

University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository

Master's Theses and Capstones

Student Scholarship

Spring 2011

Vital allies: The colonial militia's use of Indians in King Philip's War, 1675–1676

Shawn Eric Pirelli

University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis>

Recommended Citation

Pirelli, Shawn Eric, "Vital allies: The colonial militia's use of Indians in King Philip's War, 1675–1676" (2011). *Master's Theses and Capstones*. 146.

<https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/146>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

VITAL ALLIES:
THE COLONIAL MILITIA'S USE OF INDIANS
IN KING PHILIP'S WAR, 1675-1676

By

Shawn Eric Pirelli
BA, University of Massachusetts, Boston, 2008

THESIS

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
In
History

May, 2011

UMI Number: 1498967

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.


In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 1498967


Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.




ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

This thesis has been examined and approved.



Thesis Director, Cynthia Van Zandt, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of History



Jessica Lepler, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of History



Kirk Dorsey, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of History

Date May 4, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
DEDICATION.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
NOTES ON THE TEXT.....	viii

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION.....	1
I. SPIES AND INFORMANTS.....	9
II. “[CANNOT] DO OUR WORK WITHOUT THEM”.....	44
III. THE “SKULKING WAY OF WAR”.....	80
CONCLUSION.....	126
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	129

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Van Zandt, Professor Dorsey, and Professor Lepler for their incredible assistance over these past few months. They are truly the backbone of this thesis. As hard as I will try, I do not believe that I could ever repay them for their help. Additionally, I would like to thank Professors Mellyn, Polasky, and Andrews for inspiring me over the past two years of my graduate career.

I want to thank my mother who has accomplished so much in her life, and inspired me to do the same. I want to thank my father for always being there with open arms. His encouragement, love, and care made this all possible. My sister, who kept me grounded, sane, and cheerful when the research was too much. Also, I want to thank Christina for her unwavering patience and support.

Finally, I want to thank my dear friend Richard Pickering. You are like a brother to me. This project is the result of your help and support over the past three years. Without your guidance I would not be where I am today. I hope you find this work tangible evidence of my sincerest appreciation.

For my brother SSG Robert R. Pirelli,

You sacrificed your breath so that others could breathe

ABSTRACT

VITAL ALLIES: THE COLONIAL MILITIA'S USE OF INDIANS IN KING PHILIP'S WAR, 1675-1676

by

Shawn Eric Pirelli

University of New Hampshire, May, 2011

This study examines the role that Indians played in King Philip's War. It argues that Indians and Indian fighting tactics saved the colonies from destruction. This contention relies heavily on the assertion that February 1676 was the turning point in the war. Chapter I reexamines the role that Indian spies and informants played in King Philip's War, and argues that they saved the colonies from surprise attacks on major settlements. Chapter II argues that "friendly" Indians played a significant role as counterinsurgents against a common enemy. Additionally, they provided extra numbers at a time when the colonial militias suffered from impressment derelictions. Finally, Chapter III shows that only after the colonial militia adopted Indian skulking tactics did they successfully repel Philip's forces. In summation, this thesis argues that colonial authorities organized English-Indian companies after a complete economic collapse in February 1675/6. It was this Indian alliance that led them to victory.

May, 2011

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES

PCR

Nathaniel Bradstreet Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England*. 10 in 16 vols. (Boston, W. White, Printer to the Commonwealth, 1857).

RGCMB

Nathaniel Bradstreet Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England*. 5 in 6 vols. (Boston: W. White, Printer to the Commonwealth, 1853).

MHC

Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society for the Year 1794, 3 vols. (Boston: Munroe & Francis, Printers to the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1810).

NOTES ON THE TEXT

Dates in the text are modified to incorporate both the Julian calendar – which was used in the seventeenth century – and our modern Gregorian calendar. Under the Julian calendar, 25 March began the new year, rather than 1 January under the Gregorian calendar. “1675/6” will follow any date between 1 January and 25 March. This format preserves the seventeenth-century style, while making it accessible to a twenty-first-century reader.

This thesis also keeps the original seventeenth-century spelling, capitalization, and italics of words (unless otherwise noted). For instance, a word such as “colors” might be spelled “colours.” Likewise, the word “near” might be spelled “neer.” Many of these words are identifiable, and the reader should have no difficulty deciphering the text.

INTRODUCTION

In February 1675/6, a wounded Captain Benjamin Church arrived in Plymouth to discuss the United Colonies' course of action. King Philip's war had been raging through the New England colonies for nine months and left in its wake unprecedented devastation. The combined forces of the Wampanoags, Nipmucks and Narragansetts pressed closer to Boston and Plymouth. The colonies feared that the Narragansetts would soon take Rehoboth – a settlement thirty miles west of Plymouth proper. If they did, authorities realized that their enemy would soon take Plymouth.

Captain Church addressed the council with great determination. He boldly asserted that, given a company of 300 men comprised of one-third Indians, he would “lye in the Woods as the Enemy did” and repel the Narragansett threat at Rehoboth.¹ This request probably floored the Council who had recently offered Church 60 or 70 soldiers for a campaign to Rehoboth. The idea that Plymouth colonial militia would adopt Indians as soldiers was no doubt scoffed at by some of the members. After a brief consideration, the Council of War replied “That they were already in debt, and so big an Army would bring such charge upon them...And as for

sending out *Indians*, they thought it no wayes advisable."² Captain Church was then dismissed.

One week later, Plymouth colony sent Captain Michael Peirse and Lieutenant Samuel Fuller to Seekonk – several miles west of Rehoboth – with “20 or 30 of the southern Indians.”³ The Council of War believed that a campaign in the west would prevent the Narragansetts pushing forward to take Rehoboth. With Peirse and Fuller was a Wampanoag Indian named Captain Amos who took command of a small portion of Peirse and Fuller's company. In total the Peirse, Fuller and Amos' group consisted of more than one hundred Indian and English soldiers.⁴

On 25 March 1676, Peirse's mixed English and Indian company arrived at Seekonk. After a quick strike they wounded their enemy. Confident that their mission was successful they rested a night. The next day, Peirse marched west from Seekonk to finish the job. One of the Captain's guides spotted a few enemies in the distance and Peirse ordered the entire company to pursue them. Unaware that the Narragansetts had set a trap, his company found itself in the center of an ambush, outnumbered by hundreds. According to George Bodge, the colonists lost fifty-two English and eleven Indians that day.⁵ Peirse and Fuller were among those killed.

The campaign to save Rehoboth was as effective as hitting a hornet-nest with a stick. The Narragansetts replied to Peirse's attack by

taking Rehoboth on 28 March and burning nearly eighty houses and barns.⁶ A day later, Providence suffered an attack that left it immobilized for the duration of the war. Enemy forces pushed closer to Plymouth.

There was a change in attitude among colonial authorities in Boston and Plymouth. Days after the report came in that Peirse's company was ambushed, Plymouth ordered "the number of three hundred Indians, well fitted to go forth, and be ready for a march by the eleventh of April next."⁷ Boston and Plymouth were now willing to use Indians in the militia.

What happened in February 1675/6? Why did the Council of War refuse Church his Indians on 20 February and only a week later order Captain Peirse to march with a company of almost thirty Indians?

This thesis attempts to answer that question. Captain Church requested Indians at a time when the colonies still believed that they could win a war without Indian support. Until 21 February 1675/6, Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Rhode Island authorities did not authorize the use of Indians in the war. Colonial authorities believed that all Indians shared a common racial identity and would help Philip's war-effort from within. Thus, for the first eight months, the colonists spent their resources keeping Indians out of the war as allied combatants. Additionally, only Connecticut authorized the use of Indians as combatants, spies, and informants during the early months of the war.

This thesis divides King Philip's War into two halves: the first stage occurs between June 1675 and February 1675/6, and the remaining second stage that takes place between March 1675/6 and August 1676.

During the first half of the war, the colonists held on to their Old World phalanx-style methods. They believed that part of their identity as Englishmen came from their military structure. To adopt the Indian method of skulking meant that the wilderness had consumed them. It also meant that they were admitting that Old World combat was not effective against enemy combatants. Thus, for the first eight months of the war the colonists kept Indians out of the war and held onto their military identity.

By February, Philip's forces had accumulated important alliances. Most notably, the Narragansetts, Agawams, and Nipmucks joined in the campaign against the colonies. These groups won battles at strategic locations causing the colonies to suffer heavy damages to their infrastructure. The Indian confederacy under Philip swelled in population and during many battles dwarfed colonial militia companies.

On 21 February 1675/6, the colonies announced that they were so far in debt that they could not continue the war.⁸ In Chapter 2, I call this announcement the "February Declaration." At the time the Declaration was made, the colonial authorities were forced to reevaluate their military strategy. On the one hand, the colonies could keep their Old World and racially divided style of warfare and lose the war; or they could use

Indians and skulking, and lose their military identity. Peirse's campaign at Seekonk was the first major change toward a racially inclusive militia. It was also at this moment that the colonists decided that they valued their lives over their old identity.

This thesis shifts the turning point of the war from April 1676 to February 1675/6. Douglas E. Leach argues that the tide turned when the colonists shifted from a defensive to offensive war in the early months of spring. The argument in this thesis, however, contends that the shift was not a physical victory but rather a psychological change to warfare techniques. The colonists were placed in a struggle for survival and were losing. In February, that struggle came to a peak. Captain Peirse's expedition was symbolic of the colonies' realization that the Old World methods were no longer effective in the New World.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, Spies and Informants, discusses Indians as information gatherers for the colonies. During the war, colonial officers found that Indians could be used to gather information regarding the enemy forces' location, size, and expected attacks. By April 1676, colonial leaders had gathered such precise information that they prevented major damage to the western settlements.

The second chapter deals primarily with friendly Indians in the colonial militia. This study defines friendly Indians as any Indian who

viewed himself as an individual in the same struggle for survival as the colonists. Often, but not all the time, these were Christian Indians who had been born in settlement towns and were raised by the English. It outlines the importance of friendly Indians at a time when the colonies were nearly out of money, provisions, and soldiers. Friendly Indians, who had remained loyal to the colonies, provided the militia with hundreds of men willing to fight.

Finally, the third chapter illustrates the importance of Indian skulking tactics. It shows that toward the beginning of the war, colonial forces were ill prepared for combat in America. They often marched loudly through the woods, waited for their enemy in open fields, and carried heavy armor that slowed them down. As a result, these fighters were easy targets for a quick, silent, and invisible enemy. When the colonial authorities adopted friendly Indians into the colonial militia, the former taught the English proper skulking techniques that saved hundreds of lives.

This thesis will argue that when the colonies used Indians in King Philip's War, the Indians significantly contributed to the colonial victory. By arguing that February 1675/6 was the major turning point in the war, this thesis identifies the definitive moment when colonial tactics, ideology, and identity changed. Chapter two and three compare the pre-February war with the post-February war. This comparative method allows the thesis

to illustrate how successful the colonists were after they adopted Indians and Indian tactics into the colonial militia.

NOTES

¹ Thomas Church, *Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which Began in the Month of June 1675* (Boston, 1716), 19.

² Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 19.

³ George Madison Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War being A Critical Account of That War with A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677* (Baltimore, MD: Clearfiled Company, Inc. 2002), 331.

⁴ *Ibid*, 347-9.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ *Ibid*, 331.

⁷ PCR, V: 192-3.

⁸ RGCMB V: 70.

CHAPTER I

SPIES AND INFORMANTS

Accomplished spies leave few traces. Informants hope that their activities will remain covert. For those keeping their true natures in the shadows, even as they become cultural and political border crossers, continued safety requires secrecy before, during, and after a mission. It was no different in the seventeenth century. Though the English depended on Indian informants and spies throughout King Philip's War, the written record of their activities is thin. This vacuum can be explained by the need to protect indigenous espionage figures even after the war's end. Despite their absence from many records, Indian informants and spies were vital allies in the war against Philip.

If Jill Lepore is correct, that King Philip's War was also a battle of words, and that in its aftermath the colonists disassociated themselves from Indians by writing histories, the accounts of Indians as key figures in the English victory will necessarily be few and far between.¹ This is a second factor complicating the historian's attempt to understand the role of Indian spies and informants in the 1670s.

For the purpose of this chapter, informants are individuals that supplied the English with information on the enemy's position, strength, and population *without* concealing their identity. These Indians ranged from captives, friendly Indians, formerly hostile Indians, and runaways. In some cases, informants tortured the enemy for information and relayed the intelligence to colonists. Other times, they knew where the enemy's position was because they had either been with or seen the enemy at one time.

Historians who have written about King Philip's War have shown that colonists used spies. Yet they skim over or ignore the spies' contribution to the English victory in 1676. In Douglas E. Leach's *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, Leach briefly mentions the role of Indian spies. He argues that the colonists were more prepared for a Nipmuck attack in February 1675/6 when they were presented with information gathered and presented to them by the Indians.² Unfortunately, his argument that the war was "a struggle for survival between two mutually antagonistic civilizations, and only a total victory of one side or the other would be likely to settle the matter" insists that the war was bifurcated – or separated by two different identities.³ Thus, instead of recognizing spies and informants for their contributions, he believes that had "Gookin acted with less speed and determination" after a spy told him of the Nipmuck raid, "the ensuing event might have had a far different ending."⁴ Leach believes that it was Gookin's response, not

the Indian's intelligence that changed the course of events. Additionally, Leach writes, it was not the spy's information that saved the western settlements from destruction, but rather the arrival of Captain Samuel Wadsworth's company that "helped turn the tide."⁵ According to Leach, Indian informants played a peripheral role in the outcome of King Philip's War.

Historians now accept that the war was not as racially divided as Leach believed. Richard R. Johnson maintains that the "enduring characterization that pits white man against Indian has a satisfying simplicity that has too often obscured a more complex reality."⁶ More recent historians argue that while the war, in the words of James Drake, "certainly had an ethnic dimension," allegiances "did not derive solely from ethnicity."⁷ In King Philip's War some Indians were fighting the same struggle for survival as the English colonists.

In their analysis of that struggle historians have missed the significance of Indian spies and informants. Daniel Mandell argues that in February 1675/6 spies "saw several things that would augur the course of the war over the next few months."⁸ Mandell does not consider the significance of spies in the war. Rather, he argues that their information was true and provided the English with valuable insight. Rather than acknowledge his activities as an informant for the English, Jill Lepore contends that John Sassamon was killed because of his "ability to act as a

mediator” and that it was “bilingualism and his literacy” that led to his murder.⁹ Philip Ranlet argues that Sassamon represents multiple identities as both Indian and English and historians can use Sassamon's identities to understand New England legal practices.¹⁰ James Drake, claims that Sassamon was the epitome of a failed strategy of Indian integration into European culture. Sassamon, for Drake, was a diplomat who offered Philip protection under the colonial government and, as a result, died.¹¹ None of these authorities see Sassamon as an informant who provided intelligence of Philip's planned attack. Thus, these authors miss the significance of Indians as spies and informants by only focusing on the role they played as mediators between two cultures rather than on their intelligence during times of conflict and crisis.

Rather than focus on the border-crossing abilities and information gathering of Indian spies and informants, this chapter will examine the information those spies gathered and its effects. Furthermore, this chapter will suggest that Sassamon and other Indians provided the colonists with information on impending attacks. This chapter asks how beneficial the information gathered by Indians was to the colonists. In some instance, it was unquestionably beneficial, as when colonial authorities heeded warnings that saved western settlements from destruction. From the Mohegans and Pequots that tortured their captives, to those that deserted Philip's forces with key intelligence on his strategies, location,

and strength, this chapter will offer a new perspective on the use of Indian informants and spies during King Philip's War.

JOHN SASSAMON

The first time John Sassamon shows up in the records is as an interpreter for Increase Mather and John Eliot in the 1640s.¹² After his conversion to Christianity, Sassamon worked with Eliot to translate the Bible into Algonquian. His achievements earned him a reputation as “a man of eminent parts & wit.”¹³ He then spent his time in Natick, Massachusetts proselytizing to other Indians while teaching them reading and writing.¹⁴ Eventually, in 1653, he attended Harvard University along with four other prominent Indian men.¹⁵

Nine years later Sassamon left the English to live with Alexander, the Wampanoag sachem who took power in 1660 after his father, Massasoit, died. When Alexander died in 1662 his brother, Philip, ascended into the position of sachem.¹⁶ Sassamon became Philip's assistant, and Philip seemed to trust Sassamon to translate any contracts made between the Wampanoags and the English.¹⁷ As Lepore argues, “the same skills that made Sassamon valuable to Eliot now made him almost indispensable to Philip.”¹⁸ The sachem could not speak or read English, and, thus,

Sassamon's mark appears on many of Philip's contracts made between 1663 and 1670, proving that he was a valued assistant.

The records are not clear about Sassamon after 1672. One source states that he "was sent to preach to the Namaskets, and other Indians of Middleborough."¹⁹ Another reports that he was with Philip until the winter of 1675.²⁰ Others maintain that he was still under the protection of the colonies and was used as a mediator between various Indian groups and colonial authorities.²¹ Wherever Sassamon was in 1674, he was at least close enough to Philip to gather information regarding the mounting conflict; he was, also, close enough to Philip for the sachem to know that Sassamon was aware of his plans.²²

In January 1675 John Sassamon travelled to Plymouth Colony with information that Philip, sachem of the Wampanoags and Pokanokets, was preparing for war against them.²³ Sassamon had spent the past ten years as one of Philip's counselors, and he knew that Philip would kill him if the colonies learned of his plan to attack them. It was with a great personal risk that Sassamon told Governor Josiah Winslow the colonies, colonists, and both of their lives were in danger.²⁴

Winslow had heard reports such as these many times before from other Indians. Sometime in early 1671, an unnamed Indian reported that Philip was preparing for war against Plymouth.²⁵ The sachem was called to Taunton, Massachusetts to answer for these claims. In a treaty on 10 April

1671 (Treaty of Taunton), Philip admitted that he had "*broken this my Covenant with my Friends, by taking up Arms, with evil intent against them.*"²⁶ To rectify the situation, Philip agreed to give Plymouth all of his firearms and weapons "*for their security so long as they shall see reason.*"²⁷ Plymouth believed that they had averted war through this agreement.

According to George Bodge, in April 1675 a Christian Indian named Waban "came to Gen. Gookin and warned him of Philip's intention shortly to attack the English."²⁸ He continued, "the Wampanoags intended Mischief and were only waiting for the Trees to leave out, that they might the easier conceal themselves after they had begun."²⁹ Waban probably felt comfortable telling this to Gookin since the latter was the superintendent of Indian affairs in Massachusetts Bay Colony. There is no account of General Gookin's reaction to this information. Additionally, there is no record of whether Waban knew Sassamon or how he came across this information. Waban went to Gookin again in May "and urged the same and said that...the Indians would fall upon the towns."³⁰

By 1675, Winslow seems to have expected these rumors. Since 1660, colonial authorities nearly always called Indians sachems to answer for rumors that they were conspiring against the colonies. These meetings had become a regular occurrence in New England. Sassamon and Waban were no different than those that came before them. The

information just as plausible, and both had respectable reputations in New England. But this time Winslow dismissed the informants and ignored the warnings.³¹ One month after Sassamon left Plymouth, he was found dead in Assawompset Pond.³² Five months later, in June 1675, Plymouth executed Sassamon's suspected murderers (three Wampanoag Indians); two days later Philip held a war dance in preparation for war.³³

Sassamon carried information that might have changed the outcome of King Philip's War – or prevented the war altogether. The colonies were not prepared, militarily or strategically, for war when hostilities broke out in June 1675. The Massachusetts General Court did not meet until 9 July 1675 – several weeks after Philip first attacked Swansea.³⁴ Kyle Zelner says that the “court began to prepare for conflict” only after they met in July, and voted “for several war taxes...to amass supplies for an army.”³⁵ Plymouth responded a week earlier but took several weeks to send troops on an expedition against Philip's forces.³⁶ By the time Massachusetts and Plymouth companies arrived, Swansea and surrounding towns lay in ruins. Philip's forces had killed ten English colonists in two towns before the Plymouth Colony acknowledged that the war had begun.³⁷

Sassamon and Waban were informants who provided the English with credible information that would have, perhaps, saved many lives in 1675 and 1676. Yet, the colonists during the early summer of 1675 were not

yet prepared to rely on Indian informants. Nevertheless, the information Sassamon carried might have cost Philip the war. In the words of Nathaniel Saltonstall, "King Philip suspecting he either would divulge or had already made known this Secret to the English, took Council to kill this Sosoman."³⁸ Sassamon's role as an informant caused his death.

THE MOHEGANS AND PEQUOTS AS INFORMANTS

In August 1675, John Pynchon, found of Springfield, sent a letter to Governor John Winthrop Jr. of Connecticut. He explained the usefulness of Indians as informants in the war against Philip. Pynchon explained that "Philip with forty of his men is now at a place called Ashquoach a little on this side of Quabog."³⁹ He continued, "our Indians judge that either Philip will go to them at Memenimisee, or that they will come to Philip at Ashquoash, which the Indians think is rather the more convenient place and so they make 250 soldiers."⁴⁰ The intelligence that Pynchon relayed to Winthrop specified that "Philip have but 30 guns, and the other 10 bows and arrows."⁴¹

According to the Indian informants, Philip's forces "are now weak and weary and may be easily dealt with, whereas if we let them alone...they will burn our houses and kill us all by stealth."⁴² Winthrop then sent out a force of 250 soldiers, which resulted in the capture of one of

Philip's most valuable leaders. Hartford, in awe that the Connecticut Indians recovered such precise information wrote to Pynchon and asked for any intelligence "and earnestly desire as any comes to your hand it may be posted away to us."⁴³

To show their support for the United Colonies, Mohegan Indians, with their sachem Uncas, marched into Boston and reported that the Narragansetts were hiding Wampanoag men and women.⁴⁴ The Narragansetts posed the greatest threat to the United Colonies, and Massachusetts and Plymouth spent much of their efforts attempting to keep these Indians out of the war. This information led Massachusetts authorities to judge a preemptive strike against the Rhode Island Indians as necessary. In July 1675, Plymouth and Massachusetts ordered the Narragansetts to sign a loyalty compact ensuring that if Philip's subjects entered into their territory, they would turn them over to the English as prisoners.⁴⁵ The Narragansetts signed and the colonists believe that this agreement would keep them from fighting in the war.

THE GREAT SWAMP FIGHT OF DECEMBER 1675

Both Plymouth and Massachusetts were reluctant, at first, to listen to Indian informants. While some ranking officers valued any intelligence that could help in the campaign against Philip, the colonial authorities rarely

authorized it. Captain Benjamin Church consistently trusted any Indian who fought alongside his company. Early in the war, Church encountered John Alderman, an Indian who had left Mount Hope in search of English protection. According to Church, Alderman "gave him an account of the State of the *Indians*, and where each of the *Sagamores* head quarters were."⁴⁶ Alderman even offered to escort Church to Philip's sister-in-law Weetamo's territory. After serious deliberations, the Massachusetts authorities sent Captain Baxter, Captain Hunter, and Captain Church to find Weetamo's camp. After a quarter-mile, the three companies found three of the sachem's warriors and killed one of them. As they travelled farther, they came to their location and open fired. After some time, the English forced the entire village to retreat into the swamps and the fort was taken.⁴⁷

Colonial mistrust came as a result of a general racial prejudice against all Indians. This mistrust cost the colonies a great deal. Not only were some soldiers not willing to listen to Indian informants, but also they wanted all Indians dead. Captain Samuel Moseley was particularly fond of the latter option, and on occasion was disciplined by his own superiors for cruel treatment of friendly Indians.⁴⁸ As Douglas E. Leach writes "Many of the troops had nothing but contempt and hatred for all Indians."⁴⁹

In October, English authorities received information from a Wampanoag informant that Canonchet, the Narragansett sachem, was

planning an attack.⁵⁰ This came as something of a surprise since the English had signed an alliance treaty with the sachem at the outbreak of the war. The July Treaty specified that the Narragansetts would remain loyal to the colonists, refrain from entering the war, and “*use all Acts of Hostility against the said Philip & his Subjects, entering his Lands or any other Lands of the English.*”⁵¹ Though the colonists were doubtful that the Narragansetts would stay out completely, they hoped that the treaty would pacify the Narragansetts for a short while.

Several times between July and October, Indians reported to English that Wampanoag canoes travelled to and from Narragansett territory.⁵² In his contemporary history of the war, William Hubbard, emphasized that the Narragansetts resented the contract with the English from the beginning and actively welcomed Philip's men, women, and children onto their land as refuges.⁵³ Others knew that the Narragansetts accepted Wampanoag messengers.⁵⁴

The report in October, however, was different. This time it was an Indian who was with Canonchet when he made the plans.⁵⁵ This Indian had been with the Narragansett sachem for several weeks and Canonchet. The informant knew firsthand that the Narragansetts had breached the contract. The General Court of Massachusetts announced that the Narragansetts “*but juggle with us*” and scheduled a preemptive strike.⁵⁶

The colonies attacked in December 1675. Despite large numbers of Narragansett warriors, the battle was relatively successful for the colonists. This was due, in part, to the informants. Connecticut and Massachusetts forces surprised the Narragansett warriors with a concerted attack. Unaware that the English knew of their plans, the Indians did not prepare a counterattack, and fought a somewhat disoriented fight.⁵⁷ After hours of battle, the English drove the Narragansetts from the fort into the swamps in retreat. A wounded Captain Benjamin Church arrived on the scene as the Indians retreated. He announced, "Some of the Enemy that were then in the Fort have since inform'd us, that near a third of the *Indians* belonging to all that *Narraganset Country* were killed by the *English*, and by the Cold that Night, that they fled out of their Fort so hastily that they carried nothing with them."⁵⁸ Based on this information, Church recommended that the English take the fort for shelter and starve out the Narragansett forces.

General Winslow agreed to Church's proposal. Winslow rode his horse toward the fort with the order to preserve it. Another Captain, who opposed Church's advise, to take shelter in the Narragansett forts, told Winslow "*That if he mov'd another step towards the Fort he would shoot his Horse under him.*"⁵⁹ This stopped Winslow. The Captain then called for the company doctor – who was working on Church's bullet wound – and explained the situation. The doctor returned to Church and said "*if he*

gave such advice as that was, he should bleed to Death like a Dog before they would endeavour to stench his blood."⁶⁰ Church, now in fear for his life, withdrew his recommendation. The company then burned the fort to the ground.

If the Indians supplied Church with the correct information than the soldiers could have camped in the fort and pursued the enemy after being fully rested. The Narragansetts grew more bellicose after what was known as the Great Swamp Fight in December 1675. The Rhode Island tribe soon threw their lot in with Philip and decimated several frontier towns in Massachusetts and burned Providence.⁶¹ In some cases, the United Colonies listened to their informants and it led them to victory; other times the information was dismissed and the English forces lost opportunities to remove serious threats.

The Great Swamp Fight of 1675 with the Narragansetts might have turned out differently if an Indian informant had not told Plymouth Colony that Canonchet was planning an attack against the English. The Narragansetts, wielded incredible strength in the region, and the United Colonies feared them more than any other group. William Hubbard wrote that if the Narragansetts sided with Philip "it would have been very difficult, if possible for the *English* to have saved any of their inland plantation from being utterly destroyed."⁶² According to Sherborne Cook, the Narragansett warrior population was roughly 1,000, with a reserve

population of almost 4,000.⁶³ The preemptive strike at the Narragansetts' fort in December 1675 eliminated one-third of the Indians in all of Narragansett territory (if we can take Church's informant at his word).⁶⁴ If all of these figures are accurate, or off by only a little, the preemptive attack on Narragansett lands diminished their population to just over 2,600. This was a tremendous victory for the English – one that would never have happened without the Indian informant.

UNRECOGNIZED SPIES

In his narrative "An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England," Daniel Gookin wrote the sole surviving firsthand account of Indian spies.⁶⁵ Completed in 1677, Gookin's account was not published until 1836.⁶⁶ The original manuscript is believed lost. Many of Gookin's other works were destroyed in a fire during the early eighteenth century.⁶⁷

As the Superintendent of Indian affairs in the Massachusetts Bay colony, Gookin was afforded certain knowledge and control unavailable to others.⁶⁸ The colonial authorities trusted him with the responsibility of looking after the Indians in Massachusetts. During the war Gookin used his position to take measured risks with his Indian allies. He rarely told others of his Indian spies, and since none of his contemporaries mentioned Indian

spies in their writing, one might deduce that they were unaware of Indian spying.⁶⁹

High-ranking officers did not know about Gookin's spies, and in one instance the Superintendent's secrecy almost proved fatal. By 26 October 1675, colonists feared a general uprising by all Indians in southern New England. Colonists claimed that allegiances were ethnic, and that all Indians would ally with Philip.⁷⁰ Fear escalated when colonists heard that the Nipmucks joined Philip's forces.⁷¹ Coupled with the belief that the colonists could not tell the difference between a friendly Indian and an enemy Indian, colonial authorities interned all Indians onto Deer Island in October 1675. Other laws prevented Indians from travelling more than one mile from their homes unless accompanied by an Englishman.⁷² When a corporation in London sent money, supplies, and letters for better treatment of the Indians on Deer Island, Massachusetts authorities assured it that "these Christian Indians [were] allies and friends of the English" and that for their security this internment policy was necessary.⁷³

Job Kattenanit, one of Gookin's spies, was granted permission to travel into Nipmuck country to find his family (whom he had left to serve the English). Captain Mosely "became infuriated, and created a most unpleasant scene in the presence of the assembled troops."⁷⁴ Mosley represented the view that Indians were not trustworthy. Other disagreed with Mosely and his supporters. During the war, colonists, soldiers, and

authorities often divided over whether the English could trust Indians during the war. Attacks by Indians on major settlements in the west increased the division between the two sides. Despite fierce controversy the colonists realized that their survival necessitated the ability to listen to, learn from, and use Indians.

To protect the Indians, Gookin only told a few people of the spying expeditions. In November 1675, Captain Henschman's forces, near Hassanamesit caught Job Kattenanit on a mission. At first there was a heated debate over whether Henschman's company should kill the Indian for travelling without an English chaperone and, they assumed, conspiring against the English. Fortunately, one company officer offered Kattenanit an opportunity to explain his situation to Captain Henschman. When the spy showed Henschman his mission note, signed by Gookin, the Captain admitted that he was unaware of any spy practices organized by the colonial authorities.⁷⁵ Henschman sent Kattenanit to Boston for further examination, and the spy was eventually cleared.

GOOKIN'S TWO SPIES

Job Kattenanit and Daniel Gookin's other spy, James Quannapohit, gathered, perhaps, the best intelligence of the war. In December 1675, the Narragansetts fought against the colonists in The Great Swamp Fight –

one of the most important battles of the war. The battle made it clear the colonies needed more information regarding the whereabouts, strength, and intention of other Indian tribes who had the potential to cause severe damage to English settlements.⁷⁶ In January 1675/6, the colonial Council of Massachusetts asked Major Daniel Gookin to take several Christian Indians and employ them as spies for the English.⁷⁷ Gookin, who had spent months trying to prove that Christian Indians could be of great use to the colonies, accepted the order and took both James Quannapohit and Job Kattenanit from Deer Island to his house in Cambridge. Gookin offered them five pounds and instructions before they left the city on 30 December.⁷⁸

The pair told the Nipmucks they were escaped captives from Hassanamesit and that they were inquiring about the current situation of the rebel forces. They said there were more Indians on Deer Island who were awaiting this information so that they could help in the rebellion.

Confident that these two spies were interested in supporting the rebellion, the Nipmucks told Kattenanit and Quannapohit that Philip was near Fort Albany seeking an alliance with the Mohawks.⁷⁹ Next they told them that they had planned a rendezvous point for themselves, the Narragansetts, and the Wampanoags in early spring. After coming together, the three tribes planned a full-scale united attack against the English in which they planned to destroy several major towns.⁸⁰

Furthermore, in regards to their strength, the Nipmucks explained that they “gloried much in their number and strength, and that [in] all this war their loss of men was inconsiderable.”⁸¹ Even more shocking was that they “boasted of their expectation to be supplied with arms and ammunition and men from the French, by the hunting Indians.”⁸² According to this report, not only were enemy forces still strong, united, and well preserved, they expected the French to supply them with weapons.

Finally, the Nipmuck sachem, Mautampe, told the two spies that the first full-scale attack by all three bands would be against Lancaster. The plan was well designed. First, Nipmuck and Narragansett forces would burn the only bridge into Lancaster preventing any English forces from rescuing the town. Then they would destroy Lancaster and all the surrounding areas before the English found their way into the area.⁸³

Kattenanit risked his life to retrieve information for the colonies. He decided to stay behind in Nipmuck territory for several days after his partner James Quannapohit and he had gathered information about the impending attack on Lancaster. Quannapohit pleaded with Kattenanit to come to Boston. According to Gookin, the conversation began when Kattenanit announced, “I am willing to venture a little longer, and go down with the Indians that are to meet with the Narragansetts; and, if I live, I may get more intelligence. And,’ said he, ‘if God spare my life, I intend to come away about three weeks hence.”⁸⁴ His partner responded

by pleading "after I am gone, I fear the enemy will suspect us to be spies, and then kill you."⁸⁵ These two Indians knew that they risked everything to support the English.

In early January, Quinnapohit left the Nipmucks for Cambridge. Kattenanit stayed with the enemy for several days longer hoping that he could gather more intelligence. On 24 January, Quinnapohit found Gookin and warned him of the attack on Lancaster. Gookin then relayed this information to the Council of War and pleaded that they send troops to protect the surrounding towns. Not believing the severity of the threat, Massachusetts hesitated in making a decision and delayed the reinforcements. Days later, reports arrived that a small settlement near Sudbury was burned to the ground and the Nipmucks had killed or taken captive the inhabitants.⁸⁶ Massachusetts authorities, still cautious about trusting Quinnapohit, sent "two mounted patrols to cover the frontier line from Groton down to Medfield."⁸⁷

Two weeks later, Gookin awoke to Job Kattenanit pounding at his door.⁸⁸ It was ten o'clock at night, and Kattenanit, out of breath, came bearing very important information.⁸⁹ Kattenanit told Gookin that "Before he came from the enemy at Menemesse, a party of the Indians about four hundred, were marched forth to attack and burn Lancaster; and, on the morrow...they would attempt it."⁹⁰ Furthermore, the spy reported that

he had stayed with the Nipmucks long enough to observe an alliance with his hosts and the Narragansetts.⁹¹

Gookin leapt out of his bed and ran down the street to consult Thomas Danforth – a member of the Council of War. The two of them spent several hours writing to local militia groups to reinforce Lancaster by morning. Letters were sent to Marlborough, Concord, and Lancaster that recommended all the townspeople to abandon their locations and seek shelter in the surrounding towns. The letters warned that this attack would consist of four hundred Narragansett and Nipmuck warriors, and that the attack was scheduled for the next morning.⁹² Gookin and Danforth had done all they could do to protect the western settlements; now they played the waiting game.

By daybreak, Captain Samuel Wadsworth, of Milton, received the letter and gathered forty of his men for a march to Lancaster. When Wadsworth's company arrived, the bridge was already burned and Nipmuck and Narragansett forces had begun their descent onto the town. The sight was gruesome to colonial forces. Mary Rowlandson, who was captured by Nipmuck warriors during this attack, wrote the following in her narrative:

The first coming was about Sun-rising; hearing the noise of some Guns, we looked out; several Houses were burning, and the Smoke ascending to Heaven. There were five persons taken in one

house, the Father, and the Mother and a sucking Child, they knockt on the head; the other two they took and carried away alive. There were two others, who being out of their Garrison upon some occasion were set upon; one was knockt on the head, the other escaped: Another their was who running along was shot and wounded, and fell down; he begged of them his life, promising them Money...but they would not hearken to him but knockt him in head, and stript him naked, and split open his Bowels.⁹³

For several hours, the Nipmuck and Narragansett forces burned houses, killed and dismembered civilians, and destroyed crops. The Nipmucks, especially, had no sympathy for these inhabitants. In one instance, the Indians scalped a man, stripped him naked, and watched as he crawled away in agony.⁹⁴

Wadsworth discovered another bridge into the area that the enemy had partly destroyed by pulling off the planks; he used it to engage the Indian forces.⁹⁵ His company immediately fortified a garrison house owned by a local inhabitant Cyprian Stevens.⁹⁶ The militia company split: one half stayed at the garrison and continued the pitched battle, while the other tried to retrieve another garrison-house within the town. This latter building protected another bridge that if it were fortified would allow allied forces the opportunity to sandwich the Indians in a two-pronged battle. The Indians, who realized this, raced Wadsworth's forces to the garrison and burned it before it was fortified.⁹⁷ Wadsworth, and the rest of his men, retreated, and Lancaster was destroyed.

Boston authorities brought Kattenanit in for information. With Lancaster now demolished, Boston authorities wondered where the Nipmuck and Narragansett forces would strike next. Kattenanit informed them that the plan was to attack Medfield, Groton, and Marlborough with forces from the Lancaster raid.⁹⁸ Massachusetts' authorities sent out Major Thomas Savage and Captain Mosely to Medfield with between five hundred and six hundred men.⁹⁹ On 21 February, colonial forces found fifty houses burned to the ground and many dead residents.¹⁰⁰ The Indians had not finished with the town when Major Savage's company arrived. With nearly double the amount of soldiers, colonial forces drove the Indians back into the swamps and saved Medfield from total destruction.¹⁰¹

Based on the information provided to the authorities by Kattenanit, Boston reinforced both Groton and Marlborough two days after the Medfield fight. While they managed to stave off some attacks, the Indians seemed to be everywhere. After the Medfield fight Mary Sheppard, whom the Nipmucks had captured on 12 February, was released. When the English came upon her, she informed them that the Indians "were in three Towns beyond Quobaog."¹⁰² Major Savage and Captain Mosely split their forces to cover more ground. Somewhere near Quoboag, Mosely met with Major Treat's Connecticut forces and drove the Indians back into the

swamps.¹⁰³ Mosely was injured in the battle and both officers deemed it unwise to chase the enemy into the woods.

Information soon came that the Indians had already planned an attack near Northampton, Massachusetts. According to Nathaniel Saltonstall in 1676, enemy forces were not aware that the English had recovered information on the attack and “found such warm Entertainment [and] had kindled their Fire.”¹⁰⁴ When Major Savage arrived with a company of roughly five hundred soldiers the Nipmuck and Narragansett warriors “were forced to fly with great Confusion.”¹⁰⁵ An informant told Savage that the Indians still had a larger contingency force, and the informant believed that if Savage stayed at his location the English could drive the Indians into an ambush at Deerfield.¹⁰⁶ Nipmuck forces returned with one thousand warriors to find two English companies prepared for battle. Major Savage’s groups “pursued them to their usual Place of Rendezvous near *Deerfield*” and forced the Indians into retreat.¹⁰⁷

February 1675/6 was a particularly difficult month for English forces. The Indians attacked fifty-two towns, pillaged twenty-five, and destroyed seventeen.¹⁰⁸ Indians also destroyed towns that supported troops with food, provisions, and rations. Colonial authorities realized that abandoned towns put more pressure on soldiers. With minimal resistance remaining in the towns, Indian forces marched toward Boston and Plymouth without

trouble. To prevent abandonment, the Courts ordered that "it shall not be in the liberty of any person what soever who is by law enjoyned to trayne...ward or scout to leave the Towne he is an Inhabitant of upon any pretence whatsoever...upon the penalty of twenty pounds."¹⁰⁹ People in the areas south of Boston had begun moving closer to the city for protection, and Boston authorities wanted this to stop. Wrentham colonists, for example, abandoned their town in the spring 1676 and migrated north to Dedham.¹¹⁰

Colonial forces had survived the first wave of onslaughts. Spies were to thank for this. Gookin's two spies, James Quannapohit and Job Kattenanit, provided the English with information that proved vital. If Kattenanit had not informed Gookin of the impending attack on Lancaster, and the several later attacks, the English might have lost all of the major settlements west of Marlborough.

THE WAR SHIFTS

As the war shifted toward a colonial offensive in April, more Indians surrendered to English authority. Colonial authorities received information on where Philip was and where he was attacking next. On 10 April 1676, Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote, an informant told one company "that the Enemy had a designe, on the next Day, to fall upon the Garrison, and

some few Houses that remained at Marlborough, to revenge the Death of one of their eminent Men that was slain when they were last there."¹¹¹ Quickly, Major General Winslow went with a company of men to meet Major Thomas Savage in Boston. They consulted with Captain Mosely and planned an expedition for the next day. When the forces arrived in Marlborough they did not find the enemy and were called back to Boston. The English abandoned Marlborough too soon, however. Days later Boston received information that Philip's forces had waited for the colonial militia to leave before attacking. Everything in Marlborough, except the Garrison, was destroyed.¹¹² The informant gave them the correct information, but impatience cost another settlement.

On 21 April, Gookin received information from one of his Indians that Philip's remaining forces numbered at 1,500 and that they had burned Sudbury to the ground.¹¹³ Almost immediately after hearing this, Captain Hugh Mason was sent, with several other forces, to Sudbury. Philip, surprised that the English arrived so quickly, retreated into a local riverbed. By the time Philip gathered his troops for a counterattack, the English had secured the only bridge into the town. Shortly, thereafter, three more companies arrived as reinforcements under Captain Prentiss, Corporal Phipps, and the Indian company of Captain Hunting.¹¹⁴ The three reinforcement forces arrived one day later on 22 April to find that

the enemy had already withdrawn during the previous night. The Sudbury fight was a victory for the colonists.¹¹⁵

As the war neared its end, colonial forces enjoyed victory after victory over Philip's forces. In his *A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences*, Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote that the English should not forget the Indian informants, who "have done us considerable Services."¹¹⁶ He continued,

they serve especially for Spies and Scouts to [stalk] the skulking Enemy, and drive them out of the Swamps and Woods, and then the *English* can the better fight them, and indeed our greatest Exercise hath been to find the Enemy rather than to Fight them, unless they be very much Superior in Numbers. But now the *Indians* dread our Approaches with those *Indian* Vancourriers, and the Lord hath caused much of his Terror to fall upon them.¹¹⁷

CONCLUSION

When colonial forces acted on the information that spies and informants retrieved they saved themselves from disaster. Information on Philip's forces afforded the English the opportunity for preemptive attacks against the Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and Wampanoags. It also better prepared the English. The attack at Lancaster, in February 1675/6, could have devastated western Massachusetts and paralyzed colonial

reinforcements if Kattenanit had not informed the colonies of the attack.¹¹⁸ The intelligence that Mohegans and Pequots brought to the Connecticut colony early in the war forced the capture of several of Philip's most valued leaders. According to George Bodge, Connecticut did not suffer the damages of its neighboring colonies because it chose to use Indians from the earliest stages of the war.¹¹⁹ Massachusetts and Plymouth, however, trusted their spies only after they suffered significantly greater losses. During the latter half of the war, spies and informants provided Massachusetts and Plymouth with opportune successes.

The colonies suffered devastating losses when they did not heed the information gathered by informants. Governor Josiah Winslow could have protected the southern and western settlements with reinforcements after Sassamon and Waban informed him of Philip's plans. He also could have also prepared the colonies for war with a reformed and improved military system. Kyle Zelner illustrates how unprepared New England was for this conflict, and why they suffered so many losses during the early stages of war.¹²⁰

Spies and informants were willing to risk their lives to get correct information to their English allies. The information provided by Indians that Philip's forces were near New York seeking aid from the Mohawks was accurate, and it allowed Plymouth and Massachusetts an opportunity to petition to Governor Andros of New York.¹²¹ When Kattenanit and

Quannapohit told Gookin that the Nipmucks and Narragansetts were planning an attack on Lancaster for the morning of 10 February, the intelligence was verified. When Indians warned of an attack against Marlborough in April 1676, the attack came – though the English had disbanded. When Sassasmon and Waban told Governor Winslow that Philip was scheduling a war with the colonies, it came. These Indians provided colonists with up-to-date, honest, and correct information that, when heeded, saved the colonies.

Friendly Indians in King Philip's War played a crucial role in helping the English prevent Philip from achieving victory. Their information prevented the Nipmucks from advancing into Boston. The information also enabled the colonists to surprise-attack the Narragansetts and minimize their fighting forces before the tribe entered the war. Spies and informants risked their lives to gather intelligence on Philip's forces' location, size, and strength. Without this information, Philip's allies may have inflicted greater devastations from which the colonies may not have recovered.

NOTES

¹ Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998).

² Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 157-158.

³ *Ibid*, 178.

⁴ *Ibid*, 158.

⁵ *Ibid*, 158.

⁶ Richard R. Johnson, "The Search for the Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England," *Journal of American History* 64 (Dec., 1977), 623.

⁷ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 77.

⁸ Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 92.

⁹ Lepore, "Dead Men Tell No Tales," 485; also, see Lepore, *The Name of War*, 25.

¹⁰ James P. Ronda and Jeanne Ronda, "The Death of John Sassamon: An Exploration in Writing New England Indian History." *American Indian Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer, 1974).

¹¹ James D. Drake, "Symbol of a Failed Strategy: The Sassamon Trial, Political Culture, and the Outbreak of King Philip's War," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 19:2 (1995).

¹² Jill Lepore believes that Sassamon was probably the Indian with Captain John Underhill in the Pequot War, but this is only speculation since Underhill does not name his companion. See Lepore, *The Name of War*; also see, Mather, *Brief History*, 3.

¹³ Lepore, *The Name of War*, 30; Samuel G. Drake, *The Book of Indians; or, Biography and History of the Indians of North America, From its First Discovery to the Year 1841* (Boston, 1841), 9.

¹⁴ Drake, *The Book of Indians*, 9.

¹⁵ Lepore, *The Name of War*, 31-32.

¹⁶ This thesis will address the sachems by their English names Alexander and Philip. Both sachems changed their names in 1660 as a sign of respect to English culture.

¹⁷ Lepore, *The Name of War*, 39.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 39.

¹⁹ Drake, *The Book of Indians*, 9.

²⁰ Easton, *Relation*, 3.

²¹ Mather, *Brief History*, 3-4; Saltonstall, *The Present State of New-England*, 3.

²² Hubbard, *A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1677), 15.

²³ Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1676), 2.

²⁴ Mather, *Brief History*, 2; John Easton, "A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. Easton, of Rhode Island, 1675," edited by Paul Royster (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 3.

²⁵ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 11.

²⁶ *Ibid*.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 11-12.

²⁸ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 394.

²⁹ Samuel G. Drake. *The Old Indian Chronicle; Being a Collection of Exceeding Rare Tracts, Written and Published in the Time of King Philip's War* (Boston, 1836), 197.

³⁰ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 394.

³¹ Saltonstall, *The Present State of New-England*, 3; Hubbard, *A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1677), 15.

³² Lepore, *The Name of War*, 21; Anonymous, *A Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England*. (London, 1675), 4; Hubbard, *Narrative*, 15; Saltonstall, *The Present State of New England*, 3.

³³ Samuel G. Drake. *The Old Indian Chronicle; Being a Collection of Exceeding Rare Tracts, Written and Published in the Time of King Philip's War* (Boston, 1836), 97.

³⁴ Kyle F. Zelner, *Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen During King Philip's War* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 40.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 40.

³⁶ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 16.

³⁷ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 16; Easton, *Relation*, 7.

³⁸ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A Continuation of the State of New-England, being a farther Account of the Indian War*, in Samuel G. Drake, ed., *Old Indian Chronicle* (Boston, 1836), 54-55.

³⁹ Carl Bridenba, ed., *The Pynchon Papers Volume I: Letters of John Pynchon, 1654-1700* (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1982), 140-143.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid, 140-143.

⁴² Ibid, 140-143.

⁴³ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 86.

⁴⁴ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 107.

⁴⁵ Hubbard, *Narratives*, 22.

⁴⁶ Thomas Church, *Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which Began in the Month of June, 1675* (Boston, 1716), 11.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 12.

⁴⁸ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 87.

⁴⁹ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 162.

⁵⁰ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 116.

⁵¹ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 22.

⁵² "To Governor John Winthrop, Jr. 27 June 1675 from Roger Williams," in Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed. *The Correspondence of Roger Williams. Vol. II 1654-1682* (Rhode Island Historical Society, 1988), 699.

⁵³ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 16.

⁵⁴ Anonymous, *A Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England* (London, 1675), 4.

⁵⁵ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 116.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 116.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 129-131.

⁵⁸ Church, *Entertaining Passages* 17.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 16.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 16.

⁶¹ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 166.

⁶² Hubbard, *Narrative*, 29.

⁶³ Sherburne Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population Decline among the New England Indians." *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1973), 12.

⁶⁴ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 17.

⁶⁵ Daniel Gookin, *An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677* (Arno Press, New York, 1972).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 427.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 426.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 480.

⁷⁰ Douglas E. Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 2009), 20, 145-154; Gookin, *An Historical Account*, 472.

⁷¹ Saltonstall, *The Present State of New England with Respect to the Indian War* (London, 1675), 190-191; Melvoin, *New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deefield* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 99; Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougas, *King Philip's War: The History and Legacy of America's Forgotten Conflict* (Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 2000), 51; George Madison Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War being A Critical Account of that War with A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677* (Baltimore, MD: Clearfiled Company, 2002), 33, 131; Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in new England, 1675-1678* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 138; Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A Farther Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England, Occasioned by the Quarrel-some Disposition and Perfidious Carriage of the Barbarous and Savage Indian Natives There* (London, 1676), 4; Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 87-88; Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 100.

⁷² Saltonstall, *The Present State of New England*, 8.

⁷³ Quoted in Bodge, *Soldiers*, 402.

⁷⁴ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 162.

⁷⁵ Gookin, *An Historical Account*, 481.

⁷⁶ Gookin, *An History of the Christian Indians*, 486.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 486.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 486.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 487-488.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 488.

⁸¹ Ibid, 488.

⁸² Ibid, 488.

⁸³ Ibid, 488-489.

⁸⁴ Gookin, *History of the Christian Indians*, 489.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 489.

⁸⁶ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 157.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 157.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 157.

⁸⁹ Gookin, *An History of the Christian Indians*, 489.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 490.

⁹¹ Ibid, 491.

⁹² Ibid, 490.

⁹³ Mary Rowlandson, *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, Together With the Faithfulness of His Promises Displayed* (Cambridge, 1682), 1-2.

⁹⁴ Rowlandson, *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God*, 5.

⁹⁵ Gookin, *An History of the Christian Indians*, 490; Hubbard, *Narrative*, 61.

⁹⁶ Gookin, *An History of the Christian Indians*, 490.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 490.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 490.

⁹⁹ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New England, being A Continued Account of the Bloody Indian-War, From March till August, 1676* (London, 1676), 3.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 3.

¹⁰² Ibid, 3.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁸ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America: From the Colonial Era to the Civil War* (Westport, CT: The Greenwood Press, 2007), 13; Drake, *King Philip's War*, 123.

¹⁰⁹ RGCMB, V: 79.

¹¹⁰ Jordan Fiore, *Wrentham 1673-1973: A History* (Town of Wrentham: Thomas Todd Company, 1973), 17.

¹¹¹ Saltonstall, *A New and Farther Narrative*, 10.

¹¹² Ibid, 10.

¹¹³ Gookin, *History of the Christian Indians*, 510.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 511.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 215.

¹¹⁶ Saltonstall, *A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences That have hap'ned in the Warre Between the English and the Indians in New-England*, in Drake, *Old Indian Chronicle*, 256.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 257-58.

¹¹⁸ For this hypothetical claim, see Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 158.

¹¹⁹ Bodge, *Soldiers*.

¹²⁰ Zelter, *Rabble in Arms*.

¹²¹ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 122; Stephan Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 229-230.

CHAPTER II

"[CANNOT] DO OUR WORK WITHOUT THEM"

Throughout the seventeenth century, Indian alliances were essential to the survival of New England's English settlements. From the earliest attempt at establishing permanent footholds, the colonists were aware of their vulnerability to attack by European competitors and indigenous nations, and formed English-Indian compacts whose military elements included wartime mutual aid. The first treaty "to confirme a Peace" occurred at Plymouth in March 1620/1. The six part agreement established by Governor John Carver, the Wampanoag sachem of the Pokanoket Massasoit, and their various councilors, stipulated, "That neither he [Massasoit] nor any of his should injure or do hurt to any of our people." It also said, "If any did unjustly war against him [Massasoit], we would aid him; if any did war against us, he should aid us."¹ In 1636, shortly before the outbreak of the Pequot War, the Narragansetts entered into a similar agreement with the Massachusetts Bay Colony.² Two years later, after the close of the war, the Mohegans signed a similar treaty with both the Narragansetts and the English in Connecticut.³ Over the course of

decades, these documents influenced trade relations, military actions, Christian missions, Indian sovereignty and land transactions.⁴

This chapter will look at the use of Indians as combatants during King Philip's War. It describes the war in three parts. First, it will discuss the early fear among colonists that the Indians were united in conspiracy against the colonies. Next, the chapter will address the mid-war period when Philip's forces had tremendous success in recruitment and combat. Colonists soon realized that keeping friendly Indians out of the war brought significant losses. The third section will discuss the vital reintroduction of Indians into the militia companies. In summation, this chapter argues that without the help of Indian alliances and warriors, New England would not have survived the war.

Furthermore, this chapter will address another aspect of King Philip's War alliances. The common assumption among scholarly research is that the turning point of the war was April 1676 when Mohawk raids and starvation weakened Philip's forces.⁵ This chapter will argue that the turning point in the war came earlier in February 1675/6 when the colonies found themselves nearly out of soldiers, economically in debt, and unable to supply military companies with firearms or provisions. The decision to readmit Indians into the war as allies, at the point the colonists faced complete economic and military failure eventually shifted the war from a defensive to offensive operation. This chapter believes that the turning

point of the war was not a physical victory, as other scholars have argued, but rather a strategic shift. Thus, the most important moment in the war was what this chapter will call the “February Declaration” when a Massachusetts council decided that the colonies could no longer continue the war without a change.

EARLY ALLIANCES

The first war in New England occurred in 1636 and lasted until 1638. The Pequot War, as it is now known, was a struggle between English forces, their Indian allies, and the Pequots of southern New England. According to sources, the two Indian groups that allied with the English, Narragansett and Mohegans, acted as interpreters, strategists, diplomats, consultants, and informants. In Captain John Underhill's account he emphasized his reliance on one Indian warrior. Underhill wrote, “wee had an *Indian* with us that was an interpreter, being in English cloathes, and a Gunne in his hand.” Taking notice of the Indian, some Pequots asked, “what are you an Indian or an English-man” to which the interpreter responded, “come hither...and I will tell you.” The interpreter then shot dead the curious Indians.⁶

Indians also served as guides that helped the English navigate unfamiliar terrain. John Endecott, in 1636, marched with two Indian guides

that led him through the swamps and forests of Connecticut.⁷ The English valued Indians as guides and strategists since they supplied information on who the “enemy was, where they were, how to get there, what their probably intentions were, and keeping that kind of information up to date over time.”⁸ When William Bradford recounted the events of the Pequot War years later, he mentioned how useful the Indians were in bringing the soldiers to enemy forts.⁹

Indian alliances also swelled the numbers of English militias. Sherburne Cook estimates that the entire Pequot community numbered roughly 3,000 in 1637, with approximately 1,000 warriors.¹⁰ At a battle in Mystic, Connecticut, the colonial Court sent only fifty English volunteers to fight against roughly 400 men, women, and children.¹¹ Expecting to be outnumbered, military leaders requested the help of both the Narragansetts and Mohegans who each supplied the English with several hundred warriors. With their military support the English surrounded and burned Pequot villages.

FEAR OF A GENERAL UPRISING

At the outbreak of King Philip's War in June 1675, many paranoid colonists feared that an ethnic and racial identity would promote a concerted pan-Indian campaign against the colonies. John Easton wrote

that the "English were jealous that there was a general plot of all Indians against the English."¹² William Harris, in Rhode Island, echoed Easton's observation.¹³ William Hubbard argued that when fighting began other Indians were eager "or might soon be perswaded to joyn with him in acting this bloody Tragedy."¹⁴ A resident of Warwick, Rhode Island, insisted, "There is a rumour as though all the Indians were in combination and confederacie to exterpate and root out the English, which many feare."¹⁵ Years later, Captain Benjamin Church recalled that Plymouth colonists feared all Indians "had form'd a design of War upon the English."¹⁶

These fears were perpetuated by the many reports claiming Philip had sent messengers to neighboring sachems in hopes of an alliance.¹⁷ Reports acknowledged that Philip had sent messengers to Awashonks the tribal leader of the Sagkonets to ask for her support. Captain Church confirmed this report when the sachem told him that six of Philip's men had already spent days convincing her to ally with his forces.¹⁸ Governor Roger Williams of Rhode Island wrote that he had seen canoes traveling from Philip's territory of Mount Hope to the Narragansetts.¹⁹ William Hubbard emphasized that the Narragansetts received several emissaries before the war began and agreed to protect Philip's men, women, and children during wartime.²⁰ Other colonists heard of Philip dispatching messengers to several tribes in the attempt to secure a confederacy.²¹

Alliances between English colonies were quite different than alliances between Indians. English alliances were based on a shared identity and language.²² When Roger Williams offered Plymouth his support in the war, despite political differences, he claimed "all the Colonies were Subject to one K[ing] Charles and it was his pleasure and our Duty and Engagement for one English man to stand to the Death by Each other in all parts of the world."²³ John Easton, who was irritated that Massachusetts and Connecticut entered Rhode Island and formed a compact with the Narragansetts without permission, agreed that "when...English blood was spilt" it "engaged all Englishmen, for we were to be all under one king."²⁴

Unlike the English, Indian alliances were fragile. This was because, as Jenny Hale Pulsipher writes, Indians needed to emphasize that the confederacy was one of "political choice rather than ethnicity."²⁵ Indians did not have a transnational identity. Howard Russell maintains, "various tribes had from time to time battled or displaced one another even though speaking dialects of a common language."²⁶ Thus, when Philip sought alliances with other Indian groups he used fear to pressure them to join. Philip's six men at Sogkonate told Awashonks that if she refused Philip's offer they would "kill the *English* Cattel, and burn their Houses on that side [of] the River, which would provoke the *English* to fall upon her, whom they would without doubt suppose the author of the *Mischief*."²⁷ His

messengers told other sachems, "the *English* had a Design to cut off all the *Indians* round about them, and that if they did not Joyn together, they should lose their Lives and Lands."²⁸

New England's colonial authorities believed that swift, unilateral action could sever alliances among the Indians and shorten the war's length. Fearing a pan-Indian alliance against them, they continued this practice throughout much of the war. Governor Roger Williams emphasized how vitally necessary it was to keep the Mohegans and Narragansetts from entering into the war.²⁹ Plymouth sent Captain Benjamin Church to meet Awashonks, request her continued loyalty "and shelter her self, and People under [their] Protection."³⁰ Instead of asking Awashonks to supply the English with fighters, he insisted that she and her people remain "within [their] own limits of *Sogkonate*" and stay out of the war.³¹

Suspicion of treachery was one of the barriers to English acceptance of Native assistance. After meeting with Awashonks, Church was sent to the Pocasset tribe with a similar proposal for another sachem, Weetamoo.³² Plymouth sent two additional messengers to the Nipmuck Indians asking them to reinstate their allegiance to the colony.³³ Massachusetts authorities sent Captain Edward Hutchinson and Captain Thomas Wheeler into western Massachusetts to request the allegiance of the Quabaug Indians.³⁴ One Springfield resident, John Pynchon, wrote a

letter to Governor Winthrop Jr. informing him that the Mohegans and Pequots were “our professed friends” and cannot be allowed to join with Philip.³⁵ Almost immediately, Winthrop sent messengers to the Connecticut Indians asking for their allegiance.

During the early stages of the war potentially hostile Indians were instructed to remain on their lands to prevent any English suspicion. The Narragansetts were of particular interest to the United Colonies. Both the Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay authorities sent messengers into Rhode Island in July 1675 to prevent the Narragansetts from entering the war.³⁶

The agreement instructed the Narragansetts to resolve any hostilities between the English and the Indians; reinstate their loyalty to the colonies; and “*use all Acts of Hostility against the said Philip & his Subjects, entering his Lands or any other Lands of the English.*”³⁷ The Articles, signed by four Narragansett leaders, six colonial authorities, and a translator, insisted that the Narragansetts only join the war if Philip, or Philip’s warriors, appealed to the Narragansetts on their land. Though Jenny Hale Pulsipher argues that the agreement called for Narragansetts to provide “active assistance against Philip’s forces,” the colony did not stipulate that Indians needed to seek and kill Philip.³⁸ Instead, the Article instructed the Narragansetts to remain on guard on their own lands.³⁹

Colonists in Massachusetts suspected that the Natick Christian Indians might join Philip's forces. In October 1675, these Indians were removed to Deer Island by order of the Massachusetts Bay authorities for "our security."⁴⁰ The following month, the Massachusetts Court ordered, "none of the said Indians...shall presume to go off the said islands upon pain of death; and it shall be lawful for the English to destroy those that they find straggling off from the said place of their confinement."⁴¹ The Court also restricted "any person or persons" from taking, stealing, or carrying "away either man, woman, or child of the said Indians, off from any the said island where they are placed."⁴² In Mendon, the "Hassanemesit Indians [were] ordered to [build] a fort...and to move there with their families as soon as their corn crop was harvested."⁴³ Thus, even Indians that did not identify with Philip's rebellion were under close surveillance. More so, these Christian Indians were instructed to keep out of the war.

CONNECTICUT AND ITS INDIAN ALLIES

Unlike its neighbor colonies, Connecticut authorities quickly realized the usefulness of Indian allies. The colony saw the Mohegans and Pequots as "our professed friends."⁴⁴ Governor John Winthrop Jr. and Springfield founder John Pynchon, immediately after the outbreak of King Philip's

War, encouraged the use of Indian scouts, fighters, interpreters, and guides. Winthrop as early as June 1676, sent Captain Cudworth into battle with several friendly Indians.⁴⁵ One month later, Captain Edward Hutchinson rode with three Indian guides and translators to convince the Nipmucks to renew their loyalty to the colony.⁴⁶ Others, like Captain Prentice, rallied a few friendly Indians for their companies.⁴⁷ To show their support and appreciation, Mohegan and Pequot Indians brought the scalps of their enemy to Connecticut authorities.⁴⁸

As a result of this alliance, Connecticut was "saved [from] many disasters, and secured many substantial victories."⁴⁹ By August 1675, John Pynchon sent a letter to John Winthrop Jr. informing him that a friendly Indian brought intelligence that "Philip with forty of his men [are] now at a place called Ashquoach a little on this side of Quabaug."⁵⁰ He continued, "our Indians judge that either Philip will go to them at Memenimissee, or that they will come with Philip at Ashquoach, which the Indians think rather the more convenient place, and so they make 250 soldiers."⁵¹ Pynchon ended his letter with a brief mention of Philip's strength, according to his Indians: "Philip [has] but 30 guns, and the other 10 bows and arrows, are now weak and weary and may be easily dealt with, whereas if we let him alone...they will burn our houses and kill us all by stealth."⁵² When Winthrop received this letter he sent a company of

Mohegans, Pequots and English to raid Philip's location, and these companies captured many important enemies.⁵³

THE ENEMY WITHIN

At the outset of the war, Massachusetts and Plymouth did not share Connecticut's attitude toward Indians as combatants in the colonial militias. As the war progressed, and Philip's campaigns saw success in the western settlements, the two eastern colonies disapproved of Connecticut's strategy. When the Nipmucks, Agawams, and Narragansetts joined in Philip's fight, Massachusetts and Plymouth colonists increased their distrust of all Indians.

At the outset of the war the Nipmucks of western Massachusetts seemed content to let Philip and the colonies fight it out.⁵⁴ The English relied on this neutrality to search through Nipmuck territories for Philip.⁵⁵ But Wampanoag forces moved quickly through the western parts, and paranoid colonists feared that Philip would intimidate the Nipmucks into confederacy. Connecticut sent several representatives and ordered that they turn in their weapons.⁵⁶ The Nipmucks hesitated (probably to defend themselves in case of a Wampanoag attack) and, instead, offered their continued allegiance to the colony.

Unsatisfied with the Indians' decision, Massachusetts Bay sent Captain Hutchinson and a small militia company into Nipmuck territory to demand the weapons. Expecting hostility, the Nipmuck warriors ambushed Hutchinson and his company.⁵⁷ They then attacked the local town of Quaboag and laid waste to it.⁵⁸ According to one source, Philip's forces arrived in Quaboag that day and united with the Nipmucks.⁵⁹

The second event occurred a month later. Because of Philip's success in "recruiting" the Nipmucks and several other Indian bands, colonial authorities feared every Indian as potentially dangerous. In early September 1675, Massachusetts demanded the Agawams turn in all their weapons to the colony. To prevent another Nipmuck-like occurrence, the English abducted the tribe's children and sold them into slavery. This act of hostility angered the Agawams who, unlike the Nipmucks, had sided with the colonists at the outset of the war. As a result, the Agawams joined with Philip.⁶⁰ In September and October, Agawam forces burned three hundred homes in Springfield, Massachusetts. They were also responsible for the massacre of Captain Thomas Lathrop and his sixty soldiers near Deerfield Massachusetts on 18 September 1675.⁶¹ The attack sent shockwaves and panic through adjacent regions.

When the Narragansetts cast their lot with Philip, the colonies feared the worst. Keeping these Indians out of the war was crucial. Contemporary historian William Hubbard wrote that if the Narragansetts

actively engaged in warfare against the English earlier in the war "it would have been very difficult, if possible for the *English* to have saved any of their inland plantations from being utterly destroyed."⁶² Every attempt was made to keep them neutral.

Philip was aware that the Narragansetts would make powerful allies and attempted to entice them into confederacy by sending them the heads of English soldiers.⁶³ The English viewed this as a violation of the July 1675 Treaty and quickly requested an explanation from the Narragansetts. They saw this request as a violation of sovereignty. Hostilities rose until attacks by Nipmuck and Agawam warriors at Springfield "resulted in the United Colonies' invasion of Narragansett territory."⁶⁴ Canonibus, the sachem of the Narragansetts, viewed this as open hostility against his people and finally accepted Philip's invitation of confederacy.⁶⁵

Attacks by Nipmuck, Agawam, and Narragansett forces on non-combatants further intensified panic. Between "August 1 and November 10, 1675, Indians did not leave a single one of Massachusetts' eight towns on the Connecticut River unscathed."⁶⁶

The general population feared that Philip's success in recruiting Indian groups would inevitably lead Christian Indians to cast their lot with the sachem. The Nipmucks exemplified this expectation because they were once part of John Eliot's proselytizing mission.⁶⁷ In Massachusetts, colonists began persecuting all Indians, whether or not they remained

loyal to the colonies. At the helm of this movement was Captain Samuel Moseley who "was censured by the government...for arresting without warrant a group of praying Indians at Marlborough, whom the townspeople had nearly lunched on the spot."⁶⁸

Moseley's hatred for all Indians earned him a reputation among colonists, and many turned to him when they felt uneasy about strange Indians in their towns. On 7 August 1676, while the war was coming to a close, four men were incarcerated for the massacre of six Christian Indians recently released from Deer Island (three women and three children).⁶⁹ Jenny Hale Pulsipher rightly contends that Massachusetts and Plymouth had a difficult job keeping the population from murdering any Indians residing in the colonies.⁷⁰ James Drake has emphasized that the colonial authorities made the best attempt to "determine an Indians' degree of guilt before deciding his fate," but, on the other hand, the general population were not so judicious in their decisions.⁷¹

Despite their disapproval of Indian persecutors, Massachusetts and Plymouth authorities seem to have had their own suspicions that the war was racially motivated. To prevent a united Indian alliance, Plymouth banned the sale of weapons to any Indian within the colony. The Court ordered, "none shall lend any Gun or Guns to the Indians on pain of forfeiting them or the value of them to the colonies use."⁷² Shortly thereafter, a second law prevented the sale of guns to any Indian upon

penalty of death.⁷³ Though these laws were aimed at hostile Indians, they were not particular to them and left many non-hostile Indians unable to defend themselves against persecution.⁷⁴

However, an influential minority of individuals in Massachusetts did care about the welfare of Indians. Douglas E. Leach, in *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, labels this group “moderates” because they insisted on moderate treatment rather than persecution.⁷⁵ Many of these colonists had worked closely with Indians prior to the war's outbreak. They spent years forging relationships based on mutual appreciation.

Daniel Gookin, John Eliot, and Thomas Danforth advocated for fair treatment of Indians throughout the war. Because of their missionary work, all three maintained close relationships with Indians during the seventeenth century and came to respect Indian culture. Eliot came to New England in 1631 as a Christian minister. In 1646, he established the first Praying Town in Massachusetts where Indians came and learned European styles of dress, language, reading and writing, and, most importantly, religion. By the time King Philip's War erupted, the population of Eliot's Praying Towns reached one-fourth of the Indians in southeastern New England.⁷⁶ The towns were so popular that Daniel Gookin, one of the Massachusetts Court Assistants (a very prestigious position), was offered the first position as Superintendent of Indian Affairs. He accepted the offer and worked closely with Eliot to preserve the Praying Towns.

Gookin became a captain in the Massachusetts militia and frequently insisted that Christian Indians should accompany New England soldiers on military expeditions because of their vast knowledge of the terrain.⁷⁷ During the war Eliot made every attempt to minimize persecution of the Praying Indians and to save his towns. As the war progressed, anti-Indian sentiment grew. Their attempts to legitimize Christian Indians as non-threatening failed. Even more, colonists targeted Gookin and Danforth as traitors and conspirators who, for their crimes, deserved death. On one occasion, townspeople passed small slips of paper throughout the town that read,

Reader thou art desired not to suppress this paper, but to promote its designe, which is to certify (those traytors to their King and Countrey) Guggins [Gookin] and Danford [Danforth], that some generous spirits have vowed their destruction, as Christians we warne them to prepare for death, for though they will deservedly dye; yet we wish the health of their soules.⁷⁸

Gookin was a special target since he had power as a colonial council member. More than the other two, he received death threats depicting him as a sinner who deserved hell.⁷⁹

The hostility toward Indians resulted in their displacement onto reservations. On 13 October 1675, the colonial authorities attempted to keep Christian Indians from the war altogether. They ordered, "all the

Natick Indians be forthwith sent for, & disposed of to Dear Island, as the place appointed for their present abode.”⁸⁰ Several tens of guards and soldiers were sent to local friendly Indian towns to supervise them.⁸¹ Any Indian found off of the designated reservations without a guard was to be apprehended and turned over to the colonial authorities. For nearly two months, Massachusetts and Plymouth rounded up any loyal Indian and placed them on constant surveillance.

From June 1675 to February 1675/6 most colonial authorities believed that all Indians were dangerous. The fear of a united Indian alliance resulted in the persecution, and eventual internment of these loyal residents. As war raged through New England, Philip's forces secured significant victories. His successful recruitments and growing support worried colonists who realized that colonial forces were smaller, weaker, and slower than their enemy. Internally, colonists felt safer when Christian Indians were removed to supervised reservations; externally, however, the war had run much longer than expected and the colonies were running low on provisions and soldiers.

THE COLONIES IN TROUBLE

During the first half of King Philip's War, colonial authorities did their best to keep potentially hostile and friendly Indians from joining the war

effort – no matter which side they chose. After Narragansett, Agawam, and Nipmuck forces cast their lot with Philip, colonial authorities passed laws to prevent an internal rebellion amongst Christian Indians. Until February 1675/6, the United Colonies believed that they could win the war without assistance.

Philip's forces grew stronger by the day. While the Nipmucks destroyed the western settlements, Narragansett forces moved toward Plymouth from the south. In February, Nipmuck forces took Medfield, Massachusetts, twenty miles outside Boston.⁸² Days later they were spotted ten miles closer.⁸³ The Narragansetts lit Providence, Rhode Island aflame and quickly marched into Plymouth's territory of Rehoboth.⁸⁴

As Philip's forces grew stronger, colonial militia forces weakened. Originally, colonists planned their supplies for a two-month skirmish.⁸⁵ As the war extended into November war rations and provisions ran low.⁸⁶ The colonies hit near-famine levels twice by November.⁸⁷ The Massachusetts Bay Colony Court wrote it was "considering the great danger of famine, or at least scarcity of bread & other provisions, by reason of this war."⁸⁸ Again, weeks later the Court wrote that it was still in danger of famine and prohibited the exportation of "fish & mackeral", and suspended the laws that prohibited the "importation of wheat, bisket, & flower."⁸⁹

Conditions worsened by January when authorities could not even get bread to their soldiers.⁹⁰ Connecticut was able to supply their soldiers

with "som pease...[a] little wheat or at least, little bread" as "mills generally [failed] this winter season."⁹¹ Continued raids by Philip's forces destroyed settlements that would have helped feed the militia. Narragansett, Agawam, Nipmuck, and Wampanoag forces moved quickly toward Boston, Providence and Plymouth. Colonial militias, however, were becoming tired and hungry.

Supplying militia companies with weapons proved difficult. By November, the General Court did not have sufficient weapons or ammunition with which to provide its soldiers. The Court ordered "that the committees of militia in the...towns shall hear, determine, & settle the whole accounts...respecting all disbursements of arms, ammunition, horses, furniture, provisions, &c."⁹² Shortly thereafter they instructed "every town in this jurisdiction [to] provide, as an addition to their town stock of ammunition, six hundred flints for one hundred of listed soldiers."⁹³ According to these laws, towns were now ordered to supply their companies with weapons and ammunition.

With food, provisions and aid running low, Massachusetts and Connecticut discovered that large populations of impressed soldiers were not showing up for duty. In December, Massachusetts lamented, "because many of the soldiers now abroad, partly by wounds & partly [through] the severity of the Season are so far [disabled], that no present onset can be made upon the Grand body of the Enemy."⁹⁴ Connecticut

failed to raise 300 men for a campaign and General Winslow ordered his forces to retreat from their stations because of the insufficient fighting company. All across New England colonial authorities instructed soldiers to retreat into garrisoned towns.⁹⁵

THE FEBRUARY DECLARATION

On 21 February 1675/6 the colonial authorities in Massachusetts declared:

Whereas the present war with the Indians hath so far exhausted the country treasury, that there is not a sufficiency to prosecute the said war to effect; for the encouragement of such gentlemen merchants, or any other person or persons, that are able & willing to disburse & send to the public, it is hereby declared, that the General Court of this colony shall from time to time, and at all times, stand firmly obliged for the repayment of all & every sum or sums disbursed & lent for the use of the public.⁹⁶

Under these circumstances, soldiers no longer received payment for their services. According to Bodge, "months and even years" passed without soldiers "receiving all the wages owed to them."⁹⁷ The February Declaration was a statement that the colonies failed both economically and militarily.

This marked the turning point of the war. At the Council of War on 20 February 1675/6 Captain Benjamin Church told the colonial authorities that if he were allowed "50 more [soldiers]...and 100 of the Friend Indians...he [had] no doubt [that] he might do good Service."⁹⁸ The Council responded, "That they were already in debt, and so big an Army would bring such charge upon them, that they should never be able to pay. And as for sending out *Indians*, they thought it no wayes advisable."⁹⁹ One day later the coffers were empty and the colonies realized how close they were to failure. There was little food, provisions, or soldiers; the colonies were in debt; and according to the Declaration there was "not a sufficiency to prosecute the said war to effect."¹⁰⁰

The Council of War needed troops or Philip's forces would destroy Boston, Plymouth, and Hartford like they did Providence. Out of desperation, the Council of War turned to Indians for help. Despite their earlier determination to keep loyal Indians away from the conflict, they had no choice but to let them in – it was their only chance for survival. Thus, almost one week after Captain Church requested Indians for a campaign against the Narragansetts, the Council of War sent Captain Michael Peirse to march against Philip's army with "20 or 30 of the southern Indians."¹⁰¹ Peirse's co-captain was a Wampanoag Indian named "Captain Amos."¹⁰²

On 25 March the company marched to Rehoboth in search of enemy forces. In the pursuit the Narragansetts ambushed the company one day later leading to the deaths of over fifty English and eleven friendly Indians.¹⁰³ Through this mission, colonial authorities realized that bringing loyal Indians into the war could swell militia company numbers and create a buffer zone between vital locations and enemy forces. The shift in military philosophy was the major turning point of the war. There was no chance of winning the war by themselves – as the February Declaration proved; only with Indian reinforcements were Narragansett, Nipmuck, Agawam, and Wampanoag forces soon defeated.

Days after the Peirse ambush, Plymouth authorities passed another order for “the number of three hundred Indians, well fitted to go forth, and be ready for a march by the eleventh of April next.”¹⁰⁴ Plymouth and Massachusetts jointly ordered John Curtice to “take sixe Indians from [Deer Island] for his assistance, with their armes, some of wch Indians may be improved for spies as the commander in cheife shall appoint.”¹⁰⁵ When Captain Church returned to the war in early June, Plymouth Colony was “glad that Providence had brought him here at that junction” because “they had concluded the very next day to send out an Army of 200 Men, two thirds *English*, and one third *Indians*, in some measure agreeable to his former proposal.”¹⁰⁶ Others were instructed to take Indians in their companies.

By May, the court removed some Indians from Deer Island and impressed them into military service.¹⁰⁷ Many Indians were sent as scouts to Medfield, Sudbury, Concord, Chelmsford, Andover, Haverill, and Exeter.¹⁰⁸ Others were employed as guides into Indian territory. When Seth Perry was ordered to go to the enemies and request a captive-swap, a friendly Indian named Tom Dublett guided him. English soldiers were allowed to go to Deer Island and "imploy [Indians] in scouting, labouring, or otherwise...to our security."¹⁰⁹ Major Gookin and Captain Samuel Hunting were allowed to take seventy Indians to fight in the service of the colonies.¹¹⁰ The Natick and Pawtucket Indians were taken from Long Island and placed in the service of the English. Between forty to eighty Indians were removed from their reservations every several days and impressed to fight with the English.¹¹¹

This campaign even forced colonial authorities to provide friendly Indians with weapons to fight the war. The court determined that no individual trade with Indians but also that "this law doe no way prohibbit the necessary supply and releife to such Indians and their families as are by order imployed in the country's service, or as are otherwise under the speciall care & inspection of authority, so that such supply & releife to these Indians be made as the Court or council shall allow."¹¹² The court also ordered that the Treasurer now pay any Indian that served in the militia.¹¹³

English forces, now accompanied by "friendly" Indians, moved quickly against Philip's forces. There was the assumption that by 1 June they would be on the doorstep of Philip's territory at Mount Hope. Similarly, the Mohegans and Pequots fought bravely against the Narragansetts, and on 2 July 1676, the Mohegans, Pequots and Connecticut forces hailed a resounding victory over the Narragansett forces – one that left them crippled for the duration of the war.

In the words of William Hubbard, the English "were necessitated...to return Homewards to gratify the Mohegin and Pequod Indians."¹¹⁴ In a letter from Puritan minister Thomas Walley to John Cotton Jr., Walley wrote that "I am glad of the success of Benjamin Church. That it is the good fruit of the coming of Indians to us, those that come in are conquered and help to conquer others. To observe throughout the land where Indians are employed there hath been the greatest success if not the only success which is a humbling providence of God that we have so much need of them and cannot do our work without them."¹¹⁵ In another letter to the Connecticut Court, the General Court in Massachusetts wrote,

but divine Providence ordering it that our forces, by weaknes & wants, could not atteyne that end, new forces were raysed, upwards of three hundred men, horse & foote, with *forty Indians*, committed to the conduct of Capt. Daniel Hinchman & severall captaines under his command, who since hath opportunely, by sending out parties, *discovered the enemy by*

*our Indian scouts as fleeting up & down, and by a party of horse, under the command of Capt. Thomas Brattle, on the 5th [May], between Mendon & Hassansenemesit, the Indians discovered the enemy...kild atwenty...none of the troopers or scouts wounded.*¹¹⁶

Many scholars have missed the significance of the February Declaration. There are a few possible reasons for this. Douglas E. Leach wrote the most comprehensive history of King Philip's War. Leach says that his focus is on the military struggle in New England, and finds parallels between World War II and the seventeenth-century war.¹¹⁷ Though he tries to see both sides, he nevertheless argues that the colonists had the time, resources, and materials to wait out Philip's attacks. In his view the rebel Indians were not prepared for such a long war, and by May they were divided and starving.¹¹⁸ For Leach, this was the clear division between Indians and English: the English had the resources to finish the war, the Indians did not. His conclusion rests on the idea that Indians fell into three categories: enemy, neutral, or playing a small role in the English's success. Thus, the February Declaration, which this essay argues illustrates the United Colonies' failure to win the war alone, does not fit with Leach's view of King Philip's War. He does not recognize how depleted English supplies had become in January and February 1675/6.

Nathaniel Philbrick, in his book *Mayflower*, privileges anecdotal evidence over the legislative records, and hence does not mention the

February Declaration.¹¹⁹ Philbrick excessively admires Captain Benjamin Church. When Church leaves the war in February because the colony was “already woefully in debt” and had rejected his ideas, Philbrick takes this at face value and moves on with his narrative.¹²⁰ There is no discussion about why Church was denied a fighting force of friendly Indians. He focuses his attention on Captain Peirse who, in March 1676, was offered twenty Indians from Cape Cod.

James Drake makes no mention of the February Declaration. Drake argues that King Philip's War was at first an internal conflict between colonists who believed their opponents were children that needed discipline until the conflict became unmanageable.¹²¹ Drake skims past the importance of the February Declaration – mentioning only something similar. “After eight months,” he writes “in February 1676, the English and their Indian allies were at the depths of despair.”¹²² How deep was this despair, he does not say. Additionally, Drake argues that “Indians played a large role in putting down Philip's rebellion.”¹²³ He does not, however, explain why the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies removed an internment policy that, in February, led to the employment of Indians in the colonial companies.

In fact, many scholars do not even address the issue of exhausted treasuries in Massachusetts and Plymouth. Russell Bourne quotes Benjamin Church's *Entertaining Passages*, but does not explore it further; Jenny Hale

Pulsipher argues that in February 1676, soldiers were dissatisfied “with how the war was being waged” and explains it by discussing the military ranking system; Daniel Mandell writes that by February 1676, “some towns in Massachusetts reported that nearly 50 percent of those called to service refused to appear. Others deserted after joining.”¹²⁴ Mandell makes no mention of the economic stresses, and argues that the reason for this was the internal conflicts between soldiers and the government of Massachusetts.¹²⁵

All of these authors miss the importance of the February Declaration as a symbol of failure. Economically, Stephen Webb writes, the New England commonwealths did not recover from King Philip's War until a century later.¹²⁶ He writes, not “for a century would the per-capita wealth of their colonists recover its pre-1676 level.”¹²⁷ The colonies had no money to pay troops or supply them with food and provisions. Fortifications in the west were abandoned because soldiers' supplies ran too low.

Of the authors who argue that the Mohawks played an important role in the war's outcome, only Webb discusses their role in relation to what he calls the period of “devastation, demoralization, [and] dependence.”¹²⁸ Webb argues that these factors and the Mohawk raids were interrelated as early as February.¹²⁹ The colonies feared that if, during their time of “devestation” and “demoralization”, they turned to Governor-General Andros and asked his Mohawk allies to attack the

Wampanoag the English Crown would have a stake in New England – ending the United Colonies' pseudo-independence.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, the colonies had no choice and as Webb writes, "The Mohegan[s]...pressed the Boston (and Connecticut) magistrates to accept this proposal by Governor-General Andros, 'affirming that the said Mohawks were the only Persons likely to put an end to the War, by hindering the Enemy from Planting; and forcing them down upon us.'¹³¹ With few other choices, the colonies reluctantly accepted their "dependence."

PHILIP'S EXECUTIONER

On 12 August 1676, Philip's forces retreated to Mount Hope. His pursuers were Captain Benjamin Church, Major Savage, and a company of English and Indians. At the advice of his Indians, Church's company combed the swamp and found Philip reloading his gun. In shock, Philip threw away his weapon and ran into an ambush. He was shot in the chest twice and fell face down in the mud. The Indian who shot him, John Alderman, quietly escorted Captain Church to the place from where the shot was heard. Church and his company stood over the corpse in awe. He then instructed an Indian to quarter Philip's body and hang the remains from a tree.¹³²

Church returned to his army group to relay the news: the war was over; Philip was dead. Soldiers cheered and rejoiced at the news. Days of fasting and thanksgiving commemorated the victory and acknowledged the sacrifices made for the safety of the colonies.¹³³ Thus, on 12 August 1676 John Alderman was hailed a hero. Alderman was an *Indian* who ended the war that the colonies nearly lost.

CONCLUSION

This chapter offered a reexamination of the turning point of the war. It argues that colonial military success between April and August 1676 was the result the introduction of Indians into the war. The February Declaration of 1675/6 illustrates the United Colonies' total economic and military failure. It also shows that as Philip's forces grew stronger between January and February 1675/6, the colonists became weaker. Facing annihilation, the colonists enlisted the help of friendly Indians – a group that they tried to keep out of the war for eight months. Daniel Gookin, who probably relished the fact that he was right all along, argued that the Indians acted “as a living wall.”¹³⁴ The argument presented here is one that emphasized the colonial desperation during the war; or rather that colonial forces had no other choice but to take a risk and admit Indians into their militias. This led the colonists to victory in August 1676.

NOTES

¹ Dwight B Heath, ed., *Mourt's Relation: A Journal of the Pilgrims at Plymouth* (Bedford, MA: Applewood Press, 1963), 56-57. For discussion on the necessity of Indian alliances, see Cynthia Van Zandt, *Brothers Among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Wayne E. Lee "Using the Natives against the Natives: Indigenes as 'Counterinsurgents' in the British Atlantic, 1500- 1800," *Defense Studies*, 10: 1, 88-105; for one example of the failure of a colony, see Michael Leroy Oberg, *The Head in Edward Nugent's Hand: Roanoke's Forgotten Indians* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

² Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 21.

³ *Ibid*, 22-23.

⁴ Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritan and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965); Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*; Margaret Connell Szasz, *Indian Education in the American Colonies, 1607-1783* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1988).

⁵ Douglas E. Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 2009); Daniel R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Stephan Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

⁶ John Underhill, *Newes From America or A New and Experimental Discoverie of New England* (London, 1638), 7.

⁷ Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 110-111.

⁸ Lee, "Using the Natives against the Natives," 92.

⁹ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation: 1620-1647*, ed. Samuel Eliot Morison (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2006), 294-297.

¹⁰ Sherburne F. Cook, *The Indian Population of New England in the Seventeenth Century*, Vol. XII (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 50-53.

¹¹ Underhill, *Newes From America*, 39.

¹² John Easton, "A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. Easton, of Rhode Island, 1675," edited by Paul Royster (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 9.

-
- ¹³ Douglas E Leach, ed. *A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip's War: The Second William Harris Letter of August, 1676* (Providence, RI, 1963), 23-25.
- ¹⁴ William Hubbard, *A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1677).
- ¹⁵ Quoted in James D. Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 90; Letter from Samuel Gorton to John Winthrop Jr., September 11, 1675, in the Winthrop Papers in MHC.
- ¹⁶ Thomas Church, *Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which Began in the Month of June, 1675* (Boston, 1716), 1.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-2; also, see Easton, *A Relation of the Indian War*, 8.
- ¹⁸ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 2.
- ¹⁹ "To Governor John Winthrop, Jr. 27 June 1675 from Roger Williams," in Glenn W. LaFantasie. ed. *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*. Vol. II 1654-1682 (Rhode Island Historical Society, 1988) 699.
- ²⁰ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 16.
- ²¹ Anonymous. *A Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England* (London, 1675), 4.
- ²² Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 108-9.
- ²³ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 109.
- ²⁴ Easton, *A Relation of the Indian War*, 5.
- ²⁵ Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 108.
- ²⁶ Howard S. Russell, *Indian New England Before the Mayflower* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1980), 188.
- ²⁷ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 2-3.
- ²⁸ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *The Present State of New-England with Respect to the Indian War* (London, 1675), 4
- ²⁹ "To Governor John Winthrop, Jr. 27 June 1675 from Roger Williams," in Glenn W. LaFantasie. ed. *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*. Vol. II 1654-1682 (Rhode Island Historical Society, 1988) 699.
- ³⁰ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 3.
- ³¹ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 3.

³² Goerge Madison Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War, being A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677* (Baltimore, MD: Clearfield Company, 2002), 29.

³³ Nathaniel Saltonstall. *A Farther Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England, Occasioned by the Quarrel-some Disposition and Perfidious Carriage of the Barbarous and Savage Indian Natives There.* (London, 1676), see "A Letter from Edward Rawson to the Massachusetts Government", 7.

³⁴ Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War*, 29.

³⁵ Carl Bridenba, ed., *The Pynchon Papers Volume I: Letters of John Pynchon, 1654-1700* (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1982), 152-53.

³⁶ Easton, *A Relation of the Indian War*, 9. Easton described Rhode Island's irritation that the other colonies sent men into Rhode Island "without our consent or informing us." See page 8.

³⁷ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 22.

³⁸ Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 113.

³⁹ Hubbard, *Narratives*, 21-23.

⁴⁰ RGCMB, V: 64.

⁴¹ RGCMB, V: 64.

⁴² RGCMB, V: 64.

⁴³ Daniel Gookin, *An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England, in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677* (New York, Arno Press, 1972), 436.

⁴⁴ Bridenba, *The Pynchon Papers Volume I*, 152-53.

⁴⁵ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 78. See, also Bodge, *Soldiers*, 394.

⁴⁶ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 51.

⁴⁷ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 394.

⁴⁸ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 394.

⁴⁹ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 394.

⁵⁰ Bridenba, *The Pynchon Papers Volume I*, 140-143.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 140-143.

⁵² *Ibid*, 140-143.

⁵³ Ibid, 140-143.

⁵⁴ Richard I. Melvoin, *New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 99.

⁵⁵ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 100.

⁵⁶ Melvoin, *New England Outpost*, 99.

⁵⁷ Saltonstall, *The Present State of New England*, 190-191.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 190-191.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 190-191.

⁶⁰ Schultz, *King Philip's War: The History and Legacy of America's Forgotten Conflict* (Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 1999), 51; Bodge, *Soldiers*, 33; Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675-1678* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 138.

⁶¹ Saltonstall, *A Farther Brief and True Narration*, 4; Bodge, *Soldiers*, 131; Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 87-88.

⁶² Hubbard, *Narrative*, 29.

⁶³ Leach, *A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip's War*, 23-25; also, see Leach's *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 47-49. There is much dispute over what role the Narragansetts played in the war. Francis Jennings believed that Rhode Island's neutrality is what kept most of the Niantics and Narragansetts out of the war, see Francis Jennings *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 299.

⁶⁴ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 117.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 117.

⁶⁶ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 86.

⁶⁷ Jennings, *Invasion of America*, 309.

⁶⁸ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 87.

⁶⁹ Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the same King*, 135; Pulsipher, "Massacre at Hurtleberry Hill: Christian Indians and English Authority in Metacom's War," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July 1996), 460.

⁷⁰ Pulsipher, "Massacre at Hurtleberry Hill."

⁷¹ Drake, "Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip's War," *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), 42.

⁷² PCR Vol XI: 242.

⁷³ PCR Vol XI: 242.

⁷⁴ Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 118.

⁷⁵ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 145-154.

⁷⁶ Harold W. Van Lonkhuizen, "A Reappraisal of the Praying Indians: Acculturation, Conversion, and Identity at Natick, Massachusetts, 1646-1730," *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), 396.

⁷⁷ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 152.

⁷⁸ Quoted in Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 151.

⁷⁹ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 144.

⁸⁰ RGCMB, V: 57

⁸¹ RGCMB, V: 53, 55

⁸² Drake, *King Philip's War*, 123.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 123.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 166.

⁸⁵ RGCMB V: 69.

⁸⁶ PCR X: 460.

⁸⁷ RGCMB V: 52.

⁸⁸ RGCMB V: 52.

⁸⁹ RGCMB V: 65.

⁹⁰ RGCMB V: 78. 79.

⁹¹ MHC, VI: 89-90.

⁹² RGCMB V: 66.

⁹³ RGCMB V: 63.

⁹⁴ PCR X: 459-460.

⁹⁵ RGCMB V: 79.

⁹⁶ RGCMB V: 70.

-
- ⁹⁷ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 367; Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 109-111.
- ⁹⁸ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 19.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 19.
- ¹⁰⁰ RGCMB V: 70.
- ¹⁰¹ PCR, V: 185-187.
- ¹⁰² Bodge, *Soldiers*, 348.
- ¹⁰³ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 349; Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 167-168.
- ¹⁰⁴ PCR V: 192-193.
- ¹⁰⁵ RGCMB V: 74, 75.
- ¹⁰⁶ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 20-21.
- ¹⁰⁷ RGCMB V: 79.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 84.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 85.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 83-88.
- ¹¹² *Ibid*, 80.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid*, 87.
- ¹¹⁴ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 107-108; Hubbard, *Narrative*; 63-64.
- ¹¹⁵ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 153.
- ¹¹⁶ RGCMB V: 96-97. See the letter from John Allen to John Rawson. Italics are my own.
- ¹¹⁷ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, viii.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, 181.
- ¹¹⁹ Nathaniel Philbrick, *Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War* (New York: Viking Press, 2006).
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 297.
- ¹²¹ Drake, *King Philip's War*.

¹²² *Ibid*, 140.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 91.

¹²⁴ Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion*, 182; Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, 177; Mandell, *King Philip's War*, 103.

¹²⁵ Mandell, *King Philip's War*, 103.

¹²⁶ Webb, 1676, 238.

¹²⁷ Webb, 1676, 238.

¹²⁸ Webb, 1676, 238.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 239-240.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 240-1.

¹³² Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 53.

¹³³ DeLoss Love, William. *The Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England* (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1895), 193, 475.

¹³⁴ Gookin, *Historical Account*, 436.

CHAPTER III

THE "SKULKING WAY OF WAR"

The outbreak of King Philip's War in June 1675 forced a collision between two different military styles. In New England, colonists depended on a European-style phalanx configuration.¹ Central to the military literature produced in Europe and America during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was an insistence on a stationary army controlled by a rigid formation. This literature also included advice on how to wield large or heavy weapons such as pikes, arquebuses, matchlocks, or flintlocks. Thus, heavy weapons and a relatively immobile army proved effective in Europe where all armies, with few exceptions, used this military structure.

In contrast, Indian warfare tactics relied on skulking, which was an unpredictable, quick, and effective practice in New England's densely wooded forests.² Before the arrival of Europeans, Indians fought with bows, arrows, and tomahawks. These weapons were small, easily portable, and allowed Indians the advantage of neither being seen nor heard by their enemy. As trade expanded between Indians and

European colonists, the former acquired firearms. Yet, rather than adjust their military style, Indians combined their speed and stealth with the weapon's power.

A confrontation between these military cultures emerged in 1675. This chapter will first consider the differences between Indian and English military ideas, philosophies, and strategies. It will then argue that during the first half of King Philip's War, the English refused to adopt skulking into their military system for fear that they would lose their civilized identity. Yet because European-style methods had little success against Indian skulking tactics, colonial forces, during the first half of the war, spent time, effort, and money fighting an enemy they could not see, hear, or fight.

Those that opposed the use of skulking tactics by colonial forces soon awakened to New England in shambles, and their lives on the line. As a result, the colonists discarded their familiar military methods for skulking. When the colonies adopted skulking practices, Wampanoag, Narragansett and Nipmuck forces could no longer use the woods and swamps as escape routes. This chapter concludes by arguing that the colonial victory against Philip's forces relied on the reluctant adoption of Indian skulking practices in late February 1675/6 as a last effort to hold off their defeat at the hands of Philip's forces.

ENGLISH MILITARY STRUCTURE

Old World military tactics and strategies were familiar to seventeenth-century New England colonists. Nearly every able-bodied man was aware of the military literature produced in English during this period.³

The literature included a wide spectrum of fighting techniques. Texts discussed the application of weapons, rank, etiquette, fortification, and “the quality of horses suitable for heavy cavalry...to that adequate for dragoons.”⁴ In 1639, William Barriffe’s *Military Discipline or the Yong Artillery Man* offered step-by-step instructions on the proper way to hold a musket and pike while marching to the “beats of the *Drum*,” which he called “the voice of the *Commander*, the *spurre* of the *valiant*, and the *heart* of the *coward*.”⁵ John Cruso, in his *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie*, instructed officers on how to gather strategic intelligence and the acceptable way to meet an enemy in the field.⁶ Henry Hexham, in 1634, wrote *The Principles of the Art Militarie*, in which he detailed European military strategies with visual imagery – presumably for illiterate soldiers.⁷ According to Barbara Donagan, no “aspect of war escaped these military authors of the earlier seventeenth century.”⁸

Central to the literature was an emphasis on proper behavior, formation, and weapon control for an army or companies within an army. Diagrams and texts instructed soldiers on the proper formation of musketmen and pike-men. According to Barriffe, "When we instruct our *Soldiers* how to *face Square*" it "be very necessary for *young Souldiers* to move 10. or 12. paces upon every *motion of facings*."⁹ In formation, each soldier in rank was instructed to stand six feet apart, three feet apart, or one foot apart, depending on the enemy's distance.¹⁰ Men bearing muskets faced "*right and left*" while pike-men split into two groups and stood at the front and rear of the formation facing the opposite direction.¹¹ These pike-men, according to one source, should be "armed with a head-piece, a Curace and Tases defensive, & with a Pike of fiftene foot long, and a Rapier offensive."¹² In a sixteen-step diagram, musketeers were instructed on how to discharge a musket beginning with its placement on a support stand, then firing the weapon, and finally resting it on one's shoulder.¹³ The reliance on tactical formation, muskets, rapiers, and pikes, were the most common topics of English and European military literature.¹⁴

THE COLONIAL MILITIA

Until 1675, the New England militias mirrored their English counterpart. Colonists were organized into small divisions of civilian soldiers

known as trainbands.¹⁵ In Massachusetts, every male colonist, age sixteen or older, was required to participate in military exercises once every three years, for six days at a time.¹⁶ Drills consisted of a mixture of formation maneuvers, weapons training, and proper military behavior.¹⁷ Laws instructed military officers to ensure that “their Souldiers be well and compleatly Armed...with...two thirds of each Company be Musquetiers, and those which serve with Pikes, have Corsets and head-peices.”¹⁸ Each trainband was taught the basics of handling a sword, the correct posture for holding a pike, firing a musket, and how to wear protective armor properly.¹⁹ Finally, and most importantly, the militia was instructed to march in formation to the beat of a drum while calling the enemy into an open “champion field.”²⁰

Early New England settlers relied heavily on men with English military backgrounds for protection. Settlers at Plymouth brought with them Miles Standish, a professional soldier, for fear that in America the English would be “in continual danger of the savage people.”²¹ Standish had been a mercenary soldier in the Low Countries for Queen Elizabeth’s army, and was no doubt well trained in English military customs.²² John Underhill and John Mason arrived in America shortly after the first settlement. These two were “schooled in England’s wars on the Continent and in Ireland.”²³

Military commanders derived their manner of fighting from the European and English methods.²⁴ Standish, Underhill, and Mason brought

Old World warfare notions to America. In Plymouth, Standish trained the residents in the proper use of "Swords, Rapiers, and all other piercing weapons" commonly used by the English and Europeans.²⁵ During the 1637 Pequot War, Underhill and Mason marched to Fort Saybrook in formation as one man "beat up the drum" and another flew the colonial flag ahead.²⁶ Underhill acknowledged that the his company "chose to beat up the Drum and bid them [Indians] into battell, marching into a champion field."²⁷ He waited in the field while the army "displayed our colours." He soon realized that none of the Indians "would come neare us."²⁸ Annoyed at this blatant disregard for his military custom, Underhill burned their Wigwams, destroyed their crops, and for several days stole their food.²⁹ As the war proceeded, small ambushes by Pequot warriors forced Underhill to "subdivide our divisions" into smaller units.³⁰ These regiments fought in "tight formations" while "militiamen marched about 'in rank and file'" and displayed their muskets and pikes.³¹

New England colonists and English citizens were aware of the social, cultural, and economic effects of war. Reports from the continent helped develop a sense of proper wartime etiquette. Between 1618 and 1648, conflict in Hapsburg, Germany tore the country apart in what the English believed the most barbaric ways.³² Eyewitness reports contained detailed accounts of soldiers beating "out the braines of poore old decrepid women, as in sport" and "poore people...slaine before anothers face."³³

The Thirty Years War, as it is now known, illustrated the “uncivilized” devastation caused by unregulated wars. English people used the Thirty Years War to reinforce formal etiquette for wartime.³⁴

INDIAN FIGHTING TACTICS

Indian warfare differed from the European custom in a number of ways and they fought to accomplish a variety of outcomes. Customarily Indians fought wars “to settle boundary disputes, avenge insults, and extend or resist tribal authority.”³⁵ Indians often warred against other villages for three reasons: “valor,’ ‘revenge,’ and to acquire captives.”³⁶ Recently, Daniel Richter has shown that Indians initiated small-scale wars through a practice called “mourning-war” where a bereaved community raided another community to replace a member killed in war.³⁷ Unlike Europeans, Indians rarely fought over economic and political issues. Furthermore, warfare objectives were not Clausewitzian, meaning satisfied by total extermination of one side or the other.³⁸ Warfare was not a “continual struggle to complete victory”; nor was it intended to dominate the enemy “normally associated with European-style conquest.”³⁹

Until the arrival of European traders, Indians fought with lightweight weapons, which allowed for quick and stealthy movements through densely wooded areas. William Wood, in 1634, noted that they “use no

other weapon in war than bows and arrows."⁴⁰ These weapons catered to a strategy much different from the European style tactics. In his observation, Wood argued that there were significant military differences between Indians and Europeans. The "warriors make towards their enemies in a disordered manner, without any soldier-like marching or warlike postures, being deaf to any word of command, ignorant of falling off or falling on, doubling ranks or files."⁴¹

As European traders established better relations with Indians, the latter acquired muskets, powder, and shot. Indians found that although muskets were heavier than bows, they were still as quick and "generally excellent marksmen."⁴² Contemporary authors noted how quickly and quietly Indians moved through the woods. In 1674, John Josselyn observed that they fought by "ambushments and surprises, coming upon one another unawares."⁴³ The adoption of European muskets, and the quiet skulking practices of Indians, frightened colonists who believed that Indians might find a way to manufacture gunpowder and drive the English from the continent.⁴⁴

OBSERVATIONS OF EACH OTHER

Colonists came to America with preconceived notions of how wars should be fought.⁴⁵ Since Indian warfare fit into the "uncivilized" category,

colonists were reluctant to adopt skulking until, in King Philip's War, it became absolutely necessary. The success of the Pequot War in 1638 reinforced the colonists' admiration for their own military philosophy.

Colonial militias followed the European norms that governed how wars should be fought, when they should be fought, "what weapons and tactics are permissible, whom among the enemy it is appropriate to kill...and what conventions [should be] observed."⁴⁶ Outside of these conventions were cannibalism and torture, which were practiced by Indians. Eyewitness accounts of these practices during wartime frightened colonists.

Indian habits that fit European notions of "savagery" and "barbarism" were described with derision.⁴⁷ In 1636, Jean de Brébeuf wrote that the Hurons captured and tortured enemy combatants for "Five or six days."⁴⁸ The Hurons spent this period "burning the prisoners over a slow fire, and not satisfied with seeing their skins entirely roasted, they cut open the legs, the thighs, the arms, and the most fleshy part of the body and thrust into the wounds glowing brands or red-hot hatchets."⁴⁹ In New England, Increase Mather wrote of a similar incident. After the Wampanoags destroyed the town of Sudbury on 20 April 1676

they took five or six of the English and carried them away alive, but that night killed them in such a manner as none but Salvages would have done. For they stripped them naked, and caused

them to run the Gauntlet, whipping them after a cruel and bloody manner, and then threw hot ashes upon them, cut out the flesh of their legs, and put fire into their wounds.⁵⁰

Mather concluded, "they are the perfect children of the Devill."⁵¹

Thomas Abler acknowledges that while "we do not have as many comments concerning Indians' views of the European method of waging war" it "seems incontestable that many European conventions and practices would seem as barbaric to Indians as Indian practices did to Europeans."⁵² One of these practices was total war. After John Underhill and John Mason lit the Pequot camp of Saybrook Fort in Mystic, Connecticut aflame during the Pequot War, friendly Narragansett fighters screamed, "*mach it, mach it*, that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is too furious, and slaies too many men."⁵³ The Saybrook Fort was decimated within half an hour and contemporary estimates reported between four and "six hundred Indian souls" were "brought...to hell" on that fateful day.⁵⁴ Those that escaped the fire were butchered with English swords.⁵⁵ Young men, who had never experienced warfare firsthand were shocked by the carnage and noted carcasses "so thicke in some places, that you could hardly passe along."⁵⁶

Colonial soldiers also judged Indian strategy as strange, unimpressive and ineffective. After Underhill obliterated the Pequot forces he sent his Mohegan allies into Pequot territory so "that we might

see the nature of Indian war.”⁵⁷ After observing for some time, Underhill hyperbolically remarked that the Mohegans “might fight seven yeares and not kill seven men.”⁵⁸ To his surprise, the Indians “came not neere one another, but shot remote, and not point blanke, as wee often doe with our bullets.”⁵⁹ Fighting, he believed, “is more for pastime, than to conquer and subdue enemies.”⁶⁰ The English hardly considered this method of combat warlike since “the [Indians] fight farre differs from the Christian practice.”⁶¹ John Mason suggested that their fighting “did hardly deserve the Name of Fighting.”⁶² Roger Williams, five years after the Pequot War ended, reiterated Underhill’s observations. Williams wrote of the Narragansetts, with whom he had familiar relations,

Their Warres are farre lesse bloody, and devouring then the cruell Warres of *Europe*; and seldome twenty slaine in a pitchd field : partly because when they fight in a wood every Tree is a Bucklar [shield]. When they fight in a plaine, they fight with leaping and dancing, that seldome an Arrow hits, and when a man is wounded, unlesse he that shot followes upon the wounded, they soone retire and save the wounded :and yet having no Swords, nor Guns, all that are slaine are commonly salin with great Valour and Courage : for the Conquerour ventures into the thickest, and brings away the Head of his Enemy.⁶³

Military leaders believed that skulking was futile against English tactical superiority and failed to see “the sophistication and military effectiveness”

of Indian practices.⁶⁴ The belief that their military strategy was superior during much of the seventeenth century kept them from adopting a skulking strategy.

Thomas Abler believes that the evidence points to the likelihood that colonists used rape in war.⁶⁵ In 1672, *The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony* condemned the practice of rape in war.⁶⁶ This might have been a case of prevention, rather than reaction, but it does indicate that the problem was on the minds of colonists. Rape warfare might have shocked Indians, since it did not fall into their philosophy of acceptable conduct.

There are no reported cases of captivity-rape by Indians during the seventeenth century.⁶⁷ When Nipmuck forces captured Mary Rowlandson at Lancaster on 10 February 1675/6, Rowlandson spent nearly three months with the Indians. She was eventually ransomed in May 1676 for £20 and wrote a narrative of her experiences. In *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God*, she emphasized, "*not one of them ever offered me the least abuse of unchastity to me, in word or action.*"⁶⁸ James Axtell argues that rape perhaps did not occur among Indian communities because many female captives were adopted into the community to fill familial roles.⁶⁹ Quinnapin, the Nipmuck sachem, perhaps saw her as an individual who could fulfill the duties of a woman in the clan.⁷⁰

A COLD WAR

Between the Pequot War and King Philip's War, colonial militias did not change their battlefield strategies. In the relative peace of the mid-century decades, there was no incentive to drive transformation. After the successes of the first war, colonists assumed that the European-style system was more effective than Indian skulking. Kyle Zelner argues that colonial authorities paid little attention to developing a new model army for fear that it "would tarnish their image" as civilized Englishmen.⁷¹ The cold war between the two cultures allowed colonial authorities to manage Indian relations through diplomatic agreements rather than military engagement. When these agreements failed at the outbreak of King Philip's War, the colonies fell back on a military system that had rarely been tested by the realities of New England as battleground.

Economic prosperity between 1640 and 1670 enabled colonists to move farther into the backcountry. In five years, 1637 to 1642, Boston authorities purchased roughly 129 grants for an average of four acres per household.⁷² By 1660, colonial towns grew at about one town per year – expansion limited only by the competing claims of rival colonies.⁷³ Settlers brought livestock with them for survival. According to Virginia DeJohn Anderson, as early as 1634, towns gauged their prosperity by the size of their herds.⁷⁴ Because towns depended so heavily on livestock, "New

Englanders reversed the usual English fencing practices" which allowed animals to roam into Indian territories and damage crops.⁷⁵

For protection against encroachments many Indian communities submitted themselves to English common law with the expectation that they would be protected from wandering livestock.⁷⁶ Because of the success of settlements in the backcountry, seventeenth-century "settlers no longer needed the friendship of Indians."⁷⁷ As a result, laws were passed that did not recognize "the fundamental incompatibility of English and Indian subsistence regimes," and "colonial authorities repeatedly permitted joint use of land."⁷⁸ As James Drake argues, King Philip's War began because of the colonial authorities' inability to fulfill their reciprocal responsibility to protect Indian property.⁷⁹ Without a sound compromise between 1636 and 1675 based on mutual respect and reciprocation both sides became frustrated.

Even as Philip made preparations for war, the colonies continued their push for the diplomatic relations that had divided the two cultures. Philip was called to Massachusetts and Plymouth a total of thirteen times between 1662 and 1671 to account for rumors of conspiracy.⁸⁰ In 1671, Philip appeared before a council in Taunton where he signed an agreement that forfeited his authority and surrendered his weapons to the colonial authorities.⁸¹ The sachem was infuriated by this blatant disregard for his authority. The colonial authorities, however, hoped that Philip's

ambitious troublemaking would end with this agreement.⁸² When it appeared that Philip was preparing for war, Plymouth organized its forces and Rhode Island offered its support.⁸³

THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF OPEN WAR

Because the colonial militia depended on Old World etiquette and strategy during the first half of the war, Indians often obliterated settlements, livestock, and settlers with little or no resistance.⁸⁴ Frightened, angry colonists often described Indian skulking tactics in insulting terms. Nathaniel Saltonstall called Indians, "Wolves" who would "dare not come forth out of the Woods and Swamps" to fight properly.⁸⁵ Similarly, other colonists who experienced the destruction of their homes, farms and communities emphasized similarities between the pernicious skulking of Indian warfare and the devil's work.⁸⁶ Through the winter months of 1675, the colonial militia gradually modified its military strategy and system to combat Indian skulking. In March 1675/6, the colonial militias were losing the war. To save themselves they reluctantly adopted skulking tactics. This tactical transformation contributed significantly to the colonial victory on 12 August 1676.

Seven or eight of Philip's men arrived in Swansea on 20 June 1675. When an Englishman refused to sharpen their hatchets because "it was

the Sabbath Day, and their God would be very angry if he should let them do it" the Indians became angry.⁸⁷ To show their irritation, they broke into another's house and stole some food. After they finished, they turned their attention to a man walking down the road, whom they took captive for a short time.⁸⁸ Swansea residents panicked and quickly sent a message to Plymouth and Boston for help. When Governor John Leverett of Massachusetts received this letter he ordered that the drums be beaten to signal war. In "three House time" Massachusetts "Mustered up about an Hundred and ten Men."⁸⁹ The other settlements – Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island – joined the charge and spent several days enlisting volunteers for the militia.⁹⁰

Trouble in Swansea escalated, and more Wampanoag warriors provoked the settlers.⁹¹ For several hours, Wampanoag men harassed the towns' residents until a young man shot an Indian dead. This was exactly the excuse Philip needed to declare war against the colonies.

One day later, the Indians attacked Swansea, killed the young man, his father, and "five more English."⁹² One account of this event wrote that

They took [a woman]...skinned her Head, as also the Son, and dismiss them both, who immediately died. They also, the next day killed six or seven Men...and two more at one of the Garrisons; and as two Men that went out of one of the Garrisons to draw a Bucket of Water, were shot and

carried away, and afterwards found with their Fingers and Feet cut off, and the skin of their Heads slayed off.⁹³

Colonial forces arrived and “found divers English Murthered on the Road, and were informed by the English there, of divers Hostilities of the Indians.”⁹⁴ Swansea was destroyed, and eventually abandoned. In only a few days Philip had shown the crushing power of Wampanoag forces.

The English forces were not prepared for combat in densely wooded areas. They neither knew, nor wanted to know, how to maneuver through the forests. Instead, one Massachusetts Captain, Samuel Mosely, used “several Dogs” to find the Indians in the swamps.⁹⁵ When Plymouth engaged their enemy on 29 June, Wampanoag warriors shot and wounded a large portion of colonial forces and killed the commander. When the English attempted retaliation the Indians “ran into Swamps” and prevented “a further pursuit of the Enemy.”⁹⁶ Increase Mather wrote that when the Indians used the natural resources to their advantage “nothing could be done against the Enemy.”⁹⁷ Nathaniel Saltonstall echoed Mather's observation when he wrote that the Indians behaved

Like Wolves, and other Beasts of Prey, that commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by Stealth, [and] dare not come forth out of the Woods and Swamps, where they lay skulking in small Companies, being so light of Foot that they can run away when they [wish], and pass Bogs,

rocky Mountains, where we could by no Means pursue them.⁹⁸

Even when colonial forces followed Indians into the woods they were incompetent. Mather reported that they "sometimes unhappily shoot *English men* instead of *Indians*."⁹⁹ As a result, Lieutenant Phineas Upham begged the Massachusetts authorities for soldiers "acquainted with the woods" because his soldiers dared not to pursue their enemy. The colonial militias were unprepared for warfare in the swamps, and officers realized that they were unprepared for combat in the swamps and thus risked "away Mens lives."¹⁰⁰

On 18 July, Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth forces combined their efforts to seek out the Indians in the swamps. Not knowing where their enemy lay, colonial soldiers shot at "every Bush they see move (supposing the *Indians* were there)."¹⁰¹ Wasted ammunition became a problem for New England forces, as they aimlessly shot at anything that moved. Powder was not cheap. Though the first gunpowder mill was constructed in 1675 colonists still imported brimstone and saltpeter.¹⁰²

The successes of Indian ambushes showed how poor the English were at detecting Philip's forces. When Captain Thomas Lathrop and eighty of his men transported "cartloads of goods near Deerfield, Massachusetts" an Indian company ran out of the swamp and killed seventy men.¹⁰³ On 2 August, Nipmuck forces, now allied with the

Wampanoags, surprise attacked Captain Hutchinson's company in Brookfield. Indian forces left the town smoldering after they "wrapped special arrows with rags containing brimstone and 'wild fire'" and shot them into houses.¹⁰⁴ Reports of "travelers being waylaid" while walking through towns forced many to relocate closer to Boston.¹⁰⁵ Increase Mather noted that Indians knew "where to find us, but we know not where to find them."¹⁰⁶

Philip moved quickly. The success of his forces rested on their ability to avoid "block-houses and instead hit isolated farms. The English, secure in their block houses, could do little more than watch as the Indians devastated their farms."¹⁰⁷ In Taunton, colonists' best attempts to catch Philip's forces by erecting forts were foiled. Instead, Philip led his forces across a water passage into a swamp and escaped capture.¹⁰⁸

When colonial forces placed another trap for Philip on 30 July, Philip "slipped past the area's troops" and attacked into central New England.¹⁰⁹ From here, Philip's forces and Nipmuck forces combined to destroy the towns of Brookfield, Taunton, Bridgewater, and Dartmouth.

Before any news of their whereabouts reached other militia companies, the Indians struck Northfield. When Major Robert Treat realized that Philip's forces had moved further west, they pursued, "leaving cattle there and even soldiers' corpses unburied".¹¹⁰ Similarly, Major Pyncheon received news that Philip's forces intended to attack Hadley,

Massachusetts in October 1675. Pynchon and a company of 190 soldiers rushed to Hadley “only to find the town in flames, and the Indians fled.”¹¹¹ John Easton wrote that soldiers spent weeks searching the coastlines for Philip while they waited for information about Philip's next attack.¹¹²

Virginia DeJohn Anderson has shown that when Indians raided towns at the beginning of the war, they specifically targeted livestock.¹¹³ According to Anderson “livestock had come to symbolize the relentless advance of English settlement.”¹¹⁴ Very rarely did Indians consume the animals, but rather they tortured them by cutting legs, intestines, and pulling out eyes.¹¹⁵ By focusing on the slaughter of animals, Anderson argues, Indians were sending “a message of terror to their enemies.”¹¹⁶

Though Anderson's argument is sound, she does not consider the strategic importance of killing English livestock in New England. Philip, by 1675, was well aware that colonists relied on livestock for sustenance.¹¹⁷ In an attempt to starve the colonists into submission, Philip, according to one account, had killed “eight thousand head of Cattle” in the first seven months.¹¹⁸ Each town the Indians raided cost the inhabitants hundreds of horses and cattle – essentially debilitating towns and forcing the inhabitants to leave. Providence lost “neer a hundred cattell”, while areas along the border of Rhode Island and Massachusetts lost “at the least a thousand horses &...two thousand Cattell And many Sheep.”¹¹⁹

As the war progressed, coastal towns had little food to give its soldiers in the backcountry. In some circumstance, company units arrived into towns to find it destroyed. Often stayed "thereabouts till they have eaten and consumed what stock of Cattle or Sheep the Indians had left."¹²⁰ While the colonial army foraged for food, Philip's forces attacked other towns and settlements.¹²¹ The Indian forces strategically debilitated entire militia companies by destroying their crops, livestock, and shelter with unpredictable raids. Colonial fighters were too slow, too weak, and too hungry to protect themselves from Philip's forces and settlements fell like dominos.¹²²

When the first generation of soldiers who had fought in the Pequot War died, they left the subsequent generations unprepared for military combat. The first generation consisted of Underhill and Mason who died in 1672; Lion Gardiner in 1663; and Endecott in 1665.¹²³ This new generation consisted of Captain Samuel Mosely, a former privateer in Jamaica, Major Thomas Savage, who, although never engaging in armed conflict was Boston's militia captain from 1652 to 1682, and various landowners that were elected officers by their town.¹²⁴ The infantry, furthermore, was made up of all volunteers who had no other experience with war than the triennial military drills that taught them how to use Old World weapons.¹²⁵ Thus, this generation of New England soldiers had remarkably little experience fighting as wartime combatants.

BENJAMIN CHURCH AND THE WRONG TYPE OF WAR

Early in the war, one soldier in particular, realized the inefficiency of Old World tactics. Church was raised in a military family after his father, Richard Church, fought with the colonists in the Pequot War. Because of his service in the colony, Richard's name shows up on the 1643 Plymouth Colony list of men able to bear arms.¹²⁶ Captain Church was, thus, well trained in military weaponry of the seventeenth century. Yet what made Captain Church stand out among other colonial fighters was his ability to adopt Indian skulking tactics early in the war.

In 1674, Captain Church moved from Duxbury to Sogkonate (now known as Little Compton, Rhode Island). During the seventeenth century Plymouth Colony purchased the area from the Indians. In all likelihood, Church's wife Alice Southworth's grandmother and step-grandfather, Alice Carpenter and Governor William Bradford, purchased the area and it was passed down through the generations. But Church was the first colonist to move to Sogkonate and soon gained "good acquaintance with the Natives...and was in a little time in great esteem among them."¹²⁷ In particular, Captain Church took a familial liking to the Indian sachem Awashonks and her people, the Sogkonates. His kindness to Awashonks and her people earned their trust.

Church never explained how he came to recognize the effectiveness of skulking – other than that it worked – but we can deduce from his narrative *Entertaining Passages* that his willingness to adopt Indians into his company at an early stage played a significant role. One historian believes that Church's

openness to human relationships with Indians made Church capable of learning from them. It was this quality that made him successful in partisan warfare. Unlike the regular soldiery, Church learned from Indians how to fight Indians, and since he also knew how to recognize and evoke the humanity of the Indians, he was able to bring personal influence to bear in diplomacy and in recruiting Indians to fight against King Philip.¹²⁸

When war broke out in 1675, the Plymouth government recruited Church. During the early stages of the war he met fierce resistance to his adoption of Indian tactics. When he insisted that he could take a company of his best men to surprise an Indian war party, the ranking officer told Church his methods were flawed and the orders were to "go to *Mount-hope* and there to fight *Philip*" openly.¹²⁹ After the Great Swamp Fight of December 1675, Church recommended that since the militia companies had driven the Indians from the swamps English forces should stay in the Narragansett wigwams for the night. He argued that since the "Wigwams were Musket-proof" and "Sufficient to supply the whole Army"

with "a good warm House to lodge in," they would surely protect the soldiers from "the Storms and Cold." Another ranking officer believed that instead the wigwams should be burned. The company doctor sided with the latter who, while operating on a bullet wound in Church's leg, told him "if he gave such advice as" to stay in the wigwams for the night "he should [let him] bleed to Death like a Dog."¹³⁰

There is no doubt that Church's ability to cross between worlds (to sleep one night in a house, and one night in a wigwam) worried colonists. Solomon Stoddard commented that if those that used skulking tactics "act like wolves" they are to be "dealt withall as wolves."¹³¹

Thus, Church encountered heavy resistance when he met with the Council of War in February 1676. Church recommended "he...take the Command of Men" and "not lye in any Town or Garrison with them, but...lye in the Woods as the Enemy did."¹³² This, as well as his argument that "they must make a business of the War, as the Enemy did" was rejected as "no wayes advisable."¹³³ William Hubbard, writing about King Philip's War in 1677 wrote that the early failures of colonial troops occurred because they took "up a wrong Notion about the best Way and manner of fighting with the *Indians*...that [they believed] it were best to deal with the *Indians* in their own Way."¹³⁴

TWO CHOICES

Holding onto Old World military tactics for fear that they would lose their identity proved costly. English colonists realized early in the war that if they admitted that Indian warfare was strategically advanced – and adopted it – they would become victims of the wilderness.¹³⁵ As a result, the colonies suffered the heaviest damage between September 1675 and February 1675/6. By February, the situation in New England was dire. Deerfield, Northfield, Swansea, Hatfield, Hadley, Springfield, Rehoboth, Providence, Wrentham, Marlborough, and many other towns were attacked, pillaged or burned to the ground.¹³⁶ Additionally, thousands of homes were decimated.¹³⁷

Philip's forces pressed forward until, by February 1676, they had destroyed towns like Chelmsford, Medfield, Scituate, and Weymouth. The town of Medfield was "just twenty miles from Boston."¹³⁸ Days later, "Indian raids came within ten miles of the town."¹³⁹ Providence, Rhode Island rose up in flames and everything south of Pawtucket, Rhode Island was abandoned. Massachusetts' residents fled burning towns for protection closer to Boston and Plymouth.¹⁴⁰

Officials in Boston planned for the worst. Their idea: build a fortification around Boston "from the head of navigation on the Charles River to a point on the Concord River in the town of Billerica."¹⁴¹ In upper

Connecticut, inhabitants and soldiers crowded into the only homes left standing, going days without food or protection.¹⁴²

Even with much of New England in flames, the colonies continued to hold onto their Old World military style. Thus, colonial forces continued to make costly mistakes and experienced devastating losses. During a campaign in Connecticut, “one of the English soldiers wore squeaking shoes” and an Indian guide refused to march forward until the soldier replaced his shoes with a pair of moccasins. Another soldier “wore a pair of leather breeches which being dry made a rustling noise, which the Indian objected to” and halted the procedure “until the breeches were either removed or soaked in water, to prevent the rustling.”¹⁴³ During an expedition in 1675, militias were still holding up the emblematic “Colours in the Front of [their] Company.”¹⁴⁴

The colonists needed to make a choice: continue fighting as their ancestors had and lose the war (which meant losing everything), or learn from the Indians a new method of fighting. With the former the colonists would have lost their lives, the latter, their link to the past. For fifty years, colonists spent time, energy, and money pulling the Indians out of the wilderness; by 1676, the Indians successfully pulled the English *into* the wilderness. The colonists’ existential choice to live meant there was no turning back to the past for help.

TURNING POINT OF THE WAR: ADOPTION OF INDIAN TACTICS

Reluctantly, colonists made the choice to adopt Indian tactical methods. Between October 1675 and December 1676 the colonies began modifying their strategy. On 13 October 1675, colonial authorities announced, "Whereas it is found by experience that troopers & pikemen are of little use in the present war with the Indians" the militia "shall forthwith furnish themselves with carbines and ammunition...to serve as foot soldiers during the said war."¹⁴⁵ Pikemen were "practically worthless in the forest because they lacked knowledgeable guides and perceptive scouts" during the early stages of the war.¹⁴⁶ Slowly the colonial military realized that the only way to win a war against the Indians was to learn how to fight like them.

Scholars have underemphasized this last point. Douglas E. Leach and Patrick Malone argue that that Philip's forces never stood a chance against the colonial army. Leach argues that Philip's forces lost because they were ill prepared for a long-term struggle. Throughout *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, Leach maintains that Indian attacks were merely "setbacks" to colonial forces, and that English forces realized they could end the war by attacking Indian crops by the winter of 1676.¹⁴⁷ For Leach, spring harvests enabled colonists to "carry on the war almost indefinitely while the Indians continued to use up their very limited resources."¹⁴⁸ In this view,

the colonists' wore out the Indians out by protracting the war and burning Philip's means of sustenance.¹⁴⁹

Malone, similarly, explains King Philip's War as a war decided by attrition and technological superiority.¹⁵⁰ Malone argues that Indian tactics "were not enough to win a war against the far more numerous colonists, whose Indian allies, fortified garrison houses, and almost unlimited logistical support."¹⁵¹ Colonists, accordingly, had better firearms, protection, food-storage, and a larger population that Indians had no chance of driving off the land. No matter how hard or long the Indians fought against the colonists, the colonial militia always had the upper hand. As a result, the longer the Indians fought, the more they suffered "disease, starvation, lack of ammunition, and relentless pursuit" of their enemies.¹⁵² For both Malone and Leach, Philip's forces faced inevitable defeat from the moment they attacked Swansea.

James Drake, who has made extraordinary strides in our understanding of King Philip's War, also argues that Philip's forces lost due to internal divisions and a failed unification between all Indians. Though the colonies were divided at first, their success materialized as colonies unified through the dehumanization of Indians, unification of religion and culture, and their resolve to fight.¹⁵³

Still others emphasize the role that Mohawk raids played on the war's outcome of the war.¹⁵⁴ Daniel R. Mandell claims that rather than

fight a two-pronged war against the Mohawks and English, Philip's forces surrendered to the English. When the English offered amnesty to all Indians that had not engaged in heinous attacks against colonists, the Indians serving under Philip submitted themselves to the English rather than face the torture most commonly associated with Mohawks.¹⁵⁵ Jill Lepore believes that the assault on Philip during diplomatic relations with the Mohawks in 1676 decimated Philip's warriors – an assault from which Philip's forces never recovered.¹⁵⁶

All of these theories, however, do not take into account several important factors. First, as mentioned earlier in this essay, Philip's forces made significant progress in New England from the outset of the war to March 1676. Towns and settlements fell more quickly than they were repaired, and were abandoned. Garrisons and forts did not prevent Philip's forces from maneuvering through the backcountry. Furthermore, Nipmuck, Narragansett and Wampanoag forces in the spring of 1676 were only ten miles from Boston proper.¹⁵⁷ If colonists had waited until April for Philip's warriors to falter, they would not have survived the summer.

Furthermore, by calling the initial stages of the war a "setback" for the inevitable colonial victory, Leach and Malone ignore the contemporary situation in New England. Looking back, one can hardly see the "inevitability" of victory during the first half of King Philip's War. Out of ninety towns, "52 were attacked...25 pillaged and 17 destroyed."¹⁵⁸

“Indian attacks produced a wave of refugees who swamped eastern towns struggling to sustain the burdens of war.”¹⁵⁹ As colonists relocated closer to Boston, Massachusetts officials passed laws which made it illegal to leave settlements for fear that the buffer zone between major port cities and Indian forces would be breached.¹⁶⁰ That Massachusetts' authorities entertained the idea of building a fortified wall around Boston indicates how serious conditions were by 1676¹⁶¹

Secondly, if English technology was superior to their enemies, then why did colonists suffer their heaviest losses during the first half of the war? In July, when Massachusetts and Plymouth prepared for the war, they supplied their soldiers with enough rations for a two-month skirmish.¹⁶² This means that although colonial authorities *believed* that their military power was superior – they expected to squash Philip in a short time – it was in fact vulnerable to Indian skulking. English forces chose to change their military tactics because they were, in fact, not effective against the Indians.

Finally, there is no doubt that the Mohawk raid on Philip's forces in February 1676 played a significant role in the outcome of the war. Mandell argues that the death of many Wampanoag warriors “no doubt angered the Nipmuc and Narragansett war leaders,” which caused a division among leadership.¹⁶³ The Mohawks decimated Philip's forces. The continued success of Mohawk fighters in western New England became a

critical turning point in the war as more of Indian warriors surrendered to the English to escape Mohawk captivity.¹⁶⁴ When Captain Church led his company of Indians and English into the backcountry, telling enemy combatants

*Come, Come, you look wild and surly, and mutter, but that signifies nothing, these my best Souldiers were a little while ago as wild and surly as you are now; by that time you have been but one day along with me, you'll love me too, and be as brisk as any of them.*¹⁶⁵

Any Indian that submitted directly to Church, and “behave themselves...he would do well by them, and they should be his men and not Sold out of the Country.”¹⁶⁶ Faced with the choice of Mohawk torture or submission to colonial forces – especially Church – the Indians chose the latter, en masse.

But the Mohawk raid alone did not stop Philip's forces, nor does this theory explain why colonial forces successfully captured hundreds of Indians in war. In early March 1676, Massachusetts authorities sent Captain William Turner on the first approved skulking mission. Turner marched with “a recently released [Indian] captive” and a small company of men – both Indians and English. When his forces arrived at the native camp of Peskeompskut at nightfall, Turner instructed his men to keep quiet and wait until sunrise to strike. All night, Turner and his men watched as Indians

ate a late-night meal of fish and beef (from cattle killed earlier). Turner's company remained so quiet that the Indians at Peskeompskut had no idea they were being watched, and Turner noted that they did not bother to secure their location with a guard. Finally, upon daybreak, Turner open fired on the Indians. Unaware that *colonial* forces had fallen on them, the Indians screamed "Mohawks! Mohawks!"¹⁶⁷ This was both the first ambush by the colonial forces on Indians, and the first resounding victory of the New Year.

With this, the colonial army took its first military plunge into the wilderness and searched for their enemies on their ground. The woods were no longer a sanctuary for Philip's forces, thus colonists eliminated the unpredictability of Indian attacks. One historian wrote that Turner's attack intimidated the Indians and the "tribes became divided and demoralized" and soon broke "into small wandering parties."¹⁶⁸ Other offensive attacks under Major Talcott, Captain Henschman, and Captain Mosely pursued enemy forces into the swamps and killed them in great numbers, or taking a large amount of captives.¹⁶⁹

Several weeks after Turner's forces ambushed the Peskeompskut camp James Avery and George Denison used similar tactics against Narragansett forces. Indian scouts and spies alerted Avery and Denison to the location of Narragansett forces. The two captains laid an ambush similar to the ones Indians laid for colonists during the early stages of the

war. When Canonchet, the Narragansett leader pursued the bait, the colonial forces outflanked the Narragansetts and open fired.¹⁷⁰ According to Mandell one of the most "critical turning point[s] was the capture and death of the powerful war leader Canonchet."¹⁷¹ The capture and death of Canonchet "was really the death-blow of the war, for he was the real leader of all active operations at this time."¹⁷² His capture, and the surrender of the Narragansett forces days later, effectively eliminated Philip's chances to push colonists off his land, and gave the militia the much needed morale boost that propelled them into victory.

Captain Church returned to the war in June 1676 after a four-month leave and proved that he was "a person extraordinarily qualified for, and adapted to the affairs of war."¹⁷³ Now that the colony understood the effectiveness of skulking in war and approved their soldiers to use it, Church quickly employed Indian tactics. In February, when Church requested several men to "lye in the Woods as the Enemy did", the colonial authorities denied his request. When he returned in June, the Governor Josiah Winslow of Plymouth was "particularly glad that Providence had brought him there at that juncture" and gave him two hundred men, English and Indian, with which to fight Philip.

In his expeditions he captured the Munponsets without "one escaping."¹⁷⁴ He captured the forces of Little Eyes by hiding in the forest; forced 66 Indians to surrender at the Great Swamp Fight; led the

expedition that killed Philip; and his company of Indians and English formerly ended the war in the south with the surrender of Anawon.¹⁷⁵ For his tactical accomplishments, Increase Mather praised him for "achievements...so magnanimous and extraordinary, that my reader will suspect me to be transcribing the silly old *romances*, where the *knights* do conquer so many *giants*."¹⁷⁶

As for the rest of the army, Reverend John Eliot wrote the following to Robert Boyle in October 1677:

In our first war with the Indians, God pleased to shew us the vanity of our military skill, in managing our arms, after the European mode. Now we are glad to learn the skulking way of war.¹⁷⁷

CONCLUSION

Old World warfare failed in New England where there were no battlefield greens or champion fields. Pikes, phalanxes, and swords, which were common features of European combat, were useless against Indians. The military strategies and brilliant displays, such as pitched warfare and the use of drums to signify the arrival of troops, became more of a burden in the backcountry. Pike-men were too slow for military expeditions in America. Furthermore, formation lines brought colonial forces many unnecessary losses.

During the first eight months of the war, colonists were not able to keep up with Philip's forces and suffered greatly for it. Ambush after ambush, colonial forces doubted whether their divine right to subdue and conquer the wilderness was in God's plan. Between the outbreak of the war in June 1675 and the death of Philip in August 1676, towns and colonies called nineteen separate Thanksgivings and Fasts to beg for God's forgiveness. At no other time in New England were so many Thanksgivings and Fasts called within a one-year period.¹⁷⁸ As soldiers' morale dropped, so did their confidence that colonial forces would win the war.

When colonists adopted Indian skulking tactics, replaced pike-men with foot soldiers, and replaced their rapiers with tomahawks, the tide changed.¹⁷⁹ Colonial forces responded more quickly to Philip's attacks and drove Indians away from vulnerable settlements. Hostile Indians could no longer hide in the swamps, or seek protection in the woods because colonists were now willing to follow them into those areas. Slowly, soldiers became quieter and faster until their tactics were just as unpredictable as Philip's. The raid at Peskeompskut by Captain William Turner and his company symbolized how effective the English were with Indian skulking tactics. Because they were no longer afraid of the swamps, Avery and Denison's company captured Canonchet. These events were impossible

for the early militia that relied on drums, pikes, flags, and heavy equipment.

The colonists did not win the war alone, however – Indians, who had remained loyal to the colony, taught the colonists how to skulk in war. With each attack, colonial companies brought with them several Indians who, during combat, kept soldiers quiet and hidden. The use of these Indians by the colonial forces was another reason the New England colonies were victorious in August 1676.

NOTES

¹ Edward Rawson, *The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony*, (Cambridge, 1672), 107-115; Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (March, 1988); Kyle F. Zelner, *A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and the Militiamen during King Philip's War*, (New York: New York University Press, 2009).

² Patrick Malone, *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians*, (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991).

³ Barbara Donagan, "Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England's Military Education before 1642," *Past & Present*, No. 147 (May, 1995), 72-5.

⁴ *Ibid*, 89.

⁵ William Barriffe, Lieutenant, *Military Discipline or the Yong Artillery Man* (London, 1639), 1-14.

⁶ John Cruso, *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie: Or Rules and Directions for the Service of Horse* (Cambridge, 1632).

⁷ Henry Hexham, *The Principles of the Art Militarie: Practised in the Warres of the United Netherlands*, (1634).

⁸ Donagan, "Halcyon Days," 89.

⁹ Barriffe, *Military Discipline*, 30-1.

¹⁰ Barker, Robert. *Instructions for Musters and Arms and the use thereof*, (London, 1631), 1.

¹¹ Barriffe, *Military Discipline*, 32-3.

¹² Anonymous. *The Exercise of the English, in the Militia of the Kingdome of England*, (London, 1642), 1-2.

¹³ Hexham, *The Principles of the Art Militarie*, 14-9.

¹⁴ See Donagan, "England's Military Education."

¹⁵ Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures," 1188-9; *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3rd ed., s.v. "Trainband".

¹⁶ Rawson, *The General Laws and Liberties*, 107-8.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 108.

¹⁸ Ibid, 108.

¹⁹ Ibid, 107-114.

²⁰ Ibid, 108; Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures," 1188-9.

²¹ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647*, ed. Samuel Eliot Morrison (New York: Knopf Publishers, 1952), 26; for a brief discussion of Standish as a professional soldier, see Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (March, 1988), 1188.

²² Nathaniel Morton, *New-Englands Memoriall: or, A brief Relation of the most-Memorable and Remarkable Passages of the Providence of God, manifested to the Planters of New England in America* (Cambridge, 1669), 143.

²³ John Ferling, "The New England Soldier: A Study in Changing Perceptions," *American Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), 27.

²⁴ Ferling, "The New England Soldier," 33.

²⁵ Ibid, 27.

²⁶ Charles Orr, ed., *History of the Pequot War* (Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897), 130; James Axtell, "The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness," *WMQ*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July, 1972), 341.

²⁷ John Underhill, *Newes from America or A New and Experimental Discoverie of New England*, (London, 1638), 14-15.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Quoted in Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 110.

³¹ Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures," 1189.

³² Donagan, "Halcyon Days and the Literature of War," 73-76.

³³ Quoted in Donagan, "Halcyon Days and the Literature of War," 77.

³⁴ Donagan, "Halcyon Days and the Literature of War," 73-76.

³⁵ Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians 1620-1675* (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1965), 37.

³⁶ Kathleen J. Bragdon, *Native People of Southern New England, 1500-1650* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 148.

³⁷ Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Long-house: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 64, 66, 139. While Richter believes that this was a practice by Iroquois culture, there is no evidence that Algonquian speaking people in the northeast adopted it.

³⁸ Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures," 1190.

³⁹ James D. Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 151; also, see Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 103-6; Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures", 1190.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Ronald Dale Karr ed., *Indian New England, 1524-1674: A Compendium of Eyewitness Accounts of Native American Life* (Pepperell, MA: Branch Line Press, 1999) 116-7.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, 73.

⁴⁵ Donagan, "Halcyon Days".

⁴⁶ Thomas Abler, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War." *Anthropologica*, Vol 34, No. 1 (1992), 4.

⁴⁷ For a discussion of what constituted "savagery", see Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 19-31; also, see Robert F. Berkhofer Jr. *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian From Columbus to the Present* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 25-31.

⁴⁸ Allan Greer, ed. *The Jesuit Relations: Native Missionaries in Seventeenth-Century North America* (Boston, Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2000), 56.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr With the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1676), 27.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Abler, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism, and Rape," 13.

⁵³ Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War*, 151-157; Underhill, *Newes From America*, 39, 42-43.

⁵⁴ Underhill notes that the fires burned so quickly that Pequot soldiers' bowstrings burned before they had a chance to retaliate, see Underhill, *Newes From America*, 39; Increase Mather, *Early History of New England; Being a Relation of Hostile Passages Between the Indians and European Voyagers and First Settlers*, ed. Samuel G. Drake (Boston, 1864), 169.

⁵⁵ Underhill, *Newes From America*, 39.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 40.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 40-41.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 40-41.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 40-41.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 40-41.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 3-4.

⁶² John Mason, "A Brief History of the Pequot War" (London, 1656), 41.

⁶³ Roger Williams, *A Key into the Language of America: or An help to the Language fo the Natives in that part of America, called New England*, intro. Howard M. Chapin (Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 1997) 188-9; for an in depth analysis of the role of enemy body parts in Algonquian culture, particularly the Pequots, see Andrew Lipman, "A Meanes to Kniff Them Togeather": The Exchange of Body Parts in the Pequot War", *WMQ*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan., 2008).

⁶⁴ Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, 23.

⁶⁵ Abler, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape," 13.

⁶⁶ Rawson, *The General Laws and Liberties*, 15.

⁶⁷ Abler, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism, and Rape," 13-14; for an in depth analysis of captivity narratives through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see James Axtell, *The European and the Indian: Essays in Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

⁶⁸ Rowlandson, *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God*, 107.

⁶⁹ Axtell, "The White Indians of Colonial America," *WMQ*, ser. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1975).

⁷⁰ Rowlandson, *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God*, 31.

⁷¹ Zelner, *Rabble in Arms*, 61.

⁷² William Haller, *The Puritan Frontier: Town- Planting in New England Colonial Development 1630-1660* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 63.

⁷³ Haller, *The Puritan Frontier*, 109; John Frederick Martin, *Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

⁷⁴ Virginia DeJohn Anderson, "King Philip's Herds: Indians, Colonists, and the Problem of Livestock in Early New England," *WMQ*, 3rd Ser., Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), 603.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 604.

⁷⁶ James D. Drake, "Symbol of a Failed Strategy: The Sassamon Trial, Political Culture, and the Outbreak of King Philip's War," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 19:2 (1995) 127.

⁷⁷ "To Governor John Winthrop, Jr. from Mr. Richard Smiths, June 27, 1675," in LaFantasie, Glenn W. ed. *The Correspondence of Roger Williams*, Vol. II 1654-1682 (Rhode Island Historical Society, 1988), 31.

⁷⁸ Anderson, "King Philip's Herds." 609.

⁷⁹ Drake, "Symbol of a Failed Strategy, (1995).

⁸⁰ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 2009), 23-27.

⁸¹ Hubbard, *Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England* (Boston, 1677), 11-12.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 14, 16.

⁸³ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 27.

⁸⁴ For examples on what colonists viewed as warfare etiquette in America, see Thomas Abler, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War," *Anthropologica*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1992); also, for an understanding of how English citizens contrasted their beliefs about "civilized" warfare with other European countries during the early seventeenth century, see Barbara Donagan, "Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England's Military Education before 1642," *Past & Present*, No. 147 (May, 1995).

⁸⁵ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New England*, by N.S., in *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699*, ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 89.

⁸⁶ Increase Mather calls the Wampanoag men who destroyed Sudbury "perfect children of the Devill." See Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr With the Indians in New England*, (Boston, 1676), 27.

⁸⁷ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *The Present State of New-England with Respect to the Indian War* (London, 1675), 9.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 9.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 10.

⁹¹ PCR, X: 362-65.

⁹² John Easton, "A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. Easton, of Rhode Island, 1675," ed. Paul Royster (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 7.

⁹³ Saltonstall, *The Present State of New England*, 10-11.

⁹⁴ Anonymous, *A Farther Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England* (London, 1676), 4.

⁹⁵ Saltonstall, *The Present State of New England*, 10.

⁹⁶ Mather, *A Brief History of the War with the Indians in New England* (London, 1676), 4.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 4.

⁹⁸ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New England, by N.S.*, in *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699*, ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 89.

⁹⁹ Mather, *A Brief History*, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 5.

¹⁰¹ Hubbard, *Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians*, 26.

¹⁰² Malone, *Skulking Way of War*, 73.

¹⁰³ Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, 83; Mather, *A Brief History*, 5; Hubbard, *Narrative*, 36-37.

¹⁰⁴ Richard I. Melvoin, *New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 98.

¹⁰⁵ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 159; Jordan Fiore, *Wrentham 1673-1973: A History* (Town of Wrentham: Thomas Todd Company, 1973), 17.

¹⁰⁶ Mather, *A Brief History*, 49.

¹⁰⁷ John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814*, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 30.

¹⁰⁸ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 27.

¹⁰⁹ Melvoin, *New England Outpost*, 98.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 100.

¹¹¹ George Madison Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War being A Critical Account of That War with A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677* (Baltimore, MD: Clearfiled Company, Inc. 2002), 68-69.

¹¹² Easton, *A Relation of the Indian War*, 8.

¹¹³ Anderson, "King Philip's Herds."

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 622.

¹¹⁵ Samuel G. Drake. *The Old Indian Chronicle; Being a Collection of Exceeding Rare Tracts, Written and Published in the Time of King Philip's War* (Boston, 1836), 102.

¹¹⁶ Anderson, "King Philip's Herds," 622.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 622.

¹¹⁸ Edward Randolph's Report in Nathaniel Bouton et al., eds. *Provincial Papers: Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire*, vol. 1 (Concord, NH, 1867), 344.

¹¹⁹ Douglas E. Leach, ed., *A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip's War: The Second William Harris Letter of August, 1676* (Providence, RI, 1963), 44, 46, 58.

¹²⁰ Edward Randolph, *Edward Randolph; Including His Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, with Other Documents Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1676-1703* (Boston: The Prince Society, 1899), 64.

¹²¹ Randolph, *Letters*, 64.

¹²² *Ibid*.

¹²³ Curtiss C. Gardiner, *Lion Gardiner, and his Descendents with Illustrations 1599-1890* (St. Louis, MO: A Whipple, 1890); Effingham De Forest, *Captain John Underhill: Gentleman, Soldier of Fortune* (New York: Underhill Society of America, 1985); Louis Bond Mason, *The Life and Times of Major John Mason of Connecticut, 1600-1672* (New York: Putnam, 1935); Alexander Young, *Chronicles of the First Planters of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1623-1636* (Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1846).

¹²⁴ Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War*, 59, 87, 102, 117, 127.

¹²⁵ Rawson, *General Laws and Liberties*, 108.

¹²⁶ PCR, VIII: 189.

¹²⁷ Thomas Church, *Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which began in the Year 1675*, (Boston, 1716), I.

¹²⁸ Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, ed. *So Dreadfull a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip's War 1676-1677*, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 374.

¹²⁹ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 28.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 16.

¹³¹ Quoted in Axtell, *The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness*, 344.

¹³² Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 19.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 19.

¹³⁴ Hubbard, *Narratives*, 39.

¹³⁵ See Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860*, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 117-28; also, see Ferling, "The New England Soldier", 33.

¹³⁶ Drake, *Old Indian Chronicle*, 164-166.

¹³⁷ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 123.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 123.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, 123.

¹⁴⁰ Drake, *Old Indian Chronicle*, 164-166.

¹⁴¹ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 166.

¹⁴² Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*, 95-96.

¹⁴³ Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War*, 394-395.

¹⁴⁴ Hubbard, *Narrative*, 19.

¹⁴⁵ RGCMB, V: 47.

¹⁴⁶ Malone, *Skulking Way of War*, 84.

¹⁴⁷ Leach, *Flintlock & Tomahawk*.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 200.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁵⁰ Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, 94-96.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, 94.

¹⁵² Ibid, 96.

¹⁵³ Drake, *King Philip's War*.

¹⁵⁴ Daniel Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Jill Lepore, *The Name of war: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998); Drake, *King Philip's War*.

¹⁵⁵ Mandell, *King Philip's War*.

¹⁵⁶ Lepore, *The Name of War*.

¹⁵⁷ Drake, *King Philip's War*, 123.

¹⁵⁸ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America: From the Colonial Era to the Civil War* (Westport, CT: The Greenwood Press, 2007), 13.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 13.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 13.

¹⁶¹ Drake, *King Philip's War*.

¹⁶² RGCMB V: 69.

¹⁶³ Mandell, *King Philip's War*, 109.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 110.

¹⁶⁵ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 36-37.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 36-37.

¹⁶⁷ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 246; Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678*, (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1990), 190-191.

¹⁶⁸ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 37-38.

¹⁶⁹ Bodge, *Soldiers*, 38.

¹⁷⁰ For more information on Captain Avery and Captain Denison see Drake, *King Philip's War*, 131.

¹⁷¹ Mandell, *King Philip's War*, 110.

¹⁷² Bodge, *Soldiers*, 38.

¹⁷³ Church, *Entertaining Passages*, 18-19.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 31-32.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 31-53.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted in Slotkin and Folsom, *So Dreadfull a Judgment*, 370.

¹⁷⁷ Letter from Rev. John Eliot of Roxbury to Hon. Robert Boyle, October 23, 1677, in Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society for the Year 1794, Vol. 3 (Boston, 1794), 178-79.

¹⁷⁸ William DeLoss Love Jr. *The Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1895), 464-497.

¹⁷⁹ For a brief discussion of colonial soldiers use of tomahawks instead of swords, see Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, 98.

CONCLUSION

On 21 February 1675/6 the colonies realized that their attempts to defeat Philip and his allies had failed. Since the beginning of the war, Philip's strength had increased, his allies grew, and his goals neared. Colonists, on the other hand, were out of money, faced military conscription issues and were days away from defeat. Only when the colonies grasped the severity of this situation did they realize that their military identity needed to change. One week after the coffers were announced empty in the February Declaration, the Council of War ordered Captain Peirse to use friendly Indians in his next expedition. This decision, symbolized the turning point in the war. The adoption of Indians and Indian skulking tactics into the colonial militias led colonies to victory.

Philip's forces and their allies won the majority of battles during the early stages of the war because the colonies were not prepared for skulking warfare. His victories in critical locations, challenged Old World combat methods. In the Old World there were no battlefield greens. Pikes, phalanxes, and swords, which were common weapons of the Old World, were useless against their new enemies. Heavy armor and loud noises intimidated Europeans, but hostile Indians saw slow and noisy soldiers as

easy targets. During the first half of the war, Philip appeared to be winning the war.

The February Declaration marked the moment when colonists realized that they could no longer carry out the war without help. By sending friendly Indians to internment camps, the colonial authorities believed they were protecting both the Indians and the English from each other. They were protecting both peoples physically and symbolically. The English believed that Indians had nothing to contribute to a superior civil and military system. When this system collapsed in February, the colonists realized that to save their lives they needed help from friendly Indians.

After February, Indians proved to be vital allies in King Philip's War. The military tactics that the Indians taught the colonists during the second half of the war saved the colonies from destruction. Additionally, Indians provided extra military support at a time when many colonists refused duty. These Indians provided a fortification against Wampanoag, Narragansett, Nipmuck, and Agawam advances. Finally, successful expeditions resulted from the adoption of Indians and Indian tactics, which was a more efficient military strategy.

Indians also supplied colonists with detailed information and intelligence on enemy forces. When heeded, this information helped the colonies avert disaster. As this thesis illustrates, when colonial authorities did not use spies and informants the result was disastrous for the colonies.

The February Declaration changed the way that the colonists fought King Philip's War. They realized that they could no longer support the war alone. Friendly Indians, adopted into the colonial militias, taught the colonists the best way to stop Philip's forces. These Indians swelled the colonial militias at a time when soldier moral was low. Finally, they provided the colonial authorities with information that, when acted upon, saved hundreds of lives. There is a clear distinction between the first eight months and the latter six months of King Philip's War. From March to August 1676, the colonies saw great successes in their military expeditions. These successes were due to the friendly Indians who fought for survival alongside the colonists.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SECONDARY SOURCES

MONOGRAPHS

- Anderson, Virginia DeJohn. *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Axtell, James. *The European and the Indian: Essays in Ethnohistory of Colonial North America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Berkhofer Jr., Robert F. *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian From Columbus to the Present*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- Bodge, George Madison. *Soldiers in King Philip's War Being A Critical Account of That War with A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677*. Baltimore, MD: Clearfiled Company, Inc. 2002.
- Bourne, Russell. *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England 1675-1678*. New York: Athenaeum, 1990.
- Bragdon, Kathleen J. *Native People of Southern New England, 1500-1650*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.
- Bridenbaugh, Carl. *The Pynchon Papers Vol. I: Letters of John Pynchon, 1654-1700*. Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1982.
- Cave, Alfred A. *The Pequot War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996.
- De Forest, Effingham. *Captain John Underhill: Gentleman, Soldier of Fortune*. New York: Underhill Society of America, 1985.
- Drake, James D. *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999.
- Drake, Samuel G. *The Book of Indians; or, Biography and History of the Indians of North America, From its First Discovery to the Year 1841*. Boston, 1841.

- Fiore, Jordan. *Wrentham 1673-1973: A History*. Town of Wrentham: Thomas Todd Company, 1973.
- Gardiner, Curtiss C. *Lion Gardiner, and his Descendents with Illustrations, 1599-1890*. St Louis, MO: A. Whipple, 1890.
- Greer, Allan, ed. *The Jesuit Relations: Native Missionaries in Seventeenth-Century North America*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Grenier, John. *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Haller, William. *The Puritan Frontier: Town-Planting in New England Colonial Development 1630-1660*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.
- Heidler, David S and Jeanne T. Heidler. *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America: From the Colonial Era to the Civil War*. Westport, CT: The Greenwood Press, 2007.
- Jennings, Francis. *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and The Cant of Conquest*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
- Karr, Ronald Dale, ed. *Indian New England, 1524-1674: A Compendium of Eyewitness Accounts of Native American Life*. Pepperell, MA: Branch Line Press, 1999.
- Kawashima, Yasuhide. *Igniting King Philip's War: The John Sassamon Murder Trial*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
- LaFantasie, Glenn W, ed. *The Correspondence of Roger Williams, Vol. 2 1654-1682*. Rhode Island Historical Society, 1988.
- Leach, Douglas E. *Flintlock & Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War*. Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 2009.
- Lepore, Jill. *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998.
- Lipman, Andrew. "A Meanes to Knitt Them Together': The Exchange of Body Parts in the Pequot War." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. 2008).

- Love Jr., William DeLoss. *The Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1895.
- Malone, Patrick. *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1991.
- Mandell, Daniel. *King Philip's War: Colonial Expansion, Native Resistance, and the End of Indian Sovereignty*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.
- Martin, John Frederick. *Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- Mason, Louis Bond. *The Life and Times of Major John Mason of Connecticut, 1600-1672*. New York: Putnam, 1935.
- Melvoin, Richard. *New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989.
- Oberg, Michael Leroy. *The Head in Edward Nugent's Hand: Roanoke's Forgotten Indians*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
- Orr, Charles, ed. *History of the Pequot War*. Cleveland: The Helman-Taylor Company, 1897.
- Pearce, Roy Harvey. *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Philbrick, Nathaniel. *Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War*. New York: Viking Press, 2006.
- Pulsipher, Jenny Hale. "Massacre at Hurtleberry Hill: Christian Indians and English Authority in Metacom's War." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, Vol. 53, No. 3 (July 1996).
- Pulsipher, Jenny Hale. *Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
- Richter, Daniel K. *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

- Richter, Daniel K. *The Ordeal of the Long-house: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
- Russell, Howard S. *Indian New England Before the Mayflower*. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1980.
- Schultz, Eric B and Michael J. Tougias. *King Philip's War: The History and Legacy of America's Forgotten Conflict*. Woodstock, VT: The Countryman Press, 2000.
- Simmons, William S. *Spirit of the New England Tribes: Indian History and Folklore*. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1986.
- Slotkin, Richard and James K. Folsom, eds. *So Dreadfull a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip's War 1676-1677*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1978.
- Slotkin, Richard. *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973.
- Steele, Ian K. *Warpaths: Invasions of North America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Szasz, Margaret Connell. *Indian Education in the American Colonies, 1607-1783*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1988.
- Van Zandt, Cynthia Jean. *Brothers Among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Vaughan, Alden T. *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965.
- Webb, Stephan Saunders. *1676: The End of American Independence*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995.
- Young, Alexander. *Chronicles of the First Planters of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1623-1636*. Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1846.
- Zelner, Kyle F. *A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and the Militiamen during King Philip's War*. New York: New York University Press, 2009.

ARTICLES

- Abler, Thomas. "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War." *Anthropologica*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1992).
- Anderson, Virginia DeJohn. "King Philip's Herds: Indians, Colonists, and the Problem of Livestock in Early New England." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct., 1994).
- Axtell, James. "The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July, 1972).
- Axtell, James. "The White Indians of Colonial America." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1975).
- Bushnell, David. "The Treatment of the Indians in Plymouth Colony." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1953).
- Cook, Sherburn F. "Interracial Warfare and Population Decline among the New England Indians." *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1973).
- Derounian, Kathryn Zabelle. "Puritan Orthodoxy and the 'Survivor Syndrome' in Mary Rowlandson's Indian Captivity Narrative." *Early American Literature*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 1987).
- Derounian, Kathryn Zabelle. "The Publication, Promotion, and Distribution of Mary Rowlandson's Indian Captivity." *Early American Literature*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1988).
- Donagan, Barbara. "Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War." *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Oct., 1994).
- Donagan, Barbara. "Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England's Military Education before 1642." *Past & Present*, No. 147 (May, 1995).
- Downing, David. "Streams of Scripture Comfort': Mary Rowlandson's Typological Use of the Bible." *Early American Literature*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter, 1980/1981).

- Drake, James D. "Symbol of a Failed Strategy: The Sassamon Trial, Political Culture, and the Outbreak of King Philip's War." *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 19:2 (1995).
- Drake, James. "Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip's War." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Mar., 1997).
- Ferling, John. "The New England Soldier: A Study in Changing Perceptions." *American Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 1981).
- George, Timothy. "War and Peace in the Puritan Tradition." *Church History*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Dec., 1984).
- Greene, David L. "New Light on Mary Rowlandson." *Early American Literature*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1985).
- Hirsch, Adam J. "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England." *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (March, 1988).
- Johnson, Richard R. "The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England." *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Dec., 1977).
- Karr, Ronald Dale. "Why Should You Be So Furious?': The Violence of the Pequot War." *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Dec., 1998).
- Katz, Steven T. "The Pequot War Reconsidered." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (June 1991).
- Kawashima, Yasuhide. "Legal Origins of the Indian Reservations in Colonial Massachusetts." *The American Journal of Legal History*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 1969).
- Leach, Douglas E. "The Military System of Plymouth Colony." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sep., 1951).
- Lee, Wayne E. "Using the Natives Against the Natives: Indigenes as 'Counterinsurgents' in the British Atlantic, 1500-1800." *Defense Studies*, 10:1 (2004).

- Lepore, Jill. "Dead Men Tell No Tales: John Sassamon and the Fatal Consequences of Literacy." *American Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1994).
- Lonkhuyzen, Harold W. Van. "A Reappraisal of the Praying Indians: Acculturation, Conversion, and Identity at Natick, Massachusetts, 1646-1730." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1990).
- Mahon, John K. "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Sep., 1958).
- Malone, Patrick. "Changing Military Technology Among the Indians of Southern New England, 1600-1677." *American Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1973).
- Marshall, Joshua Micah. "A Melancholy People': Anglo-Indian Relations in Early Warwick, Rhode Island, 1642-1675." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Sep., 1995).
- Morrison, Kenneth M. "The Bias of Colonial Law: English Paranoia and the Abenaki Arena of King Philip's War, 1675-1678." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Sep., 1980).
- Nelsen, Anne Kusener. "King Philip's War and the Hubbard-Mather Rivalry." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 1970).
- Peterson, Harold L. "The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620-1690." *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1947).
- Ronda, James P and Jeanne Ronda. "The Death of John Sassamon: An Exploration in Writing New England Indian History." *American Indian Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer, 1974).
- Shy, John W. "A New Look at Colonial Militia." *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Apr. 1963).
- Webb, Stephen Saunders. "Army and Empire: English Garrison Government in Britain and America, 1569 to 1763." *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1977).

PRIMARY SOURCES

Anonymous. *A Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England*. London, 1675.

Anonymous. *A Continuation of the State of New-England; Being a Farther Account of the Indian War*. London, 1676.

Anonymous. *News From New-England*. London, 1676.

Anonymous. *The Exercise of the English, in the Militia of the Kingdome of England*. London, 1642.

Barker, Robert. *Instructions for Musters and Arms and the Use Thereof*. London, 1631.

Barriffe, Lt. William. *Military Discipline or the Young Artillery Man*. London, 1639.

Bouton, Nathaniel, et. al. *Provincial Papers: Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire, Vol. 1*. Concord, NH, 1867.

Bradford, William. *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647*. Edited by Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Knopf Publishers, 1952.

Church, Thomas. *Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which began in the Year 1675*. Boston, 1716.

Cruso, John. *Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie: Or Rules and Directions for the Service of Horse*. Cambridge, 1632.

Drake, Samuel G. *The Old Indian Chronicle; Being a Collection of Exceeding Rare Tracts, Written and Published in the Time of King Philip's War*. Boston, 1836.

Easton, John. "A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. Easton, of Rhode Island, 1675." Edited by Paul Royster. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006.

Gookin, Daniel. *An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England, in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677*. New York: Arno Press, 1972.

Heath, Dwight B. ed. *Mourt's Relation: A Journal of the Pilgrims at Plymouth*. Bedford, MA: Appelwood Press, 1963.

Hexham, Henry. *The Principles of the Art Militarie: Practised in the Warres of the United Netherlands*. 1634.

Hubbard, William. *A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England*. Boston, 1677.

Hubbard, William. *The Present State of New England*. London, 1677.

Leach, Douglas E. ed. *A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip's War: The Second William Harris Letter of August, 1676*. Providence, RI, 1963.

Josselyn, John. *New-Englands Rarities Discovered: In Birds, Beasts, Fishes, Serpents, and Plants of that Country*. London, 1672.

Mason, John. *A Brief History of the Pequot War*. London, 1656.

Mather, Increase. *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England*. Boston, 1676.

Mather, Increase. *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England*. Boston, 1676.

Mather, Increase. *Early History of New England; Being a Relation of Hostile Passages Between the Indians and European Voyagers and First Settlers*. Edited by Samuel G. Drake. Boston, 1864.

Randolph, Edward. *Edward Randolph; Including His Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, with Other Documents Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1676-1703*. Boston: The Prince Society, 1899.

Rawson, Edward. *The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony*. Cambridge, 1672.

Rowlandson, Mary. *The Sovereignty & Goodness of God, Together With the Faithfulness of His Promises Displayed*. Cambridge, 1682.

Rowlandson, Mary. *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, Together with the Faithfulness of His Promises Displayed*. Edited by Neal Salisbury. Boston: Bedford Books, 1997.

Saltonstall, Nathaniel. "A New and Further Narrative of the State of New England, by N.S." In *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699*, Charles H. Lincoln. New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1913.

Saltonstall, Nathaniel. *A Farther Brief and True Narration of the Late Wars Risen in New England, Occasioned by the Quarrel-some Disposition and Perfidious Carriage of the Barbarous and Savage Indian Natives There*. London, 1676.

Saltonstall, Nathaniel. *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New England, being A Continued Account of the Bloody Indian-War, From March till August, 1676*. London, 1676.

Saltonstall, Nathaniel. *A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences That have hap'ned in the Warre Between the English and the Indians in New-England*. London, 1676.

Saltonstall, Nathaniel. *The Present State of New-England with Respect to the Indian War*. London, 1675.

Underhill, John. *Newes from America or A New and Experimental Discoverie of New England*. London, 1638.

Vincent, Philip. *A True Relation of the Late Battell fought in New England, between the English, and the Pequet Salvages*. London, 1638.

Williams, Roger. *A Key into the Language of America: or An help to the Language for the Natives in that part of America, called New England*. Introduction by Howard M Chapin. Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 1997.