Explaining partition: Reconsidering the role of the security dilemma in the Cyprus crisis of 1974

Michael Todd Smith
University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis

Recommended Citation
https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/122

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

BY

MICHAEL TODD SMITH
BA, University of New Hampshire, 2007

THESIS

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in
Political Science

December, 2009
This thesis has been examined and approved.

Thesis Director, Lawrence C. Reardon
Associate Professor of Political Science

Lionel Ingram
Senior Lecturer, Political Science

Stacy VanDeveer
Associate Professor of Political Science

Date: December 10, 2009
DEDICATION

For Era
I would like to acknowledge and give thanks to everyone that helped me along the way. Special thanks are given to Professor Reardon, who was very patient, and to Professor Ingram, who has always reminded me to think of my goals and how to achieve them.
ABSTRACT


By

Michael Todd Smith

University of New Hampshire, December, 2009

In this thesis the proposed link between a security dilemma at the domestic-level of analysis and partition following ethnic conflict is examined in the context of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The original framework of the argument being examined was offered by Chaim Kaufmann and is analyzed here by comparing and contrasting the history of Cyprus with the components of the framework. The thesis suggests that the framework does not adequately explain the partition in the case of Cyprus, as the history of that conflict does not reflect the components observable in the proposed linkage between the security dilemma and partition, nor does the situation fully reflect the traditional notion of a security dilemma.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| DEDICATION | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | iv |
| ABSTRACT | v |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. EXPLAINING PARTITION: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partition in Political Science</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to Explain Partition with Theory and History</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Security Dilemma in Political Science</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking the Security Dilemma to Partition</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing the Link: Methodology</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Organization</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE CASE OF CYPRUS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Background</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining the Dependent Variable</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN CYPRUS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identities</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardened Identities</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of a Security Dilemma</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the development of the modern concept of sovereignty in the 17th century, there have been countless examples of territories, enclosed by political borders, that have seen their shape and size changed and reduced as a result of human factors. Such changes often came at the end of wars, in which the losing side was compelled to surrender “spoils” of sufficient value, so as to have made the winner’s efforts justifiable. At times, these changes came when a newly ascendant authority determined that the lines on the map would be more appropriately drawn in different ways. Other times still, groups of people in a given territory simply agreed that living apart was more amenable than living together.

There are numerous other ways in which geopolitical shifts have come about, of course. What is significant for political scientists today is the ongoing effort to name and classify events and phenomena that result in visible changes of the lines drawn on the maps of the world. Among these phenomena is what political scientists call partition. While political scientists do not yet agree if partition “was done” or “had occurred”, it is mostly agreed that partition “was” on the island of Cyprus in 1974, and in numerous other locations around the world. The question usually submitted is “why?”
By the end of 1974, the island of Cyprus had been split in two: a wide, mostly uninhabitable strip of impassable territory came to divide the northern third of the island from the southern two-thirds. What would lie in between was initially deemed entirely uninhabitable. This condition did not come as a result of a powerful and destructive geophysical phenomenon, but rather the result of political actions. This event, a type of political schism, had been seen in numerous historical conflicts: the creation of the Irish state, the division of India and Pakistan, and the separation of the two Koreas, to name a few. Cyprus was just the latest, and there have been more since. However, it has become one of the most discussed and studied examples, in no small part because of the political environment both on and around the island at the time of the partition.

Why does partition occur? Why was the island of Cyprus partitioned, and what lessons does that outcome hold for those studying partition generally? Numerous theorists have proposed answers to these questions. This project seeks to explore the proposed explanation that the intrastate security dilemma can account for partition in cases where ethnic conflict has preceded the partition itself.

Here partition is to be considered a continuing problem in political science, and the security dilemma, a well-known theory concerning conflict escalation, is treated as a possible cause for partition under certain circumstances. While this project is focused on developing a better understanding through existing theory of whether partition can occur as a result of the security dilemma, and is motivated by a desire to evaluate such theory in the context of a crucial case
study of the partition of Cyprus, we must discuss more fundamental and arguably unresolved questions about the nature of both partition and the security dilemma at the same time.

With regard to partition, there is little agreement among the authors that write about partition generally with regard to the basic definition of partition, how it arises or how it is imposed. Indeed, there is little discussion in the literature available today that directly approaches defining partition and the reasons for its occurrence: analysis often morphs quickly into arguments on the worth of partition as ethnic conflict management policy for the various powers in a position to impose it on others, or for those very few states or communities that are said to have chosen to impose it on themselves, such as Sweden and Norway in the early 20th century.¹

With regard to the security dilemma as a potential cause of partition, there is much discussion about the security dilemma’s use in explaining political events at various levels of analysis, and much disagreement on the matter. What was proposed to explain events in the anarchic international community has more recently been applied to ethnic conflicts; the appropriateness of this application is far from settled in the fields of political science and international relations. Additionally, the issue of identity is one that informs the security dilemma at the domestic-level of analysis; something entirely absent from the original “dilemma.”

Strong arguments have been made as to the proper level of analysis from which to consider partition as a problem, whether at the international level of

analysis or the domestic level of analysis. However, in order to test the viability of the security dilemma as a cause of partition during or following ethnic conflict, partition must be treated, at least nominally, as a domestic-level problem. This will be tested directly through a previously-enunciated notion that links the security dilemma with partition. Though proffered by various scholars, this concept is reviewed here through the work of Chaim Kaufmann. The theory finds that the causes of past partitions which are rooted in an ethnic conflict are the result of acute intrastate security dilemmas. While the work of Kaufmann is primarily prescriptive, directed at supporting the use of partition in the present and the future to resolve ethnic conflicts, Kaufmann's own conception of partition is based on perceptions of those partitions that have occurred in the past, and this includes the partition of Cyprus. Essentially, this makes Kaufmann's theories concerning the origins of partition testable. This particular understanding of partition is based on a domestic determinants level of analysis, at which an intrastate security dilemma naturally be pegged, but through its testing one can observe whether or not such determinants are sufficient or even appropriate to explain partition in the case in question.

In this paper we take the position that these perceptions of the security dilemma and its explanatory value with regard to partition are not entirely accurate when applied to the critical case study used here, the case of the partition of Cyprus in the summer and autumn of 1974. For the purposes of this study, then, the dependent variable in the testing that will be done is partition itself, though qualified by intending for the explanation to only cover those
partitions during or following ethnic conflict; the proposed reasons for partition, the security dilemma, is what is to be tested directly. Cyprus will stand in as the case in which this testing will be conducted in a thorough and critical way.

The scope of this paper’s study, therefore, is to remain limited, focusing primarily on a crucial case study that is meant to both test a preexisting theory of partition, and to explore the dynamics of the security dilemma and partition generally. In the rest of this chapter, the development of both partition and the security dilemma as concepts in political science will be briefly traced, which will be followed by the status of the concepts in the literature today. The purpose of this is to provide perspective; the epistemological problems of these two concepts need to be understood, so that the conclusions of this study can be held in appropriate perspective. Also of significance is a discussion of the shift in use of the security dilemma as an international-level phenomenon to one also located at the domestic-determinants level. The three pieces by Chaim Kaufmann that will provide the general structure of the argument that is to be tested will be described, as will the background for his take on the independent variables in cases of partition that follows ethnic conflict. The methodology for this study will be described, as will the ways in which the testing is to be conducted on the selected case. In Chapter 2, the dependent variable will be measured and described, with an emphasis on the history of domestic politics in Cyprus leading up to its partition. In Chapters 3 and 4, the independent variables described by Kaufmann in his work will be defined for this project and then described in the case of Cyprus. While Kaufmann refers directly to the intrastate
security dilemma, he identifies components of such, including components relating to identity, and each component must be matched to the Cyprus case in order for proper testing. The argument that links the independent variables offered by Kaufmann to partition will be evaluated. In addition to shedding more light on the dynamics of partition, this exercise will hopefully provide direction for future inquiry into the nature of partition and theories of partition rooted in the domestic determinants level of analysis.

A review of the relevant literature concerning both partition and the security dilemma is necessary to understand the complexities involved in the subjects of this project. The two concepts are treated in this chapter as separate and distinct; the potential causal links between them are to be evaluated in later chapters. The development of partition as a concept is first addressed, followed by the development of the security dilemma.

**Partition in Political Science**

In order to approach the question of why political partition occurs, one must first attempt to develop a solid conception of what partition is, both throughout history and today. Based on the great many definitions available and widespread disagreement between scholars on the subject, this is not a straightforward task. Partition is often thought of as simply the splitting of a nation in two; as we shall see, its classification is not nearly so simple. Additionally, the literature on partition is both analytical and prescriptive at times, and oftentimes authors write from both perspectives. Kaufmann is among such authors, and his place in the literature, informed by a strong realist background,
comes out of the oftentimes opposing perspectives that make up the study of partition. Kaufmann’s definition of partition is just one among many, though it is reflective of themes that have built throughout the past half-century of the study of the concept. As the study of partition has moved from defining the concept to asking why it arises, the discussion of this development is crucial in understanding the nature of partition in this study (with regard to Kaufmann) and generally. Kaufmann’s prescriptive arguments are indeed based on foundational arguments that are not settled issues in the field of political science. For a fair evaluation of Kaufmann’s take on partition, the development of the concept as an issue in political science and its state in the literature is expressed in succinct terms here.

The general concept of partition is not new and it can be said to predate the notion of Westphalian sovereignty. Originally a matter of “estate law” in feudal times,² Brendan O’Leary points to the division of Poland in the late 18th century as the basis for the modern, “pejorative associations of partition,”³ and for a transition to something that was, as it related to sovereign states, outside generally acceptable norms. Until the early 20th century, partition continued to be seen as a nasty procedure of statecraft “for the benefit of empire, to strengthen rule or simplify administration.”⁴ Since then, it has been referred to as a method

---

³ Ibid., 888
by which colonial powers have extricated themselves from their colonies and have left a basis for administration along ethnic lines.

In the introduction to his book *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition*, Robert K. Schaeffer describes the increased occurrence or practice of what he labels as partition in the international community after the Second World War, and notes that partition would essentially come and go in contemporaneous groupings, with three observable periods in which partition occurred. The first period came immediately after World War II; the second with the division of Pakistan and Cyprus, and the third with Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia. These periods were well defined by the interludes between them, during which few partitions were observed.

Perhaps as a result of this perceived increase in the occurrence of partition, in the last quarter of the 20th century partition began to be promoted by some international relations theorists as the most effective (or “best”) way to resolve long-standing and bitter ethnic conflicts. John J. Mearsheimer was the co-author of two prominent articles in the 1990’s which prescribed the use of partition in the Balkan conflicts, and preceded a number of authors that would make arguments that ethnic conflicts often create sufficient conditions for partition. On the other hand, many others came to reject the utility of partition as

---


a tool of statecraft\textsuperscript{7}; others still see partition as a political phenomenon akin to any other, like war.\textsuperscript{8} Despite these various contexts in which partition has been reportedly observed and referred to, the precise definition of what constitutes a partition is elusive.

Partition is \textit{generally} defined in the literature as akin to what O'Leary describes as "a previously unified territorial entity... divided into two or more parts, which may be marked with borders"\textsuperscript{9} – or, as stated above, splitting a nation in two. Beyond this very broad definition there are a variety of more narrow ones (and, surprisingly, a few broader ones), and this results in a considerable variety of historical instances which may be described (or coded) as a partition, and those that may not be. As a result, some suggest that "there is no generalizable wisdom derived from the literature on partition"\textsuperscript{10} at all. Despite the long history of partition as a concept, the authors included in what is referred to by Sambanis as the "first wave"\textsuperscript{11} of partition theory scholars began writing only in the second-half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century; indeed, we are only up to the second wave of scholars on the subject. The first wave generally concerned itself with


\textsuperscript{8} See, for example, Brendan O'Leary, 886-908

\textsuperscript{9} Brendan O'Leary, 887

\textsuperscript{10} Dan Lindley, 224-241 See also Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, "Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions," \textit{American Political Science Review} 101:4 (2007): 678

\textsuperscript{11} Nicholas Sambanis, 437. Sambanis identifies a number of first wave scholars, including Donald Horowitz, Robert A. Dahl, and Samuel P. Huntington.
the proper definition of partition, while the second wave has been more vocal on the question of "why" partition occurs, as well as some authors' efforts of prescription for present-day conflicts.

Of the scholars of the "first wave", the work of Stanley Waterman, a political geographer, and Donald L. Horowitz, whose often-cited, lengthy volume *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* addresses widespread issues of ethnic conflict and how to manage the related violence, seem especially relevant because of the contrast between them. In four pages, Horowitz takes on partition as a possible strategy for ethnic conflict management, and very simply defines partition as "separating the antagonists," in an ethnic conflict, especially where they are territorially concentrated. On the other hand, Waterman defines partition as "a process resulting from a situation in which two or more groups differentiated on the basis of ethnicity, nationality or ideology find conditions more comfortable to govern separate, more uniform areas than to live in partnership with one another."

One definition explains partition as a method; the other explains partition as a phenomenon. One definition explains partition as being imposed by a third party; the other explains partition as a condition reached by the parties in conflict. These are two continually reinforced dichotomies that exist in the writings of

---


13 Ibid., 588-589

ethnic conflict theorists and political geographers considering partition during the first wave.

More recent, second wave scholars have not been any more consistent with each other in their definitions, however. O'Leary, a prolific writer on the subject of ethnic conflict more concerned with defining partition as a phenomenon than worrying about its efficacy, emphasizes the need to distinguish partition from secession. He therefore suggests the more specific definition of "a fresh border cut through at least one community's national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or authorities."  

This definition clearly describes partition as a phenomenon. He goes on to make clear distinctions between partition and the act of secession.

Not everyone distinguishes partition and secession, however. When defining partition, Jaroslav Tir specifically includes the motivation for partition in his definition, with secessionist-based divisions as a type of partition. He defines partition as "an internally motivated (i.e. secessionist) division of a country's homeland... territory that results in the creation of at least one new independent secessionist state."

Most relevant to this paper, Chaim Kaufmann in turn defines partition in the context of those imposing it. He states that partition is a "(separation) jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides

---

15 Brendan O'Leary, 888


17 Though, as will be demonstrated, Kaufmann's definition does not imply that the causes of partition rest with the powers imposing it.
(and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party.”  

Kaufmann, like O’Leary, goes on to distinguish this from secession, though his definition for that phenomenon differs from both O’Leary and Tir.

Chapman and Roeder observe that while there is little agreement over a precise definition of partition, there has been some general consistency between those they label as “comparativists” and those they label as “international-relations scholars.” The comparativists have tended to clearly distinguish partition from other forms of post-conflict institutional arrangements (such as de facto separations or autonomy), whereas the international-relations scholars tend to lump these concepts together (which Chapman and Roeder allege “conflates important distinctions among different domestic political institutions that shape post-settlement political processes inside states”). In the above examples, the political geographers (Waterman and O’Leary) would constitute the comparativists, while Horowitz and Kaufmann are clearly among the international-relations scholars. Chapman and Roeder don’t clearly observe consistent distinctions between partition and secession in their categorization, however; one can observe that while the unlike pairing of Kaufmann and O’Leary distinguish secession from partition in their respective theories, other unlike pairings do not.

---


19 Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 678

20 Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 678
Why is the discussion of these details important? While Kaufmann and Mearsheimer are firmly rooted in a traditional realist perspective concerning the discussion surrounding partition, typology affects dramatically the study of such a concept which has affected millions of people over the course of the past few centuries. On this point, there is valuable insight provided by the Russian scholar Valery Tishkov's demonstrated struggle to properly define and classify "ethnic conflict." While his argument is arguably constructivist in nature, it is instructive because of the fragmented nature of partition and how the way in which it is studied may impact the outcomes that are reached by scholars determining its status in the field. One might wonder, and justifiably so, how constructivist arguments can be relevant to realist interpreters of the concept of partition, a group Kaufmann and his predecessors easily belong to. Realist arguments like those of Kaufmann must still depend on the consistency of the definitions of concepts being worked with, in order to evaluate the power relationships between two or more actors. Prescribing something that is not yet consistently defined can conceivably lead to major issues in the study of the subject. Aspects of this problem may be observable when studying partition.

**Efforts to Explain Partition with Theory and History**

The scholarly work of Mearsheimer and Kaufmann, and of those reacting to them, has nevertheless begun to formulate some general answers to the "why" of partition. These authors try to correlate the presence of certain types of ethnic conflict in countries which have undergone (successful) partitions in the past.

---

They then go on to argue this as a basis for the use of partition in the future. Many (including this author) take issue with the specific components of their theories, yet the scholarship on partition has proceeded from first wave, when the focus was largely on definition, to the second wave, where definition is accompanied by the “why” and the “how effective?” This being said, there is little in the literature of both the first and second wave to suggest that much has been “settled” on the topic of partition.

For now this author hesitates to provide a further litany of partition definitions; the disagreements as to what might constitute a precise definition will continue. However, it is very useful to look at the practical side of partition theory. What disputes or conflicts can be considered to have resulted in, or to have been ended by, partition? As with answering the question “what is partition?” it of course depends on who you ask, and the edges of the inclusive group of “events that were partitions” vary accordingly. Those who define partition narrowly might include states that O’Leary describes as having undergone partition based on his “fresh cut” definition: Ireland and Hungary in 1920, India in 1947, Palestine in 1937 and 1948, and Cyprus in 1974. These are commonly discussed cases in the literature; Ireland, India and Palestine are almost uniformly considered the definitive examples of partition by those engaging in a discussion of the various cases.

Those who define partition broadly, as Nicholas Sambanis decides to do in his heavily quantitative study of partition from 2000, might include many, many

---

22 Brendan O'Leary, 889-890
others. When Sambanis states that partition is simply “a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes,” he includes examples like Azerbaijan in 1996, China-Taiwan in 1947, Georgia twice in the 1990’s, the former Yugoslavia multiple times, and even Cyprus in 1963 (when there was a limited degree of ethnic “unmixing” as a result of Turkish-Cypriot formation of enclaves in major cities and towns).\footnote{Nicholas Sambanis, 447-449} Indeed, this definition would permit many of the states involved in many of the conflicts of the past century to be labeled as having undergone partition.

\textbf{The Purpose of the Study}

We do not aspire to resolve all of the typological difficulties that partition presents and indeed, exposure to where partition is said to have occurred in the past is relevant here merely to show the extent to which it is a problem in international politics. This discussion is also intended to provide perspective however, and to draw out some analytical utility from what has been written on partition before. The range of political phenomena that is encompassed by the term “partition” may be greater than or less than what is covered by those definitions that are discussed in some quick detail here. We can see that many nations over the past century alone have been split in two or more pieces; generalizing about those splits and why they happen is the difficult part.

For this paper, however, it is useful to take one part of the ongoing argument, and start looking for answers. Over the past two decades, a growing number of neorealist theorists have begun to apply a political theory known as the security dilemma to conflicts seen to be “intrastate” as opposed to
"interstate." Among those authors is Chaim Kaufmann, who attributes partitions in various places over the past century as having been necessitated by domestic-level security dilemmas. Included among the cases from which Kaufmann draws his conclusions is the partition of Cyprus in 1974. Whether his understanding of partition and the security dilemma, and indeed a general understanding of these political concepts, can be correlated with the situation in Cyprus is the primary question to be answered here. We take Chaim Kaufmann's writings, and, based off of his suggested typology of partition and the dynamics of the security dilemma as he understands them, apply it to the case of Cyprus to see if such ideas holds up for the specific case of Cyprus. As previously stated, partition in political science, including the basic definition and classification of it, is not a settled topic in the literature. While Kaufmann's prescriptive arguments will not be explored here, there is a great deal which must be observed about partition and how effectively, or not, the domestic-level application of the security dilemma can explain the dynamics of it. In order to proceed to testing Kaufmann's ideas, we must first understand the background of the security dilemma, and how it came to be used to address domestic-level conflict.

The Security Dilemma in Political Science

Kaufmann's theories were chosen in lieu of many others that exist because he contends that the basis for partition having been imposed on ethnic communities in conflicts in the past lies in certain characteristics of those ethnic conflicts, most notably the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a well-known and well-studied concept that comes out of traditionally realist ways of
looking at international relationships. Before describing the rest of Kaufmann’s work, some background on realism and the security dilemma is appropriate.

Realism is a term often used in international relations and political science, and it generally refers to a school of thought concerning the way in which states behave in relation to one another. The basic tenets of realism are that states are primarily self-interested actors and will act to pursue their interests in an anarchic international arena. This is best done by maximizing the power of the state in relation to all of the other states, and preserving any advantages that the state may have. Political scientists often look back to Kenneth Waltz as the one who first clearly articulated the role of realism in international relations, and since the publication of his *Man, the State and War*, many others have refined the logic of realism with regard to problems that appear in the international community.

The security dilemma can be seen as one of the early efforts to refine the typically realist view of international relations. It has been traditionally viewed as an international relations theory that can be used to understand the “ramping up” of conflict between two states, most notably with regards to arms races. States that exist in an anarchic situation will naturally tend to try to increase their own security. While the concept dates back to the 1950’s in separate works by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield^24^, Robert Jervis’ work in a 1976 book and the article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” in 1978 is often pointed to as the foundation of security dilemma theory. According to Jervis, the security dilemma

is based on the notion that "an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others" and that, as a result, the others will attempt to compensate, leading to the original state's perceived reduction in security and so on. While Jervis himself goes on to apply his theory's logic on an individual level (police officer and suspect in a dark alley), the security dilemma was usually considered to be most relevant with interstate conflicts.

However, a number of theorists since the Cold War have taken the security dilemma logic and attempted to apply it to ethnic conflict. In his article "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?" Paul Roe provides a sweeping summary of the transition of the concept of security dilemma from one focused on relations in the international community to those at a domestic level between ethnicities in conflict. Roe points out the scholars who have led this transition and the ways in which structures at the international level can be approximated by domestic-level structures.

The scholars Roe discusses include Posen, Mearscheimer and (Stuart) Kaufman, among others. Posen, for one, asserts that the security dilemma has "considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the wreckage of empires." As summarized by Melander, Posen "applied the logic of the security dilemma to ethnic conflict, and argued that geographically induced first-strike advantages

---


26 Ibid., 189

help explain the outbreak of ethnic warfare... (and that) first-strike advantages are greater if ethnic groups in conflict live interspersed with each other."28 Yet, in order for this to be the case, numerous domestic-level structures must be shown to be similar to those at the international level. Roe states that the logic of the security dilemma is said to remain constant in intrastate conflicts when “conditions (within states) are similar to those between states in the international system,”29 and Stuart Kaufman, as quoted in Roe, points out that while “strictly speaking the security dilemma should not apply to contending ethnic groups within a state... anarchy can be approximated... if ethnic groups effectively challenge the government’s legitimacy and control over its territory.”30 Anarchy, then, and the security threat of possible first-strike capability that comes with the arrangement of groups under anarchy, need to be structures that can be approximated within the domestic-level situation characterized by ethnic conflict. There are other structures, however. Kaufman is also quoted in Roe as saying that “the neorealist concept of a security dilemma cannot be mechanically applied to ethnic conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not enough to create a security dilemma between communities which may have been at peace for decades. An ethnic security dilemma requires reciprocal fears of group extinction.”31

29 Paul Roe, 188
31 Stuart Kaufman as quoted in Paul Roe, 192
According to Roe, Stuart Kaufman and others, an additional, necessary component of the intrastate security dilemma is the threat to the continuing existence of *identity*, especially ethnic identity. For Roe, this presents what is better termed as an "(inter-) societal security dilemma,"\(^{32}\) which essentially means that the intrastate security dilemma is one between ethnicities which hold on to distinct cultural identities, with the fear that these identities are at risk from the strengthening of the other cultural identities. In this way, the notion of straightforward "increases in security by means of an increase in armaments by a state in the anarchical system of world politics leading to a security dilemma" is replaced by a variety of ways to increase or decrease the security of identity-based groups in a system merely resembling anarchy. Roe points out that in this system, "one society (minority group) seeking only to defend its identity within the state may be perceived by another (majority group/state) as harbouring secessionist goals."\(^{33}\)

The finer points of the argument that identity is a crucial part of any intrastate security dilemma have yet to be agreed upon. However, it is an intriguing notion, especially when considering specific cases, such as that of Cyprus. Roe's above quotation would, from a bird's-eye view, seem to describe the character of some ethnic conflicts. Roe is not alone in his assertion that identity plays a role in the intrastate security dilemma, either. This notion is, in fact, one of the major tenets of Chaim Kaufmann's writings on how ethnic conflicts come to an end. As we will see, Kaufmann asserts the same notion and

\(^{32}\) Paul Roe, 194

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 199
applies traditional security dilemma logic to identity-based ethnic conflict and the events leading up to past partitions, including in the case of Cyprus. Kaufmann links the intrastate security dilemma definitively with partition, and this is why his theories are crucial in the case study that will be described here.

**Linking the Security Dilemma to Partition**

Chaim Kaufmann is a prolific scholar on issues of ethnic conflict and their resolution, writing from a distinctly realist perspective and often advocating methods of intervention as internationalist policy for domestic disputes. In three highly relevant articles one can see the basis for Kaufmann’s conviction that partition ought to be employed to resolve ethnic conflict; this conviction is based on Kaufmann’s understanding of why past partitions, and the various other possible conclusions of ethnic conflicts, have occurred. It is this understanding that we look at here, and then proceed to test in the case-study portion of this paper. Kaufmann was chosen among a number of scholars which express the general notion that intrastate security dilemmas lead to partitions in cases of ethnic conflict; this is because of the clarity with which Kaufmann has expressed this notion. According to Kaufmann, two ethnicities in conflict in a state must be separated in order for the conflict to end; therefore, in lieu of the destruction of one of the communities, partition must occur. The three most relevant articles are summarized below, and make his reasoning clear.

Kaufmann’s 1996 article, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” laid the groundwork for later articles which more directly addressed partition, but the basic assumptions that Kaufmann lays out in the article are
crucial for understanding his perspectives on partition. This early article of Kaufmann’s lays out the ways in which he believes ethnic wars come to an end.

According to Kaufmann, ethnic wars can be distinguished from other, ideological conflicts due to a single factor: the “flexibility of individual loyalties.” Inflexible identities are characteristic of ethnic conflict. Loyalties in ethnic conflicts are easier to evaluate, says Kaufmann, as they are consistently tied to one’s ethnic identity. Kaufmann assumes that ethnic identities are “fixed by birth,” though he acknowledges that others would not agree with his characterization of ethnicity. Ethnic identities are the “hardest,” and therefore most inflexible, because of their dependence on many things tied to identity generally, such as “language, culture, and religion... and parentage.” A central assumption of his is that a conflict between two or more ethnically-based communities generally has the effect of hardening the ethnic identities of those involved along ethnic lines, and creates a security dilemma that is heightened severely when those communities’ populations are heavily intermixed. Because of the logic of the security dilemma, Kaufmann argues that any conflict between ethnicities will not end until the security dilemma ends; Kaufmann believes this can only occur by “physical separation of the rival groups.”


35 Ibid., 140

36 Ibid., 141

37 Essentially, when communities are “mobilized for violence.” Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 158

38 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 139
acknowledges in his early article that partition can occur without ethnic separation, but that this merely increases conflict and is not logically based.

The second article of Kaufmann is especially relevant as it more directly approaches the issue of partition. In his piece, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” Kaufmann goes further in detailing the circumstances in which partition may arise. He claims that due to the security dilemma in ethnic wars, warring communities will always be separated before the conflict ends.39 Because of this, partition becomes one of just a few possible outcomes, all of which incorporate separation. It is here that Kaufmann defines partition in his own terms,40 from the perspective of those that impose it. This definition, however, is based on Kaufmann’s notion that the situation “on-the-ground” in an ethnic civil war compels the “responsible powers” to impose partition. This crucial point is one which will be thoroughly examined in the case study. Based on his definition, Kaufmann lists 10 partitions that have occurred during the twentieth-century, all of which he says have led to the formation of new states.41 Among them are the relatively peaceful examples


40 While stated above, to remind the reader Kaufmann’s definition is “separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party” from Chaim Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” 125

41 Though, as we will see, not all of them are internationally recognized; the partition of Cyprus resulted in the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, which is officially considered illegitimate by all other states, with the exception of Turkey.
occurring in Norway (1905), Singapore (1965) and Slovakia (1993), as well as the more violent examples of Ireland (1921), India (1947) and Cyprus (1974).

A simple, early criticism of Kaufmann’s particular definition of partition is that it does not seem to lead to a more thorough typology than a distinction between those partitions that are violent and those that are not violent, and partition’s distinction from secession. Kaufmann distinguishes partition from secession by defining the latter as a “new (state) created by the unilateral action of a rebellious ethnic group.”42 Essentially, if both parties in a conflict agree to the separation, it is partition (hence the peaceful partitions); if a separation is imposed on two parties by an outside party, it is partition (hence the violent partitions). However if one party successfully separates from the original, it is not partition at all, but rather secession. This can become confusing.

His article’s primary focus, though, is on the favorability of partition in various situations; it is not a work like that of O’Leary, who is concentrated on defining and classifying it. After briefly evaluating four partitions (Ireland, India, Palestine and Cyprus) on the basis of their appropriateness given the circumstances, Kaufmann concludes by offering policy recommendations to those considering ethnic conflict management techniques.

The third of Kaufmann’s works that is relevant here is his own evaluation of the partition of Cyprus. While it will be more useful in the portion of this paper that discusses the case study of Cyprus, there is one observation that will be made about it here: while the article never restates his earlier definition of

partition, its discussion of partition does not remain entirely consistent with that earlier definition. Kaufmann states prior to discussing the 1974 partition that the conflict in Cyprus in 1963-1964 resulted in its first partition when many Turkish-Cypriots formed enclaves scattered throughout the island. These enclaves were not linked with each other, nor were they concentrated in one particular section of the island. Indeed, there remained many mixed towns and most of the cities continued to have neighborhoods made up of both communities. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots (which will be defined as our ethnic communities in the case study) certainly did not agree to this “partition,” and Kaufmann even argues that the Greek-Cypriots were very much against the formation of the enclaves – a basis for the security dilemma which would, theoretically, develop. However, this “partition” was not imposed by foreign powers or a third party either – in fact, if there was a time at which foreign powers had the least to do with the island, it was during this first post-independence island-wide conflict. In the context of those that impose partition, the events of 1963-1964 would seem not to reflect partition; if anything they might be seen as a form of secession under Kaufmann’s definition. The word partition is used too freely in this instance.

From the content of these articles we can clearly identify why, from Kaufmann’s perspective, partitions in the past occurred. The purpose of this paper is to test this perspective, and as a result of the testing, challenge it. Kaufmann’s explanation for why states in ethnic civil war are partitioned explains that “once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot end until the
populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions."\(^{43}\) In his theory, "disputes between communities which see themselves as having distinct heritages over the power relationship between the communities"\(^{44}\) results in a security dilemma, which cannot be remedied by anything other than separation due to the hardening of ethnic identities. According to Kaufmann, "ethnic war causes ethnic unmixing"\(^{45}\) and while the formal partition may require the intervention of an outside entity to enact the partition, the primary causes for that partition lay in the security dilemma posed by the ethnic mobilization. Therefore, the more formal hypothesis would be: If there is an intrastate security dilemma (characterized by hardened ethnic identities and mobilization), then this leads to partition. This is the hypothesis that is to be tested here using the critical case study of Cyprus. The independent variable offered is that which simply summarizes the variables which Kaufmann expressed in the three articles as leading to partition, described most clearly in his second article. While the "primary" independent variable is the security dilemma, discussion of this from the perspective of Kaufmann must include the terms "hardened ethnic identities" and "mobilization", which he utilizes to describe his theories. This being said, these terms are not defined in any great detail in the three articles mentioned, though this conveniently allows this author flexibility in evaluating the framework offered by Kaufmann, and the case in question.

\(^{43}\) Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," 441

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 436

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 441
Testing the Link: Methodology

In order to test Kaufmann, the use of a crucial case study will allow the reader to understand the details of a particular partition following an ethnic conflict and the dynamics which cannot be understood from the abstract. To that end, we have selected the partition of Cyprus as the case study for this paper. The selection of Cyprus is not random. The author has identified potential inconsistencies with Kaufmann's theories and has chosen the Cyprus case upon reading those theories; the references made with regards to Cyprus throughout Kaufmann and others' works have brought up many potential ways in which to examine both the problem of partition and how the security dilemma is used to address it, and the partition of that little Mediterranean island which for many decades has been the headache of countless ambassadors and negotiators.

Due to the selection of a single case study, however, the results of this paper are to be viewed as limited in terms of their overall generalizability. This is a paper that looks at partition and the appropriateness of the security dilemma as a cause of partition, but is fundamentally about demonstrating that a certain explanation for partition may not be appropriate in the case of Cyprus. This author believes strongly that each individual case of partition in the past must be analyzed from a historical perspective to see if the same lessons learned here can be applied to those cases. This being said, here we test Kaufmann's theory on the Cyprus situation, point out discrepancies that are observed, and determine whether the tested theory holds up in light of available historical information.
With regards to the partition of Cyprus, the hypothesis that we are testing can be recast to suggest that partition resulted from a state of mobilization and hardened ethnic identity among both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to the point where no political conciliation was likely to occur, and an escalation of the conflict between them was based on the standard logic of the security dilemma. Both the characteristics of the identity problem and the escalation caused by security dilemma logic must be present in order for the hypothesis to hold some value in this case. As Kaufmann’s theory goes, while what literally imposed the partition was the invasion of the Turkish military, the underlying cause of the partition was the degree of polarization within the country between two communities (hardened ethnic identities) and the impossibility of a change in the situation without separation, or the complete destruction of one of the communities (characteristic of the security dilemma). It is the details of this situation that will be used to test the hypothesis.

We must make one additional note before continuing. The conflict that has occurred on Cyprus in active and passive forms for the better part of 55 years is of a character which has resulted in sensitivities surrounding the way it is described. While it is important to try to remain as neutral as possible in description, and therefore to acknowledge these sensitivities, this author also will attempt to make his writing as understandable as possible in relation to the general theory being considered. Therefore, the terms “ethnic conflict” and “intercommunal conflict” will be used interchangeably to reflect the use of the first term by Kaufmann, and the use of the second as the tacitly agreed-upon term.
used by Cyprus scholars. This brings up a question about the distinction between “ethnicity” and “community”. For our purposes, we make a sincere effort to refer to “Greek Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriots” as those native to the island of Cyprus that consider themselves to be culturally Greek or culturally Turkish, respectively. The two groups are the communities in conflict; the question of the ethnicity of the participants will not be answered here. Here we also attempt to clearly distinguish between entities from the nations of Greece and Turkey and their culturally linked counterparts on the island of Cyprus by including the “Cypriot” identifier after a particular community. Disagreement over the proper terms to describe the communities continues today, nearly 35 years following the partition; this author makes no claims to resolving them.

**Study Organization**

The hypothesis being tested is rooted in domestic determinants as the level of analysis from which the cause of the partition of Cyprus can be observed, as the proposed cause is an intrastate security dilemma. To that end, the measurement of the independent variables must be in some way focused primarily on the domestic situation in Cyprus being the core cause of the second Turkish invasion and the resulting partition. The measurement of the dependent and independent variables are given in abstract and, for the dependent variable, case-specific terms below. In many ways, the choice of Kaufmann’s framework presents considerable analytical utility, as this framework is quite loose and not strictly defined in its original expression in his articles. This clearly presents other potential problems, but for the purposes of this explorative study, it allows this
writer to cover considerable ground without being restricted to the confines of narrow definitions.

In abstract terms, the dependent variable would be “partition” as defined by Chaim Kaufmann. This definition, as mentioned earlier and repeated here for emphasis, is: “a (separation) jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party.” This definition is in some ways convenient as the imposition of partition by a third party is encompassed by the definition, and does not leave the imposition of partition to an intervening variable. Additionally, the lessons of the first chapter and the difficulty in defining partition at all are kept in mind as well. Kaufmann’s definition is but one of many available. While most of the reviewed theorists working with partition agree that Cyprus in 1974 was an identifiable case of partition, not all hold the same viewpoint. However, we keep with Kaufmann’s definition for the purposes of this paper and, using that definition, define partition in the Cyprus case.

The independent variable in abstract terms would be the “presence of an intrastate security dilemma, characterized by the presence of mobilized ethnic groups with hardened ethnic identities.” First, ethnic groups will be measured by commonality of culture and religion. Mobilization implies the willingness and preparedness to use organized military or otherwise violent force against another community. Hardened ethnic identities are defined as they are by Chaim Kaufmann. Ethnic identities are “fixed by birth” and “are hardest, since they
depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change. The degree of polarization between the two communities indicates how hardened ethnic identities are. Finally, the intrastate security dilemma is evaluated in terms of the entire dynamic between the two ethnic communities in conflict. It should be mentioned that the usage of "intrastate" before security dilemma is intended to distinguish the security dilemma Kaufmann describes from the sort that might exist between powers on the systemic level. It has become common practice to use "intrastate" in domestic cases; however, Kaufmann simply refers to a "security dilemma." Additionally, it can be observed that the definitions of Kaufmann’s variables are somewhat vague; precise measurement is lacking in the original articles, and therefore here we will attempt to approximate historical observation to the above variables. As the reader will see, even at a more abstract level, many potential issues with the variables become clear.

To examine the Cyprus problem and the events of 1974 in the context of Chaim Kaufmann's theories on ethnic conflict and partition, one must first establish that the abstract independent variable in Kaufmann’s theories corresponds to the Cyprus situation sufficiently to make the comparison between abstract theory and reality. To do this, the abstract independent variable will be broken down into three separate components based on Kaufmann’s criteria. These components are akin to "preexisting conditions," characteristics allowing a

---

46 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 437

47 For a clear breakdown of the components, please see the section in the appendix entitled, “Security Dilemma Tables”
security dilemma to develop in a domestic situation. Each of these components will be evaluated in the context of the situation on Cyprus in 1974 by asking the following questions. The questions are: 1) Is the population composed of ethnic groups with distinct ethnic identities? 2) Are these identities “hardened”, as determined by the degree of polarization between the groups? 3) Is there mobilization of these groups? Once these questions are answered, one must then consider whether an intrastate security dilemma existed.

For the testing portion of this paper, a crucial case study of the situation in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 is utilized to see if the hypothesized theory, based on the theories of Chaim Kaufmann concerning the security dilemma and partition, is sufficient, or if the hypothesized independent variable cannot be linked sufficiently to the given dependent variable. As described above, the situation in Cyprus occurred as the result of many factors; it is the suggestion of the security dilemma and related primary influences as the root cause of the partition that this case study endeavors to explore.
CHAPTER II

THE CASE OF CYPRUS

Historical Background

Before entering into a discussion regarding the nature and measurement of the dependent variable in the case, a brief overview of the situation on Cyprus leading up to the 1974 partition is useful and instructive. Cyprus has a long history, and there have been a multitude of influences on the population which became known as the Cypriots. These influences have more recently been consolidated into two primary “Cypriot” identities – the following touches just lightly the historical ramifications of this.

While there is strong evidence of numerous Neolithic settlements having existed on the island, Cyprus has since ancient times been inhabited by a population that culturally and religiously self-identified as Greek. This identification survived despite the fact that the early Cypriots were repeatedly conquered by competing civilizations from the Classical through the medieval periods. In the 16th century it was occupied by the Ottoman Empire, the original source of much of the ancestry of Turkish Cypriot population. As in many other places, the Ottomans ruled the island using the millet system, allowing self-rule within the Greek Orthodox community, so long as taxes were promptly paid.¹ The relationship between the Ottomans and the Greek population of Cyprus has

been variously described as good to exploitative on the part of the Ottomans; aside from a series of public executions on the island at the time of the Greek War of Independence, there is little evidence of violence between the communities during the occupation, especially since the Greek Cypriot community was considerably larger than the Ottoman one, which "drifted to the island"\textsuperscript{2} during this period.

The Ottomans retained control of the island until the United Kingdom leased the island in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century in return for providing assistance with Turkish struggles with the Russian Empire. The British later declared it a crown colony following the Ottoman alliance with Germany during World War I and its subsequent downfall. British control came at a time when there was increasing Greek nationalism among the Greek Cypriots. While the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had lived relatively harmoniously alongside each other as previously mentioned (especially in contrast with other areas of the world in which culturally Greek and culturally Turkish peoples coexisted), the growth of Greek nationalism led to intercommunal suspicions, the teaching of Greek and Turkish nationalist perspectives of historical tensions between the communities, and increasing political distrust. Ultimately, nationalism led to the development of the "enosis" movement on the island – an active push for unification with Greece.\textsuperscript{3} This movement intensified in the years following the Second World War, during which many Greek Cypriots volunteered for the Allies, and

\textsuperscript{2} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{The Mediterranean Feud}, 92

\textsuperscript{3} Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," \textit{Adelphi Papers} 234 (Winter 1988/9): 3
subsequently developed an expectation of some degree of independence in return.\textsuperscript{4}

The enosis movement among the Greek Cypriots existed in a relatively civil manner until the 1950’s. Archbishop Makarios III, head of the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church, had attempted to use his influence on the Greek Cypriot population to pressure the British government for independence; in 1950 he held a plebiscite in which 96% of Greek Cypriots supposedly demanded enosis.\textsuperscript{5} Subsequent efforts to involve Greece and the United Nations in creating a path towards unification with Greece failed (largely due to Britain insistence on its maintenance of sovereignty over the island). Makarios and the retired Cypriot-born Greek Colonel (later General) George Grivas then began to use the church and a violent rebellion (in coordination with each other) to pressure the United Kingdom into turning the island over to the Greeks,\textsuperscript{6} and to gain the attention of the United Nations and the world community at the same time. The minority-Turkish Cypriots, however, were unnerved by the prospect of enosis and rallied the Turkish government to their own cause, which was embodied by a desire for either the status quo, or a cantonal partition.\textsuperscript{7} When the issue was finally brought up in the United Nations and in subsequent multilateral negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the UK, it was ultimately decided by the “guarantor powers” that neither enosis, nor a return to Turkish rule, was

\textsuperscript{4} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{The Mediterranean Feud}, 94
\textsuperscript{5} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{The Mediterranean Feud}, 94
\textsuperscript{6} Alan James, \textit{Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-1964}. New York: Palgrave, 2002: 9
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 12-13
acceptable. Turkey refused to allow Greek control of the island; their refusal is often attributed to the security threat that a potentially large Greek bastion off their southern coast would pose, as well as their concern for their brethren on the island.

The United Kingdom granted the island independence instead, which was grudgingly accepted by many Cypriots in both communities.\textsuperscript{8} However, in the course of the campaign for freedom from the United Kingdom, both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had become highly wary of each other due to occasional “collateral” violence in the course of the Greek Cypriot campaign against the British, and the British habit of preferring to employ Turkish Cypriots over the Greek Cypriots in civil servant positions (which included the police force).

After the establishment of independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots struggled to coexist. The independence itself was guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece, with assurances that one or more of them would interfere in the island’s politics if it became clear that the situation there had become unacceptably hostile to either community, or if either community attempted unification with their “motherland”\textsuperscript{9}; this created looming pressure on the government from the beginning. In protection of this guarantee, a few hundred Turkish and Greek troops were mandated to be stationed on the island, and those numbers ballooned


\textsuperscript{9} Christopher Hitchens, \textit{Cyprus}. Kent: Quartet Books Limited, 1984: 49
unsurprisingly beyond the set levels at a rapid pace.\textsuperscript{10} The Greek and Turkish Cypriots attempted to make a unitary government function; the constitution was instituted with the cooperation of the three guarantor powers and its creators were cognizant of the fact that tensions were high between the two communities on the island, as radical Greek Cypriot elements continued to demand enosis, and small, militant Turkish Cypriot groups prepared for conflict. The constitution provided for shared government, with generous proportions of government positions granted to the Turkish Cypriots given their numbers (in an effort to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from being steamrolled in administrative decisions by the majority – roughly 80\% of the population was Greek Cypriot at the time), and shared veto power over the approval of legislation.\textsuperscript{11}

However, the majority Greek Cypriots took full control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, when the minority Turkish Cypriots pulled out of the government and retreated into enclave communities scattered around the island following a protracted series of intercommunal attacks and counterattacks that year. The fighting was seemingly prompted by the Archbishop’s (now the first Cypriot president) attempts to reorganize the constitution and the political discord that the attempts created. Due to the quotas on employees from each community, many positions dedicated to Turkish Cypriots were going unfilled and government functions had come to a standstill. Turkey, in its role as a guarantor

\textsuperscript{10} Christopher Hitchens, \textit{Cyprus}. Kent: Quartet Books Limited, 1984: 65

\textsuperscript{11} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{The Mediterranean Feud}, 96
power, rejected the reorganization attempts even before the Cypriot Vice President (by law a Turkish Cypriot) Fazil Kuchuk had a chance to veto them.\textsuperscript{12}

Stronger and more violent underlying differences were ever-present. Sporadic intercommunal violence persisted for a time even after UN peacekeepers were installed on the island in 1964; the UN as an organization was attempting to bring the two communities together under some form of cooperative government, yet often were only able to keep opposing groups of Cypriots apart and in separate neighborhoods in the cities using peacekeeping troops; even this proved a challenge, however\textsuperscript{13} The Turkish government even launched a series of aerial bombings when peacekeepers could not prevent an attack on a particular Turkish Cypriot enclave; they were then told in stark terms by the American President Lyndon Johnson not to do more to inflame the situation.\textsuperscript{14} In late-1967, following the formation of a military government in mainland Greece, the (mainland) Greek-supported, trained and staffed Cypriot National Guard launched a series of raids on Turkish Cypriot neighborhoods and enclaves, apparently without the will of the core leadership of the Greek Cypriot government. The negative reaction among both the Greek Cypriot leadership and the world community lead to the expulsion of the Greek contingent of troops (as well as a near invasion by Turkey).\textsuperscript{15} By 1967, this contingent had reached at


\textsuperscript{13} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{The Mediterranean Feud}, 97

\textsuperscript{14} Parker T. Hart, 10

least 10,000; many were to covertly return. Obviously, this did nothing to increase the confidence of the Turkish Cypriots.

The period following the 1967 crisis was one of relative calm, and of talks which “focused on a search for a system of local government which would give Turkish-Cypriots a degree of autonomy without endangering the unity of the state.” While the violence began to subside following the expulsion of Greek troops and the initiation of the bi-communal talks in 1968, those talks had yet to achieve a resolution when the partition was enacted six years later. As the talks were ongoing, there was quiet surge in operational strength among the Greek Cypriot extremists under the name EOKA-B, who, organized by General Grivas (who had become disenchanted with Makarios after believing that enosis was no longer the goal in the mind of the president) and supported by the mainland government of Greece, turned their attention to the Greek Cypriot government of President Makarios. There were numerous assassination attempts on the president during this time (all of which the president “miraculously” escaped from – even a helicopter crash – thereby cementing his nearly cult of personality status among many Greek Cypriots).17

However, by 1974 high-ranking members of the Greek junta (including Colonel Ioannidis, the purported day-to-day leader) began to plan for an outright coup. According to Laurence Stern, significant sums of money had been coming from Athens to support EOKA-B’s plans – which were dedicated primarily to the


17 Andrew Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 73
toppling of President Makarios (in the name of enosis). While General Grivas died shortly before the plan was executed, the Greek junta was able to keep his extremist group together and put a man named Nikos Sampson, notorious for his open hatred (and past murders) of the Turkish Cypriots, in place as its nominal leader. On July 15th, 1974, a small number of tanks and armored vehicles rolled from National Guard barracks to the Presidential Palace in the capital of Nicosia, as well as to the town halls of the other major cities in Cyprus. In Nicosia, martial law was declared, as was the death of Makarios (in fact, Makarios walked out the back door of the Presidential Palace, across a street, and into a taxi, which eventually brought him to the British bases for safe escort off of the island). Sampson was then put in place as the new President of Cyprus. He would remain in this position for a total of eight days; the coup and his installation as president precipitated the crisis just prior to the partition of the island.

**Examining the Dependent Variable**

Kaufmann's definition of partition, as previously stated, is: a "(separation) jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side) or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party." In this case, it was the latter which occurred. In order for Cyprus to constitute a partition by Kaufmann's

---

18 Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy* 19 (Summer, 1975): 42

19 Andrew Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*, 79

20 Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," 125
definition, one must consider Turkey to be a separate entity from the Turkish Cypriot community on Cyprus, given that it was Turkey which acted to separate the two communities on the island (keeping in mind that the "why" is still the outstanding question). Even given the sensitivity of applying labels to the communities on the island and their respective cultural homelands, it is generally held in the literature that this was the case prior to 1974, despite outstanding arguments concerning the ethnicity of the Turkish Cypriot community. These arguments are considered in greater detail in coming chapters.

Based on Kaufmann's definition and the history of Cyprus, the dependent variable in this particular case, "partition of Cyprus", is a fairly straightforward historical event in itself (indeed, it is the reasons for its occurrence that are being framed by the security dilemma argument). On July 20th, 1974, five days after the coup against the Makarios government, the Turkish military launched an invasion by air and sea from the southern coast of Turkey to the northern coast of Cyprus and established positions on the northern coast. Initially linking two major Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the military paused when the junta-supported regime fell (along with the junta itself, which faced major domestic and international backlash following the removal of Makarios). Fiona Adamson describes how Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit "appeared to believe that (the resulting change in government in Athens following the unsuccessful coup) would lead to a resolution of the Cyprus conflict,"21 and the leader of the Cypriot House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, became interim President and

began negotiations with the Turkish government to reach an acceptable conclusion. The negotiations reached an impasse over the creation of separate zones for the communities, however, and the Turkish military proceeded to take over the northern 37% of the island by the end of the following month. Nearly all of the Greek Cypriots north of the line set up by UN troops after the end of the Turkish advance were expelled to the south during this time. Turkish Cypriots both fled, and were pressured by the Turkish military to flee, north, to the point where very few of one community were left in the areas controlled by the opposite community. This resulted in the complete, de facto division of the territory in which the two communities once coexisted politically (at peace and in struggle). The division of the island has not been recognized in international law or by any individual nation except for Turkey and, for a time, Pakistan. This division was imposed on both communities by a stronger third-party, and therefore, for the purposes of this paper, this fulfills the requirement of linking the dependent variable of Kaufmann to the case of Cyprus. There have been various proposed explanations for why the partition occurred: there are numerous authors which have proposed theories that suggest there was an international imperative to solve the situation as it threatened to involve two NATO allies in a direct conflict.\textsuperscript{22} Others have pointed to the domestic policy of

\textsuperscript{22} See, for example: Parker T. Hart, \textit{Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War}. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990
Turkey regarding the post-coup situation.\textsuperscript{23} Kaufmann's theory focuses our study on the domestic situation within Cyprus itself.

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example: Fiona B. Adamson, "Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis," \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 116:2 (Summer 2001)
CHAPTER III

THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN CYPRUS

The relevant aspects of Kaufmann's theory must be identified in the case of Cyprus by examining the three components described in Chapter 1.\textsuperscript{1} Kaufmann's characteristics which allow for the presentation of the security dilemma logic in a domestic setting are each evaluated independently, and then a consideration of the three together is given, followed by an analysis of any apparent security dilemma.

**Ethnic Identities**

With regard to the first component, as to whether there were distinct ethnic identities in the two communities in question, the answer is mostly straightforward. While the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had co-existed on the island for centuries, they continued to retain their ethnic identities, and these existed in 1974. The Greek Cypriots spoke Greek, were Greek Orthodox Christians, and had developed strong Hellenistic feelings and traditions. The Turkish Cypriots spoke Turkish, were Sunni Muslims, and looked to Turkey as their cultural homeland.

Historically the Greek Cypriots were allowed to retain independent religious leadership while under Ottoman and British rule; this leadership was “a

\textsuperscript{1} For a breakdown of these components as they relate to the Cyprus case, please see the section in the appendix entitled, “Security Dilemma Tables”
source of continuity and security during occupation"² and allowed the Cypriots to keep their Greek identity. The Turkish Cypriots lived by the Ottoman set of rules, the Greek Cypriots by their own. However the Ottomans also used “confiscatory” colonial tactics to take advantage of the Greek Cypriots, contributing to later Greek nationalism,³ and placing the Greek Cypriots in a lower “class” than the Turkish Cypriots. According to Joseph, as quoted in Lindley, although there were, “four centuries of coexistence and considerable physical intermingling, the two communities remained separate and distinct ethnic groups.”⁴ During the British period, the Greek Cypriots began rallying for enosis, resulting in the Turkish Cypriot response of taksim, or the partition of the island into two territories, to be absorbed by their respective “motherlands”. At this point, according to Wolfe, “the conflict had begun,”⁵ and very little (though with some significant exceptions) cultural convergence of the two communities occurred leading up to the events of 1974.

One potential flaw in this component being applied to the Cyprus problem is the argument that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots might not have held on to the “Cypriot” party of their identity at all, but rather considered themselves Greek and Turkish nationals, and oriented themselves in this way. There is some supporting evidence to this assertion, especially given the segregation between

² Dan Lindley, 228
³ Dan Lindley, 228
⁴ Ibid.
the two communities in the 1960's. Even after the establishment of an independent Cyprus, each community had been “encouraged to establish and maintain separate ‘special relationships’ with their motherlands,” especially with regards to “educational, cultural, religious, sporting and ethnic related matters.”\textsuperscript{6} Schools received Greek or Turkish textbooks, and the longstanding historical conflict between the two civilizations was routinely emphasized.

It is clear that the leaders of the Greek Cypriot government did not act in a way that promoted a Greek national identity, however. While President Makarios had at times referred to the notion that all Cypriots were Greek, he convincingly shifted his priorities over the 1960s by moving away from enosis and instead towards establishing a strong Cypriot government. As Schaeffer argues, Makarios “did not want to subordinate his movement to Greek authority or antagonize Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority.”\textsuperscript{7} This was especially true following the takeover of the Greek government by a (by most accounts) fanatical junta in 1967. There is evidence that most Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, had begun to value their independence along the same lines as Makarios, at least more so than with the radical elements of Cypriot society.\textsuperscript{8} Continued reverence for the pro-enosis zealots on the part of a small minority existed as an influence on the island is a consideration that should not be taken lightly, however.


\textsuperscript{7} Robert K. Schaeffer, 240

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 242
The general argument concerning a lack of the "Cypriot" part of identity altogether deserves greater exploration than this current study can provide for, as information concerning that identity has been, in the opinion of the author, often very partial and generally unreliable. It is generally held in the literature, however, that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were independent communities, and while culturally linked to their respective mainlands, they were for the time being independent political communities as well. For the purposes of this study it is suggested that the Cyprus situation satisfies the first Component, as it is clear that there were distinctions between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identity.

**Hardened Identities**

With regard to the second component, there are a variety of ways in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities had hardened by the summer of the partition, and the most clearly observable are the instances of ethnically-based violence that had occurred leading up to the point at which the island was partitioned, and the effect on each community in the aftermath of those instances. There was sporadic intercommunal fighting in the British period, followed by widespread fighting at the collapse of the constitution in 1963, and reckless (Greek-supported and controlled) Cypriot National Guard action in 1967-68 that sparked another round of fighting. Following the conflict in 1963, a United Nations Peace-Keeper (UNFICYP) was sent to enforce a separation of two neighborhoods in the capital and to prevent the outbreak of fighting between the two communities around the island; additionally, the Turkish military
threatened to invade in 1967 on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots; both instances contributed to a hardening of identity because of partial physical and total psychological separation based on ethnicity and a threat to one ethnicity by a force related to the other.⁹

Chaim Kaufmann, in his own evaluation of the partition of Cyprus, observes modes occurring over the few decades preceding the partition by which the two communities had hardened their identities. These well-documented examples include: a) the previously mentioned separate educational systems from the times of British rule through the time of independence, where each "represented its own people as consistently heroic and the other as consistently barbaric;"¹⁰ and b) the persistent existence of a pro-enosis Greek Cypriot militia after the independence of the country in 1960, which the Greek Cypriot government itself was having trouble controlling. Known as EOKA-B (the second version of EOKA, the Greek Cypriot rebel group during the 1950’s), it would be partially responsible for the coup that took place just before partition.¹¹

In addition to Kaufmann’s observations, there are numerous other characteristic examples that can be pointed to. Souter cites the constitution of the independent Cyprus, which, in granting “exceptional minority rights” to the Turkish Cypriots, had “frustrated” the Greek Cypriots still pining for enosis, and

---

⁹ David Souter, 662-663


¹¹ Chaim D. Kaufmann, “An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus,” 211-212
precipitated some of the violence that has been described already. Laurence Stern begins his piece on Cyprus with a detailed description of the funeral of General George Grivas, the leader of EOKA and EOKA-B, and describes how “some 100,000 Greek Cypriots in all” came in person to honor a man known for his “fanatical…pursuit of the age-old Hellenic dream of enosis” and harsh attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots – and this just months before the partition. All of these points taken together suggest that there was considerable polarization between the two communities at various times during the period being considered.

**Mobilization**

With regard to the third component, or the mobilization of each side, the answer is not as immediately clear that the situation on Cyprus meets the abstract definition, and for a number of good reasons. For the sake of argument and in the interest of testing the basic, underlying hypothesis, this author will suggest that this component is fulfilled as well; however, serious reservations exist and will be expressed here. The main question lies in the following: who was mobilized, and more importantly, what were they mobilized for? Mobilization in this case is strictly related to traditional military/strategic capability; Kaufmann does not treat mobilization as being consistent of anything other than the traditional notion of an ability and willingness to fight, unlike some authors that suggest mobilization can take the form of actively appealing to and strengthening

---

12 David Souter, 661

13 Laurence Stern, 34
identity. For Kaufmann the significance of identity, while clearly present based on the previous two components, is distinct from traditional mobilization.

Based on earlier fighting, which was often fierce, there is a general assumption that there was a willingness on both sides to fight if necessary. Additionally, by the mid-1970's the Turkish Cypriots still mostly confined themselves to defensible enclaves or exclusive neighborhoods for the perceived need for protection and self-governance, which presented what was arguably strategic threats to the Greek Cypriots; the interspersed nature of the Turkish Cypriot communities within the overwhelming majority of the land inhabited by the Greek Cypriots recalls Posen's arguments about interspersed populations and violence. Additionally according to Kaufmann, while "in theory the enclaves were under tight blockade... in practice weapons and... fighters were smuggled into many of them."¹⁴ The Greek Cypriots, in control of the internationally recognized government, with the ability to buy weapons from foreign governments for its Cypriot National Guard (composed of as many Greek national officers as it was of Cypriot officers) had an established force to use against the Turkish Cypriots. The presence of a Greek-supported, pro-enosis extremist force on the island also constitutes the mobilization of some of the Greek Cypriots.

However, even at first glance the assumption of mobilized Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces with the specific (immediate) intent to harm each other after 1968 is suspect. Between 1968 and 1974, there was a period of "relative

---

¹⁴ Chaim D. Kaufmann, "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus," 213
calm”\textsuperscript{15} in which the two sides “conducted direct negotiations,”\textsuperscript{16} which were, according to Souter, “frequently constructive.”\textsuperscript{17} During this time there were very few deaths, “perhaps several tens”\textsuperscript{18} at the most, according to Kaufmann (it should be noted that this estimate is the highest found by this author), related to the intercommunal conflict directly. Glafkos Clerides, the chief Greek Cypriot negotiator, and future Greek Cypriot president during the post-coup period of stabilization, reportedly believed that “the talks might have been proven productive if external powers had not intervened.”\textsuperscript{19} This may seem to suggest that mobilization, clearly evident in late-1967 at which time there had been skirmishes silenced only by firm Turkish threats of invasion, had decreased.

Additionally, what might further dampen the analysis that the Greek Cypriots were mobilized to the point of a willingness to act was Greek Cypriot strategic concern that exceeded the bounds of the domestic situation. Even Grivas, as fanatical as he is said to have been, knew that if the Greek Cypriots (or Greeks in general) were to push too far, the Turkish Cypriots might be aided by the Turkish government. Whether this was because of Turkish concern for the Turkish Cypriots, or simply Turkey’s desire for Cyprus not to become a strategic threat is beside the point. The Greek Cypriot irregulars, led by the

\textsuperscript{15} Dan Lindley, 231

\textsuperscript{16} Chaim Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” 151

\textsuperscript{17} David Souter, 663. For a detailed, though somewhat partisan, account of the negotiations, see Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Chapter 3 (63-71)

\textsuperscript{18} Chaim D. Kaufmann, “An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus,” 216

\textsuperscript{19} James H. Wolfe, 78
hundreds of Greek officers and thousands of Greek troops that had been smuggled to the island after 1963, had learned this the hard way in 1967 after attacking the town of Kophinou, which led to a near-Turkish invasion, Turkish airstrikes and the expulsion of Grivas and most of the mainland Greek troops from the island.20

This is in no way to suggest that intercommunal animosity had simply disappeared once the Greek and Greek Cypriot extremists lost their foothold in 1967-68. There were clearly elements of Greek Cypriot society which continued to despise the presence of the Turkish Cypriots and would have attempted to reduce that presence if at all possible. However, a combination of a shift in strategic focus and the linking of mainland Turkish interests with the situation on the island made the realization of the more genocidal intentions of extremist Greek Cypriots impossible. The Greek Cypriot irregulars' consideration of ends (making Cyprus a "Greek" island) versus means (their military might) is a domestic determination of relative strength, yet directed not towards the primary domestic opponent, but an external element.

Despite its close ethnic and cultural ties to the Turkish Cypriot community, the Turkish government until 1974 was distinct from any government on Cyprus. As suggested by Borowiec and others, Turkey has been since the 1950's more concerned with preventing Greece from obtaining Cyprus as a potential forward base a mere 40-odd miles off its southern coast; the fact that protecting the Turkish Cypriots was popular in Turkey made their interest in the island more

20 David Souter, 663
It remains unclear what their role in the island's governance has been since then, but this is also beside the point.

The Greek Cypriot irregulars by the late-1960's were certainly armed and dangerous, but following 1967-68, primarily used their resources and influence against the interests of President Makarios, who by this time was seen by the rightist groups as the primary impediment to their ultimate goal, enosis. This perspective and the rightists' continued motivation following what can only be described as a major defeat at Kophinou, also was likely a product of another external element. The Greek government fell to its military leaders in 1967, and the junta established in its place was stridently anti-communist, anti-Turk, and anti-Makarios. According to Loizos, "the Greek dictators had no love for President Makarios since he was democratically elected and popular, and seemed tolerant towards communists."23

The 1960 agreement that had allowed the Cypriots their independence from Great Britain had also established a small presence of troops from Greece and Turkey; the officers from Greece were primarily responsible for training the Cypriot National Guard. Loizos describes how "these officers did their best to indoctrinate the young Cypriots with the junta's ideas, and kept a list of any conservatives who were particularly hostile to the Makarios government."24 By the early 1970's, these officers had "started clandestinely to distribute weapons,

21 Andrew Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 113-114
22 Robert K. Schaeffer, 242
24 Ibid.
uniforms, and remuneration to those they enrolled in a new underground
movement formed in 1972, which became known as EOKA B.²⁵ The purpose of
this organization and its activities was to undermine Makarios, weed out the
‘false’ Greeks²⁶, and enact the union of Cyprus with Greece as soon as possible.

The presence of the Greek irregulars and their influence after 1968 must
be put into some context. First, in the 1968 Cypriot presidential election, the
opposition leader Takis Evdokas, someone who openly advocated for enosis,
received 2% of the vote; Makarios won the other 98%.²⁷ Makarios was
supported by both leftist parties on Cyprus, including the Communist party AKEL;
moderates also supported him precisely because of his opponent’s continued
active support for enosis. Second, following the failure of EOKA B to secure its
goals in 1974, numerous Cypriot individuals were accused and/or convicted of
subversion by the Cypriot government, due to their participation in EOKA B. The
total number of both accused and convicted members was 827.²⁸ By
comparison, mainland Greek troops on the island, when at their legal (and
lowest) levels, numbered 950.²⁹ These figures are intended to provide some
idea of the relative influence that enosis-driven Cypriot forces on the island had
in relation to their numbers (Tishkov’s lessons about numbers in conflict aside).

²⁶ Ibid.
²⁷ Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977: 82
²⁸ Kyriacos C. Markides, 116
²⁹ Peter Loizos, 56
How many members of a given ethnicity does it take for action to constitute an entire ethnic group’s intent in an ethnic conflict? Especially when those taking the action were “in power” for less than a week? These are questions for a broader study of the subject.

Markides summarizes the development of EOKA B and its activities in the context of the ethnic struggle by saying that, during the period between 1967 and the partition, the “Turkish Cypriots remained spectators to the intra-Greek Cypriot rivalry.”30 This is significant when considering this component as necessary for testing the variables in this case overall. He goes on to list several occasions on which there was actually Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cooperation, including a celebration of football (one of the most treasured past times on the island), Archbishop Makarios tour of and promise of aid to a tornado-devastated Turkish Cypriot enclave, a polite meeting between Makarios and the former Cypriot Vice President Fazil Kucuk, and even the willingness of Turkish Cypriot hardliner Rauf Denktash to attend a meeting of the Greek Cypriot-dominated Cyprus Sociological Association without bodyguards.31 These might appear to some to be small gestures, yet the reader should recall that Cyprus is a small place; leadership is often embodied by just a few individuals.

Even still, in the context of EOKA B’s insurgency, intercommunal relations were unlikely to have significantly improved following the generally poor conditions of relations post-1968. Poor relations and actively hostile ones are

---

30 Kyriacos C. Markides, 153
31 Kyriacos C. Markides, 151-153
two separate things, however. Some authors, including Necatigil, make arguments claiming there was a sufficient level of mobilization among the Greek Cypriots in the month-long period between the initial Turkish invasion of the island and the actual partition which would have been sufficient cause for the partition; these arguments say, in effect, that the Greek Cypriots became mobilized to the point of carrying out murders in Turkish Cypriot communities during the chaotic period following both invasions, in reaction to the loss of any central leadership.\textsuperscript{32} While Necatigil points to a handful of newspaper articles, most of the support for his argument comes from a pair of Turkish sources, one written by the Turkish Cypriot hardline leader Rauf Denktash. Paul Sant Cassia, who researched Cypriot deaths on the island during this period reports that "with a few notorious exceptions that affected the Turkish Cypriots, most losses and disappearances were Greek Cypriots."\textsuperscript{33} He also blames most of the deaths on the extremist, Greek-supported Greek Cypriots and the remainder on the invading Turkish army, and not the Turkish Cypriots. This is all besides the point when looking at the argument that an \textit{intrastate security dilemma} caused the partition as well; once the Turkish invasion occurred, the dynamic clearly changed.

All of this taken together undermines to some degree the notion, often casually expressed in literature in which Cyprus is referred to, that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were at each others' throats leading up to the

\textsuperscript{32} Zaim M. Necatigil, 84-85, see also Pierre Oberling. \textit{The Road to Bellapais}. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

\textsuperscript{33} Paul Sant Cassia, \textit{Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus}. Berghahn Books, 2005: 38.
Turkish invasion. The period between invasion and partition shows more of a potential for having clear mobilization of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, but it is not clear that the Turkish Cypriots were at all mobilized relative to other forces on the island; the evidence for widespread popular mobilization of Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots, beyond the rhetoric, is fairly thin prior to the Turkish invasion. Finally, there is the notion that the initial Turkish invasion changed the dynamic of the security dilemma to the point where an intrastate security dilemma could not account for the losses on both sides, because it no longer existed. Therefore, this could lead one to wonder if the situation on Cyprus matches the criteria for Kaufmann's independent variable.

**Presence of a Security Dilemma**

In terms of a security dilemma, there is no clear demonstration of the traditional notion of increases in security on both sides that is directly related to the domestic increase in security on the other side, at least not purely so. This is because the Greek Cypriot increases in security, while conceivably resulting in Turkish Cypriot increases, were the result of Greek-on-Greek conflict or concerns over a possible Turkish invasion. Remember, Kaufmann treats the identity components and the mobilization components separately. While there is clear evidence that identities were hardened and the opportunities to bolster those identities were taken at every turn, it has not been demonstrated that identity-based mobilization was relevant with regards to Kaufmann's notions of mobilization generally.
We could stop here and say that the Cyprus case does not fully embody the intrastate security dilemma as described by Kaufmann; however, Kaufmann believes that Cyprus is indeed a qualifying case, and because the third component can be argued in either direction, we proceed to evaluate the overall argument on the assumption that there is a sufficient level of similarity between the independent variable generally and the Cyprus case. We remain cognizant, however, of the potential logical weaknesses in comparing the two, and will return to this argument in the conclusion of this paper.
CHAPTER IV

TESTING THE CASE OF CYPRUS

To evaluate the argument, we need to ask whether Kaufmann's independent variable leads to the dependent variable in this case. In other words, did the presence of an intrastate security dilemma characterized by hardened ethnic identities and mobilization on Cyprus lead to, or cause, the partition of the country. To begin, we look at the ways in which the independent variable might have caused the dependent variable, given what we know about both variables. Then this is weighed against the totality of information about the event itself, to determine if the independent variable is indeed necessary and sufficient to explain the dependent variable, only necessary, or neither.

The ways in which the security dilemma of Cyprus might have caused the partition of the country have, of course, been partially discussed above. The ingrained nature of ethnic identities based on nationalist education, a history of violence and distrust, the constant presence of (albeit small) ethnic militias, and the partial physical separation of the two communities after the 1963 withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves, contribute to the notion that the communities were “ready” for partition by Kaufmann’s; as Kaufmann describes in his theories concerning ethnic separation, once these ethnic identities have formed and there is a willingness to fight on the part of those in each community, then the only possible outcome is the complete physical separation of both
groups in partition, or the complete annihilation of one group by the other. In Cyprus, the former occurred before the latter could, or so the theory goes.

Yet, in addition to the previously mentioned concern about the situation in Cyprus constituting a security dilemma, a number of questions must immediately be raised about the theory's application to the Cyprus case. The first asks why the Cyprus conflict did not result in the complete destruction of one side or the other (as opposed to partition) if there are two possible outcomes of the type of ethnic division and mobilization described by Kaufmann in his theory. According to Kaufmann, "Cyprus may have been lucky not to have experienced more rounds of war than it did,"¹ and many of the reasons why genocide did not occur lay in the determination by each side that the other could threaten their own existence if they provoked a conflict. For the Greek Cypriots, however, the determination was based on fear not of the Turkish Cypriots, but of Turkey itself. Turkey was a mere 40 miles from the northern shore of Cyprus; the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were, according to Kaufmann, "militarily strong enough to be useful to invading Turkish forces,"² yet too weak to present any true threat to Greek Cypriot offensive capability on their own. The Greek Cypriot irregulars, led by General Grivas, had made the mistake of attacking an enclave in force in late-1967, as previously mentioned; Turkey was barely restrained from launching an all-out invasion at that point.

While Turkey's involvement technically lies outside of the realm of "domestic determinants", the strategic logic of the Greek Cypriots (irregulars or

¹ Chaim D. Kaufmann, "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus," 213
² Ibid., 214
otherwise) to not risk a full scale attack on the Turkish Cypriots was determined in the context of the domestic problem. If neither side was to destroy the other, then this brings us back to partition and our second question. Why, or perhaps more appropriately, how did partition occur as a result of the security dilemma given the logic concerning the relative strength of both sides? If there existed ethnic polarization, hardened ethnic identities, the potential willingness and capability to use force against the other community, yet the knowledge that the same existed on the other side, then why does partition occur as opposed to a stasis of the situation? A catalyst of some sort which prompted a change in the domestic situation must have conceivably been present; yet the clear catalyst of a Greek-sponsored coup in the July preceding the partition falls outside of the logic of the security dilemma and the realm of domestic determinants. It becomes clear that the theory, based as it is on domestic determinants and the dynamics of ethnic politics, is not sufficient to explain the dependent variable in this case, though it is also clear that it remains a potential component of the reason why partition occurred.

At the domestic determinants level, a significant preexisting condition to the partition was the degree to which EOKA B and its Greek co-conspirators had fragmented the authority of the Greek Cypriot government on Cyprus. There is a much more clearly identifiable, active security situation (if not a true security dilemma) between Greek Cypriot government forces and EOKA B forces than there was an ever-escalating, identity-based security dilemma between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots during this time period. Even with this
security situation, much of its outcome was determined by the actions of a foreign power, Greece. This fight in Cyprus was, after all, a fight between those wishing to unite the island with Greece, and those who had come to see the immediate perils of doing so. The strategic dilemma a purely Greek takeover of Cyprus might present to Turkey is easy to imagine, then and now. The relevance of this to Kaufmann's theory, however, is slight, as his security dilemma attempts to explain outcomes like partition during ethnic conflict. There is no way to construe the dispute between different factions of the Greek Cypriots in the 1970's as a security dilemma along the lines of the identity-based dilemma that Kaufmann describes, of course.

Again, none of this is to negate the intercommunal problems; they were real and continue to exist today. It would be unwise to question the major role that the intercommunal conflict had in the eventual partition of the island; the conflict certainly invited the international attention that the island would receive, for better or worse. The question is whether the security dilemma Kaufmann and others sees existed on the island in a way which led to the partition, and given what has been described, it seems unlikely that the security dilemma was either the primary factor or a sufficient condition. Therefore, while the intercommunal conflict might have "set the stage" for the partition, it was not sufficient to make the show go on. At the time of the partition, there were more palpable issues which may have led to the partition.

Throughout the course of researching the case, it has become obvious that there existed considerable internal and external pressures on the situation in
Cyprus. Some were invited by the governments involved, some not, but the
Cyprus problem was not limited to domestic, ethnic conflict alone. This does not
mean, on the other hand, that international level forces that were clearly present
on the island can be said to be both necessary and sufficient to have caused the
partition of Cyprus either; based upon the logic and case-specific details of
testing Kaufmann, it appears as though the best explanation for the partition of
Cyprus will likely take into account both domestic determinants and international
level forces, and such a combination is not accounted for by intrastate security
dilemma theory.

Over the course of the years leading up to the partition of the island the
heavy involvement by foreign powers in the affairs on the island often went
beyond the control of those elected leaders on the island, whether in the
Republic of Cyprus government (Greek Cypriots) or in the self-administered
areas under Turkish-Cypriot control. This involvement blurred the lines between
a domestic and international conflict and undermines the purity of domestic-level
explanations that try to approach the ethnic conflict and its clear role in the
eventual bisected condition of the island. However, there is abundant evidence
that foreign powers had a direct hand in promoting, prompting and enacting the
complete physical separation of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots,
contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of Cypriots. Indeed, while
partition had been floated as an idea among the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
leadership since the time of the British ownership of the island, there is no
evidence that this author has found that suggests that an arbitrary division of the
island into two, and the resulting massive population transfers, were preferred by either community. Foreign powers may have been allowed to have the influence that they did because of the domestic situation on Cyprus. However, the degree and nature of that influence throws into doubt the notion that an intrastate security dilemma or even any active security situation between rival factions (Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot conflict or Government/EOKA B conflict) can sufficiently account for the partition alone, or even to a sufficient degree.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARIZING THE ARGUMENT

In reviewing everything that has been said thus far, it is clear that much of the ethnic dynamic described by Kaufmann's theories was real; what is less clear is that the specific domestic political situation he points to as the root cause of partition following ethnic conflict, the intrastate security dilemma, can be attributed to the partition that would occur in the case in Cyprus. Cyprus was torn in two by many different things. There was the intercommunal fighting that came with its historical experience and reinitiated largely by the particular character of its independence; there was also intense fighting between the various factions of Greek Cypriots, each having a different vision of the future for the island mapped out in their collective minds. When one ethnic group, the Turkish Cypriots, felt compelled to retreat into defensible enclaves in reaction to early troubles, and in anticipation of trouble to come, there existed a persistent source of tension between it and the other ethnic group which believed the entire island to be their home. The fact that both groups had long lived in intermixed areas and continued to be spread across the island reinforced the distrust; the fact that each community proceeded to try and isolate themselves from contact with the other only goes to demonstrate how that distrust was deepened over time.

However, once the two communities had developed entrenched positions,
we see that even though there was a continued distrust of each other, there was a relative stasis for seven years in which extremist militias refocused their attentions on their own leaders, and intercommunal violence waned in the presence of a stable deterrent for both sides. This seven year period is crucial; while it cannot be said that the two communities functioned as a nation, the urgency of the intercommunal conflict had decreased to the point where there were signs of reconciliation – impossible according to Kaufmann. Additionally, the presence of militias targeting the leaders of their own community, while having a potentially negative effect on the security of the opposing identity, also undermined the identity of that community as well – this works against the logic of the security dilemma.

It wasn’t until a catalyzing event occurred that both communities were brought back into the fray, and by then the outcome was beyond the Cypriots’ control. As we’ve seen, this wasn’t a Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot catalyst, but rather a primarily Greek catalyst, then swiftly overtaken by the inevitable Turkish response. The catalyst wasn’t incidental, either. Since the birth of independent Cyprus, both Greece and Turkey had been charged with taking care of the island’s sovereignty. Greece supplied large numbers of troops to the island to protect its interests, and the Turkish threatened to invade whenever the Greek Cypriots pushed too far. This all suggests that external forces had continued to affect Cypriot politics during its independence, that this would necessarily interrupt the logic of an intrastate security dilemma and its effect on
the island’s status, and that the island’s citizens were never truly left to their own
devices.

In light of the effect of these external forces on the logic of the security
dilemma and the proposed link between the dilemma and partition, it is
concluded here that the general theory concerning an intrastate security dilemma
cannot sufficiently explain partition in the Cyprus case. The ideas that Kaufmann
present are instructive in pulling out the nature of the domestic situation in
Cyprus leading up to the partition, and it is argued that they also, in part, offer a
necessary condition for the partitions occurrence. The partition is unlikely to
have been effected as it was if both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots identified
themselves as simply Cypriots, and aligned politically across communal lines.
The experience of the United Kingdom in Cyprus in the 1950’s demonstrates how
even people from a dry little island in the Mediterranean can frustrate greater
powers. Yet, based on the available theories and the reviewed evidence, it must
be a combination of both the internal security situation and the external forces
that are needed to properly explain why Cyprus was partitioned.

The choice to test Chaim Kaufmann’s theories on ethnic separation and
partition at the domestic determinants level was made because these theories
have been used in the past to justify future partition. A full understanding of past
partitions, therefore, is important. The Cyprus case study was chosen in an
attempt to demonstrate that past partitions, and even only those coming out of
ethnic conflicts, do not necessarily all fit the same mold. While on the island of
Cyprus there were continuously heightened suspicions, sporadic skirmishes and
occasional island-wide confrontations between two distinct ethnic groups, a variety of other influences on that situation led to the partition. The ethnic conflict may have contributed to that partition, but is not alone sufficient to explain it.

Looking beyond the case of Cyprus and to the subjects of both partition and the security dilemma generally, there are a number of applicable lessons that this study can begin to contribute. What does this study mean practically for partition theory? It is simply a statement that suggests the notion that an intrastate security dilemma leads to partition in cases of ethnic conflict cannot be universally held to be true for past partitions that followed ethnic conflict. Because past cases of partition, including the case of Cyprus, are used to recommend the future use of partition, the study is also a tacit recommendation that perhaps greater, more accurate classification of past partitions would be appropriate. Kaufmann's definition of partition is loose enough to encompass many historical geopolitical divisions, the Cyprus case included. This study is not able to shed additional light on the definitional problems of partition because of the strict adherence to the definition offered by Kaufmann; however, a historical look at a specific instance of geopolitical division can hopefully contribute to the mass of knowledge that is used to resolve epistemological issues. Kaufmann's particular definition of partition described a historical situation like Cyprus accurately, yet his own explanation for that phenomenon could not account for a case which met his definition of partition.

With regard to the intrastate security dilemma, this study raises questions concerning how to accommodate the "blurring of the lines" between domestic
and international influences on intrastate situations when there is discussion of the security dilemma using its original logic. The differences between the security dilemma logic in its traditional form and the security dilemma that is based on identity as a component of security could not be fully addressed in this study because of the way in which Kaufmann’s argument was structured. While identity is, in theory, a significant component of the intrastate security dilemma, to what degree can it be accountable for geopolitical changes like partition in practice? This study could not reveal more insight into this issue, as the case of Cyprus, in this author’s opinion, does not reveal identity, or a security dilemma based on “identity as security,” to be a sufficient cause for the partition of Cyprus.

Going forward, it may be useful to take a look at additional cases using the same framework and to see if the same issues appear. Was the same dynamic present in the case of the partition of India, for example, or in the breakup of Yugoslavia? The domestic use of the security dilemma was alluded to by Mearsheimer in the case of the latter at the time of its collapse, yet a structured look at the breakup of Yugoslavia from the perspective of Kaufmann’s theory would present a useful counterpart to the analysis concerning Cyprus that was presented here.

For the Cyprus case itself, this study is an attempt to clarify the often casually expressed relationship between the conflict among the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and the partition of 1974. It is not a denial that such a conflict existed – and indeed was a fierce one that continues to this day. However, it is an affirmation that the ethnic conflict and the partition can be seen
as distinct components of the history of Cyprus, each characterized by different political dynamics which have yet to be fully understood. I conclude that a thorough review of the history of Cyprus cannot demonstrate the security dilemma to be the reason behind the partition.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX

SECURITY DILEMMA TABLES

Table 1. Three Characteristic Components of the Security Dilemma
(according to Kaufmann)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Component 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinct Ethnic Identities</td>
<td>Of the two or more groups in a given territory with distinct identities, at least two must hold consistently to norms of culture and religion, and these must be seen in contrast to other identities by the group</td>
<td>At least two of the groups which hold on to identities which are hardened must be actively mobilized in the preparation for conflict between members of their group and another of a differing identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for at least two groups in a given territory to claim cultural and religious identity distinct from one another</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Three Components of the Security Dilemma as Represented in Case of Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Component 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinct Ethnic Identities</td>
<td>Hardened Identities</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two distinct ethnic identities, one that considered itself culturally Greek and adhering to the Greek Orthodox religion, the other culturally Turkish and adhering to the Sunni Islam religion</td>
<td>Patterns of education and separation of the two communities during times of colonization lead to an understanding in each community of the other as suspicious and potentially harmful</td>
<td>While there was militia activity in both communities, no evidence of widespread mobilization with the intent to destroy the other community leading up to the 1974 crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component Fulfilled: YES</td>
<td>Component Fulfilled: YES</td>
<td>Component Fulfilled: UNCLEAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>