior.

Second is the liberal pathway. The liberal pathway is first distinguished from the realist pathway in that states have a choice about whether or not to abide by a certain norm. States that abide by norms for liberal reasons do so because they have concluded that doing so is in their own best interest. When the cost-benefit analysis of norm adherence no longer favors their interests, states will abandon norms. Finally, states may internalize cultures through the constructivist pathway when they see principles on which the culture is based as being legitimate.

Within the discipline of IR, the notion that states alter their behavior because they find certain principles or norms to be “legitimate” remains a contentious one (Hurd, 1999). States’ interests “are shaped by internationally shared norms and values that structure and give meaning to international political life,” but it is difficult to say that this is so because states find certain principles to be legitimate (Finnemore, 1996, p. 3).

However, the norm of national self-determination is consistently expressed in terms of its legitimacy as an organizing principle. The norm of national self-determination did not fundamentally alter the nature of international politics. Indeed, the “formal order is still defined by the mutual recognition of sovereign states; but

\textsuperscript{14} Others have offered explanations for how states may transition from one state of anarchy to another using Wendt’s typology. Ripsman (2005) offers a thorough account of the transition from conflict to peace in Western Europe in the post-World War II era, arguing that a combination of realist and liberal factors have been instrumental in preventing war and consequently promoting peaceful relations among the European states.
sovereignty is now said to reside with the people, as a result of an act of national self-
determination based on the will of the majority” (Mayall, 1990, p. 28; Keitner, 2007).

Both Hobbesian and Lockean cultures may feature war. Rather than examine the
shift from conflict to peace, the emphasis here is on exploring the shift away from war
carried to conquer enemies and capture territory, to conflicts ostensibly fought to pursue
or defend the “national” interest. It is clear that a major characteristic of the Lockean
culture is the disinclination of states toward pursuing territorial gains. “Killing” a state is
essentially synonymous with incorporating its territory into the sovereign jurisdiction of
the victor. One would not expect to see this type of behavior in a situation of “restrained
rivalry”. A Lockean culture of anarchy does not preclude the use of force to settle
disputes between states. Nor does it imply that cultures of rivalry cannot degenerate into
cultures of enmity (Wendt, 1999). What is does entail is the acceptance of other states’
legitimate rights to exist within certain territories and the understanding that other states
are not out to annihilate the Self.

**Conclusion**

The preceding chapters are intended to develop the theoretical basis for the
second part of this thesis. Chapter four uses a case-study method to qualitatively explore
the relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm. Chapter five develops a
research design to quantitatively measure the relationship between nationalism and the
anti-conquest norm. The results suggest that there is a slight though significant negative
relationship between nationalism and pursuing territorial conquest. Chapter 6 concludes
with an interpretation of the quantitative and qualitative results, offering suggestions for
further research.
CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDIES IN US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

So far a number of important themes have been covered in order to make clear the logic behind this study’s hypotheses. Modern nationalism as we think of it today dates back only to the time of the French Revolution. Nationalist sentiment may come about on its own among the people of a given territory, or be actively cultivated by the sovereign authority of that territory. In either case, nationalism entails some attachment to a specific territory, and part of what defines the “nation” or the “self” is its differences from people who live outside that territory. At the same time, since the middle of the 19th century, territorial issues have less frequently featured in international conflict. Some argue that this is accounted for by the spread of a “norm against conquest.” This anti-conquest norm is an integral part of Wendt’s theoretical conception of the Lockean culture of anarchy where states exist in a state of restrained rivalry. This paper hypothesizes that as national self-determination gained prominence as the most legitimate means of deriving sovereign authority, states with strong national identities, while not necessarily being any less hostile in their behavior toward other states, are less inclined to pursue permanent territorial conquest. In other words, the study suggests that the gradual spread of nationalism and the nearly simultaneous decrease in territorial conflict are not merely coincidental but are causally related.
Here, two case studies in American foreign policy are presented to test one aspect of the nationalist-restraint hypothesis – whether or not national self-determination is “embedded” in the anti-conquest norm. The brief history of the norm above explored this dynamic as it appears in major international treaties. This section looks at the content of the norm as expressed in statements made by American policymakers. The intent of the cases studies is not to demonstrate any causal relationship between the anti-conquest norm and a corresponding change in foreign policy behavior, but to illustrate the close relationship between norms about national self-determination and the anti-conquest norm.

Tanisha Fazal (2007), in her book *State Death*, uses two case studies in American foreign policy towards the Dominican Republic to qualitatively test her theory that states that are “buffers” between great powers are historically more likely to “die”. Part of her intent is to test the nationalist-resistance hypothesis discussed above, which posits that countries will be less willing to invade, occupy, or conquer other countries when the prospects for massive popular resistance are high in the target country. She finds that although the United States did not choose to annex the Dominican Republic (in both cases), its decision was not based on considerations of nationalist resistance from the Dominican population.¹⁵

This section first reexamines the case of the near annexation of the Dominican Republic by the United States in 1870 with an emphasis on the pro- versus anti-annexationists to explore whether or not arguments about the appropriateness of certain foreign policy goals were framed in terms of a norm against conquest and whether this norm was justified with appeals to national self-determination. The second case is the US

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¹⁵ She does note that anti-annexationists successfully used this argument to get the US Senate to vote against annexation, admitting that the influence of nationalist-resistance is “slightly positive” in this case (Fazal, 2007, pp. 138-139).
occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. While Fazal devotes some time to exploring the role of the anti-conquest norm in the latter case, she makes no mention of it in the earlier case. As the first case will demonstrate, the anti-conquest norm was not only openly appealed to during the debate over annexation, but it was also linked to the principle of national self-determination.

Both cases were intentionally borrowed from Fazal in order to explicitly engage the literature on the norm against conquest. For Fazal, the first case (near-annexation in 1870) essentially serves as a “deviant” case to be explained by her theory, while the occupation case is a “typical” case of state death (See Gerring, 2009). A typical case “exemplifies what is considered to be a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon” (Gerring, 2009, p. 648). Conversely, a deviant case method “selects the case(s) which, by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value” (p. 655).

Here, the roles of the cases are reversed. The near annexation case serves as a typical case of a norm against conquest constituted by national self-determination deterring territorial annexation, while the occupation of 1916-1924 exemplifies a deviant case where the sovereignty of another state was subverted, albeit temporarily.

In examining these cases, speeches made by policymakers serve as the primary sources of evidence. This type of evidence, though it has many weaknesses, is the best way to test the influence of ideas about national self-determination on the norm against conquest. How leaders and policymakers articulate arguments about the appropriateness of territorial conquest is the only reasonable means of making inferences about the whether or not national self-determination is taken to be the basis of the norm against
conquest. In a perfect world, we would be able to get inside the heads of policymakers to see what they are really thinking. “Our understanding of the impact of norms on state and nonstate behavior and of the processes by which norms evolve is thus limited by our inability to adequately penetrate the human consciousness” (Nadelmann, 1990, p. 480).

**Hypotheses**

The case studies test three hypotheses. First, if national self-determination is a significant component of the norm against conquest, we should see policymakers appealing to this principle as the basis of their arguments against conquest.

*H1: Policymakers will base objections to annexation on the principle of national self-determination.*

The second hypothesis is similar to the first, though it focuses on those who favor annexation:

*H2: Policymakers who favor annexation will present the territory in question as being either uninhabited or occupied by a population compatible with American national identity.*

The third hypothesis is based on the expectation that when policymakers argue in favor of occupation, they will argue that the use of force is justified in order to protect national interests while preserving the right of national self-determination of the occupied people against the threat of another foreign power.

*H3: Policies involving sovereignty-infringing occupation will be explicitly stated as being intended as temporary measures.*

Having set out the three hypotheses, the paper now turns to the two case studies.
Case 1: The Near Annexation of 1870

The Dominican Republic declared its independence from Haiti in 1844. As a hedge against the possibility of future Haitian and Spanish aggression, Dominican dictator Buenaventura Baez expressed interest in becoming part of the United States in October of 1849, though the issue did not come to be considered seriously until the end of US President Andrew Johnson’s term in 1868 (Nelson, 1990). In early 1869, two resolutions were introduced in the US Congress calling first for US protection of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and second, for annexation of the Dominican Republic. Both resolutions were defeated. However, since US President Grant was a strong proponent of annexation, a treaty was signed between the US and Dominican governments which would allow the US to annex the Dominican Republic and lease Samana Bay for use as a military base upon ratification by both governments (Nelson, 1990). To the dismay of Grant and other pro-annexationists, the treaty expired before the US Congress was able to vote on it, an outcome attributed to the most vocal opponent of annexation, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner. Subsequent efforts by President Grant to extend the ratification period were initially successful but ultimately failed when the Senate’s vote on ratification fell far short of a two-thirds majority.

Throughout this debate the US public was largely indifferent, and “simply had no conception of the existence of the Dominican Republic” (Nelson, 1990, p. 61). The consequence of this indifference was a lack of the popular support that Grant needed to push the treaty through (p. 96). Yet this lack of popular interest did not prevent interested parties from appealing to national principles in justifying their positions.

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16 Nelson’s (1990) historical account of the near annexation provides an extremely comprehensive narrative of the annexation debate and will be used extensively here.
Debates Over Annexation

Nelson (1990) identifies three varieties of pro-annexationists in the United States (p. 48). First, there were those like President Grant that favored annexation because they believed the United States should become an expansionist, imperialist power. Second, there were those who feared European encroachment into the US sphere of influence and favored expansionism as a means of securing US interests before the Europeans could reap the advantages of possessing the Dominican Republic. Finally, there were some parties that were interested in annexation for the perceived benefits to be gained from exploiting the country’s resources. Included in this last group were General William L. Cazneau and Colonel Joseph W. Fabens, both of whom maintained extensive contacts with pro-annexationist figures in the Dominican Republic. All of these viewpoints can essentially be classified as realist arguments.

The two most prominent figures on the anti-annexation side were Senator Sumner and Senator Carl Schurz. In a debate in March 1970, Sumner offered five points of opposition to the treaty of annexation (Nelson, 1990, pp.97-98): the treaty would lead to further imperial acquisitions by the United States; the European powers did not represent a significant threat in the region; the United States would assume the Dominican Republic’s public debt; civil war within the Dominican republic would be inevitable; and annexation “would impair the predominance of the colored race in the West Indies and therefore would be unjust to it” (p. 98). Of these items, only the last seems to have a
connection to an idea about the illegitimacy of extending the domain of the US over another group of people.

During a later debate in December 1870, Sumner offered a number of additional reasons pertinent to the territorial dimensions of nationhood. Referencing the Dominican people and their territory, Sumner argued that “[i]t is theirs by right of possession; by their sweat and blood mingling with the soil; by tropical position; by its burning sun and the unalterable laws of climate,” going on to say that “their independence is as precious to them as is ours to us and it is placed under the safeguard of natural laws which we cannot violate with impunity” (Sumner quoted in Nelson, 1990, p. 103).

Finally, in a speech to the Senate in March of 1971, Sumner further elaborated his reasons for opposing the annexation of the Dominican Republic. Others note that Sumner spends a great deal of time emphasizing the necessity of maintaining congressional oversight of executive powers (Nelson, 1990; Fazal, 2007). It is clear that this was one of his primary goals. Yet he devotes nearly as much time discussing the principle of equality between nations. Sumner insists that, “all nations are equal, without distinction of population, size, or power” (Congressional Globe, p. 301). At this point it is unclear whether he is talking about states or the people that comprise states. He adds that international law does not “know any distinction of color,” and “whatever is the rule for one is the rule for all; nor can we do to a thinly-peopled, small, weak, or black nation what we would not do to a populous, large, strong or white nation” (Ibid). It is Sumner’s emphasis on race that makes it clear that he is not talking about states or governments, but about the people that make up national groups. In other words, he is not using the word “nation” casually to refer to states as many do today. From his statements, we can
see that he viewed different national populations as needing and deserving sovereignty, though he insists that no nation is better or worse than any other nation.

The first part of Sumner’s December speech cited above clearly portrays the Dominican people as being unsuitable for American citizenship by virtue of their vastly different culture, closely linked to territory and place. It is an appeal to a seemingly natural delineation between two societies, one not based on civic nationalism but on cultural distinction.

The above speeches are obviously concerned with race. Indeed, in his March 27th, 1871 speech to Congress, Sumner argued that the annexation would deprive “the African race… of its natural home in this hemisphere” (Congressional Globe, p. 305).

This viewpoint has been systematically explored by Love (2004). Love argues that a constitutive aspect of national identity for many Americans during this time was the belief that “racial homogeneity was the prerequisite characteristic of a republic,” and that “white racial limitations, fixed by nature and dictated along the lines of climate separating the temperate and tropical zones, made Santo Domingo unsuitable for settlement” (Love, 2004, p. 55).

Love (2004) argues that there were two sources of objection to the treaty to annex the Dominican Republic:

The first was the environmentalist, exploiting popular beliefs about climate, fixed racial distinctions, and the lowly and irreversible nature of the peoples who inhabited the tropical zone. The second line of objection – a natural extension of the first – sought to conjure up fear among both politicians and the American people: fear based on the promise that (although the time was not specified) annexation would eventually make the republic a state of the Union and the Dominicans citizens of the United States, the political and social equals of white males (Love, 2004, p. 41).

Both of these positions are essentially rooted in ideas about nationality. Love also notes that various newspapers of that era reported Sumner making disparaging comments about
the population of the Dominican Republic during an executive session of Congress (p. 57). According to this account, which is also emphasized by Sumner’s biographers, Sumner believed that the island’s population would be unfit for American citizenship and would be impossible to assimilate into American culture (p. 57). Senator Carl Schurz was much more explicit in registering his disapproval of the Dominican people, arguing openly that they were not capable of governing themselves and thus would only become a burden to the American nation (Love, 2004, p. 59).

While proponents of the treaty attempted to refute Sumner’s arguments about the character of the island’s population to some degree, they also made attempts to present the island as nearly uninhabited (Love, 2004, p. 58). This is plain in the statements of Senator Oliver Morton, who argued that annexing the Dominican Republic presented an opportunity to acquire “a vast territory open to the hand of art and science and industry, and almost without inhabitants” (Quoted in Love, 2004, p. 58).

So, while ideas about race played a significant role in motivating opponents of the treaty, these ideas are not separable from ideas about the nation and who counts as a legitimate member of the nation. National identity was in many ways linked to race, at least for a great number of American citizens. The major opponents of the treaty “dominated the debate, established its terms, and crippled Grant’s treaty,” while the treaty’s “supporters were weak, colorless, and unpersuasive” (Love, 2004, p. 60). This is not to say that appeals to the national self-determination were necessarily the deciding factor in preventing the US from annexing the Dominican Republic, only that a form of nationalism was an underlying constitutive aspect in the frequent appeals to the anti-conquest norm.
The next case looks at the US occupation from 1916 to 1924 in an attempt to determine whether this dynamic is a reemerging feature of American foreign policy.

**Case 2: The US Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924**

As noted above, the American occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 is one of the cases used by Fazal (2007) to test the nationalist-resistance hypothesis. The concern here is with the same question posed by Fazal: why did the United States choose not to permanently annex the Dominican Republic during this occupation? Though the question is the same, this paper will instead focus on how, if at all, appeals to the principle of national self-determination influenced debates over the appropriate goals of the occupation. This case is a more difficult test of this study’s hypotheses because it did involve the “destruction of Dominican sovereignty” (Calder, 1984 p. 1).

In 1916, the US occupied the Dominican Republic in order to prevent a revolutionary movement from overthrowing the country’s government. There is no pretending that the United States intervened for anything other than realist reasons. While the decision to intervene may have been framed in idealistic terms, it is doubtful whether these ideals truly served as a sufficient motivation for action. The US’ primary goals were “to protect the approaches to its southern coast and the Panama Canal against unfriendly powers, especially Germany” and maintain regional hegemony (Calder, 1984, p. xii). German intervention was viewed as imminent, and the impending revolution was viewed as providing fertile ground for German occupation. Thus, President Wilson decided the best plan of action was to intervene first (Fazal, 2007).
While it is true that “under President Woodrow Wilson, the anti-imperialist, United States interventions reached the apogee in Central America and the Caribbean,” Wilson never considered annexation, and never intended the occupation of the Dominican Republic to be permanent (Bemis, 1957, p. 129; Fazal, 2007). Fazal argues that the absence of any intention to permanently annex the Dominican Republic is accounted for by the influence of the anti-conquest norm (Fazal, 2007, p. 145). As the first case demonstrates, appeals to this norm were prominent during the near-annexation of 1870. Senator Sumner repeatedly made reference to a principle of equality between nations, and his ideas about this principle were intertwined with ideas about the proper membership of the nation. Because there was never a serious debate over whether or not the US should annex the Dominican Republic in the years after 1916, there is no comparable set of relevant speeches to be mined for data. Annexation of the Dominican Republic simply was not an issue.

However, it is reasonable to examine speeches made by President Wilson in other contexts during the time leading up to the 1916 occupation to determine whether or not he deemed the nation to be the appropriate unit to which the norm against conquest ought to be applied. The next section looks at Wilson’s ideas about national self-determination and the norm against conquest as espoused in a number of different speeches. Studying Wilson’s words provides an additional opportunity to examine the links between nationality and the anti-conquest norm as expressed in public discourse.

**Wilson’s Ideology and Foreign Policy**

Wilson’s ideas about national self-determination are well known. In his “Fourteen Points” speech, Wilson repeatedly emphasizes the importance of redrawing state borders
to coincide with national boundaries, advocating this policy for the Balkan states, the
former Ottoman Empire, as well as the Polish (Wilson, 2001[1918], p. 231). For Wilson,
war has largely been the result of using military force to hold together “peoples who did
not want to live together, who did not have the spirit of nationality as towards each
other,” and “who were constantly chafing at the bands that held them” (Wilson,
2001[1918], p. 232). His ideology has strongly influenced the development of nationalist
movements in the former colonial world (Manela, 2007).

In his 1913 “Address on Latin American Policy,” delivered to the Southern
Commercial Congress in Alabama, Wilson stated that,

[T]he United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She
will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the
territory she has; and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no
quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity.
(Wilson, 2006, p. 382).

Later, in his 1917 speech to the Senate, “Essential Terms for Peace in Europe,”
Wilson suggested that the Monroe Doctrine be adopted as a general principle across the
globe: “that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but
that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of
development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and
powerful” (Wilson, 2006, p. 396; Manela, 2007). This echoed an earlier address where
Wilson insisted, “no nation is fit to sit in judgment upon any other nation” (Wilson, 1956,
p. 250).¹⁷

Wilson’s understanding of the causes of war was linked with a belief that “the
United States had a moral mission to defend, extend, and support Abraham Lincoln’s

¹⁷ Even so, Wilson did not “regard America as simply one nation among others” (Kane, 2008, p. 148).
concept of government of the people, by the people, and for the people to the greatest extent possible in peaceful relations with other peoples and nations” (Bemis, 1957, p. 109). Because America had “proved the validity of liberal and democratic government,” it had a mission to guide the entire world toward this goal. Yet the rest of the world was to be divided along lines of nationality, only one of many possible organizational principles.

In sum, Wilson believed in a form of liberal nationalism serving as the basis for peaceful relations between states (Kane, 2008, p. 145). Still, he “rejected the idea that nations were primordial, ethnocultural entities and regarded them instead as the products of organic, evolutionary development” (Kane, 2008, p. 145). For Wilson, “a nation was the historical achievement of a mixed people struggling to become a single people with a distinctive identity” (Kane, 2008, p. 145). He granted legitimacy to this identity by advocating it as the basis for the state. Nations can accommodate new members, though nation-states cannot legitimately extend their jurisdiction over other nations.

At the same time, Wilson was concerned that universal application of the national self-determination principle would cause upheaval, and thus limited the text of the League of Nations to provide for “the rights of existing states to ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’” (Manela, 2007, p. 61). Independence was to be granted to the colonies, and even though independence was to be granted to states whose borders had largely been determined by Europeans, this outcome was consistent with Wilson’s liberal, civic nationalism. So, the “US occupation of the Dominican Republic did not constitute a territorial conquest, but neither did it reflect a respect for the Dominican right to territorial sovereignty” (Fazal, 2007, p. 146). The United States intervened when its
national interests were threatened, though its actions were always limited to intervention and not permanent conquest. Wilson “was convinced that such interventions as he made in Mexico, Haiti or Santo Domingo were no more than the creation of the necessary conditions of ‘constitutional liberty,’ and, therefore, only formally in conflict with the doctrine of self-determination” (Raymont, 2005, p. 17). Thus, Wilson did not consider it to be a contradiction of his principles to intervene in the Dominican Republic in order to uphold national sovereignty against the threat of Germany. This is compatible with the Lockean culture of anarchy, where states may interfere with one another, though ultimately respect each other’s right to exist when they are not imminently threatened.

**Conclusion**

The first case provides evidence in favor of the first two hypotheses. Senator Sumner’s objections to the treaty were partially based on a belief that nationality was the appropriate organizing principle of international politics. Accordingly, he advocated respecting the territory of other nations. His comments about race make it clear that he intended his statements to pertain to peoples, not governments. His opponents, many of whom stood to gain materially from annexation, made attempts to frame the issue as one where a largely uninhabited territory was to be absorbed into the United States to the benefit of all.

While there is less evidence in the form of speeches and Congressional transcripts for the occupation of 1916-1924, the vast literature on Wilson’s ideology and foreign policy goals make it clear that he held views similar to Sumner. Like Sumner, his conviction that the United States should never again take territory by force was rooted in a belief that “nations” were fundamentally different – no two nations suited to live under
the same sovereign authority. In both cases, the anti-conquest norm was expressed by reference to the legitimacy of national self-determination.

Neither case necessarily demonstrates (or even makes an attempt to demonstrate) any causal relationship between the norm against conquest and a corresponding change in behavior. This is not the purpose of the case studies. What the cases do demonstrate is that where the norm against conquest is appealed to, it is often justified on the basis of the principle of national self-determination. In other words, it is nations, not states, that should not conquer one another. Whether or not the relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm has an impact in the real world is the subject of chapter five.
CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN & RESULTS OF STATISTICAL TESTS

The previous chapter does not test whether nationalism actually constrains foreign policy goals, but whether national self-determination is a constitutive feature of the anti-conquest norm. The case studies demonstrate that there is reason to see the anti-conquest norm and modern nationalism as intertwined. The purpose of this section is to explore, using a large-N statistical analysis, whether states that are more nationalistic are more or less likely to pursue territorial conquest. This chapter seeks to go beyond the qualitative analysis and determine whether or not this suggested relationship actually produces measurable changes in state behavior. Just as Fazal (2007) assumes that more nationalistic states will be more likely to put up "nationalist-resistance" in the face of foreign aggression, this section assumes that more nationalistic states, while not necessarily being any less likely to use force, will be less likely to pursue territorial conquest as a goal of foreign policy. In other words, more nationalistic states will be more likely to adhere to the anti-conquest norm, even if they are no less inclined to interfere with other states.

First, variables are defined and described. The theoretical literature on nationalism is used to conceptualize and operationalize nationalism. Next, measures and indicators from the Correlates of War (COW) are described. Finally, a logistic regression model is used to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
are comprised of data spanning the period of 1816 to 1944. Data from the post-1945 period are not used because of the various competing explanations for the absence of territorial conquest after 1945 (threat of nuclear war, bipolar power distribution, etc.). While somewhat problematic conceptually, the tests here do indicate that more nationalistic states are less likely to choose territorial revision.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in this study is “revision type,” or, whether or not a state sought to revise the territorial status quo as an end of using force or declaring war. This serves as an indicator of whether or not a state is abiding by the anti-conquest norm. In terms of Wendt’s cultures of anarchy, this variable indicates whether or not a state has internalized the Lockean culture. The COW Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset records whether or not states sought either to revise or maintain the status quo in using force or declaring war against another state. Because this study is not concerned with the question of whether or not nationalism foments peace, the population of cases used here is comprised solely of those incidents where one state either used force or declared war against another state. Each observation in this project is the use of force by an individual country. In other words, the unit being measured is not war, but individual incidents of armed conflict or war declaration by states.

Revision is measured using the COW variables “revisionist state” and “revision type.” The data is comprised of 446 cases of revisionist countries that initiated conflicts involving either the use of force by one party or the declaration of war during period of

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18 The COW data is available from http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
1816 to 1944. The COW Coding Manual sets out the guidelines for determining whether a state is revisionist as follows:

To be considered revisionist, a state must demonstrate, through its behavior, a desire to change the status quo in a significant way. It is possible for there to be no revisionist states in a dispute, and it is possible for revisionist states to be on both sides of a dispute. More typically, however, at least one revisionist state will be identifiable in a dispute and revisionist states on both sides of a dispute is [a] very rare phenomenon (Correlates of War Dispute Coding Manual, p. 6).

In addition to coding whether or not a state is revisionist, the COW dataset codes the type of revision sought. The four types of revisionist goals are territorial, regime, policy, and other. Obviously it is possible for states to seek more than one of these revisionist goals in a given conflict. The criteria for each type are as follows:

a territorial issue is at stake when the actor is attempting to gain control over a piece of territory that it claims but does not possess. A policy issue is involved when the actor seeks to change the foreign policy behavior of the target, while a regime issue centers on the desire by the actor to change the government of the target (Correlates of War Incident Coding Manual, p. 7).

Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996, p. 178) elaborate on this coding scheme:

Both sides of a dispute can be considered revisionist if they both are dissatisfied with the status quo, but the state that openly attempts to challenge the pre-dispute condition by 1) making claims to territory, 2) attempting to overthrow a regime, or 3) declaring the intention not to abide by another state's policy, was coded as revisionist. For example, British efforts to stop the Brazilian slave trade were coded as an attempt to alter the status quo since the pro-slave trade policy of Brazil existed prior to the onset of the disputes. Likewise, Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands and American attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro make these states revisionist actors in their respective disputes. Great effort was made to distinguish between the initiator of a dispute (the state that takes the first militarized action) and the revisionist state.

The revision type variable in the first model was recoded into a dummy variable where “1” indicates “territorial revisionist” and “0” indicates all other revisionist goals.

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19 Not every revisionist country coded as such in the COW dataset is used. This is because there are some instances where Polity does not list democracy scores for states at certain periods of time because they were not sovereign. Where there is a discrepancy between COW and Polity, Polity is used.

20 There are actually two revision type variables, the second of which codes the secondary goal of the state in using force. Only the first revisionist goal is used here.
Revisionist states that initiated the conflict are used exclusively. Status-quo seeking states are not included as an additional means of controlling for variation in state attributes. This is already reflected in the reported number of cases (446) above. Again, for the sake of this portion of the project, a state that pursues a policy of territorial revisionism is said to be not abiding by the anti-conquest norm.

**Independent Variables**

Based on the theoretical foundation set out in the first part of the paper, the expectation is that states that are more “nationalistic” will be less likely to be territorially revisionist. The parallel assumption is that more nationalistic states will be more likely to favor national self-determination as the organizing principle of world politics. Accordingly, more nationalistic states will be more likely to internalize the Lockean culture. The independent variables here are intended to serve as proximate indicators of nationalism. Measuring nationalism at the state-level, let alone at the individual level, is no easy endeavor. The measures used here are the same as those used by Fazal (2007), and consistent with her research design and results, the findings produced by the quantitative analysis here are modest.

Three independent variables (measured with a total of five indicators) are used here: level of democracy, level of industrialization, and time since independence. Each variable is used because of its relevance to the theoretical literature on nationalism. Other relevant variables that would be interesting to test include GDP/capita and population density, though these figures are either unavailable or unreliable for the time period covered here. The variables used here, while not ideal, are the best available indicators of nationalism for the scale and scope of this project.
Democracy

The first independent variable is level of democracy. Fazal argues that since “populations in more democratic states presumably have more ownership of their government and are more used to self-government,” democracy strengthens a sort of “civic” national identity (See Fazal, 2007, p. 76). She uses the Polity IV polity scores to measure level of democracy. The expectation is that states that are more democratic will have a stronger sense of this “civic” national identity, and will be less inclined to incorporate new populations into the state by pursuing territorial conquest.

Democracy is measured with two indicators using the Polity IV dataset. The first measure is simply the institutionalized democracy score, measured on a scale of zero to 10. This measure does not take into account any measures of autocracy from the Polity project. The first measure is labeled “Democracy 1” in the output. The second measure of democracy incorporates authoritarianism scores by using the “polity” variable, which measures authoritarianism and democracy on a scale of -10 (most authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic). The values of the polity variable have been recoded and compressed into a categorical variable with four values, ascending from authoritarianism to democracy. The four values indicate strong autocracy, weak autocracy, weak democracy, and strong democracy. This measure is labeled “Democracy 2” in the output below.

The first hypothesis and its corresponding null hypothesis are as follows:

\( H_1: \text{States that are more democratic will be less likely to seek revision of territorial boundaries.} \)

\( H_{0.1}: \text{States that are more democratic are no less likely than states that are less democratic to seek revision of territorial boundaries.} \)
Industrialization

The second independent variable is level of industrialization. Gellner (1983) argues that modern nationalism is the product of shifts in the underlying organizational principles of society; namely, the shift from pre-agrarian and agrarian societies to industrial societies. Industrial society is at its core built on principles of endless progress and equality. Whereas agrarian societies are compartmentalized into specialized groupings, industrial society requires that all members gain proficiency in certain skills in order to carry on the march of progress. The key here is that shared education in turn creates a population of citizens with a common culture. Accordingly, as states proceed along the course of industrialization, a sense of national identity should develop.

It is this theoretical explanation that Fazal (2007) uses as justification for measuring nationalism with indicators of industrialization. Like the democracy variable, industrialization is also measured with two separate indicators – iron and steel production and primary energy consumption. Both indicators are from the COW National Material Capabilities dataset, the same indicators used by Fazal.

For the sake of this project, there is one problem with the COW data: the COW measures of the industrialization variables cover an extremely large range and may assume thousands of values. This becomes a problem because the logistic regression model measures how the increase in one unit of the independent variable influences the odds-ratio of the dependent variable. Thus, when tests are conducted with the raw data provided by the COW, the result is a highly significant indication of there being absolutely no impact on the dependent variable. For example, when possible values range from zero to 60,765 thousands of tons, a state that produces 5001 thousands of tons of
iron and steel would not be expected to differ significantly from a state that produces 5000 thousands of tons. Accordingly, if we are to capture whether or not there is a meaningful impact on the likelihood of using force to revise territorial boundaries at different levels of industrialization, the COW measures must be recalibrated.\footnote{It appears that Fazal (2007) uses the COW data without making any such changes. It would be interesting for her models to be adjusted to incorporate these changes in order to determine whether these quantitative measures of nationalism improve the likelihood of buffer states survival.}

The measures of iron and steel production were divided by one thousand, yielding units that measure \textit{millions} of tons. Measures of primary energy consumption are divided by one hundred thousand, yielding measures indicating \textit{hundreds of millions} of tons. In other contexts, smaller units of industrialization would surely be appropriate. For the purposes of this study, doing away with subtle differentiation in industrialization is appropriate given that the intent is to compare states at significantly different levels of industrialization.

The second hypothesis and its corresponding null hypothesis are as follows:

\begin{align*}
H_2: & \text{ States at higher levels of industrialization will be less likely to seek} \\
& \text{revision of territorial boundaries.} \\
H_{0,2}: & \text{States at higher levels of industrialization will be no less likely than states} \\
& \text{at lower levels of industrialization to seek revision of territorial boundaries.}
\end{align*}

\textbf{Time since Independence}

The final independent variable is \textit{time since independence}. Hobsbawn’s (1991) discussion of “proto-nationalisms,” or organizing principles that served as basis for later organization along the lines of nationality, highlights “the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity” as the “most decisive criterion of proto-nationalism” (p. 73). Popular sovereignty, which entails the conversion of populations
from “subjects” to “citizens,” redefines political identity while retaining a continuous territorial entity. The shared experience of living in the same political system for an extended period of time can thus shape national identity.

Time since independence is computed by subtracting each state’s date of entry into the international system from the date at the time of the militarized interstate dispute. The COW State Membership dataset records when states first entered the international system. In the event that a state was occupied and later regained sovereignty, it is recorded as having more than one entry date. For states with more than one independence date, the earliest date is used. This is appropriate given that the earlier date indicates when a distinct political entity first entered the system, and later reentered as that same territorial entity. Like the industrialization measures, the measure of “time since independence” is recalibrated by dividing by ten so that each unit increase marks an increase of ten years rather than one. The third hypothesis and its corresponding null hypothesis are as follows:

\[ H_3: \text{“Older” states will be less likely to seek revision of territorial boundaries.} \]

\[ H_{0:3}: \text{“Older” states will be no less likely than “younger” states to seek revision of territorial boundaries.} \]

**Bivariate Correlations**

Before running the logistic regression model, it is important to check for multicollinearity between the independent variables. Multicollinearity occurs when “the explanatory variables in a data set are highly correlated” (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999, p. 41). In logistic regression, “Variables which show high levels of multicollinearity provide little unique information which leads to high standard errors and regression...
coefficients that are unlikely to accurately reflect the impact that [the independent variable] has on [the dependent variable] in the population” (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999, p. 141). Since two of the variables in the study are measured with multiple indicators that one would expect to be highly related, some caution must be taken.

**Table 1. Bivariate Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy 1 Polity Democracy</th>
<th>Democracy 2 Polity Score</th>
<th>Iron &amp; Steel Production</th>
<th>Energy Consumption</th>
<th>Time Since Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 1 Polity Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 2 Polity Score</td>
<td>951*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Steel Production</td>
<td>053</td>
<td>067</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Energy Consumption</td>
<td>250*</td>
<td>123*</td>
<td>947*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Since Independence</td>
<td>098*</td>
<td>167*</td>
<td>604*</td>
<td>532*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at .05 level

As expected, Table 1 indicates that the democracy variables are highly correlated with one another, as are the industrialization variables (bold in table 1). Since this means that each indicator is essentially measuring the same thing as the indicator it is paired with, it is sufficient to use only one measure for democracy and one measure for industrialization in the logistic regression model.

**Methodology and Variable Selection**

To test the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, this paper uses a logistic regression model. Since the dependent variable is a binary variable and the independent variables are measured at the interval level, logistic regression is the most appropriate tool for exploring the relationship between these variables. Unlike linear regression, logistic regression does not allow one to describe change in the dependent variable simply as a function of unit-increases in the
independent variables. Rather, unit-increases in the independent variables are associated with corresponding changes in the odds-ratio of the dependent variable. In other words, as the independent variable changes, the probability of observing one possible outcome relative to other possible outcomes changes. An odds-ratio of exactly “1” would indicate that changes in the independent variables do not change the odds of observing one outcome more or less often than another outcome. An odds-ratio of less than one would indicate that including a given independent variable in the analysis makes the dependent variable outcome of interest less likely than others, and vice versa for an odds-ratio greater than one. None of the independent variables used here are normally distributed, though this does not cause any problems for the logistic regression model. This is because the logistic regression model makes no assumptions about the distribution of the independent variables.

Ultimately the first democracy variable was selected for use in the final model because it is more consistent with the theoretical literature on nationalism. Rather than measuring autocracy and democracy, the Democracy 1 variable measures only democracy. Iron and steel production was used rather than primary energy consumption because it was less highly correlated with the democracy measure than was primary energy consumption. Iron and steel production is more highly correlated with time since independence than primary energy consumption, though this difference is small in comparison to the discrepancy in correlations between the industrialization and the democracy variables. Three independent variables are used in the final model: Democracy 1, iron and steel production, and time since independence.
Results

Included in the logistic regression model are the first democracy variable, iron and steel production, and time since independence. The logistic regression equation indicates that an increase in each independent variable does have a negative effect on the odds of a state being territorially revisionist. However, as Table 2 demonstrates, the time since independence variable did not achieve significance at the .05 level. Thus, we cannot reject the null of hypothesis 3.

Figure 2. Logistic Regression Model

\[ \text{Logged odds (being territorial revisionist)} = 0.468 + 0.075X_1 \text{[Democracy 1]} + 0.051X_2 \text{[Iron & Steel Production]} + 0.047X_3 \text{[Time Since Independence]} \]

Plugging various values of the independent variables into the logistic regression model helps to illustrate what this model actually means. Where a state registers a measure of “0” for each independent variable, the logged odds of being territorially revisionist are equal to .468. To obtain the original odds, we raise e to the .468th power and obtain 1.596. This means that the odds of being territorially revisionist as opposed revisionist in another way are about 1.6:1 (or simply 1.6) when all three independent variables are equal to zero.

Table 2 reports the full output of the logistic regression model. As hypothesized, each unit increase in both democracy and industrialization produces a (modest) decrease in the odds-ratio. Again, an odds-ratio of less than one indicates a negative relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Measures of democracy and industrialization achieved statistical significance and yielded the results expected by hypotheses H1 and H2. Thus, we can reject the first two null hypotheses. However, the
variable “time since independence” did not achieve significance. Thus, we fail to reject the third null hypothesis. The R square values indicate that including the independent variables in the model improves our ability to predict the odds of being territorially revisionist slightly, at least a 7.2% improvement but no more than a 10.2% improvement.

Table 2. Results of Logistic Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Odds-Ratio</th>
<th>Estimated Coefficient</th>
<th>Wald Statistic</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 1</td>
<td>928**</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>5.793</td>
<td>003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Steel Production</td>
<td>950*</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>8.579</td>
<td>016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Since Independence</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>2.149</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>3.662</td>
<td>056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard error in parentheses
** Significant at the 0.05 level
* Significant at the 0.05 level
-2 Log Likelihood = 567.931
Cox & Snell R Square = 0.76
Nagelkerke R Square = 0.102
n = 446

Controlling for the effects of iron and steel production and time since independence, each unit change in the democracy variable produces a change of -.075 in the logged odds of being territorially revisionist. This change is better captured in terms of the odds-ratio. An odds-ratio of .928 means that each unit increase in democracy produces a decrease of 7.2% in the odds of being territorially revisionist (100 * [1 - .928] = 7.2). For example, by increasing the democracy score from zero to five while controlling for the other independent variables (using the logistic regression equation), the odds of being territorially revisionist decrease from 1.6 to about 1.1. Again, this number represents the ratio of territorial revisionist states to other types of revisionist states in the sample. Increasing the democracy score to 10 makes the odds-ratio about
This is a rather substantial change (a decrease of more than fifty percent) in the odds that a state is territorially revisionist.

The same goes for the iron and steel variable. Each increase of a million tons of iron and steel production (while controlling for democracy and time since independence) produces a change of -.051 in the logged odds of being territorially revisionist, or, to put it another way, each unit increase causes a five percent decrease in the odds that a state is territorially revisionist. Like the democracy variable, increases in iron and steel production from zero to ten million tons cause the odds-ratio to drop from about 1.6 to .95, a decrease of a little more than a third.

These results, though modest, are interesting in that they differ considerably from Fazal's (2007) findings. Where Fazal found absolutely no impact of industrialization on the likelihood of more nationalistic states deterring conquest, the results here show that more democratic states at higher levels of industrialization are less likely to pursue territorial conquest.

**Conclusion**

The intent of this section was to quantitatively test the hypothesis that nationalism might restrain territorial expansionism with some admittedly imperfect measures of nationalism. The logistic regression model used here does indicate that this very specific operationalization of nationalism has a rather substantial impact on a very specific type of activity – whether or not a state seeks territorial revision rather than some other revisionist goal.

Even if the tests here resulted in unequivocal confirmation of the hypotheses, the need to provide supplemental qualitative analyses would still exist. Again, the issue of
whether or not the anti-conquest norm is a causal factor in explaining the lack of territorial conquest is not taken up directly here. However, if one accepts the relationship posited between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm in the case study section, then this quantitative analysis provides further evidence in favor of viewing the anti-conquest norm as an important causal factor explaining the relative dearth of territorial conflict by showing that increases in nationalism are associated with decreases in territorial revisionism relative to other revisionist goals.

At the very least, the quantitative analysis here demonstrates that further exploration of the hypothesized relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm is justified. Still, it is important to recognize that attempts to quantitatively measure nationalism, especially at the state-level as this study does, are highly controversial and problematic. In most cases, qualitative analysis is the most appropriate method for studying nationalism and national identity. Indeed, though Fazal (2007) finds only the most limited amount of support for the nationalist-resistance hypothesis in her quantitative analysis, she does find some clearer evidence of the theory in her case studies. The results do justify further inquiry into the question of how nationalism influences aspirations of territorial revisionism.

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22 As noted, Fazal (2007) makes a strong argument in favor of attributing the relative lack of territorial conquest to the anti-conquest norm.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This study seeks to build on the existing body of constitutive theorizing about the “culture” of the international system by attempting to establish the content of the anti-conquest norm, making explicit its relationship to Wendt’s cultures of anarchy framework, and making an effort to determine whether this norm, based in national self-determination, has causal power in world politics. In doing so, it deals with questions and concepts that do not always lend themselves to straightforward empirical analysis. Nationalism, norms, and “cultures of anarchy” are not phenomena that we can objectively quantify and measure. Accordingly, the findings presented here are modest. The chief objective of this paper is to show how the literature on nationalism, the anti-conquest norm, and constructivism can help explain the “culture” of international society.

In attempting to answer the question of what constitutes the “Lockean” system and the “norm against conquest,” this study proposes that the idea of national self-determination has been an important and under-emphasized component of restrained rivalry, which manifests itself in a norm against territorial conquest. One way to explore the relationship between norms about national self-determination and the anti-conquest norm is to study debates surrounding foreign policy decisions. This paper uses two cases previously studied in the anti-conquest norm literature (though there are countless

\[23\] It is possible to interpret the word “restrained” in different ways. Here, it is used to indicate disinclination towards territorial conquest, a limited usage though one consistent with Wendt’s framework. While states have refrained from territorial conquest, they are not necessarily any less hostile towards one another.
additional cases that could be studied). The cases demonstrate that where the anti-conquest norm is appealed to, it is based on the idea that national self-determination is the legitimate standard of dividing the world into states.

The cases alone do not demonstrate any causal relationship between the advent of nationalism and a corresponding decline in territorial conflict. However, the quantitative analysis above gives reason to think that the relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm is not simply limited to political rhetoric. The results show that nationalism, as operationalized here, does in fact decrease the odds of a state being territorially revisionist relative to other types of revision. The effects of the nationalism variables are not drastic, but states at vastly higher levels of industrialization are substantially less likely to be territorially-revisionist when they are using force or declaring war, as are fully consolidated democracies relative to non-democracies.

Together, the case studies and the quantitative analysis suggest a new theoretical path to Wendt’s Lockean culture. Rather than the Lockean culture simply resulting from iterated interaction between states, the evidence presented here indicates that nationalism is at least a plausible alternative explanation for the historic and contemporary Lockean culture. As national self-determination gains legitimacy as a political doctrine, it gives rise to a norm prohibiting territorial conquest which, when abided by, creates conditions consistent with the Lockean culture. This study presents evidence in favor of this view by demonstrating both that a link between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm exists and that nationalism seems to decrease the likelihood of states choosing territorial conquest as a goal even if they are not necessarily any less likely to use force.
Fazal (2007) makes the argument that “even if the norm against conquest is fairly deeply internalized on a global level today, internalization is no guarantee of permanence” (p. 238). She uses Wendt’s three degrees of internalization to speculate that if the norm against conquest has only been adopted under conditions of coercion, it is likely that it is much less firmly ingrained than is often assumed. By showing how a norm that is seen as highly legitimate (national self-determination) underpins the anti-conquest norm, this paper suggests that the anti-conquest is more secure. It might seem obvious that nationalism and self-determination complement one another, though it is entirely conceivable to imagine societies ordered on principles of religion, ideology, or ethnicity. Because the historical evolution of the nation as a form of identity is intricately tied to territorial states (while still capable of existing independent of those states), it is a more rigid type of identity.

This paper makes no judgment on an important question: “Is intervention to replace domestic political structures normatively better than straight-out conquest?” (Fazal, 2007, p. 241). The invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq during the past decade, along with the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, make it clear that the United States is entirely willing to intervene to displace regimes. Indeed, while the norm against conquest may be fairly secure, it does not necessarily make a new “culture” of anarchy significantly less hostile. Further, even if states refrain from pursuing territorial conquest because of national self-determination, there is no indication that this norm will be upheld for anything other than realist reasons (van der Maat, 2011). Indeed, as the case studies demonstrate, realist logic was an ever-present feature of both debates. This paper merely suggests that using Wendt’s framework is a useful tool for discussing the
structural effects of nationalism in world politics. Accordingly, the primary contributions of this study are theoretical. The paper is careful to mention throughout that the hypotheses and findings presented are not concerned with demonstrating that more nationalistic states will be more or less violent. The quantitative portion of the study tests only territorial revision as a goal of foreign policy relative to other revisionist goals in situations where one state either used force or declared war against another state.

Implications of Findings for Future Research

This project suggests a number of avenues for future research. One limitation of this study is that it includes only case studies of American foreign policy. In one sense this might be considered a strength: since American national identity is said to be uniquely malleable, one might expect the United States to be more willing to pursue territorial conquest and incorporate new inhabitants into its polity. At least in the case of the Dominican Republic, this was not the case. Yet for the findings of this study to be generalized beyond the modest results of the quantitative analysis, case studies of other countries’ foreign policies should follow. Both the quantitative analysis and the case studies are limited to the pre-1945 period. Future research should look at whether national self-determination remains a significant constitutive component of the norm against conquest.

Different research designs for the quantitative section are also imaginable. For instance, rather than the logistic regression model used (which only measures territorial revision relative to other types of revision), a rare-events analysis could determine whether nationalistic states are more or less likely to pursue territorial conquest period. This research design is beyond the scope of this study, though it would provide an
Interesting further test of the quantitative hypotheses. The logistic regression model is appropriate for this paper since the goal of the paper is to study goals in war relative to one another, not incidents of war relative to times of peace. A rare-events analysis would be more fruitful in terms of prescribing courses of action for policymakers.

An additional interesting avenue of future research, perhaps better suited to historians, would be a history of the anti-conquest norm. While Fazal (2007) states that Woodrow Wilson was the first to articulate the anti-conquest norm, the first case demonstrates that, in fact, appeals to this norm appeared long before Wilson. Future work could provide a more thorough process tracing of this norm than the brief one offered here. Additional research could also use case study analysis to more rigorously test whether the anti-conquest norm actually alters state behavior. This is a difficult task, and one that is beyond the scope of this paper, though it is a necessary one. The case studies used here are meant only to illustrate the relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm as expressed by policymakers. Case study analysis seeking to demonstrate a causal relationship between the norm and behavior would do a better job of capturing the relationship between nationalism and the anti-conquest norm than the quantitative analysis presented here.

While there are many possible ways to build on the research presented here, the paper at least provides evidence that national self-determination is a constitutive component of the anti-conquest norm, that increases in nationalism decrease the likelihood of a state being territorially revisionist relative to other types of revision, and thus that the advent of modern nationalism is a plausible alternative to iterated interaction as a pathway to Wendt’s Lockean culture of anarchy.
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